Prototype theory and the meaning of verbs, with special reference to modern Greek verbs of motion.

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PROTOTYPE THEORY AND THE MEANING OF VERBS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MODERN GREEK VERBS OF MOTION

by

Eleni Antonopoulou

A t h e s i s submitted f o r the degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy

School o f O r i e n t a l and A f r i c a n Studies U n i v e r s i t y o f London

1987

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ABSTRACT

The present study t e s t s the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f Prototype t he o ry , sel ect ed among competing t h e o r e t i c a l frameworks, to a l e x i c a l semantic anal ys is o f verbs, wi th p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the p r ev i o u s l y uncharted domain o f Modern Greek verbs o f motion. A number o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which Prototype theor y e st a b l i s h e d in connection wi t h c e r t a i n types o f nouns are demonstrated to p e r t a i n to verbs: t h e i r meaning i s not a m a tt e r o f necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i on s, but r a t h e r a m a t t e r o f g r a da t i o n; t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s combine in n o n - a r b i t r a r y ways t o form c at e g o r i e s w i t h f uzzy boundaries the members o f which are n o n - e q u i v a l e n t . Two c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s o f motion verbs according to ' ma jor c l a s s i f i c a t o r y p r o p e r t i e s ' are discussed a t l e n g t h . F i r s t , ' s t a t e s ' , 'processes' and ' e v e n t s ' are shown t o c o n s t i t u t e a continuum, t he focal points o f which are i d e n t i f i a b l e on the basis o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f f a c t o r s such as s pat io -te mpor al s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , aspect, i n h e re nt semantic p r o p e r t i e s o f i n d i v i d u a l verbs and the nature o f the 'theme' (moving o b j e c t ) . Second, ' c a u s a t i v i t y ' and ' a g e n t i v i t y ' are understood as d i s t i n c t , to some e x t e n t , c l u s t e r s o f s c a l a r p r o p e r t i e s and d i f f e r e n t Modern Greek motion verbs are shown to e x h i b i t these p r o p e r t i e s to a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r degree. In seeking to determine which f a c t o r s may be r esponsi bl e f o r the formati on o f verb c a t e g o r i e s , i t i s r e c a l l e d t h a t t he v a l i d i t y o f the p r i n c i p l e o f ' f a m i l y resemblance' and the method f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the ' b a s i c ' l e v e l .of a b s t r a c t i o n cannot be te s te d in the case o f verbs. I t is suggested t h a t o t he r f a c t o r s may be o p e r a t i v e , such as the r e l a t i v e ' s a l i e n c e ' o f c e r t a i n combinations o f p r o p e r t i e s , ' l i n g u i s t i c markedness', f a m i l i a r i t y and frequency.

This t e n t a t i v e conclusion i s r e i n f o r c e d wi th r espect to Modern Greek verbs o f motion by the r e s u l t s o f s p e c i f i c t e s t s .

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ACKN O W L E D G M E N T S

I wish to express my g r a t i t u d e to my s uper vi sor Dr. D.C. Bennett f o r hi s i n v a l u a b l e guidance and advice and hi s i n f i n i t e p at i en ce and constant encouragement. I am also deeply indebted t o Professor D.

Theophanopoulou-Kontou f o r her i ne st i ma bl e i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t i o n and personal kindness.

My thanks are also due to several f r i e n d s and c o ll ea gu es , too numerous to mention here, f o r advice and much needed moral support.

P a r t i c u l a r mention must be made o f Miss A. K ok k ol i, who helped wi th several pa rt s o f t h i s manuscript, o f Dr. S. Asproudis, who a ssi st ed in the s t a t i s t i c a l a na ly s is o f t e s t r e s u l t s , and o f Miss A.

Tsomlektsoglou, who demonstrated g r e a t s k i l l arid d i l i g e n c e in p u t t i n g t h i s t h e s is i n t o i t s f i n a l form.

^ N o t e : T h e m a j o r w o r k f o r t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n w a s c a r r i e d ou t d u r i n g m y y e a r s at S O A S a n d w a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l e t  ed b e f o r e 1 9 8 3 .

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ABBREVIATIONS, N O T A T I O N AND FORMAT OF EXAMPLES

A f u l l l i s t i n g o f the a b b re vi a t i o ns used in t h i s t e x t is given below:

Adv. = a d ve r b/ a d ve r bi a l Adv.Phr. *■ adve rb i al phrase CA = c l u s t e r a n al y s i s CAUS = c au s at i ve

CC = c r o s s - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n CL = change o f l o c a t i o n CP = change o f p o s i t i o n

DC = d i r e c t c a u s a t i o n / c a u s a t i v e EC = e x p l i c i t c au sa ti ve

FS = Formal Semantics

HCS = h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r i n g scheme IC = i n d i r e c t c a u s a t i o n / c a u s a t i v e I f . « i m p e r f e c t / i m p e r f e c t i v e

INTR = i n t r a n s i t i v e LC = l e x i c a l c au s at i v e LOC = l o c a t i v e

MG - Modern Greek

MGMV = Modern Greek motion verb

MV = motion verb

NC = n a t ur a l class NON-CAUS - non-causati ve

NP = noun phrase

N^LOC “ noun phrase o f l o c a t i o n Pf. = p e r f e c t / p e r f e c t i v e PP = p r e p o s i t i o n a l phrase Prep. = p r e p o s i t i o n

S = sentence

SM * s el f- movi ng s .o . * someone

S-P-E = s t a t e ( s ) - p r o c e s s ( e s ) - e v e n t ( s ) SST = semantic s i m i l a r i t y s o r t i n g t as k s . t h . = something

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TR V VP

s.wh. = somewhere

= t r a n s i t i v e

= verb

= verb phrase

Pho n o l og i ca ll y i d e n t i c a l verbs appear as separ ate items wi th subscr ipts ( e . g . ' r o l l } ' , ' r o l l g ' ) . The s ub sc ri pt s are used to f a c i l i t a t e t he d e s c r i p t i o n and are not meant as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t items are i nvolved r a t h e r than a s i n g l e polysemous one.

Modern Greek examples appear in broad phonemic t r a n s c r i p t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g conventions are adopted: p a l a t a l i z a t i o n o f / k / , / v / , / x / and / g / before f r o n t vowels i s not marked; n o n - s y l l a b i c < i > is t r a n s c r i b e d as / j / ; p r e n a s a l i s a t i o n o f voiced p l o s i v e s i s not marked s y s t e m a t i c a l l y . T i t l e s o f Greek newspapers, magazines and books and a uthors' names are t r a n s l i t e r a t e d , as are also t he terms ' k a t h a r e v o u s a ' , ' d i m o t i k i ' and 'Koine Nea E l l i n i k i ' . Modern Greek examples are f ol l ow ed by an English t r a n s l a t i o n ; a word-by-word gloss i s also provided whenever t h i s i s considered necessary.

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INTRODUCTION

This t h e s i s attempts a l e x i c a l semantic a nal ys is o f motion verbs, and in p a r t i c u l a r Modern Greek verbs o f motion, w i t h i n the framework o f Prototype t h e o r y . While t he method o f approach adopted here has been e x t e n s i v e l y t e s t e d in domains covered by nouns, i t has not p r e vi o us l y been ap p l ie d s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to verbal c a t e g o r i e s . As a r e s u l t , the a na ly s is is both t h e o r e t i c a l and d e s c r i p t i v e , o f n e ce s s i t y touching upon p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r i e s o f human c a t e g o r i z a t i o n and p h i l oso p hi ca l ' discussions o f the r e l a t i o n between l i n g u i s t i c expressions and e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y .

Prototype t he or y - which i s adopted in t h i s study as a more a p p r o p r i at e method than componential a na ly s is and semantic f i e l d t h e o r i e s - has r a i s e d a number o f i n t e r e s t i n g issues which are examined here i n connection w it h Modern Greek motion verbs. The main p r i n c i p l e s i nvolved are the f o l l o w i n g :

- Word meaning i s not a ma tt er o f necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s .

- Hyponyms are not e q u i d i s t a n t from t h e i r su p er or di na te ; the members o f a category are not e q u a l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s cat egory.

- Semantic p r o p e r t i e s are not a r b i t r a r i l y combined to form c a t e g o r i e s .

The most i mportant general issue, in my opi ni on, is g r a da t io n and the f uz z in es s o f boundaries between semantic c a t e g o r i e s . A l l these t e n e t s o f Prototype t he or y seem e q u a l l y r e l e v a n t t o the d e s c r i p t i o n o f the semantic f a c t s o f verbs as well as o f nouns.

Motion verbs c o n s t i t u t e a f a i r l y w e l l - d e f i n e d semantic f i e l d and e x h i b i t a number o f i n t e r e s t i n g p r o p e r t i e s also r e l e v a n t to ot he r verbal domains. The f i e l d has the a d d i t i o n a l m er it s o f being h i g hl y s t r u c t u r e d , o f c o n ta i ni n g many cat eg o r ie s f a m i l i a r to most n a t i v e speakers and, what i s more i mportant, o f i n v o l v i n g c at eg o r i es more

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r e a d i l y d e sc r ib a bl e i n terms o f perceptual and f u n c t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s than those o f most o t h e r verbal domains. This i s perhaps the reason why a l o t o f l i n g u i s t i c research has been conducted in t h i s area of the vocabulary o f languages o t he r than Modern Greek, e s p e c i a l l y English and German.

Modern Greek verbs o f motion have never been s y s t e m a t i c a l l y examined, which has n e c e s s i t a t e d the i n c l u s i o n in t h i s study o f a consi der able volume o f d a t a . The p e c u l i a r s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s i t u a t i o n o f Modern Greek, namely the i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f ' katharevousa' (t he ' p u r i s t i c ' language v a r i e t y ) and ' d i m o t i k i ' ( t he ' c o l l o q u i a l ' / ' p o p u l a r ' v a r i e t y ) presents special problems in several areas, from th e c o l l e c t i o n of data and the f or mati on o f taxonomic s t ru c t u r e s to t he assessment of p r o t o t y p i c a l i t y judgments o f s u b j ec t s.

Some o f the te n et s o f Prototype t he o r y , such as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the ' b a s i c l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n ' and the p r i n c i p l e o f ' f a m i l y resemblance' f o r cat egory formati on cannot be r e a d i l y t e s t e d in the case o f verbs. A v e r i f i c a t i o n o f these t en e ts presupposes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e l i c i t i n g a t t r i b u t e s ( p r o p e r t i e s ) o f cat eg o r ie s d i r e c t l y from n a t i v e speakers, which i s not e v i d e nt in t he case o f verbs.

Never th e le ss , i t can be shown t h a t n a t i v e speakers do make r e l i a b l e judgments on the r e l a t i v e d i st an ce between the i n c l u s i v e category and i t s hyponyms i n those cases where such taxonomic o r g a n i z a t i o n is well e s t a b l i s h e d . An i mportant p o i n t is t h e r e f o r e r a i s e d concerning what such judgments are based on, i . e . what i s r esponsi bl e f o r the formati on o f c at e g o r i e s in the case o f verbs, and in the area under i n v e s t i g a t i o n in p a r t i c u l a r . This study does not a sp i re t o provide answers to such i mportant problems, e s p e c i a l l y as i t i s a piece of l i n g u i s t i c r a t h e r than p s y c h o ! i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantics. I t cannot, however, avoid t e s t i n g the v a l i d i t y o f c e r t a i n proposals concerning the forma ti on o f c a t e g o r i e s , such as semantic s i m i l a r i t y , number o f shared p r o p e r t i e s , the r e l a t i v e s a l i e n c e o f combinations o f p r o p e r t i e s , and the natur e o f the ' b a s i c ' l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n f o r verbs.

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The s t r u c t u r e o f th e present study i s as f o l l o w s :

Chapter I discusses a t some l ength the search f o r an a pp r op r i at e t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r the d e s c r i p t i o n to f o l l o w . I t also i ncludes a s ecti on on t he d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the f i e l d o f motion verbs.

Chapters 2 and 3 contai n an account o f those p r o p e r t i e s o f verbs which are here considered 'maj or c l a s s i f i c a t o r y p r o p e r t i e s ' , namely

s t a t e s - p r o c e s s e s - e v e n t s , c a u s a t i v i t y and a g e n t i v i t y .

Chapter 4 discusses the r e l a t i o n s between Modern Greek verbs of motion and the 'mi nor p r o p e r t i e s ' considered r e l e v a n t f o r the d e s c r i p t i o n o f the verbs in quest ion. I t provides an answer to the question o f how the f i e l d i s organi zed.

Chapter 5 r e p or t s the r e s u l t s o f t e s t s conducted wi th a view to checking the p os si bl e psychological r e a l i t y o f c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s and s t r u c t u r e s based on the ' p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c ' a n al y s i s c a r r i e d out in the preceding chapt er s. I t also includes an attempt t o i d e n t i f y some o f the f a c t o r s r espons ibl e f o r the formation o f protot ypes in the domain o f Modern Greek verbs o f motion.

An Appendix i s i ncluded which contains s i x l i s t s o f Modern Greek motion verbs. L i s t I comprises 181 e n t r i e s which are i n d i c a t i v e o f the m a t e r i a l the d e s c r i p t i o n i s based on. Besides motion verbs a number o f verbs o f p o s i t i o n are also i ncluded, speci al r ef erence to which i s made in Chapters 2 and 4. L i s t I I contains f i v e t e s t - f r a m e s and the verbs o f L i s t I which can occur in each one o f them. L i s t I I I presents a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f Modern Greek motion verbs along the ' p r o c e s s - e v e n t ' continuum. L i s t s IV and V show the r e l a t i v e degree o f a g e n t i v i t y o f a number o f caus ati ve and n o n- causati ve Modern Greek verbs o f motion. L i s t VI contains a l l the taxonomic sets and natur al classes i d e n t i f i e d w i t h i n th e f i e l d under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . L i s t s V I I and V I I I present a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f motion verbs based on the 'minor p r o p e r t i e s ' t hey e x h i b i t .

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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR A LEXICAL SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF MOTION VERBS

1.1 A case f o r l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantics

In an area o f s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n where t h e r e i s l i t t l e agreement on what the su b j ec t ma tte r r e a l l y i s , i t i s no wonder t h a t t h e r e i s no agreement on i t s pa rt s and t h e i r c o n te n t. * Semantic t heory lends i t s e l f r e a d i l y to such confusion by l y i n g at the crossroads o f ' p u r e ' l i n g u i s t i c s , psychology and l o g i c .

Logical grammar or Formal Semantics (hencef or th FS) understands and t h e r e f o r e descri bes the semantics o f nat ur al language in terms o f a th eor y o f e n t a i l m e n t s . Consequently i t sets i t s e l f goals such as matching meanings t o s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r i e s , d e sc r ib i ng sentences through t h e i r t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s or e xp l a i n i n g how t he meanings o f i n d i v i d u a l words c o n t r i b u t e t o the o v e r a l l meaning o f the sentence they belong t o . So word meaning i s not t o be analysed in i t s own terms but only in terms o f t h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n . This i s a l l very well f o r ' l o g i c a l ' words (such as ' a n d ' , ' b u t ' , ' o r ' , ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' ) . The v as t m a j o r i t y o f n o n - l o g i c a l words i s , however, l e f t out, in the sense t h a t FS refuses t o break i n t o t h e i r semantic c o n te n t. Lexical meaning is r e l e g a t e d t o l exi co g r ap h y . This is very simply and e x p l i c i t l y expressed i n Thomason ( 1 97 4 : 4 8 ) :

"the problems o f semantic t heory should be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from those o f l e x i c o g r a p h y . . . we should not expect a semantic theory to f u r n i s h an account o f how two expressions belonging to the same s y n t a c t i c category d i f f e r in meaning. 'Wal k' and ' r u n ' , f o r i n s t a n c e , . . , c e r t a i n l y do d i f f e r in meaning, and we r e q ui r e a d i c t i o n a r y o f English t o t e l l us how. But th e making o f a d i c t i o n a r y demands c on si der able knowledge o f the wo r l d" .

Cresswell ( 1 9 78 : 4) considers the same example o f two d i f f e r e n t but r e l a t e d words, namely ' w a l k ' and ' r u n ' , only to e x p l a i n t h a t the s peaker' s knowledge t h a t the two verbs share a +movement component

* A n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n is D o w t y ( 1 9 7 9 ) .

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i s not t o be i n cor por at ed i n the m o d e l - t h e o r e t i c apparatus because i t i s "a lre ad y present in the fun c ti on s d e sc r ib i ng ' w a l k ' and ' r u n ' " .

In simple terms, t h e r e is such a t h i ng as p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c knowledge, which i s compl etel y d i s t i n c t from knowledge o f the world and the l a t t e r i s the concern o f l e x i c og r ap he r s , not l i n g u i s t s . A r e l a t e d noti on i s t h a t i t i s impossible t o c on s t ru c t a th e or y o f word meaning in any s c i e n t i f i c a l l y r esp e ct ab l e form and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t he r e i s no place f o r ' l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l s em an t i c s' .

Let us consider the v i a b i l i t y o f a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to t h i s problem, s t a r t i n g wi t h a rephrasi ng o f Thomason's 'sweeping' statement. I t can be argued t h a t ' w a l k ' and ' r u n ' d i f f e r in meaning and we r e q u i r e l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantics to provi de semantic r ep r e s e n t a t i o n s f o r them which should reveal both how they d i f f e r from one another (and a number o f r e l a t e d items) and how they are i n t e r r e l a t e d . We expect these semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to be p a rt o f the l e x i c o n o f a grammatical theor y and a l l the r e l e v a n t i nfo r ma ti on to serve as i np u t to l e x i co g r ap h y . A d i c t i o n a r y o f English is the output o f l ex ic ogr aphy and we expect i t to t e l l us how ' w a l k ' and ' r u n ' d i f f e r from one another as ' l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s ' , i . e . as English words. We do not expect i t t o do anything more than t h a t . A f t e r a l l , according t o the standard d i s t i n c t i o n between the d i c t i o n a r y and the l e x i c on i t i s the l a t t e r t h a t i s assumed to be a 'mental l e x i c o n ' , a r e f l e c t i o n o f a speaker' s l e x i c a l competence.

Li n gu i st s are expected to f i n d out about a speaker' s 'mental grammar', i . e . t he i n t e r n a l i z e d set o f r u l e s which enable someone t o understand and speak h i s / h e r language. Lexicographers are not.

The r e l a t i o n between a s peaker 's mental processes and grammatical operat ions has been a problem o f major concern f o r p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s since the e a r l y s i x t i e s . The goal o f psychological semantics remains

at l e a s t to s o m e p e o p l e . ... . . _ . , , c l e a r , A l t i s t o show how language and the world are r e l a t e d to one another in the human mind" (Johnson-Laird 1 9 8 2 : 7 ) .

In view o f the simple f a c t t h a t language and the world are n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d through the human mind and t h a t no grammatical

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model can be d e sc r ib i ng speakers' competence w h i l e a t the same time being p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y u n r e a l , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the goals o f l i n g u i s t i c and psychological semantics cannot be very c l e a r - c u t .

This could be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d as implying t h a t t h e r e i s no place f o r l e x i c a l semantics except as p a r t o f p s y c h o ! i n g u i s t i c t h e or y . In f a c t i t should be understood as l e a d i ng to the conclusion t h a t i t is necessary to i n v e s t i g a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t e g r a t i n g some o f the i n s i g h t s o f th e philosophy o f language and p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s w i t h i n a l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantic t he o ry .

The m a j o r i t y o f r e l a t i v e l y r e ce nt work in l e x i c a l semantics is c a r r i e d out w i t h i n the framework o f ' d e f i n i t i o n a l ' systems. Some o f the str on g e st a t ta c ks mounted ag ai ns t d e f i n i t i o n a l systems are based on t h e i r psychological u n r e a l i t y . I t seems d e s i r a b l e at t h i s p oi n t to consider a s p e c i f i c example in some d e t a i l . This example concerns the psychological r e a l i t y o f anal ysing causati ves and d e f i n i n g them as complex verbs, i . e . breaking them up i n t o a c au s at i v e element and some o t h e r e le ment(s) also present in corresponding non- ca us at i v es.

f o r e x a m p l e Fodor, G a r r e t t , Walker and Parkes (hencef orth FGWP) (1 980 ), Areport r e s u l t s o f t e s t s proving ( i n t h e i r view) t h a t c ausati ves are deep simplex verbs and t h e r e f o r e undefined. The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t no psychological r e a l i t y can be claimed f o r any d e f i n i t i o n s , since causati ves are by f a r the ' b e s t ' cases f o r d e f i n i t i o n a l systems.

The method adopted by FGWP f o r t e s t i n g the psychological r e a l i t y o f anal ysing ' k i l l ' , f o r i n st an ce , as 'cause t o d i e ' can be summed up as f o l l o w s . The sentences John b i t Mary and John k i l l e d Mary are compared, o f which only the l a t t e r sentence i s considered as i n v o l v i n g a c au sa ti ve ver b, and s u b j ec t s ' judgments are sought on whether i t is in the former or the l a t t e r sentence t h a t 'John' and 'Mary' are more " c l o s e l y r e l a t e d " . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t i f the l a t t e r sentence does not get a lower score than t he former one ( i . e . i f i t i s not considered t h a t 'John' and ' Mary' are l es s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d as arguments o f ' k i l l ' than o f ' b i t e ' ) , the a n al y s i s o f verbs i n t o components rece ive s a mortal blow.

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Rather expectedl y no c o r r e l a t i o n was found to e x i s t between c aus ati ve s and r e l a t i v e complexity in t he s p e c i f i c sense o f the exper iment er s' equation o f c a u s a t i v i t y = compl exi ty = loose l i n k between the v e r b ' s arguments. I t is doubt ful whether r e l a t i v e complexity can be checked through such methods. For i t i s hard to imagine even the f i r m e s t supporter o f d e f i n i t i o n a l systems expecting such a one-to- one correspondence between l i n g u i s t i c and psychological phenomena. FGWP's method is r emini scent o f experiments c a r r i e d out in the s i x t i e s w i t h a view t o di sco v er in g whether d e r i v a t i o n a l compl exi ty c o r r e l a t e d w i t h processing compl ex ity . The hypothesis t e s t e d in those experiments was t h a t the more complex the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l d e r i v a t i o n o f a sentence i s , the more d i f f i c u l t i t would be t o produce or comprehend. The r e s u l t s o f those i n v e s t i g a t i o n s proved in essence t h a t no one-to-one correspondence should be expected between mental processes and grammatical o p e r a t i o n s .

Evidence in favour o f the psychological r e a l i t y o f surface s t r u c t u r e s i s re po r te d in FGWP, summing up L e v e l t ' s (1970) f i n d i n g s to the e f f e c t t h a t s u b j e c t s ' i n t u i t i o n s r espect t he grouping of words i n t o surface c o n s t i t u e n t s . A possi bl e expl an a ti on o f s u b j ec t s ' support o f ' sta nda rd surface o r d e r ' could be simply t h a t t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y the or der t o which they are most exposed. I t can be argued t h a t t h i s is even more so concerning l e x i c a l items. I nf or ma ti on ' f i x e d ' and c on so li dated in the form o f a s i n g le l e x i c a l item ( e . g . ' k i l l ' ) is c l e a r l y much more immediately accessi bl e in t h i s form than in any corresponding decomposition ( e . g . 'cause t o d i e ' ) . I f ' k i l l ' were found t o i n vo l ve a l o os er l i n k between i t s arguments than ' b i t e ' , t h a t would not have been p r oof o f th e psychological r e a l i t y o f i t s an a ly s is as 'cause t o d i e ' e i t h e r . For ' b i t e ' a lso involves a complex i n t e r n a l make-up. I t might have c o n s t i t u t e d evidence agai nst the psychological r e a l i t y o f l e x i c a l i z a t i o n , i . e . o f the s al i e n c e o f l e x i c a l items as ( f i x e d ) u n i t s . I t is undoubtedly a pp r op r i at e to seek psychol ogi cal evidence f o r any l i n g u i s t i c hypothesis set up.

The appropri ateness o f method, i s , however, a serious problem.

Be t h a t as i t may, the f a c t remains t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' b a s i c ' and 'complex' concepts assumed in most d e f i n i t i o n a l systems

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i s not w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d . There i s no evidence in f avour o f a hypothesis along the l i n e s : ' c a u s e - t o - d i e ' i s l e s s complex than ' k i l l ' and ' k i l l ' i s more complex than ' d i e ' simply because 'cause' and ' d i e ' are p a r t o f the d e f i n i t i o n o f ' k i l l ' . Even i f ' d i e ' i s f u r t h e r analysed i n t o ' s i m p l e r ' u n i t s , the problem w i l l remain o f how these l a t t e r u ni t s (whether they be p r i m i t i v e or n ot) are i n t e r p r e t e d , i . e . what f i x e s t h e i r extensi ons. Despit e t h e i r m e r i t s , which seem t o me t o l i e elsewhere (and w i l l be discussed in the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n ) , d e f i n i t i o n a l systems have not as y e t provided an answer t o the o v e r a l l problem o f what r e l a t e s words t o the worl d. We are s t i l l badly in need o f ext ens ive i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o throw l i g h t on the process o f c a t e g o r i z a t i o n t h a t converts what Labov (1978) c a l l s

"the continua o f the r e al world" i n t o th e c at e g o r i e s of the l i n g u i s t i c system. Unless such conversion processes are b e t t e r understood no hi gher l e v e l l i n g u i s t i c semantic t he or y can be expected. The d i s t i n c t i o n between ' p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c ' i nfo r ma ti on and 'knowledge o f the w or l d' is much l ess than a h e l p f u l one.

Consider a s p e c i f i c example provided in i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s famous d i s t i n c t i o n by a non-supporter o f FS, Mereu ( 1 9 8 3 ) . I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough the same verb ' w a l k ' i s a t issue, also used as an example by Thomason (1974) and Cresswell (1978) as mentioned at th e beginning o f t h i s s ec t i o n . This time ' w a l k ' is said to have a l e x i c a l meaning approximately e q u i v a l e n t t o "moving in a c e r t a i n way by means o f legs" and an encyclopaedic meaning, which i n v o l v e s , among other t h i n g s , i n fo r m at i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t (a) " f i s h cannot w al k" . But i f ' l e g s ' is somehow i ncluded, then r ef ere nc e i s i m p l i c i t l y made to those e n t i t i e s which possess t h i s p r o p e r ty . I t is hard t o imagine t h a t the meaning o f ' l e g s ' i s a r r i v e d a t s e p a r a t e l y from the r e a l world obj ect s which have l e g s. Therefore?- knowledge o f ' w a l k ' and ' f i s h ' i mpl ies knowledge o f ( a ) . So the (a) type o f i n f or m at i o n need not appear e i t h e r in the l e x i c o n or in the d i c t i o n a r y . We are l e f t e x a c t l y where we were. At one end o f the scale ( i . e . no knowledge- o f - t h e - w o r l d i n fo r m at i o n a t a l l ) ' w a l k ' and ' r u n ' w i l l r e ce i ve i d e n t i c a l semantic r e p r es e n t a t i o n s (as a lr ea dy mentioned in connection w it h FS). S i m i l a r l y f o r ' c r a w l ' and a l l such change-of- l o c a t i o n verbs, f o r c l e a r l y i f ' l e g s ' can be shown t o l i n k d i r e c t l y w i t h encyclopaedic i n f o r m a t i o n , so can ' c o n t a c t wi th ground',

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presumably, ( o r whatever e ls e w i l l be needed to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t types o f m ot i o n) . To be c o n s i s t e n t wi th t he 'no knowledge o f the wo r l d' d o c t r i n e i t i s conceivable t h a t even ' mo t i o n ' has t o di sappear from the semantic s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f ' w a l k ' ; in s h o r t , t h a t only l o g i c a l connectives and q u a n t i f i e r s can be handled in a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y acceptabl e manner.

One more view has to be considered b r i e f l y , which i s advocated by a number o f people working i n models o f l i n g u i s t i c comprehension, a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e and computational l i n g u i s t i c s . I t e n t a i l s e l i m i n a t i n g t he d i s t i n c t i o n between l i n g u i s t i c and encyclopaedic i n f o r m at i o n and r e p l a c i n g the two l e v e l s o f a n al y s i s w i t h a unique one. The under lyi ng assumption i s t h a t world-knowledge i s the f i r s t and most important source o f i n fo r ma ti on in decoding the l i n g u i s t i c message. The ' p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c ' c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the word is r e s t r i c t e d to s t r i n g s o f sounds and a set o f very simple s y n t a c t i c r u l e s . Quite c l e a r l y t h e r e i s , in t h i s case, no room f o r a l e x i c a l l e v e l o f processing. L i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantics i s again accused o f adopting an e s s e n t i a l l y ' s t a t i c ' d i c t i o n a r y view.

A f i n a l note has to be added concerning the r e l a t i o n o f word-meaning t o sentence-meaning. The l e x i c o n is sometimes d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the d i c t i o n a r y by saying t h a t the former i s s en t en c e- or i en t ed w h i le the l a t t e r i s w o r d - o r i e n t e d . The t e n e t t h a t the semantic stat us o f i n d i v i d u a l l e x i c a l items i s determined by the c o n t r i b u t i o n these items make to t he meaning o f the sentences in which they appear i s too wel l known t o r e q u i r e e l a b o r a t i o n . On the o t he r hand, the view t h a t the meaning o f a sentence i s a f un c t i o n o f th e morphemes i t contains and the way in which those morphemes are s y n t a c t i c a l l y combined seems e q u a l l y p l a u s i b l e . The whole issue o f whether sentence-meaning or word-meaning is more basic does not answer any more questions than i t r a i s e s .

What seems to me a reasonable proposal in r e l a t i o n t o word and sentence meaning is combining the l o g i c a l form o f a sentence wi th l e x i c a l l y analysed words which belong t o t h i s sentence. The cond i t i on s under which the sentence would be t r u e are to be provided

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by the t r u t h - t h e o r y . This can take care o f the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f ' l o g i c a l words' and ' se ma nt i c o- gr ammat i ca l' s t r u c t u r e s . I t cannot do anything more than t h a t . A l l o t he r ' n o n - l o g i c a l ' l e x i c a l items have to be analysed s e p a r a t e l y and d i f f e r e n t l y and t h i s i s e x a c t l y the domain o f l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l semantics. Such items may be analysed on the basis o f the c on d i t i on s o f t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t i e s . Actual l i n g u i s t i c expressions and condi ti ons o f appropriateness o f a p p l i c a t i o n are perhaps the only t hi ngs t o which we have immediate access.

The r e s u l t o f such analyses w i l l not amount to necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s . I t w i l l be a c t u a l l y argued in the f o l l o w i n g secti ons t h a t l e x i c a l a n al y s i s should not have necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c on d i t i on s as i t s g o a l . I t can however, co n t ai n a l o t more necessary, i . e . i mpor tant, i nf or ma ti on than simple e n t ai lm e nt

r e l a t i o n s can a ll o w f o r .

In any case, whatever i s adopted as an a p pr o p r i a t e framework f o r l e x i c a l a na ly s is cannot be o f the same s tatus as t r u t h condi ti ons provided f o r sentences. I t may f o r the most p a r t be language s p e c i f i c . Comparison o f s i m i l a r l y c a r r i e d out analyses might one day y i e l d conceptual e n t i t i e s in the form o f s u bst an t i ve semantic u n i v e r s a l s . This I understand t o be t he end product; not the tool to c ar r y out l e x i c a l a n a l y s i s in t he f i r s t pl ace .

What seems i m pe ra t iv e in order to attempt any l e x i c a l semantic a nal ys is which purports to c o n t r i b u t e to an understanding o f what belongs t o l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l competence i s some v i a b l e noti on o f human c a t e g o r i z a t i o n which can serve as a guide. What i s also necessary i s some t he o ry o f language and the worl d.

The f a c t t h a t no such t h e o r i e s are w i de ly accepted and ready to be a ppl ied f o r the purposes o f the a n al y s i s o f a s p e c i f i c p a r t o f the vocabulary o f a n a tu r a l language does not imply t h a t they do not e x i s t in a t e s t a b l e form. Lexi cal a na ly s is cannot be postponed u n t i l such t h e o r i e s are completed. Rather, i t can be expected to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e i r completion by consi deri ng l e x i c a l semantic f a c t s

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in d e t a i l and p r o v i di ng emp i ri ca l c o r r o bo r at i o n and l i n g u i s t i c preciseness as best i t can.

1 .2 E xi s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l frameworks: a di scussion

1 . 2 . 1 Componential a n a l y s i s : the 'major'shortcomi ngs

Lexi cal semantics has always concentrated on two areas of i n v e s t i g a t i o n : the i n t e r n a l semantic make-up o f words and the semantic r e l a t i o n s between them. Componential a n a l y s i s and f i e l d t he or y have been developed to cover these areas.

Since the e a r l y s e v en ti e s , componential a n a l y s i s (or l e x i c a l decompo si ti on)1 has been accused o f a number o f shortcomings which cannot be overlooked. In f a c t , these a t t a c ks were meant t o demolish the whole idea o f semantic components. The e x t en t to which I b e li ev e these c r i t i c i s m s t o have succeeded in t h e i r aim w i l l emerge from a more or l ess d e t a i l e d discussion o f each one o f them.

1 . 2 . 1 . 1 N a t u r e of f e a t u r e s

Abstractness as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f meaning components was probably i n h e r i t e d from two d i f f e r e n t sources: t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy and de Saussure's ' l a n g u e ' , but was attacked more s e v er el y than e i t h e r .

Not ic e t h a t abst ract ness is a problem in i t s e l f . Few f i r s t y ear undergraduates are happy wi th the notion o f the 'phoneme' u n t i l they g et to know what you use i t f o r ; c e r t i f y i n g about something t h a t i t i s a b s t r a c t may simply amount t o saying what i t i s not ( l i k e saying t h a t the phoneme i s n e i t h e r a sound nor a l e t t e r , f o r i n s t a n c e ) . Besides t h a t , however, one could clai m t h a t the a b s t r a c t u n i t s/he has set up is a useful t h e o r e t i c a l c on st r uct and proceed to show what use s/he can make o f i t . I t seems to me beyond doubt t h a t by s e t t i n g up semantic components one can account in a r a t h e r neat way f o r a number o f l e x i c a l semantic f a c t s such as synonymy, antonymy, redundancy, ambiguit y, anomaly, c o n t r a d i c t i o n : they have proved

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u s e f u l . T h e o r e t i c a l const ruct s are o f course a t ta cke d on what they cannot r a t h e r than on what they can do. This i s probably a much more f r u i t f u l engagement than di scussing the natur e o f the semantic components proposed by Katz and Fodor (1963) and l a t e r r e de f in e d by Katz (1972) under the names 'semantic markers' and 'semantic d i s t i n g u i s h e s ' . Yet the c r i t i c i s m o f both versi ons has centred on two p o i n t s : abst ractness and th e d i s t i n c t i o n between markers and d i s t i n g u i s h e r s .

What seems t o me, however, to be much more i mportant than e i t h e r , is whether semantic f e a t u r e s can p o s si b ly be exhausti ve o f the meaning o f a word even when they are accompanied by arguments attached to the p r ed i ca t es and h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d . Not ice t h a t problems have cropped up even in the best cases o f l e x i c a l decomposition, e . g . ' k i l l ' and ' c a u s e - t o - d i e ' . Although (1) John k i l l e d Mary does e n t a i l (2) John caused Mary t o d i e , the mere f a c t t h a t ( 2 ) i nvolves two p r e di ca t es r a t h e r than one gives r i s e to the discrepancy between ( ! ' ) and ( 2 ' ) :

( 1 ' ) *John k i l l e d Mary on Saturday by stabbing her on Fri day ( 2 ' ) John caused Mary to d i e on Saturday by stabbing her on

F r i d ay .

To ensure the r e q u i re d s y n c h r o n i c i t y , time i nd i ce s can be added to the p r e d i c a t e s . Yet the f a c t remains t h a t b i c o n d i t i o n a l i t y cannot be expected t o e x i s t between (1) and ( 2 ) ( F o d o r 1 9 7 0 ) .

Neverthel ess some s o l u t i o n s are a v a i l a b l e :

( a) Lexical decomposition need not amount t o p r ov i di ng necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c on d i t i on s f o r a given word to denote; and t h e r e f o r e f e a t ur e s a r e, in p r a c t i c e , s i m i l a r to meaning p o s t u l a t e s .

(b) Words are ' t r a n s l a t e d ' i n t o a number o f components which are again to be understood as o th e r ( s i m p l e r ) words o f the same language. C l e a r l y each language i s e n t i t l e d t o have i t s lexemes

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analysed i n t o terms drawn from i t s own vocabulary ( o r from a more w id el y understood but c u l t u r a l l y akin one) w i t h ou t pretending t h a t these a r e , through magic, ele vat ed to the s tatus o f a metalanguage p r oper . Working w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f a s p e c i f i c language and t he l i m i t a t i o n s o f a s p e c i f i c c u l t u r e and ignori ng a s p i r a t i o n s a t u n i v e r s a l i t y does not imply t h a t one is l e f t wi th nothing a t a l l as i t i s o f t en suggested by c r i t i c s o f l e x i c a l decomposition. With a s u f f i c i e n t number o f such analyses a t hand, c r o s s - c u l t u r a l and i n t e r - l a n g u a g e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s could be attempted t o y i e l d , a t the l e a s t , groupings o f t y p o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and, a t b est , t h e o r e t i c a l ( i . e . m e t a l i n g u i s t i c ) c onst ruct s a r r i v e d a t as a r e s u l t o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f such analyses and p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l c o ns id e r at i o n s .

( c) Semantic f e a t u r e s can become s u b st a n t i a l i f they are adequately analysed and e xp l ai n e d, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f how e x a c t l y they are expressed (whether in Engl ish, in Tagalog or in s ym bo l s )^ a

good example o f t h i s i s the extremely i n t e r e s t i n g attempt by M i l l e r and Johnson-Laird (1976) to e s t a b l i s h c o g n i t i v e l y p r i m i t i v e concepts. This i s a way o f e l i m i n a t i n g the shortcomings o f ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' and s t i l l being l e f t with a semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Such approaches are not to be confused (as they sometimes ar e) w i t h Katz ( 1 9 7 2 ) , f o r i ns t an c e, where semantic markers were said to r epr esent 'conceptual components o f senses' and d i s t i n g u i s h e r s to mark ' p u r e l y perceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s ' w i t h o u t e x p l a i n i n g s a t i s f a c t o r i l y t he content o f e i t h e r .

Lehrer ( 19 74:176) seems to complain t h a t "i n most tr eatment s the f e a t u r e s are l e f t unexplained or l e f t f o r psychol ogi sts or philosophers t o e x p l a i n " . Yet i f the components are t o acquire independent substance t h e re are few ot he r a l t e r n a t i v e s . One attempt at e s t a b l i s h i n g some o f these notori ous semantic primes i nstead o f i n d e f i n i t e l y t h e o r i z i n g about them i s Wierzbicka ( 1 9 7 2 ) .

Wi er zbi cka a t ta c k s t h e use o f formulae o f symbolic l o g i c in l e x i c a l semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as not being ' e x p l i c a t i o n s ' , in the sense

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t h a t they would r e q u i r e an e xp l anati on in t h e i r t u r n . Her own proposal amounts t o c o n st r uc t in g a paraphrase o f a sentence under an a ly s is which she c a l l s "the semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " o f t h a t sentence by v i r t u e o f i t s being made up o f words taken as primary and combined in accordance w it h grammatical r u l e s o f what she c a l l s a

"semantic language". The whole const ruct draws e x c l u s i v e l y from her own i n t r o s p e c t i o n and i n t u i t i o n : "the method i s i n t r o s p e c t i o n , the e v i d e n c e - f a c t s o f i n t u i t i o n " ( p . 2 4 ) . Wi erzbi cka, who a t t a cks the formulae o f symbolic l o g i c as being themselves in need o f e x p l i c a t i o n s , sets h e r s e l f the goal o f e s t a b l i s h i n g primes which w i l l be expressions which are themselves "impossible t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l i c a t e " ( p . 1 3) . They are expressions in n a t u r a l language from which the meanings o f ot he r expressions are b u i l t . She proceeds to compile a l i s t o f such ' i n d e f i n a b l e s ' which are supposed to be adequate t o e x p l i c a t e a l l u tt e r a n c e s . Apparentl y she assumes t h a t her formulae are not i n need o f e x p l i c a t i o n simply because they are drawn from n a t ur a l language. In p r a c t i c e , however, the actual formulae are even more obscure than most o f ' t e c h n i c a l ' metalanguage.

Consider her d e f i n i t i o n o f " x i s moving" :

"x can be thought o f as becoming a p a r t o f d i f f e r e n t pa rts o f t h a t p a r t o f the world" ( p . 97)

which i s based on A. BogusTawski's idea t h a t movement i s "becoming somewhere". I t i s not obvious t h a t such d e f i n i t i o n s correspond to

"ideas which everybody can f i n d in hi msel f" (p. 1 5 ) . They may well correspond to ideas t h a t BogusTawski and Wi erzbi cka ' f i n d in the ms el ves '. The r e s t o f us do need an e x p l i c a t i o n . So, making an appeal t o " i n t u i t i v e obviousness" does not seem t o solve t he problem.

What can be l ess c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e than e x p l i c a t i n g ' s a l t ' through ' s a l t y ' and ' e a r s ' through ' h e a r i n g ' , both o f which Wi erzbi cka fi n ds a ' compell ing t e m p t a t i o n ' ? Notice t h a t even CAUSE which is almost unanimously regarded as a major c a t e g o r i z i n g element f o r verbs i s not granted the s t a t u s o f a semantic p r i m i t i v e by Wi e rz b i ck a , because " i t i s r e l a t e d t o and paraphrasable in terms o f j f " ( p . 1 7 ) , which i s not considered a p r i m i t i v e e i t h e r , needless to say. In sh o r t the problem i s not so much whether we need an e x p l i c a t i o n t o understand the formulae or n o t, as t h a t a l o t o f d e f i n i t i o n s ( a) are a r b i t a r y and

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(b) cannot be put to the t e s t . We are thus l e f t w i t h o u t the grounds f o r a f r u i t f u l di scussion even. Wi erzbi cka h e r s e l f r a i s e s the problem o f "sensual data" o b j e c t i n g t o Locke's considering expressions r e l a t e d to such data i n d e f i n a b l e . Yet her own d e f i n i t i o n o f ' l i g h t ' i s based p r e c i s e l y on such an expressi on: "There is no l i g h t here = This place is such t h a t being in t h i s pl ace one cannot see" ( p . 1 9 ) . I d e n t i f y i n g semantic f e a t u r e s wi t h p r i m i t i v e s and seeking p r i m i t i v e s in such ' p h i l o s o p h i c - p h i l o l o g i c a l ' ways seems an impossible t a s k.

Consider, however, a much b e t t e r founded attempt a t t e s t e d in the work o f M i l l e r and Johnson-Laird ( 1 9 7 6 ) , which shows t h a t an a nal ys is in terms o f f e a t u r e s or c on d i t i on s can be a useful tool i f i t s elements are p r op e rl y d e f i n e d . 3 M i l l e r and Johnson-Laird are not attempti ng a thorough e x p l o r a t i o n o f ' c o g n i t i v e and a f f e c t i v e language' f o r the areas they are examining. That could only be the goal o f a mammoth p r o j e c t . T h e y h a v e at l e a s t t r i e d to d e v e l o p a s e t of p r i m i t i v e s i v a t e d by t h e p s y c h o l o g y , of p e r c e p t i o n a n d c o n c e p t i o nJ h i s i s c l e a r l y a

s a f e r way t o t r y and e s t a b l i s h semantic u n i t s (whether they are c a l l e d f e a t u r e s or c o n d i t i o n s ) which have some substance than j u s t p h i l o so p hi z i ng about them. T h e i r s p e c i f i c proposals concerning 'cause' and 'mo t i o n ' are discussed in some d e t a i l elsewhere as they are p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to the anal ys is o f Modern Greek motion verbs ( he ncef or th MGMVs). T h e i r f o r m a l i z a t i o n does borrow from symbolic l o g i c , but i t i s e x p l i c a b l e , adequately e x p l i c a t e d in the t e x t i t s e l f and i n f o r m a t i v e . A b r i e f comparison between t h e i r understanding o f causation in terms o f ' p e r c e i v ed causes' and I kegami 's (1969) w i l l h o p e f u l l y show the advantages o f t h e i r approach over a vague e x p la n at i o n (although I seem t o f i n d f a u l t w i t h both analyses o f CAUSE).

1 . 2 . 1 . 2 Markedness

Markedness i s also i n h e r i t e d from s t r u c t u r a l i s t phonology and u s u al l y attacked in connection w it h b i n ar y complementary f e a t u r e s . The question i s o f t en r a i s e d as to which member o f an o pposi ti on should take the negation o p e rat or and by i m p l i c a t i o n be a t t r i b u t e d the s ta t us o f the l es s ' b a s i c ' one.

Prototype theory and the meaning of verbs, with special reference to modern Greek verbs of motion.

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ACKN O W L E D G M E N T S

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS, N O T A T I O N AND FORMAT OF EXAMPLES

INTRODUCTION