The CSDP in Action in the Sahel Region: a governmentality
perspective
Maxime Delhez
Supervisor: Dr. Julien Jeandesboz
Second Reader: Dr. Stephanie Simon
27
thJune 2014
Master's thesis Political Science
European Union in a Global Order
The Securitization of EU Development Policy:
Of Discourses and Practices
Lisa Begusch
Supervisor: Dr. Julien Jeandesboz
Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Otto Holman
28
thJune 2013
Master thesis Political Science
European Union in a Global Order
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Julien Jeandesboz, for its continuous support, its useful comments and its recommendations during my thesis writing process. I would also like to thank him for the very interesting seminars about the European Union relations with the Middle East.
I would also like to thank Dr. Stephanie Simon for the second reading of my thesis.
I would like to thank all the officials that I have met in Brussels for giving me their time and providing me useful information about the European action in the Sahel.
Last, I would like to thank my friends and my family for their support during the writing process of this master's thesis.
Table of content
List of Acronyms ... v
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Governmentality as an Approach to CSDP ... 4
2.1 A Critical Approach to Security in Europe ... 4
2.2. Governmentality ... 6
2.2.1. Political rationalities ... 8
2.2.2. Problematization ... 9
2.2.3. Technologies of government ... 9
2.3. CSDP activities as a field of governmentality ... 10
2.3.1. Political rationalities: CSDP and liberal peace ... 11
2.3.2. Technologies of government: security and development ... 15
2.4. Conclusion: of political rationalities and techniques of government ... 17
3. Research Design: An analysis of CSDP Discourse and Practices ... 18
3.1. Data Generation Procedure ... 18
3.2. Methodology: discourse and practices as a medium ... 19
3.2.1. A Discourse Analysis: highlighting political rationalities and problematizations ... 19
3.2.2. A Policy Instruments Analysis: a focus on political practices ... 21
3.3. Conclusion: a discourse and policy instruments analysis ... 23
4. Problematization: The Sahel and the security-development nexus ... 25
4.1. The emergence of the nexus in the relation between the European Union and African Countries ... 25
4.2. The security-development nexus in the case of the European strategy for security and development in the Sahel. ... 30
4.2.1. The origins of the strategy for the Sahel ... 30
4.2.2. The Sahel Strategy: a narrative about the security and development ... 31
4.3. Concluding remarks ... 35
5. EUCAP Sahel Niger: a civilian operation ... 37
5.1. Context and Issues in Niger ... 37
5.2. Objectives and means of the civilian mission ... 41
5.3. EUCAP Sahel Niger: the EU's comprehensive approach and affirmation of the EEAS .. 45
5.4. EUCAP Sahel Niger: A policy instrument analysis ... 47
5.5. Concluding remarks ... 50
6. EUTM Mali: a military operation ... 51
6.1. Context and Issues in Mali ... 51
6.2. Objectives and means of the military mission ... 55
6.3. EUTM Mali: a mission without link to the Sahel strategy? ... 58
6.4. EUTM Mali: a policy instruments analysis ... 60
6.5. Concluding remarks ... 62
Annexes ... 66
Annex 1: Request for access restricted documents under Regulation 1049/2001 ... 66
Annex 2: Reply from the Secretariat of the Council concerning my request for access under Regulation 1049/2001 ... 67
Annex 3: Reply from the Secretariat of the Council concerning my confirmatory application for public access under the Regulation 1049/2001 ... 70
Annex 4:Guidelines and questions for the interviews ... 71
Annex 5: Report of interview I with an official from the West Africa Division, EEAS, Brussels, 5th May 2014. ... 72
Annex 6: Report of interview II with an official from the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, European Commission, 7th May 2014. ... 75
Annex 7: Report of Interview III with two officials from the Africa Desk, European Union Military Staff, EEAS, Brussels, 7th May 2014. ... 78
Annex 8: Report of Interview IV with on official from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), EEAS, Brussels, 8th May 2014. ... 82
Annex 9: Report of Interview V with an official form the Strategic Integrated Planning Division, Crisis Management Planning Directorate, EEAS, Brussels, 8th May 2014. ... 86
Annex 10: Report of Interview VI with two officials from the Belgian Permanent Representation to the European Union and two officials from the Belgian military representation to the Political and Security Committee, Brussels, 8th May 2014. ... 88
Annex 11: Report of Interview VII with an official from the Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Brussels, 8th May 2014. ... 91
Annex 12: Report of Interview VIII with an official from the Conduct of Operations, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EEAS, 19th May 2014. ... 93
Annex 13: Report of Interview an official from the Military Crisis Management Cell and an official from the Civilian Crisis Management Cell, Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Brussels, 19th May 2014. ... 95
Annex 14: Report of Interview X with an official from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EEAS, Brussels, 20th May 2014. ... 98
Annex 15: The African continent as depicted by the European Commission in the EU strategy for Africa ... 100
Annex 16: Map of the Sahel ... 101
Annex 17: AQIM presence in the Sahel as depicted by the EEAS ... 102
Annex 18: Map of Niger ... 102
Annex 19: Map of the Sahel with Boko-Haram operational area ... 103
Annex 20: Key migrant route from Africa to Europe ... 103
Annex 21: Major roads for the Moroccan Hashish ... 104
Annex 22: map of the new deployment in Niger ... 104
Annex 23: Map of Mali ... 105
Annex 24: Map with the territory controlled by the rebels (Azawad) ... 105
Bibliography ... 106
List of Acronyms
ACP AFISMA AQIM AU c.a.s.e. CFSP CMC CONOPS PLUS CSDP DAC DG DG DEVCO DG ECHO ECOWAS EEAS ESDP ESS EU EUTM FAC FOC GTIA HR/VP IfS MINUSMA MUJWA NMJ NMLA ODA OECD PSC PSPSDNAfrican, Caribbean, Pacific
African-led International Support Mission to Mali Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
African Union
Critical Approach to Security in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Crisis Management Concept
Concept of Operation Plus
Common Security and Defence Policy Development Assistance Committee Directorate-General
DG of the European Commission for Development and Cooperation DG of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
Economic Community of West African States European External Action Service
European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy
European Union
European Training Mission Foreign Affair Council Full Operational Capability
Groupement Tactique Interarmes (Combined Armed battle group) High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
Instrument for Stability
Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la
Stabilisation au Mali (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Niger Movement for Justice
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Political and Security Committee
Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement au Nord Mali
SDS SSR UN UNDP UNSC
Stratégie pour le développement et la sécurité des zones Sahélo-sahariennes du Niger
Security Sector Reform United Nations
United Nations Development Program United Nations Security Council
1. Introduction
"Security and development cannot be separated" (EEAS 2011: 1): this sentence resumes perfectly the European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel presented by the European Union (EU) on 21st March 2011. The European External Action Service (EEAS) published this strategy four months after its putting into service following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (EEAS 2011). In line with this strategy, Brussels has adopted a comprehensive approach towards the region in order to support the "core" Sahelian countries — Mali, Mauritania and Niger — in their achievements of a secure environment and sustainable economic development. This comprehensive approach combines both development objectives and security imperatives. It mobilizes all the available European instruments of foreign policy ranging from diplomacy, economy, development and security. More recently, stemming from this strategy, the EU has set up two missions in the region under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The first one is a civilian mission in Niger. EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in August 2012 and aims at improving the capacity of the Nigerien internal security forces. The second mission is a military mission that takes place in a situation of crisis in Mali. EUTM Mali began in February 2013 with the purpose of training and advising the Malian army. The EEAS depicts those two missions as an important part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards the region and as working with an understanding of the links between security and development (EEAS 2012; 2013; 2014c). In fact, the whole European action in the region is presented as making a connection between security and development policies: they will help those countries to ensure their security and they will support their economic growth and sustainable development. The European action in the Sahel is framed in terms of support for poor people rather than in terms of geopolitics and geo-economic interests
Yet, the link between security and development is not obvious. The linkage between the two formerly distinct policy areas has been emphasised in numerous reports, papers and policy documents since the end of the Cold War. Western policy makers have increasingly argued that security is impossible without sustainable development and vice versa. They spread this claims even if there is no empirical evidence to support it (Hettne 2010; Stern & Öjendal 2010). This discursive linkage has been described as the 'security-development nexus' by the scientific literature. According to Hatzigeorgopoulos (2012), the main consequence of this nexus is to lead either to a "securitisation of development" or to a "developmentisation of security". In any case, the distinction between security and development policies is blurred and the two policy areas become increasingly similar. The securitisation of development policy — i.e. the inclusion of security aspects in development policies— has already been
widely examined by scholars in Internal Relations and European studies (see for instance Chitiyo 211; Duffield 2001; 2007; Lecompte & Vircoulon 2014). The securitisation of EU development policy towards the Sahel region has even been analysed at the University of Amsterdam last year (Begusch 2013). However, the question of the developmentisation of security policy — i.e. the insertion of developmental preoccupation in security policies — remains largely unexplored. Therefore, rather than focusing on the securitisation of development policies, this thesis is going to focus on the developmentisation of CSDP in the case of the Sahel region. Actually, the two on-going missions in the region offer a good opportunity to analyse the effects of the security-development nexus from a CSDP point of view.
To investigate on this problem of the developmentisation of CSDP, three main questions are going to guide the scientific argumentation developed in this thesis: 1) How the security of the Sahel region has been framed in term of development? 2) What are the consequences of this framing for the European security policies in the region? 3) Whose security is being promoted by these policies, the European security, the security of the Sahelian states or the security of the local population?
To answer these questions, this thesis draws on the literature with a sociological approach to security practices. This perspective apprehends insecurity as a politically and socially constructed phenomenon (Huysmans 2006). In order to grasp the political and social processes lying behind the current European security policies in the Sahel region, I approach CSDP through the lens of Foucault's concept of governmentality. As a framework of analysis, governmentality steers the attention of the researchers towards the relationship between political thoughts and governmental interventions, or saying differently between political rationalities and techniques of government. The adoption of this framework of analysis pushes me to conceptualize CSDP as a field of governmentality by focusing on the political rationalities and the technologies of government at work through CSDP activities1.
Conceptualising CSDP activities as a field of governmentality leads me to use discourse and practices as medium for my analysis. I analyse the European discourse about security and development in general and about the Sahel region in particular through the means of a discourse analysis. This allows me to highlight the political rationalities at work in Brussels and to understand how the Sahel has been problematized as a security issue by the EEAS. I approach practices via the policy instruments analysis developed by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004). An investigation of the two CSDP missions by using this approach lets me grasp the
techniques of government used by the EU in Mali and Niger in order to translate its rationality on the theatre of operation. Besides that, a focus on the instruments also allows me to underline the political and symbolic meaning that lies beyond the use of specific technologies of government.
Following this approach, this thesis argues that the security-development nexus — and the comprehensive approach that stems from it — is strongly promoted by the EU, and by the EEAS in particular, in order to strengthen its distinctive identity on the international stage. Discursively linking security and development is a way for the EEAS to affirm its new position amongst the EU institutional structure by increasing its visibility. In fact, the discourse about the links between security and development is used to serve specific interests instead of reflecting the needs of the country targeted by the CSDP missions. Besides that, the security-development also increases the legitimacy of EU foreign policy regarding to European citizens. Actually, by phrasing its interventions in terms of development and support to the Nigerien and Malian states, the EU legitimizes its intervention in the eyes of its citizens but also in the eyes of the local population. Yet, this framing masks the fact that the European intervention is mostly driven by its security and economic interests in the region. Actually, the EU uses development as an entry point to secure its interests in the region. By using capacity-building and Security Sector Reform (SSR) techniques, Brussels wishes to increase the capacity of Mali and Niger to control their vast territory and they will thus be able to protect the EU's interests. Finally, this European approach represents a developmentisation of CSDP because the aim is to give to Bamako and Niamey the opportunity to take care of their security and destiny by themselves. It also marks the adoption of a preventive approach: the EU acts at the origins of the threats to its interest; it wants to tackle the roots causes of insecurity.
To sustain this argument, this thesis is divided in five main sections. First, it develops my theoretical framework by locating the research into the framework of the critical approaches to security and by presenting the Foucauldian framework of analysis based on the concept of governmentality. Then, the next chapter presents my methodology based on the use of discourse and practices as means of investigation. The third chapter analyses the European narrative about the links between security and development. It focuses specifically on the discourse about the Sahel region in order to understand how this region has been perceived as a problem by the EU. Fourth, it presents the civilian CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel Niger. After a contextualization and a presentation of the objectives of the mission, it analyses it by using the policy instruments approach. Five, before the conclusion, it investigates the other mission — EUTM Mali — following the same patterns.
2. Governmentality as an Approach to CSDP
This first chapter lays down the theoretical aspects of this thesis. It argues that the adoption of governmentality as a framework of analysis gives the opportunity to deconstruct the security policy of the European Union towards the Sahel region. Indeed, the framework offered by Foucault's concept of governmentality provides some important conceptual tools allowing the researcher to produce a critical analysis of CSDP. In this chapter, I begin by locating my analysis into the trend of thought known as critical approaches to security practices in Europe. Then, I present governmentality as a framework of analysis that focuses on political rationalities, problematization and techniques of government. Finally, I apply this framework of analysis to CSDP activities in order to grasp a particular kind of political rationality at work through current CSDP missions and operations.
2.1 A Critical Approach to Security in Europe
Orthodox approaches to security have long dominated the field of security studies in America and Europe (c.a.s.e. collective 2006). These traditional approaches suggest that security is a given; it is an ontological imperative that the state must purse to ensure its survival (Walters & Haahr 2005: 94). In this perspective, the state was the central referent object and emphasis was placed on the protection and preservation of national security. Hence, military power and military threats were the central focus of these traditional approaches to security (Walt 1991).
However, since the 1980s important innovations have emerged in the field of security studies and European scholars were in the vanguard of these novelties. Three schools of thought — Copenhagen, Aberystwyth and Paris — were central in this intellectual rupture from orthodox approaches to critical approaches to security. The Copenhagen School is well known for its concept of 'securitisation' that defines security as a speech act. It is because an event is discursively conceptualised as a threat that it triggers the adoption of exceptional measures and the mobilization of security policies. Consequently, scholars associated with this school focus mainly on discursive practices. Aberystwyth has been central for the development of so-called Critical Security Studies. The researchers associated with this movement reject the statist approach to security. Rather, they have defined security in term of emancipation in order to tie it with the people and not with the state. This particular approach of security places human emancipation at the centre of the analysis. Finally, the Paris School has developed a more sociological approach to security practices. It has focused mainly on security professionals, governmental rationalities and security technologies. Therefore,
researchers from this school are less oriented to discourse and more to practice. Whereas Aberystwyth and Copenhagen have strong roots in the fields of political theory and International Relations, the Paris School gathers together researchers from various disciplines such as International Relations, political sociology, law and criminology (c.a.s.e. collective 2006; Huysmans 2006; Waever 2004).
Even if scholars from those three different schools have divergent opinions on certain aspects, they have enough similarities to spark off a creative debate and create new conceptual tools for studying security policies. For instance, the three schools identify and denounce the depoliticization of security policies. Furthermore, they all emphasize the political construction of security issues. Consequently, some of the researchers from these schools have institutionalized their cooperation in a number of research networks. One of these networks is the Critical Approach to Security in Europe (c.a.s.e.) collective. It brings together researchers with an interest in critically examining contemporary security practices in Europe. In their manifesto, researchers from the c.a.s.e. collective proposed some directions for future researches. Notably, they argued for the need to critically analysing the merging between security and development in current European security practices (c.a.s.e. collective 2006).
This is precisely what this thesis is going to do, i.e. critically analysing the security-development nexus in the European security policies towards the Sahel region. However, even if researchers from the c.a.s.e. collective share some common grounds, the differences between the three schools are still perceptible. One can still make a difference between the discursive and sociological approaches to security. By adopting a sociological approach to security, the analysis of the CSDP developed in this thesis can be located in the framework of thought advocated by the Paris School.
According to the partisans of this sociological approach to security, discursive formations are not sufficient to understand properly how security operates. In order to critically investigate contemporary security practices, scholars need to take into account both discursive and non-discursive practices: "a sociological approach is stronger than a purely linguistic approach to securitization, because it combines discursive and non-discursive formations, including know-how, gestures and technology" (Balzacq et al. 2010: 3). Thence, with this double focus on discourse and practices, insecurity appears to be more than a political construction: it "is a politically and socially constructed phenomenon" (Huysmans 2006: 2). Insecurity is a domain of practices that is produced "through socially and politically investing security rationality in policy areas" (Ibid: 6) and the modulation of this domain of practice
highly depends on technological and technocratic processes (Ibid.: 8). From this political sociology perspective, it appears that narratives of security "are rooted in a certain form of governmentality" (Balzacq et al. 2010: 2).
Therefore, the plea made by Merlingen for moving the study of European security policy from governance to governmentality seems pertinent for critically analysing the merging between security and development in CSDP policies towards the Sahel region (Merlingen 2011). Indeed, focusing on mentalities and practices, governmentality underscores the constructed nature of political problems. As a framework of analysis it offers the possibility to investigate "the 'unnatural' intellectual and technical work" behind EU security policy. Hence, this Foucauldian perspective allows for the generation of highly critical perspectives on CSDP that question mainstream academic works on this policy field (Merlingen 2011: 156). To summarize, this thesis adopts a political sociology perspective for analysing current European security policies in the Sahel region. In line with the approach advocated by the Paris School, this research applies governmentality to analyse the CSDP. It focuses on the sociological nature of EU's security practices by investigating on the rationalities and technologies at work in European security policy. For instance, this sociological perspective will allow me to understand the important role played by the EEAS in the production of a discourse linking security and development. Now, first of all, it is time to look carefully at Foucault's concept of governmentality and what this concept can bring to the study of European integration if the field of security and defence.
2.2. Governmentality
Foucault developed his concept of governmentality during his lectures as a professor at the Collège de France while he was exploring the modes of diffusion of power and what he called "the problematic of government" (Foucault 1991a: 87). Strictly speaking, governmentality is not a theory in itself. Rather, it is a framework of analysis, a toolkit that contains few conceptual tools allowing the researcher to carry out a critical approach to political research (Merlingen 2012; Walters & Haahr 2005). Foucault used the term governmentality in order to link semantically governing (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalité) (Lemke 2001: 191). Later, governmentality became seen as a neologism for 'governmental rationality' (Gordon 1991: 1). It refers to a particular way of thinking about and exercising political power. Therefore, studies in governmentality pay attention to the way governments think about their role in the society and the ways they exercise it. The study of
governmentalities pushes the researchers to investigate the relationship between governmental intervention and political thinking (Merlingen 2006: 183).
When using the term governmentality, Foucault referred to the formation of a new form of political rationality that has emerged during the 16th century and has become central in the 18th century. This new political rationality is fundamentally different from the one depicted by Machiavelli in The Prince (Lascoumes 2004: 4). For the prince "the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality […] understood as the link that binds him to his territory and his subjects" (Foucault 1991a: 90). However, during the 16th century, following a process of rationalization and technicization, a new political rationality came out. The objective was no longer to reinforce and protect a territory. Rather, the exercise of power aspired to produce and organize the populations in order to let it fully develop its properties (Lascoumes 2004: 4). Consequently, for the first time in Europe the exercise of power was oriented towards the wealth and happiness of the population. The rational behind this was to reinforce the power of the state by increasing the productivity and docility of its inhabitants (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 21). Following Foucault own words, governmentality refers thus to "[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has a its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security" (Foucault 1991a: 102).
By focusing on the political rationalities and techniques of the organisation and exercise of power (Merlingen 2003: 361), governmentality offers a framework that allows the researcher to think differently about contemporary regimes of government (Rose 1999:3). Applying to Europe, this framework enables us to grasp the governementalization of Europe, i.e. the mechanisms which allow the EU to function as a centre of power and governance in certain policy fields. By opening up and developing the inside of the European Union, governmentality denaturalises the idea of Europe because it does not presuppose to know where Europe is and what it does (Walters & Haahr 2005). Besides that, considering its focus on networked governance, governmentality is well tailored to analyse the kind of deterritorialised and de-stated politics taking place at the European level (Merlingen 2006). Yet, governmentality has been mainly applied to EU's domestic/internal politics (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 22). Huysmans (2006) for instance used it to analyse the relationship between the freedom of movement and the securitisation of migration in the EU. Walters and Haahr (2005) adopted a governmentality perspective to deconstruct the discourse
about European integration. However, applying the "Foucault's toolkit" (Merlingen 2012) to EU's external policies in general and CSDP in particular will contribute to our understanding of this field of European integration. Indeed, Merlingen argues that investigating CSDP through the lens of governmentality offers three main advantages. First, a governmentality analysis highlights the productive power that is exercised through CSDP. Second, it directs the attention of the researchers to micro-practices and minor aspects of CSDP and consequently, it brings a new perspective to the study European security policy. Third, it allows scholars to understand what is at stake in CSDP by paying attention to the changes in the political rationalities informing policy-making (2011; 2012).
To resume, with his concept of governmentality Foucault focused on the history of the art of government (Walters & Haahr 2005: 3); he "traced the shifting mentalities underpinning how rulers have thought about their art and the different practices of rule they have devised and employed to perfect it" (Merlingen 2011: 150). Therefore, a research following the precepts of governmentality focuses on the mentalities and technologies deployed for the control of the conduct of conducts (Rose 1999: 9). Applying to the EU, this focus on political thought and political technologies allows the researcher to denaturalise and deconstruct European governance. In order to grasp those mentalities and technologies of government at work in CSDP, I focus on three key notions of the governmentality framework: political rationalities, problematization and technologies of government (Merlingen 2011: 152).
2.2.1. Political rationalities
As previously shown, the activity of government and the exercise of power are inextricably bound up with the activity of thought. (Rose 1999: 8). For this reason, studies in governmentality pay a particular attention to the mentalities of government, to the way political authorities imagine and think about their role (Walters & Haahr 2005: 5). Therefore, the notion of political rationalities is crucial because it seizes well the significance of those governmental mentalities.
A political rationality or a rationality of government is a way of thinking about the nature of governmental practice. It answers questions such as: Who can govern? How should we govern? What should we govern? Why do we need to govern? (Gordon 1991: 3; Walters & Haahr 2005: 6). Consequently, a governmental rationality makes governance thinkable. It is a particular discourse that delimits a field of governance by determining the subjects, objects and practices to be governed. It makes a specific domain intelligible for the exercise of power
and it gives the means — strategies and tools — by which this power has to be applied, by which it has to be governed (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 23; Merlingen 2011; 152).
2.2.2. Problematization
The notion of problematization is central because as stated by Rose and Miller government is a "problematizing activity" (cited in Walters and Haahr 2005: 6). Political rationalities determine the problem to be governed. They engender their own problematizations, which determine the challenges and threats to good governance. As a result, the way a government frames a problem, the way it defines threats and risks, is not neutral: it is a mental construction that has been shaped by the political rationalities (Merlingen 2011: 153). In this sense, insecurity is well the result of a social construction; it is "a politically and socially constructed phenomenon" (Huysmans 2006: 2). This is in line with the emphasis placed in governmentality approach on the "constructed nature of political problems" (Merlingen 2011: 153).
This conceptualisation of insecurity as a social and political construction attracts the attention of the researcher to the framing of security issues. The institutional and discursive processes through which a particular event has been defined as a threat definition become thus central in the study of security policy. This focus on security framing enables to understand how the application of security knowledge to policy problems made them intelligible as an object of security (Huysmans 2006).
Finally, it is during this problematization or this security framing that the mentalities of government can be identified. Indeed, political rationalities become really apparent and visible during the problematization process. Problematization tells us how the government perceive its role, the society and the threats to it (Walters & Haahr 2005: 6).
2.2.3. Technologies of government
As previously stated, governmentality studies focus on the relationship between political thoughts and governmental interventions. If political rationalities make governance thinkable, technologies or techniques of government make it "practicable". They translate the governmental ideas and ambitions into concrete actions (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 23). In fact, as Rose argued it: "[t]hought becomes governmental to the extent it becomes technical, it attaches itself to a technology for its realization" (Rose 1999: 51).
Besides that, as explained earlier in this chapter, the modulation of insecurity domains depends on technological and technocratic processes. The instruments of policy
implementation — i.e. the techniques of government— precede and pre-structure the framing of insecurity domains. The technologies have thus an impact on the problematization process because as noticed by Huysmans "the solutions and available technologies do to some extent define the problems" (2006: 8).
Therefore, an analysis of the means, instruments and mechanisms through which the government exercises its power is primordial (Walters & Haahr 2005: 14). Technologies of government are used to shape the conduct of the target in the hope of producing certain effects and avoiding undesired events. A technology of government is then:
[…] an assemblage of forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth, traversed and transacted by aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed (Rose 1999: 52).
2.3. CSDP activities as a field of governmentality
Since the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) — now called the CSDP since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty — in 1999, the European Union has deployed 31 CSDP missions and operations2. (EEAS 2014a; EEAS 2014b). Through this deployment of military and civilian missions/operations, the EU has become a key contributor to international security and stability by being active in the field of crisis management. (Gross 2013; Howorth 2007). Most of the missions have been deployed in Africa. Yet, as noticed by Keukeleire and Raube, at the time of the creation of the common security policy, "it was far from obvious that it would be used to tackle crises in developing countries" (2013: 563). To understand how the EU has become involved in the security of the African continent by launching CSDP operations and missions, it is worthy to look at the political rationality at work through CSDP activities. To do so, this section conceptualises CSDP as a field of governmentality. This allows me to take critical look on this European policy by focusing on the "darker side" of CSDP (Merlingen 2012: 198). First, I look at the political rationalities at work through EU security policies. Then, I look at the techniques used by the EU when it launches a mission in a foreign country.
2 The difference between CSDP mission and operation lies in the nature of the mandate. An operation has an
2.3.1. Political rationalities: CSDP and liberal peace
This section of the thesis argues that a particular kind of political rationality is at work through contemporary CSDP activities. As noted by Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006: 28-29), this rationality is marked by an ambiguity, a double-sided nature. On the one hand, it is an expression of altruism, of the care for others and a concrete sign of a global civilizing process. On the other hand, the rationality at work through CSDP activities divides the world in two by making a distinction between civilized/developed and 'to be civilized'/'to be developed'. This "othering process" (Merlingen 2012) allows the EU to use control-oriented approach in order to transform the country targeted by CSDP activities (2006: 28-29). In fact, CSDP activities "are enfolded in a political rationality that is characterized by a particular admixture in liberal thought of elements of the pastorate" (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006:30). This hybrid rationality that combines elements of liberalism and political pastorate is not unique to EU's CSDP activities, it is a characteristic of modern forms of governmentalities according to Foucault (Ibidem). Let me now elaborate on these two political rationalities at work through CSDP activities.
As defined by Rose, liberalism refers to "a certain way of codifying and delimitating the exercise of sovereign power by identifying a realm of society with its own economic processes and its own principles of cohesion, and populated by individuals acting according to certain principles of interests" (1999: 49). Therefore, liberalism — as a political rationality — aims at activating and promoting the responsibility and the political autonomy of citizens. Hence, citizens are expected to assume more and more responsibility for their own security, welfare and wellbeing. (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 30). The ultimate goal of liberalism is thus to enhance the welfare of the population and by doing so to ensure the prosperity of the whole country.
From this liberal political rationality follows a liberal problematic of security. This particular problematic of security is related to people and all the conditions and events that retard or promote their wellbeing. It is thus concerned with securing these biological and social processes in the name of people, rights and freedom. The ultimate objective is to improve the life of the population. (Duffield 2007: 4). This liberal conception of security is well caught by the concept of 'human security' that prioritizes the security of the people over the security of the state (Thede 2013). Following this understanding of security centred on the well-being of the individuals, underdevelopment became perceived as a threat. Wars are seen as the result of underdevelopment, poverty and weak state institutions (Duffield 2011; 2007; Hettne 2010). Therefore, if one wants to preserve peace and reduce the number of conflicts, one needs to promote development and transform the dysfunctional and underdeveloped
societies. This is according to Duffield, the objective of the idea of liberal peace. This idea "reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached though a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and especially, transformational measure" (Duffield 2001: 11).
The concept of human security and the transformational aim of liberal peace are at the origin of the convergence and merging of security and development in the 1990s. Development policies re-established their earlier concerns with poverty and conflict and at the same time, security policies have come to share the terrain of development (Chandler 2007; Duffield 2001; Hettne 2010). Indeed, the idea of liberal peace has pushed development policies towards the promotion of social transformation in underdeveloped countries. It has led to what Duffield calls a 'radicalisation' of the politics of development. Alongside this radicalisation of development, following the widening of the concept of security to include the threat of underdevelopment, security policies have invested developmental tools and initiatives with ameliorative and transformative power (Duffield 2001). Therefore, security and development policies have become increasingly similar. They both share a similar objective: transforming the war-affected or underdeveloped societies in order to prevent the (re)emergence of violence and conflict and to put those countries on a path towards peace (Duffield 2001; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006). The purpose of this linkage between security and development is to coordinate policy intervention in non-Western states; it aims at creating a comprehensive approach to Southern states (Chandler 2007). As argued by Stepputat, the security-development nexus can thus be seen as a project of coherence that usually "targets unruly areas in the global South" (Stepputat 2012: 439).
Regarding the European security policies, this idea of liberal peace and the security-development nexus have pushed CSDP towards the field of capacity-building and SSR (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandermoortele 2012; Youngs 2008). The EU focuses on the promotion of good governance in fragile states through development policies but also through CSDP activities: the EU often uses SSR missions as a mean for state building (Hout 2010; Youngs 2008). The aim of state building is to enhance the capacities and structure of the states in developing countries (Marquette & Beswick 2011). Therefore, as argued by Chandler (2012), the ultimate objective of these European capacity-building policies is to enable fragile states to secure themselves by empowering them as agents of their own development and security. According to Pugh, Gabay and Williams (2013), this represents a clear shift towards a developmentisation of security. Consequently, I can argue that CSDP has been 'developmentised' following this liberal conception of security.
Following this, it is now clear that a liberal rationality is at work through CSDP: CSDP activities are represented as a way to better the world by promoting security, good governance and prosperity in 'conflict-like' or conflict areas (Merlingen 2012: 196). However, as argued by Tholens (2012), what is at stake through CSDP capacity-building and SSR is norms transfer: it is the transfer of (Western) liberal democratic values to targeted countries. It is taken for granted that the EU knows which norms and values are good for underdeveloped and fragile states. It is here that another kind of rationality — the pastorate — is at work through CSDP activities.
This idea of promoting good governance and progress is linked to modernisation theory. In this sense, it is a reproduction of the colonial discourse about the idea of Western "civilising mission" (Schlag 2012). Indeed, the EU represents itself as helping others become liberal, peaceful and wealthy. It considers itself as an example for the others, for the underdeveloped countries. As remarked by Merlingen, the effect of this is that "the EU acquires the status of a repository of a historically evolved normality that post-conflict societies must strive to achieve if they want to go beyond conflict and underdevelopment in which they are trapped" (2012: 201). Through its capacity-building and SSR activities, the EU presents itself as an exemplar for those countries it qualifies as inferior or underdeveloped others. Thus, CSDP governmentality constructs third countries as problematic and in need of European intervention. The good and knowledgeable EU brings its assistance and guidance to the underdeveloped country targeted by the theatre of operation (Merlingen 2012).
In this sense, CSDP governmentality is marked by a political rationality similar to what Foucault has qualified as "pastorate" (Foucault 1982). This pastorate originated in Christian institutions. It is the idea that certain individuals, thanks to their religious quality, can serve others as pastors. It is a very special form of power that is salvation oriented, oblative, individualizing, continuous with life and linked with the production of truth (Foucault 1982: 782-783). At the core of this idea of pastorate power is the image of the shepherd — a superior kind of human being — and the flock that needs to be guided and protected (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 30). This is exactly what we find in CSDP activities with the European Union being the shepherd and the population living in the theatre of operation being the flock. Through this pastorate, CSDP activities contribute to the "othering process" that depicts the EU as an evolved entity and the others as inferiors (Merlingen 2012).
In fact, this pastorate has for major effect to constitute targeted countries as underdeveloped, inferior and dependent of the EU. This effect was already pointed out in the 1990s when Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995) — two Foucault-inspired postcolonial
scholars — have vigorously criticized modernisation assistance and Western development aid. For instance, Escobar argued that:
[…] there exists a veritable under-developed subjectivity endowed with features such as powerlessness, passivity, poverty, and ignorance, usually dark and lacking in historical agency, as if waiting for the (white) Western hand to help subjects along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative, and traditions. (1995: 8)
Therefore, as noted by Duffield (2006), I can argue that we are facing a continuation of the colonial discourse that legitimised intervention by depicting the West as effective and the non-West as ineffective. This ability of effective states to declare others as ineffective "has played a central role in the re-expansion of the West's sovereign frontier" (Duffield 2006: 215). This double sided political rationality and the linkage between security and development has constructed the post-colonial and underdeveloped world as a governable object for the EU (Stepputat 2012). Indeed, as Merlingen stated it: "CSDP governmentality assigns to Brussels the power to remake the outside in particular in its neighbourhood in its own image" (Merlingen 2012: 200). In 1994, Ferguson and Lohmann claimed that the major effect of the development machine in Lesotho was the expansion of "the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally takes 'poverty' as its point of entry and justification" (1994: 180). This quote perfectly describes the effect of the political rationalities at work through CSDP activities because they give the EU the power to act in foreign countries and to control and influence the life of these foreigners.
To conclude, the political rationality at work through CSDP activities is a strange and hybrid mixture of liberalism and pastorate power. The principle of freedom advocated by the liberal rationality stands in contradiction with the idea of pastoral power, where the subject of power is depicted as inferior and dependent on the pastor. According to Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, the underlying assumptions behind this paradox is that a period of pastoral discipline is necessary in order for the natives to learn the principles of responsible choice and to install sufficient institutional capacities for liberal peace in fragile or post-conflict societies (2006: 31). The principle effect of this rationality is to create a convergence and a merging between security and development. Development is seen as a precondition for security and security is seen as necessary for development. This rationality and the link between security and development allow the EU to intervene in underdeveloped and fragile countries. The EU acts in these countries to transform them, to reordering them in line with best European practices. Therefore, we are assisting to a developmentisation of the European security policies with the move of CSDP towards the field of capacity-building and SSR. This creates
confusion and reinforces the similarities between security and development policies. Indeed, as Escobar said it about development assistance in 1995, what is at stake though CSDP governmentality is a:
[…] process by which in the history of the modern West, non-European areas have been systematically organized into and transformed according to European constructs. Representations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as Third World and underdeveloped are the heirs of an illustrious genealogy of Western conceptions about those parts of the world (1995: 7).
Now that I have looked in depth at the political rationality at work through CSDP activities, it is time to look at how this double-sided rationality is implemented on the ground through certain technologies of government.
2.3.2. Technologies of government: security and development
Two technologies of government are at work when the EU conducts CSDP activities: security and development. Those two technologies are either working separately or simultaneously in CSDPP activities. In this section I first present Huysmans' concept of "security as a technique of government" (Huysmans 2006: 6). Then I look at how we can conceptualise "development as technique of governmentality" (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 13). Finally, I argue that the nexus formed by security and development can also be conceptualised as technique of government.
In The Politics of Insecurity (2006), Huysmans argued for moving the study of insecurity from a threat-centred analysis to an understanding of insecurity as a domain of practice. Security studies would therefore focus on the routines, the administrative instruments and the professional agencies involved in the process of security framing (Huysmans 2006: 2-6). From this first move stems a second: "a step from discursive to more technocratic interpretation of security framing" (Ibid: 6). The concept through which this second move is captured is the one of "security as a technique of government" (Ibid.: 6). This concept adds a technocratic point of view in security studies; it emphasizes that the modulation of insecurity domains highly depends on technological and technocratic processes. Indeed, Huysmans considers that the policy instruments available to deal with a specific issue often precede and pre-structure the political framing of this issue. As a result, the available means and technologies do to some extent define the political problem (Ibid.: 8-9). Huysmans defines technique as: " (1) a particular method of doing an activity which usually involves practical skills that are developed through training and practice, (2) a mode of procedure in an activity, and (3) the disposition of things according to a regular plan or design" (Ibid.: 9). This technocratic point of view about the framing of insecurity domain as one main advantage:
following Foucault's approach, it allows the researcher to unpack specific technological devices used to exercise power in the context of an analysis of the political rationalities of a government (Ibid.: 93). Finally, the addition of a technocratic point of view pushes the security studies towards the field of sociology. It leads to a political sociological analysis of the technocratic politics (Ibid: 13).
Security is not the only technique of government performing through CSDP activities, as I have previously explained, CSDP activities aims more and more at reinforcing the institutional structure of fragile and underdeveloped states in order to create the necessary institutional conditions for liberal peace. In this sense, CSDP makes more often use of development tools. Because of this shift in development policy towards the reinforcement of institutions and capacity-building in fragile states, Stern and Öjendal argued that development could be considered as a technique of government (2010: 13). In their words, development "has become a technique of governmentality, of disciplinary and biopolitical control" (Ibid.). Indeed, development is now more and more used to transform fragile or post-conflict states into liberal states where the population can live freely, develop all its properties and increase its welfare and wealth (Duffield 2001; 2007).
With the increase emphasis on capacity-building and SSR missions, CSDP activities frequently combine development and security; security policies are designed to reinforce the capacity of the targeted state. This combination of security and development — both techniques of government as I have explained — can also be conceptualised as a technique of governmentality. As stated by Stern and Öjendal (2010), security and development are techniques of biopower through which subjectivity and life are governed. Those two techniques of government intend to improve the life of people in (possible) conflict marked societies. Hence, techniques of security and development are use to counter insurgency against biopower through controlling and disciplining people from underdeveloped countries. Understood as technique of governmentality, the use of security and development "seemingly evacuate the political questions of the ethics of 'governing the other', and life itself, and technologize (or in other words, depoliticize) the (bio)politics of security-development" (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 13).
To summarize, the CSDP's double-sided political rationality is translated on the field of CSDP activities through two main techniques of government: security and development. These techniques of government are either performing separately or together in CSDP activities.
2.4. Conclusion: of political rationalities and techniques of government
In order to provide a critical analysis to current security practices in the European Union, this thesis adopts a more sociological approach to CSDP activities in the Sahel region. With its focus on political rationalities and techniques of government, the framework of analysis provided by Foucault's concept of governmentality allows me to conduct a political sociology analysis of the European involvement in Mali and Niger.
The conceptualisation of CSDP activities as field of governmentality has highlighted the political rationalities and techniques of government at work through this European policy. CSDP activities are marked by a double-sided rationality that mixed elements of liberal thought and political pastorate. This hybrid political rationality makes a connection between security and development policies. It also gives to the EU the power to intervene in underdeveloped and fragile states in order to transform the institutional structure and the capacity of those states according to European standards and values. The objective for the EU is to empower those fragile states as agents of their own security and development. Therefore, I argue that CSDP has been 'developmentised'; it shares the same objectives as development policies. The techniques of government that translate this political rationality on the ground provide an example of this developmentisation of the European security policies. Indeed, two kinds of techniques of government — security and development — are at work through CSDP policies.
Therefore, conceptualising CSDP as a field of governmentality shows how underdeveloped and fragile states have become "governable objects" for the European Union (Stepputat 2012: 440). In the next chapter, I expose my methodology to investigate how the Sahel region has been transformed in a governable area for Brussels.
3. Research Design: An analysis of CSDP Discourse and Practices
Keeping in mind the Foucauldian framework of analysis presented in the previous chapter, this chapter details the methodological aspects of my research. It presents the research design that guides my empirical analysis. I first outline the kind of data that I mobilize to construct my scientific argumentation about the security-development nexus and the two CSDP missions in the Sahel region. Then, I introduce my methodology with its focus on discourse and practices. This thesis uses a discourse analysis and a policy tools approach. I explain here how the use of discourse and practices as medium fits perfectly with the focus of governmentality on political rationalities, problematizations and political technologies.3.1. Data Generation Procedure
The primary sources mobilized in this thesis consist mainly of relevant European documents coming from the documents registers of the Council of the European Union (hereafter, I only use the word 'Council' to designate the Council of the EU), the European Commission and the EEAS. Those documents cover the period between 1999 — the year of the creation of the ESDP — and today. Almost all the documents are available for public access on the public documents register of these EU institutions. Indeed, despite my request to access several classified documents, I could only access three of them and only one was useful for the purpose of this thesis.3 All the documents are related to the CSDP, the relations between Africa and the EU, the Sahel strategy and the two CSDP missions in the region, i.e. EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger. These documents are of primary importance, they represent a "gold mine" that shows how security is understood inside the European institutions (Neal 2013: 126). However, I need to be careful while using those documents because they present a complex challenge: "[m]ost texts are produced by drawing on multiple genres, discourses and/or styles, and in this sense any text is hybrid, but EU policy documents are particularly complex." (Teti 2012: 269). To add to this complexity, the production of EU documents necessitates the intervention of various actors coming from different departments and units (Ibidem). Besides EU's official documents, I also use the data collected through my fieldwork in Brussels. I have conducted ten interviews with officials from the EEAS, the European Commission and the French and Belgian permanent representations to the EU4. All
the officials were dealing with at least one of the CSDP operation in the Sahel region. All the
3 See annex 1 for my request to access restricted documents.
reports of the interviews are enclosed in the annexes of the thesis5. Finally, Bruxelles2 — a
Francophone website specialised in EU's external relations —, LeMonde — a French newspapers — and JeuneAfrique — a Francophone website specialized in the African actuality — are also an important source of information and data.
Regarding the secondary sources, I mobilize the researches of several scholars about the security-development nexus, the CSDP, the EU Sahel Strategy and the two CSDP missions in the region. This scientific literature is an important source of complementary information. In accordance with Booth, Colomb, and Williams, I use them to support my argumentation if I cannot find the data in my primary sources (2008: 69). Let me now explain how I am using these primary and secondary sources.
3.2. Methodology: discourse and practices as a medium
Merlingen considers that "the study of governmentalities, […], is concerned with the relations between government interventions and political programmes or styles of political thinking" (Merlingen 2006: 183). However, Foucault has never provided a clear explanation on how to investigate this relationship. In this section, I argue that the use of discourse and practices as medium for investigation is pertinent. Indeed, a discourse analysis and a policy instruments analysis allow me to focus on the relationship between political rationalities and techniques of government or said differently between the security-development nexus and the two CSDP operations in Mali and Niger.
3.2.1. A Discourse Analysis: highlighting political rationalities and problematizations
For Walters and Haahr, the study of problematizations and rationalities involves a focus on discourse. In this sense governmentality is inseparable from the work of post-structuralist discourse analysis (Walters & Haahr 2005: 6). In fact, discourse matters because it constructs meanings for the world, because it renders the world intelligible. Therefore, "[t]o analyse discourse is to grasp the ideational structures that enable and constrain political behaviour" (Merlingen 2012: 191). In this sense, investigating on discourse reveals the political rationalities that pre-structure political actions.
Discourse analysis is an approach to language that can be applied to every forms of communication, from talks to written texts and newspaper articles. Therefore, it can be applied to European documents and interviews (Bryman 2012). In order to conduct a proper
5 For privacy reasons, all the reports are anonymous. Only the position of the interviewees is mentioned in the
discourse analysis, one needs to take language as an irreducible medium. Language is a constitutive dimension of reality. It is a social system that produces reality for human beings (Neumann 2008: 61; Walters & Haahr 2005: 6). In that sense, discourse is constitutive of subjectivity (Jeandesboz 2007: 390).
However, I am not only interested in language because governmentality pushes discourse analysis to engage with the technical aspect of discourse, with "the materiality of discourse". This means that one must also focus on "the eminently technical ways in which the world is represented by means of little things like charts, tables, numbers, diagrams and reports" (Walters & Haahr 2005: 7). This materiality of the discourse is important because it is through these materials that the world is made visible and governable (Ibidem.).
According to Neumann, a discourse analysis follows three main steps (2008: 63-75) .The first one consists in delimitating the discourse to a vast but manageable range of sources. Regarding my research, I include in my discourse analysis all the European documents related to the Sahel region — and more specifically to Mali and Niger. I also include all the documents in the field of security and development policies since 1999. I chose 1999 because it marks the beginning of the ESDP. I also include essential documents about the CSDP such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 and the 2008 report about its implementation for instance. Lastly, my discourse analysis also encompasses an analysis of the discourses of the officials that I met in Brussels. The second step consists in identifying and mapping the various representations contained in the discourse (Neumann 2008). Indeed, it is important to focus on the way in which discourse links words in relation of equivalence or differentiation to each other. These "chains of equivalence" or "chains of differentiation" are crucial because they fix the meanings of the discourse (Merlingen 2012). Finally, the last step consists to look carefully at the variation in these chains of representations. Not all the representations are of equal importance. The task consists thus to identify the dominant representation in one discourse. (Neumann 2008).
Finally, as Foucault emphasised it, it is important to focus on the condition of the formation of the discourse, on "its formal rules of construction". In that sense, analysing discourse can be compared to archaeology because the researcher needs to grasp the facts and conditions of the manifest appearance of discourse (Foucault, 1991b). Hence, my discourse analysis contains a scrutiny of the emergence of the European discourse about the Sahel region.
By following this method, I would be able to grasp the political rationality and the problematization lying behind the European security policies towards the Sahel countries.
However, as argued by Jeandesboz, it is important to not isolate the discourse analysis from the realm of practices (2007: 390). Therefore, we also need to looks at how a specific discourse is concretely translated on the ground.
3.2.2. A Policy Instruments Analysis: a focus on political practices
Governmentality supposes that the researcher places the study of practices in the centre of its analysis. According to Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004), one way to analyse political practices is by looking at the instruments of public action. Therefore, in this thesis, I analyse the European political practices in the Sahel regions through the instruments mobilised by Brussels in the Sahel region.
According to Foucault, the analysis of political practices through a focus on political techniques is central because it is trough these techniques that states of domination are maintained and power exerted. Actually, Foucault proposed a disciplinary conception of power based on the use of political techniques to control and assure the conduct of conducts (Lascoumes & Le Galès: 2004: 20) Governmentality highlights the importance of political techniques in the exercise of power. Therefore instrumentation is seen as the central activity in the art of government (Lascoumes 2004: 6). For Lascoumes and Le Galès, public policy instrumentation means:
[…] the set of problems posed by the choice and use of instruments (techniques, methods of operation, devices) that allow government policy to be made material and operational. Another way of formulating the issue is to say that it involves not only understanding the reasons that drive towards retaining one instrument rather than another, but also envisaging the effects produced by these choices. (2007: 4).
Hence, to focus on public policy instrumentation means to analyse in depth political practices through a focus on instruments. A public policy instrument can be defined as:
[…] a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation. (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007: 4)
With this definition, I can now make a useful analytical distinction between an instrument, a technique and a tool. As defined above, an instrument is a kind of social institution such as census or taxation for instance. A technique is a specific device (disposif in the Foucauldian vocabulary) operationalizing the instrument such as a specific law. A tool is a micro-device
