Europeanisation, conflict settlement and contested states : a case study of the Abkhazia-Georgia and Moldova-Transnistria conflicts

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University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Masters Political Science: European Politics and External Relations

Research Project: The EU and Its Neighbours: Politics, Policies, Challenges and

Opportunities

Title: Europeanisation, Conflict Settlement and Contested States: A Case Study

of the Abkhazia-Georgia and Moldova-Transnistria Conflicts

Submitted by Mícheál O’Keeffe

Student Number: 11273062

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Second Reader: Dr Andrey Demidov

Date: 23/06/2017

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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Dimitris Bouris, for his excellent support and guidance throughout this research project. Without his quick replies to emails, willingness to meet to discuss my work, detailed feedback and generosity in lending me some books, completing this thesis would have been far more difficult.

Secondly, I would like to thank my family and friends back home for supporting me throughout this process. Speaking to them through Skype and social media about what was happening back home provided me with a welcome break from the sometimes intense researching and writing that this thesis entailed.

Finally, I would like to thank my classmates for making this an enjoyable experience. I very much enjoyed our post-class drinks and learning about their respective countries and cultures.

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 5

Abstract 6

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction 7-8

1.2 Research Question 8

1.3 Methodology 9-11

1.4 Thesis Outline 11

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction 12

2.2 Europeanisation 13-21

2.3 Contested States, Definitions and Terminology 21-26

2.4 Sovereignty 26-28

2.5 Conclusion 29

Chapter 3: Europeanisation and Conflict Settlement in Moldova

3.1 Introduction 30

3.2 The ENP, EaP and Mechanisms of Europeanisation 31-36

3.3 EU-Moldova Relations 36-37

3.4 The PCRM (2005 – 2009) 37-40

3.5 The AEI (2009 -) 40-43

3.6 The Effect of Europeanisation on Transnistria 44-48

3.7 Conclusion

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Chapter 4: Europeanisation and Conflict Settlement in Georgia

4.1 Introduction 50

4.2 EU-Georgia Relations 51-53

4.3 Saakashvili and Europeanisation (2006 -2012) 53-57

4.4 The Georgian Dream Coalition (2012 – ) 57-60

4.5 The Effect of Europeanisation on Abkhazia 60-63

4.6 Conclusion 64-65

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Abbreviations

Alliance for European Integration: AEI Association Agreement: AA

Autonomous Trade Preferences: ATP Central and Eastern Europe: CEE Civil Society Organisation: CSO

Commonwealth of Independent States: CIS Corruption Perception Index: CPI

Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area: DCFTA European Neighbourhood Policy: ENP

Eastern Partnership: EaP European Union: EU Georgian Dream: GD

Generalised Scheme of Preferences: GSP

Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus: GSP + Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: PCA

Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova: PCRM Rational Institutionalism: RI

Reporters Without Borders: RWB Sociological Institutionalism: SI

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United National Movement: UNM United Nations: UN

Abstract

Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, settling conflicts in the neighbourhood has been an official aim of EU foreign policy. Indeed, with the plethora of conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood it is no surprise to find that the study of the EU’s involvement in conflict settlement has received quite a lot of scholarly attention. However, this thesis finds a gap in the literature in the lack of attention paid to the role of contested states in the EU’s attempts to settle conflicts in the neighbourhood. It seeks to address this gap and build on the work of scholars who have conceptualised for the EU’s approach to conflict settlement in the neighbourhood by analysing how the europeanisation of a ENP member state effects the conflict settlement imperatives of a contested state. The thesis draws on the literature on europeanisation, contested states and sovereignty and applies the identified concepts and theory to the case studies of the Abkhaz-Georgian and Moldovan-Transnistrian conflicts. The thesis finds that the EU faces difficulties in Europeanising the veto states and that its ability to influence the elites within the contested state is dependent upon both the veto and contested state’s willingness to engage with each other and the EU. It was also found that the EU’s effect on the contested states was limited by the contested states’ sovereignty and contested status. Finally, it was concluded that the EU’s a strategy of Europeanising the veto state with the hope of attracting the contested state to reintegrate into the veto state has brought little in the way of results. The thesis thus concludes noting that the europeanisation of a veto state through the ENP has very little impact on the conflict settlement imperatives of a contested state.

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Chapter 1

1.1

Introduction

Since the inception of the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has made conflict settlement and resolution one of its main foreign policy goals. The settlement of conflicts in the neighbourhood has been a priority for the EU and has been mentioned in key foreign policy documents, such as the

European Security Strategy (European Council 2003, 4), the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (European Commission 2004d, 4), A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood (European Commission 2011a, 5-6), the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission 2015b, 4) and most recently in the Global Strategy (EEAS 2016, 28-32).

It is no surprise therefore to find that many scholars have sought to conceptualise the EU’s approach to conflict settlement and resolution as a result of the EU’s clear interest in such processes (Coppieters et al 2004; Diez et al 2008; Kyris 2013, 2015; Tocci 2007). However, very few scholars, who have conceptualised the EU’s approach to settling conflicts in the neighbourhood have paid a great deal of attention to the role played by contested states. This is rather puzzling when one considers that many of the ‘frozen’ or ‘unresolved’ conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood involve states whose statehood is contested. Indeed, these states are of great contemporary significant to the social sciences as their contested nature often causes tensions and it is not uncommon to see these tensions boil over and lead to open conflict. One can find examples of this in the EU’s neighbourhood, both to the east and to the south.

To the east, the recent flaring up of tensions between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic resulted in the death of 30 soldiers and caused a number of civilian casualties (BBC 2016). The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict heated up in 2008 which resulted in a Russian intervention and the deaths of hundreds and displacement of thousands. Ceasefire agreements in eastern Ukraine between the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics and the Ukrainian government have been consistently breached. To the south, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to linger, with the conflict heating up on occasion and recently renewed tensions

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between Western Sahara and Morocco have made begun to make the headlines (Bennis 2016).

Indeed, when such conflicts do break out, they have the potential to spill-over into wider regional conflicts. The Azerbaijan-Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has the potential to draw in Armenia as well as the regional allies of each side in Russia and Turkey. The conflict between Ukraine and the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics has also led to tensions and minor skirmishes on the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border (Istomin and Bolgova 2016, 185).

1.2

Research Question

Given the gap in literature, the contemporary salience of contested states in the EU’s

neighbourhood and the settlement of their conflicts to the social sciences, this thesis will seek to answer the following research question: how does the Europeanisation of a European

Neighbourhood Policy member state affect the conflict settlement imperatives of a contested state?

This will be followed with sub questions such as: What effect does the EU’s approach have on the elites of the contested states? How does the contested nature of the state and the nature of its sovereignty impact on the effectiveness of the EU’s approach?

This thesis will analyse the europeanisation of states through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as it wishes to build on the work of previous scholars, such as Coppieters et al (2004), Diez et al (2008) and Tocci (2007), by looking how the europeanisation of the veto state impacts on the contested state and its conflict settlement imperatives.

This thesis will focus on conflict settlement as opposed to resolution or transformation, as in many of the conflicts involving contested states, settlement of the conflict can be seen as a necessary condition in order to bring about meaningful conflict transformation or resolution (Noutcheva et al 2004, 10-11). It is difficult to envisage how conflict resolution or transformation could take place when many contested states have very little contact with their veto states and their populations live mostly entirely separate lives. They hold different narratives to their respective conflicts, one which is generally reproduced in political and media discourse with very little alternative voice being offered, in particular in contested states where they are generally more isolated from the international community.

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1.3

Methodology

In order to operationalise my research question I will make use of a comparative case study. I consider this method to be apt for this thesis as it provides in depth knowledge on specific cases and is an effective method for testing theories.

It is important to note that despite their commonly shared contested status, the contested states in the EU’s neighbourhood remain very diverse in many other aspects of their statehood, which can make generalising quite difficult. They differ in terms of their level of official recognition in the international community, with some, such as Palestine, being widely recognised internationally, whereas others, such as Transnistria, fail to be recognised by any United Nations (UN) member state. They also differ in terms of what has been referred to as ‘domestic sovereignty’ (Krasner 2001) or ‘positive sovereignty (Jackson 1990). In this case, Palestine possess very little ‘domestic sovereignty as a result of the Israeli occupation, whereas Transnistria would fare much better.

However, despite this diversity, it is possible to divide the contested states into two groups, those which possess greater forms of Krasner’s (2001) ‘domestic sovereignty’, such as Transnistria and those which possess what Geldenguys describes as ‘Titular recognition’, such as Palestine (2009, 25). This thesis will focus on case studies related to the former, so as to allow for a greater degree of generalisability within that specific group.

The case studies which will be used for this thesis will be the Abkhaz-Georgian and Moldovan-Transnistrian conflicts. These conflicts are chosen as firstly, both Abkhazia and Transnistria would fall into the group of states possessing domestic sovereignty. Secondly, there are a number of similarities between the two veto states which make their cases comparable. Both veto states’ relations with the EU are governed by the ENP and both have signed an Association Agreements (AA) which includes a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement with the EU. Both veto states are also former Soviet republics with similar population sizes and both of the conflicts also erupted during the fall of the Soviet Union. However, it is important to note that there are a number of differences between the two which may lead to divergences in results. The Abkhaz-Georgian conflict was far bloodier and intense than the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict. The Abkhaz-Georgian conflict was also primarily ethnic in nature and involved massive displacement of people. There have also been skirmishes across the Abkhaz-Georgian border whereas the Molodvan-Transnistain

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border has been relatively peaceful. Finally, Abkhazia is recognised by 4 UN members, including Russia.

The thesis will make use of the rational institutionalist (RI) and sociological institutionalist (SI) approaches to europeanisation for a number of reasons which will be explained following a review of the literature on europeanisation in Chapter 2. This thesis will focus on the europeanisation of Georgia and Moldova and the effect this has on the conflict settlement imperatives of Abkhazia and Transnistria. This approach is chosen as the EU’s main strategy, in both cases, has been to europeanise the veto states so as to make them appear more attractive to the contested states, with the hope of enticing them to reintegrate into their respective veto states. Noutcheva et al explain that this approach seeks to place indirect pressure on the populations within the contested state so as to encourage a change in policy from the contested state towards reintegration or to possibly result in regime change, as a result of which the new regime will seek to reintegrate into the veto state (2004, 27).

As Radaelli notes, when making use of europeanisation one must identify ‘what’ is being europeanised and ‘”how much change’” has occurred as a result (2000, 14). This thesis will focus on the democratisation and economic integration into the EU of both Georgia and Moldova through the ENP Action Plans (APs) and the AAs for two primary reasons. Firstly, democratisation and economic integration are considered to be two of the three main areas in which the EU seeks to reform states through the ENP (Börzel 2010, 15; Gawrich et al 2010, 1212). Secondly, as will be seen in Chapter 3 and 4, democratisation and the economic integration of the veto states into the EU is central to the EU’s strategy of making them more attractive to the elites and populations of the contested states.

Democratisation involves covering quite a broad number of areas and therefore this thesis will focus specifically on three areas: corruption, judicial independence and media freedom. These three areas are chosen, firstly, because they are often mentioned as high priorities in the ENP’s APs as well as in the Association Agendas and secondly, as a result of these areas having blighted democratic progress in many post-Soviet states. Progress, or a lack of progress, will be measured using indicators from respected bodies such as Transparency International, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders (RWB) and the World Bank Governance Indicators.

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Progress in the Georgia and Moldova’s economic integration into the EU will be measured by the upgrading of trade relations with the EU and their ability to adopt and implement the required regulations.

This thesis will also look inside the contested state and assess the impact the europeanisation of the veto state has on the contested state. This will be done from a RI and SI approach with specific attention being paid to see as to whether the europeanisation of the veto state has affected elites within the contested states and whether it has led to a change in their views and or approaches to conflict settlement.

This thesis will also analyse the EU’s support for civil society organisations (CSOs) in Abkhazia and Transnistria. This is done as, firstly, this support can be viewed as part of the EU’s attempts to engage in differential empowerment of actors within Abkhazia and Transnistria so as to empower moderate actors and thus pressure elites to reach a settlement. Secondly, the funding for CSOs can be viewed as stemming from the development of the veto states’ relations with the EU, with instruments such as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (European Commission 2007c; 14-16; European Commission 2011b, 22-25; European Commission 2011d, 13) and the European Endowment for Democracy (2015; Freizer 2017, 169) being used to fund CSOs in both contested states.

The data used in this thesis will be official documents and textual data. The official documents will include the key documents related to the ENP and its revisions, ‘Progress Reports’ and official documents from the Georgian and Moldovan governments such as government activity programmes. The use of textual data from secondary sources will include academic journal articles as well as academic monographs, edited volumes of books and reports from CSOs.

1.4

Thesis Outline

This thesis will begin in Chapter 2 with a literature review which will analyse the literature on europeanisation, contested states and sovereignty. The literature on europeanisation will be reviewed so as to identify a theory to be used in this thesis. The review of the literature on contested states and sovereignty will identify the concepts which will be used in this thesis. This will be followed in Chapter 3 with an analysis of the europeanisation of Moldova and the effect it has on Transnistria. Chapter 4 will then look at the europeanisation of Georgia and the effect this has had on Abkhazia and the prospects for conflict settlement.

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Chapter 2:

Conceptual Framework

2.1

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on europeanisation, contested states and sovereignty with the aim of identifying the theory and concepts which will be used in this thesis. The chapter will be structured as follows:

Firstly, there will be an overview of the literature on europeanisation with the aim of identifying a theory which will then be used in the empirical chapters of this thesis. It would be impossible for this section to capture the entirety of the debate on europeanisation, rather it will seek to briefly review the different generations of the literature and look at how some of the key approaches have evolved over time.

Following the analysis of the literature on europeanisation, there will be a review of the literature on contested states, with the aim of selecting the appropriate concept for this thesis. In analysing the literature, particular emphasis will be placed on the terminology used for contested states as well as the definitions used, given the large variety for both found within the literature.

The chosen concept for contested states will then have a major bearing on the analysis which follows it on the literature on sovereignty. It will be necessary to ensure that the definition chosen for sovereignty is compatible with that of chosen for contested states, given that the two are intrinsically linked

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2.2

Europeanisation

The literature on europeanisation can be divided into three generations: 1) Membership Europeanisation: which analyses the EU’s impact on its member states, 2) Candidate Europeanisation: which analyses the EU’s impact on states which have a membership perspective, although, this group usually includes two sub groupings: the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the Western Balkans with Turkey, 3) Neighbourhood Europeanisation: analyses the EU’s impact on neighbouring states, which have no membership prospective, through the ENP However, this literature review will also include the literature on europeanisation as a means of conflict settlement, given its relevance to this thesis.

1) Membership Europeanisation

One of the most common approaches to membership europeanisation has been ‘new institutionalism’ (Bulmer 2008, 50; Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, 7). This approach is usually divided into three strands: RI, SI and historical institutionalism (Ibid, 50-51; Ibid, 7-9). RI assumes actors hold fixed preferences and seek to maximise their gains in their pursuit of their self-interest (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, 7). Institutions are understood as opportunity structures or veto points, where actors can either successful exploit the opportunities offered or are prevented from doing so by veto points (Bulmer 2008, 50). RI requires there to be a misfit, which presents actors with new opportunities, constraints and the capacity to take advantage of these opportunities whilst avoiding the constraints (Börzel and Risse 2000, 6). Mediating variables can include the presence of multiple veto players as well as formal institutions (Börzel and Risse 2000, 7; Bursens and Deforche 2008, 5-7; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008, 32-34).

SI places a greater emphasis on the importance of norms, ideas, organisational culture and discourse (Bulmer 2008, 50). From a SI perspective, a misfit may result in change at the domestic level should the norms, ideas, structures of meaning, or practices at the EU level be consistent with those at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse 2000, 8). Mediating variables in the process of europeanisation can include norm entrepreneurs and informal institutions which are conducive to consensus building and the sharing of costs (Börzel and Risse 2000, 9; Bursens and Deforche 2008, 6) as well as issue salience (Bursens and Deforche 2008, 7).

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Historical institutionalists are primarily concerned with how and why institutions change and the implications this may have for policy output (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 605). They are particularly interested in “critical junctures”, which may be caused by EU induced reforms (Ibid, 605). Similar to RI, critical junctures offers certain actors the opportunity to press for reform, however, it also draws on SI as perceptions of integration by national elites is considered to influence their response (Ibid, 605-606).

Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002, 258-9) identified three mechanisms of europeanisation: institutional compliance, changing domestic opportunity structures and framing domestic beliefs and expectations. Institutional compliance refers to when the EU sets a specific institutional model to which member states must comply (Ibid, 258). The changing of the domestic opportunity structures involves changing the balance of power at the domestic level in a way which may challenge to the domestic institutional equilibrium and thus lead to reform (Ibid, 258). Finally, framing domestic beliefs and expectations is considered to be the weakest mechanism of europeanisation and occurs through the adoption of symbolic or vague policies (Ibid, 259). Framing may influence the outcomes of domestic reforms where there is already a dominant coalition which supports reform along the lines of those backed by the EU, by providing policymakers with ideas and possible solutions to domestic problems (Ibid, 263).

2) Accession Europeanisation

The literature on accession europeanisation tends to be divided into two parts: those who deal with the successful europeanisation of the CEE accession states and the more difficult process of the europeanisation of the Western Balkan states and Turkey.

Glenn (2004) looks at the accessions negotiations process for the CEE countries as a means by which to pressure the acceding states to europeanise. He found that the opening and closing of chapters (Ibid, 7-13) as well as the transition period allocated to acceding states were quite similar, despite the states’ diversity (Ibid, 17). Glenn shows how the common pressure placed on acceding states resulted in the adoption of similar policies and structures in order to meet the EU’s requirements (Ibid, 20-24).

Similar to Glenn (2004), Grabbe (2001, 1020) lists five mechanisms of europeanisation during the accession process of the CEE countries: 1) gate-keeping, 2) Benchmarking and monitoring, 3) provision of institutional and legislative templates, 4) aid and technical

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assistance and 5) advice and twinning. Gate-keeping is considered to be the most powerful mechanism as it allows the Commission to delay a country’s entry into the next stage of the accession process and thus create domestic embarrassment for the government and pressure it into adopting the relevant reforms (Ibid, 1020-1021). Benchmarking and monitoring work in a similar fashion with the aim being to embarrass the government into reforming through the release of progress reports and ranking the different acceding countries according to their performance in reforming (Ibid, 1022). The third mechanism involves the transposition of the acquis communitariare into domestic law, which is facilitated by aid, technical assistance, advice and twinning (Ibid, 1023-1024).

Börzel (2010) makes use of the RI and SI approaches previously used to explain membership europeanisation. She found that the adoption of the acquis communautaire by the CEE countries represented a significant misfit with significant adaptation costs (Ibid, 9). However, the effects of the adaptation costs were mitigated by the positive conditionality, the pre-accession funds and the lack of significant mediating factors, such as veto players (Ibid, 9-10). From a SI perspective, the EU facilitated the reform process by providing domestic actors with greater legitimacy to carry out the reforms (Ibid, 10).

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) adopted an external incentives model approach to explain for the changes in the CEE accession states. This model sees the EU make use of positive conditionality, which unsettles the domestic equilibrium in the CEE countries through the introduction of an additional set of incentives to adopt EU rules (Ibid, 664). The model predicts that a candidate state will adopt EU rules should the benefits presented by EU rewards outweigh the domestic adaptation costs (Ibid, 664). They found that democratic conditionality had little effect on the already reforming CEE states given that these states were already democratising (Ibid, 669). However, they found that the authoritarian leaders did not seek to reform, although, they suggest that the incentives offered by membership may have undermined their rule and led to the election of reform minded governments in their place (Ibid, 669-70). They also found that the setting of EU rules as conditions for membership was the primary reason for rule adoption in the CEE states (Ibid, 671).

However, in turning to the Western Balkans and Turkey, Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit (2012) believe that the external incentives model cannot explain for the developments in Albania, Croatia and Turkey. They found key tenants of the model, such as the credibility of promises and the speed of reward to be undermined in their case studies (Ibid, 61). In their

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criticism of the external incentives model, they call for greater emphasis to be placed on the interests of domestic actors, in addition to that of the EU level, as opposed to solely focusing on the EU level (Ibid, 62). They find that in their three case studies, the RI approach of differential empowerment was better placed to explain for the successes and failures of the europeanisation of these states (Ibid, 60). They illustrated how EU pressure for reforms in all three case studies only resulted in improvements in the rule-of-law scores when the reforms coincided with the interests of the ruling elites, illustrating the importance of looking at the domestic level as well as the EU level (Ibid).

Börzel (2011) found that RI and SI can explain for the different degrees of impact of europeanisation across the Western Balkans and Turkey. She finds the prospect of EU membership has resulted in differential empowerment which resulted in the ousting of nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia (Ibid, 7). However, she notes that the EU norms and values tend to resonate at a much lower degree compared to how they did in the CEE countries and thus negatively affect its degree of potential impact (Ibid, 7).

Another notable finding from Börzel’s study is that statehood in the Balkans acts as a mediating factor for europeanisation in bringing about domestic change (Ibid, 8). She found that the differing degrees of statehood in the region correlated with success in adopting and implementing EU reforms (Ibid, 10-11). However, her findings tend to contradict those of Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, who found state capacity to be rather insignificant in their three case studies (2012, 61).

3) Neighbourhood Europeanisation

Quite similar to the external incentives model, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) develop a theory of external governance for europeanisation through the ENP. This can take the form of hierarchical governance, which involves a “formalized relationship of domination and subordination and is based on the production of collectively binding prescriptions and proscriptions.” (Ibid, 797). The second form is one of network governance, which is a horizontal form of cooperation, in which actors are formally equal in which no actor can impose its will on the other without consent (Ibid, 797). The third and final form is market governance, which involves the outcome of the interaction between formally equal actors being as a result of competition (Ibid, 799).

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Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) take a governance approach towards the EU’s promotion of democracy in the neighbourhood. They note that there are three possible ways by which the EU can democratise its neighbours: leverage, linkage and governance (Ibid). However, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig critique both the linkage and leverage approaches and conclude that they are not suitable for democracy promotion in the neighbourhood (Ibid, 898-900) and therefore adopt a governance approach. This approach involves the promotion of democratic principles through sectoral cooperation and reform (Freyburg et al 2009). They take an institutionalist approach towards democratic governance, which notes that the greater amount of:

“transposition of the democratic governance elements is legally specified in the EU acquis and/or international treaties (codification), the more this acquis is promoted through institutionalized transgovernmental networks (institutionalization), and the more EU activities are supported by other international actors (internationalization), the more likely it is that these norms will be effectively transferred to the third country.” (Ibid, 918).

Despite finding a discrepancy between adoption and implementation, they found support for the institutionalist model in their study of Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine (Ibid).

However, the same criticism levied against the external incentives model for its tendency to ignore domestic actors has been levelled against the external governance approach. Langbein and Wolczuk found that the degree of codification did not result in a greater degree of convergence in Ukraine, rather they pointed out the central role of domestic actors in impeding convergence (2012, 875). Delcour and Wolczuk also note how the external governance model would have failed to explain for the “’silent europeanisation’” of Armenia, as a result of its primary focus being on the EU level (2015, 502-3). Declour also finds that the ENP, more so than the accession process, requires more emphasis to be placed on the interests of domestic actors given that change in the neighbourhood “crucially hinges on the application of EU instruments by a wide range of actors.” (2013, 347). Thus similar to the external incentives model, it is seen that external governance approach downplays the significance of domestic actors to the determent of the effectiveness of the theory.

For Sasse the ENP has two primary functions: 1) as an external reference point for both pro and anti-EU integration domestic actors, which they can use when they view it as being consistent with their interest, 2) as a loose framework for the socialisation of both the EU and the domestic actors (2008, 296). He also notes that the ENP makes use of

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lite’” which refers to the manner in which both the incentives and potential adoption costs are rather vague (Ibid, 303). Sasse notes how the socialisation process through the ENP also saw developments in the process of conflict resolution in Moldova, saw the introduction of a number of reforms in Ukraine and a “cognitive change on the part of the EU” (Ibid, 313-14). Börzel argues that the “less democratic and the weaker a state is, the higher the domestic costs of Europeanization and the lower the willingness and the capacity of governments and other domestic actors to deal with them.” (2010, 12). The lack of a membership prospect, the lower levels of democracy relative to the CEE states and the lower levels of state capacity mean that the neighbourhood states should be more resistant to europeanisation (Ibid, 12). The lack of capacity of CSOs as well as the ability of incumbents to “’pick and choose’” which reforms they wish to adopt has also helped to stabilise regimes (Ibid, 22). Despite this, Sasse notes that one should not look as to whether the incumbent regime finds the adoption costs to be too high, but rather to other domestic actors who may see the incentives of the ENP as satisfactory enough to mobilise against domestic veto players (2008, 303). Indeed, Melnykovska and Schweickert (2008) point out how despite having a weak civil society, domestic elites or oligarchs can act as a bottom-up force for institutional change.

Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) look to ‘policy transfer’ as a means of europeanisation in the neighbourhood. They identify four forms of ‘policy transfer’: 1) unilateral emulation, 2) adaptation through externalities, 3) conditionality where change fits domestic interests, 4) conditionality where change is brought about through pressure (Ibid, 420-421). Although Lavenex and Uçarer place greater emphasis on the role of domestic actors than the external incentives model (Ibid, 423-424), they adopt a similar approach to conditionality as

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) (Ibid, 425), which is problematic for the reasons given above.

4) Europeanisation and Conflict Settlement

Coppieters et al (2004) introduced the concept of europeanisation as a means of bring about conflict settlement. They define europeanisation, in the context of conflict settlement, as “a process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures.” (Noutcheva et al 2004, 7). The EU is conceived of both as an “active player” in conflict settlement as well as a “framework” (Ibid,

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8). The EU as an ‘active player’ involves the europeanisation of the conflicting parties through conditionality and social learning (Ibid, 12-16). The impact of conditionality on the conflicting parties is understood using the RI model previously mentioned in the preceding sections (Ibid, 12-13). The social learning process ocurrs through contact with EU institutions and the perceived legitimacy of EU norms and policies (Ibid, 14). The reference the authors make to the EU as a framework as a means of conflict settlement tends to focus solely on those states which are member states and states which have a membership prospective and is therefore not applicable to the case studies of this thesis (Ibid, 9-10).

In response to the work of Coppieters et al (2004), Popescu identifies a number of conditions which may see europeanisation either contribute to conflict settlement or prolong the conflicts (2004, 1-4). According to Popescu, europeanisation is considered to be conducive to conflict settlement when: 1) The (potential) benefits of Europeanization have to be higher than the benefits of the status quo for the dominant elites of both conflict entities, 2) Europeanization has to be attractive for both, rather than only one, conflict party, 3) Europeanization has to be attractive for the protector state of the secessionist entity, 4) the benefits of Europeanization have to be credible and have to be received within a visible time span, 5) Europeanization has to lead to a differential empowermentof those actors which are likely to favour a resolution of the conflict, thus altering the structure of interests that keeps certain conflicts unsolved (Ibid, 1-3).

Popescu also considers europeanisation as being likely to prolong the conflict and increase the division between the two conflicting sides when the following conditions are met: 1) When the costs of conflict resolution for interested actors are higher than the benefits from integration through Europeanization, 2) When the resolution of the conflict is perceived as

going against the Europeanization strategies of one of the conflict parties (Ibid, 3-4). However, it is difficult to judge which conditions are of greater importance than others and it

leads one to question what effect would it have on conflicts if all the conditions which are seen as conducive to conflict settlement were met, however, one of the conditions which would see europeanisation prolong the conflict is present. As Popescu notes, “these conditions exist in mixed forms, which means that the effects of Europeanization of every single factor in concrete cases are rarely, if ever, clear-cut.” (Ibid, 1).

Similar to Coppieters et al (2004), Tocci (2007) makes use of both the RI and SI, however, she adds to them with what she terms “passive enforcement” (2007, 17-18). Passive

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enforcement involves “obligations” which are considered to be “necessary rules which determine the overall framework that make mutually beneficial cooperation.” (Ibid, 17). This requires for there to be “legally defined and definable rules embedded in EU contracts.” (Ibid, 17). It is necessary for these rules not to be view as a cost by third parties, or at least viewed as a necessary cost for which in return in gains engagement with the EU (Ibid, 17). It also requires for the third party to wish feel a “sense of belonging with Europe” and/or wishes to cooperate/integrate with the EU (Ibid, 17). This is rather problematic for Abkhazia and Transnistria as in the current circumstance neither seemingly wishes to integrate with the EU or feels a sense of belonging with it.

Albert et al (2008) look at the transformative impact integration with the EU has on border conflicts. For Albert et al conflicts are dependent upon the “continuous communication of incompatibilities” (Ibid, 22). The EU engages in “perturbation” through the production of discourse which challenges the predominant conflict discourse or acts as a means through which non-conflict orientated discourse can come to fruition (Ibid, 24). However, it is difficult to assess how the EU may be able to change the discourse within the contested states given their authoritarian and isolated nature. One of the means by which Albert et al (2008) suggest how the EU may change such discourse is through AAs, however, in the case of the contested states under study in this thesis, it is primarily if not exclusively only the veto state which engages with the EU in this process and therefore it may be difficult for the EU to seek to change the discourse in the contested state.

Kyris (2013; 2015) makes use of europeanisation to assess the EU’s impact on Northern Cyprus. Kyris makes use of “’cognitive Europeanization’” which occurs through socialisation and through a change of domestic opportunity structure (Ibid, 869). He also, unlike

Coppieters et al (2004), focus on the EU’s impact on Turkish-Cypriot CSOs (Ibid). Although relevant to this study, given that it illustrates the difficulties the EU faces in seeking to engage with contested states without contributing to what may amount to ‘creeping

recognition’, Kyris’ work illustrates that the prospect of accession to the Union played a role in the europeanisation of CSOs (Ibid, 871-877), something which is lacking in the case of Akhazia and Transnistria. However, the EU has funded CSOs in Abkhazia and Transnistria and therefore Kyris’ approach may be relevant.

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As was noted in the opening chapte, this thesis will make use of rationalist RI and SI approaches to europeanisation, as seen in Coppieters et al (2004) and Tocci (2007). There are a number of reasons for the selection of these approaches.

Firstly, the both approaches have been used in every generation of the europeanisation literature, illustrating its flexibility and analytical value. Secondly, the literature has clearly illustrated the importance of taking into account the role of domestic actors in determining the potential domestic impact of europeanisation. The critique of the external incentives model and the external governance model are clear illustrations of this. Thirdly, both RI and SI were utilised by Coppieters et al (2004) and Tocci (2007), however, both studies are over a decade old and therefore cannot account for recent developments. For example, Coppeters et al’s (2004) work was published very soon after the launch of the ENP and at the beginning of the EU’s greater engagement with conflict settlement in Georgia and Moldova, thus it requires further study. Similarly, since the publishing of Tocci’s (2007) work on Georgia, there have been significant developments, such as the 2008 war with Russia and its recognition of Abkhazia, a change of government in Georgia and the signing of an AA with the EU in 2014. Finally, the EU engages with CSOs in Abkhazia and Transnistria as part of the process of socialisation and differential empowerment and Kyris (2013; 2015) has illustrated how both approaches are capable of explaining for such processes.

2.3

Contested States, Terms and Definitions

In order to understand the difficulties faced by the EU in seeking to settle conflicts involving contested states in the neighbourhood through europeanisation it is necessary to identify a term and definition which will be used for such entities. The term should reflect the nature of the contested states’ current situation which makes direct EU engagement highly unlikely and the definition should deflect the diversity of contested states in the EU’s neighbourhood. Kolstø adopts Jackson’s (1990) “quasi-states” term for contested states as a result of what he believes to be the similarities between the two, such as that should contested states receive official international recognition, they would transform into Jackson’s ‘quasi-states’ (Ibid, 725). Kolstø makes use of three criteria for a state to qualify as his ‘quasi-state’: 1) the leadership of the state must control most of the territory it lays claim to, 2) it must have sought but not achieved international recognition, 3) it must have been in existence for at least two years (Ibid, 725-6).

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Kolstø’s term ‘quasi-states’ and definition will not be used in this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, the term states’ will not be used as his claim that all of his ‘quasi-states’ would transform into Jackson’s (1990) ‘quasi-‘quasi-states’ is rather questionable. For example, Somaliland lacks a patron state to provide it with the financial, political support as well as a security guarantee and yet it is believed to meet the requirements for statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 (Geldenhuys 2009, 137-9). Secondly, his requirement that states control most of their territory would mean the exclusion of important states in the European neighbourhood, such as Palestine and Western Sahara, whose situation is quite similar to that of his ‘quasi-states’ as their right to independent statehood is contested. Finally, his claim that the state must not have achieved international recognition leaves a very narrow few cases which could be studied as the terms ‘international recognition’ was left undefined. For example, he declares Taiwan to be in a category of its own as it is recognised by 28 states (Ibid, 726). However, it is unclear if Abkhazia would thus also be excluded, given that it is recognised by 4 members of the United Nations (UN).

King (2001) made use of a number of different terms to describe contested states, however his article is best known for its use of the term “statelike entities” (Ibid, 252). He defined a ‘statelike entity’ as one which has “(1) a population and (2) a government exercising sovereign control over some piece of territory – but without the imprimatur of international recognition.” (Ibid, 525). This term and definition will not be used in this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, this definition ignores the different degrees of recognition these states possess. Some ‘statelike entities’, such as Kosovo possess widespread de jure recognition, with it being recognised by 115 states whereas others, such as Somaliland (Geldenhuys 2009, 140-2) and even more so Taiwan (Ibid, 220-1) possess significant degrees of de facto recognition. Secondly, as was mentioned in the reasoning for the rejection of Kolstø (2006), the definition’s requirement for the entity to have control over territory would lead to the exclusion of important states in the EU’s neighbourhood.

Kolossov and O’Loughlin make use of the term “’pseudo-states’” as these states are “’transitional or ‘incomplete’” (1998, 151). ‘Pseudo-states’ are said to have “declared sovereignty, have all necessary attributes of a ‘normal state’, and are in full control of their territories” however lack international recognition (Ibid, 155). This term and its definition will not be used in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, this term is problematic as it is politically-loaded and biased in favour of the veto state as it suggests that the state in question has no genuine claim to statehood, thus ignoring the manner in which many of the states

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which are recognised today previously spent periods of their history as ‘pseudo-states’, such as the Netherlands and Portugal (Crawford 2012, 10-11). Secondly, as was mentioned in the case of King (2001) and Kolstø (2006), the requirement in the definition for the entity to control a certain territory would lead to the exclusion of important states in the EU’s neighbourhood and therefore will not be used in this thesis.

Pełczynska-NałEcz et al make use of the term “Almost-states”, as these are states which possess certain aspects of statehood, such as “de facto independence” from their veto state, however, lack official recognition from the international community (2008, 371). After focusing exclusively on the Post-Soviet area, Pełczynska-NałEcz et al conclude that the ‘almost-states’ are “de facto satellites” for their patron states (Ibid, 373). However, this conclusion is problematic, because as Caspersen has shown, the relations between contested states and their patron states, should they have one, are often far more complex than the term ‘puppet’ or ‘satellite’ would suggest (2009, 52-55)

Lynch (2004; 2007) makes use of the term ‘de facto state’, as used by Pegg (1998), for three main reasons. Firstly, he argues that ‘de facto states’ are “political projects” with political institutions and an intrinsic link to themes such as decolonisation and self-determination (Lynch 2007, 486). Secondly, Lynch believes that the term is appropriate given that the issue of ‘statehood’ is one of the primary issues obstructing the resolution of the conflict (Ibid, 486). Finally, Lynch argues that the international state system incentivises groups which seek self-determination to pursue statehood as a result of the wide range of rights provided by state sovereignty, such as legal equality and the non-interference (Ibid, 486-487). For Pegg the term ‘de facto state’ is justified as; firstly, it is claimed that de facto states meet the criteria of population, territory and effective government for statehood, secondly, the term de facto is used to indicate that the state in question lacks de jure acceptance (1998, 44-5). However, the term will not be used in this thesis as its definition, like those mentioned before, requires for the state to effectively control its territory and possess Jackson’s (1990) positive sovereignty (Pegg 1998, 26) and thus excludes important states in the EU’s neighbourhood which face similar challenges.

Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) and Caspersen (2012) make use of the term ‘unrecognized states’. The term ‘unrecognized state’ is chosen as the entity is believed to possess a certain degree of “state-ness”, a certain degree of Krasner’s (2001) domestic sovereignty and seeks international recognition (2011, 3). The term is defined along similar lines to Kolstø (2006)

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and Pegg (1998) in that it requires for the state to have de facto independence from its veto state and to have territorial control of at least two-thirds of the territory to which it lays claim, including the capital and key regions (Caspersen 2012, 8-9). It is also required to have been in existence for at least two years and must not be internationally recognised or, if so, only by a small number of states (Ibid, 10-11). The government of the ‘unrecognized state’ must also be seeking to develop its state institutions and to demonstrate its own legitimacy (Ibid, 11). Finally, an ‘unrecognized state’ has declared independence or has displayed a clear aspiration for achieving independence (Ibid, 11).

This thesis will not use the term ‘unrecognised state’ or the definition provided by Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) and Caspersen (2012) for three main reasons. Firstly, as Geldenhuys notes, the term ‘unrecognized states’ suggests that the state in question receives no recognition (2009, 27). However, states which lack official recognition, such as Somaliland, have been granted de facto recognition by many states (Ibid, 140-2). Indeed, Caspersen herself notes that Somaliland has greater accesses to the international community than many other ‘unrecognised states’ and that the UK has provided it with “de facto recognition” (2015, 401). Ker-Lindsay also pointed out how contested states’ engagement in peace negotiations presupposes an acknowledgement on the behalf of external actors of the contested state’s existence and therefore a certain degree of recognition (2015, 270). Berg and Toomla also found that no contested state has been “completely negated by international society because of its illegality” (2009, 33) and this thus must involve some form of recognition. Secondly, the requirement for the ‘unrecognized state’ to control territory and possess a certain degree of domestic sovereignty would lead to the exclusion of important states in the EU’s neighbourhood which face similar challenges to those states the authors refer to. Finally, it appears as though Caspersen herself has recognised the terms’ limitations and therefore abandoned the term in one of her latest articles (2015).

Geldenhuys (2009) makes use of the term ‘contested states’. He chooses to use this term as most of the states meet most of the requirements of statehood in international law, the Montevido Convention and as a result of the importance placed on the contested nature of their statehood which results in their “relegation to life in international limbo.” (Ibid, 26). Geldenhuys definition of ‘contested states’ is significantly broader and thus more inclusive than those of the previous scholars mentioned. He requires that the state: 1) lack formal international recognition, 2) it must have declared independence or at least affirmed its right to be treated as a formally sovereign equal state by others, 3) it attempts to act as if it was a

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sovereign state in engagements with the outside world, 4) it meets most of the criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention or has a widely recognised right to statehood, 5) it must have been in existence for at least three years (Ibid, 26). Similar to the criteria of Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) and Kolstø (2006), the age limit is considered to be a means of avoiding the study of “wannabe states of a ‘flash in the pan’ variety’” and also ensures that there is sufficient material which allows for an adequate in-depth study of the state (Geldenhuys 2009, 26).

Finally, taking inspiration from Krasner’s (2001) notion of ‘problematic sovereignty’ Papadimtriou and Petrov (2012) alter Geldenhuys’ (20009) contested states term so as to include internationally recognised states. Papadimtriou and Petrov list three characteristics, of which, a contested states must possess at least one (2012, 749). Firstly, a contested state may be an internationally recognised state with membership in the UN which cannot control its entire territory as a result of an ongoing conflict or a lack of connection with the population of the uncontrolled territory (2012, 749). Secondly, a contested state may be a “de facto governing authority of a contested territory” which has declared its independence, however, it lacks full international recognition, as illustrated through its lacking of membership of the UN (Ibid, 749). Finally, a contested state may be a state which whose capacity to exercise authority is greatly limited because of the weakness of its state apparatus, either as a result of its poor resources or complications resulting from its constitutional arrangements (Ibid, 749). Papadimtriou and Petrov’s (2012) modification of Geldenhuys’ term ‘contested states’ is useful in that it places emphasis on not just the statehood of the contested state but also on that of the veto state. It allows for the acknowledgement that, for example, post-Soviet states, such as Georgia and Moldova, have had their statehood within their internationally recognised boundaries contested since their independence from the Soviet Union. However, the requirement for a state to have declared independence is rather problematic. For example, Taiwan has not declared independence, partly because to do so would result in a war with its veto state China and thus possibly put an end to its existence as an independent state. Abkhazia had also existed independently from Georgia for a number of years before it declared independence in 1999. Therefore unlike the definition provided by Geldenhuys (2009) and Caspersen (2012), Papadimtriou and Petrov’s (2012) definition fails to possess the necessary flexibility on this particular issue.

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The term ‘contested state’ and the definition provided by Geldenhuys (2009) will be used in this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is because the term captures the nature of the challenge faced by a large number of states in the EU’s neighbourhood. States as diverse as Western Sahara and Transnistria face a similar challenge in that their right to independent statehood is being challenged. Secondly, the definition is inclusive and therefore allows for the inclusion of many of the different varieties of contested states in the EU’s neighbourhood. Finally, although, as was noted above, Papadimtriou and Petrov’s (2012) make a very interesting modification of the term ‘contested state’ so as to include veto states, however, this thesis, will only use the term to refer to states which lack widespread formal international recognition, as expressed through UN membership, for the sake of simplicity.

2.4

Sovereignty

Sovereignty is central to the issue of contested states and may act as a mediating factor to the effectiveness of the use of europeanisation as a means to bring about conflict settlement. The effects of europeanisation may be limited by a lack of independence on the part of the elites of contested states from their patron state. Should a contested state’s borders be controlled by its patron state there also may be difficulties in the europeanisation process as it may complicate efforts to promote trade or engage with CSOs when the patron state opposes such engagement. It is also important that the definition of sovereignty chosen is able to explain for the diverse nature of the sovereignty of the contested states in the EU’s neighbourhood. James bases his conceptualisation on ‘Constitutional independence’ by which it is meant that a state is “being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme.” (Ibid, 461). This conceptualisation of sovereignty views it as being independent of international law, as international law does not prescribe sovereignty, but rather presupposes its existence (Ibid, 463), thus official international recognition is irrelevant. This approach also views sovereignty as being absolute and unitary (Ibid, 463), thus rejecting the approaches taken by Jackson (1990) and Krasner (2001). Jackson takes a very similar approach to James (1999), in conceptualising sovereignty as being constitutionally separate (2007, 10) and the supreme authority domestically, as expressed through “freedom from legal subordination to any other authority.” (Ibid, 16). Thus Jackson’s conceptualisation of sovereignty does not require that the state be recognised in order for it to be independent (Ibid, 12).

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James’ (1999) and Jackson’s (2007) approaches set the bar very low for states which can be considered to be sovereign. For both scholars the quasi-states mentioned by Jackson (1990) and contested states are just as sovereign as any other state within the international system. This rather simplistic conceptualisation of sovereignty fails to take into account the challenges faced by states which lack official recognition of their sovereignty relative to those that have such recognition. As a result of the lack of official international recognition of their sovereignty a number of contested states have been eradicated by means of military force, such as such as the Republika Srpska Krajina by Croatia. This contrasts with states quasi-states, such as Somalia, whose survival is being supported by the international community.

Crawford (2012) makes use of the term ‘independence’ where others use ‘sovereignty’. ‘Independence’ is viewed as having two primary elements: “the seperate existance of an entity within reasonable coherent frontiers; and its not being ‘subject to the authority of any other State or group of states’, which is to say that it has over it ‘no other authority than that of international law’.” (Ibid, 66). Crawford distinguishes between ‘formal’ and ‘actual’ independence. ‘Formal independence’emphasises the legal component of independence, with it involving the powers of a government, in both interal as well as external affairs, being “vested in the seperate authorities of the putative State.” (Ibid, 67). However, according to Crawford and importantly in the case of contested states, one of the derrogations from ‘formal independence’ is when another state claims “the right to exercise governmental authority over a territory the formal independence of that territory is in issue” (Ibid, 71).

‘Actual independence’ is a relative concept which Crawford defines as “the minimum degree of real governmental power at the disposal of authorities of the putative State that is necessary for it to qualify as ‘independent’.” (Ibid, 72). However, one of the derogations from ‘actual independence’ for Crawford is “illegality of origin”, in which case “its title to be a ‘State’ is in issue.” (Ibid, 74). This is relevant in the case of many contested states as many were founded through illegal secession.

Jackson (1990), conceptualises both negative and positive forms of sovereignty. Negative sovereignty, if legal in form and is defined as “freedom from outside interference” (Jackson 1990, 27). Positive sovereignty, is understood as the government holding the necessary capabilities to provide political goods for their citizens and “take advantage of their own independence” (Ibid, 29). Indeed, it was the work of Jackson (1990) that inspired Pegg to write about the “new facet of the ‘new sovereignty game’” (1998, 4). Pegg argued that de

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facto states were “the flip side of the quasi-state coin” (1998, 4) in that they possessed positive sovereignty and lacked negative sovereignty, whereas quasi-states possessed negative sovereignty and lacked positive sovereignty (1998, 6).

Unlike Jackson (2007) and James (1999), Krasner takes a multifaceted approach towards sovereignty. He identifies four different way in which sovereignty has been used in the literature: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty, similar to Jackson’s (1990) positive sovereignty, refers to “the organization of authority within a given state and its effectiveness” (Krasner 2001, 7). Interdependence sovereignty refers to the “ability of public authorities to control transborder movements” (Ibid, 6-7). International legal sovereignty involves international recognition as a sovereign state (Ibid, 9). Finally, Westphalian sovereignty involves the exclusion of “external authority structures...from the territory of a state.” (Ibid, 10).

This thesis will adopt the multifaceted approach to sovereignty taken by Krasner (2001), as it seems to be able to capture the complex nature of the sovereignty. It also appears to suit contested states, as the nature of their sovereignty tends to vary. A number of contested states, such as Palestine, may be stronger than most in terms of international legal sovereignty, however, significantly weaker in domestic and interdependence sovereignty. Others, such as Transnistria, may be very strong in domestic sovereignty, however, practically non-existent in international legal sovereignty.

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2.5

Conclusion

This Chapter has identified the theory and concepts which will be used in this thesis.

It began by reviewing the literature on the different generations of europeanisation. Following this review, it was decided to adopt a RI and SI approach to conflict settlement, similar to that used by Coppieters et al (2004) and Tocci (2007). This approach was adopted as a result of its presence in every generation of the literature, its ability to take into account the role of domestic actors, and because it was considered necessary to build on previous work in this area.

The Chapter then saw a review of the literature on contested states. It was decided to use Geldenhuys’ (2009) ‘contested states’ as a result of its ability to capture the nature of the challenge faced by a diverse set of states in the EU neighbourhood whose statehood is contested. It was also chosen as its definition was inclusive and therefore allowed for the inclusion of many of the different varieties of contested states in the EU’s neighbourhood. Following on from the review of the literature on contested states, there was a review of the literature on sovereignty with the aim of identifying a definition from the literature which would be suitable for the concept of contested states. The multifaceted approach taken by Krasner (2001) was selected as a result of its ability to capture the complex nature of the sovereignty of contested states. As was noted the nature of the sovereignty of contested states tends to vary, with some tending to be relatively strong in international legal sovereignty and others in domestic sovereignty.

The next chapter will apply the theory and concepts identified in this chapter in the context of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict.

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Chapter 3

Europeanisation and Conflict Settlement in Moldova

3.1

Introduction

The primary objective of this chapter is to analyse how the europeanisation of Moldova has affected, if at all, the conflict settlement imperatives of Transnistria. The primary objective is accompanied by two sub-questions: 1) What effect does the europeanisation of Moldova have on the elites in Transnistria? 2) How does the contested nature and the sovereignty of

Transnistria impact the effectiveness of the EU’s strategy? This chapter will proceed as follows:

Firstly, it will provide an overview of the development of the ENP, its revisions and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) with particular attention being paid to their mechanisms of europeanisation.

Secondly, it will then proceed to analyse the europeanisation of Moldova under the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and the Alliance for European Integration (AEI). This will focus on possible progress in democratisation through analysing their reform progress in fighting corruption, creating an independent judiciary and ensuring for a free and independent media. It will assess the economic integration of Moldova into the EU under the two governments by analysing their progress in adopting economic reforms so as to avail of improved trading relations with the EU.

Finally, this chapter will also analyse the affect of EU’s europeanisation of Moldova as well as the EU’s engagement with CSOs in Transnistria on the domestic opportunity structure in Transnistria. It will also assess as to whether EU engagement with Transnistrian CSOs has had a socialising effect on these actors. The contested nature of Transnistria’s statehood and its sovereignty will be used as mediating factors for this impact.

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3.2

The ENP, EaP and Mechanisms of Europeanisation

The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 saw the EU encounter new neighbours both to its east and to its south. The expected accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 led to the

realisation that the Union’s borders could still yet move further to the east. The ENP was the EU’s response to “this new situation” (European Commission 2004d, 2).

The coming enlargement was viewed as bringing both opportunities, such as trade and investment (European Commission 2003, 3) and challenges in the form of common threats, such as organised crime and conflicts (Ibid, 3; European Council 2003, 8). The EU sought to develop a new framework in order to develop its relations with its new and some of its older neighbours, recognising that the previous approaches taken towards them were inadequate and failed to bring about significant reforms (Dannreuther 2006, 190; Kelley 2006, 31). The ENP lacked a membership prospective for participants as a result of the EU’s ‘enlargement fatigue’ and was instead conceived as a means by which the neighbours could “come as close to the Union” as possible “without being a member” (European Commission 2003, 10). The ENP was launched in 2003 and brought together states from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the former Soviet states with Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) under the same umbrella. It was launched with the aim of averting the development of “new dividing lines” in the neighbourhood and sought to “promote stability and

prosperity” as well as develop “a ‘ring of friends’” around the Union (Ibid, p.4).

The tools used in the ENP to encourage reforms amongst the neighbours were seen as being inspired by the EU’s experience of enlargement (Balfour and Missiroli 2007, 15; Delcour and Tulmets 2009, 505; Kelley 2006; Magen 2006, 405; Pace 2007, 667-668; Sasse 2008, 297). The APs, the Country Reports and Progress Reports were considered to be very similar to tools used during the enlargement process (Kelley 32-34; Sasse 2008, 297) as well as from the EU’s experience in the Balkans (Magen 2006, 407-410). It was seemingly the confidence the successful transformation of the CEE states which prompted the EU to adopt similar tools for the ENP (Ibid, 398-399), however, the adoption of this approach for the EMP states has been criticised for its ignorance of the very different context (Pace 2007, 667-668).