Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture
University of Groningen (Home) University of Udine (Host)
Month and Year when submitted:
July, 2017
Title of Master Thesis:
Whose Story Wins: The use of “negative soft power” in the West/Russia power struggle
Submitted by:Tammo Toppe Student number first university: 2169940 Student number second university: 131846 Contact details: +491637829617/t.toppe@hotmail.de
Supervised by: Prof. Dr. J.S.A.M. (Hans) van Koningsbrugge and Angela Napolitano
Place, date
Bremen, 30.07.2017
MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Tammo Toppe hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Whose Story Wins: The use of “negative soft power” in the West/Russia power struggle”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Signed :
Table of content
Introduction: 4-6
Literature Review: 7-10
Chapter 1: A Power Struggle in the 21st Century
• Introduction 10-11
• Part 1: Theory of a Power Struggle 11-14
- The School of Realism and the Theory of
Offensive Realism 12-14
• Part 2: A Hard Power Dimensions 14-18
• Part 3: A Soft Power Dimension 18-27
-Concept of Soft Power 18-21
-Public Diplomacy and RT 21-23
-The Soft Power Dimension 23-27
• Part 4: Russia's Approach to Soft Power 27-29
• Part 5: Negative Soft Power and the Information Revolution 29-34
-The Information Revolution 30-31
-The Paradox of Plenty 31-32
-A Competition for Credibility 32-33
-Negative Soft Power and the use of Information 33-34 Chapter 2: Whose Story Wins
• Introduction 34-35
• Methodology and Justification 36-37
• Part 1: Planning Phase 37-38
• Part 2: Development Phase 38-42
• Part 3: Exemplary Comparison 42-44
• Part 4: Discussion and Evaluation 44-48
Conclusion 48-50
Bibliography: 51-60
Introduction
In the 21st century the notion of power, more precisely the resources that make one powerful, are in
a state of flux. Whereas, in the 19th century power was defined by whose army wins, in the 21st
century power rather depends on whose story wins.1 This trend is strongly influenced by the
increasing availability and importance of information and is expressed in the international state
system through the increased engagement of actors in so called “information warfare”2, narrative
battles and competitions for credibility, which demonstrate the increasing conjunction of
information and power.3 Thereby it is not important which side can accumulate the biggest military
might, but who can gain interpretational sovereignty of events. The scholars Arquilla and Ronfeldt, already in 1999, pointed out that it is necessary for governments to develop, as they termed it, an “information strategy”, in order to be able to manage and prevail in these new arising fields of state
competition.4 In general, these developments have lead to a rising importance of the concept of soft
power, which is described as the ability of an actor to achieve its goal through attraction rather than
coercion.5
A phenomena, which has occurred frequently in recent years and epitomizes this shift of power resources are so called “fake news” and “disinformation campaigns”. They rely solely on non-violent means, but have the ability to polarize and destabilizes societies through the use of information, if they are perceived by an audience as credible. An example of a fake news incident
was the so called “Lisa Case”6. This case made headlines in January 2016, when a 13 year old
Russian-German girl, living in Berlin, claimed that she was kidnapped and rapped by two refugees. This story was quickly picked up by Russian news outlets and broadcasted all over the world and caused a wave of anti-refugee demonstrations and reinforced the claims against the handling of the refugee crisis by the German federal government. It furthermore, compelled Russian foreign minister Lavrov to accuse German authorities to camouflage the investigations in order to not
increase the negative publicity about the refugee policy of the German government.7 However, after
an investigation of the German police the claims of the girl turned out to be false. Nevertheless, this
1 Joseph Nye, “The Information Revolution and Soft Power,” Current History 113, (2014): 2.
2Giles Keir, “Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of
Power,” Chatham House, The Royal Insitute of Foreign Affairs, 2016,4.
3John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noonpolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), ix.
4John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noonpolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999),1.
5 Joseph Nye, The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.
6 http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm 7 Benjamin Bidder, “Russland wirft deutschen Behörden Vertuschung vor,” spiegel.de, 26.01.2016,
case has impressively shown the power of fake news and disinformation and their destabilizing effects, as it has lead the audience, that perceived the story as credible, to demonstrate against government policies, increase its doubts of the integrity of the German government, increased the political polarization in Germany and contributed to diminish the credibility of Germany.
As the example of the “Lisa Case” has already shown, the importance and utilization of soft power has increased in the field of international politics.
Above, others the currently very tense West/Russia relations are paradigmatic in that sense. These relations have been the source of great challenges lately, since Russia has demonstrated its return to a rather assertive foreign policy by the successful annexation of Crimea and military interventions
in Ukraine and Syria8. Parallel to that, the use and understanding of soft power in these relations
has gained great importance.9 Thus this thesis is settled around the correlation of the increasing
importance of soft power and the development and role of the concept in the West/Russia relations, by asking the research question:
“Does Russia employ the concept of “negative soft power”, through its state owned public diplomacy tool RT Deutsch, on the soft power dimension in the overarching power struggle between the West and Russia?”
Thereby this thesis seeks to contribute, by offering an explanation for the rising importance of soft power, and therewith for the phenomena of fake news and information wars, which can be
understood as symptoms of the employment of the concept of “negative soft power”10.
Furthermore, this new concept will analyzed and tested in this thesis, in the context of the West/Russia relations, in order add to the, so far rather little, research about this topic. All in all, this process will take place in the broader framework of the debate about Russia's approach to the concept of soft power, to which this thesis also seeks to contribute.
Thus, this thesis address a melange of pressing, as well as current issues, as it is settled in the broader framework of the West/Russia relations. As major events in the near past, such as the annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine and Syria and the resulting mutual sanction regime, have already demonstrated, these relations are important for the preservation of peace in Europe and on the globe. Therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of these relations and the use of the concept of soft power within them. In other words, the need to analyze and explain the practice of non-coercive engagement in international affairs, such as the
8 Giles Keir, “Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of
Power,” Chatham House, The Royal Insitute of Foreign Affairs, 2016, 2.
9 Sinikukka Saari, “Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its influence in Former Soviet Republics:
Public Diplomacy po russkii,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 1 (2014):51.
10 Joseph S. Nye, “Information Warfare Versus Soft Power,” project-syndicate.org, 17.05.2017,
employment of soft power and negative soft power, has never been more acute.11
Thereby, this thesis also wants to shed light on the logic that is behind the current phenomena of fake news and disinformation campaigns, in order to better understand them and thus manage their
impact. Furthermore, this thesis addresses important developments, such as the impact of the 21st
century information revolution on the concept of soft power and thereby analyzes how interaction between states has changed.
In order to address these issues and answer the research question, the following thesis will be structured in two chapters, which are again divided in multiple sub chapter or parts. In general, the first chapter is designed to provide evidence that the concept of soft power has gained increasing importance, next to hard power in international relations, and develop the hypotheses, which will be tested in the second chapter.
In more detail, the first chapter will begin by theorizing the West/Russia relations with help of the international relations theory of realism in the first part. This theory will be operationalized and applied to the West/Russia relations, in the second part, in order to establish a hard power dimension in these relations. Consequently, the third part will establish a soft power dimension. However, only after introducing the concept of soft power, public diplomacy and the Russian public diplomacy tool RT. In the fourth part, this thesis will elaborate on the Russia approach to the concept of soft power. In the fifth and final part of the first chapter, this thesis will focus on the impact of the information revolution on the concept of soft power and analyze how this contributed to a change in the concept of soft power and the development of the concept of negative soft power. The second chapter is designed to test the previously developed hypotheses by utilizing the method of quantitative content analysis (QCA). Therefore, the second chapter will begin by introducing and justifying the choice of method. The first part will then elaborate on the planing of the QCA, by subtracting the hypotheses from the research question. The second part will define and justify the material that is used in the QCA and also operationalize the hypotheses through the development of a category catalog. The following application of the category catalog to the material can be reviewed by consulting the coder sheet in the annex. However, the application is not written down in the second chapter. In the third and final part of the second chapter, the data, that was generated through the application of the QCA, will be elaborated and discussed in order to support or hamper the hypotheses. The findings of the two chapters will then be gathered and summarized in the conclusion.
11Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, “Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power,” Media, War &
Literature Review
The following literature review will present a few chosen studies and their results that are closely related, as well as have had an influence on the thesis and the analysis that is conducted within this thesis. The review will also connect this thesis to multiple, larger and still ongoing academic debates in respective academic fields and while doing so identify gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill. Therefore it is necessary that this literature review, not only integrates what acclaimed scholars have said, but also builds bridges between related topics. This is especially important, since this thesis is build on the cross section of a multitude of academic fields. In order to do so, this literature review is structured in four blocs, each representing a field of studies or multiple fields that are closely connected and an extract of the academic debate within it.
The first bloc is concerned with the rising importance of the concept of soft power in international relations and the reasons therefore. The concept of soft power, in this study, is perceived as a tool of analysis, as well as an object of study itself. The aggregates of attention on this concept, despite its intangible nature and difficulty in being measured in international relations,
which has been discussed, among others, by Goldsmith and Horiuchi.12 Nevertheless, this thesis
argues, in line with the research of Miskimmon and O'Loughlinand Arquilla and Ronfeldtthat the concept of soft power has not only gained increased attention in the last decade, but has also been integrated, by many governments, as a tool to conduct foreign policy and achieve national aims
instead of relying on the use of hard power tools.13 14 This thesis seeks to contribute to the
explanation of this development by putting its analytical emphasis on the synergy of the “Information Revolution” and the use of soft power in international relations, following the works
of Hanson.15 Thereby, this thesis attempts to build a bridge, between the study of the concept of soft
power, its use in international relations and the field of communication studies.
The second bloc will discuss the changes that the information revolution has broad about to the concept of soft power and its application. Therefore, this thesis pictures the information revolution as a catalyst, that is not only partially responsible for increasing the importance of soft power in international relations, but also for the rising importance of credibility as a resource of soft power. Therewith this thesis follows the argument of scholar Joseph Nye, who argues that, due to the overflow of information and the therewith arising “paradox of plenty”, which will be further
12 B. Goldsmith and Y. Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Policy Opinion Matter for US Foreign
Policy?,” World Politics 63, no. 3 (2012):555.
13Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, “Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power,” Media, War &
Conflict 7, no.1 (2014): 71.
14John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noonpolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), ix.
elaborated on in the following chapter, credibility becomes a more important resource.1617
The third bloc addresses the broad field of West/Russia relations and the IR school of realism. Therewith, does this bloc focus on the context, in which this thesis seeks to further analyses the above described trends and phenomena and in which it also seeks to test the previously laid out arguments. By following the works of scholars, such as Nitoui, Monaghan, and Lucas, this thesis argues that the West/Russia relations have become gradually geopolitical and have turned into a
struggle for power.18 19 20 Scholars like Serguin and Leonid, Shiraev and Mankoffhave suggested,
through their works, that this development is influenced and vise-versa, in a causality dilemma like
relationship, by Russia's gradual development into a realist actor in the international system.21 22 23
A precise classification of Russia in a sub-category of the realist school, however is rather difficult. Nevertheless, this thesis, by utilizing the sub-category of offensive realism, as defined by John
Marsheimer, attempts to explain Russia's behavior in the West/Russia relationship.24 At the same
time acknowledging the academic debate in the field and the contributions made by Morgenthau,
Roseand Waltz.252627 However, this thesis follows the argumentation of Raik, that indicates that the
current West/Russia power struggle is not a new edition of the Cold War, despite similarities, but
rather a clash of norms and values instead of ideologies.28 Furthermore, the thesis agrees with
Howard that one remarkable difference of the current West/Russia power struggle, in comparison to the Cold War, is the venue on that it takes place, which can be described as the “information
infrastructure” or global information space.29 30 Furthermore, this thesis contributes to this debate,
16 Joseph S. Nye, “ Public Diplomacy and Soft power,” Annals of the American Academy of political and Social Science
616, (2008).
17 Joseph Nye, “The Information Revolution and Soft Power,” Current History 113, (2014).
18 Cristian Nitoui, “Increasing Geopolitical? The EU's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space,” Journal of Regional
Security 11, no. 1 (2916).
19Andrew Monaghan, “'An Enemy at the Gates' or 'From Victory to Victory'? Russian Foreign Policy,” International
Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008).
20 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin´s Threat to Russia and the West (London:Bloomsburg
Publishing, 2014).
21 Alexander Sergunin and Leonid Karabeshkin, “ Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy,” Politics 35, no. 3-4
(2015)
22 Eric Shiraev, Russian Government and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
23 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics (Plymouth: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012).
24 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:Hill Companies, Inc,
1954).
26 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, (1998). 27 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press Inc., 1979).
28 Kristi Raik, Geopolitical, values and the ideational battle over the EU's Eastern neighborhood, ed. By Kristi Raik &
Siniukka Saari (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), 60.
29 Philip N. Howard, Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things may set us free or lock us up (London: Yale University
Press, 2015)
30 Philip N. Howard, “Social media and the new Cold War,” Reuters: The Great Debate, Aug. 1, 2012,
by connecting the studies of the concept of soft power and the concepts increasing role in the West/Russia relations. Thus, this thesis argues along with the studies of Nielsen and Vilson, Saari and Wilson that Russia increasingly employs soft power tools in the struggle for power with the
West.313233
In order to complement the previous bloc, the fourth bloc presents the academic works that are part of the growing literature about Russia's use and understanding of the concept of soft power. Above others have Serguin and Leonid and Hudson pointed out that, while parts of the Russia government elites have recognizes the growing importance of soft power and have adopted it in
their policy making, they still neglects the voluntaristic and non-coercive nature of soft power.34 35
Joseph Nye also consented, when he wrote so frankly that “Russia does not get soft power”.36 Thus
Russia pursues a different and rather state centric approach to soft power as Osipova points out.37
Nevertheless, right at this interface of academic fields, this thesis attempts to contribute as it perceives Russia's disinformation campaign as an expression of its own approach to soft power. As Fotyga, Polyakova, Meiter and Barnett, and Kvitha point out, these campaigns have the aims to undermine the notion of objective information, the legitimacy of the EU and thus destabilize the
West in order to give Russia a gain in the power struggle.383940
All in all, the major themes that this thesis encounters are spread over the academic fields of International Relations and communication studies. Thus the thesis includes topics such as soft power and the power struggle between the West and Russia, as well as the information revolution and the phenomena of “disinformation campaigns” and “fake news”. Thereby, does this thesis function as a bridge builder, between fields of studies and attempts to contribute, by further
31 Kristian L. Nielsen and Maili Vilson, "The Eastern Partnership: Soft Power Strategy or Policy Failure?", European
Foreign Affairs 19, no.2 (2014).
32 Sinikukka Saari, “Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its influence in Former Soviet Republics:
Public Diplomacy po russkii,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 1 (2014).
33 Jeanne L. Wilson, “Russia and China Respond to Soft Power: Interpretation and Readaptation of a Western
Construct,” Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015).
34 Alexander Sergunin and Leonid Karabeshkin, “ Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy,” Politics 35, no. 3-4
(2015)
35 Victoria Hudson, “'Forced to Friendship'? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for
Audience Attraction in Ukraine,” Politics 35, no. 3-4(2015).
36Joseph Nye, "What China and Russia Don't get about Soft Power," Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/.
37 Yelena Osipova, “New Russian Public Diplomacy: Conceptualization, Practice and Limmitations,” International
Studies Association, 2012, http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/d8f26c6d8298478ea6920dfaf0f3aed2.pdf.
38Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, “Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties”
European Parliament Report, Brussels, 2016.
39 Alina Polyakova, Marlene Laruelle, Stefan Meister and Neil Barnett, “The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian
Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016, 13.
40 Kavitha Surana, “The EU Moves to Counter Russian Disinformation Campaign,” 23.12.2016,
analyzing the increased importance of credibility as a soft power resource, in synergy with the Russian approach to soft power, in the overall context of the the West/Russia relations.
Chapter 1:
The research question is eventually an advance, into the interface of the realms of power, communication and international relations (IR), which seeks to explore the concept of negative soft power. Therefore, this chapter is designed to analyze, explain and develop the complex context in which this research question is settled in.
Accordingly, this chapter will first focus on the sub-research question, “To what extent can the IR
theory of realism explain the power struggle between the West and Russia and Russia's behavior in it?” The realist school and offensive realism in particular have been chosen for this research due to
its explanatory power and its ability to allow a better comprehension of Russian behavior in the current West/Russia relations, which due to the school of realism can also be perceived as a West/Russia power struggle.
Second, this chapter will focus on the sub-research question“Is there a power struggle taking place
between the West and Russia and if of what sort?”. Furthermore, this chapter will develop the
concept of negative soft power and also put this concept into context by asking the sub-research question, “Is negative soft power used in a competition for credibility in the broader context of the
power struggle between the West and Russia?”.
Accordingly this chapter argues, that Russia perceives the West41/Russia relations through the lens
of the IR paradigm of realism. As a consequence, the West/Russia relations are perceived by Russia in terms of geopolitical competition, that is also called a “power struggle”. In this struggle, it is
Russia's aim to simply increase Russian influence and decrease the power of the West.42 Based on
this assumption, the chapter argues further that the power struggle between the West and Russia takes place on a hard power and soft power dimension. Furthermore, the chapter argues that within the soft power dimension, a competition for credibility takes place and that Russia is utilizing negative soft power to win this competition. However, this hypothesis will be tested in the second chapter through the analysis of the generated data.
In order to present evidence that supports the above arguments, the following chapter will theorize the West/Russia relations, with help of the IR realist theory, and use the two dimensions as well as the competition for credibility as different but interconnected levels of analysis. In more detail, the first part of this chapter will introduce, explain and justify the use of the IR school of
41 The term "the West" will be used in this thesis as a synonym for the EU, NATO and its member countries. 42 Sinikukka Saari, “Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its influence in Former Soviet Republics:
realism and the realist concepts that are of great analytical importance for this research. The second part operationalizes and applies the school of realism to the West/Russia relationship, to establish Russia's affiliation with this paradigm. Thereby it introduces the first level of analysis by setting its focus on the hard power dimension. The third part will deepen this analysis to the next level and introduce the soft power dimension of the West/Russia power struggle. Therefore, it will, in its first section, introduce the concept of soft power, as well as its relations with public diplomacy. In the second section, it will analyses and explain the soft power dimension of the power struggle between
the West/Russia in the eastern European post-soviet space (EEPSS).43 In the fourth part, it will
further analyze the approach Russia takes to soft power and establish the hypothesis that Russia is utilizing “negative soft power” as well as regular soft power. In the final part, the chapter seeks to analyze the concept of soft power by establishing it in the context of the information revolution.
Although, the research question sets its focus specifically on the negative soft power used in Germany, the West/Russia relations are still a crucial part of its answer, as it answers to how and why Russia is utilizing negative soft power in the EU and Germany. Furthermore, Germany as a member of the EU, is certainly involved in the EU/Russia relations. Based on the size of its population, its economic strength and its core position within the EU, one can argue that Germany has considerable influence on the way the EU designs its policies towards Russia. However, it is also very relevant to analyze the Russian exertion of influence in Germany because Germany and
Russia have a profound relationship, based on growing economic and social interdependence.44
Hence is it in Russia's interest to exert influence on Germany, in the greater context, to make a gain in the power struggle against the West. Likewise, an attempt to broaden the research question to not just Germany but the entire EU, would exceed the limitations of this thesis and can be reserved for further research.
All in all, the content of this chapter shall guide the understanding of the reader from the large theory of realism to the narrow concept of negative soft power, that is projected through the public diplomacy tool RT, and demonstrate their interconnection and application, on the background of the West/Russia power struggle, and allow for a well-funded exploration of Russian negative soft power in Germany in the following chapter.
Part 1: The Theory of a Power Struggle
This part will describe the dynamics and assumptions, under which Russia perceives the world and its relations to the West and under which its foreign policy operates, by explaining and
43 In this thesis, this defenition refers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.
44 Alina Polyakova, Marlene Laruelle, Stefan Meister and Neil Barnett, “The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian
applying the IR theory of offensive realism, as defined by John J. Mearsheimer. However, the discussion of Russia as an offensive realist actor is not intended to produce a fixed theoretical classification and neither a philosophical debate. Since realism is a paradigm that applies to all parts of life, its assumptions are transposed into all actions of the realist actor. Thereof follows that features of the realist paradigm will be visible throughout the analysis of the hard and soft power dimension of the West/Russia power struggle, as well as in the “competition for credibility” in
which Russia engaged in.45
The School of Realism and the Theory of Offensive Realism
The school of realism can be described as one of, if not as the most dominate theoretical
school in the field of IR.46 Its roots go back more than 20 centuries, to military thinkers like the
Chinese Sun Tzu and the Greek general and writer Thucydides, who so famously said in the Melian Dialogue „the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept“.47 To encapsulate the quote and to summarize the school in one sentence, realism is a school
of thought that explains international relations in terms of power and describes international politics
as being governed by the national interests of states.48 Thus, in the realist paradigm, the most
important actors in the international system are states, as they act autonomous and rational in the
pursuit of their own interests.49 Realists actors also see the international system in a state of
anarchy.50 This implies that there is not necessarily chaos or an absence of structure in the
international system, but rather the lack of an overreaching framework in form of a central
government.51 These realist observations are also translated into four realist core assumptions that
are directly or indirectly implemented by realist actors, such as Russia. These assumptions will be operationalized in the following part, as indicators to underpin the claim that Russia obeys to the realist paradigm.
First, for a realist actor the survival of the state is the principal goal of every state.52 Due to the lack
of a central authority in the international system and the thereof existing anarchy, every state has to make sure by itself that it can defend its territory, in other words its sovereignty.
Second, a realist actor assumes that a state is a rational actor who acts in a way that increases the
45 Joseph S. Nye, “Information Warfare Versus Soft Power,” project-syndicate.org, 17.05.2017,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cyber-warfare-weakens-russia-soft-power-by-joseph-s—nye-2017-05.
46 Musarant Amin, Rizwan Naseer, Tilak Ishtiaq, "Realism-Dominating Theory in International Relations: An
analysis", Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 1, no. 7 (2011): 1.
47 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: International Edition (Pearson, 2011), 36. 48 Viotti and Kauppi, Theory, 36.
49 Viotti and Kauppi, Theory, 37. 50 Viotti and Kauppi, Theory, 42. 51 Viotti and Kauppi, Theory, 42.
likelihood of its existence, which means it acts with the constant aim of increasing its power.53
This allows for the third assumption, that all states possess a military capacity, which makes the world or the international system a dangerous and uncertain place. Furthermore, based on a zero-sum logic, that allows only relative gains, realist actors can engage in an “arms race” that ultimately leads to a security dilemma.
Finally, the fourth assumption states that international relations are essentially a story of great power politics, because the states with the biggest economy and greatest military complex are most
decisive.54 This reinforces the drive of all actors to make relative gains in power in order to become
a great power.
Through different interpretations of these core assumptions, which also serve as common denominator, the school of realism is not homogeneous and consists of multiple traits of realism,
such as classical realism55, neo-classical realism56, offensive57 and defensive realism58. The offensive
realist theory by Mearsheimer basically agrees with these four assumptions as its “bedrock assumptions”, such as the international system is anarchic, great powers possess some offensive capabilities, no state can be certain of another states intentions, all actors are rational and the
survival of the state is the primary goal of every state, are rather similar.59 However, what sets
Mearsheimer close but still apart from scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz is the offensive realist perception of the motivation of a power struggle. Just as Morgenthau, Mearsheimer argues
that there is a constant power struggle between actors in the international system.60 However,
different to Morgenthau, Mearsheimer argues that this struggle is motivated, not by a mere appetite
for power, but on a search for security in the anarchic international system.61 In that sense
Mearsheimer draws the picture of an offensive realist state that is, as Arnold Wolfers calls it, a
“hysterical Caesar” that is guided by fear and driven by the will for absolute security.62 Important is
also the difference between Waltz and Mearsheimer about the question, “How much power states want?”. Waltz says the search for security has limits, whereas Mearsheimer disagrees and states that
53 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations: Principal Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),1.
54 Slaughter, Principal Theories, 1.
55 Hans J. Morgenthau defined this approach in his book "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace" in 1948
56 As defined by Gideon Rose in his article “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” 1998. 57 As defined by John J. Mearsheimer, Eric J. Labs, Robert Gilpin and many more.
58 As defined by Kenneth Waltz in "Theory of International Politics" and Robert Jervis in "Cooperation under the
Security Dilemma".
59 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 30-31. 60 Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power”, 21.
61 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer's World – Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security”, International Security
27, no. 1 (2002): 151.
62 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
the search for power and security is insatiable, as it is drive by the quest for absolute security, which
can only be satisfied by absolute power.63
Through these assumptions offensive realism offers a coherent explanation for the Russian behavior on the hard and soft power dimensions of the overall West/Russia power struggle. As it is based on the urge to achieve maximum security, by maximizing its own power relative to that of the West.
Besides the above explained assumptions, there are two important realist concepts that need further elaboration as they are of great explanatory value to this research as they greatly influence Russia's behavior, namely geopolitics thinking and a zero-sum power struggle.
The use of geography as an element of power is mostly tied to logistical requirements of military forces and is also known as geopolitics. Geopolitical thinking describes how states use geography to an extent, that allows them to enhance their military capabilities, such as establishing allies and bases close to rival powers, as well as controlling important natural resources, in other words
project their hard power.64 Along with the concept of geopolitics comes the notion of “sphere of
interest”, which will be of further importance and elaborated on in the following section.65
Furthermore, realist actors tend to perceive relations between international actors in terms of a struggle for power. In other words, each actor in the international system is out to gain as much power as possible before that actor can be dominated by another more powerful actor. This goes hand in hand with the notion of security or national security that is reflected in the above realist assumptions. In this struggle, an actor can make only relative gains or losses in respect to its
opponent. This often leads to a binary perception along a friend/enemy dichotomy.66
The following part will show that there is a hard power dimension to the West/Russia power struggle. This dimension will be shown by interpreting certain Western actions from the Russian realist perspective. Thereby it will also become clear that Russia has developed from a liberal into a realist actor.
Part 2: A Hard Power Dimension
The following section will apply the IR theory of offensive realism to the behavior of Russia, in order to support the argument that Russia obeys to the realist paradigm and perceives the West/Russia relations as a geopolitical power struggle. Thus, this section will analyze the hard power dimension of this power struggle. Through the operationalization of the theory, this section
63 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 21.
64 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: International Edition (Pearson, 2011), 40. 65 Cristian Nitoui, “Increasing Geopolitical? The EU's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space,” Journal of Regional
Security 11, no. 1 (2916):12.
also seeks to legitimize the choice of the theory of offensive realism as an explanatory framework. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has gone through the three phases of accommodation, reorientation and consolidation, as categorized by Eric Shiraev, and along with that
has developed from a rather liberal into a realist actor.67
In short, during the phase of accommodation, which lasted from 1991 until approximately the mid-1990s, the young Russian Federation pursued a soft and reconciliatory policy. This had the aim to normalize the relations and cooperate with its former Cold War enemies and reintegrate in the international state system as an equal under equals. Michael Gorbachev emphasized this through his speech, the “Common European Home” of Russia, in front of the Council of Europe on July, 6th 1989.
These are indicators that allow to argue, that Russia, in the first half of the 1990s, was tending to develop into a liberal and cooperative actor in the international system. The liberal school of IR is one of realism's biggest challengers, as it “rejects the realist contention that the anarchic nature of
the international system means states are trapped in a struggle for power and security”68 as Richard
Linkelater wrote 1993. Russia's move towards liberalism also coincided with the observations of IR scholar Scott Burchills, when he who wrote about a "revival of liberal thought after the Cold
War"69. A Russia that adheres to a liberal worldview was also favored by the West, as the EU made
efforts to integrate Russia into the global liberal and multilateral order, to avoid a new power
struggle after the Cold War.70
However, chaotic domestic circumstances in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accommodating behavior of Russia's government were received by many Russian´s
as a weakness at home and abroad.71 Their anger articulated itself in the election in December 1995,
which constituted a crucial turning point for Russia and its relations to and perception of the West. With the legislative elections in 1995 the accommodating phase ended and the phase of reorientation began. From this point onward, Russia's perception and presence in the international system changed, as it turned away from the West and the IR school of liberalism, in a process of reorientation, towards the school of realism. Instead of seeking a place as an equal among equals,
67 Eric Shiraev, Russian Government and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 257.
68 Andrew Linklater, “Liberal Democracy, Constitutionalism and the New World Order,” in Charting the Post-Cold
War Order, ed. R. Leaver and J. Richardson (Colorado: 1993), 29.
69 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard
Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 55.
70 Cristian Nitoui, “Increasing Geopolitical? The EU's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space,” Journal of Regional
Security 11, no. 1 (2916): 13.
71 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics (Plymouth: Rowman &
the ruling elite in the Kremlin wanted to reestablish Russia as a great power in the international
system, which reflects the fourth assumption of the realist school.72
The reorientation towards the school of realism and finally offensive realism can be explained with the, above described, desolate domestic situation in combination with two international events that increased the urge for Russia's security. First, the NATO military campaign against Serbia, also known as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the context of the Kosovo War 1998-99. This campaign constituted an attack on a country that Russia perceived as an ally at that time and was
condemned by Russia at the United Nations.73 74 Whether this campaign was perceived by Russia as
a real threat to its security or was simply used as a pretext to verbally attack NATO on the international state is not clear. However, the Russian reaction to the campaign demonstrates Russia's growing sensibility towards the action of a foreign military alliance, such as NATO, in its direct neighborhood. Second, the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999, which saw the accommodation of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic into the military alliance and effectively moved NATO's influence further east into the post-soviet space and closer to the Russian border. This further contributed to the effect that Russia felt threatened by the West and felt that its security
concerns were not respected, which is a crucial aspect of offensive realism.75 From Russia's realist
point of view, this also introduced a hard power aspect to the West/Russia relations, as the use of military or economic measures to influence behavior of other actors is also called.
In short, the international situation, can be understood as evidence for the argument that Russia perceived the international system as a seemingly hostile environment, in which the West expanded its powers through the use of hard power in a zero-sum logic and thus threatened Russia's security. Since, the NATO military campaign in Serbia, as well as NATO's expansion further east demonstrated the power and enlargement of a foreign military alliance in Russia's close neighborhood.
This thesis further argues that these developments contributed to Russia's own affiliation with the paradigm of realism and started the phase of consolidation. In this phase, that lasts from the early 2000s until today, Russia, led by newly elected President Vladimir Putin, blatantly utilized its military and economic capabilities, in other words hard power, to regain a great power status and generate greater influence in its neighborhood. However, when Putin first came to power, the West
72 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics (Plymouth: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), 3.
73 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin´s Threat to Russia and the West (London:Bloomsburg
Publishing, 2014), 259.
74 BBC News, “Russia condemns Nato at UN,” bbc.co.uk, 25.03.1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/303127.stm.
initially hoped that Russia would change its course to become a liberal actor again, as Putin frequently highlighted Russia's European identity and Russia's desire to be integrated into the global
liberal and multilateral order.76 These hopes were supported by increased cooperation between
Western states and Russia in the early 2000s, which centered around topics such as trade, energy
relations, and the fight against terrorism.77
Unfortunately this perception change did not occur and Russia quickly turned back to the realist paradigm, which is not surprising since Putin himself sees the international system as intensely and
fundamentally competitive.78 The rather assertive actions and methods of Russia, in the early 2000s,
were backed by a rise in global commodity prices, whose export makes up for a large share of Russia's state revenue, that subsequently lead to a strengthening of the economy and a
modernization of the military.79 80 However, once more, not only domestic factors but also
international factors reinforced Russia's consolidation as a offensive realist actor. For example, the 2003 US lead invasion of Iraq, that Russia but also France and Germany strongly opposed, highlighted the use of hard power in the power struggle and subsequently increased Russia's
concerns about its security.81 Also the Western support of the so called “colored revolutions” in
Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004-05, were perceived by Russia as a threat to its security, in its immediate neighborhood. Russia's sensitivity about its security was also reflected by the Russo/Georgian War in the summer of 2008, as Russia did not shy away from utilizing hard power to achieve its aims. Also, the intensified emphasis of the notion of a “region in which it [Russia]
has privileged interests” by President Medvedev, shortly after the Russo/Georgian War, was a clear
consequence of Russia perceiving its relations with the West as a power struggle on a hard power
dimension.82 The geopolitical notion of a “Region of Privileged interest”, openly reintroduced
geopolitics and reflected Russia's concerns about its security and at the same time underlined its claim to become a great power in the international system. Russian president Vladimir Putin underlined these claims repetitively, for example by stating “At the same time, everything we do
will be based on our own interests and goals, not on decisions other countries impose on us. Russia
76 Cristian Nitoui, “Increasing Geopolitical? The EU's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space,” Journal of Regional
Security 11, no. 1 (2916): 16.
77 Nitoui, Geopolitical, 14.
78 Allen C. Lynch, Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,
2011), 98.
79Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Harrisburg: Brookings Institution Press,
2015),212.
80 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 23.
is only treated with respect when it is strong and stands firm on its own two feet”83. This statement
by Putin and also the announcement of a “region of privileged interest” by Medvedev reflect Russia's character as an offensive realist actor. The following Ukraine Crisis and annexation of
Crimea in March 201484, only reaffirm this categorization and put the post soviet sphere in the
center of geopolitical competition, in other words a power struggle between the West and Russia.85
All in all, the above part has demonstrated Russia's development into an offensive realist actor, that perceives the West/Russia relations as a struggle for power. In the process of analyzing this development and operationalizing the theory this part has also presented arguments that demonstrate the use of hard power tools in this power struggle, consequently the existence of a hard power dimension of the overall West/Russia power struggle.
Part 3: A Soft Power Dimension
Whereas the previous part has demonstrated the existence of a hard power dimension in the West/Russia power struggle, this part seeks to present evidence of a soft power dimension, through the following analysis. Therefore, this part is structured in three sections. The first will introduce the concept of soft power as it was defined by Joseph Nye. The second part will explain how soft power is projected and wielded through public diplomacy tools and thus can be used as foreign policy tool. The final section of this part will utilize the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy in order to analyze the soft power dimension of the West/Russia power struggle.
Concept of Soft Power
When it comes to defining power in International Relations, there are several different definitions. The scholars Viotti & Kauppi define power as “the means by which a state or other
actor wields or can assert actual or potential influence or coercion relative to other states and non state actors because of the political, geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural, or other capabilities it possesses”.86 In other words, power can be described in
terms of influence, as one actor can exercise influence over another actor, in the international system, and thus achieve a desired outcome. The form that influence can take on, in other words power, can also vary. Influence can be derived through coercion, attraction or a mixture of both.
83 Vladimir Putin, “ Russia and the Changing World,” Global Research: Center for Research on Globalization,
27.02.2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-russia-and-the-changing-world/5477500.
84 Heather A. Conley, "Russia´s Infuence on Europe," Center for Strtegic & International
Studies, Nov.13,2014, accessed: 08.10.2015, http://csis.org/publication/russias-influence-europe.
85 Cristian Nitoui, “Increasing Geopolitical? The EU's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space,” Journal of Regional
Security 11, no. 1 (2916):8.
What has been described in the previous section, mainly comprises Russia's use of hard power,
which includes the use of military and economic resources.87 Hard power allows an actor to achieve
an outcome through coercion or the threat of force. Examples thereof are the Georgian War, the Ukraine crisis and the Russian intervention in Syria. Opposite to the concept of hard power is the concept of soft power. The scholar Joseph Nye, who first introduced the concept, describes the aim
of soft power as “getting others to want the outcome you want”88 and as “the ability to affect others
through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes”89. In general, the concept of soft power was first introduced by
Joseph Nye, who established and defined the term in his book "Bound to lead: the changing nature
of American power" in 1990. He developed the concept in the aftermath of the Cold War, to explain
how one actor in the international system can exert influence onto another actor without relying on coercion or hard power. Thus, soft power is power that is based not like hard power on coercion or the threat of force, exerted by military or economic capabilities, but on attraction. In other words, soft power is the ability of an actor to shape the preference of others, to influence other actors into
pursuing the outcome one wants, through attraction rather than coercion or payment.9091
According to Nye, there are three soft power resources, as attraction can be radiated through a
countries culture, its political values and norms and its foreign policy.92 Furthermore, soft power
streaming from one of the described sources can be projected, for example through cultural
exchange, as part of cultural diplomacy and information campaigns as part of public diplomacy.93
Thus, soft power can be projected through many channels, since it is a broad concept, and includes for example a countries film industry or cuisine. This underlines Nye's perception, that soft power arises from a vibrant civil society, which is for example reflected in a countries open and creative cultural industry. Conversely, this means that soft power sources, which generate soft power, are to a large extent outside of the states control but reside with the people, individual initiatives and civil
society groups.94
However, what is very important for this thesis, these soft power resources are only effective if a
87Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, “Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power,” Media, War &
Conflict 7, no.1 (2014):74.
88 Joseph Nye, The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. 89 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 21.
90Joseph Nye, “The Information Revolution and Soft Power,” Current History 113, (2014): 4.
91Sinikukka Saari, “Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its influence in Former Soviet Republics:
Public Diplomacy po russkii,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 1 (2014):52.
92Saari, Post-Orange Revolution, 52.
93 Kristian L. Nielsen and Maili Vilson, "The Eastern Partnership: Soft Power Strategy or Policy Failure?", European
Foreign Affairs 19, no.2 (2014):246.
94 Jeanne L. Wilson, “Russia and China Respond to Soft Power: Interpretation and Readaptation of a Western
culture is perceived as attractive, political values are truly exercised and foreign policy is conducted
legitimately and with morals in mind.95 In words, soft power resources have to be perceived by an
audience, which it shall attract, as credible, in order to attract. The following part will go more in dept about the crucial role of credibility and legitimacy when it comes to the effectiveness of soft power resources.
Although soft power is based on socially constructed norms and values and is rather intangible Nye says “there is no contradiction between realism and soft power”, which allows this research to
utilize soft power within the realist perspective.96 In that sense, soft power is perceived just as a tool
to increase power and maximize security, in the tool box of a realist actor. The following analysis will underline this point, by demonstrating Russia's perception of soft power as a foreign policy tool that is able to secure considerable gains in the power struggle with the West.
Despite the three established sources of Nye's concept, its impact is still hard to measure. The two scholars Goldsmith and Horiuchi have even called soft power “difficult, if not impossible to test
empirically”.97 Due to the fact that the perception of values, culture and foreign policy is subjective
and hence viewed by every individual in a different way. Impressions, experiences and pre-existing
ideas that are held by the audience, towards which soft power is directed, serve as filters.98 These do
not allow to assign a concrete and general effect to soft power. Other factors that determine the influence of soft power on a given audience are the way in which soft power is projected and the actual narrative, in which soft power is embedded, that is put forward, rather than the unreal
concept of norms and values.99
These difficulties in measuring the impact of soft power have also influenced this thesis in two ways. First, based on the difficulty in measuring soft power, this thesis is no attempt to measure and quantify the soft power influence that Russia has on Germany. This research rather strives to explore if Russia seeks to diminish German soft power capabilities, in order to achieve a relative gain in the West/Russia power struggle. Therefore this thesis will analyze the new concept of “negative soft power” and later seek to analyze its existence in the material radiated by “RT
Deutschland” a Russian public diplomacy tool that focuses on Germany.100 Second, in order to still
analyses and explain the soft power dimension in the West/Russia power struggle the method of soft
95 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 84. 96 Nye, The Future of Power, 82.
97 B. Goldsmith and Y. Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Policy Opinion Matter for US Foreign
Policy?,” World Politics 63, no. 3 (2012):555.
98 James Curran, Media and Power (London: Routledge, 2002), 158.
99 Victoria Hudson, “'Forced to Friendship'? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for
Audience Attraction in Ukraine,” Politics 35, no. 3-4(2015):332.
100 The term "negative soft power" is not to be confused with negative soft power, as described in William A. Callahn's
power projection, namely public diplomacy, will be used as an alternative indicator. The benefit of employing a public diplomacy tool as an indicator for the use of soft power, is that public diplomacy tools can be quantified through the budget that was invested in it. This does still not represent the effectiveness of soft power but it can proof the existence of it. Therefore, the following section will introduce the concept of public diplomacy and the Russian public diplomacy tool RT, which will serve as indicator in the analysis in the following part.
Public Diplomacy and RT
In the previous section the concept of soft power as defined by Nye was explained. However, for this research it is not enough to simply understand the concept of soft power, it is also necessary to understand through which methods and through which medium soft power is projected in order to reach its target audience. Therefore the following section will address these questions by explaining the concept of public diplomacy and the importance of information for the projection of
soft power in the 21st century.
In its original meaning the term “Public Diplomacy” refers to diplomatic measures that are
not limited to circles of the political elite but are also accessible to the wider public.101 The former
director of the United States Information Agency, Edward R. Murrow, simply defined public diplomacy as diplomacy made by one state, to not interact only with foreign governments, but
mainly with foreign nongovernmental individuals and organizations.102 These definitions describe
public diplomacy as a method that is utilized by actors in the international system, to exert influence across borders in a non-coercive way and thus makes it highly interesting for this research. An example, that shows through which tools public diplomacy is working, could be an outlet of cultural
diplomacy, a state owned or state funded radio station, news papers or other media outlets.103 In the
case of this thesis, a prominent Russian public diplomacy tool is the internationally operating television station RT (former Russia Today). This tool is used by the Russian government to directly
communicate with public's abroad, in other words foreign audiences.104 Its character and role will be
further elaborated in the following section.
In general, international broadcasting is an important element of public diplomacy, as it plays a crucial role in promoting a country across boarders to a foreign audience. Through its transmission
101Joseph S. Nye, “ Public Diplomacy and Soft power,” Annals of the American Academy of political and Social
Science 616, (2008):101.
102Nye, Public Diplomacy, 101.
103 Cull, Nochals J..“Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 616, (2008): 31-54.
104 Victoria Hudson, “'Forced to Friendship'? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for
of images, news and other contents it is of crucial importance in creating a trustworthy and most of
all credible images for a foreign audience.105 Based on its great outreach, an international
broadcasting network, like CNN, BBC or RT, has the ability to radiate news events that are tailored to the countries strategic goals and create messages that reinforces a countries foreign policy
agenda.106
As already pointed out above, public diplomacy seeks to non-coercively influence a foreign public, which makes public diplomacy a great method to channel soft power resources of one country to the
public of another country.107 The medium that is therefore relevant for this research, through which
soft power is spread, is information. By spreading information about an actors attractive culture, its foreign policy and its adherence to recognized values, a public diplomacy tool, such as RT, is able to project and thereby strengthen the attraction of this actor. In other words, through the use of
information as a medium a state can project and enhance its soft power.108
In order to analyses and explain the soft power dimension in the West/Russia power struggle a Russian public diplomacy tool, which is active in the area of international broadcasting, will serve as indicator. Such a tool is the Russian state funded international broadcasting network
RT, that is charged with projecting soft power.109 However, before RT can serves as an indicator for
the employment of Russian soft power it is necessary to introduce RT's role and underline its status as a state controlled international broadcasting network. Since its launch in 2005, RT (at that time still Russia Today) has depicted itself as as an editorial independent but state funded international broadcasting network. Despite these efforts it is widely received as a mouthpiece of the Kremlin, that transports the interests and views of the Russian ruling elite through its vast network. This perception is owned to RT being funded directly by the Russian government and receiving a
growing amount of investments almost every year since its foundation.110 The claim that RT is
highly biased was further backed indirectly by Magarita Simonyan, the current director of RT, who
said in an interview with journalist Jill Dougherty that she talks daily with the Kremlin.111 Also
Russian president Putin admitted the close relations between RT and the Kremlin by saying
“Certainly the channel [RT] is funded by the government, so it cannot help but reflect the Russian
105 R.H. Gass and J.S. Seiter, Credibility and Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 154-165. 106 M. Leonard, C. Stead and C. Smewing, Public Diplomacy (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2002), 10-11.
107 Philip Seib, “Russia's Regional Militarism and the Case for Public Diplomacy,” USC: Center on Public Diplomacy,
Sep. 25, 2014, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/russia%E2%80%99s-regional-militarism-and-case-public-diplomacy.
108 Joseph S. Nye Jr, “The Information Revolution and American Soft Power,” Asia-Pacific Review 9, no. 1 (2002):8. 109 Ilya Yablokov, “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT),” Politics
35, no. 3-4 (2015): 305.
110James Painter, "The Boom in Counter-hegemonic News Channels: A case study of Telesur," Reuters Insitute for the
Study of Journalism, 2006, http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/publication/boom-counter-hegemonic-news-channels.
government’s official position on the events in our country and in the rest of the world”.112
The Soft Power Dimension in the West/Russia power struggle
The aim of this section is to analyses and explain the existence of a soft power dimension, next to the already established hard power dimension, in the West/Russia power struggle. Again the theory of offensive realism will be used as an explanatory tool, that has the ability to interpret and explain the development of the soft power dimension from the Russian perspective. Since this dimension is harder to analyze, due to the intangebility of the concept of soft power, which is not as blunt and salient as hard power, the analysis will be limited to the eastern European post-soviet
space (EEPSS).113 A geographical area which has been at the center of the West/Russia power
struggle. Within this area the analysis is centered on the salient events such as the Orange Revolution, the EU's eastern enlargement, Eastern Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Ukraine crisis. Furthermore, this section will operationalize the use of public diplomacy as an indicator that underpins the existence of a soft power dimension. Therefore, the rational is that, if public diplomacy tools are established or used, it indicates the attempt to utilize soft power.
Orange Revolution
The EEPSS is the geographical area in which Russia first experienced the abilities of Western soft power and the necessity to develop own soft power and consequently public diplomacy capabilities. Furthermore, due to the experiences in the EEPSS, Russia has realized for the first time the existence of a soft power dimension, which in its perception also obeys to the realist paradigm.
A decisive event that triggered this development was the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004-05. Here the soft power of the West, among other factors, was partly responsible for the revolution and thus demonstrated its utility in the power struggle between the West and Russia. American soft power, exerted through public diplomacy tools, such as non-governmental organizations and democracy promotion, as well as the general attraction of a majority of Ukrainian citizens to the
EU, were potent instruments that fueled the revolution.114 And eventually helped western favored
Viktor Yushchenko to become president of Ukraine, instead of the candidate Viktor Yanukovich Russia preferred.
112 Max Fischer, “In case you weren't clear on Russia Today's relationship to Moscow, Putin clears it up,” The
Washington Post, 13.06.2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/13/in-case-you-werent-clear-on-russia-todays-relationship-to-moscow-putin-clears-it-up/?utm_term=.b65c9e5fe36b.
113 In this research this term refers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.
114 David Lane, “The Orange Revolution: 'People's Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup?,” Political Studies Association
