Die netwerk samelewing

In die inligting-era word dominante funksies en prosesse al meer georganiseer in verskillende netwerke en so ontstaan ’n globale netwerk van interaksie tussen verskillende netwerke. Die inligting- en globale ekonomie word gevolglik ook ’n netwerk-ekonomie waarin produktiwiteit gegenereer word deur ’n globale netwerk van interaksie tussen verskillende netwerke van besighede en finansiële instellings. Castells (2000a:502) verklaar: “Business firms and, increasingly, organizations and institutions are organized in networks of variable geometry whose intertwining supersedes the traditional distinction between corporations and small business, cutting across sectors, and spreading along different geographical clusters of economic units.” Hierdie nuwe ekonomie is egter nie die internet ekonomie nie. Castells beklemtoon dat dit nie die ekonomie van die internet-besighede is nie. “It is the economy of all kinds of businesses and all kinds of activities whose organisational form and source of value and competition are increasingly based on information technologies, of which the Internet is the epitome and the organising form” (:2). Wat hierdie ekonomie nuut en uniek maak, is dat vir die eerste keer in die geskiedenis die basiese eenheid vir die organisering van die ekonomie nie ’n subjek, hetsy ’n individu (byvoorbeeld ’n entrepreneur) of ’n kollektiwiteit (byvoorbeeld ’n korporasie of die staat), is nie. “[T]he unit is the network, made up of a variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as networks adapt to supportive environments and market structures” (Castells 2000a:214).

Die netwerk-logika dring egter nie net die ekonomie binne nie, maar elke deel van die sosiale sisteem soos die politiek, die media-wêreld en selfs die wêreld van misdaad. Castells (2000a:500) sê tereg: “Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture.” Volgens

hom is ’n netwerk “a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of concrete networks of which we speak” (:501). Voorbeelde van sulke knooppunte in die globale netwerke is:

• die aandelemarkte en hulle aanvullende en hoogsgevorderde dienssentrums binne die netwerk van globale finansiële bewegings;

• die nasionale rade van ministers en Europese kommissarisse in die politieke netwerk wat die Europese Unie beheer;

• die papawer velde, klandestiene laboratoriums, geheime landingstroke, bendes en geldwassery-instellings in die netwerk van dwelmsmokkelary wat lande en samelewings dwarsdeur die wêreld binnedring; en

• die televisie- en uitsaaisentrums, vermaaklikheidsateljees, nuusspanne en mobiele toestelle wat seine genereer, ontvang en versprei in die netwerk van die nuwe media.

Hierdie netwerke is oop strukture en in staat om nuwe knooppunte wat dieselfde kommunikasie kodes, byvoorbeeld waardes of doelwitte, deel, te integreer. Hulle kan dus bly uitbrei sonder enige beperkings. Volgens Castells (2000a:501-502) is ’n netwerkgebaseerde sosiale struktuur gevolglik ’n uiters dinamiese en oop sisteem, ontvanklik vir innovasie sonder dat dit die balans in die sisteem bedreig.

Die basis van hierdie nuwe ekonomie is steeds arbeid. Die transformasie na ’n netwerk samelewing kom egter die duidelikste na vore in die veranderinge wat plaasvind op die gebied van arbeid en indiensneming. Daar vind ’n verskuiwing na ’n meer buigsame arbeidsmag plaas. Mercer (2005:85) beskryf dit soos volg:

This restructuring made possible a greater responsiveness to the often fickle, rapidly changing demands of consumers. This happened by reducing the number of ‘core workers,’ those permanent workers with relative job stability and benefits. In their place corporations laced greater reliance on a workforce that can be easily and quickly laid off through the use of subcontracting, temporary employment, and the replacement of full time jobs with multiple part-time positions.

Alhoewel daar dikwels baie spanning is oor die moontlike toename aan werkloosheid in hierdie nuwe samelewing, toon Castells (2000a:267-281) duidelik aan dat tegnologie per se nie werkloosheid veroorsaak nie. Dit is so dat daar as gevolg van die transformasie werkgeleenthede is wat verlore gaan, maar nuwe werkgeleenthede word ook geskep. Wat eintlik besig is om ingrypend te verander is die aard van werk. “[T]he work process is increasingly individualized, labor is disaggregated in its performance, and reintegrated in its outcome through a multiplicity of interconnected tasks in different sites, ushering in a new division of labor based on the attributes/capacities of each worker rather than on the organization of the task” (:502). Om hierdie proses te beskryf gebruik Castells (2000b:70) die term “individualization of labor” wat hy omskryf as “the process by which labor contribution to production is defined specifically for each worker, and for each of his/her contributions, either under the form of self-employment or under individually contracted, largely unregulated, salaried labor.” Arbeid word baie buigsaam en vroeëre vaste sisteme en onderskeidings vervaag. Castells (2000a:506) sê in dié verband: “Who are the owners, who the

producers, who the managers, and who the servants becomes increasingly blurred in a production system of variable geometry, of teamwork, of networking, outsourcing and subcontracting.”

Dit het daartoe gelei dat ’n proses van globalisering van spesialiteitsarbeid besig is om plaas te vind, nie net ten opsigte van hoogs geskoolde arbeid nie, maar ook ten opsigte van arbeid wat oor die wêreld heen hoog in aanvraag raak (Castells 2000a:130). Alhoewel die meeste arbeid nie geglobaliseer word nie, kom Castells (:132) tot die volgende slotsom oor die invloed van die globalisering van spesialiteitsarbeid: “[T]hroughout the world, there is increasing migration, increasing multi-ethnicity in most developed societies, increasing international population displacement, and the emergence of a multilayered set of connections between millions of people across borders and across cultures.” Terselfdertyd is daar ’n toename in entrepreneurskap, fleksie-werkers en tydelike en deeltydse arbeid.

Een van die fundamentele karaktertrekke van die nuwe arbeidsmark is die massiewe toename aan vroue in betaalde werk buite die huis (Castells 2000a:269). “Globally, 854 million women were economically active in 1990, accounting for 32.1 percent of the global labor force. Among women aged 15 years and over, 41 percent were economically active” (Castells 2004:215). Hierteenoor het die persentasie mans wat ekonomies aktief is in die arbeidsmark afgeneem. Die massiewe toename aan vroue in die arbeidsmark is juis as gevolg van die verandering vanaf ’n industriële na ’n inligting samelewing. Globaal is ongeveer die helfte van die ekonomies aktiewe vroue betrokke in die dienste-sektor en in die ontwikkelde lande is hierdie persentasie baie hoër. Castells (:218) se gevolgtrekking is: “[T]here is a direct correspondence between the type of services linked to informationalization of the economy and the expansion of women’s employment in advanced countries.”

Op die vraag hoekom vroue in die arbeidsmark so geweldig toegeneem het, gee Castells (2004:225, 228) die volgende moontlike antwoorde:

(1) Vroue word minder betaal vir die doen van presies dieselfde werk as mans;

(2) vroue se beter verhoudingsvaardighede wat so noodsaaklik is in die inligting gedrewe ekonomie met sy klem op die bestuur van mense; en

(3) vroue se groter buigsaamheid as arbeiders soos blyk uit die feit dat vroue die meerderheid deeltydse en tydelike poste vul en dat ’n groeiende aantal van hulle entrepreneurs is wat hulle eie werk skep.

In die netwerk samelewing vind daar ’n herorganisasie van magsverhoudinge plaas. “Switches connecting the networks (for example, financial flows taking control of media empires that influence political processes) are the privileged instruments of power. Thus, the switchers are the power-holders. Since networks are multiple, the inter-operating codes and switches between networks become the fundamental sources in shaping, guiding, and misguiding societies” (Castells 2000a:502). Die gevolg is dat persone en gebiede wat waarde tot die netwerk kan toevoeg deur die maghebbers ingeskakel word, maar die persone en

gebiede wat geen waarde tot die netwerk kan toevoeg nie, word doodeenvoudig uitgeskakel tot ’n posisie van strukturele irrelevansie.

Dit is juis die diepe paradoks, selfs teenstrydigheid, wat globalisering kenmerk: dit verbind met mekaar en dit sluit uit, tegelykertyd (Schreiter 2002:17). Dit beteken dat, alhoewel hierdie nuwe geglobaliseerde netwerk ekonomie die lewens van alle mense raak, dit nie almal in die sisteem insluit en bevoordeel nie (Castells 2000a:161). Alhoewel alle indikatore daarop dui dat daar ’n geweldige groei in lewenstandaard in die wêreld in die algemeen was in die laaste ongeveer twintig jaar, was hierdie proses geweldig ongelyk (Castells 2001a:15).

The poorest 20 percent of the world’s people have seen their share of global income decline from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent in the past 30 years. Meanwhile the share of the richest 20 percent has risen from 70 percent to 85 percent. The ratio of the income of the 20 percent richest people in the world over the poorest 20 percent increased – from 30 : 1 in 1960 to 74 : 1 in 1997. In 1994 the assets of the world’s 358 billionaires (in US dollars) exceeded the combined annual income of countries with 45 percent of the world’s population. The concentration of wealth at the very top accelerated in the second half of the 1990s: the net worth of the world’s 200 richest people increased from US$440 billion or more than US$1 trillion between 1994 and 1998. Thus, in 1998, the assets of the three richest people in the world were more than the combined GNP of the 48 least developed countries, comprising 600 million people.

(Castells 2000b:78) Ekonomiese groei in die wêreld het dus nie vooruitgang en voorspoed in gelyke mate vir almal in die wêreld gebring nie en het eerder gelei tot al hoe meer polarisasie in die wêreld omdat ongelykhede, armoede en sosiale uitsluiting toegeneem het. In sommige kringe word hierdie ontwikkeling “globalization-from-above” genoem omdat dit veral ongelykhede tussen die geïndustrialiseerde, ryker Noordelike lande en die ontwikkelende Suidelike lande laat toeneem het en toenemende armoede in laasgenoemde lande tot gevolg het (vergelyk Ng 2002:200-201).

Insluiting en uitsluiting sny boonop dwarsdeur lande en kontinente en die grense van insluiting wissel van samelewing tot samelewing. “For example, Bangalore is highly integrated in this new economy. But if you look to most of rural India or to the shanty towns of Calcutta, certainly they are not part of the new economy and they are part of a different economy, basic survival economy” (Castells 2001a:11). Binne in baie lande van die wêreld het rykdom toegeneem, maar ook ongelykheid, en vind daar toenemende polarisasie tussen ryk en arm plaas. Selfs in die VSA het ongelykhede en polarisasie in die negentigerjare van die vorige eeu toegeneem. Dit kom veral na vore in die ghetto’s van die middestad. Castells (2000b:141) wys daarop “that the social, economic, and housing conditions in most inner-city ghettos have considerably worsened over the past three decades….”

Die gevolg van hierdie proses van insluiting en uitsluiting is dat ’n totaal nuwe sisteem ontstaan het. Hierdie nuwe sisteem vervang “the old notions of North and South, developed and developing or underdeveloped, with the notion of networks – global networks. These global networks articulate and disarticulate so that at the same time we have a world made of global networks and local societies which

certainly are relatively independent of these networks, but at the same time they all suffer or enjoy the consequences of these global networks. In other words, globalisation does not integrate everybody. In fact, it currently excludes most people on the planet but at the same time, affects everybody” (Castells 2001a:11).

As ’n verdere gevolg van die wydverspreide en multivormige proses van sosiale uitsluiting ontstaan daar gebiede wat Castells (2000b:165) die “black holes of informational capitalism” noem. Die veelvoud van uitgesluite “black holes” vorm saam ’n nuwe wêreld: Die Vierde Wêreld.

The Fourth World comprises large areas of the globe, such as much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished rural areas of Latin America and Asia. But it is also present in literally every country, and every city, in this new geography of social exclusion. It is formed of American inner-city ghettos, Spanish enclaves of mass youth unemployment, French banlieues warehousing North Africans, Japanese Yoseba quarters, and Asian mega-cities’ shanty towns. And it is populated by millions of homeless, incarcerated, prostituted, criminalized, brutalized, stigmatized, sick and illiterate persons. They are the majority in certain areas, the minority in others, and a tiny minority in a few privileged contexts. But, everywhere, they are growing in number, and increasing in visibility, as the selective triage of informational capitalism, and the political breakdown of the welfare state, intensify social exclusion. In the current historical context, the rise of the Fourth World is inseparable from the rise of informational global capitalism.”

(Castell 2000b:168) In hierdie nuwe inligting-era word die karakter van kommunikasie geheel en al getransformeer deur “the formation of a hypertext and a meta-language which, for the first time in history, integrate into the same system the written, oral, and audio-visual modalities of human communication” (Castells 2000a:356). Kommunikasie vorm egter kultuur en daarom is Castells (:357) se gevolgtrekking: “The emergence of a new electronic communication system characterized by its global reach, its integration of all communication media, and its potential interactivity is changing and will change forever our culture.” Hierdie nuwe kultuur word deur Castells (:358) getipeer as “the culture of real virtuality.”

Binne hierdie virtuele kultuur ontstaan daar ook ’n nuwe vorm van gemeenskap deurdat mense op grond van gedeelde waardes en belangstellings aan lyn bymekaar gebring word in virtuele gemeenskappe. Die geweldige groei in virtuele gemeenskappe soos deur middel van My Facebook illustreer baie duidelik mense se behoefte aan hierdie tipe van gemeenskap. Met verwysing na navorsing van Wellman wys Castells (2000a:387-388) daarop dat virtuele gemeenskappe nie teenoor fisiese gemeenskappe staan nie.

[T]hey are different forms of community, with specific rules and dynamics, which interact with other forms of community.…Wellman has shown in a stream of consistent findings over the years that what has emerged in advanced societies is what he calls ‘personal communities’: an individual’s social network of informal, interpersonal ties, ranging from a half-dozen intimates to hundreds of weaker ties….Both group communities and personal communities operate on-line as well as off-line. In this perspective, social networks substitute for communities, with locally based communities being one of the many possible alternatives for the creation and maintenance of social networks, and the Internet providing another such alternative.

Alhoewel baie virtuele gemeenskappe ontstaan as gevolg van die behoefte aan gespesialiseerde dienslewering, ontwikkel dit dikwels tot ’n sisteem van persoonlike ondersteuning.

The Net is particularly suited to the development of multiple weak ties. Weak ties are useful in providing information and opening up opportunities at a low cost. The advantage of the Net is that it allows the forging of weak ties with strangers, in an egalitarian pattern of interaction where social characteristics are less influential in framing, or even blocking, communication. Indeed, off-line and on-off-line, weak ties facilitate linking of people with different social characteristics, thus expanding sociability beyond the socially defined boundaries of self-recognition. In this sense, the Internet may contribute to expanding social bonds in a society that seems to be in the process of rapid individualization and civic disengagement. Virtual communities seem to be stronger than observers usually give them credit for. There is substantial evidence of reciprocal supportiveness on the Net, even between users with weak ties to each other.

(Castells 2000a:388, 389) Op die vraag of hierdie virtuele gemeenskappe ware gemeenskappe is, is Castells (2000a:389) se antwoord “ja” en “nee.” Hulle is nie fisiese gemeenskappe nie en werk ook nie soos fisiese gemeenskappe, maar is nie daarom onwerklike gemeenskappe nie. Wat verstaan moet word is dat hulle ’n eie dinamika het omdat “they work in a different plane of reality” (:389). Castells (:389) verduidelik dit soos volg: “They are interpersonal social networks, most of them based on weak ties, highly diversified and specialized, still able to generate reciprocity and support by the dynamics of sustained interaction.” Wat verder onthou moet word is dat virtuele gemeenskappe nie bestaan in isolasie van ander vorme van sosialiteit nie. “They reinforce the trend toward the ‘privatization of sociability’ – that is, the rebuilding of social networks around the individual, the development of personal communities, both physical and on-line. Cyberlinks provide the opportunity of social links for people who, otherwise, will live more limited social lives, because their ties are increasingly spatially dispersed” (:389).

Mercer (2005:91) wys daarop dat in terme van kinders “preference for the virtual over the real may have its greatest impact in the way it reshapes social relationships. Children’s real-time relational worlds shrink, replaced by virtual teachers, store clerks, and even preachers. Interaction on playgrounds and in neighborhoods gives way to virtual interaction in electronic games.”