1
Terrorism as a cycle of violence
A critical discourse analysis of the ‘Orwellian’ response
by the French state to the Paris attacks
Source: Pancho, in Council of Europe 2017
Laura van den Vrijhoef S4066014
25 July 2017
Master thesis: final version
Supervisor: prof. dr. Henk van Houtum Conflicts, Territories and Identities Radboud University Nijmegen Word count: 36.029 words
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Executive summary
This thesis investigates how the French state has responded to the Paris attacks, both in terms of discourse and policy making. It makes clear that the French state’s discourse on terrorism promotes a repressive response of military and security measures, which contributes to a cycle of aggression (Bueno Lacy et al., 17 June 2016) on the international level, and a cycle of radicalization (Adida et al., 14 January 2015) on the national level. While these measures are implemented with the intention of protecting France against future attacks, they seem to be contributing to the maintenance of the terrorist threat (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy 2017). As a result, the French state’s approach to terrorism implies a disproportionate exertion of state power, which has sincere consequences for people’s lives. While the French state aims to defend human rights, it is violating them in a disproportionate way, both in war zones and at home (Amnesty International, 4 February 2016; Unicef, 15 March 2014; World Vision, 1 March 2016; Amnesty International, 26 October 2016a; Amnesty International, 26 October 2016b, Airwars, 17 January 2017).
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Acknowledgements
Nijmegen, 20 July 2017
This master thesis is written as part of the master specialization Conflicts, Territories and Identities, a combined master program of Human Geography and the Centre for Conflict Analysis and
Management (CICAM) at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. This master program has been an interesting follow-up to my bachelor in Political Science. During two years of intensive courses on international conflict, elective courses on the Arabic language, and an internship at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR), this master program has strengthened my skills of analytical thinking, critical reasoning and academic writing, and has challenged me to question my taken for granted knowledge about international conflict. It has especially triggered my interest for the topic of terrorism, which polarizes public debates in a way that I do not feel comfortable about. This thesis is just the beginning of my search for a better understanding of the societal tensions that cause, and are caused by, radicalization and terrorism.
There are a couple of names that deserve to be mentioned here. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor prof. dr. Henk van Houtum for his guidance throughout the entire research process. I am thankful for the freedom and trust he has given me to find my own voice and build my own story. Our conversations often left me in a state of confusion, but they always turned out to be very helpful for the realization of my story line.
Moreover, I was allowed to be part of CICAM, the Human Geography Department and NCBR. I am thankful for the interesting conversations I was able to have with a great diversity of people. In particular, Rodrigo Bueno Lacy and his tireless inspiration will not be forgotten soon. He has often flooded me with new insights and has never been reluctant to share his critical opinions.
Additionally, I would like to thank Sarah Dresden, my tutor and sparring-partner from the Nijmegen Centre for Academic Writing. Despite our different academic backgrounds, not much words were needed for her to understand what I was doing and where I wanted to go. She has helped me to structure my ideas and find a common thread within the bulk of information in which I had immersed myself when I knocked at her door for the first time.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to express my thanks and love to my parents Mireille and Peter and my boyfriend Funs for their never ending support during the challenging process of writing a master thesis. They have been there for me with hugs and good food during each and every ‘up’ and ‘down’ and have encouraged me to never stop believing in myself.
I am proud of the result and I hope that it can be an inspiration for others.
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Preface
This text is a personal story that is based on the news broadcast of Nieuwsuur1 (13 November 2015) and an
extra news broadcast of the NOS2 (14 November 2015a).
13 November 2015
I am drawing a painting while sitting on the couch next to my father. Drawing helps me to process my experiences of the day. It is my way out in times of bad weather, which stops me from having an evening walk through the polder landscape. My mother is upstairs brushing her teeth before going to bed. She has to get up early tomorrow morning and values a good night rest. My boyfriend is laying on the other couch working on his laptop. It is a normal Friday evening in November, just like we have had many; drinking tea after a nice dinner and watching TV. It is ten o’clock when Nieuwsuur starts off with a report about the cabinet’s failed plan for a renewed tax system. It does not interest me that much to shift my eyes from my piece of paper to the television screen.
The Dutch home care organization TSN must reverse the proposed wage reduction. Jihadi John has been killed by an American drone. We hear John Kerry, the American Minister of Foreign Affairs, warning: “The terrorists associated with Daesh need to know this: your days are numbered and you will be defeated”. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters have recaptured the city of Sinjar from Islamic State. The police has arrested 18 Kurdish protestors in the building of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Street musicians in Amsterdam will be banned. Then, in between two news items, anchorman Jeroen Overbeek firmly announces:
“We just have received the news that there have been shootings in a restaurant in Paris. French media report several deaths. We will inform you as soon as we have more information.”
Nieuwsuur continues with a report about a proposal to introduce a euthanasia pill for people with incurable diseases. After that, it elaborates on a personal story of a refugee family from Syria, living separately in the Netherlands and Turkey. The Dutch government plans to restrict the possibilities for family reunification. Then, the anchorwoman, Marielle Tweebeeke, interrupts:
“There have been shootings in a restaurant in Paris. As far as we know, two people have been killed and seven are injured. We will of course let you know when there is more to tell.”
Nieuwsuur returns to the news of the day again. Councilors express their concerns about their possibilities for monitoring the City Council after national health care responsibilities have been transferred to the municipalities. An elderly woman tells about the home care she receives, which has been reduced with three hours a week.
“And back to the situation in Paris. This night, shootings have taken place in a restaurant. Two deaths, seven injuries. We have heard that there have also been several explosions at a football stadium. Ron Linker, our correspondent in Paris, is on the line at the moment, hello Ron?” It remains silent on the other side of the line.
1 A Dutch daily news program that provides background information to the news. 2 The Dutch national news channel of the public service broadcasting.
5 “We had hoped to get more information from him, but unfortunately the connection is not working.” The anchors rush through the remainder of the news broadcast and try to get into contact with Ron Linker several times, but the connection continues to fail. In the meantime, sports anchorman Gert van ‘t Hof continues with sports news. He has not yet finished his item about Johan Cruijff, whose position at the management of Ajax seems to be under pressure, when Marielle Tweebeeke interrupts again: “We will elaborate on this in a few minutes, but first we return to Paris. Earlier this evening, we reported on the shootings that have taken place at a restaurant. In the meantime, it has become clear that eighteen people have died. In addition, things are happening at Stade de France3, where president
Francois Hollande was attending a soccer game. He has now returned to the Elysée Palace4. As soon
as we have more information… Oh, that moment is now. We finally have Ron Linker on the line, our correspondent in Paris. Ron, tell us more!”
In the minutes and hours that follow, the series of coordinated attacks that are taking place in Paris unroll themselves to our living room and to the rest of the world. When Nieuwsuur comes to an end, the NOS starts an extra news broadcast in which the anchors alternate with the correspondent in Paris, endlessly repeating what has already been said, each time with a little bit more of information.
Pictures, videos and stories of eyewitnesses appear on social media. Panic, chaos and fear seem to take over the city. The amount of deaths continues to increase to 26, 30 and eventually ‘dozens’.
The anchors and correspondents try to search for meaning. Can we think of a link between the sites of the attacks? Do they have something to do with the attacks on Charlie Hebdo? France just took extra security measures to prepare itself for the upcoming international climate summit, could this have something to do with it? How much security do we need? Is it even possible to defend ourselves against these kind of attacks? And where on earth have the shooters gone?
During the days that follow, the news is dominated by – what has come to be known as – the Paris attacks. I remember how my father in law, who used to be a calm and rational man, interprets them as ‘game changers’ in the history of international politics, similar to 9/11. Public discussions are
dominated by feelings of outrage and powerlessness. They do not allow much room for reflection. I experience how people who carefully try to take a nuanced standpoint, and question the position of Muslim migrants in France, are not taken seriously, and rejected as senseless people who disrespect the victims of Paris. I start to wonder how these social dynamics work. Do we really get overwhelmed by these attacks or does this attitude of surprise cover up a certain logic? I decided to figure it out.
3 A football stadium in the North of Paris (BBC, 9 December 2015).
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Table of contents
Executive summary2
Acknowledgments3
Preface4
Table of contents6
List of figures8
I Introduction9
II The academic context
13
The study of terrorism 13
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 14
Social constructivism 14
Discourse 15
Power 16
CDA in the study of terrorism 18
Gaps within the critical approach 18
The empirical gap 18
The methodological gap 19
The application of CDA within this thesis 20
The fictive level: ‘1984’ 20
The ideational level: speech act 20
The material level: policies 21
Concluding remarks 22
III The empirical analysis
23
The international context 24
‘1984’ 24
Speech 25
Policies 35
The international coalition 35
The French case 36
Timelines of the war 38
The myth of protecting civilians 44
The national context 47
‘1984’ 47
Speech 47
Policies 53
The Banlieues 54
Radicalization 54
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Concluding remarks 58
IV Conclusion & Discussion
61
The terrorism debate 61
Suggestions for future research 63
Policy recommendations 64
Postface
66
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List of figures
Figure I Peace for Paris
Figure II The terrorism frame by the French state
Figure III Coding scheme
Figure IV Coded speech
Figure V Representations of the war with Islamic State
Figure V.1 How the war between France and Islamic State is generally represented
by the French state and international media
Figure V.2 An alternative representation of the war between France and Islamic State
Figure V.3 How the war between European states and Islamic State is generally represented by European political leaders and international media Figure V.4 An alternative representation of the war between European states and
Islamic State
Figure VI Cycle of violence schematically Figure VII Cycle of violence in pictures Figure VIII France’s state of emergency
Figure IX Cycle of radicalization schematically Figure X Cycle of radicalization in pictures
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I Introduction
On 13 November 2015, the city of Paris fell victim to a series of coordinated terrorist attacks (BBC, 9 December 2015). Bombs were exploded nearby the Stade de France, where the French and German national soccer teams were playing a friendly match. Mass shootings were conducted in several public spaces of cafés, restaurants and terraces, where people were enjoying their Friday nights off. Visitors of the Eagles of Death Metal band were taken hostage and most of them killed in the Bataclan music venue. These terrorist attacks, conducted by French associates of Islamic State, caused the deaths of 130 people, left 368 people injured and traumatized the lives of many more (The Atlantic, 22 November 2015). Currently known as the Paris attacks, they were to enter the history books as the deadliest attacks on France since World War II (BBC, 14 November 2015).
The Paris attacks led to intense outcry within and outside France (BBC, 14 November 2015). Barely recovered from the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in January that year, people unified along feelings of disbelief and wondered why France had to become the target of such cruelty. As stated by Nathalie Nougayrède (9 January 2016), the former editor of the French newspaper Le Monde, the attacks hit ordinary people in all their vulnerability, and this could happen to anyone at any time. The French cartoonist Jean Jullien (13 November 2015) powerfully captured this emotion in his ‘Peace for Paris’ image that merged the Eiffel tower with the universal sign for peace (figure I). It became the symbol of international mourning and was widely shared at sights of commemoration and on social media (Time, 14 November 2015).
Figure I Peace for Paris
Source: Jullien, 13 November 2015
Besides expressions of unity, the fear for new attacks was spreading over Paris and the rest of France (New Yorker, 19 November 2015). Hundreds of people ran away in panic during a public gathering of commemoration at Place de la République two days after the attacks. The gunfire they thought they heard turned out to be firecrackers (BBC, 15 November 2015). This fear was reinforced by the extensive reports on the attacks that appeared in the news. News media tended to enter into endless speculation in their attempt to get a grip on the situation (Mondon, 14 November 2015). The populist leader Marine LePen exploited this environment of fear by confronting the French state with its inability to secure the safety of its citizens and soon gained popularity from her call for strong leadership (The Guardian, 1 December 2015).
10 While until then, president Francois Hollande was known for his soft and conflict-avoidant attitude, his reaction to the Paris attacks gave him the appearance of a forceful leader (The Guardian, 16 November 2015a). Ever since the earlier attacks on Charlie Hebdo, Hollande had been struggling to formulate a convincing answer to the threat of and fear for new attacks. Now, his inability to prevent the Paris attacks encouraged him to take a tough stand (The Guardian, 16 November 2015a). During the same nights of the attacks, he announced a state of emergency throughout the entire territory of France, which allowed for house arrests and police searches on a massive scale (Hollande, 13 November 2015). Three days later, in his speech before a joint session of the French Parliament, he announced to marshal the full strength of the state to strike back (Hollande, 16 November 2015). On the international level, he declared war to Islamic State and announced to increase the French
airstrikes on Islamic State’s strategic targets in Syria and Iraq. On the national level, he announced an extensive package of security policies that would strengthen the state’s capacities to monitor
potentially dangerous citizens (Hollande, 16 November 2015).
Polls indicated that this response was met with popular support (YouGov, 22 November 2015; Foreign Policy, 16 July 2016). Both the state of war and the state of emergency last until today. However, several human rights organizations have increasingly expressed their concerns about these measures. They criticize the way in which the French state’s fight against terrorism leads to a disproportionate use of state repression. Within the context of the war against Islamic State, they point to the lives of innocent civilians that are put at risk while too little is done to protect them (Amnesty International, 26 October 2016a; Airwars, 17 January 2017). Moreover, they argue that the state of emergency causes the violation of human rights on a national scale (Human Rights Watch, 3 February 2016; Amnesty International, 4 February 2016; The Local, 22 February 2017; Human Rights Watch, 27 June 2017). France does not stand alone in this; this repressive tendency dominates many state discourses on (counter)terrorism (Jackson 2007a).
This repressive tendency is backed up by the traditional study of terrorism. As a research discipline that is closely linked to state structures, it follows the same assumptions as many states: it interprets terrorism as an exceptional threat to the national security of states, which calls for the adoption of repressive measures (Jackson 2009). As a consequence, the traditional study of terrorism appears to be irresponsive to studies that question this established image (Jackson 2009). Instead, it confirms the repressive counterterrorism and security policies of many states and provides political leaders with a scientific justification for them (Jackson 2009).
However, this traditional approach is critiqued for taking terrorism as a self-contained phenomenon, with objectively observable characteristics, causes and solutions, whereby it overlooks the political context in which the concept is defined (Jackson et al. 2007). This has led to the development of a critical approach to the study of terrorism, which investigates terrorism through an alternative paradigm and takes it as a discourse (Hülsse & Spencer 2008). As such, the critical approach recognizes the political nature of the terrorism concept and explicitly integrates this into research projects. Among other things, it investigates how the general understanding of terrorism legitimizes a repressive response, while excluding non-repressive measures from the political spectrum (Jackson 2009).
In doing so, these research projects show a strong focus on the United States, as they are regarded as the precursor in the repressive trend of counterterrorism policies (Jackson 2007b). In contrast, the European Union’s discourse on terrorism has been taken as the nuanced counterpart to the American discourse, approaching terrorism in a much softer way, both in terms of words and policies (Jackson
11 2007b). However, within the current context of terrorist attacks that are taking place in western
Europe, individual European states increasingly tend to follow the American path. Amnesty
International warns that European states are taking “Orwellian counter-terrorism laws stripping rights under guise of defending them” (Amnesty International, 17 January 2017a), with France acting as one of the forerunners since the Paris attacks (Amnesty International, 17 January 2017b).
By this, Amnesty International refers to the story of 1984 (Orwell 1950). In this dystopian novel, George Orwell describes a future society that is governed by a totalitarian regime in its most extremist form. On the basis of this, he powerfully captures how fear for a certain threat can lead to the adoption and approval of far reaching policies that imply a disproportionate use of state repression. Although this story pushes state repression to its extremes, Amnesty International (17 January 2017a; 17 January 2017b) warns that the French state, in its attempt to protect France against future attacks, threatens to slip into the same direction. As put by Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy (2017), ‘the political extreme’ tends to become ‘the new normal’. For this reason, this thesis delves into the French state’s response to the Paris attacks and analyzes the use of repressive means in its fight against terrorism. This leads to the central question of this thesis:
How has the French state responded to the Paris attacks, both in terms of discourse and policy making?
In order to investigate this, the following sub-questions need to be addressed. How is terrorism framed by the French state?
How does this terrorism frame inform the adoption of repressive counterterrorism policies? How do the repressive counterterrorism policies have an effect on people’s lives?
In doing so, this thesis applies the lens of 1984 (Orwell 1950) to the French state’s discourse on terrorism as a way to deconstruct it. Since discourses have a naturalizing effect (Fairclough 1985), it can be difficult to recognize its discrepancies and tensions when being subject to the discourse yourself. Therefore, the fictive story of 1984 (Orwell 1950) will help to expose repressive tendencies of the French state in the real world. This analysis will be twofold. On the one hand, the speech that president Francois Hollande (16 November 2015) gave three days after the Paris attacks will be analyzed to see how terrorism is framed by the French state and how this informs the adoption of repressive policies. On the other hand, news items and policy reports will be analyzed in order to see how these policies work out in practice. As such, this thesis builds on the critical approach to the study of terrorism by investigating the interrelatedness of language, action and power (Jäger & Maier 2009). Yet, while the critical approach shows a strong focus on texts (Blommaert 2001), this thesis explicitly integrates counterterrorism policies and their effects into the analysis, which forms the scientific relevance of this thesis.
This analysis should not be taken as a matter of fact, but as an alternative representation of terrorism. As such, the societal relevance of this thesis is to create awareness of the power relations that are underlying the French state’s discourse on terrorism and the human suffering resulting from that – tendencies that might also be present in other discourses of European states. It thereby hopes to contribute to the development of a discourse that does more justice to the widely shared value of human rights. On the basis of this, it has the aim of challenging the readers of this thesis to reflect on their own taken-for-granted assumptions about terrorism.
12 This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II places this thesis within its academic context. It makes a case for a critical approach to the study of terrorism and follows the theoretical and methodological premises of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Chapter III contains the empirical analysis of the French state’s discourse on terrorism. It connects the fictive level of 1984 (Orwell 1950), the ideational level of the speech by president Francois Hollande (16 November 2015), and the material level of the French state’s counterterrorism policies. Chapter IV formulates an answer to the central question of this thesis. It thereby reflects on the lens of 1984 (Orwell 1950) and discusses in what ways this is helpful to understand the French case. This final chapter concludes with suggestions for further research and policy recommendations for alternative ways to deal with terrorism.
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II The academic context
This chapter starts with an overview of the academic debate on (counter-)terrorism. In doing so, it makes a case for a critical approach and explains why the topic should be studied as a discourse. As such, this thesis can be positioned within the academic framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Therefore, what follows is a discussion of CDA: its roots within social constructivism, the concept of discourse and the way in which discourse is related to mechanisms of power. Then, the gaps within the critical approach to terrorism will be discussed, as well as the way in which this thesis tries to respond to them. Finally, this chapter explains how CDA will be applied in this thesis.
The study of terrorism
The study of terrorism can roughly be divided into two approaches. On the one hand, the traditional approach to terrorism seeks to define terrorism as a social phenomenon by determining its structures, strategies and causes (Hülsse & Spencer 2008). On the other hand, the critical approach to terrorism investigates terrorism through an alternative paradigm and takes it as a discourse. Instead of asking what terrorism is, it asks how terrorism is constructed through discourse (Hülsse & Spencer 2008). Both positions will now be explained, which will result in the case for a critical approach, as this recognizes the political nature of the terrorism concept.
The traditional study of terrorism has developed from the field of security studies. As a research discipline that is closely linked to state structures and often financed by state resources, it tends to follow the same theoretical assumptions to which many states adhere: this type of violence poses an exceptional threat to the national security of states, this threat is rooted within extremist interpretations of Islam, and a repressive response is needed to counter it (Jackson 2009). This results in research projects that are mainly concerned with problem-solving rather than problem-understanding, meaning that they focus on solutions without having a clear understanding of the causes of terrorism (Gunning 2007).
Their research develops from the concept of ‘new terrorism’, assuming that the current type of terrorism marks a unique historical phase in the development of modern international terrorism. Because of the intensified use of violence, contemporary ‘religious terrorism’ is said to fundamentally differ from anarchist, nationalist and Marxist terrorism in the 19th and 20th century (Rapoport 2001). As put by Morgan (2004), “rather than focusing on conventional goals of political or religious
movements, today’s terrorists seek destruction and chaos as ends in themselves” (Morgan 2004, p. 30). The transnational organization structure of contemporary terrorist groups, their potential use of
weapons of mass destruction and their large-scale actions of indiscriminate killing are said to pose a destructive threat, which needs to be countered with evenly intensified measures (Laqueur 1999, Morgan 2004).
At the same time, several studies show opposing tendencies and question these traditional assumptions. It is argued that the security threat from terrorism is relatively limited (Mueller, in Jackson 2009), that there is no significant causal link between the religion of Islam and terrorism5 (Sageman; Pape; Bloom; Holmes, in Jackson 2009), and that repressive approaches appear ineffective to counter terrorism (Jackson 2009). In addition, the concept of new terrorism, and the extent to which
5 These studies emphasize that terrorism is not rooted in the religion of Islam. Instead, they argue that the religion of Islam is politically (mis)used by terrorist groups to legitimize the use of terrorist means in order to achieve political goals (Jackson 2009).
14 it can be regarded as fundamentally different compared to previous types of terrorism, is questioned and debated extensively (Tucker 2001; Copeland 2001; Spencer 2006; Duyvestein 2010).
However, the traditional study of terrorism has not been responsive to these new academic
developments. Similarly to the public debate, as explained by Jackson et al (2007), it seems to suffer from a moral threshold that prevents it from questioning its own assumptions. There is the risk “that understanding terrorist motives equates to sympathizing with them and explaining their behavior equates to justifying or exonerating it” (Jackson et al. 2007, p. 4). The traditional field holds on to its theoretical assumptions, despite the gap between theoretical grounding and empirical evidence. As a consequence, they confirm the repressive counterterrorism and security policies of many states and provide political leaders with a scientific justification for them (Jackson 2009).
The central problem of the traditional approach is that they fail to recognize that the term terrorism is a fundamental political concept (Jackson et al. 2007). This means that the choice to present a particular act of violence as terrorist is a political choice and thus motivated by political interests in terms of power. More specifically, states deliberately apply the term terrorism to resistant groups in order to undermine their legitimacy, and thereby strengthen the legitimacy of the state (Wecke 2003). The traditional study of terrorism excludes this political context from the analysis: it unjustly takes terrorism as a self-contained phenomenon with objectively observable characteristics, causes and solutions, and thereby overlooks the political context in which these characteristics, causes and solutions are defined (Jackson et al. 2007).
This shortcoming of the traditional approach has led to the development of a critical scientific approach towards terrorism, which includes this political context into the analysis (Gunning 2007). The critical stand focuses on the interrelatedness of language and action, which is intermediated by power interests. In particular, the critical approach focuses on the way in which political actors talk about terrorism and how this informs the policies they adopt to counter it. Moreover, it analyzes how, through these words and practices, certain societal relations of domination are produced and secured. As such, it approaches terrorism as a discourse and is rooted within the academic framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Jackson 2007a). What this means, will be explained in the upcoming section.
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
As said, the critical approach to the study of terrorism is rooted within CDA. CDA is an integrative framework of philosophical, theoretical and methodological premises that is concerned with the study of discourse. In order to understand what CDA is and does, several aspects will be discussed: first, CDA’s roots within social constructivism; second, the concept of discourse; third, the way in which discourse is related to mechanisms of power; and finally, its emancipatory aims. This section concludes with a summarizing statement on what this all means for the critical approach to the study of terrorism.
Social constructivism
CDA derives from social constructivism. This is a strand within the philosophy of science that is based on specific assumptions about the nature of the social world and how we as human beings know it. Most importantly, social constructivism assumes that our knowledge of the social world is
fundamentally subjective (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). We as human beings are formed by our surroundings – such as social networks, education, and societal norms and values – which influence how we look at the world. This means that our understanding of the world is created and maintained
15 through social processes. As a result, knowledge is socially constructed; through social interaction “we construct common truths and compete about what is true and false” (Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 5). Knowledge therefore is contextual. It is the product of specific historical and cultural circumstances and can change over time and space (Jorgensen & Philips 2002).
Language is seen as one of the most important mechanisms in this respect. Social constructivism assumes language to be a pre-condition for thought (Burr 2015). As a consequence, our access to reality is always mediated through language (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). With language we create representations of reality. However, words are never a mere and direct reflection of reality; they always carry a layer of meaning with them. As such, the words we use also contribute to the construction of reality. This is also known as the performative characteristic of language: when someone talks about something, he or she automatically constitutes it. This does not mean that physical objects do not exist, but rather that they only gain meaning, for us as human beings, through language (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). For this reason, CDA scholars show a strong focus on the investigation of texts. Texts are seen as the manifestation of social action (Wodak & Meyer 2009). Rather than merely describing particular texts, CDA scholars investigate their broader dynamics and embeddedness within social structures, thereby linking language use to its societal context (Wodak & Meyer 2009).
Social constructivism emphasizes that we are always and inevitably bounded to our ways of
interpretation, such as language. In other words, “there is no escape from representation” (Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 14). This means that it is impossible to generate universal or objective truth. Rather than trying to grasp some objective reality that is ultimately inaccessible for the human mind, social research should therefore be interested in understanding how people actively make this reality through the construction of knowledge, meaning and truth (Patterson & Cook 1997). In other words, we should not ask ourselves whether something is true, but how truth is produced through social processes (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). As such, research is socially embedded and should not considered to be separate from society (Wodak & Meyer 2009). In addition to this, critical scholars emphasize that the social construction of knowledge is embedded in systems of power and therefore fundamentally political in nature. What we define as true and meaningful, depends on who has the power to define (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). These representations – our collective stories about what is true and meaningful – is what CDA scholars mean when they talk about discourse. In the next part, the concept of discourse will be explained in further detail.
Discourse
In their use of the term discourse, many CDA scholars build on Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse (in Jäger & Maier 2009). On the basis of this, discourses can be defined as follows:
Discourses are institutionalized ways of thinking and talking, which regulate action and thereby exert power (Link, in Jäger & Maier 2009, p. 35).
Discourse is a complex concept and its various aspects are unified in this singular definition. They will now be explained step by step. First of all, discourses are ‘ways of thinking and talking’. This aspect refers to discourses as systems of representation. A discourse is a particular representation of a certain topic – an object, an event, a person, a relationship, etc. – that consists of a particular set of meanings, statements, metaphors, stories, images and imaginaries (Burr 2015). Due to these systematic
representations, statements surrounding a certain topic appear to be repetitive. Only those statements that fit within a certain discourse are accepted as true and meaningful (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). As
16 a consequence, although in principle there is an infinite number of ways to talk about a certain topic, a lot of alternative representations remain unsaid or unheard. In this way, discourses create ‘truth effects’; a particular representation is presented and received as the only true representation of a certain topic. Foucault (in Jorgensen & Philips 2002) refers to this collective construction of truth as ‘regimes of knowledge’.
Second, discourses ‘regulate action’. This aspect means that discourse, as a particular representation of the social world, forms the basis upon which people act. Besides defining which statements are possible and acceptable, discourses therefore also determine which actions are possible and acceptable. In this way, a discourse restricts people’s possibilities for action: “within a particular worldview, some forms of action become natural, others unthinkable” (Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 6). In other words, certain actions are legitimized by discourse while others are delegitimized. Thus, due to the performative characteristic of language as discussed above, action is inherent to the functioning of discourse. In relation to this, Jäger & Maier (2009) emphasize that discourses are not merely ideational; they are also material realities. In other words, they do not only exist in our minds as ideas that reflect the social world, but they also make or enable the social world: “Without
discourses, there would be no social reality” (Jäger & Maier 2009, p. 36). Therefore, while discursive elements (thinking and talking) are often the focus of CDA scholars, they can only be understood in relation to non-discursive elements (actions) (Jäger & Maier 2009).
Thirdly, discourses are ‘institutionalized’. This means that they are embedded in social institutions. Social institutions can be understood as ‘self-regulating conventions’ (Phillips et al. 2004). They entail certain mechanisms, which are socially constructed, and which enforce people to obey to the particular modes of knowing and acting of a particular discourse. In this way, social institutions police their own boundaries of acceptable statements and behavior, also known as ‘discursive limits’ (Philips et al. 2004).
Examples of social institutions are the family, the school, the workplace, the church, the courts or the government (Fairclough 1985). The mechanisms of control can be tangible, for example going to jail when conducting or preparing terrorist attacks. They can also be much less tangible, for example in case of self-censorship with regard to controversial political statements. As mentioned above, someone who questions the dominant public understanding of terrorism might risk to be rejected as a
sympathizer or justifier of terrorism (Jackson et al. 2007). As such, not only actions but also ideas that exceed certain discursive limits are policed through social processes.
Finally, discourses ‘exert power’. Because our knowledge of the world is socially constructed through discourse, and social processes are inherently political, power is crucial to the functioning of
discourse. Jäger and Maier (2009) distinguish two ways in which power plays a role: there is the power of discourse and the power over discourse. This will be explained in the following paragraph. Power
On the one hand, the power of discourse refers to the existence of discursive limits (Jäger and Maier 2009), as mentioned above. Since discourses determine what can be said, under what conditions and by whom, they evoke processes of inclusion and exclusion; they provide some and denies others the right to speak. These processes of inclusion and exclusion also work out in practice: people are included and excluded from actual groups, activities and privileges in social life. As such, discourses create and maintain relations of domination, whereby some people benefit and others suffer from a
17 certain societal hierarchy. CDA scholars are concerned with the ways in which discourse produces and reproduces these forms of social domination, as well as the way in which dominated groups try to resist this (Wodak & Meyer 2009).
At the same time, discourses function to cover up this aspect of power. According to Fairclough (1985), the defining characteristic of discourses is their capacity to naturalize. Naturalization gives certain political representations the status of objective and common sense knowledge, making their ideological underpinnings invisible. Due to this functioning of discourses as Foucauldian ‘regimes of knowledge’ (Jorgensen & Philips 2002), people often take political knowledge and practices for granted and perceive them as ‘natural’ or ‘logical’, rather than recognizing the particular interests they represent. In this way, if often happens that certain political beliefs gain an almost unchallenged status, whereby most people accept them as truth or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo (in Wodak & Meyer 2009).
On the other hand, the power over discourse refers to the ability to determine, control and change discourses (Jäger & Maier 2009). As said, discourses reflect particular representations of the social world within an endless range of possible representations and are never completely coherent.
Alternative representations are always available. This leaves room for contestation and resistance, and evokes a struggle over representation. Although some people have more power over discourse than others – for example political elites who have a privileged access to media and financial resources – dominant discourses will always be contested by opposing voices. In order to remain dominant, discourses require constant investments in their reproduction, thereby preventing alternative stories to gain a foothold in collective thinking (Fairclough 1985). This can be seen, for example, in the way in which state leaders continuously address their peoples after a terrorist attack has occurred. In this way, they try to control how the public interprets these events (Bligh et al. 2004). However, despite these efforts of political elites, individuals or singular groups do not have this determining power over discourse on their own. Discourses are ‘supra-individual’, meaning that everybody is co-producing discourse and its final result is not precisely intended (Jäger & Maier 2009). For this reason, power effects resulting from discourses “should not necessarily be interpreted as the conscious and
manipulative intent of some individual or group” (Jäger and Maier 2009, p. 39). The goal of CDA is not necessarily to point an accusing finger, but to expose these power dynamics.
As such, CDA has emancipatory aims. Because of the assumed political nature of knowledge, CDA scholars are concerned with critiquing and changing society beyond understanding and explaining it (Wodak & Meyer 2009). By making the interconnectedness between knowledge and power visible, they aim to create awareness among those who suffer from a particular discursive order. On the basis of this, the discourse, and by this the unjust societal order, can be changed. The goal of CDA therefore is “to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection”, which could be achieved by “creating awareness in agents of their own needs and interests” (Wodak & Meyer 2009, p. 7).
To this it should be added that liberating oneself from domination is not necessarily a solitary affair. Instead, fighting structural social inequality and injustice is a shared moral responsibility (Young 2006). One of the problems of social domination lies in the fact that dominated people have difficulties to be heard. Therefore, the aim of CDA should also be to make people aware of each other’s needs, interests and well-being, and to stimulate a sense of sympathy and social responsibility.
18 CDA in the study of terrorism
Rather than the exercise of ‘offering critique’, it is the interest in the functioning of power through discourse that makes the CDA approach to the study of terrorism critical rather than traditional. It starts from the idea that representations of terrorism are not objectively obtained but politically motivated, which implies that some people benefit while others suffer from them. The critical approach aims to make this interconnectedness between knowledge and power visible. As such, it aims to create awareness of injustice, and by this to change the dominant discourse and related societal order. In this way, it engages with social processes and public debate on terrorism instead of
maintaining the myth of scientific objectivity within the so-called ‘ivory tower’ of the traditional approach.
In sum, to study terrorism from a critical perspective means: first, to study how certain ways of thinking and talking about terrorism persist and become accepted as truth; second, how these beliefs regulate action to counter terrorism; third, how these beliefs and actions are institutionalized within state structures; and finally, how these state structures produce and maintain certain relations of power. This has already been shown by the way in which terrorism is consistently defined as an exceptional threat to national security. Due to this recurrent interpretation of terrorism, political actors tend to be irresponsive to nuancing standpoints, which question the actual degree of the security threat from terrorism. In this way, the idea of terrorism as an exceptional security threat is incorrectly accepted by many academic and political actors as an objective fact (Jackson 2009). Moreover, this persistent idea regulates action by informing the policies that are adopted by many states to counter terrorism. More specifically, it legitimizes repressive policies and excludes non-violent means, such as political dialogue and compromise, from the range of possible actions (Jackson 2009). In addition, these ideas and actions are institutionalized in all kinds of ways. This does not only happen through the
development of counterterrorism laws, which has the aim of preventing and punishing terrorist acts, but also through the development of societal norms, which prevents people from questioning the dominant public understanding of (counter)terrorism (Jackson 2007a). Finally, this dominant discourse on terrorism exerts power by promoting means of state repression. At the same time, this exertion of state power has largely been naturalized. It is not being recognized as a political choice, but accepted by many people as the only adequate possibility to counter terrorism (Esch 2010). In the empirical analysis in the next chapter of this thesis, these dynamics will be explained in further detail. This critical approach to the study of terrorism is starting to be seen as a useful paradigm for
understanding the social dynamics of contemporary terrorism, now that the amount of terrorist attacks in so-called western states, especially in western Europe, are increasing (Jackson et al. 2007). At the same time, just as every scientific approach, it is still developing and has its own weaknesses and gaps. These will be discussed in the following section.
Gaps within the critical approach
The critical approach to the study of terrorism shows some weaknesses in its implementation of CDA. Most significantly, two biases can be observed: one empirical and one methodological. I will now explain what they entail and how they have resulted in the focus of this thesis.
The empirical gap
First of all, from an empirical point of view, the critical approach to the study of terrorism shows a geographical bias towards the political realm of the United States (Jackson 2007b). Examples of studies that delve into the main premises of the ‘war on terror’ discourse as promoted by the Bush administration in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are numerous (Merskin 2004; Jackson 2005;
19 Croft 2006). The same applies for accounts of the extent to which this discourse has been continued by the Obama administration (Jackson 2011; Reyes 2011; McCrisken 2014).
Although Europe has become a target of contemporary terrorism as well, much less attention has been assigned to the European political discourse on terrorism (Jackson 2007b) – in addition to other parts of the world. Moreover, analyses that do take the European context into account, tend to focus on the level of the European Union (Jackson 2007b, Baker-Beall 2013). From this point of view, the European Union’ discourse on terrorism is being seen as the nuanced counterpart of the American discourse, approaching terrorism in a much softer way, both in terms of words and policies. As the European Union would define terrorism mainly as a criminal act rather than an act of war, it is believed that its approach secures international criminal law and human rights, values cooperation over war and aims to address its root causes (Jackson 2007b). Moreover, its tone would be less alarmist, showing awareness of the effects that language can have, especially in the case of terrorism (Jackson 2007b).
Apart from the question whether this still is the case, or whether this has ever been the case, this representation tends to overlook current tendencies of the European Union’s member states within their national political contexts. As shown by alarmist reports of Amnesty International, European states follow a disproportionately repressive approach towards terrorism (Amnesty International, 17 January 2017), with France acting as one of the forerunners (Amnesty International, 4 February 2016). Moreover, the Paris attacks have increased the French public distrust against the European Union, which encourages the French state to take up a national approach rather than leaving up the mandate to the European Union in the fight against terrorism (Lequesne 2016). For this reason, this thesis focuses on the European state level and highlights France as an exemplary case for the broader tendencies that European states are experiencing.
The methodological gap
The second gap that can be observed within the critical study of terrorism is related to the
methodological approach. From this perspective, CDA approaches to the study of terrorism show a strong focus on language. As already mentioned, language is indeed an integral part of discourse, but it derives its significance from its relation to action (Jäger & Maier 2009). Yet, many CDA scholars tend to focus on a particular text, or a small set of texts, while the link with broader societal structures of power often remains implicit (Blommaert 2001). As a consequence, “even though CDA researchers claim to interpret society through text, they usually end up simply interpreting text” (Blommaert, in Breeze 2011, p. 516).
A clear example can be seen in the work of Jackson (2007b), where he analyzes the development of the European Union’s counterterrorism discourse after 9/11 by comparing it to the American state discourse. The largest part of this analysis focuses on a comparison between both actors’ language use. After this, Jackson (2007b) does enter into a discussion of the implications, but this remains rather abstract and theoretical. At some point, he mentions the policy implications, but only comes to the minor conclusion that, on the basis of the existing discourses, policies might be “ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst” (Jackson 2007b, p. 243). He does not fortifies this important point with empirical evidence.
Yet, when one wants to generate change, which is CDA’s main goal, one should make tangible what the practical effects are of the use of certain words and expression for people’s lives. Only in this way, the functioning of power through discourse can actually be made visible. For this reason, this thesis
20 includes an extensive analysis of the material realm of counterterrorism policies in France and thereby makes visible how the French state’s ideas about terrorism work out in practice. How this link
between language and policies is made within this thesis through the application of CDA will be the subject of the following section.
The application of CDA within this thesis
CDA does not prescribe “a rigid formula that can be followed mechanically to produce results” (Jäger & Maier 2009, p. 56). Rather, the particular theories and methods depend on the social problem and research question(s) the research aims to address. For this reason, Jäger & Maier (2009) emphasize that researchers within CDA should be flexible and imaginative, and build a story on the basis of that. This section explains how this thesis applies CDA to the French case. In particular, it brings together three levels of analysis: the fictive, the ideational and the material. What this means can be read below. The fictive level: ‘1984’
This thesis takes the fictive story of 1984 (Orwell 1950) as the starting point for entangling the repressive tendencies within the French state’s response to the Paris attacks. As explained above, discourses are never completely coherent; parts of them will always be contradictory or paradoxical. These sights of contestation carry the potential for critique and social change. At the same time, through its effect of naturalization, discourses cover up internal tensions, giving them the appearance of coherence and objectivity (Fairclough 1985). Since we are subject to state discourses on terrorism ourselves, it might be difficult to recognize these tensions. For this reason, a fictive story, in which these tensions are pushed to its extremes, can help to expose them in the real world. Literature is known for encouraging our reflexive abilities to understand the complexity of everyday reality. It holds up a mirror to our ‘zeitgeist’ and calls taken for granted knowledge, norms and values into question (Schram 2011). The dystopian novel 1984 (Orwell 1950) is thus taken as the lens to analyze the French state’s discourse on terrorism.
In particular, this novel helps to see two paradoxes: on the international level, the state is fighting war in order to defend peace; on the national level, the state is increasing surveillance in order to defend freedom. This paradoxical reasoning forms the basis for a disproportionate use of state power in the attempt to protect the political community against disruption. As such, the story of 1984 (Orwell 1950) helps to link up the ideational level of words and the material level of policies (Jäger & Maier 2009), which I will now turn to.
The ideational level: speech act
This thesis analyzes how the Orwellian tendencies within the French state’s discourse on terrorism manifest themselves through language. This is investigated through an analysis of the speech that has been given by the French President Francois Hollande (16 November 2015) during a joint meeting of the Congress three days after the Paris attacks. Although this thesis only includes one speech act, this particular text can be seen as exemplary for the French state discourse on terrorism for two reasons. First, the speech was given in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, which means that emotions were still intense and people expected a strong leader who rendered calmness and decisiveness. For these reasons, there was little room for self-reflection, self-critique and relativization. In other words, this speech was given at a moment in time when the terrorism discourse, and the limits to what can and cannot be said, showed itself in the most explicit and narrow ways possible. Second, the speech is the
21 only recent text from the French state responding to terrorism6, which extensively links an analysis of the problem to policies that are proposed as a solution. As such, it integrates a complete argumentation into one single text, through which the underlying discourse becomes explicit and visible.
The speech is analyzed on the basis of Entman’s (1993) framing theory. Framing theory sees texts as a political message, which consists of a particular set of statements that together make up a political argumentation. In particular, framing theory provides two analytical tools. First of all, on the basis of framing categories, the terrorism frame of the French state can be reconstructed. Entman (1993) distinguishes four categories – the problem definition, the diagnosis of the causes, the moral evaluation and the proposed solution – and explains them as follows:
“Frames, then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.” (Entman 1993, p. 52).
These categories are used to analyze how the problem of terrorism is constructed by the French state and how this informs the adoption of repressive policies that should counter the problem. This
reconstruction of the terrorism frame is achieved through the method of coding. The text of the speech is coded according to the argumentation categories, which are translated into a colored coding scheme (figure II and III, next chapter). Blue indicates sentences that define the problem, purple indicates sentences that diagnose the causes of the problem, red and green indicate sentences that include a moral evaluation of the causal agents (respectively negative and positive) and orange indicates the prescribed solutions to the problem. As such, the coded text visualizes the argumentation scheme.
The second analytical tool that Entman’s (1993) framing theory provides is the concept of framing strategies. On the basis of framing strategies, it can be analyzed how Hollande (16 November 2015) attempts to secure the terrorism frame.Entman (1993) distinguishes two strategies: saliency and selection.These framing strategies drive the psychological effects of a certain frame. On the one hand, saliency means that frames highlight some pieces of information while attenuating others. This can be achieved by their positioning within the text, through a repetition of statements or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols. As a result, saliency “enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” (Entman 1993, p. 53). On the other hand, selection means that frames take certain aspects of the communicated topic into account while leaving out others. In other words, selection means inclusion and exclusion of information. For this reason, frames guide the audience not only by what they tell, but also by what they do not tell. These strategies are used to analyze the dynamics of the French state’s power over discourse (Jäger & Maier 2009) in its fight against terrorism.
The material level: policies
In addition to language, this thesis analyzes how the Orwellian tendencies within the French state’s discourse on terrorism manifest themselves through actions. This analysis builds on two empirical sources. First, a diversity of international news items is brought together in order to make a reconstruction of the historical context in which the Paris attacks have taken place. This analysis includes online news items from the following news agencies: Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, DailyMail,
6 It should be noted that this is the case for texts that have been translated into English. This has been a condition for selection, as I do not master the French language well enough to incorporate French texts into the analysis.
22 New Yorker, New York Times, The Atlantic, The Guardian, The Independent, The Local, Reuters, Time and Washington Post7. Second, a diversity of policy reports from human rights organizations are analyzed in order to reflect on the practical consequences of the proposed policies for people’s lives. The analysis of international policies is based on reports from Unicef (15 March 2014), World Vision (1 March 2016), Amnesty International (26 October 2016b) and Airwars (17 January 2017). The analysis of national policies is based on two extensive reports from Amnesty International (4 February 2016; 17 January 2017b). These empirical sources are used to analyze the dynamics of the French state’s power of discourse (Jäger & Maier 2009) in its fight against terrorism.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has set out the academic context of this thesis. It has first made a case for the critical approach to the study of terrorism. The critical approach recognizes the social and political nature of the terrorism concept, as well as knowledge in general. On the basis of this, this chapter has explained that terrorism should be studied as a discourse. This means that research projects on terrorism should aim to entangle and expose the relation between language, action and power. As such, this thesis has been positioned within the theoretical and methodological framework of CDA.
Moreover, we have seen how this thesis tries to respond to current gaps within the critical study of terrorism. By taking the French state as its case, it aims to shed light on the European state level in the international fight against terrorism. In addition, it aims to expose the practical implications of certain language use by explicitly including the material level into the analysis.
Finally, this chapter has explained how the French state’s discourse on terrorism is studied in this thesis. It has explained how the fictive level of 1984 (Orwell 1950), the ideational level of the speech (Hollande, 16 November 2015), and the material level of counterterrorism policies are linked up in order to entangle repressive tendencies within the discourse. What this means will become clear in the next chapter.
7 Only news agencies that publish in English have been included into the analysis, as I only msater the English language well enough for this analysis (besides the Dutch language).
23
III The empirical analysis
In his speech on 16 November 2015, before a joint session of the French Parliament, president Francois Hollande expressed his feelings of horror about the Paris attacks that had taken place three days earlier (Hollande, 16 November 2015). In a shocked, overwhelmed and disturbed state of mind, he wondered how it was possible that such a peace loving nation as France could be attacked by such cruelty, out of nowhere, and for no reason. In an attempt to render strong leadership, he announced “to marshal the full strength of the state to defend the safety of its people” (Hollande, 16 November 2015). On the international level, he declared war to Islamic State and announced to increase the French airstrikes on Islamic State’s strategic targets in Syria and Iraq. On the national level, he announced an extensive package of security policies that would strengthen the state’s capacities to monitor
potentially dangerous citizens (Hollande, 16 November 2015).
The repressive tendency underlying this response was understandable given the loss, pain and fear the Paris attacks have caused for so many people inside and outside France. While the terrorist threat was enduring, nobody wanted this to happen again. There was a general understanding that all possible means should be used to prevent terrorist attacks in the future. However, it could be questioned to what extent the use of military means on the international level, and the use of emergency measures on the national level, have contributed to a structural solution for the problem. Instead, Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy (2017) suggest that these policies might have been counterproductive and contributing to the maintenance of the threat. They point to the ‘Orwellian’ tendencies underlying this response, which tend to result in a disproportionate use of state power. In relation to this, Amnesty International (17 January 2017b) has called attention for the ‘securitization’ of the French state and several other European states.
In his famous book 1984 (Orwell 1950), George Orwell powerfully captured how fear for a destructive threat can lead to such a disproportionate use of state power. This dystopian novel describes a future society8 that is governed by a totalitarian regime in its most extremist form. The rhetorical
legitimization for its power is based on the paradoxical slogan: War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength. On the basis of this, the regime promotes the idea that the society’s free and peaceful existence is in constant danger of disruption, due to an external threat from aggressive other empires as well as an internal threat from rebellious citizens. Therefore, the regime has set up
permanent mechanisms of war and surveillance, which should prevent these enemies from striking an attack. In other words, the regime is fighting a war in order to defend peace and controlling its citizens in order to defend freedom.
However, throughout the entire novel it remains unclear whether these enemies actually exist. They rather seem to be a cover for infinite state power, whereby the mechanisms of war and surveillance function to protect the society’s hierarchal structure. People are made to accept, approve, and even demand for this totalitarian exertion of state power, because of their intense feelings of fear and hatred against the society’s enemies, which are stimulated through propaganda on a massive scale. People have learnt to be ignorant to the regime’s extreme power, as it is the society’s protector without which people would not be able to survive. In this way, they have internalized the idea that ignorance creates strength.
24 In short, 1984 (Orwell 1950) describes how the state secures its power through the construction of a dangerous enemy that legitimizes state repression. Although the situation in 1984 (Orwell 1950) is pushed to its extremes, Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy (2017) suggest that similar tendencies might be present in the French state’s response to the Paris attacks. Similarly, Amnesty International (17
January 2017b) warns that the French state’s counterterrorism laws are “stripping rights under guise of defending them”. Therefore, this chapter applies the lens of 1984 (Orwell 1950) to the French case as a way to disentangle the French state’s discourse on terrorism. As such, the lens of 1984 (Orwell 1950) helps to make visible how its repressive tendencies are constructed and naturalized through discourse and how they work out in practice. This analysis is divided into an international and a national section. I will now turn to the international context.
The international context
My analysis of the international context consists of three steps. First, I will zoom in on the ‘war is peace’-paradox of 1984 (Orwell 1950) and see how this paradox naturalizes state repression on the international level. Second, I will analyze the speech by President Francois Hollande (16 November 2015) in order to see how the French state’s interpretation of terrorism informs the adoption of repressive policies on the international level. I will thereby reflect on the framing strategies (Entman 1993) that Hollande (16 November 2015) applies to secure this terrorism frame. Thirdly, I will discuss the material consequences of the proposed policies by relating them to the international war context in which they are taken. Finally, in a concluding statement, I will bring these steps together and show how the French state’s discourse on terrorism results in a cycle of violence and retaliation with Islamic State (Bueno Lacy et al., 17 June 2016).
‘1984’
The story of 1984 (Orwell 1950) takes place in Oceania, one of the three empires that control the future world order in 1984. Oceania is continuously involved in a war with one of the other two empires, Eurasia and Eastasia. On the basis of the paradoxical slogan War is peace, the regime produces and maintains the idea that it needs to fight war in order to defend peace. This seems to contain a fundamental contradictory, as both terms – war and peace – are each other’s counterparts. Yet, the regime presents the enemy empires as inherently bad and aggressive, wanting to destroy Oceania’s peaceful existence. This enforces Oceania to fight back in order to protect itself against disruption by outside forces. Therefore, the apparent contradiction does not work out in a conflicting way: it means that a war is fought abroad in order to defend peace at home.
The idea of an inherently bad and aggressive enemy is reinforced through propaganda and hate campaigns, which are centered around Oceania’s leader Big Brother as the image of hope in times of barbaric war. For example, there is the daily Two Minutes Hate on television, and the annual Hate Week with military parades, speeches and hate songs. These campaigns promote a dehumanized image of the external enemy and aim to unify the people along feelings of hatred and animosity. People are not at all informed about the effects of the war abroad, or allowed to have contact with foreigners, in order to prevent any sense of sympathy or human connection. This is what makes it acceptable for them to sacrifice the peace abroad for the sake of their own peace. They are not confronted with, and therefore not aware of, the human suffering that is caused by the war.
In reality, the aggressor of the war is difficult to define. Oceania turns out to be involved in a
permanent state of war with the other two empires. All empires constantly switch alliances, but none of them ever gains the power that is needed to overthrow the others. In fact, concluding the war would not even benefit any of them. Through this permanent state of war, the different regimes maintain each
25 other. It allows them to sell their power to their people’s as a necessity to defend them against external threats. In this way, they produce and maintain each other’s legitimacy. War has primarily become an internal affair, which helps to secure the state’s internal hierarchal structure.
The following analysis of the French case will make clear that France’s war with Islamic State shows similar tendencies as Oceania’s war with the other empires. The war tends to gain a permanent status, whereby the intention of protecting French society against Islamic State’s aggression is coming under pressure (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy 2017). As such, the war tends to lose its external relevance and gains an internal function, which is to secure the power of the French state internally (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy 2017). As said, I will first look at the ideational level and see how the ‘war is peace’-paradox is constructed in Hollande’s (16 November 2015) speech, on the basis of which he promotes means of war as the ultimate response to the Paris attacks.
Speech
This analysis of the speech builds on the text that has been coded according to Entman’s (1993) framing theory, as has been explained in the previous chapter. I have translated this into a coding scheme, which is presented in figure III. To recapitulate, blue indicates sentences that define the problem, purple indicates sentences that diagnose the causes of the problem, red and green indicate sentences that include a moral evaluation of the causal agents (respectively negative and positive) and orange indicates the prescribed solutions to the problem (Entman 1993). This has resulted in the coded text as presented in figure IV, which visualizes the argumentation categories. On the basis of this, I have summarized the terrorism frame in figure II, which forms the basis of my analysis.
Figure II The terrorism frame by the French state
EVALUATION France = good Islamic State = bad
CAUSE PROBLEM SOLUTION LIKELY EFFECTS
Radicalism Terrorist attacks State repression Destroy the threat: - International: war defend peace and - National: surveillance freedom
LEGITIMIZATION Destructive threat
Source: the framing categories are based on Entman (1993), the frame is based on Hollande (16 November 2015)
