Strengthening Local Governance in Fragile States A way to resilience?

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Strengthening Local Governance in Fragile States

A way to resilience?

Masterthesis International Relations & International Organisations Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2010

Thesis supervisor: Dr. A. van den Assem Student: Maarten L. Welmers

Studentnr: S1434985

Address: Réaumurstraat 27C 3817 ZL Amersfoort

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank The Hague Academy for Local Governance for the great learning experience the internship was, and for giving me the opportunity to orient both for this thesis as for my professional career. Especially Emmely Benschop, it was a great pleasure to learn from you and work with you.

I would also like to thank Dr. A. van den Assem for the pleasant supervision. Your remarks and suggestions were very helpful.

To Michiel Welmers, thank you for your help with editing.

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Some of the poorest countries in the world seem almost doomed to be the pariah’s of the world. Congo, Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan amongst other countries seem one way or another incapable of transforming themselves into developed countries with good enough governance, reasonable welfare and basic services. Political violence, low life expectancy and large refugee flows are just some of the catastrophes that ravage those countries.

The Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, bordering with Rwanda and Uganda, are clear examples of how abundance of natural resources, ethnic tensions, refugee flows, a history of poor governance and little government penetration can create an almost lawless area. Rebel armies have roamed the Kivu provinces after the Rwandan genocide - and later the armies of Laurent Nkunda - plundering, raping, killing and invaded even UN refugee camps.

After so many years of conflict and bad governance, the question rises whether there is hope for states like Congo. Is there a way to strengthen states like Congo, to improve

governance, make living spaces more secure and improve access to basic services?

Fragile states are and certainly have been on the agenda of many donor countries and agencies since the 1990’s. Many studies and programs have been executed to make these states more resilient. This focus on state fragility can be explained by the rise of terrorism and rebel groups - and the security issues connected to them - as rebel and terrorist groups find relative safe heavens in fragile states. Another reason to focus on the fragile states is that the fragile state concept looks at the governance realm to explain why some states seem to develop at a very low rate, or in some cases seem to retaliate.

This field of study has been dominated by a view on the state level, while many of the features of state fragility exist on a very local level. There has however been considerate attention for decentralization issues - mainly with donor countries and agencies - but little research on the possible role for local governance in making fragile states more resilient has been done. Therefore there is a need to address the gap between practice and knowledge of strengthening local states in fragile states.

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As a theoretical framework underlying this thesis three forms of strengthening local

governance - which are often used in practice - will be used to answer the research question; decentralization, improving local service delivery and increasing local legitimacy. These three concepts or mechanisms will be further explored in the theoretical chapter on local

governance, as also tested in the case studies in the chapter looking at the empirical record of strengthening local governance.

The second chapter will look at the concept of state fragility. Different interpretations and studies on the causes of state fragility will be discussed including amongst others -micro-economical, political economical and governance analysis to come to an understanding of what causes state fragility. Also a definition of state fragility will be provided for.

The third chapter will look at local government. This chapter will first look at what constitutes local governance and what functions local governments in fragile states execute in general. Also the general problems local governments in fragile states are faced with or are part of will be discussed, after which the chapter will look at three possible mechanisms to strengthen local governance that may contribute to making fragile states more resilient: decentralization, improving local service delivery and strengthening local legitimacy.

The fourth chapter will assess four case studies to find out to what extend the mechanisms of decentralization, improving local service delivery and strengthening local legitimacy in practice have led to more state resilience. After the discussion of four case studies, which will look at local governance in Sierra Leone, Iraq, Bolivia and the Philippines, the three mechanisms will be discussed in more detail, to conclude whether they contribute to more state resilience.

Chapter 5 will be combining the theory and results from the chapters two to four to answer the research question.

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question. In the case studies these countries and their relevance will be introduced in more detail.

Perhaps trying to draw more general conclusions is not always the best to strive for, however the reality of so many differences in state fragility among fragile states asks for more general lessons to help direct and shape future policy making.

For the purpose of answering the research question and the sub-questions, this thesis will be based on academic literature, but also on resources of inter-governmental

organisations and non-governmental organisations. Although these organisations may have a (political) agenda with their publications, the use of different sources makes critical

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Chapter 2. Looking into state fragility

Introduction

Since the beginning of the nineteen nineties academics and policymakers have renewed their focus on governmental issues to explain the lack of developmental progress in the poorest developing countries. Robert Jacksons’ ‘Quasi states’, ‘The coming anarchy’ by Robert Kaplan and William Zartmans’ ‘Collapsed States’ were the groundbreaking works in this.

Although focusing on state failure and collapse, the realm on which they focus in these states is the same as with state fragility; the governance realm. François and Sud point out a difference between failure and collapse: for them state failure is a functional event in which state institutions fail to execute their basic functions, for instance in service delivery, while state collapse is an institutional event in which state institutions have ceased to function at all.1

In recent years scholars and politicians seem to have moved to discussing state

fragility as a concept, putting less emphasis on concepts of failure and collapse. Some authors specifically mention the effect of 9/11 on putting state fragility higher on the security and development agendas. This broad attention for state fragility can be seen in the European Development Report 2009 which focuses on state fragility in Africa and two recent OECD Development Assistance Committee reports which focus on concepts and dilemma’s and on issues of engagement with fragile states. Furthermore many donor states and agencies have published on the issue recently. Indeed state fragility seems to be a ‘hot’ topic.

Despite all efforts, no general definition has emerged and differing interpretations on the causes of state fragility and approaches to tackle it are still very much apparent. What did emerge is the focus on strengthening state apparatus, involving major policies shifts putting more emphasis on good governance, decentralization, increasing government capacity, etc. Before looking at the possible contribution that strengthening local governance can have on fragile states, this chapter will look into the concept of state fragility itself. The purpose of this chapter is not to make a semantic contribution, but rather to look at the core problems of state fragility and clarify the main causes of state fragility.

Firstly the current debate on the causes of state fragility will be discussed; secondly and based on the discussion of the causes of state fragility, the definition of state fragility will

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come to the fore and thirdly the question will be posed what the right goal for policy regarding fragile states should be.

2.1 Causes of state fragility

This section will briefly introduce some interpretations on the causes of state fragility after which a discussion of these explanations follows.

Standard of living

Monika François and Inder Sud argue that the major cause of state fragility is the failing of states to improve their citizens’ welfare.2 They hold that states can gain legitimacy only by performing their state functions, instead of improving democratic processes which may increase democratic legitimacy, but also increase the risk for new conflict. They argue that states which fulfill the two core state functions of security and improving welfare gain legitimacy with their constituents.3

François and Sud base their claims on the preliminary outcomes of the US sponsored State Failure Task Force4 which is an empirical effort looking for the causes of political instability worldwide between 1955 and 1998. The taskforce created a model (based on the polity IV dataset) which is able to identify the drivers of state failure with 70-80% accuracy which are: low levels of populations’ material wellbeing, low trade openness and major civil conflicts in neighboring countries.5 Later on more will follow on this research project.

Social Cohesion – Nation building as key to development

Seth Kaplan states that fragile states have two structural problems: weak national institutions and a fragmented political identity. Together these problems lead to unstable political orders which are difficult to change. To Kaplan social cohesion is the ‘overlooked ingredient’ in state building by the donor community. Moreover he argues that nation building is a prerequisite for economic and state development.

To support his thesis he mentions the way divided societies in the past, like Germany and Japan, were able to form cohesive societies, although these processes ‘often involved brutal wars, ethnic cleansing, savage power politics, and forced assimilation.’ These societies were able to build formal institutions based on shared customs through a process of

2

François, Monika and Inder Sud, ‘Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states’, 142.

3

Ibidem, 147.

4

This CIA-sponsored program was later renamed: Political Instability Task Force.

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strengthening cohesiveness. As a result intrastate competition changed to interstate competition.6

Fragile states however are still in the phase of intra-state competition in which political fragmentations creates incentives for elites and identity groups for short term rent-seeking instead of making long term investments for development.78 Kaplan cites William Easterly, who argues that in situations with weak political institutions, ethnic fragmentation has a worsening effect on stability.9 Kaplan sees the creation of governing institutions that foster cohesive societies and social trust, crucial for promoting development.10 Furthermore, in order to be successful, these institutions need both popular legitimacy and effectiveness, in undertaking the development and governance functions.

The way to do this is to build nation states around cohesive identity groups in a decentralized manner, attached to local traditional institutions. Inclusive power sharing is important in this regard. If necessary boundaries must be redrawn as there is no use in forcing hostile peoples to live together.11

Governance and economics

According to Paul Collier fragile states, which he labels ‘The Bottom Billion’, fail to produce economic growth and thus fall behind in development, but also face the risk of falling apart.12 Often these countries are locked in one or more development traps, or face the risk of falling in one of the four traps that Collier distinguishes: the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, the bad neighbours trap and the bad governance trap.13

The conflict trap holds that low income, slow growth and the availability of natural resource make a country vulnerable to conflict.14 The level of income also influences the length of the conflict, that is to say that in general, conflicts in countries with relative lower incomes, last longer.15 As with natural resources, countries without an abundance of natural resources are more likely to suffer from coups, while those with natural resources abundance

6

Kaplan, Seth, ‘Fixing fragile states’, Policy review 152 (2008) 66.

7

Kaplan, Seth, ‘Fixing fragile states’, 69.

8

Kaplan is not explicit on the role of elite, but when asked at a SID lecture on January 18th 2010 in Amsterdam, he mentioned that when talking about inclusiveness and social cohesion he is also referring to role of elites.

9

Kaplan, Seth, ‘Fixing fragile states’, 69.

10

Ibidem, 72.

11

Ibidem, 75-76.

12

Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (2007) x.

13

Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, 5.

14

Ibidem 20-21

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are more like to suffer from rebellions. According to Collier this is because with abundance of natural resources it is easier to finance an army for rebels.16

The natural resource trap, besides making it relatively easy to fund rebellions, makes it profitable for elite to seek rent. High rents alters political competition and by doing so

undermines democracy, as elites with their rents raise support by patronage and bribes. Another problem with natural resources abundant countries is that they generally tend to under invest.17

Having bad neighbours and being landlocked - the third trap - are difficult conditions for countries to use their labour abundance as it is more difficult and more expensive to export products.18 Also bad neighbours may lead to immigration, refugee flows and spill over of conflict.

Finally bad governments have the ability to ruin a countries economy by poor governance. The cause can be bad macro economic management, too much spending, too heavy borrowing, and with high levels of corruption by which funding for public goods does not reach its destination.19

Underpinning all Paul Collier claims is an economic statistic and theoretical analysis claiming that in the end economic growth and level of income are of key importance and therefore governments (donors and the bottom billion countries) should put their effort in raising these. According to Collier especially technical assistance is of importance.

Political marketplace

Alex de Waal analyses fragile states as political marketplaces in which, in absence of sound state institutions, governments bid for the political loyalty of elites. Violence in that context must be seen as a continuous effort to influence and/or set the price in the negotiations between elites and government. According to De Waal western interference in Congo and Sudan has driven up the price in those countries’ political marketplaces.20

Competition for patrimony is the main cause of state fragility and changing this takes a long time in which political institutions that can regulate conflict in non-violent ways need to be created. In the meantime existing conflicts must be kept, and if possible resolved, within

16

Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, 36.

17 Ibidem, 42-46. 18 Ibidem, 58. 19 Ibidem, 65-66. 20

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the political marketplace either by buy-in or by equilibrium.21 Buying-in would mean that a government has to pay a higher price to get loyalty and by doing so keeps opponents from turning to violence. The equilibrium option is a multi-centered approach in which different patronage centers all receive funds by constitutional arrangements to be able to match and or deter other patronage centers. This approach would need an external Leviathan to work in countries with patrimonial systems.22

Institutional weakness

Vallings and Moreno-Torres argue that weak state institutions are the main driver of state fragility, claiming it to be linked to ‘all other factors associated with state fragility.’

Institutional weakness of fragile states makes them incapable of managing economic, political and social change, often worsening conditions.23

Vallings and Moreno-Torres claim that it is not so much the regime type which makes a country stable or unstable, but much more the consistency of state institutions. They argue that the balance of power in state institutions normally is self-reinforcing, but that in a context of state fragility the public realm becomes a sphere open to competition between elites and/or identity groups. Three elements in this sense make up the balance in state institutions:

selection of government leaders, limits to power(holders) and the participation of the public in decision-making processes.24

The authors argue that other often mentioned causes of state fragility such as lack of economic development, abundance of natural resources, the presence of violent conflict, government transitions, external shocks, climate, disease and the impact of the international system, are not actual drivers of state fragility, but either a result or at best a co-determinant of state fragility. 25

Regime characteristics & factionalism (Political Instability Task Force)26

From 1994 until 2005 a group of scientists under the leading of Goldstone set out to identify factors contributing to political instability.27 They tried to identify these factors using data

21

Alex de Waal, ‘Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace’, 106.

22

Ibidem, 107.

23

Claire Vallings and Maguï Moreno-Torres, ‘Drivers of state fragility: what makes states fragile?’ DFID – PRDE Working Paper 7 (2005) 7.

24

Claire Vallings and Maguï Moreno-Torres, ‘Drivers of state fragility: what makes states fragile?’, 9.

25

Ibidem, 13-25.

26

Formally known as State Failure Task Force.

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from ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, adverse regime changes and genocides and politicides between 1955 and 2003. It would be too much detail to go further into their research method here, but there conclusions are quite strong as they have been able to develop a model that can predict political instability with a certainty of over 80 percent.

Remarkable enough this accuracy is not attained by the amount of variables, the opposite is true. Goldstone c.s. think that factors often mentioned in conflict literature as the presence of a large youth bulge, inflation, economic misery which do have a high correlation with these conflicts are not the source of instability, but another outcome of the real source of political instability; poor regime quality.28

The model however specifies which factors in countries contribute to political instability. The factors that Goldstone c.s. see as fundamental sources of political instability are regime type and factionalism in countries where there is relative openness in the

recruitment for executives (political participation). Full autocracies and full democracies are much less prone to instability then partial democracies and partial autocracies. According to the authors: ‘Factionalism occurs when political competition is dominated by ethnic or other

parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote a particularistic agendas and favour group member to detriment of common, secular or cross-cutting agendas.’ 29

Bringing perspectives together

Although drawing from the same dataset, François and Sud come to quite different

conclusions then the Task Force Political Instability. This may seem strange, as François and Sud put emphasis on the failing of states in fulfilling their basic functions of welfare

improvement and safety while the Task Force claims regime aspects and factionalism being more important.

However, the difference can be explained, by François and Sud drawing on

preliminary findings of the Task Force, after which the Task Force came with an improved model. Furthermore it is unlikely that governments performance in providing welfare and security is the cause of state fragility as François and Sud claim: bad economic figures seem much more a result of bad governance then a cause.

Paul Colliers’ four traps - in which ‘the bottom billion’ seem trapped - illustrate and explain why development is so hard, but do not point at a cause directly. Although Collier

28

Jack Goldstone a.o., ‘A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability’, 9.

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does point at bad governance and the rent-seeking behavior of elites, for instance when certain structural factors like natural resource abundance are present, he does not point at the political institutional realm as the cause of state fragility. He does however point at the political realm as the realm where many of the traps can be resolved or at least can be dealt with. Another strength of Collier is to show how many different issues can have limiting effects on development.

Alex de Waal seems to explain state fragility in almost the opposite way, not mentioning structural factors or governance, but merely focusing on elite behavior and on how governments buy loyalty from elites on the market for political support. A strength of De Waals’ analysis is that it brings the issue of patrimony to the agenda, which is important for practitioners in the field to be aware off. But perhaps this is more illustrative of countries which are extremely fragile, close to collapse or failure such as Sudan or D.R. Congo. Also it focuses more on the players in the game, then on the playing field and rules of the game which are the more structural causes of state fragility.

Kaplan is less preoccupied with elite behavior then De Waal, putting more emphasis on social cohesion in general. He sees the presence of different identity groups pursuing their own interest by polarizing or factionalizing politics as the main cause. Of course elites play an important role in this, but as we can see from his recommendations he clearly focuses on constitutional arrangements to keep elites from polarizing, pleading for inclusive power sharing arrangements.

Reading Kaplan we see a clear understanding of elite behavior, but also of how the rules of the game have an effect on elite behavior. However Kaplan’s theory holds more then a crucial role for social cohesion. Kaplan argues that lack of social cohesion is the most important factor undermining state fragility. It is clear that as long as elites fight each other there is not much to govern, but the question rises whether Kaplan does not drive the importance of social cohesion a bit to far as there are numerous countries with several identities that have been able to develop as a whole.

Vallings and Moreno argue along a similar line as Kaplan leaving the necessity of social cohesion out. To them the constitution and state institutions are important in shaping the political behavior of elites. State fragility is driven by poor checks and balances in government and makes states incapable of good governance. Other often related factors like economic malaise should be regarded as an effect of state fragility and not as a cause.

Finally there is the work of the Task Force Political Instability which is strong

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also underlining the effect of factionalism. The last point of course can also be seen as a result of the institutional realm. This idea is also supported by the Task Force results that only half of the countries in their research that qualify as factionalised became instable. As such, factionalism on itself is not seen as the source for political instability.30

This leaves us with a clear picture. As a direct cause regime quality with institutional and constitutional set up is the most important cause of state fragility. However, in practice both cause(s) and results are problems to resolve. Therefore it is necessary to look at how to deal with the problem(s) of state fragility and what goal(s) should be pursued. But first it is important to briefly discuss the definition of state fragility.

2.2 Defining state fragility

State fragility as a concept describes a state of the state in which state institutions do not function properly but still function. It is a scale concept in which countries can score a certain amount of state fragility. State failure and collapse however are concepts framing occasions. An example of this is Zartman on state failure: ‘the basic functions of the state are no longer performed’ 31

As with many concepts, no general accepted definition has emerged, although many authors do refer to the definition of the OECD Development Assistance Committee

(OECD/DAC) . In 2007 the committee wrote: “States are fragile when state structures lack

political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.” In 2008

the committee proposed to modify the definition by stating a state is fragile when “unable to

meet its population’s expectation or manage changes in expectations and capacity through political process.” The reason for this modification is the addition of ‘legitimacy’ to will and

capacity which are central in the first definition.32

Although not being defined as a cause in the previous section, legitimacy does play and important role in fragile states, be it in a less contested way then the will and capacity of governments. The OECD claims that in fragile states there is a need to strengthen the social contract, that is where the legitimacy point comes from. Interestingly enough there is no proof of this claim, perhaps it illustrates the western liberal agenda of donor states and agencies.

30

Jack Goldstone e.a., ‘A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability’, 19.

31

François, Monika and Inder Sud, ‘Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states’, Development Policy Review 24 (2006) 142.

32

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However, if legitimacy is not taken as democratic legitimacy, but rather as government effectiveness in service delivery (output legitimacy), there may be a strong point to make for adding legitimacy. Central in output legitimacy is the state’s service delivery. From the perspective of halting patronage and rent-seeking behaviour of elites, output legitimacy is central in this. To move on, it is impossible to create better output legitimacy without an increased popular (input) legitimacy. Output and input legitimacy are two sides of the social contract.

To illustrate and clarify this, figure 1 shows the social contract of fragile states and figure 2 shows the social contract in ‘normal’ states.33 The arrows in the figures point at service delivery relations. In the ‘normal’ state, service delivery of public goods is part of the social contract between government and the people. This is a two way relationship in which the people are supposed to make their demands known( arrow up) and government provides public goods as health care, security, etc. figure 1 is more illustrative of the social contract in fragile states. Citizens depend on both state and non-state or corrupt-state institutions for services.

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2.3 Policy aim

Now the concept and definition of state fragility are clearer, the question rises what the aim of policy responses should be. Firstly the question arises whether state building or nation

building should be strived for in this regard. Secondly, should the development community, alongside with the fragile states, be working towards stability or resilience? 35

33

Of course no ‘normal’ state exist, but later more on this topic.

34

Both figures based: Fragile States Group, ‘Synthesis paper on good practice’( Draft September2006) 11.

35

There is much to say about whether engagement is desirable at all or how this should be done. The intent of this paper is not to go into these debates, but merely to look when engaged in state building how to do this and what to aim for, mainly locally.

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State building vs. Nation building

State building refers to interventionist actions to rebuild or improve state institutions, both in terms of law and capabilities. Nation building refers to creation of cohesive identities tied to the state. These terms in practice sometimes get confused.36

As became clear in the discussion of the causes of state fragility, institutions matter as they form and limit the playing field of governments and elites. Therefore state building is a logical approach. Factionalism, however, was mentioned as the main cause of state fragility by the Political Instability Task Force.37 Institutional design can limit factionalism for instance by demanding inclusive governments or laws prohibiting political parties on the bases of particular identity groups.

Nation building can both undermine and strengthen state building as it can both create national identity and make sub-national identities more conscious and possibly leading to calls for self-determination.38 Policy makers need to consider effects of nation building initiatives before applying them as an approach, in the meantime state building seems to be the right approach to follow.

In recent years donor agencies and the OECD have taken state building to be the objective in fighting state fragility.39 Chapter three and four will look into this further.

Stability and Resilience

With the objective of state building central in the policy documents of many donor countries and agencies, the question emerges whether to build a strong and stable state or a resilient one, or both. Resilience is the ability to cope with political change and to reconcile the expectations of state and citizens.40 It appeals probably in particular to liberals who see the social contract as the base of the state. Most western donor states and international

organisations refer to resilience at the objective in state building. This can be seen for instance in the latest EU Development Report, the OECD reports, etc.

The research of the Political Instability Task Force, however, indicates that

governments in transition from full autocracy to full democracy, have greater risk of falling into instability(again).41 This means that working towards resilience through democratisation, as many western donor agencies try to do, may lead to more instability. Therefore there is a

36

Zoe Scott, ‘Literature Review on State-Building,’ University of Birmingham (2007) 3.

37

Jack Goldstone e.a., ‘A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability’, 19.

38

Zoe Scott, ‘Literature Review on State-Building,’ University of Birmingham (2007) 4.

39

‘Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations’, OECD (2008) 7.

40

Ibidem, 18.

41

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need for policy makers and development workers to be aware of this. This may mean that in the short run democratisation is not always the best solution, but that is out of the scope of this thesis. The next chapter will look at how strengthening local governments can contribute to making states more resilient.

2.4 Conclusion

State fragility is a hot topic in the development industry. Questions over lack of progress in development, human rights abuses and fighting poverty in many developing countries, have led many researchers, non-governmental organisations and (international) governmental organisations, to search for the cause(s) of lack of development and state fragility.

In this chapter regime quality was identified as the main cause of state fragility. The quality of the constitutional and institutional setup being major determinants of policy outcomes and regime legitimacy. Poor regime quality opens the way to elite capture of resources, corruption, warlords to create a power base, human rights abuse to take place, bad financial management, factionalism and so on.

Regime quality is not the only determinant. External actors and crises can also

undermine the stability of countries or seriously limit the policy options or financial resources of developing countries.

Not only external factors make it difficult for national governments: abundance of natural resources, weak national integration, different ethnic groups and a history of inequality can be powerful forces in a country limiting or putting stress on governance.

State fragility is defined by the OECD as those states that are unable to meet their population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process. There is a clear emphasis on legitimacy and state capacity in this definition. The previous OECD definition emphasized state structure lack of political will and/or

capacity. The political will factor is also of key importance.

The OECD definitions of state fragility capture the essence of state fragility well, moreover they are widely used by policy makers, international organisations and

non-governmental organisations. Therefore in this thesis the OEDC definition will be used to refer to state fragility.

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identities, which may increase factionalism and thus instability. The possible effects of nation building should be carefully regarded by policy makers.

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Chapter 3. The role and position of local governance in fragile states.

Introduction

So far this thesis has been concerned with state fragility at a very general level. The state fragility definition in its essence highlights the centrality and weakness of the governance realm - and the political processes within it - in fragile states. Therefore it makes sense to look at the governance realm for combating state fragility, even though some of the developmental and security problems associated with state fragility may seem exogenously generated. In the current Weberian international system it is the state’s task to provide security and create an environment for development.

This chapter will look at the position of local governments in fragile states. What are their positions vis-à-vis central governments, parallel institutions, society, etc, and most importantly, in what way can local governments be linked to state fragility as a cause and/or remedy? Three specific and partly intertwined concepts will be elaborated on to explore the possibilities of increasing state resilience through strengthening of local governance: decentralization, improving local service delivery and increasing local legitimacy. Through the exploration of these concepts it will become clear that they are very much interdependent.

As most fragile states are also seen as developing states, one can assume local governance in fragile to be similar to local governance in developing states states to a large degree. However not as an average developing country but rather as the bottom developing countries. Therefore many writings on local governance in developing states are likely to be of relevance for capturing what local governance in fragile states look like, although this approach may overestimate the capabilities of local governments in many occasions. In this thesis, more general knowledge about local governance in developing states may be used for illustrative and theoretical purposes, but for answering the research questions case studies from fragile states will used.

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resources and immigration issues, besides national and international groups and politics being involved.42

Before discussing the position and role of local governments in fragile states, local governance will briefly be introduced and defined.

3.1 Local governance

Local governance in itself is not a clear defined concept and can refer to many different conceptions. The term local governance entails a variety of different actors and institutions creating local public goods ranging from waste management to security.

According to Khan there are two groups of definitions; the first stating local governance are all sub-national governance structures, and the second - much narrower definition - defines local governance by five attributes. These attributes are legal personality, specified powers, substantial financial and staff autonomy from central government, citizen participation and ‘localness’.43

Both of Khan’s mentioned definitions seem to hold quite problematic positions. For instance what is local? This is a question also posed by Jan Michiel Otto. Otto argues that in different countries many different forms of local governance exist.44 In some countries local would mean village or city level, in others one may look at the province level.

A second aspect is the relation between centre and local units. Otto distinguishes between decentralized and deconcentrated local governance. Decentralized implies

autonomous local governance with generally a locally elected council, while deconcentrated governance is local representation of central governance. Most developing countries have forms of deconcentrated governance.45 Does the level of (legal) autonomy then determine whether local authorities constitute local governance?

To work with a definition of sub-national governance is far to broad for the purpose of this thesis, at the same time the five mentioned attributes seem to narrow to pose an answer to the question what is local governance. In fact, part of the subject of this thesis is whether increasing local governments autonomy helps in making fragile states more resilient.

In this thesis local governance will therefore refer to those governance agencies working at - or below - province to provide public services, in most case however at

42

Séverine Auteserre, ‘Hobbes and the Congo: frames local violence, and international intervention’, International Organisation 63 (2009) 249.

43

Shadiullah Khan, ´Local government and participatory rural development the case study of district government in north western Pakistan´, (2006) 57-58.

44

Jan Michiel Otto, ‘Lokaal bestuur in ontwikkelingslanden’ (1999) 35.

45

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municipal level. It is important to keep in mind that the institutional setup of (local)

governance differs per country. Not only differs the institutional setup, but also the context in which local governments work, the tasks they perform as also the actors they need to deal with differ. Besides clarifying what constitutes local governments it is important to look at what problems they face or what problems there generally are with local governance in fragile states. The next sections will deal with this.

The position and condition of local governments in fragile states

In 2007 the international association for local governments, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), presented the first global report on Decentralization and Local

Democracy. It provides a thorough descriptive analysis of the state of local governance in the world per region.46 To get a good impression it is useful to look at the regions that include fragile states based on the State fragility Index.47 These regions are Latin America, South Asia, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa

In all the above mentioned regions, lack of resources is a big challenge to local government. Local governments often have little or no tax rights and have to deal with large deficits especially in rural areas. Finances local governments receive from central state are often irregularly, and often ill distributed between different government agencies in disadvantage of local governments. 48

Because of lack of finances and poor education, local governments have few staff and often pay less than the private sector, which is part of the reason they have difficulty finding qualified staff. In many occasions local officials - because of underpayment - use bribery to receive some extra income.49

Since the nineteen eighties many developing countries have started decentralizing and establishing local democracy. This, however, lead to many different results and especially in the case of decentralization it was often poorly executed leading to situations in which central government officials still interfere with local policies.50

Looking at the functions and public services local governments generally are responsible for - like waste management, public cleaning, infrastructure, and in some

46

Decentralization and Democracy. A global Perspective in 2007’, UCLG report: Decentralization and local democracy in the world (2007) 19.

47

Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, ‘Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State fragility’, Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy ( 2009) 25-33.

48

Tim Campbell, ‘Conclusion, Decentralization and Democracy. A global Perspective in 2007’, in UCLG report:” Decentralization and local democracy in the world” (2007), 292-295

49

Tim Campbell, ‘Conclusion, Decentralization and Democracy’, 296.

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occasions also healthcare, education and social welfare functions - they may also still be under extensive restrictions of central government or privatized companies.

Finally, two problems that come to the fore are territoriality and parallel institutions which in some occasions are related. Some regions of the countries are hard to access and therefore are hard and expensive to control and easily neglected. These circumstances make it harder to combat criminal, rebel or terroristic groups, as is the case with the FARC in

Columbia. It may also be that societies still have some traditional customs which undermine the role of the government. Both traditional authorities and rebels groups may become alternative providers of public goods, also called parallel institutions. Marcou distinguishes between self-government, decentralization and democracy.51

An organisation as Hamas in the Palestinian areas for instance, delivers health care and educations services and therefore is a parallel institution. From a perspective of care for the people this is a good cause when civil organisations provide these goods, however they may stand in the way of creating a legitimate Palestinian government. A similar point can be made of non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and intergovernmental organisations who provide relief help or development assistance. Due to the short term nature of relief help it is not likely to be a problem.

Things become even worse when (previous) warring factions or warlords with their private armies in extreme cases - like in Afghanistan - continue to pursuit their own ends destabilizing the country, making development harder, which possibly leads to more

insecurity. 52 Security generally is perceived as a basic condition for development, as without it markets can hardly function and other public goods and universal suffrage are hard to establish.

In short, the most pressing problems for local governments in fragile states are financial shortfalls in the first place, and a lack of capacity in the second place, leading to problems with staff, contracting and management systems, and corruption.53

Ways to resilience

So far, strengthening local governance has been introduced, as also in the introduction of this chapter, as a possible way of making fragile states more resilient. In the previous chapter the

51

Gérard Marcou, ‘Essay on the clarification on some key concept and methodological problems’, in: ‘Decentralization and Democracy. A global Perspective in 2007’, UCLG report: Decentralization and local democracy in the world (2007), 305.

52

Sarah Lister, ‘State-building and government in Afghanistan’, Journal of development studies 45 (2009) 1001.

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relationships among state legitimacy, service delivery and state fragility have been established.

Decentralization is often regarded as a way to improve service delivery and reinforce or create ties between the local state and civilians. Also some authors point at the potential role of local governments in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) and development more generally. Local institutions and policy planning are of great importance.54

The remainder of this chapter will deal with decentralization, service delivery and local democracy and look into the theoretical possibilities of make the fragile state more resilient by strengthening local governance in and through these areas.

3.2 Decentralization

Definition

Shadiullah Khan defines decentralization as the ´transfer of power from the central government to more peripheral levels of government´ and argues it is seen as an effective device for tackling limitations in development, both physical and administrative, making resource management more effective and more responsive to local demands and

participation.55

Gérard Marcou distinguishes between a broad and narrow definition of

decentralization. Decentralization in the broad definition refers to the relationship between hierarchical related authorities in which the lower authority enjoys a certain amount of liberty to execute the functions attributed to it.56 In the narrow definition, decentralization describes local authorities as constituted by law, having legal personality and exerting the powers and tasks with certain freedom on base of the law(s) on which the are constituted.57

According to Marcou ‘the scope of decentralization depends on the political weight and human and financial resources available to local authorities. Decentralization does not exist outside state but it ceases to exist even within where local authorities are no more than the executors of policies determined by higher authorities.’58

Both Marcou definitions seem to be problematic for the purpose of this thesis. The first and broad definition pictures all non-central government state agencies as decentralized

54

Gérard Marcou, ‘Essay on the clarification on some key concept and methodological problems’, UCLG 302.

55

Shadiullah Khan, ´Local government and participatory rural development the case study of district government in north western Pakistan´ (2006) 45-46.

56

Gérard Marcou, ‘Essay on the clarification on some key concept and methodological problems’, UCLG 308

57

Ibidem, 308

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agencies and the second definition may unnecessarily exclude local authorities that have delegated powers or do not fit the definition in other ways. However, Marcou’s definitions may perhaps be useful when seen as boundaries. The broad definition posing a minimum of transfer of powers in contrast to deconcentration in which the central state still holds all the powers and the narrow definition posing a maximum, i.e.: would local authorities have more constitutional powers then it seems more appropriate to define the system as federalism.

When comparing Marcou’s definition with Khans’ an interesting difference appears. Marcou seems to see decentralization as static situation describing the hierarchical relations between governments’ agencies and the distribution of powers and functions between them. In contrast Khan’s definition describes decentralization as a process as he uses the term ‘transfer of power’.

Both notions are interesting. Khan’s definition seems to fit the research question better whether strengthening local governance contributes to more state resilience. However, this question immediately poses the questions to what extend more decentralization is desirable, and whether further decentralization is necessary for the purpose of strengthening local government. Of course these questions ultimately have to be considered case by case.

A useful contribution of Marcou is that the scope of decentralization is to be measured primarily by the political weight and resources - human and financial - of local authorities.

Combining these different contributions for the purpose of this thesis, decentralization will be defined as: the transfer and distribution of power and resources between central and local governments, wherein the direction of transfer is always towards the local government, in contrast with centralization. This definition is highly pragmatic and has its pitfalls, but the mayor advantage is the clarification it brings to the reader.

One final note to make here is that decentralization as a concept is sometimes confused with other concepts. Marcou points in this regard to the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) which confuses decentralization with improving governance itself.59 Similarly Marcou points at the mix up with privatization as decentralization.

Decentralization is the transfer of powers between public institutions, while privatization is

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the transfer of power from public authorities to private companies.60 Because of the focus on local governance in fragile states, privatization will fall out of the scope of this thesis.

Now decentralization has been introduced and defined as a concept, it is useful to look at the rationale of applying decentralization as possible contribution to strengthening local

governments and making states more resilient.

Rationale

Brinkerhoff and Johnson frame the rationale for decentralization in fragile states in direct relations to the problems of fragile states as a whole. Firstly they point at the weak roots of central governments beyond the centre of these nations. Fragile states have difficulties

integrating minorities and regions.61 Because of the fragmented societies of most fragile states it is likely that lack of political will besides lack of capacity plays an important role here.

A second and related problem Brinkerhoff and Johnson point at, is the distribution of resources and services central governments have in fragile states. Patronage, inefficiency, and inequitable resource distribution increase social cleavages.62

A final and related issue to the previous two is the little national cohesion in fragile states.63 Warlords, tribal systems and factionized politics are hard to overcome and undermine the legitimacy of the state.

Brinkerhoff and Johnson then point at the possible contributions strengthening local governments can have in making fragile states more resilient. Firstly, decentralization can increase the speed of provision of basic public goods as well as the provision of these goods in more rural areas. Brinkerhoff and Johnson highlight that the provision these goods for civilians is important in creating stability. 64 More on the potential of improving service delivery as a possible mean to increase resilience will follow later in this chapter.

Secondly, when designed rightly, decentralization can bring down ethnic or regional disparities. By granting more autonomy to certain regions or redistributing some region incomes out of natural resources.65 However some of the examples and suggestions the authors make may go beyond decentralization, but this will be a matter of to what extend more autonomy is granted.

60 Gérard Marcou, ‘Essay on the clarification on some key concept and methodological problems’, UCLG 306-307.

61

Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson,“ decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq”, International review of administrative sciences 75 (2009) 590.

62

Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson,“ decentralized local governance in fragile states”, 590.

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Thirdly and finally Brinkerhoff and Johnson argue decentralization will create possibilities for local governments to experiment. As the ‘feedback loops’ are much smaller than with central government, learning can take place faster. Also this kind of experimentation may lead to the spread of learning between local governments.66

Khan highlights some other rationales on decentralization. In the first place there are those who see decentralization as a an administrative matter which is to lead to increased efficiency. The rationale behind it is that when policy is being made and carried out closer to the people it can be made fit better to local circumstances and obstacles may be tackled easier.67 This argument is quite similar to the first argument of Brinkerhoff and Johnson, but puts more emphasis on efficiency.

Secondly Khan mentions the perspective of increasing citizen participation in decision making, involving issues of local empowerment and autonomy. This serves the goal of

fostering democracy and self-rule. Also governments´ accessibility improves.68 Brinkerhoff and Johnson argue a similar way, as will be shown later in the chapter, but their emphasis is more related to recreate state society relations to contribute to more stability, whereas with Khan the emphasis is more on decentralization for the purpose of self-rule more as a goal on its own.

Finally Khan mentions the development perspectives which target to increase citizen participation in development. Here it is assumed that when civilians participate in governance, they will take more ownership of policies and projects concerned. This local ownership may also increase the possibilities in development as local civilians will have more incentives to mobilize their own resources for development.69

Khan then comments these perspectives fail to address the fundamental political nature of decentralization, posing the question: Who rules and who benefits? The point Khan makes here is not to argue against decentralization, but to argue that the real impact and

consequences of decentralization depend on the context in which it is being carried out, and cannot be assumed automatically to lead to more local empowerment, less poverty, etc. In fact it may just lead to more power for the local elites or warlord.70

This is also in line with Brinkerhoff and Johnson as we will see later on. In their arguments one can see a high pragmatic agenda which is directed at stability and resilience.

66

Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson,“ decentralized local governance in fragile states”, 592.

67

Shadiullah Khan, ´Local government and participatory rural development’, 48.

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Although they do not mention resilience as goal explicitly, their approach is directed at creating a political system that is capable to deal with peaceful change.

On the whole, it seems that Khan has much more the agenda for development and argues decentralization benefits development in general, while Brinkerhoff and Khan are more directed to state fragility. Khan also does not explicitly write about decentralization for fragile states, so this division is not particular strange. However, that does not make his contribution useless for fragile states. It offers some valuable reasoning at state society relations in general by, for instance, pointing at how local ownership may increase through decentralization.

Before moving on to local self government and service delivery, it is useful to pay some attention to different types of decentralization.

Types of decentralization

Besides presenting different perspectives or rationales, Khan also presents four distinct types of decentralization. In the first place there is administrative decentralization or

deconcentration which refers to decentralization within central government for instance to

central governments’ field offices. That is central government agents working at a more local level to implement policy closer to the people, but still exerting central government

authority.71

In the previous section deconcentration was referred to as being no form of decentralization. However, in practice there may be no fine line between the two and deconcentration may have some of the benefits of decentralizing. As policy is being made closer to the people it may be more adaptive to local needs.

The second type of decentralization is functional decentralization with which central government delegates certain autonomy to relative independent semi-government organs.72 This can for instance concern public health or sanitation services.

The third type Khan distinguishes is political/democratic decentralization or

devolution referring to transfer of concrete powers to lower level authorities which are both

democratic and to a large extend - or totally - independent from central government. In practice however this does rarely involve financial or fiscal independence.73

71

Shadiullah Khan, ´Local government and participatory rural development’ 51.

72

Ibidem, 52.

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The fourth and final type is privatization, which means a transfer of authority from the public to the private sector.74 Energy of communication services have in many countries been privatized, with the rationale that private companies are more efficient and thus cheaper in their production. Beforehand it was noted that this type of privatization will not be subject of this thesis.

The purpose here however, is not discuss the separate perspectives on decentralization and establish which one is most correct, but rather to look at how decentralization may help tackling state fragility. Therefore it is important to look at how decentralization may benefit and or possibly disadvantage the process of strengthening fragile states theoretically.

For this thesis in the context of state fragility, and the state-society relations through legitimacy and service delivery, political and functional decentralization are likely to be of particular significance.

After having dealt with decentralization quite extensively, service delivery will be looked into shortly before moving on to discussing local legitimacy. Because some of the aspects of these subjects have been dealt with in relation with decentralization, they will require less room for discussion.

3.3 Local Service delivery

Local governments are generally the primary official service deliverer for public goods in developing countries, although often ill-equipped and poorly endowed with revenues. On top of that, local governments capacities are often severely effected by crisis.75 Service delivery is relevant to this thesis for two purposes, the first is the direct relationship with state legitimacy and resilience and the second is the relationship with development.

It may seem strange to deal with the relationship with service delivery and

development in general in a thesis on state fragility. However it is not as the fundamental reason why the concept of state fragility is created is to account for the lack of progress in development in many developing countries. Not only in terms of economical progress, but also lack of progress in basic living conditions and human development.

Also as mentioned in the section on decentralization, uneven distribution of services may be a source of intergroup tensions. Also the inability of states to penetrate more rural

74

Shadiullah Khan, ´Local government and participatory rural development’ 55.

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areas with services may lead to non-state local actors providing these services or rebel groups gaining more support out of discontent of the local people.

According to the OECD legitimacy is achieved by the state ‘when they deliver services in accordance with the social contract.’ This has some serious implications when a non-state actor provides the basic public services.76 There is a relation of mutual dependency as states depend on society for legitimacy and society depends on the state for public goods.

This relationship becomes under stress when governments is not the provider of public goods or does so in a corrupt way.77 When international organizations provide public goods, the state will not gain legitimacy. At the same time, if the state institutions do not deliver the public goods properly because of corruption for instance, it will likely loose legitimacy.

Kyed and Engberg-Petersen argue that local service delivery may be a starting point for local government reform. Improving the provision of local basic services (health, education, water, sanitation and physical security) is likely to lead to more legitimacy of (local) government. Furthermore it may be a way for capacity building and increasing local participation.78

Taking service delivery as a starting point because of a less political nature is

underlined by other authors also. Jackson and Scott however, warn for a quick fix mentality arguing that interventions must be planned with care.79 It may also be a misunderstanding that service delivery is an easy entry point because of a less political nature, more equal

distribution also means those who profited before may get less.

This quick fix will become even more unattainable keeping in mind that fragile states have little resources in general and especially at local government level. Moreover, lack of well trained staff provides another great problem.

It is clear that service delivery is closely intertwined with the legitimacy of the state. But what is the role of local governments in this? Are they a needed complementary tier to central government which has often been overlooked? In the next chapter the contribution of strengthening local governments in service delivery will be evaluated through some case studies. This chapter will continue by looking at the role of improving local governments legitimacy.

76

‘Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations’, OECD (2008) 40.

77

‘Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations’, 40.

78

Helene Kyed and Lars Engberg-Petersen, ‘Local governance in fragile states’, Danish Institute forInternational Studies (2008) 2-3.

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3.4 Strengthening local legitimacy

In the previous sections the importance of government’s legitimacy has come to the fore. In fragile states it was argued that weak national roots beyond the centre are an important problem in many fragile states and governments legitimacy is of great importance . In this section two subjects will be of particular importance: firstly the role of accountability and local governance in service delivery and secondly, creating new ties - or reinforcing them - between state and society through local government structures.

Better service delivery through accountability.

In societies with a well functioning social contract, citizens depend on government for public service delivery. The government has two tasks in this regard: policy planning and providing services. Citizens voice their preference to the policy makers who give orders to the service providers. And service providers provide their services.

Service delivery in fragile states suffers from several potential strains. With regard to legitimacy and accountability, lack of government willingness and capacity and corruption have their impact on delivery potentially leading to a break down of service delivery

structures. The basic mechanisms leading to such a situation are private capture of resources and corruption.80

Accountability is needed to tackle these problems. In theory this can be done both in the relationship between national and local governments, but also in creating local democracy. A local elected council would have most incentives to make sure resources are well spent, as they rely on the people to become elected and are themselves more aware of public service provision.

One of the questions to be looked at in the next chapter is whether there is empirical backup for the claim the local democracy leads to better service provision, and via service provision perhaps to more legitimacy.

Strengthening local governance: local politics

The instability and fragmented nature of fragile states are at the core of its problems.

Brinkerhoff and Johnson argue that (political) decentralization may have specific benefits for fragile states.

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Firstly through strengthening the local political realm, civilians in fragile states learn tot deal with potential conflict issues in a peacefully political way. This will lead to more conflict management capabilities.81 Here the idea comes to fore that in fragile states civilians need to be socialized in peaceful democratic values to deal with political conflict.

Secondly they argue that through more local government, minorities that are nationally insignificant in numbers, may attain local wins with elections. Leading to more representation for these groups, and avoiding winner takes all politics on a national scale.82 Thus reducing tensions and taking away insecurity for these groups, as they can have some power over themselves.

Thirdly, through creating or reforming local governance, elite groups and spoilers’ power can be contained. A new more legitimate local government can emerge which is expected to lead to increased legitimacy with the people.83

The basis rationale behind all three elements is that decentralizing political power should lead to more stability. Giving minorities some room for self-government, containing local power holders, and allowing governance to reach more peripheral areas.

Here a certain interplay between political decentralization, legitimacy, services and stability comes to the fore. The next chapter will explore these relations in case studies trying to find empirical backup for these theoretical claims. However before looking at how local governments can contribute to resilience, it is worth looking at how local governance in many occasions is part of the state fragility problem.

3.5 local government as a destabilizing force

So far local governance has been written about as a potential contributor to state resilience when strengthened. But in many occasions local governments in fragile states are corrupt, choose party in ethnic conflict, or are simply the domain of (local) warlords.

Afghanistan provides a case in which the local realm politics may be more harmful then central government politics. According to Lister, the power in Afghanistan has become highly decentralized since the Soviet invasion, arguing that factional leaders came to

dominate in distinct geographical areas. Organising themselves in loose alliances, warlords came to dominate large territories.84

81

Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson,“ decentralized local governance in fragile states”, 592

82

Ibidem, 592

83

Ibidem, 593.

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With the US-led intervention, warlords from the north and the west joint the intervening forces and were incorporated in the transitional administration. The Afghan people have suffered for many years because of the warlords’ local political rule, according to Lister they prefer a strong central government to break the power of local power holders.85

Afghanistan is not a case on its own: in many countries patronage, corruption, unequal distribution of resources and unequal access to law enforcement are a daily practice. In

Yemen local politics is also heavily mixed with local tribal leaders and warlords creating their own spheres of influence.

In these circumstances it will be very difficult to reform local government. Both to regain people’s trust in local government and to effectively contain local power holders’ power. In fact: policies designed to do so will most like first lead to a destabilization of the domestic order. However, the question how to deal with this lays outside the scope of this thesis.

3.6 Conclusion

Local governments in fragile states function in difficult circumstances. Financial resources are scarce, local officials are often poorly educated, corruption and bribery create legitimacy problems, and so on. Central government intermingling in local affairs and local traditional systems of warlords may create a difficult context to function in.

Another big problem local governments in fragile states are faced with, is that they are often responsible for large rural areas with little infrastructure, making service delivery even harder.

Decentralizing governance in fragile states may increase citizen participation, local funds for service delivery and strengthen the legitimacy and accountability of local

governments. Even via citizen participation, policy making can be more responsive to local needs and priorities and thus more efficient, foster ties between state and society and facilitate representation of minority and/or ethnic groups. Moreover by increasing local governments resources they may improve their service delivery and thereby change the satisfaction or legitimacy of the civilians.

More and better local service delivery can help to penetrate rural or relative underprivileged areas with service delivery. When done in a non-discriminatory way, this

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may decrease intergroup tensions. Improving local service delivery can also contribute in pursuing the Millennium Development Goals.

Strengthening local legitimacy can serve to strengthen local politics as well as

improving service delivery through accountability mechanisms and local participation. It can be an important method to fight corruption, make policy more responsive and foster a political culture of participation.

As the reader may have noticed, the three concepts relay on each other to be effective mechanisms in making fragile states more resilient. What also comes to the fore is the potential for less efficient or corrupt governance. When designed badly, local governments can become the prey of local elites or warlords capturing resources and/or creating their own power bases. Local governments can then become a destabilizing force in fragile states.

In the next chapter, four case studies will be examined to see if the three presented concepts in practice have helped to make states more resilient. These case studies will show how local governance can be captured by elites for their own good, as well as how

Strengthening Local Governance in Fragile States A way to resilience?