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(2) Chapter 1: Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. . 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Communication and method 1.3 The ‘common ground’ approach to philosophy and psychiatry: methods and challenges. Analysis of theory Linguistic philosophy and qualitative research Experimental research and clinical reasoning Historical and sociological research Integrating and translating the research 1.4 Description and prescription 1.5 Integrating the research 1.6 Implications for this study and overview 1.1 Introduction Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ǣ ǡ ǢǢ Ǣǡ ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ osophy: ‘‘How will your activities help my patients?’’, especially if Ǥ
(3) ǤȋʹͲͲȌǡ as a ‘consciousǦing exercise’: ‘‘Philosophy gives us a more complete view 9.
(4) Chapter 1. world.’’ But though philosophy and psychiatry share a common interest in the ǡǡǡ Ǥ to a ‘communication gap’ between the disciplines (ibid.), obstructing fruitful ǤȋǤǤ ʹͲͲͶȌǡ psychiatry to the average practitioner. Philips (2011) states: ‘‘Most publications in — — practice is quite unrealistic ….If you really want to influence mental health care with Wittgenstein’s account of meaning as use and practice, you will have to get rid of the technical language and translate Wittgenstein’s analysis into the la ǡ ǡ ǡ philosophical assumptions they are working with, how those don’t serve them well, and how your suggestions might lead to better practice.’’. ǣ Ǥ
(5) ǤǦ Ǧ‘technicality’ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ methods towards practice, implying use of empiricism (‘show them’) and pragmatism (‘better practice’)Ǥ. If we follow this advice, the empirical study of ‘implicit philosophical assumptions’ or Kendler and Parnas’ ‘a priori philo ideas’ seems a suitable starting point.
(6) ǡ been used to denote what they refer to as ‘a priori beliefs and assumptions’. Related terms in this regard are ‘philosophica iews’, ‘tacit knowledge’, ‘hidden beliefs’ and suchlike. Though no exact definition of these terms is given, they refer ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ convenience, the term ‘beliefs’ will be provisionally employed here. What characterizes these beliefs as ‘philosophical’ can be derived from the subject ǣ ǡ ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ 10.
(7) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. (phenomenology) and what ‘good practice’ entails (ethics). A clearer and more ǡ ȋ ȌǤ ǫ ǡ ȋ ʹͲͳͷȌǡ philosophy’s value would be too dependent on human interests. How far down thi ǫ. 1. ǡǣ ǡ ȋͳͻͺͺȌ ǡ Ǥ ǦǦ vis philosophy, and philosophy’s fundamental commitment to intellectual curi Ǥ disciplines. First though, I suggest Philips’ thoughts can be developed further. . 1.2 Towards philosophy in practice Ǧ Ǥ
(8) ǡ literature have been devoted to the different ‘models’ of prac ȋǤǤ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ȌǤ ǡ ȋ Ǥ ʹͲͲǡ ͳͻͻͷǡ ney 1998). An assumption implicit in Philips’ suggestion is that practitioners ǡ Ǥ ǡ like ‘mental disorder’, ‘mind and body’ or ‘classification’ operate in practice? Are ǫ ǫIf they subscribe to certain ‘models’ of mental disorder, or ǡ ǫ ǡ ǣ Ǥ Colombo and Fulford’s study (2004) of diverging models of mental disorder in 11.
(9) Chapter 1. interdisciplinary teams highlights the diversity of thought at ‘ground level’. Their in practiceǡ ǡ ǡǤ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
(10) ǡ ‘whose philosophy is it?’ may become difficult to answer. All Philips’ advice but does not obviate it, on the contrary: with this in mind philosophy Ǥ.
(11) ǡ between philosophical beliefs and actual practice: first there is ‘pure’ conceptual ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ȋ Ƭ ʹͲͲǡȋ ʹͲͳͶȌǡȋʹͲͳͳȌǤ is the analysis of more general, encompassing ‘models’. The psychodynamic ȋǤǤ Ƭ ͳͻͺͶǡ ò ͳͻͺͷȌǡ ȋ ͳͻͻͷȌǡ ȋ Ƭ ʹͲͳͳȌ ȋ ʹͲͲͲȌǤ Ǧtic, the ‘models’ approach is present if there is a set of ontological Ȁ Ǥ ǡȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ assumption of a more pluralist practice than the more monolithic ‘models’ ȋ ͳͻͻͺȌǤ ȋ Ȍ ǣ ǡǡ Ǥ
(12) ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 12.
(13) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. Ǥ ǡ Ǥ. Ǥ ǡǡǤǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
(14) ǡ the same approach could be taken to focus on patients’ views and actions and to Ǥ commensurate with both parent disciplines will be used: a ‘common ground’ approach. There is no ambition to ‘prove’ the value of philosophy empirically or to ǡ Ǥ
(15) ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ʋ Ǥ ǡ Ȁ ȋ ʹͲͲͻȌǤ ǡǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ǥ ʹͲͳȌǤ parallels between Dooyeweerd’s criticism and arguments in the postpositivi ȋ Ǥ ͳͻͺǡ ͳͻͻ͵ǡ ͳͻͻͻǡ ͳͻͻȌǤ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
(16) ‘science studies’ appr h, ‘following scientists through society’ is applied (with. 1. 13.
(17) Chapter 1. Ȍ Ǥǡ attempting to ‘follow philosophy ough psychiatric practice, society, and history’. . 1.3 The ‘common ground’ approach to philosophy and psychiatry: methods and challenges. Ǧ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ȋͳͻͳȌǡ ȋͳͻͶȌǡ ȋʹͲͲ͵ȌǤ
(18) ǡ ȋǡƬ ʹͲͲͻǡǡʹͲͳ͵ǡʹͲͳͷǡʹͲͳͷǡǤ ʹͲͳͲǡǡʹͲͳʹȌǤ ȋ ʹͲͲͺȌ Ǥǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋǤǤ ʹͲͲǢ ʹͲͲͻȌǤ ȋȌǤ . Analysis of theory ǡǡ Ǥ ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍǡ ǡ ǣ ǡ ǡǡǤ
(19) ǡ Ǥ 14.
(20) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. Ȁ on personal experience of his colleagues’ views. Other authors focus on Ȁ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ȋͳͻͻͷǡ ǤʹͲͲͷȌǤ ǡ how ǡȋȌǤ theoryǡ practiceǡǤ ǣ Ͷ ǡ ȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ Ǧ versus humanistic theories, and so on. From a ‘models’ perspective, psychiatry has ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ǥ ǤʹͲͲʹǡ ͳͻͻͷȌǤ Ǥ ǡǦ Ǥ. 1. ǡ ǡǤǡǡ ǦǦ Ǧ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
(21) ǡ Ǥ
(22) ƲƲ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ . 15.
(23) Chapter 1. (Norman 2000, 2005). Therapeutic ‘eclecticism’ may come in many forms. It may f an ‘‘all the way down’’ eclecticism from theory to practice, but one might ǡ Ǧ ȋǤǤ Ȍ Ǥ
(24) ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
(25) ǡ ȋ Ȍ ǡǤ Ǧ Ǧ ȋʹͲͲǡ ʹͲͲͳȌǤ Ǥǣ ȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡǣ Ǧ Ǧ ǫ. ǡ knowledge ǡ Ǥ
(26) ȋ òͳͻͺͷǡ ͳͻͻͻȌǤ ǡ ȋǡ Ȍ ȋǡ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ ȋ Ǥ ʹͲͲǡ ʹͲͳ͵ǡ ʹͲͲͺȌǤ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǡǤ ǡ ȋʹͲͳͶȌǡ ȋ ȌǤ 16.
(27) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. ǡ ȋ ʹͲͲͺȌǤ Ǧ ȋǡǤǤʹͲͲǡ ʹͲͳͳ). The authority of professionals’ knowledge claims has met with competition from the growing ‘expert by experience’ professional movement, and the parallel Ǧ ȋ ʹͲͳǡ ʹͲͲʹȌǤ Ǥ. 1. ǡ ǡ ǣ to analyze the philosophy of practice by attending to individual practitioners’ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ ȋ Ǥ ʹͲͳʹȌǤ ǡ ȋȌ ȋȌǤ
(28) ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ
(29) ǡ Ǥǡ ǦǦ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ . 17.
(30) Chapter 1. Linguistic philosophy and qualitative research ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ǡǦ Ǥ ǡ philosophy. Much of Fulford’s philosophical work is rooted in the Ordi ǤǤǤǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋ ʹͲͲͶȌǡ ǡ Ǧ method, based on the assumption, rooted in the Oxford tradition, that one’s ordinary use of language offers a window into one’s philosophical assumptions. ȋȌ ȋ2000), although what is termed ‘assumptions’ or ‘philosophy’ here may be referred to as ‘narrative’ or ‘discourse’ within some QR frameworks. It has been ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋǤǤʹͲͲͳǢͳͻͺͺȌǤ Ǥ ǡȋʹͲͳͷȌ Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ Ǧ ǡǤ ǡ ȋǤʹͲͳͷǡ ͳͻͻͺȌǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ practitioners’ and patients’ perspectives, which demonstrating that competence is just an assessment by the therapist, but also a ‘co-constructed reality shaped by the experiences and stories of patient and therapist’. This implies the relevance of ǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ ͳͻͻȌǤ 18.
(31) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. Ǥ ȋͳͻʹȌǤ ‘philosophy of the mundane’, the takenǦǦ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǡǤ ǡǡǦǡ Ǥ ms. ‘‘Clinicians, ǡǡ metaphors’’ (Fenton 1998). The (partially) tacit beliefs may, if they achieve a ǡ ‘framework theory’ and be embedded at one or more of the previously mentioned Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ƭ ȋ ȌǤ
(32) ȋ ʹȌǡ ǡǦ Ǥ. 1. Experimental research and clinical reasoning. Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ȋǤǤ ͳͻͻ͵ǡ Ǥ ʹͲͲͺǡ ʹͲͳȌǤ ǡ Ǥ s’ perspectives has taken place more within the ‘clinical reasoning’ tradition (Norman 2000), which has focused more Ǥ ǡ 19.
(33) Chapter 1. Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ȋǤǤ Ȍ ȋǤǤȌǡ Ǥ ǤȋʹͲͲʹȌ respect to DSM diagnoses, imputing a causal structure to the ‘atheoretical’ feature ǡ ǣ ȋ ǤʹͲͲͺȌǤ. ȋ ʹͲͲȌǤ Ǧ clinical cases. ‘‘The more a behavioral problem is seen as originating in ‘‘psychological’’ processes, the mo Ǣ ǡ ǡ responsible and blameworthy.’’ One obvious advanta ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
(34) Ǥ. Ǥ
(35) ǡ ǫ ǡ ǡ ǫ Ǥ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ‘framework theories’ (GodfreyǦ ʹͲͲ͵Ȍ ǡ developed within the field of ‘personal epistemology’ (see below). It is an empirical Ǥ Ǥ
(36) ͵ǡ Ǥ . 20.
(37) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. Historical and sociological research contingency of one’s views, and ǡ ȋǤǤ ʹͲͲ͵ȌǤ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ƭ ͳͻͻͷǡ ͳͻͻͻȌǤ
(38) A History of Clinical Psychiatry ȋͳͻͻͷȌǡǣ. 1. “The history of clinical psychiatry may be defined as the study of the way in which clinical signals and their descriptions have interacted in successive historical periods, and of their psychosocial context. To estimate the extent to which earlier meanings (terms, concepts and behaviors) are preserved when clinical categories are transferred from one discourse to the next, historian and clinician need to know how descriptive and nosographic rules are formulated. For example, can it be assumed that ‘mania’, ‘melancholia’, or ‘hypochondria’ mean in 1995 the same as they did in 1800? How can differences be made explicit? One of the objectives of historical nosography is to decode the rules controlling psychiatric discourse, and make explicit the drafts upon which it is based.”.
(39) Ǥ ȋǤǤ ǦHeerding 2000). Berrios’ argumen ǡ what he describes as the ‘biological signal’ (the easiest example of such in ȌǤ Ǥ empirical Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ͳ ȋ ʹͲͲͺȌǤ ǣ ȋ Ȍ ǫ ǡ ǫ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ Historiography: the study of the methodology of historians and the development of history as a discipline.. 1. 21.
(40) Chapter 1. ǡ interpretations throughout the event’s history, in the origin ǡ different social and scientific domains. A ‘oneǦsided and caricatured’ picture of the Ǥ ǡ ȋ ȌǤ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǤǦ purely progressive either in ‘converging on truth’ (cf. ʹͲͳʹȌ ǡ ȋ ȌǤ Integrating and translating the research. Ǥ
(41) ǡ tioner’s ideas of patients being more or less (morally) responsible for Ǥ
(42) ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ practitioners’ǡǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ Ǥǡ ȋ 22.
(43) Examining the philosophy of psychiatric practice. ʹͲͲȌ ȋ ǤʹͲͲ͵ȌǤ Barrett’s interesting findings: over time, the rational understanding on the part of the staff of patients’ experiences and behavior increases, and given the association understanding of behavior with ‘normality’ and hence of moral responsibǡ staff’s views on patients’ responsibility for their behavior change accordingly. This ǡ try point for ethics suited to Philips’ goal of ‘improving practice’. I ǡ ital staff. Ahn’s demonstration of a continuum of causal ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ȁ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
(44) for collaborative ‘philosophy in psychiatry’ field work, with clear potential to Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧǡ Ǥ. 1. . 1.4 Description and prescription Ǥ ǡ ǡ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ address worries attached to the concept of ‘empirical ethics’, a research field Ǥǡ ǡ issues rather than methodologies for determining one’s (research) field of interest: methodologies are tools, and follow aims. They then refer to Hume’s is/ought 23.
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