1
Master of Art Thesis
EUROCULTURE
Home University: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Host University: Jagiellonian University Krakow, Poland
January 2011
Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy.
The case study of Turkey
Submitted by: Student Name: Silvia Schiavon Student Number: 1953044 Email: superiotti@hotmail.com
2
Table of Content
Introduction………...3
Methodology……….5
I. The ―Europeanisation Phenomena‖………...6
1. The Europeanisation of national foreign policy………..15
II. Turkish Foreign Policy: An Overview………25
1. The Cyprus Issue………..34
2.Analysis………...40
III. Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy………...43
3
Introduction
The main idea of this study is that, through accession negotiations and the conditions set imposed by the acquis communitaire, the EU is affecting several aspects of national policies within candidate countries. Indeed, throughout the accession process, applicants are required to fulfil membership obligations by redefining their interests and behaviour as well as reorienting the direction and shape of their policies. The accession process is pushing the applicant countries towards greater convergence with EU in terms of institutional, administrative, policy-making and policy outcomes.
This work applies the multi-faceted theory of Europeanization to the domain of national foreign policy and traces the change the latter underwent in response to the impact of EU institutions, norms and policy-making styles. As Kevin Featherstone, ―europeanization can be a useful entry-point for greater understanding of important changes occurring in our politics and society‖1
. The specific focus of this thesis is on the changes in the candidate countries‘ foreign policy as a consequence of the Europeanisation process. Particularly, the author attempts to assess the Europeanisation of foreign policy in acceding countries by examining the Turkish case. The Helsinki Council in 1999, when Turkey was recognized as an official candidate state for EU membership, and the beginning of the accession negotiation process in 2005, constituted two important turning point for Turkish socio-political transformation. Indeed, looking at the specific field of foreign policy, significant changes happened in Turkey‘s external relations with its neighbours since 1999. For instance, as it will be analysed in the following chapters, Turkey moved from a hard power approach to one that utilises soft power instruments. In addition, it also became evident some changes in foreign policy making procedures and outcomes, partially due to the changes in the civilian-military balances in Turkey. Thus, this thesis poses the following questions: To what extent does Europeanisation explain these recent changes in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP)? In which ways has Turkey‘s Europeanisation, alongside the EU accession process, impacted on Turkey‘s foreign policy? Three steps will be taken to answer these questions. First of all, a background on the much debated but still unclear broad concept of Europeanisation is provided, differentiating between the member states and the candidate states. In this chapter a specific section is dedicated to the Europeanisation of
4
national foreign policy. Second, the changes in TFP since 1999 are investigated. Finally, the third chapter, through Michael Smith‘s model of analysis, examines how these changes could be explained by the Europeanisation process. Indeed, Smith‘s model allows us to investigate how Europeanisation affects four key factors in the TFP decision-making process: the creation and the strengthening of a new elite mainly made by the civil society, the transformation of the bureaucratic apparatus, the changes in the Turkish constitution and the growing role of the public opinion.
It is important to keep in mind that the decision to limit myself on the role of the Europeanisation process on these transformations, is not to deny the significance of internal changes such the electoral victories of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 and 2007. Indeed, this strong Party, and particularly the figure of the new Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, obviously has a key role in this process of transformation. However, for the purpose of this thesis, I mainly look at changes in the TFP in response to European norms and the EU‘s political conditionality from 1999 onwards.
By examining the Turkish case in terms of assessing the impact of Europeanisation on foreign policy-making process and outcomes, this thesis will hopefully be a contribution to the literature on Europeanisation of foreign policies. Moreover, it is intended to provide a new perspective to study the relations between the candidate countries and the EU during the enlargement process. Indeed, usually the major attention of the literature on European integration, is on the process of harmonization and adaptation of internal policies itself, without investigating how this national changes, due to the fulfillment of the membership criteria, also affect the foreign policy field. By focusing on Turkey as a key study, this research would provide an opportunity to test hypothesis about Europeanisation on a very unique context, outside the cultural, political, and economic particularity of advanced Western European democracies.
5
Methodology
Following Smith‘s model of analysis, this thesis will use multiple indicators and tools to measure foreign policy changes in order to draw valid conclusions as to where Turkey is heading to. The first step is a deep study of secondary resources about key concepts such as Europeanisation, European integration, civil society, history of Turkey, soft power, democracy and Turkish foreign policy. Additionally, primary sources are taken into consideration such as official web-sites, official documents, lecture delivered by Turkish Foreign Minister and international newspapers. Moreover, Euro barometer and Transatlantic trends will be analysed and compared in order to investigate the changes in the Turkish public opinion.
Last, but not least, this thesis is also based on a field research job in Cyprus, one of the most important examples to illustrate the changes in TFP. The Cyprus issue is still among Turkey's top foreign policy priorities; indeed, until the internal problem of the island will not be solved, Turkey accession to the EU has partially been frozen. The Cyprus case has furnished the author with a visible positive correlation between Turkey‘s Europeanization and encouraging changes on Turkey‘s behavior towards the island.
6
I. The “Europeanisation phenomena”
The concept of Europeanisation, despite its frequent use in European Studies and despite the attempts of many authors to describe it, still lacks a clear, unanimous and single definition2. In a very broad meaning, it is possible to describe it as a process which involves the transfer of a specific idea from one group of actors to another, involving Europe as one of the agents. However, in the last years, the dominant view defines Europeanisation more precisely as European Union‘s policies impact on domestic policies (agriculture, environment, employment..), politics (political parties and interest groups) and polity (institutions) not only within the member states but also outside Europe3, therefore linking it to the European integration process and the ―EU-ization‖4
. It is important to underline that whether Europeanisation is linked to European integration, the two concepts are not synonymous. With political integration national states agree to abandon part of their sovereignty in order to fuse it with supranational organizations. The process of Europeanisation is a consequence of it. Indeed, the Europeanisation process refers to the changes that member or candidate states decide to make as a result of integration or having it as their final object. Thus, the effect of Europeanisation on national level can be defined as a process of domestic changes in which member as well as candidate states, adapt their policies and institutions to new practices, norms, rules, and procedures emanated from the European system of governance. However, whether this concept of ―top-down‖ Europeanisation is part of both candidate and member states, for the latter it is possible to observe also a ―bottom-up‖ Europeanisation process. In this case the focus is on the influence of national policy preferences and interests on the European level. In other words the ability of states to upload their national preferences to the EU level.
2. Johan P. Olsen, ―The Many Faces of Europeanisation‖, Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 (2002) : 921-952 available also on http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm (accessed 21 March 2010); Claudio M. Radaelli, ―Europeanisation: solution or problem?‖, European Integration online paper 8, no.16 (2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm (accessed 21 March 2010); Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social theory and the implications of Europeanisation (New York: Routledge, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Corrnell University Press, 2005);
3. Kalliope Agapiou-Josephides, “The Political System of Cyprus at the Threshold of the European Union: Patterns of Continuity, Change, and Adaptation‖, Euro-med integration and the 'ring of friends': the Mediterranean's European challenge, IV, no. 14 (2003): 237-252. Available on line on
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/Agapiou.pdf (accessed 28 March 2010)
7
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that, following these mechanisms, the way Europeanisation occurs differs in member states and in candidate states. Indeed, the latter are positioned in an asymmetrical relationship with the EU: the European Union has more coercive routes of influence in the domestic policy-making process since these states are still trying to gain admission and, therefore, they have to accept ―the rules‖ if they want to become members. Moreover, regular reports provide for the EU a direct route into domestic policy making of candidate states: criticisms made in the EU reports can have a powerful impact on changing domestic policy making since they can compromise the membership. At the same time, the applicants cannot influence EU policy making from the inside as they cannot upload their own preferences into the European level policies since they are not yet part of the Union. Moreover, since aspirant states in the Europeanisation process have to download EU policies that are already established before they become members, the candidate countries ―become policy takers rather than policy makers‖5
. Of course, it is also true that, indirectly, each candidate state brings with it new European public debates and new issues to solve at the EU level as is the case of Turkey, but this process, as just said, is not a direct consequence of the aspirant member state‘s will, therefore it is not a direct uploading.
This asymmetrical relationship affects also public opinion towards the EU in applicant states since, without the possibility for people to be involved at the European level, there is the risk to perceive the decisions of the EU more as an invasion that a positive development for the state in which participate.
However, despite these differences, a common denominator for both candidate and member states to obtain domestic changes, is what Maria Green Cowles, Thomas Risse and James Caporaso define the ―goodness of fit‖ between European-level processes on the one hand, and domestic structures on the other hand. ―The lower the compatibility (fit) between European institutions and national institutions, the higher the ‗adaptational pressures‘‖6
. Besides, the internal situation of the state under the impact of Europeanisation is another important condition for changing; in other words, the
5. Ozlem Terzi, ―Europeanisation of foreign policy and candidate countries: a comparative study of Greek and Turkish cases‖, Politique européenne 3, no. 17 (2005), 119
8
presence of facilitating factors, national actors or institutions, and how these respond to the adaptational pressures inducing the change7.
Europeanisation should not be confused with harmonization. Indeed, depending on national conditions and degree of misfit the first has different effects. Radaelli identifies four ways by which states respond to Europeanisation: inertia, when there is a lack of change; absorption, when the change is more an adaptation without real modification of the essential structures; transformation, when the fundamental logic of the political behaviour changes; retrenchment, when paradoxically national policies become less European than they were and Europeanisation produces the opposite effect pushing the state far away from Europe and its values8.
Exploring the literature on Europeanisation, it is possible to understand how this concept includes more than a downloading-uploading process of political rules. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, analysing the concept in a broader context, apply the term within four categories. First, as an historical process, referring to ―the export of European authority and social norms such as imperial control, institutional organisation and practices, social and cultural beliefs, values and behaviour‖9
outside Europe. As the authors underline, the challenge here is to define what constitutes ―Europe‖ and the European patterns and values since ―in the modern period Europeanisation has often meant adaptation only to ‗west‘ European norms and practices‖10, usually defined as general ―western values‖. A second category of application sees Europeanisation as a cultural diffusion process within Europe, due to the increasing trans-nationalism of this area. The usage of the term in this category tends to be very broad including the diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities and patterns of behaviour. As already underlined, ―Europeanisation today is more often associated with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership‖11
, therefore the last two categories see Europeanisation as a mechanism of institutional adaptation as well as the adaptation of policy and policy processes at national level. However, also in this context the authors go beyond the pure mechanism of downloading/uploading to
7. Ozlem Terzi, ―Europeanisation of foreign policy and candidate countries: a comparative study of Greek and Turkish cases‖, 113-136
8. Claudio, M. Radaelli, ―The Europeanisation of Public Policy‖, in The Politics of Europeanisation, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 27-56
9. Kevin Featherstone, ―Introduction: In the Name of Europe‖, in The Politics of Europeanisation, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 6
9
understand the reason behind national changes. In other words, focusing on candidate sates, the authors investigate whether the domestic transformation and adaptation to the Europeans norms and values is due to the ―carrot and stick‖ mechanism of conditionality, or because of a logic of appropriateness, thus, believing that the change is the best solution for the State itself.
Following the reasoning of Featherstone and Radaelli, there are several competing theories explaining the Europeanisation process and its consequent domestic changes. Trying to reduce them to two broad families it is possible to identify rational theories on the one hand, and constructive ones on the other hand. Each of these is based on different logics of action: logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness respectively. Rational choice institutionalism explains outcomes as results of choices made by rationally self-interested agents. It privileges a consequentialist mechanism with agents acting in response to assumed benefits (material or social) or the threat of sanctions. From this point of view, Europeanisation, particularly in the candidate states, is perceived as an emerging political opportunity to pursue the own goals. Thus, state action can be explained at least as partly exogenous, due to the larger institutional setting in which the action takes place. Here, institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government. Following this approach for the candidate states, the EU has a strong even if short-term impact on the national level through mechanisms such as conditionality and technical and monetary aid12. The conditionality mechanism ―is the core strategy of the EU to induce non member states to comply with its principles of legitimate statehood‖13
. While the state is meeting certain criteria, the European Union serves material or immaterial assistance. The final reward for the state, in return of applying certain behavior designed by the EU, is usually the promise of membership. This external incentives model is one of the most effective foreign policy tools of the EU towards aspirant members in the short time. However, with this ―carrot and stick‖ mechanism, the fundamental structure of the state and the national identity are not touched. Indeed the state adopts bargaining strategy only to get the rewards as soon as possible
12. See Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanisation, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2003); Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, Thomas and Risse, Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005)
13. Frank Schimmelfenning, Stephan Engert and Heiko Knobbel, ―Costs, Commitment and
10
following logic of cost-benefit calculation without belief in the consequences of the change it is doing at national policy level.
Whether the rational approach can be defined as a more calculus approach, the sociological constructivism is more cultural. In this second approach, (formal and informal) institutions ―affect identities, self-images and preferences of the actors‖14. Following this perspective, changes come from the inside because the interests and the values of the state have changed. The logic of appropriateness argues that the actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially accepted behaviour and these collective understandings strongly influence the way actors define their goals. From this perspective, Europeanisation is understood as the ―emergence of new rules, norms, practices and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures‖15. In this model it is important that actors are convinced that a certain behavior or policy is the most desired one. Thus, here the EU, through mechanisms such as social learning and lesson-drawing, has a more long-term impact at a national level due to the internalization of its norms and values on the domestic level and the consequent creation of, at least partially, a new ―more European‖ identity16. Indeed, the EU membership process usually affects the national identity in different degrees. ―Many social norms not only regulate behavior, they also constitute the identity of actors‖17
. Following this perspective, norms are not only legal prescriptions but also they are social practices with certain meaning and interpretations. For this reason the EU enlargement is a very rich area not only for political scientists or scholars of international relations but also for sociologists and even anthropologists. ―Inclusion in EU processes influences the domestic perceptions of interests and the valid way of
14. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ―Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms‖, Political Science, XLIV, (1996): 939
15. Tanja, A. Borzel, The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: The Limits of External Europeanisation, Freie Universitat Berlin, Research College ―Transformative Power of Europe‖
http://www.daad.de/imperia/md/content/de/zentren/boerzel.pdf (accessed 1 July 2010)
16. Social learning is a less direct process in which the changes are achieved, after a period of contacts between the state and the EU, through the internalization of the EU norms and values by local actors; Lesson-drawing is a response to domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo. It is similar to social learning but in this case the contact with the EU and the EU activities are not decisive factors in the decision to adopt European rules. It is possible to say that it is more an endogenous process rather than exogenous. For more details see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, 12-22
11
achieving their ends, resulting in changes in ways of policy definition, policy outcome and ways of policy pursuit‖18
.
Of course, the credibility of the EU promises or threats and the clarity in the specification of conditions and obligations from the European Union, are other important factors that determine the possible success of the previous mechanisms19. Similarly, norms and values should represent a ―degree of legitimacy‖ in the importing state to make it difficult to reject them. The legitimacy of the European values is visible since its foundation, indeed, as underlined by the Treaty of Amsterdam ―The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States‖ (new Article 6(1)). Membership of the European Union was expressly conditional upon respect for the principles set out in this article. These values and principles are also present in article 4 of the Helsinki Council Presidency Conclusion that established the general framework for candidate states relations with the EU in the foreign policy sphere:
They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues20.
In this case is also evident the link between fundamental values such as democracy and respect for human rights on the one hand, and foreign policy on the other hand. Moreover, since this set of values and principles is of course part of a national identity, the link between identity and foreign policy is easily understandable. ―National identity, by definition, reflects a nation‘s relationship to ‗the other‘, (…) (therefore) the relations a state has with a foreign state, has a strong dialectical relationship with national identity‖21
. Thus, every impact of Europeanisation on the core structure and national
18. Ozlem Terzi, ―Europeanisation of foreign policy and candidate countries: a comparative study of Greek and Turkish cases‖, 116
19. Nathalie Tocci, Conflict Resolution in the European Neighborhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor, EUI Working Paper RSCAS no.29 (2004) http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/04_29.pdf (accessed 29 March 2010)
20. Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki European Council, Article 4, 10-11 December 1999. Available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm
12
identity of a state inevitably also has an effect on its national foreign policy as to its substance, priorities and objectives.
As written in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ―The Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law‖. Again, in the Article 2 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe it is possible to read that the European ―we-ness‖ evolves around common values like ―respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, including rights of persons belonging to minorities‖. Therefore, following the socio-constructivist approach, membership and, consequently, the Europeanisation process, is based on the voluntary internalization of all these principles. Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva speak about ―subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and identity‖ of the state22
.
Thus, the Copenhagen Criteria basically determine that ―the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minority‖. In other words, the creation of institutions that guarantee the values that are at the core of the integration process. Consequently, as illustrated by a statement on goals from the European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs Olli Rehn: ―Enlargement becomes a matter of extending the zone of European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law‖.23 Therefore, in this case it is possible to speak about a ―Soft-Europeanisation process‖, also evident, in the foreign policy field, in the importance given to the idea of soft power.
The idea of ―Soft-Europeanisation‖ is stressed in the definition of Radaelli: Europeanisation consists in a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‗way of doing things‘ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies24.
22. Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, EU Neighbourhood PolicyCEPS Working Documents, 2005 http://www.ceps.eu/book/europeanisation-gravity-model-democratisation (accessed 22 July)
23. Olli Rehn, ―Values Define Europe, Not Borders‖, Financial Times, 4 January 2005
13
As pointed out by Grabbe, this definition underlines the importance of change in the logic of political behavior. Moreover here are present both the hard (rules, procedures and policy paradigms) and soft (styles, way of doing things, shared beliefs and norms) transfers that are part of the Europeanisation process25. The constructivist approach is focused particularly on the latter.
As already said, the concept of Soft-Europeanisation as a process of exporting values and principles shared at the EU level into new applicant states, leading to a change in its interests and behaviors, can then be linked to the Joseph Nye‘s idea of soft-power. Indeed, according to the author,
Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are several ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. (…) Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (―carrots‖) or threats (―sticks‖). But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoff(…) A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its examples, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it26.
Therefore, through ―soft tools‖ it is possible to attract or repel other actors to "want what you want"27 since this becomes also what they want. Nye underlines the importance of attraction power for the resources of the Soft Power such as culture, domestic values and policies, foreign policy substance and style. Joseph Nye gives various examples of Europe‘s advantages in the competition for global popularity through the use of soft power; the most important is of course the enlargement process. By coaching and conditioning new former states for EU entry, enlargement has become the most important achievement of EU foreign policy, and its success owes overwhelmingly to soft power. However, the EU within itself possesses a considerable amount of soft power due to its nature as a multilateral organization based on shared
25. Heather Grabbe, Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, (Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Turin, 22-27 March 2002, Center for European Reform, London) http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/grabbe_ECPR.pdf (accessed 26 August 2010)
26. Joseph S. Nye, ―The Place Of Soft Power In State-Based Conflict Management‖, in Leasing the Dogs of War, Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. All (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 389-391
14
values and principles. The pursuit of European countries to find economic well-being, political unity and peace through multilateralism is a powerful source of credibility for EU policies, as is Europe's contemporary image as an island of social democracy and prosperity. As Timothy Garton Ash pointed out, the strength of EU‘s ―soft power is demonstrated by the fact that not only millions of individuals but also whole states want to enter it‖28.
However, the problem is that human rights and the rule of law principles are considered by Europeans to be a precious heritage of the era of enlightenment, therefore something proper of Europe and originating in Europe. Instead, these values represent not only values of the Western European states but also values of the overall international community and of the United Nations as it is possible to read in the United Nation web-site:
Democracy is one of the universal core values and principles of the United
Nations. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
principle of holding periodic and genuine elections by universal suffrage are essential elements of democracy. These values are embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and further developed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which enshrines a host of political rights and civil liberties underpinning meaningful democracies29.
For this reason it is very difficult to distinguish the impact of Europeanisation from that of globalization or from other external factors. This ―problem of equifinality‖30 is a further challenge for methodology.
However, since this aspect of ―Soft-Europeanisation‖31
has been less analysed, particularly about its impact on national foreign policy, and because of the importance of mechanisms such as socialization and norms internalization in the change of interest and behaviour on national actors, the socio-constructivist approach, together with the rational institutionalism one, will be taken in consideration in this thesis to analyse the impact of Europeanisation on Turkish foreign policy.
28. Timothy Garton Ash, ―The Great Divide‖, Prospect Magazine, March 2003 29.Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/rule_of_law/democracy.htm (accessed 25 July 2010)
30. Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Muller, ―Applying the Concept of Europeanisation to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms‖, (Paper prepared for the GARNET Conference 2010- The European Union in International Affairs, Panel B.3)
15
The particular field of research on the impact of Europeanisation on national foreign policy needs some more explanation.
1. Europeanisation of national foreign policy
Christopher Hill defines foreign policy as ―the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor‖32
. Therefore, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) involves the study of how this ―independent actor‖, acting singly or in groups, makes foreign policy. Indeed, according to foreignpolicyanalysis.org,
As a field of study, foreign policy analysis is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner. The underlying and often implicit argument theorizes that human beings, acting as a group or within a group, compose and cause change in international politics33.
However, as Hill pointed out in his book The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, it is important to keep in mind that understanding the reasons behind foreign policy decisions is not an easy task. Moreover, since the relationship taken in consideration in the world of foreign policy are not only those between states but also those between states and transnational actors of many different kinds, and across a range of different issue-areas,
Understanding how foreign policy decisions are arrived at, implemented, and eventually changed, is not a matter of a single theory, even less of generalizing on the basis of an individual case. It involves doing justice to the richness and complexity of the foreign policy universe, without forgetting the basic premise of social science (...). This means that there are two sides to the politics of foreign policy, the international system and the bureaucratic domestic politics impacting on policy makers. (...) it is the interplay between the two which constitutes our large, elusive but fascinating subject34.
Thus, the explanation of foreign policy decision making is factorial and multi-level besides being interdisciplinary.
James Rosenau, in order to understand the basic characteristics of the foreign policy, goes even beyond the micro-macro dimensions division pointed out by Hill, affirming that there are five sets of independent and explanatory variables that affect foreign policy decision-making: the individual factors which make the decision maker policy
32. Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3 33.Foreign Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, College of Arts & Science, and the University of Missouri. http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org/ (accessed 15 September 2010)
16
choices different from those of other decision makers; the role factors, in other words the behaviour of the decision makers due to the role that they play in their official positions; the governmental and societal factors related to the influence respectively of the government and of the society on the decision maker behaviour, and finally the systematic factors. These are the external factors and the important world developments that have important impact on the policy choices of the decision maker35. The way Europeanisation affects national foreign policy is part of this last group even if, indirectly, it could also be part of the government and societal factors. Indeed the Europeanisation process affects both the government and the society and, as just mentioned, these have a consequent influences on the policy maker decisions.
Europeanisation of national foreign policy is a topic getting increasingly more space and importance in the international political debate. However, is important to keep in mind that it is a quite new research field, probably because of the unique nature of foreign policy36. Foreign policy is usually considered as high politics and it lies at the heart of national sovereignty, therefore something untouchable by a supranational power as the European Union. Moreover, there is no clear European template to follow for member states as to foreign policy matters. The dynamics of Europeanisation in this policy field differ from the dynamics in other policy areas. For instance, the ―goodness of fit‖ explanation for national changes is not as suitable to the field of foreign policy as it is for policy fields marked by hierarchical governance. Indeed, in the area of foreign policy there is usually no ―clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into member – as well as candidate – states‖37.
One of the most cited explanations of Europeanisation in the foreign policy sphere is the one of Ben Tonra who defines it as a ―transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the way in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internationalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making‖38
. Within this framework
35. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Francis Pinter, 1980)
36. Examples of researches on this topic are Claudia Major, ―Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?‖, Politics, 25, 3, (2005): 175-190; Michael Smith, ―Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation‖, Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 4 (2000): 613-631
37. Simon Bulmer and Claudio Radaelli, ―The Europeanisation of National Policy?‖ Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation no. 1/2004 (Belfast: Queen's University, School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, 2004), 9
17
Europeanisation of foreign policy can be considered as a learning process by national elites. In Major‘s interpretation as well, Europeanisation of foreign policy is ―more a process of socialisation than forced adaptation‖39
even if the mechanism of conditionality is still strongly influent. Habits of cooperation, accepted advantages of shared information, responses to common threats, have all significantly altered patterns of national policy-making. In this context, the participation in the CFSP helps to bolster a shared sense of identity among states and to mitigate perpetual differences40. In other words, there is the possibility of redefinition of national interests and identities in the context of ‗Europe‘. This aspect of the Europeanisation, as a process that leads also to a transformation in the identity of the applicant country‘s society, is often forgotten; nevertheless, it has important consequences on the foreign policy field. Indeed, this leads to a modification in the worldview of the country, and it is useless to underline the importance of this transformation in taking foreign policy decisions.
However, analysing foreign policy transformations as a consequence of the Europeanisation process, it is necessary to distinguish between member and candidate states in this field too. In fact, as already said, in the case of the latter the approach to use is the top-down perspective. Indeed, for candidate states it is not possible to directly upload their own preferences on the European level and the relation between the state and the EU remains asymmetrical therefore also the conditionality mechanism has a stronger impact than in member states. Moreover, in the case of applicant states, even the national identity is still stronger ―national‖ and less ―European‖, particularly at the beginning of the Europeanisation process, and this of course can be an obstacle for the process of change.
Michael Smith identifies four general indicators of the adaptation of national foreign policy to the Europeanisation process. These are: élite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change and the increase in public support for European political co-operation41. Smith‘s model of analysis allows to investigate the most important areas of national changes due to the Europeanisation process. Moreover, it emphasizes the importance of both the two approaches to Europeanisation previously mentioned: on the one hand the social constructivism approach that, in this case,
39. Claudia Major, ―Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?,‖ Politics, 25, no.3, (2005): 186
40. Christopher Hill and Wallace William, ―Introduction: Actors and Actions.‖ In The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, ed. Christopher Hill, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 9
18
explains the indicators of élite socialisation and public support. On the other hand, the rational institutionalism is necessary to understand the bureaucratic reorganization and the constitutional change.
Furthermore, this work is based on the idea that ―the process change in Turkish foreign policy is also driven by domestic factors in which the Turkish institutional, political, economic and social context is interconnected with the external dynamics embedded in the EU accession process‖42
. This interconnection is perfectly underlined by Smith‘s model of analysis. Indeed, as Smith pointed out, national policy decisions are not made in a vacuum43. They are the result of both interactions at national level and interactions with other states. This leads to the importance of the socialization mechanism in the foreign policy decision-making process. Indeed, ―problem-solving fundamentally depends on the extent to which relevant decision-makers are socialized into the system, since it implies a certain level of trust among actors, and a certain amount of devotion to a common enterprise‖44
. Institutionalized networks and cooperation among states during prolonged periods of time encourage this socialization process that emerges around three concepts: common reflexes, norms of behavior and thinking, and identity45. To these factors, it is necessary to add other important key elements in the socialization process, such as diffuse reciprocity, mutual responsiveness, confidentiality, consensus, consultation, respect for other member states and the prohibition of hard bargaining; all of them create what Smith called a ―culture of compromise‖46
.
In the European context this socialization mechanism is particularly evident. Indeed, the assumption is that EU membership leads to increase intergovernmental cooperation and consultation among national foreign policy actors. As Hill and Wallace underlined,
the COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginnings of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all these have moved the conduct of national foreign policy in the European context away from the old nation-state national
42. Fuat Canan, The Impact of Europeanisation on Turkish Foreign Policy. An Analysis of Period since 1999, (Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller & Co, 2009), 50
43. Michael E. Smith, ―Institutionalization, Policy adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation‖, European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1, (2004): 95-136.
44. Michael E. Smith, ―Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy cooperation‖, Journal of European Public Policy, 7, no. 4, (2000):5
45. Ibid. 249-250
19
sovereignty model towards a collective endeavor, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential47.
Through a dense process of cooperation national foreign policy actors become far more familiar with each other‘s thinking and they learn to value EU foreign policy as beneficiary for their own targets considering the EU as an acceptable arena in which to make foreign policy decisions. Thus, in this context, the EU becomes the frame for change rather than only its origin.
Constructivists argue that this socialization gradually leads to a convergence of foreign policy actors‘ interests that become more European. Indeed, the socialization of policy-makers into a European decision-making framework has an effect on their belief system: the distinctive national orientation they have might be supplemented if not partly transformed by commonly accepted and legitimate European norms and social identities. This Europeanization of decision-makers is, in turn, expected to result in more decisions having a European dimension. An increasing European orientation of foreign policy-making groups might, thus, ―…lead to an actual Europeanised foreign policy…‖48
.
It is important to keep in mind that socialization is a process rather than an outcome and it does not have to be successful49. However, it could be successful if it results in the actor‘s internalization of positive European beliefs and practices. This can be achieve through mechanisms such as social learning and lesson-drawing with which national policy-makers learn the norms and rules of the EU foreign policy culture. The process of learn and transfer of norms and rules is mediated by the existence of the so-called ―norms entrepreneurs‖50
who ―translate‖ the EU policies on the local and national level. The ―entrepreneurs‖ are those policy-makers directly involved and the most exposed to EU norms and rules; officials from different ministries and local governments who have participated in exchange and twinning programs offered by EU institutions and members. For instance, the EU set up a political framework for cooperation with candidate countries that includes annual meetings of the Heads of
47. Christopher Hill and William Wallace, ―Introduction: actors and actions‖, in The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, ed. Christopher Hill, (London: Routledge, 1996), 6
48. Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 8
49. Frank Schimmelfenning, ―International Socialization in the new Europe: rational action in an Institutional Environment‖, European Journal of International Relations 6, (2000): 109-139
20
State and Government and, twice annual meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and political directors of the associated countries with the EU countries.
There is a general agreement that a process of learning characterizes the first contacts between national officials and the EU. This learning process starts during the period when the candidates are observers in EU institutions. The ―active observer‖ is the status granted to the future members covering the period between the signing and ratification of the accession treaties. During this period, the national representatives are able to attend all Council‘s meetings and to familiarize themselves with the working methods and procedures. The experience accumulated by experts from different ministries during this time allows them to get a good grasp of the negotiation practice with representatives of the European Commission and of the acquis communautaire in their specific sectors of expertise. Through cooperation and socialization the new member states learn the rules of consensus and negotiation indispensable in a EU of 27 members. Indeed, following the norm of respect for other member states there is redefinition of what the national priorities are, what the official position is in respect to other countries‘ concerns, and how the pursuit of national interest resonates with the common European interest. In addition, national officials learn that national foreign policy is strengthened by political cooperation, not weakened51. EU membership offers a new platform to defend national interest, backed by the political and economic weight of the EU. In this case, the power nature of the Europeanization is the ―power to‖ or Europeanization as empowerment. Indeed, the EU member states have more access to information, resources, and decisions than their own capabilities would allow52. Besides, the EU membership offers to member states a stronger stand on the international stage. In the specific case of Turkey, the socialization process is teaching this country that it is usually easier and more successful to reach the own goal through a cooperative rather than an aggressive approach.
Unfortunately, in the broader context of the EU accession process, the assumption that the internalization of new norms and rules follows a logic of appropriateness rather than the one of consequentiality, namely that those EU norms are internalized by
51. Michael E. Smith, ―Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy cooperation‖, 619
21
individual officials because they are good and right in their own, is difficult to prove53. However, regardless of the reason of the internalization of European standards, the change that derive from socialization and learning mechanisms tend to be more stable and of long term than the one due to adaptation and conditionality. Indeed, while the latter refers to changes which occur when actors merely adjust their behavior to external factors, the first refers to changes in their preferences, interests and, sometimes, even identity. Thus, the structure of the state is affected.
Following Smith‘s model of analysis, this ‗thinking in European terms‘ is also reflected in the extensive re-organization of national foreign service structures in response to improving participation in CFSP over the years. As Michael Smith argued, ―there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership in particular also influence the way individual member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy. Political co-operation priorities become national priorities, and EU member states, or future member states, are expected to live up to these joint commitments‖54
. Thus, the Europeanisation of foreign policy is also clearly connected to the process of change at the level of institutions participating in policy-making, i.e., bureaucratic transformation. National foreign ministries and core executives, together with the bureaucratic machinery implementing the decisions and the main political forces, all give input into the foreign policy-making process. The reception and therefore the domestic adaptation to the EU, is seen here as the form of institutional, procedural or policy change in the EU member states or in a candidate countries which occurred as a result of balancing the needs of a country and external demands.
According to Smith, three changes in this field need to be stressed. First, political co-operation requires the establishment of new national officials. These new institutional roles provide a key source of continuity in national attention for CFSP affairs. For instance, the 1973 Copenhagen Report specifically required the establishment of a Group of Correspondents (later European Correspondents) to prepare meetings of political directors and liaise with their counterparts in other EU states. This Group was permanently devoted to political co-operation and a great deal of the aforementioned socialization took place within it. The Report also required each EU state to link itself to the COREU telex network, another permanent bureaucratic innovation designed to
53. Meltem Muftuler Bac and Evrim Taskin, ―Turkey‘s accession to the EU: Does Culture and Identity Play a Role?‖, Ankara Review of European Studies, 6, no. 2, (2007): 31-50
22
improve political co-operation. These were the only permanent administrative changes required of political co-operation until after the Maastricht Treaty (beyond the normal sharing of diplomats and staffing of the EPC Secretariat). By that time, coordination problems between Political Directors and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) concerning the CFSP had encouraged the establishment of CFSP counselors attached to each member state‘s permanent representation to the EU. Smith mainly investigates the circumstances in member states rather than in candidate states, however, for the latter the situation is not very different.
Second, political co-operation encourages the expansion of national diplomatic services. Indeed, there is little doubt that political co-operation prompted a common trend toward the expansion, in size and finances, of foreign ministries, as well as an increase in the number of their missions to other countries due to its growing workload. The expansion most directly related to political co-operation involves the growth of staffs and budgets in national foreign ministries. Part of this expansion is because of the growth of the political co-operation agenda, which requires EU states and future members to develop some level of expertise in areas which previously had not concerned them. As to the third change, political co-operation leads to a clear reorientation (and, in a few states, also a reorganization) of the internal administrative structures of national foreign ministries. Together, these three developments help to reinforce the norms of political co-operation, and they also spill over, to some extent, to other relevant aspects of national and foreign policy.
As for the third indicator of Smith‘s model of analysis, it is important to underline that political co-operation also prompted important constitutional debates in several states. These are worthy of mention since they demonstrate the extent to which certain states have been willing, despite often high political costs, to reorient their national legal structures according to the changing demands of European integration in general and political co-operation in particular55.
Finally, Smith underlines the importance of the public opinion in European affairs. With the ever-growing impact of the EU on the daily lives of citizens of EU member states and candidate countries alike, one can argue that the importance of public opinion is growing in parallel.
23
Thus, for the clarity and the completeness of these four indicators, Smith‘s model of analysis will be used in this thesis in order to investigate the impact of the Europeanisation process on TFP.
However, there are other similar theoretical frameworks that underline the link between exogenous and endogenous factors of change and that take in consideration the importance of both conditionality and socialization mechanism for changes in candidate countries. One of these is developed by Aydin and Acikmese. They identified three types of foreign policy conditionality: first, conditionality through the jure political criteria (the EU promotes political reforms to strengthen democracy will have an indirect impact on TFP), second, conditionality through de facto political criteria (the criterion referred to here is the peaceful settlement of disputes between candidate countries and their neighbors), third, conditionality through the Common Foreign and Security Policy acquis56 (Turkey needs to adopt the CFSP acquis, including legally binding international agreements, and has to align itself with EU common positions, declarations and joint actions, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when required).
Finally, taking in consideration also the three levels of analysis in international relations (individual, state and systematic levels) expressed by David Singer in The
levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations57, that refer again to the micro/macro – domestic/international dimensions of foreign policy, another interesting model of analysis is the one of Ahmet Sozen. Indeed, he investigates factors affecting the specific case of TFP changes on four levels58:
Conceptual setting, that comprehends the theoretical ideas or ideologies that consciously or unconsciously are used by the policy maker;
Micro setting, that includes the background of the decision maker;
Domestic macro setting, that is the domain included influential factors within the national boundary of the country such as level of democracy and importance of civil society;
56. Mustafa Aydin and Sinem A. Acikmense, ―Europeanisation through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy‖, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 9, no. 3, (2007): 263-274
57. David Singer, ―The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations‖, in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. J. N. Rosenau, (New York: Free press, 1969), 20-29
58. Ahmet Sozen, ―A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges‖,
24 External macro setting, that includes significant world development and all the outside national boundary factors affecting policy maker decisions. About this last dimension, the research will be limited to few international examples focusing more on the Europeanisation process and the accession negotiation process of Turkey.
25
II. Turkish Foreign Policy: An Overview
To understand what, in general, drives contemporary TFP, it is worth taking stock and trying to understand the main motives behind it. One of the elements that have been shaping TFP in the long-term span, affecting both foreign policy objectives and foreign policy orientation of Turkey, is its geo-strategic position.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File
As emphasized by Aydin, this makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, Caucasian and Middle Eastern country, all at the same time59. In view of this strategic geographical location, Turkey, as Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out, is a state whose importance is not derived from its power and motivation but rather from the possibility to have access to areas or resources to the great powers60. Historically, Turkey‘s most strategically significant asset has been its control of the straits of the Dardanelles and Bosporus. Moreover, it also controls access routes from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, providing natural links between Europe and Asia.
However, as William Hale emphasizes, ―while its geographical situation increases Turkey‘s international weight, it also raises the prospect of an attack by any of the great powers with ambitions in these regions‖61
. In other words, if on the one hand this location at the crossroads of land connections between Europe, Asia and Africa has increased Turkey‘s geopolitical importance, on the other hand, it has also encouraged a sense of insecurity with respect to its territorial integrity. This feeling of instability and insecurity will have a strong effect also on the foreign policy of the country culminating
59. Mustafa Aydin, ―Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey‖, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 3, no. 2 (2003): 170
60 Zbigniev Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperative, (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 41
26
in the 1990s with the so called national security approach. Before investigating on these important aspects that characterized TFP until a few years ago, it is necessary to understand another element that affected in the past and still affects Turkey‘s international relationships: its historical legacy.
The new Turkish Republic emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, after the independence war led by ex-Ottoman army commander Mustaf Kemal Ataturk, who became the first President. He was influenced by the ideas of the European Enlightenment, by a nationalism based on territory and population rather than religious affinity, and he was driven by the will of modernization. However, the opening up to Western ideas and values was in contrast to the strong ―Islamization‖ of the country. Indeed, the Founding Father felt that Islam prevented social progress and was a barrier to fashioning a cohesive Turkish national identity. Therefore, Islam was strictly divorced from politics62.
Ataturk devoted his life to the laborious task of national reconstruction leaving aside the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. Internal reconstruction and reform was the main priority. His foreign policy was characterized by the famous principle ―peace at home, peace abroad‖, signifying a peace-seeking and non-interventionist approach in international relationships. Turkey maintained friendly relations with the major powers of the time (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France), but avoided establishing close strategic alliance with any of them. A series of treaties with its neighbourhood were signed to ensure its security and territorial integrity, but the country remained aloof from regional politics adopting a policy of non-alignment. However, after Ataturk‘s death in 1938, a policy of non-intervention no longer seemed feasible given the international environment. The security and territorial integrity of Turkey could no longer be preserved by maintaining a non-alignment policy particularly during the Cold War period. Ankara recognized that Turkey should forge a close alliance with the United States as the only viable strategy against the Soviet aggression. Thus, Ankara‘s most important foreign policy concern between 1945 and 1980s, was identified with containing the Soviet Union.
During the same period, Turkey also became member of several international organizations such as the League of Nations in 1932, the United Nations in 1945, the
27
Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1960. Moreover, another step toward a further modernisation and westernisation of the country, happened under the leadership of the President Turgut Ozal with which TFP shifted from Kemalism to neo-Ottomanism63, i.e., from a security-oriented approach to an economic-oriented approach. Ozal aimed for a rediscovery of Turkey‘s identity as a Muslim country and a revaluation of Turkey‘s past as an empire. According to him, this was not in contradiction with Turkey‘s western orientation, indeed the recognition of all pieces of Turkish history and all faces of Turkey‘s identity was seen as allowing a reaffirmation of Turkey‘s choice for the West on a more solid and honest basis. Domestically, the new President of Turkey tried to return to a democratic order and to modernization following liberalization policies. One of the key points of his policy was the economic reform that also influenced Ankara‘s foreign policy orientations. Indeed, Ozal advocated a foreign policy line that emphasized the expansion of Turkey‘s commercial and economic relations with the region surrounding the country. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey found itself in the position to deal with its neighbours. In the Balkans, the Black sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey tried to exert influence using not only its geopolitical position but also its historical and cultural ties with the newly independent states64. Ozal took the initiative to set up regional co-operation institutions in the area surrounding Turkey such as the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) and he started new important commercial relations with Russia. Moreover the number of visitors to Turkey from Balkans and ex-Soviet Union increased considerably with a flexible visa policy for inhabitants of the Black Sea region65. Besides, Turkey also set up strong links with Central Asia and the Middle East in political and economic relations. Indeed, Ozal believed that Turkey, with its good relations in these regions, would be integrated into the West66. Thus, after the cooling of relations caused by the last Turkish military coup between 1980 and 1983, he
63. The term neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leading Turkish columnist, Cengiz Candar, to refer to Turkish pursuit of active and diversified foreign policy in the region based on the Ottoman historical heritage. The neo-Ottomanism envisioned Turkey as a leader of Muslim world and a central power in Eurasia.
64. Sule Kut, ―The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s‖, in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. Barry Rubin & Kemal Kirisci (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2002), 10
65. Kemal Kirisci, ―Turkey‘s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times‖, (EU Institute for Security Studies: Chaillot Paper, no. 92, 2006), 30
28
repositioned Turkey on its European track67 adding, with the development of a competitive export-oriented economy, a further dimension to Turkey‘s European orientation besides the ideological one of the Kemalist elite68.
In sum, in contrast to its neighbours, with the exception of Greece, Turkey, in the post-Cold War era, found itself on the side of winners. In The Economist in December 1991 Turkey was declared to be the ―Star of Islam‖. With its democracy, secular form of government and liberal market economy Turkey was proposed as a prototype to be emulated by the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union69. However, this positive period ended soon and ―Turkey very quickly found itself in the very midst of a turbulent region with serious conflicts erupting in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East‖70. Moreover, in the new post-Cold War era, Turkish policy makers faced a serious crisis losing the strategic importance, particularly in European security, on which traditional TFP was based71. This had its repercussions on EU-Turkey relations. Indeed, Turkey‘s relations with Europe worsened when the Soviet threat disappeared72. The US leaders started to think that Turkey‘s strategic value for American interests was more to be seen in respect to the greater Middle East than in its classic NATO role, however, as Hale pointed out, the western European states did not seem to have put Middle Eastern security at the top of their foreign policy agenda73.
This confusion about its role in world, added to the feeling of insecurity due to the instability within its neighbourhood, lead to the so-called national security approach that characterized TFP for all the 1990s. Ziya Onis, refers to the Turkey of that period as a coercive regional power characterised by the use of the threat of force as main foreign policy tool and by a growing importance of a military and narrow elite in foreign policy decision making74. Ilhan Uzgel, underlined as the military has been the most influential institution in Turkish political life since 1960, defines the 1990s as the ―golden age‖ of
67. Soli Ozel, ―It Truly is a Long and Winding Road: The Saga of EU- Turkey Relations‖, in Turkey and the European Union, (American Institute for Contemporary Farman Studies Working Paper Series, The Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 4
68. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, (London: Hurst&Company, 2003), 212
69.―Star of Islam: A Survey of Turkey‖, The Economist, 14 December 1991 70. Kemal Kirisci, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times, 12
71. Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 2
72. Gulnur Aybet and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, ―Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey‘s Problematic Relationship with Europe‖, International Journal, 55, (2000), 580
73.William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 223
