Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture Home University: Uppsala University
Host University: University of Groningen
August 2011
Title:
Europeanisation beyond Europe
Case study:
EU as a promoter of integration in Southeast Asia since 1997
Submitted by:
Tran Hoang Cam Nhung Student Number: catr886, s1968998 Contact Details: camnhungth@gmail.com 179 Group 10 KhuongTrung
Thanh Xuan, Hanoi VIETNAM
Supervised by:
2 Declaration
I, Nhung Tran Hoang Cam, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled ‘Europeanisation beyond Europe: The European Union as a promoter of integration in Southeast Asia since 1997’, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own work. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
3
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ... 5
1. Introduction ... 6
2. Perspective of the Research ... 7
2.1. Aims ... 7
2.2. Literature Review ... 7
2.3. Conceptual Framework ... 10
2.4. Methodology ... 14
2.5. Presentation of Structure ... 15
I. Europeanisation beyond Europe ... 17
3. Chapter 1:European integration as a global inspiration ... 17
3.1. Hard Power ... 18
3.1.1. Economic and Financial Strength ... 18
3.1.2. Territory, Population, Resources and Military Force ... 24
3.2. Soft Power ... 29
3.2.1. Development Aid ... 29
3.2.2. Diplomacy ... 30
II. Case study: Europeanisation in Southeast Asia ... 37
4. Chapter 2: Overview of EU-ASEAN relations ... 37
5. Chapter 3: Europeanisation in Southeast Asia ... 42
5.1. EU’s strategy and policy documents on supporting SEA integration ... 42
5.2. EU-ASEAN collaborative programmes for SEA regional integration ... 46
5.3. Tracing EU’s imprint on ASEAN’s important documents ... 48
a. ASEAN Vision 2020 ... 48
b. ASEAN Charter ... 50
5.4. Hindrances to Southeast Asian Regional Integration ... 56
a. Economic Dimensions ... 56
b. Political Dimensions ... 61
c. Socio-cultural Dimensions ... 68
III. Concluding Remarks ... 68
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2. Summary of Findings ... 69
3. Future Agenda ... 71
Bibliography ... 71
List of Tables and Figures ... 81
5 Acknowledgements
The subject of this MA thesis has long been of interest to me. I wish to study more about the European Union in particular and about European values in general and above all, it is my pleasure to write about Southeast Asia, my home.
My thanks go to both my home university Uppsala (Sweden) and host university of Groningen (the Netherlands) for giving me the opportunity to carry out a thorough research on this interesting topic.
I am thankful for the guidance, assistance and encouragement of Associate Professor Dr. Magnus Lundberg and Professor Dr. Rien T. Segers.
6 1. Introduction
The European Union has always been active in promoting regional integration process in third world countries. It is possible that it remains, a sui generis, the most successful example of regional integration to which no other organisations can compare. A
European Commission report in 1995 affirmed that ‘the European model of integration has become an unavoidable ‘reference model’ for virtually all regional initiatives’1. However the extent to which European integration has gone beyond its border and turned into a global inspiration or ‘Europeanisation beyond Europe’ remains a question. Studying the case of Europeanisation in Southeast Asia, or to put it differently, studying the instruments through which the European Union has diffused the ideas of integration in Southeast Asia is the central theme of the thesis. To put it more clearly, the research aims at providing a deeper understanding of the policies that the EU has been pursuing by evaluating the effectiveness of its engagement in ASEAN’s regional integration since 1997.
The thesis topic was much inspired by the Intensive Programme theme adopted by Euroculture university network in June 2010: ‘Europe between Europeanisation and Globalisation’2, particularly the sub-theme of title ‘European integration: a model for the wider world’. The research is intended to enrich the quasi- inadequate literature on the influence of EU’s integration beyond its borders and how it is perceived in Southeast Asia.
1
European Commission, ‘European Community Support for Regional Economic Integration Efforts among Developing Countries,’ (1995).
2
7 2. Perspective of the Research
2.1. Aims
The thesis embraces two major parts: Europeanisation beyond Europe and a case study in Southeast Asia. Correspondingly, the author seeks to measure the extent to which the European integration has sought to become a global inspiration. To put it more simply, how the EU has been perceived as a global promoter for regional integration elsewhere. The case study is conducted on the relations between the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to see how Europeanisation is portrayed in a specific region.
Questions raised in the case study are (1) what are the instruments through which the EU has diffused the idea of regional integration to Southeast Asia (SEA) since 1997 and how to evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency? (2) What are the hindrances for regional integration in Southeast Asia?
2.2. Literature Review
The EU model has always been a central theme in scholarly circles. Referring to a working paper titled ‘Diffusing Inter-regionalism: The EU as a model for regional integration’ (2009), Börzel and Risse3 claimed that the EU seeks to diffuse the idea of regional integration to other related- issue projects in the world. Their primary argument is that actors seek to promote their ideas, based upon three logics of social action: 1, instrumental rationality 2, normative rationality 3, communicative rationality, and that there are five mechanisms (coercion, manipulation utility calculations, socialisation, persuasion and emulation). According to them, the EU has developed a ‘rather sophisticated tool box’ for the external diffusion of ideas; nonetheless some tools might have been used more effectively than others. As phrased in their working paper, together with political dialogue, ‘the EU and the member states have relied heavily on external incentives (conditionality), on
3
8 the one hand, and technical and financial assistance (capacity-building), on the other.’ They lamented that the EU has not made use of coercion as a mechanism for diffusion so far.
Laffan4 proposed that European integration is a form of ‘deep regionalism’, which makes it an internationalised model.
The European Union represents a form of deep regionalism in contrast to other regionalism in the world. No other regionalism in the international system is characterized by equivalent ties either in terms of depth or breadth. No other regionalism has displayed the potential to alter the relative congruence between territory, identity and function which characterized the nation states.5
To illustrate this, Laffan considered five sectors, including: Scope, Institutionalisation, Normative Underpinnings, Order and Welfare. Furthermore, Laffan argued that the process of institution building, law making, policy integration, and market creation in the European Union had produced a European model of internationalisation with distinctive characteristics; and the characteristics of the emerging European system after the shifts in the dynamic integration in the 1980s.
A criticism of her paperwork might be that there remain overlaps between some points. For instance, Laffan asserted that the European Union represented a form of ‘deep regionalism’ in terms of scope, as it was much more ambitious and far- reaching than other organizations. Her paper continued by dealing with welfare, as an extremely important economic factor. In addition, she presented characteristics of the European ‘deep regionalism’ as processing additional shortcomings and difficulties without elaborating on them, to some extent, this seems to weaken her arguments because they are unanswered problems.6 Laffan wrote, ‘The Union is most effective when it can use ‘soft power’- market access, the Union budget, its attraction as a community of values, and its ability to impose conditions for membership.’ That the EU primarily based itself on its soft power has been
4
Brigid Laffan, ‘The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalization,’ (1997) (accessed April, 2010). 5
Ibid. 6
9 commonly agreed; even so ‘its ability to impose conditions for membership’ seems irrelevant to her argument about the international level of EU soft power impacts.
The idea of ‘deep regionalism’ is also shared by Wallace, he indicated that the depth of European integration could be depicted by the existence of ‘common rules and standards to remove what might, otherwise constitute non- tariff barriers to trade within a single market’7.
In his discussion paper, Janowski raised the question whether the European Union could be a possible global paradigm for regional integration. He cast doubts on the assumption of a wholesale European model, but claimed that single features of the European integration process may motivate other regions to follow a similar track, for example, the creation of a common market. Unfortunately, the paper would have been more elaborate if Janowski had expanded his argument as to how the Union could be a global model rather than merely focusing on the question of the way in which it could be an international pattern.
By the same token, Kühnhardt wrote that: ‘It would be misleading to assume that regional integration could be modelled and made suitable for export and implementation elsewhere.’8 As he put it, it is neither convincing to compare the EU at the level of supra-nationality, nor is it sufficient to base his argument on economic parity and to regard other models as flawed or irrelevant. He suggested broadening the scope of comparative study by taking regional integration efforts in the light of historical and global trends. It is agreed that regionalism as well as globalisation is a nebulous concept, which cannot be comprehended separately from its specific historical contexts or circumstances.
On the whole, scholars take different approaches to the question of how the EU has been able to influence regional integration outside its borders. Börzel and Risse looked at the EU as ‘a promoter of ideas’ under five mechanisms, Laffan argued it is the form of ‘deep regionalism’ that makes it an global model; whereas both Janowski and Kühnhardt made a
7
Wallace, William. Regional Integration: The West European Experience. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994
8
10 more cautious statement, saying that only some specific features of the European integration process may encourage other regions.
2.3. Conceptual Framework
This thesis research attempts to apply various international relations theories to approach the topic. The first part of the topic ‘Europeanisation beyond Europe’ will be to take stock via the neo-realist approach, the theory of comprehensive national power, hard power versus soft power, and the theory of integration. More specifically, to systematically assess the extent to which European integration has gained influences beyond its borders, the paper would use indicators from the concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) as a starting point. CNP, initiated by China, is a rationale used in international relations to calculate the geopolitical power of a country. CNP takes into consideration overall conditions and strengths of a country. According to an index concerning territory, population, resources, military force, economic and financial strength and leadership. The first five elements are defined in the neo-realist categories to measure a country’s power as well. Taking into consideration all these theories and international relations concepts, the thesis research then grouped them into two major categories, mentioned in the paper as hard power (territory, population, resources, military force and economic strength) compared to soft power (development aids and diplomacy).
A concept which might however overlap the above concepts of power and influence is Ray Cline’s formula9 (1977), in which he developed:
Potential Power= (C+E+M) x (S+W)
C= critical mass (territory, position and population); E= economic strength e.g. GDP10;
M= military strength;
S= strategic purpose/ leadership capability;
9
Cline, Ray S. ‘World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift ‘ (1977) and Chadwick, Richard W., Perspective on the Global Political Economy, official webpage university of Hawaii, USA, 2003
http://www.hawaii.edu/intlrel/pols315/Text/Theory/t-polec.htm (accessed 19 May 2011) 10
11 W= National will/ popular support
Hard power is an international relations theory that describes the use of military and economic means to influence others. It is used as a contrast to the concept of soft power, coined by Joseph Nye in a book entitled ‘Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power’ (1990). Soft power is the ability to influence others and obtain what you want through diplomacy, culture and values. Nye defined:
Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (…) with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority11.
The concept of Europeanisation enjoys increasing popularity within the study of European integration. This phenomenon of Europeanisation was initially conceived as ‘the process of production of the common rules at the EU level by the member states, their impact and various negotiations between the two levels (EU and its members).12 In fact, Europeanisation has more often been used while referring to the changes caused by European integration, which is the concept used in this research paper.
The theory of ‘integration’ received widespread attentions among scholars after World War II. Ernst Haas defined integration as ‘the voluntary creation of larger political units involving the self-conscious eschewal of force in relations between participating institutions’13. Similarly, Michael Hodges saw integration as ‘the formation of new political systems out of hitherto separate political systems’14. It seems apparent that the two definitions mainly include politics; likewise, an important point to be noticed here is that both definitions lay their focus on the voluntary action of the political units and the establishment of a new institutionalised organ. As William Wallace saw it, integration was ‘the creation
11
Jr Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership,’ (2006),http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf. However, this term was first mentioned by Joseph Nye in his book titled ‘Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power’, published in 1990, New York.
12
Bafoil, Francois. ‘What are we Looking for by Comparing EU and ASEAN?’, Sciences Po, France, (2009),p 11
13
Cited Earnst Haas1971, Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p 12 14
12 and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units’15. Put differently, Wallace raised the definition to a more abstract scale in which formal integration was only created when there was a change in institutional framework. What is more, the EU’s integration experience was also inherent in a definition that Haas provided:
The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.16
This was a broader definition which covered both the social and political aspects of integration; a concept which was then widely-held by integration theorists. The definition of ‘integration’ dates back to the 1950s. As Rosamond commented, ‘the unfolding events in Europe after 1945, offered a generation of social scientists an alluring set of events to describe, categorise, explain and predict’17.
What might be considered as a rationale for European integration was ‘a clear objective, a shared vision, and strong political support’18 from state-members. On the other hand, Southeast Asian integration, albeit new, was much more complicated and often caught in between regionalisation and regionalism. This is also a view of Evans when he wrote that East Asian integration ‘often takes hybrid forms that frequently blur the distinction between governmental and nongovernmental.’19 It remains perplexing when it comes to the new regionalism shown in the Asian integration paradigm; some people say it is purely market- driven regionalisation as opposed to the EU’s institutionalised regionalism, others might argue that the East Asian integration project is getting more institutionalised. Asciutti affirmed that the Association has always followed the ‘de facto regionalisation rather than
15
Cited William Wallace 1990, Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p 12
16
Cited Ernst Haas 1968, Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p13 17
Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p10 18
Evans, Paul, ‘Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity, Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region, edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004, p196
19
13 de jure cooperation and the highly informal diplomatic relations’, and that is the characteristics of Southeast Asian regionalism often known as the ‘ASEAN Way’.’20 This paper, however, does not seek to point out a clear cut definition of Southeast Asian integration, either top-up or top- down process, but appears to accept the Southeast integration process merely as a common region building project. To make the distinction between de facto economic regionalisation and de jure institutional regionalism is rather beyond the scope of this essay.
Neo-realism or structural realism was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz21 in his book ‘Theory of International Politics’ in 1979. The theory starts from an assumption that international structure is defined by an anarchic system, i.e. the international structure is decentralised, having no formal authority and no superior institution. ‘Anarchy in international relations means the absence of rule or lack of government;’22 however, it does not mean the structure of the international system is chaotic. In fact, the system is characterised by a balance of power. The states compete with each other to gain as much power or at least to not let others alter the balance of power in their favour, because the anarchy ‘leaves them little choice if they want to survive.’23 The more power a state gains, the less likely it will get attacked. Waltz once wrote that this: ‘privileges structural constraints over agents’ strategies and motivations.’24 The result is an emergence of a relatively stable balance of power25.
As can be seen, structural realism focuses on power politics. John J. Mearsheimer26 advanced a clear structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for
20
Asciutti, Elena. ‘The ASEAN Charter: An Analysis.’ Perspectives on Federalism 2, no. 1, 2010, p3 21
Mearsheimer, John J. ‘Structural Realism.’ In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dune and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p 71- 78
22 Ibid. 23
Ibid. 24
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979 25
Kux, Stephan, Regional Integration and Globalization: Is the European Union a global player? Dieter Mahncke et al (eds), ed. ASEAN and the EU in the International Environment. Vol. 4: Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, p221
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14 power. He held that there are five assumptions about the international system that ‘depict a world of ceaseless security competition’27. The first hypothesis is that global structure operates in an anarchic system. It simply means that an individual state acts on self-help and there is no authority interference. Hierarchy is on the contrary. The second assumption is that all states possess some varying offensive military capacity. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. And since intentions are in the minds of policy-makers, it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intention of whether they are about to use force to alter shift the balance of power or whether they are satisfied with what they have. As a result, there always exists competition for power among states. The fourth assumption is about the top priority goal of a state. Mearsheimer explained that the main goal of states is survival, i.e. states tend maintain their domestic order before pursuing any other goals, like prosperity, protecting human rights and so forth. The final hypothesis is that states are rational actors. They are able to come up with sound strategies with a view to maximising their prospects for survival. To Mearsheimer, only when all these five assumptions are combined, do states feel pre-occupied with the pursuing of power at all cost.
Above was a brief summary on the neo-realist school, some concepts of power that this research uses to evaluate the extent to which the European Union has sought to promote regional integration beyond its border.
2.4. Methodology
The analysis will be using both qualitative and quantitative methods in respect to analysing primary documents and secondary texts as well as combining data and figures correspondingly. Primary documents analysed in the paper include policy documents from both the EU and ASEAN, recent data surveyed by eurostat, Eurobarometer 73, 75 surveyed 2010 and 2011, ASEAN and so forth. Secondary sources are from relevant books, articles, chapters and working papers.
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15 2.5. Presentation of Structure
For the structure of the research paper, the thesis deals with two main parts Europeanisation beyond Europe and Europeanisation in Southeast Asia as a case study. The main structure, therefore, is organised into two main parts supported by five chapters, an introduction, three empirical chapters and a conclusion.
The background of the research topic and how it relates to the Euroculture programme was briefly described in the Introduction.
The first chapter presents the reason for Europeanisation beyond Europe, evaluating the extent to which European integration has sought to become a global inspiration and exerted a global influence. In order to do so, the author would like to use benchmarks in neorealist categories to measure one entity’s power, such as territory, population, resources, military force, and economic and financial power. In addition, the paper also uses some other indicators from Ray Cline’s potential power formula or a rationale to measure national comprehensive power, a concept initiated by China, which encompasses leadership, domestic support etc.
Chapter two offers an overview of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. The emphasis is on creating a framework for the research by explaining why the author chose 1997 as a milestone to evaluate the EU’s policies towards Southeast Asian regional integration; the chapter also gives a brief look at the relationship between the two blocs in three perspectives: political and security, economic and socio-cultural dimensions. It will also focus on the question why the EU has actively engaged in regional integration projects elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia (SEA); thus it defines the scope of the paper and provides initial information for the EU’s policies advocating regional integration of its counterpart in the third chapter.
16
as this is the first time SEA was singled out for such an official document. Next it categorises varied collaborative programmes between the EU and ASEAN with regard to the latter’s three major priorities. Some assessment on the effectiveness of the EU’s supporting policies and the EU as an integration exporter is presented in this chapter as well. By analysing its policies in the covered period, the chapter seeks to draw a conclusion on whether the EU’s policies towards the region are consistent and coherent. The focus of EU’s policy analysis is placed on the ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support Phase II 2006- 2010 (APRIS II) The final part of this chapter seeks to find out which elements have hindered the development of Southeast Asian regionalism towards a deeper level such as is found in the European Union.
17 ‘One reason for creating the European Community
was to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs’- Walter Hallstein28 I. Europeanisation beyond Europe
3. Chapter 1:European integration as a global inspiration
The first chapter measures the extent to which European integration has been able to surpass its border, and become a global inspiration. More specifically, the chapter will respectively utilise different criteria to judge whether Europeanisation has actually happened at a global level. The list of benchmarks are the indexes used by international relation theory to measure comprehensive national power, the definition of which, I believe, was mentioned in the conceptual framework.
The choice of the word ‘inspiration’ in the paper was not picked at random. Because the EU, as a global inspiration, does not necessarily mean that other region- builders must replicate European project. But European integration, as a sui generis, has been playing a crucial role in shaping other regional projects, i.e. other regional builders can learn from European experience, thus applying suitable features or avoiding incompatible idiosyncrasies. As Kühnhardt reminded us, the European integration is perceived as a source of inspiration ‘but cannot be used as a simple ‘role model’, because ‘neither European sources nor its goals, neither its policies nor its institutions can be found with identical characteristics elsewhere in the world.’29
28
Walter Hallstein was born in Germany in 1901. After presiding over the German delegation that negotiated the Plan Schuman, 1st January 1958 he became the first president of the European Commission. He maintained in that post until 1968. The quote is introduced in Bindi, Federiga M. The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World. USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p13.
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18 3.1. Hard Power
3.1.1. Economic and Financial Strength
‘Good wine needs no bush.’- William Shakespeare During more than half a century of its consolidation, the European Union has been dramatically transformed from a war- ravaged continent to what constitutes an economic superpower, which makes it irresistibly attractive in to the other. As it is quoted in a report by European Reflection Group on challenges and opportunities for European Union in 2030, ‘external influence cannot be achieved without solid growth.’30 It is the scope and the active coverage of the economy that exerts its magnetism towards other regional groupings.
In terms of the scope of the economy, the United States lost its place as the world’s largest economy to the EU in 2007 and since then the Union has retained this position. Figure 1 showed that the EU as a whole produced more than $14.5 trillion of all final goods and services within a year, ranked first in the world, was slightly higher than the US while approximately doubled China, more than three times higher than Japan and far higher than the others.
According to European Commission statistics in 2009, the EU was a major power in international commerce and accounted for one fifth of global exports and imports.
Figure 1: GDP World Rank Order 2009 Source: CIA Factbook
As the dynamic activities of the economy evolved, the inception of the Single European Act in 1986 marked a turning point in European regionalism in particular and the
30
European Reflection Group. ‘Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities.’ (2010) 0 5 10 15 20 European Union United States
China Japan India Germany United Kingdom Russia G DP (Gr o ss Do m estic P ro du ct) (Tri ll io n U SD )
19 global form of regional integration in general31. The Union had generated an economic liberalisation, which was unprecedented in history. As Molchanov described it,
The arrival of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of a single currency, the euro, in 1999, have demonstrated a readiness and capacity to surpass all the usual limitations of other regional trade organizations, most of which have yet to progress beyond the initial stages of a free trade area or a customs union. From the perspective of regional integration, Europe evidently ‘leads the pack’.32
His observation, albeit given in 2005, remains true to this day. The EU has gone well beyond the limitations seen in previous failures in regional projects, in moving forward to establish a supranational community.
Further, the EU has become a major trading partner with a wide range of countries and regions. As shown in Figure 2, the US remained the biggest trading partner with the EU, followed by China, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Japan and Turkey. Other countries accounted for approximately 40% of the trade balance.
Figure 2: Share of EU imports and exports Source: European Commission, 2009
31
Fawcett, Louise L'Estrange & Hurrell, Andrew (red.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, eds. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
32
Mikhail A. Molchanov, ‘Regionalism and Globalization: The Case of the European Union,’ in Globalization and Political Ethics, ed. ‘Richard B. Day’, ‘Joseph Masciulli'‘Brill, 2007), available athttp://people.stu.ca/~molchan/pdfs/regionalism_and_globalization2005.pdf. Others 39% USA 14% China 17% Russia 9% Switzerla nd 7% Norway 6% Japan 5% Turkey 3%
Share of imports into the EU, first half of 2009 Others 48% USA 20% China 7% Russia 6% Switzerlan d 8% Norway 4% Japan 3% Turkey 4%
20 Formal agreements have been signed, allowing the Union to remove protectionist tariffs, promote free trade and liberate freedom of movement- of goods, services, capital and labours. Obviously, EU member states succeeded in building a common project, called ‘an elaborate design for market integration on a regional basis’33. Notably, even NAFTA, which includes such a dynamic economy as the US, remains ‘less ambitious and far-reaching’34 than the EU when regarding economic integration. Again, the APEC35, covering a wider range of members from the Pacific Rims with membership from many strong economies in the world, such as: the US, China, South Korea, Russia, Australia and the like, might also be less effective, in a sense that the organisation itself is more a forum for debate than a deeply integrated grouping.
In contrast, European integration has established a supranational entity; as a result, political mechanism could enhance economic cooperation within the region and vice versa. As Molchanov observed,
Well before the World Trade Organization came into being, the European Commission and specialized bodies of the Council of the European Union were already actively engaged in promoting extensive and accelerating economic interaction between EU member states.36
Furthermore, the launch of the euro in 1999 generated interest in other parts of the world. An excellent illustration of this is the way in which the euro affected East Asian regionalism. Xu Ming qi37asserted that the euro, as a symbol of EU’s success story would somehow have a stimulating effect on East Asian cooperation. In addition, this could produce a ‘psychological element’ which might spur East Asians to start thinking about their own regional monetary integration. It can be said that since the adoption of the euro, the idea of a common regional currency was no longer foreign to the East. In the Asia Development Forum in 2000 and 2001, East Asian scholars all discussed favourably on the possibility of
33 Ibid. 34
Laffan, the European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalization, European Integration Online Papers, 1997, 1-17.
35
Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation 36
Molchanov, Regionalism and Globalization: The Case of the European Union. Brill Academics Publisher, 2005 37
21 an Asian Monetary Fund and advocated closer monetary cooperation in the region.38 A common currency, namely Asian Currency Unit (ACU) was even planned to be launched in the beginning of 2006 in East Asia39.
The euro has become one of the most important currencies besides the US dollar, which used to be the only real choice for people’s savings, especially in developing countries like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia etc. This point was made explicit by European Directorate-General for Communication:
‘Since 1999, the euro has increased its role as a reserve currency among the world’s central banks, mainly at the expense of the dollar and the Japanese yen. The switch to the euro has been greater in the case of developing countries than for industrial ones.’40
On the other hand, the launch of the single currency, besides its advantages, also has disadvantages, among which may be the loss of national sovereignty. The Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1993, which limited member states’ budget deficit to 3% of gross domestic product (GDP), somehow contains European national governments’ macro-economic policy. Since the countries must accept the common rate within the whole zone, this means that they might have to manage their budget with a common regional policy and try to confine their inflation rate together. However, not all countries are at the same level of strong or stable economies. And if one state is on the verge of default, it is impossible for the others to ignore her because once a member’s economy fails, it is likely to drag the rest down with it.
An illustration of this is the current financial crisis in Greece. From the author’s viewpoint, it is too simple to say that the so- called ‘modern Greek tragedy’ started from the first day when Greece joined the EU in 1981. Although this tourism industry based- state has always been a weaker member, it could function reasonably well when there were a lot of tourists. Only when a series of crises, including the global financial crisis and the world-wide economic recession emerged, depriving Greece of its strength, did it have to cope with a
38
Ibid., p135 39
The plan was delayed by political and technical arguments over which currencies to include and how the weighing system would work. Source: The Financial Times online http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fba697ae-bcfb-11da-bdf6-0000779e2340.html#axzz1V6w4ZtAi (accessed 17 May 2011)
40
22 tighter budget spending for increasing unemployment. At this critical juncture, it had already exceeded by more than four times the limitation of national budget deficit of the Euro zone. The country had to ask for loans from the European Central Bank. European Union leaders, after long debates, accepted to save Greece economy for the sake of the whole Euro zone’s credibility.
A first bailout package to Greece’s budget deficit, worth €110bn, was launched in May 2010. The three-year package seemed to have failed to shore up Greece’s economy, calm the financial markets, or avoid contagion spreading to other debt- laden European economies41 as only six months after that a €113bn bailout was offered to Ireland. And recently in July 2011, Euro zone leaders and the International Monetary Fund have agreed to lend Greece a further €109bn42. Despite this series of huge bail-out packages which have been put out to rescue these economies, the contagion is still getting out of hand. The prevailing debt crisis in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain recently points to a great fear of a euro collapse. While all this mess might give the impression that the EU is a mere paymaster but fails to show real leadership, and that the euro, a symbol of European full integration, is in doubt, the problem is now how the EU integration can preserve its global role as an integration inspiration.
Moving on to another point, the Union’s economic deep integration project renewed attention to the function of an intra- regional trade network. As written in a European Community document, the role of intra- regional liberalisation has been seen as a means of expanding markets and reaping efficiency and scale economies gains.43 It is worthwhile noting that trading within a region accounts for a major part in trade balance and this is true in almost every region not only in European Union. As indicated in Figure 3, intra-zone imports and exports accounted for approximately 40% of the total world trade in both 1967 and 2007. These two years also recorded a nearly 3 per cent increase in total trade volume.
41
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000 (accessed 17 April 2011) 42
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000 (accessed 17 April 2011) 43
23 Figure 3: World trade volume Source: CEPII, Chelem- International Trade Database 2009
The flexibility of the Union’s economy has been criticised especially after its latest enlargement. A prime concern is its lack of competitiveness since hourly compensation costs in Europe are among the highest in the world, 44 and this makes it more difficult to compete with newly emerging countries like India, China, especially East Asian region.
Figure 4 showed the average money, an employee was paid in different selected years, in which the EU always ranked among the highest. As compared to East Asia excluding Japan, East Asian labourers were paid nearly four times less than their European counterparts, especially in 2007. In what might be considered a response to the data above, an EU’s document stated: ‘The EU’s human capital has long underpinned its economy, based on cutting-edge innovation and creativity. But other regions are now moving ahead through
44
US Department of Labour’s, Table of Hourly Costs of Employees http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ichcc.t02.htm (accessed 7 May 2010) North America 12% South America 5% European Union 19% East Asia 8% Other Europe 4% Oceania and other Asia 3% Othes 10% Intra-zone 39%
World exports Intra-Zone included
1967 North America 6% South America 3% European Union 13% Other Europe 4% East Asia 19% Oceania and other Asia 3% Others 10% Intra-zone 42%
World exports Intra-Zone included 2007
North America 11% South America 4% European Union 19% Other Europe 8% East Asia 9% Oceania and other Asia 4% Othes 9% Intra-zone 39%
World Imports Intra-Zone included
1967 North America 13% AmericaSouth 3% European Union 15% Other Europe 4% East Asia 15% Oceania and other Asia 3% Others 6% Intra-zone 41%
24 higher levels of investment in research, technological development and innovation.’45 Whilst acknowledging that, EU lawmakers foresaw that ‘by 2030, Asia is expected to be that the forefront of scientific and technological developments, producing high-value goods capable of transforming production and overall quality of life’.46
Figure 4: Hourly costs USD, selected years 1998-2007 Source: US Labour Department In short, since its establishment, the European Union has always been a forerunner in creating integration within member states in terms of economic cooperation and it did make significant progress, so preserving model status. As Donnell summed up clearly ‘[i]n the contemporary international system, the European Union is the most advanced model of the regulation of economic internationalisation that goes beyond trade.’ 47 Though here and there problems might still exist in the EU’s economy, nobody can deny its economic strength on a global scale. And naturally, just as ‘good wine needs no bush’48- an entity of solid internal strength does not need to advertise and still generates inspiration elsewhere.
3.1.2. Territory, Population, Resources and Military Force
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the neo-realist approach to measure one entity’s strength, include territory, population, resources and military force and two more recently 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47
O Donnell R, ‘Economic Union’ in Laffan B, O Donnell R and Smith M., Unsettled Europe: European Integration in a Transformed World, London: Routledge, 1997
48 William Shakespeare 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hourly compensation costs in U.S dollars
United States Japan
25 added elements: economic and financial power. Among these, the first three elements are the prerequisite for a potential power. Starting with six founding members signing the Treaty of Paris to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950s, the number of EU member states now reached 27 and numerous countries have been applying to become future European Union candidates.
The EU underwent a massive enlargement to Central and Easter Europe in 200449 and 200750when ten new countries joined the EU and another two Eastern European countries were allowed to participate in the Union respectively. According to an old statistic of Eurostat in 2002, regarding the demographic number, the entry of twelve countries in 2004 would be an increase of more than 27% in population for the Union.51And apparently the integration of the new countries would also provide a gain in total geographical area as well as natural resources for the EU.
Entity Land Area mil km2 Population mil pp GDP PPP52 million $ Rank
EU27 4.303 501.064 14,820,000 1 China 9.597 1,354.146 10,090,000 3 India 3.287 1,214.464 4,060,000 5 Japan 0.377 126.995 4,310,000 4 USA 9.159 317.641 14,660,000 2 World 510.072 6,908.688 74,540,000
Figure 5: Source: Author’s compilation from Eurostat 2010 and CIA Factbook 201053 As indicated in the table above, the EU today covers over four million km2and has a population of more than five hundred million. In terms of geographical area, the EU is less than half the size of the US, but is nearly double in population scale, and overtook the US to
49
The ten new countries joined the EU in 1st May 2004 were Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia.
50
Two countries got their EU membership in 2007 were Bulgaria and Romania. 51
Adapted from the figure used in Verluise, Pierre, The EU enlargement, what will it change?, 2004 online version http://www.diploweb.com/forum/verluise11english.htm (accessed 13 May 2011)
52
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) an economic indicator, often used when measuring for cross- country comparisons. 53
26 become the world’s largest economy. EU population accounts for only 7% of the world total while sharing a fifth of the world’s GDP in 2010.
Though the costs and benefits of enlargement or the direction of inward or outward development remain highly debated, it is undeniable that enlargement has presented significant economic opportunities in the form of a larger scale economy, a richer sources of natural resources, of labours and a larger market.
Unlike economic integration, military cooperation in European Union is rather recent and there is much still to be developed. Though the earlier efforts to create a common security and defence policy may have existed since 1940s, it was only spurred on and translated into action at the end of 20th century. The EU’s failure in Kosovo in 1999 or the crises in Congo, Libya etc. were just some of the reasons which explain the EU’s alteration in security and defence policy since then. Referring to these incidents, Kux criticised that ‘[a]s the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia or the crises in Africa have demonstrated, the EU has no power or power- projection capability of its own.’54 Obviously, the EU had realised this bitter truth themselves, as at a European Council meeting in Cologne 1999, a high ranking EU officer said that the ‘Union must have the capacity for autonomous action; backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.’55 Cornish held that all these steps provide a solid foundation for translating the EU’s financial muscles into geopolitical clout. He believed the ‘dynamic works both ways: wealth will breed armed might, and might well breed wealth.’56
The idea of creating a unified military force was initiated at the end of 1999 in Helsinki, Finland where the EU announced their intention to create a ‘rapid reaction force
54
Kux, Stephan, Regional integration and globalisation: Is the European Union a global player, p221, Dieter Mahncke et al (eds), ed. ASEAN and the EU in the International Environment. Vol. 4: Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999.
55
European Council declaration quoted from ‘Common security and defence policy: Development of European military capabilities’, 2011 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/118348.pdf (accessed 02 August 2011)
56
27 able to act autonomously.’57 This step may alter the preponderant view at that time, which considered the EU as an economic giant but a political dwarf. As Cornish summed it up clearly, ‘for many participants and spectators, years of inconclusive argument and false starts ended when European security finally crossed the line into a more coherent, mature and purposive debate in 1998-1999.’58 Since then, the European Council has established many permanent political and military institutions to realise the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), such as European Defence Agency, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) or the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
Though the EU has no standing army, it managed to set up two battle groups of 1500 troops each. These forces are on standby at any given time59. Other than that, the EU relies on ad hoc forces contributed by its members; the total active military of the EU has now reached two million troops. (Table 6) Therefore, one of the key points in its Headline Goal 201060, set by the EU, lies in the EU’s capability to deploy forces quickly. In terms of defence and military force, each EU member state remains sovereign, either a member of NATO or neutral or both. The EU admits, however, that they remain far from the stage when they can ‘speak with one voice on major world issues like peace and stability, relations with the United States, terrorism…’61
1999: EU15 2009: EU27
Total defence expenditure €156.2bn €209.7bn
57
Gordon, Philip H. ‘Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work.’ Foreign Affairs (2004), p12 58
Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture.’ International Affairs 77, no. 3 (07, 2001).
59
European Security and Defence Policy: Development of European military capabilities, 2009 http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf (accessed 02 August 2011)
60
That is the successor of the Headline Goal 2003, which set military target for European Union. While the Headline Goal 2003 agreed on mobilising 50000 to 60000 troops. The forces should be able to deploy within 60 days and be sustainable for at least a year. http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/capabilities/military-capabilities.aspx?lang=en (accessed 18 July 2011) Since 2003, the EU has undertaken a series of peacekeeping and crisis management missions, such as military stabilisation force of 7000 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 and some other short- term missions in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
Official website of the European Union http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (accessed 02August 2011) 61
28
Expenditure/ GDP 2.1% 1.7%
Budget/GDP 1.7% 1.4%
Total active military 1,759,568 2,013,990
Figure 6: EU military capabilities Source: Strength in Numbers? EU- ISS Policy brief, Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999, compiled by Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn on basis of figures from the Military Balance 1999-2000 and 2008-2009.62
Besides the ‘awkward’ relationship between the EU and NATO in terms of overlapping membership amongst other things, a real concern for the EU was the subsequent defence- spending gap. As Toje63 observed, ‘while the US spends 9 percent of its budget on research and development, the EU states combined spend a meagre of 1.5 per cent.’64 The reasons for this underinvestment may be traced to the EU’s leaders’ conscious choice of dealing with the substantial deficit issues. Mr Hans Hillen, Dutch Defence Minister, delivered a speech at a Security and Defence agenda meeting entitled ‘NATO-EU: Shaping NATO’s reform agenda’ in June 2011, which listed some of the basic reasons for EU’s current low investment in defence related matters, ranging from the banking crisis and the health cost crisis to Afghanistan.65 According to him, such individual choice has been the reasons for underinvestment and he called for a more defined pool of shared efforts from the EU’s country members. That is also the reason why some scholars held view that structural realism fails to fully describe the nature of the EU. What the EU has been pursuing regarding military capacities is far removed from the theories of neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. In their hypothesis, all states try to possess some varying offensive military capacity because they are insecure about the intentions of other states. And since it seems impossible to know the intentions of others, despite their statements, which sometimes can be deceiving, international structures always witness competition for power. In the EU’s
62
Toje, Asle, ‘The European Union as a small power after the post Cold War, Palgrave Mcmillan’, USA, 2010, p 71 63
Ibid. 64
Ibid. p 70 65
A transcript of his speech can be found at
29 case, European leaders seem to have chosen to neglect investments in military but prefer to depend on NATO and their special relationship with the US instead.
From a different perspective, Toje pointed out further that the EU’s defence budget was not effectively spent, ‘there was too much is spent on non- deployable assets’, whereas projection capabilities fall short of their requirements, typically strategic transport, command, control and communications.66 For all these reasons, it might be possible to argue that the EU’s military has yet to match its own capacity.
3.2. Soft Power
3.2.1. Development Aid
That policy-makers want to utilise their relations or developmental aids to impact on the recipients is one of the mechanisms used to instil ideology, which is known under the name ‘conditionality’. This mechanism discussed in Börzel and Risse’s joint paper was mentioned in the conceptual framework part of the thesis.67 One of the most prominent policies of the EU is its humanitarian and developmental aid. The coverage of EU humanitarian action spreads worldwide, from Africa to Asia, from the poorest regions to the most disadvantaged and vulnerable sub-regions. According to European Commission, in 2009 alone, the EU provided relief to more than 70 countries, with a budget of more than 900 million euro per year68. It cooperates with the United Nations and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to give its support to people who are in need.
Interestingly enough, it is the EU not the US nor Japan69, that has been the world’s largest donors of aid for many years now, supplying almost 60% of global aid70. Figure 7 clearly illustrated that the EU has been playing a crucial role over the last decade. There was a slight drop in 2007 and 2008, probably due to the far impact of financial crisis in Asia. In general, the funding trend was on the rise.
66
Toje, Asle, ‘The European Union as a small power after the post Cold War, Palgrave Mcmillan’, USA, 2010, p 70 67
Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. ‘Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration.’ KFG Working Paper Series 7, (2009)
68
European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 2009 (accessed 2 May 2010) 69
Both the USA and Japan are well-known for their strong soft power, and big donors. 70
30 Figure 7: ODA Donors Source: European Commission, OECD/DAC
On the other hand, the EU actively established relations with almost all regions, and generously supported regional integration processes elsewhere. As reported in the Reflection Group Report to the European Council, broadening relations and supporting other integration processes has become ‘the EU’s greatest asset. The EU must become a continental hub through strategies of inclusiveness and engagement.’71 That is to say, the Union completely acknowledges the importance of setting up widespread relations and giving aid because these activities are a source of influential power, and therefore the EU’s enormous asset. Since late 1990s, its pro- regional integration policy has been radically realised.
The Union strongly believes in the merits of regional integration, including as a tool for development. According to the Commission, regional integration among developing countries, if carried out in a transparent and open manner, contribute to their integration in the world economy and plays a key role in conflict prevention and peace consolidation.72
3.2.2. Diplomacy
Another index to measure the extent to which EU has sought to become a global inspiration is diplomacy which, in this paper, comprises three elements: (1) The European Union’s influence in using its skilful diplomacy in dealing with both the past and current
71
European Reflection Group, PROJECT EUROPE 2030: Challenges and Opportunities 72
European Commission, European Community Support for Regional Economic Integration Efforts among Developing Countries 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 B il li o n Eu ro
Main Donors of Official Development Assisstance
31 support from its membership73, (2) its leading role in global threats and in a futuristic field; (3) as a final indicator of how the EU citizens evaluate their leadership.
There is a belief that reconciliation depends on historical context and notably on the decisions of national leaders. It is the ‘mental programming’ of the political elites to translate hereditary enemies into partnership, a programming which can be acquired in some countries but might not in others. For example, since Franco- German rivalry relationship after World War II, six founding EU members have been successful in pooling these two economies with European Coal and Steel Community since 1951, turning this cold relationship into coordination, preserving long-lasting peace in the Continent. This is a ‘rare case’ in history and might incite inspiring sentiments. As Hoon pointed out, Franco- German rapprochement holds an ‘exemplary status as a successful reconciliation process between two nation- states with historical antagonism’74.
This might not be the case in Asia with the Sino- Japanese ‘hot economy, cold politic’ relationship, nor with India- Pakistan mutual mistrust; nor in Latin America with Argentina and Brazil’s inharmonious interaction. These examples among others, suggest that reconciliation can be achieved in one place while it may not be possible in others. Forgiveness might be more difficult to pursue in different circumstances, and it needs great efforts and engagement from both political elites and from the public. Why Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer effectively united France and Germany has long been discussed, and is rather beyond the scope of this paper. But it is important to note that European experience of overcoming historical resentments within the Franco- German relationship has, without doubt, gained admiration from world opinion.
Another point in this sub-chapter of diplomacy is the EU’s leading role in global issues, ranging from environmental awareness, the use of alternative natural materials, and research into sustainable development and climate change.
73
Ray Cline’s formula to assess power of nations (1977) in which he developed: Power= (C+E+M) x (S+W); C= critical mass (territory+ population); E= economic strength; M= military strength; S= strategic purpose/ leadership capability; W= National will.
74
32 Europe is the first region in the world to implement such far-reaching, legally binding climate and energy targets. Its climate and energy package heralds significant changes that are to be made by 2020, notably in terms of lower greenhouse gas emissions, more renewable energy and greater energy efficiency.75
This quotation from the European Commission’s report in 2009 plainly states the leading role of the EU regarding climate and energy targets. It set goals to effectively lower greenhouse gas emissions, increase the use of renewable energy and changing energy consumption habits by 2020. All these ambitious plans could be untenable, since none of these issues greatly affect a minor state, nor can they be solved solely by a single entity, but they are one of the ‘gravest challenges facing humanity’76, and can only be tackled at an international level. The EU, therefore, has been regarded as pioneer in sustainable development. In what might be considered an illustration of this, many study tours have been carried out by ASEAN policy makers to Europe in 2002, so that they could make direct contact and exchange information on the European Union’s experience in the ‘development and use of common policies to address biodiversity conservation and other environmental issues at the regional level’.77
While taking a revolutionary role in that field, European soft power naturally attracted global attention. Furthermore, this long- term strategy might ensure a sustainable growth when other continents might concentrate on exploiting their mineral resources without considering their future sustainability.
A final point in this sector concerns citizen support of European Union leadership. Ultimately, intergovernmental organisations or supranational entities can thrive or not, that depends largely on their domestic support.
75
European Commission, ‘General Report on the Activities of the European Union,’ (2009),http://europa.eu/generalreport/en/welcome.htm. (accessed 2 May 2010)
76
http://europa.eu/pol/env/index_en.htm (accessed 12 June 2011) 77
33 Figure 8: Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer75, and Public Opinion in the European Union: 2011, p34.
A survey, conducted when the financial crisis in the Euro zone was increasing in 2010 (Figure 8) showed that more than 50% of Europeans surveyed thought that their country had benefited from being a member of the Union. In autumn 2010, when Greece was on the verge of a default, the EU had to bail out the country but all the measures have not yet proved effective, and since the crisis remained contagious, the survey recorded a downward trend by 7% between autumn 2009 and autumn 2010. Opinions of the benefits of European membership surveyed in spring 2011 have improved slightly while the opposite opinion has declined slightly by 2%. This data might suggest that European citizens are beginning to give more support to the EU’s measures over the current crisis. The general trend seemed to be that the number of people who believe EU membership as beneficial has been relatively stable in the surveyed period (Autumn 2001- Spring 2011); the number fluctuated around 50%. The lowest per cent recorded was in autumn 2003 with only 46%. The reason for this might be because of the EU’s involvement in the Middle East during this time.
52% 51% 50% 50% 46% 47% 53% 55% 52% 54% 54% 59% 58% 54% 56% 55% 56% 57% 53% 50% 52% 27% 26% 28% 29% 34% 35% 34% 33% 36% 33% 34% 30% 29% 31% 31% 32% 31% 31% 35% 39% 37% 21% 23% 22% 21% 19% 18% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 11% 13% 15% 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 11% 11% A ut. 20 01 Sp .20 0 2 A ut. 20 02 Sp .20 0 3 A ut. 20 03 Sp .20 0 4 A ut. 20 04 Sp .2 0 0 5 A ut. 20 05 Sp .20 0 6 A ut. 20 06 Sp .20 0 7 A ut. 20 07 Sp .20 0 8 A ut. 20 08 Sp .20 0 9 A ut. 20 09 Sp .20 1 0 A ut. 20 1 0 Sp .20 1 1 Sp .20 1 1
EB56 EB57 EB58 EB59 EB60 EB61 EB62 EB63 EB64 EB65 EB66 EB67 EB68 EB69 EB70 EB71 EB71.1EB72 EB73 EB74 EB75
Q: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...? %EU
34 Figure 9: Source: European Commission, Euro barometer 73, Public Opinion in the European Union: First Result, 2010, p16
As shown in Figure 9, trust in the EU was most pronounced in Estonia with 68%, Slovakia with 65% and in Bulgaria and Denmark 61% of the population surveyed showed belief in European Union. The UK had the lowest number of 20%, followed by France and Germany with 39% and 37% correspondingly.
Figure 10: Source: European Commission, Euro barometer 73, Public Opinion in the European Union: First Result, 2010, p15. 68 65 61 61 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 50 50 47 45 44 43 43 42 42 42 42 41 40 39 37 20 22 28 24 35 40 34 30 29 32 39 40 35 44 45 48 47 43 49 44 47 50 56 41 52 51 51 54 66 10 7 15 4 3 10 15 17 14 8 8 13 6 5 5 8 13 8 13 11 8 2 17 7 9 10 9 12 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% EE SK BG DK BE RO HU LT MT NL LU P L FI CZ SI PT IE SE ES EU 27 CY EL IT AT LV FR DE UK
Q: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in European Union?
Tend to trust Tend not to trust Don't know
42% 48% 29% 29% 31% 30% 47% 40% 66% 65% 62% 63% 11% 12% 5% 6% 7% 7%
The European Union EB73 Sp.2010
The European Union EB72 Aut.2009
The (NATIONALITY) Government EB73 Sp.2010
The (NATIONALITY) Government EB72 Aut.2009
The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT) EB73 Sp.2010
The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT) EB72 Aut.2009
Trust in Institutions
35 Figure 10 compared citizens’ trust in the EU, in national governments and parliaments in autumn 2009 and spring 2010. Whilst trust in national governments and parliaments stood still or slightly increased by 1%, trust in the EU has decreased from 48% to 42%. As reported in Euro barometer 73, the reason for this downward trend can be explained, ‘possibly as a consequence of the debt crisis in Greece and the subsequent questions about the euro’s stability, trust in the EU has been affected.’78 However it is interesting to note that though the number of those trusting in the EU has declined, ‘yet far more people continue to trust the EU than their own parliament or their own government’.79
Seen from a neo-realist approach, in which power is defined by territory, population, resources and military force, the EU’s integration has, only to some extent, been a global influence. Because in terms of military force, the EU member states mostly depend on military support by NATO. To illustrate this, Kux said that ‘as the conflict in ex- Yugoslavia or the crises in Africa demonstrated, the EU has no power or power- projection capability of its own.’80 On the other hand, in terms of economic and financial strength, and although there exist issues, the EU economy remains the world’s biggest economy sharing a total GDP of nearly $ 15,000 trillion, which accounts for one- fifth of the world economy.81
To conclude this chapter, it may also be worth, albeit briefly, looking at some examples of how EU inspiration has been turned into realisation in varied world regions. The success of European integration apparently triggered the creation of free trades in Africa, Asia and the Americas as early as in the 1960s and 1970s82. The African Union has used the EU as an institutional blue print. It is easy to recognise the ‘increasing reference to the success of European integration’83 in activities of the Caribbean Community, particularly in
78
Euro barometer 73, 2010, p15 79 Ibid.
80
Kux, Stephan, Regional Integration and Globalisation: Is the European Union a Global player?’ Dieter Mahncke et al (eds), ed. ASEAN and the EU in the International Environment. Vol. 4: Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999.
81
Data was estimated at USD current rate, and was illustrated Figure 5 82
Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. ‘Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration.’ KFG Working Paper Series 7, (2009)
83
36 its decision to establish a CARICOM Single Market. Another EU interest in Latin America is the relationship with Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). The EU negotiated an Inter-regional Association Agreement with MERCOSUR between 1999 and 2004, and since then has continuously enhanced this relationship. Kuhnhardt believed that MERCOSUR was also much encouraged by this successful experience. Yet the most interesting example to look at is ASEAN’s. ‘Not only does ASEAN seek to play a key political role in the region to counterbalance both Japan and China, it is also keenly aware of the threat of China to its export markets and hence to its traditional role as a magnet for foreign direct investment.’ 84 The paper moves on to look at the case study of Europeanisation in Southeast Asia since 1997.
84
