Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

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Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Groningen (Home)

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen (Host)

May 2015

The European Union - client, partner or example?

The perception of the EU in Azerbaijan

Submitted by:

Richard van Schaik 1902563 (Groningen) 11400555 (Göttingen) r.w.van.schaik@student.rug.nl

Supervised by:

Dr. Nienke de Deugd Prof. h.c. Dr. rer. pol. Peter Schulze

The Hague, 27th_{of May 2015}

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“Some scholars look on the area south of the Caucasian mountains as belonging to Asia, while others, in view of Transcaucasia’s cultural evolution, believe that this country should be considered part of Europe. It can therefore be said, my children, that it is partly your responsibility as to whether our town [Baku] should belong to progressive Europe or to reactionary Asia”

-- Kurban Said, Ali and Nino, first published in German in Vienna, 1937, current English language version, New York, 2000, 3-4.

“A nation will forgive damage to its interests, but not injury to its honour, and certainly not when this is done in a spirit of priggish self-righteousness”

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Introduction

We want to integrate even closer into the European Union. […] We know it is not an easy way. Of course, the demands made by the European Union to the member-states of this organization are far more serious than those put before the member-states of the Council of Europe. But integration to Europe is our strategic course. Therefore we want to follow this way.

-Heydar Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, February 20011

On the 20th of May 2015, Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced that he would not travel personally to EU’s Eastern Partnership summit in Riga the next day.2_{The explanation}

was that he was busy preparing the European Games, but this choice of priorities is at least remarkable. It seems in stark contrast to Azerbaijan’s pro-Western orientation. In analyses, such as the one by Bengtsson and Elgström, Azerbaijan is even mentioned as one of the countries that “readily recognize both the great power status of the EU and the attractiveness of its normative agenda.”3 There are number of European politicians who repeatedly praised Azerbaijan for its progress towards democracy, even though such a development cannot be seen in reality.4 Contrarily, Amnesty even started talking about a crackdown on civil society in 2013.5 This begs the question what has happened since the above proclamation of Heyder Aliyev and the ‘too busy schedule’ of his son? Did Azerbaijan’s perception of the importance of the EU change and how has the EU contributed to this?

Some argue that Azerbaijan has never been genuinely interested in the West. As early as 2001, Daniel Heradstveit published an article in which he interviewed people who stated that Heydar Aliyev was “deceiving the West by echoing whatever it says.”6_{In their view,}

Aliyev’s behaviour was merely an act of window-dressing with the purpose of buying Western

1_{Heydar Aliyev’s Heritage Research Center, “Talk of President of the Azerbaijan Republic, Heydar Aliyev,}

with the Delegation of European Union,” February 21, 2001, http://lib.aliyevheritage.org/en/2305230.html.

2_{Contact.az, “Ilham Aliyev Refused to Attend the Summit of ‘Eastern Partnership,’” May 20, 2015,}

http://contact.az/docs/2015/Politics/052000116500en.htm#.VWMzafntlBc.

3_{Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström, “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in Global Politics:}

Conflicting Role Conceptions?,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (January 2012): 99.

4_{ESI, Caviar Diplomacy - How Azerbaijan Silenced the Council of Europe (Berlin: European Stability}

Initiative, May 24, 2012), http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_131.pdf.

5_{Amnesty International, Downward Spiral: Continuing Crackdown on Freedoms in Azerbaijan (London,}

October 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/16000/eur550102013en.pdf; Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Call for EU Sanctions Raises Activist-Hopes,” EurasiaNet, September 26, 2014,

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70181.

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4 goodwill. In that case, the above quote of Heyder Aliyev was not sincere in the first place. Thomas de Waal similarly challenges the assumption that “Baku is genuinely interested in embracing the West’s idea of liberal order.”7_{Did the country now just stop to echo the West}

or did it really change its orientation? According to De Waal, the increase in oil wealth has made the country believe that it is powerful enough to go its own way. In my thesis, I will explore the implications of this ‘resource curse’ theory. If Azerbaijan would want to pursue a more independent policy, this makes it much more difficult for the EU to engage the country.

On the one hand, it seems that Azerbaijan is still actively trying to buy goodwill. It invests huge amounts of money in upholding a positive reputation internationally. For example, it organizes costly international events such as the first European Games and the Eurovision Song Contest.8 It is very sensitive to international criticism and stubbornly continues to state that, “there are no political prisoners in Azerbaijan.”9 On the other hand, it does not shun to criticize the same organisations that it is actively trying to lobby. As this thesis will describe later, it has at times publicly confronted the European Union and some of its political leaders individually. It appears to me that there is friction between, on the one hand, the desire to be a modern European country and, on the other hand, the implications of what such a choice would entail in practice. Currently it faces criticism for keeping up the desire without making the necessary reforms.

In order to understand this resistance to true European integration, I will look at the Azerbaijani perspective on its relation with the European Union. I will look at what its expectations have been and how this worked out in practice. In my view, this dimension is currently explored insufficiently. Many academic articles and policy papers currently use the term ‘local ownership’, but it is hard to come by any reference to voices coming from Azerbaijan itself. This leads to incomplete analyses that do not look at realistic alternatives. For example Iryna Solonenko recognizes that EU’s policies are ineffective when the “political survival of incumbent elites and authoritarian regimes are at stake.”10_{This is a finding that I}

7_{Thomas de Waal, “Azerbaijan Doesn’t Want To Be Western,” Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2014,}

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142113/thomas-de-waal/azerbaijan-doesnt-want-to-be-western.

8_{Andrew Rettman, “Azerbaijani Lobbyists Target EU Opinion,” EUobserver, May 24, 2012,}

https://euobserver.com/foreign/116369; Azadliq Radiosu, “Azerbaijan Is To Spend 8 Billion Dollars On Inaugural European Games,” November 24, 2014, http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/26707738.html.

9_{Rikard Jozwiak, “Aliyev Says No Political Prisoners In Azerbaijan,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, June 21,}

2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-rights-aliyev-political-prisoners/25024048.html.

10_{Iryna Solonenko, “The EU’s Democratization Efforts in the Black Sea Region: The Challenge of}

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5 will later apply in the case of Azerbaijan. However, she treats the elite merely as an obstacle to the effectiveness of EU’s policy, but she does not discuss in what kind of relationship Azerbaijan would be interested. The article continues to explore alternative ways for the EU to be effective in the region, but it does not recognize that EU’s normativity could be one of the very problems too. EU’s policy presupposes that countries are naturally attracted to the EU, 11

but this does not seem to hold when Azerbaijan even rejected the proposed Association Agreement. In this thesis, I will therefore explore what we can learn from studying Azerbaijan’s perception of the EU.

Especially since Azerbaijan started to export its gas and oil reserves, its perception on the balance of power has changed significantly. Azerbaijan is aware that the EU is eager to consume its energy resources and that the country lies in a geographically strategic position. Instead of seeing the EU as an ultimate goal, “Azerbaijan positions itself as a donor and sees the EU as being on the receiving end of the equation.”12 European aid might seem to be ‘free money’, but it is often linked to various political conditions. I will argue that as an effect of the resource curse, Azerbaijan prefers to finance its own modernization instead of accepting conditions that could pose a threat to the status quo. As its wealth grew, it became less inclined to listen to Europe’s demands. For the EU this poses difficult questions: should it neglect the deteriorating political situation and continue to profit from the energy resources that Baku can provide or should it rather take a harsher stance, which is likely to come at a certain economic price. The EU has refrained from making a clear choice, but both options seem difficult to reconcile.

This thesis, focusing on Azerbaijan’s perspective on the EU, will not resolve this predicament. It will rather suggest some possible ways forward. I studied the evolvement of cooperation in various fields and the opinions voiced by Azerbaijani politicians, journalists, activists and citizens. The main question that I will answer is: how can we understand the

Azerbaijani perception of and engagement with the European Union? I will thereby answer

the following sub-questions:

1. How is the perceived relationship affected by domestic political and economic conditions?

2. How has Azerbaijan’s foreign policy orientation changed over time?

11_{Bengtsson and Elgström, “Conflicting Role Conceptions?,” 98.}

12_{Anja Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26,}

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6 3. How and what kind of cooperation emerged with the EU?

4. How do different Azerbaijani actors perceive the EU? 5. How has EU’s policy influenced the local perception?

6. What kind of policy implications for the EU could the Azerbaijani perspective have?

The first question will be answered in the first two chapters. By first discussing the relevant theories, I set a framework that can be used for explaining the situation in Azerbaijan in the second chapter. That chapter will look into the formation of the modern state of Azerbaijan, its identity and its foreign policy. The EU will only come into play in the third chapter. That chapter will provide answers to sub-questions three, four and five. As I want to move beyond mere description and analysis, I will look at the implications of the Azerbaijani perspective in chapter four. Finally, I will answer my research question by discussing my main findings in the conclusion.

Methodology

It can be difficult to study a country like Azerbaijan as an outside observer. For example, English-language sources are available only sporadically and information is often biased due to limited amount of press freedom.13 However, as my thesis focuses solely on the Azerbaijani

discourse about the EU, it is less important if the sources I use reflect actual reality. There are

luckily plenty of such documents available. Martyn Hammersley writes that many social settings are nowadays ‘self-documenting’.14_{The political field is one such fields that produce}

a lot of written material directly and indirectly. This makes it relatively easy to study its discourse (much more so than its actual motives). These political documents are inevitably biased, but that too can be a source of data by itself.15 Inevitably there is an imbalance between the information on dissenting opinions in Azerbaijan and those which are informed by the official line of thought. I tried to distinguish position of the actors as much as possible, but ultimately paid more attention to how the government, state officials and elite perceive the European Union. As these are the decision-making bodies, their perceptions are also of particular interest when looking at how these affect the actual engagement. I nevertheless

13_{In the 2015 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, Azerbaijan ranks 162th out of 180}

countries.

14_{Martyn Hammersley, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, 3rd ed (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007),}

121.

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7 sought to supplement this with other data such as survey results and blog posts that would give an indication of how civil society and ordinary people think. None of this can be sufficient to represent society as a whole, but I could use them as examples of the discourse on the EU.

I used Grounded Theory as my main approach: a method developed by Glaser and Strauss in which there is a constant interplay between theories and data. Rather than starting with one or the other, “ideas are used to make sense of data, and data are used to change our ideas.”16_{I deemed this the most appropriate method for data collection and interpretation, as}

any formulation of hypotheses beforehand would limit the possible outcomes of the research. If I would start with the data on the other hand, I would be limited to the sources I would happen to find at the start. Instead, I therefore began to read all relevant material, formulate some ideas, and then search more specifically within the material or seek other documents. By doing so I came up with a couple of frequently recurring themes, which have been used to structure this thesis. It is not the aim in Grounded Theory “to provide a perfect description of an area, but to develop a theory that accounts for much of the relevant behavior.”17_{All examples that will}

follow are both illustrations of and explanations for certain behaviour.

In the period September 2014 – February 2015, I followed all English-language news articles that appeared in or about Azerbaijan and checked the news less intensively in the period after. I could read most of the major news websites in Azerbaijan because they also offer English-language translations of their articles. It was therefore not difficult to obtain enough information. These news articles were all recent examples of how the EU is perceived, but I also incorporated more historical examples. I therefore studied relevant articles that appeared less recently and used a variety of other sources, such as scholarly literature, European and Azerbaijani policy documents, survey data and WikiLeaks. These secondary sources often required more interpretation in order to uncover how certain actors really feel or behave. I therefore studied them only complementarily, in order to see if they matched the trends from other sources.

The cables coming from WikiLeaks, though composed by US diplomats, also provided useful information on Azerbaijani perceptions. I have studied all cables that came out of Azerbaijan and specifically looked for those that had a European dimension to them. They cover the period between 2006 and 2009: a particularly interesting era because Azerbaijan’s

16_{Ibid., 159.}

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8 attitude was slowly changing at that time. However, it is still an open debate whether scholars can make use of WikiLeaks as a source because of methodological, ethical and legal reasons. Methodologically, I contend with Gabriel J. Michael, who states that the problem of one-sidedness or the partiality of the information is common to the study of any document.18 WikiLeaks is particularly worth studying because it is “uniquely valuable and offers insights that would otherwise be unavailable”.19 In 30 years, the cables would be disclosed and scholars would also study them. There is thus no methodological difference in this. A problem that remains is that one cannot verify whether the information is true. I therefore always considered whether it was in line with other sources. I also focused particularly on (supposedly) literal quotations of Azerbaijani officials.

Finally, I sought ways to include the opinions of those people who are not self-documented. During my 5-month stay in Azerbaijan, my employer preferred if I would not survey people on the street or do interviews as locals would potentially not distinguish that I was asking them these questions for personal reasons. I therefore conducted an online survey. I was aware that politics is a taboo topic in Azerbaijan and that it can scare people off. I therefore formulated a list of questions with a local researcher that would not be too political. However, this put severe limits on the amount of information I could possibly ask. I also wanted to keep the survey short, so that many people would be willing to participate. In the end the response rate turned out very high (101 respondents), but I regretted not having asked more questions. Nevertheless, it provided valuable insights that I elaborate on in chapter three. Initially the Azerbaijani researcher promised to spread the survey among the network of her organization, but due to unclear reasons the director later decided against it. I therefore reached my audience by sharing it through Facebook and by launching a low-budget online adverts campaign which specifically targeted people above the age of 30 (since even now 66% of the respondents was younger).

Such a sample does not truly reflect society. It was also remarkable that virtually all respondents had studied at university level, except for those who were still too young. Even though I did not specifically ask for their occupation, the World Bank writes that in Azerbaijan 67 percent of 25-34 year olds with a university degree work in the public sector.20 This might

18_{Gabriel J. Michael, Who’s Afraid of Wikileaks? Missed Opportunities in Political Science Research, SSRN}

Scholarly Paper (Forthcoming) (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, December 22, 2014), 7.

19_{Ibid., 4.}

20_{World Bank, PID: Tertiary Education Project, April 8, 2014, 2,}

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1. Theoretical Framework

This chapter explores relevant concepts and theories that can be used for analysing and explaining Azerbaijan’s perceptions on the European Union. The chapter has been split up in two sections, which both cover elements that will follow in chapter two and three respectively. The first part looks into the conditions and the construction of the modern state of Azerbaijan. Many articles refer to resource curse theory to explain the current political situation. I find that this concept can also be used to explain part of Azerbaijan’s perceptions on the EU. Another influential factor is that of its identity and national narrative. This is therefore something that I will explore separately. Throughout the thesis I will keep referring to the implications of the theories discussed here. They offer important insights on the formation of the country, its foreign and domestic policy, but also for its discourse and relations with the European Union. The second part of this chapter looks into the theories of socialization and the normative power of the European Union. These concepts are at the basis of EU’s policy towards the region. It is therefore interesting to explore on what kind of presumptions they are based, how EU’s policy has worked out in practice and how target countries have perceived such behaviour. This second section is therefore the basis for what is to follow in chapter 3: on the (perceived) relationship between Azerbaijan and the EU. It helps to explain the behaviour of the European Union and the criticism that Azerbaijan might have on this.

1.1. Conditions and context of modern Azerbaijan

Resource curse

The possession of natural resources can be as much of a curse as a blessing. Andrew Rosser writes that natural resources were, according to conventional wisdom, only seen as advantageous until the late 1980s.21 They would potentially enable development countries to ‘take-off.’ Later, literature started to emerge which recognized that an abundance of natural resources “increases the likelihood that countries will experience negative economic, political and social outcomes including poor economic performance, low levels of democracy and civil war.”22_{This effect has been called ‘the resource curse’. Even though natural resources are not}

the direct cause of such ills nor are all countries affected equally, there is an undeniable

21_{Andrew Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey, Working Paper Series}

(Brighton: IDS, 2006), 7,

http://mobile.opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4061/Wp268.pdf?sequence=1.

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11 correlation between their presence and the situation in a country. Vugar Bayramov summarizes the finding of various scholars: for society, it can lead to delayed modernisation and entranced inequality, for economy low profitability, fewer perspectives for future growth, and underdeveloped economic sectors.23 Oil is a particularly disruptive resource because of its high value.24

Even though most scholars agree on these effects, there is considerable disagreement on the causal mechanisms. Andrew Rosser broadly distinguishes seven different perspectives: economic, behaviouralist, rational actor, state-centred, social capital, structuralist and radical.25

All perspectives ascribe a big role to the (political) elites, which accumulate the resource incomes. As the income of these states is so large, there is no strict necessity to generate domestic revenues through taxation. The ruling elite thereby becomes less accountable to society. The elites are freer to serve their own interest and will do everything in order to preserve the status quo. This is how resources can foster autocratic tendencies, patronage, corruption, bribery and nepotism.26 As will be discussed later, Azerbaijan saw similar forms of behaviour after 2005 as its resource income increased dramatically. The primary interest of Azerbaijan’s elite became to maintain control over the resource income by remaining in power. The perceived correlation between an abundance of resources and low levels of democracy has been proven by several studies. Noteworthy is the statistical research of Michel Ross, who compared the data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997. Particularly in low-income countries the discovery of oil has often had antidemocratic effects, whereas it had no discernible effect in countries such as Norway, Britain and the U.S.27 Jeff Colgan therefore suggests that policymakers “may find it desirable to minimize the flow of such income into under-institutionalized states.”28_{Resources are not a curse in themselves, but they can lead to}

authoritarian practices in countries where “transparency and accountability were already

23_{Vugar Bayramov, “The Diversification of Azerbaijan Economy; Ways to European Integration,” Russkii} Vopros, no. 3 (2014).

24_{Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (University of California Press, 1997),}

15–16.

25_{Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 13.}

26_{Anja Franke, Andrea Gawrich, and Gurban Alakbarov, “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier}

States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double ‘Curse’in Post-Soviet Regimes,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 111–112.

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12 weak.”29 The post-Soviet area was clearly such an area, where a new elite inherited a weak state structure. Vladimir Gel’man argues that the effects of the curse can clearly be seen in the resource-rich countries:

All the successful antiregime “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet area took place between 2003 and 2005 in the resource-poor countries (Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). On the contrary, in oil-rich countries— Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia— color revolutions either failed or did not take place at all.30 Even though such an observation does not prove a direct relationship, Gel’man states that the governments in these countries have more to lose than power alone – namely also the distribution of resource revenues. Anja Franke et al. similarly argue that there is a specific ‘post-Soviet rentierism’ in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.31_{The combination of autocratic and}

neopatrimonial regimes and a population with little political interest and hierarchical orientation, is a condition which both fosters and is strengthened by the resource curse.32

Much has been written how a resource curse can affect both domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, the regime can be strengthened by the ‘repression effect’. This occurs when the regime increases its spending in order to preserve the status quo, thereby fostering authoritarianism.33 The country particularly increases its spending on the military and security apparatus to guarantee their loyalty in case of a political crisis. It also increases the number of ‘strongmen’, both to maintain control over the political developments in the country and to create jobs in order to prevent people from becoming dissident. If this is coupled with limited accountability, because of the lack for proper taxation, there is little space for more democratic alternatives. The resource curse thus creates a situation domestically that becomes resistant to any change that could hurt the interests of the ruling elite.

In its foreign policy, the resource curse affects a country because it needs to export its resources abroad. When a country is landlocked, like Azerbaijan, it faces the so-called ‘transport curse’ too. Its ability to prosper “depends on political and policy decisions taken by governments of transit states, and their influence is no less, if not more important, than the

29_{Hannes Meissner, The Resource Curse and Rentier States in the Caspian Region: A Need for Context} Analysis, GIGA Working Paper (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2010), 21,

http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp133_meissner.pdf.

30_{Vladimir Gel’man, Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia : Oil, Gas, and Modernization (Blue Ridge}

Summit, PA, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2010), 64.

31_{Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov, “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States,” 119–120.} 32_{Ibid., 124–134.}

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13 actions of consumer countries.”34 This makes the affected country very vulnerable to the mood of its neighbours. We can thus expect Azerbaijan to pursue a balanced foreign policy towards all countries that could potentially disrupt the export of its energy resources. Resources might also lead to military conflicts since “oil income can be used to finance military capabilities and campaigns, which expands the state’s opportunities for aggression”, while on the other hand, “oil income also generates an enormous financial incentive to avoid any international conflict that would interrupt the state’s oil export sales.”35_{I will look at the effects of the resource curse}

in Azerbaijan particularly in chapter one, but will keep referring to the concept throughout the thesis.

Citizens in the making

Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence in 1991 was followed by a lengthy process that involves setting up a functioning administration, controlling the borders, monopolizing force, and much more. Pal Kolsto argues indeed that a state in the true sense does “not spring full-grown from declarations of independence or extensions of international recognition.”36_Most

importantly, all people should be united in a way that they share a common identity and sense of destiny. History has shown that wars can importantly contribute to this, as they rally the entire population “round the flag and the central political leadership against the foreign foe.”37

Also the construction of a particular narrative can also form the basis of an identity. A clear example of this in the Caucasus is Georgia for whom full-fledged Euro-Atlantic integration is perceived as an almost ‘sacred destiny’.38_{I will therefore look at what kinds of narratives have}

been formed in Azerbaijan and whether the Karabakh conflict has played a role in this.

When studying a narrative, one should be very careful about the meaning of the terms used. I will look at the extent that Azerbaijan pursues European integration and ‘Europeanization’. Merje Kuus argues that one should be careful when studying these concepts as they are often based on an understanding where “the West is conceived as a model that the EU accession countries - framed as a blank sheet with no (proper) institutions and laws - ought

34_{Nikolay Dobronravin, “Oil, Gas, Transit, and Boundaries: Problems of the Transport Curse,” in Resource} Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas, and Modernization, ed. Vladimir Gel’man and Otar Marganiya

(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 154.

35_{Colgan, “Oil and Resource-Backed Aggression,” 16691.}

36_{Pal Kolsto, “Nation-Building in the Former USSR,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996): 118.} 37_{Ibid., 127.}

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14 to follow.”39 Such a model presupposes a unified ‘Westernness’ or ‘Europeanness’. Neighbouring countries are only treated as subjects to the extent that they conform to the non-negotiable Western values.40 Non-conformity thereby becomes equal to being archaic or not yet European. Their citizens are portrayed as “victims of the 'father-state' - naive, immature, in need of overcoming the 'mental straightjacket' of communist society.”41_{Kuus thus calls for a}

postcolonial approach, in order to recognize the way these discourses are constituted. It is important to recognize that these countries are also subjects and exercise agency. As my focus is on the Azerbaijani discourse, I will indeed look at how these concepts are used by the population itself and how this might differ from the ‘European understanding’ of the same words.

1.2. Europe as a regional hegemon

Socialization through conditionality

Socialization is a process by which the EU can influence other countries to make them adopt new roles or to change their values and interests. The idea of socialization presupposes these adjustments are made voluntarily by the third country: by a logic of ‘appropriateness’ instead of ‘consequences’.42_{The latter logic is based on a rationalist perspective, in which countries}

make strategic calculations. In this view the EU can make changes by offering incentives, rewards and punishments (the so-called ‘carrots and sticks’). The receiving state will carefully calculate how they can maximize their interests. But even if high rewards can indeed (temporarily) change certain behaviour or values, there is no guarantee that socialization or internalization of these norms occurs.43 The state has then not moved beyond a logic of consequences: the state will simply re-calculate what is most beneficial next time. Countries are naturally conservative as historical choices often inform future ones. Still this is no reason why Azerbaijan would not be able to change its orientation anytime.

The policy of the European Union is largely based on the political conditionality principle. This means that the Union will reward a state for good behaviour (carrots) while it

39_{Merje Kuus, “Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe,”} Progress in Human Geography 28, no. 4 (August 1, 2004): 475.

40_{C.S. Browning, “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses}

of Region-Building in the European North,” Geopolitics 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 52.

41_{Kuus, “Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe,” 477–478.} 42_{Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,”} International Organization 59, no. 04 (October 2005): 808.

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15 would refrain or punish when this does not occur (stick). The success of such a strategy depends on “the determinacy of [the] conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs.”44_{The power of the EU is thus severely limited}

when it has little leverage and its requests are politically costly. Nevertheless, Schimmelfennig notes that we should not underestimate the indirect power of the EU. It can be the case, for example, that it does not influence an authoritarian government directly, but that it signals to its society that its government is the main obstacle towards further Europeanization. In such a way, the government’s credibility can be undermined and the EU can mobilize the society against it.45 Conditionality can thus be effective beyond the target government’s compliance alone.

Kirsti Raik argues that conditionality achieves the best results when it is used as an affirmative policy: “pushing for better and faster reforms where the political will and commitment are in place to begin with.”46_{In such a situation, the country can receive rewards}

for little or no political costs. Conditionality can also function as “an external reference point which domestic political actors in the ENP countries can choose to utilise when it fits their agenda.”47_{However, for a country governed by an autocratic government, “complying with the}

EU’s political conditions would be tantamount to regime change.”48_{The success of}

conditionality thus depends on both the rewards that are offered and the political costs that are demanded. Neither strong commitments, high rewards nor low costs are sufficient conditions by itself: history has shown that all need to be present in order for conditionality to be effective.49 Given the authoritarian nature of Azerbaijan and the possible effects of its resource curse, there is thus little reason to expect that conditionality is effective.

Next to the costs and benefits, the success of conditionality depends for a large part on how EU’s carrots are perceived. It has for example been said that, “[the EU] has to be less

44_{Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Neighborhood Policy: Political Conditionality and Its Impact on}

Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighboring Countries,” Paper Prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial

International Conference, 2005, 9. 45_{Ibid., 10.}

46_{Kristi Raik, Between Conditionality and Engagement: Revisiting the EU’s Democracy Promotion in the} Eastern Neighbourhood (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, April 2011), 3,

http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp80.pdf.

47_{Gwendolyn Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern}

Neighbours,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 296.

48_{Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From} Leverage to Governance? (Routledge, 2013), 15.

49_{Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact}

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16 interested in giving the reward than the target government is in getting it.”50 There is no need for a government to reform when it knows that the EU prefers to give unconditional assistance rather than no assistance at all. Kristi Raik argues that compliance to conditionality might be posed as a voluntary option, but that in practice it is essentially “a coercive policy which contradicts the democratic idea of bottom-up influence and restricts national decision-making.”51_{For a newly independent country, keen to preserve its sovereignty, this can lead to}

a feeling of interference. EU’s conditionality requirements might thus not only be ineffective, but it could also frustrate relations only further. This is something that I will explore in chapter three.

European normative power

The previous section looked at a rationalist bring about change in a target country, but table 1 also shows alternative strategies. Depending on the country, one strategy may be more effective than the other. Scholars such as Anja Franke argue that because of each country’s unique conditions, the EU should adjust its policy for every country individually.52 Currently the EU has a ‘uniformity of demands and rewards’ in its relations with all partner countries. However, practice has shown that it has been very difficult to impact the norms of a country because they are inherently conservative due to path-dependency. Ideally, normativity would not prescribe a country what to do, but it would change its way of thinking by suggesting what it should or ought to do.53 If successful, the country would then profess long-term commitments instead of making case-to-case evaluations. Rewards and punishments would then become unnecessary. Ian Manners described this process as: “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is.”54_{Practice has shown, however, that Europe has been remarkably unsuccessful to}

do so – especially in a country like Azerbaijan. I expect that oil wealth and conservativeness of the ruling elite play a large role in this.

Table 1: National Strategies Toward Europeanization

Determined by … Target

Cost-benefit calculation Secure rewards Avoid punishment

50_{Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood, 10.}

51_{Raik, Between Conditionality and Engagement: Revisiting the EU’s Democracy Promotion in the Eastern} Neighbourhood, 4.

52_{Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” 150.}

53_{Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political} Studies 44, no. 5 (December 1, 1996): 948.

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17

Secure financial or logistic support

Norms Support EU norms

Deny EU norms

Path-dependency Maintain persisting Soviet-era mentalities Reject EU norms

Based on Hall and Taylor (1996) 55

Generally, the failure of normative suasion to take place among EU’s neighbouring countries has been ascribed to many different causes. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, for example, looks at geopolitical factors and argues that EU’s “soft power foreign policy […] is being challenged by the offensive realism of Russia as the events in Ukraine unfold.”56_{He states that}

it is difficult for a country to think in terms of where it wants to be, when security considerations (i.e. cost-benefit calculations) prevail. This could be the case in Azerbaijan too, of which 20 percent of its territory is occupied. Russia plays a key role in the continuation of this conflict. So does Baku even have the possibility to choose a more pro-European course without antagonizing its northern neighbour? Throughout the thesis I will look what effect the Karabakh conflict and the Russian threat have on Azerbaijan.

Much criticism also focuses on the inconsistency or the ‘hypocrisy’ of the EU. For example Börzel and Hüllen note that, while the European Neighbourhood Policy aims to foster both effective governance and democratic governance simultaneously, it clearly favours stability over change.57 Even though the Union states that both forms are complementary, these scholars argue that they often lead to conflicting situations. Crawford comes to similar conclusions when looking at the EU’s attempts at democracy promotion in Central Asia. He states that:

by being dressed-up as lofty principles, EU external policy is presented in a positive and favourable manner, while simultaneously serving to conceal lowly self-interests and to legitimise ongoing co-operation with (semi-)authoritarian rulers, with potentially antidemocratic outcomes.58

For Crawford this particularly poses a legitimacy question to the domestic (i.e. European) audience. Others primarily look at what such a policy signals to the target countries. Ioffe calls

55_{Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” 154.}

56_{Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The European Union and the Black Sea Region in Search of a Narrative or a New}

Paradigm,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 (June 26, 2014): 286–287.

57_{Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen, “One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals: Cohesiveness and}

Consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 7 (June 16, 2014): 1033–49.

58_{Gordon Crawford, “EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From Lofty Principles to}

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18 this behaviour ‘doublespeak’; it gives people in the country the impression that they are being used which will only turn them cynical.59 The EU’s desire to prefer some cooperation to no cooperation, could possibly undermine EU’s legitimacy and hence the goals that it is trying to pursue. Especially in the case of normative power, it is of utmost importance to lead by example. For Azerbaijan, I would predict that this doublespeak leads to either appreciation because it ignores the country’s problems, or frustration because it does not offer consistent support.

Much of the flaws in EU policy stem from the fact that there has been too much “Euro-focused navel-gazing.”60 According to Mayer, Eurocentrism and euro-narcissism only leads to adverse reactions from outside states. Instead, he suggests a narrative that is “coherent (‘speaking with one voice’), transparent (‘who thinks what in the EU and who decides’), consistent (‘CAP?’) and normative (‘value-based multilateralism’).”61_{This criticism provides}

a useful starting point for analysing the perception of the EU in Azerbaijan. Whereas Mayer states that outside countries want such a clear narrative, I will argue that Azerbaijan eagerly uses these weaknesses in EU policy as leads for counter-criticism. It can use this as an excuse for not having to comply to the norms itself. I could therefore even argue that Azerbaijan does not want an improved EU policy in which such weaknesses are resolved. The effectiveness of EU’s policy, however, can be strengthened if target countries do not have the option to easily put the blame elsewhere.

59_{Grigory Ioffe, “Geostrategic Interest and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from Post-Soviet Space,”} Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 7 (September 1, 2013): 1262.

60_{Hartmut Mayer, “Is It Still Called ‘Chinese Whispers’? The EU’s Rhetoric and Action as a Responsible}

Global Institution,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 78.

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2. Azerbaijan: from childhood to puberty

This chapter provides the necessary background information in order to understand the factors and conditions that have shaped Azerbaijan’s perception of the European Union. It starts with a brief historical account of what happened after the country emerged out of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously to the establishment of a new leadership, it had to rethink its identity and foreign policy. Each of the following sections will explore one of those aspects. Since policy formation is a never finished process, I will also look at how this developed or changed over time. In this chapter I primarily aim to describe specific behaviour. Whenever it is relevant I will complement this with theoretical explanations, such as that of the resource curse. In the last section, I will summarize the findings in order to provide an answer to the question which domestic conditions influenced Azerbaijan’s perception of the EU and how its foreign policy has changed over time.

2.1. Political History

The country of Azerbaijan became independent with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The territory was previously part of bigger empires and only enjoyed a short-lived independence between 1918 and 1920. Politically, the country has been greatly influenced by the Aliyev family. Heydar Aliyev became leader of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1969 and was promoted in 1982 to the Politburo, the highest organ in Soviet politics. When Azerbaijan became independent, it was shortly led by two presidents that quickly succeeded each other. In 1993 Heydar Aliyev re-entered the political arena as the new president. He brought stability to the country, but critics such as De Waal argue that “he preferred not to experiment with democracy and began to build a strong semi-authoritarian state. The country’s nascent democratic institutions were brought under suffocating control.”62 Governmental structures such as the former parliament, the Supreme Soviet, and ministries had already been powerless previously. Audrey Aldstadt states that rather than empowering them, Aliyev chose power.63

The system that developed was democratic in name, but stopped short at its actual implementation. Andreas Schedler uses the term ‘electoral authoritarianism’ for this: a seemingly democratic state, which uses democracy as an instrument for authoritarian rule. 64

62_{Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010), 126.}

63_{Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijan and Aliyev,” Problems of Post-Communism 50, no. 5 (October 9, 2003): 4.} 64_{Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder and London:}

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20 Others use the similar concept of ‘low intensity democracy’, in which there is still a minimum practice of democracy, with regular elections and respect for basic human rights.65 Simão notes that by using democracy instrumentally, Azerbaijan can keep international partners at a distance by presenting the current situation as an ‘unavoidable stage’ on the long road to democracy.66_{Furthermore, the government can maintain control over the political process by,}

for example, sponsoring pro-government ‘opposition’ parties and GONGO’s (‘governmental’ NGO’s).67_{Jos Boonstra notes that the difference between democratic rhetoric and reality is the}

largest in Azerbaijan among all former Soviet republics.68 _{The Central Asian republics might}

be violating more human rights and in Belarus democracy might be more hindered, but none of these states is pretending that ‘all is well’ to the extent that Azerbaijan does.

Especially since the coming to power of Ilham Aliyev in 2003, the son of Heydar, this discrepancy has only grown larger. Before becoming president, he stated that he would never allow ‘uneducated vegetable sellers’ to gain power.69_{His accession after his father’s death has}

been called a ‘dynastic succession’.70_{Unlike his father, who was more of a statesman, Ilham}

was mostly a businessman interested in profits and used the exponentially increasing oil wealth “to mitigate any foreign or domestic risks” – the earlier described repression effect.71_{In the}

decade after 2005, 70 billion dollar of the total oil income of 108 billion (65%) had been spent.72 Kerem Öge argues that the effects of this resource curse have been exacerbated by Azerbaijan’s structural problems, such as the lack of expenditure transparency, abundance of

65_{Licínia Simão, “The Problematic Role of EU Democracy Promotion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and}

Nagorno-Karabakh,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 1 (2012): 195.

66_Ibid.

67_{See examples of pro-government opposition (former) and GONGO's (latter): RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service,}

“Televised Azerbaijani Presidential Debate Descends Into Chaos,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, September 19, 2013, sec. Azerbaijan, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-election-debate-attack-television-president-hasanli/25111775.html; EurasiaNet, “Azerbaijan: Debating GONGO vs. NGO,” EurasiaNet, November 4, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70761.

68_{Jos Boonstra, How Serious Is the EU about Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Azerbaijan?,}

Democracy working papers (London: ECFR/FRIDE, 2008), 1, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/837cbaa227801cc69a_k4m6iiry5.pdf.

69_{Barbara Oertel, “Präsident Regiert Im Koma,” July 8, 2003,}

http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/print-archiv/printressorts/digi-artikel/?dig=2003%2F08%2F07%2Fa0066.

70_{Maria Lipman, “Birth of a Dynasty?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed November 24,}

2014, http://carnegie.ru/2003/08/11/birth-of-dynasty.

71_{Rashad Shirinov, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance,” Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 37}

(March 29, 2012): 3.

72_{Farid Guliyev, “‘After Us, the Deluge’: Oil Windfalls, State Elites and the Elusive Quest for Economic}

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21 corruption, weak civil society and the lack of accountability.73 This is in line with the expectation that oil would be particularly disruptive in the weak post-Soviet states.

Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani political situation should not be over-simplified. Farid Guliyev argues that the elite is more than president Ilham Aliyev alone.74 He should therefore not be seen as a complete autocrat. The ministers in his cabinet are all extremely powerful oligarchs too: they all run huge business empires and use their political influence to protect their business interests and wealth.It is in their primary interest to preserve the status quo “that has served them so well.”75_{The limited amount of privatization that took place only}

strengthened their grip on the economy: privatization simply shifted ownership from the state into their personal hands.76_{Virtually all large businesses are owned by ‘state}

officials-turned-oligarchs’, ministers and other senior officials in the Presidential Administration. Although the government formally pursues a strategy of diversification, such a policy could in practice “threaten the status quo benefiting wealthy elites.”77_{It therefore practices a very conservative}

policy instead, resistant to any change.

This situation shows the double-cursedness of Anja Franke et al.’s concept of post-Soviet rentierism: Azerbaijan’s ministers do not only seek to preserve the status quo in resource distribution, but they have similar anti-reformist attitudes because they practically own the private sector economy. An example of this can be seen in the Azerbaijan’s negotiations about accession to the WTO, which have been ongoing for more than sixteen years now.78 A WTO-membership would oblige it to implement liberalisation measures that would hurt certain monopolies. The political leadership, which often controls these monopolies, has no incentives to take further steps on the path towards WTO-membership. Franke is therefore very pessimistic about the future of post-Soviet rentierist countries and only expects changes if oil and gas prices would decline dramatically.79 This scenario indeed seemed plausible when oil prices started to decline in 2014 and the regime seemed increasingly uneasy.80

73_{Kerem Öge, “The Limits of Transparency Promotion in Azerbaijan: External Remedies to ‘Reverse the}

Curse,’” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 9 (October 21, 2014): 1487–1489.

74_{Farid Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at}

Conceptualization,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13, no. 3 (2005): 416.

75_{Waal, “Azerbaijan Doesn’t Want To Be Western.”} 76_{Guliyev, “‘After Us, the Deluge,’” 3.}

77_{Ibid., 5.}

78_{Leila Alieva, “Azerbaijan and the Impact of the Lack of Democratisation on Relations with the EU,”} European View 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 42–43.

79_{Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov, “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States,” 133–134.} 80_{EurasiaNet, “Azerbaijan: How Will Baku Handle the Oil Price Slide?,” December 22, 2014,}

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2.2. New nation, new identity

How can you speak about the identity of a people whose alphabet has been changed four times in the last seventy-five years?81

After the country’s independence, Azerbaijan had to construct its identity and narrative. As the quote above shows, its identity was not a given fact. In less than a century, the country had changed its script from Arabic to Latin and Cyrillic. Upon independence, it changed back to Latin. According to Lynley Hatcher this was a clear choice of identity: a Turkic one.82 This choice can be seen as “a momentous and visible divorce from a Russian-influenced identity.”83 Another constituting factor for its new identity was its early 20th century independence. At that time, it was the first democratic republic in the Muslim world. Nowadays it is common to hear references to this episode in popular and political discourse. Even though this republic lasted for only twoy, one of Ilham Aliyev’s speeches starts with, for example, “a solid foundation was laid for the future successful development of Azerbaijan.”84 Later in the speech, he describes democracy as being an indigenous and integral part of the Azerbaijani people. He states that, “We will continue the reforms aimed at promoting democracy, human rights and formation of a free society. We will continue these reforms not to please anyone but for our own future.”85

Thus, the country will pursue reforms not because of Western pressure, but because of its own national values, Azerbaijani values.86

This is not to say that it does not pursue Western values too. Ilham’s father made a very similar speech just a decade earlier stating that, “the system of government and style of society we are developing in Azerbaijan is based on Western values.”87_{The difference between the}

two speeches is that Heydar is openly saying that it pursues Western values, while Ilham explicitly states that it does not perceive itself to be guided by any external power. I will argue that this change in discourse has arguably also taken place in practice. Rail Safiyev also describes this change and argues that in the beginning, the new state enshrined the ideals of

81_{Fereydoun Safizadeh, “On Dilemmas of Identity in the Post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan,” Caucasian} Regional Studies 3, no. 1 (1998): 1.

82_{Lynley Hatcher, “Script Change in Azerbaijan: Acts of Identity,” International Journal of the Sociology of} Language 2008, no. 192 (July 2008): 105–113.

83_{Ibid., 111.}

84_{Ilham Aliyev, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Official Reception on the Occasion of the National Holiday of}

Azerbaijan – the Republic Day,” May 27, 2014, http://en.president.az/articles/11948.

85_Ibid. 86_Ibid.

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23 human and civil rights and upheld the idea of constitutionality. The Baku government was eager to gain international prestige for its political achievements. But all of this changed in 2005, “when new power holders with extreme financial resources emerged to shatter constitutional politics and dictate their rules.”88_{After it started to be affected by the resource}

curse, the elite began to disregard international pressure. Safiyev nevertheless finds it very important that outside powers maintain normative pressure on the Azerbaijani government.89

Since, Baku started to criticize the West openly, but I do not expect that it will truly re-orient itself and reject these values. Leila Alieva states that the question about being part of Europe is ‘almost existential’; it is part of the very essence and foundation of the state as it has been forming since the 19th_{century. The first republic and all subsequent developments have}

caused that “its Europeanness is, in effect, at the core of the very existence of Azerbaijan as a nation, which makes EU integration the only option for the survival of the state and its national identity.”90_{Safizadeh states likewise that the West has generally been seen as the only viable}

option.91 In turn, this strategic orientation to Europe “represents the most important and perhaps the only significant source of influence that the EU possesses over Azerbaijan.”92_{Europe might}

be presented as only one among several options, but it does not seem as that Azerbaijan could seriously consider any alternative.

Its Western orientation can be seen in foreign policy too, as will be described in the next section. Unlike other post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan has clearly pursued an integrationist policy towards Western institutions. This ‘path dependency’ obliges it - from a rationalist perspective - to uphold Western values and human rights. Rather than rejecting these norms altogether, it would state that ‘everything is fine’ or bring up the shortcomings of other countries instead. I would argue that it is interesting to note that it nevertheless still decides to uphold exactly these values. It does so by arguing that they are indigenous. This is contrary to, or possibly a way of dealing with, the implications of the previously described post-colonialist view of Merje Kuus. She stated that Europe is often portrayed as a model that ought to be followed and the outside countries as ‘blank slates’ with no subjectivity. The speech of Ilham

88_{Rail Safiyev, “Informality in a Neopatrimonial State: Azerbaijan,” in State and Legal Practice in the} Caucasus: Anthropological Perspectives on Law and Politics, ed. Stéphane Voell and Iwona Kaliszewska

(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2015), 141.

89_{Ibid., 140–142.}

90_{Alieva, “Azerbaijan and the Impact of the Lack of Democratisation on Relations with the EU,” 40.} 91_{Safizadeh, “On Dilemmas of Identity in the Post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.”}

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24 Aliyev, however, shows Europe to be much more a ‘companion’ with values similar to those indigenous in Azerbaijan rather than an ‘example’. This re-framing might be a way to cope with a perceived power imbalance.

Baku’s uneasiness with being criticized might also have to do - from a cultural point of view - with its ‘honour culture’.93_{In such a culture, it is believed that honour should be}

preserved at all times and that an insulted person should always respond an allegation. Likewise, international criticism almost always provokes a counter-reaction. I would argue that its reaction to external criticism therefore shows a high resemblance to the characteristics of an honour culture. It could thus be questioned whether openly criticizing Azerbaijan is the most tactful and effective strategy. The Azerbaijani leadership has increasingly often shown to the world that it does not appreciate others’ advice. I will call this self-assertiveness that emerged in the oil era a form of ‘puberty’: whereas in the past Baku blindly implemented whatever the West told it to do, it is now not even willing to face criticism anymore, let alone listen.

As this section argued from the beginning, the choice for Europe has never been the only one. Azerbaijani people has always felt a close affiliation with Turkey for linguistic, religious and historic reasons. Baku therefore looks with great interest at the EU-Turkey relations: if this will not progress, and the cause of this is “perceived as being based on the country’s cultural identity”, this will have implications for the Azerbaijan’s engagement too.94_{Already the fact}

that the EU has a preferential treatment with Armenia and Georgia is often perceived to be due to their shared Christian background. Azerbaijan thus feels that it somehow does not fully belong to Europe.95 Azerbaijani politicians often refer to its ‘bridge function’ between Europe and Asia. It is a country that has affinity with both continents. For full European commitment, Cornell argues, it is mostly up to the European countries to proof that it is not a ‘Christian club’ and that the door is open for other countries as well.96 Only this would take Baku’s skepticism away.

93_{For a discussion of honour in Azerbaijan from a slightly different perspective see, Katy Pearce and Adnan}

Hajizada, “No Laughing Matter Humor as a Means of Dissent in the Digital Era: The Case of Authoritarian Azerbaijan,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 22, no. 1 (2014): 74.

94_{Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan Since Independence (Armonk, NY, USA: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2010), 422.} 95_Ibid.

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2.3. Foreign policy

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy had to find a balance among different interests and affiliations. On the one hand, this involved historical and religious bonds to Iran, ethnic, linguistic and intellectual links to Turkey, and political, intellectual and linguistic ties to Russia. On the other hand, Azerbaijan had to make geopolitical, strategic and security considerations. It found itself in “the centre of the Russian–Turkish–Iranian geopolitical triangle.”97_{This has resulted in a}

balanced foreign policy, in which it tried to maintain good relations with all major powers. The only exception to this was during the rule of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan in 1992-1993. Their foreign policy was based on extremely idealistic and nationalistic principles, based on the ideals of anti-colonialism and ethnic brotherhood (pan-Turkism). 98 This behaviour angered both Russia and Iran, which led those two powers to seek rapprochement with Armenia instead.99

Since the Aliyev’s came to power, the foreign policy has been guided by the two principles of national interest and the interests of the ruling elite.100 From such a rational perspective, the West was viewed as the best economic model to emulate and as the only power constellation that was able to provide physical security and territorial integrity.101 The West, after all, dominated almost all international institutions. For a country like Azerbaijan, becoming a member of the Western constellation was perceived as “the ultimate recognition of its legitimacy and hence an ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and security.”102 It initially thought that in return for exporting Azerbaijani oil and gas, the West could provide security guarantees. Baku’s commitment to European integration was so strong that under Heydar Aliyev the country never had a strategic policy of balance but only took some tactical steps of balance, according to the former President’s foreign policy advisor.103

The reasons for this Western orientation can be explained by its energy reserves too. Esanov et al. argue that natural resources were not immediately available for exploitation at Azerbaijan independence. Azerbaijan could only develop into an exporting country by

97_{Nazrin Mehdiyeva, “Azerbaijan and Its Foreign Policy Dilemma,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 3 (November 1,}

2003): 271.

98_{Shirinov, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance,” 2.} 99_{Mehdiyeva, “Azerbaijan and Its Foreign Policy Dilemma,” 274.} 100_{Shirinov, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance,” 2.}

101_{Murad Ismayilov, “Power, Knowledge, and Pipelines: Understanding the Politics of Azerbaijan’s Foreign}

Policy,” Caucasus Survey 2, no. 1 (November 2014): 82.

102_{Ibid., 83.}

103_{WikiLeaks, “Ambassador’s Dinner with Foreign Policy Analysts,” December 12, 2006,}

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26 attracting foreign investors, whom had “to be convinced of the business-friendly intentions of the government.”104_{This led to comparatively reform-minded policies. However, these}

scholars already warned in 2001 that these policies would likely change once the country started to be less dependent on foreign investors. Indeed, many government officials would later regret their sacrifices for ‘being a trustworthy and reliable partner’: they felt that many of the oil contracts had been signed at a time of national weakness and that these had been unduly beneficial to multinationals.105_{Their initial hopes and expectations slowly began to change in}

feelings of remorse. Nevertheless, the West remained Azerbaijan’s most important partner and Baku did not change its foreign policy. Even if it was not satisfied about the relationship that had developed, it did not have any other choice but to continue exporting its resources westwards.

Looking back at the first years of Heydar Aliyev’s leadership, the relations seems to be in stark contrast with those of the last decade. In those times officials in Baku “were very attentive to everything spelled out in the West” so that “Azerbaijan accepted without much discussion all the conventions, treaties and agreements in order to become a well-mannered member of international and, most importantly, Western institutions.”106_{Observers thus}

remarked that the West had a rare degree of influence over the country’s political development.107 Due to the ‘transport curse’, and hence its reliance on both Georgia and Turkey, it did not have any other choice than to keep good relations with its neighbours. The implications of this curse were expressed by a government official who stated that, “if Georgia is not independent, it will be impossible for Azerbaijan to be independent.”108_{The Russian}

factor thus remains, even when Azerbaijan does not have to use Russian pipelines anymore. Another official stated that “if Georgia is taken by Russia, Azerbaijan's western-oriented foreign policy will collapse.”109_{The country is thus trapped by geography.}

104_{Akram Esanov, Martin Raiser, and Willem H. Buiter, “Nature’s Blessing or Nature’s Curse: The Political}

Economy of Transition in Resource-Based Economies,” Akram Esanov, Martin Raiser and Willem Buiter, in

Richard M Auty and Indra de Soysa, Eds. Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia,

2001, 9.

105_{Cornell, Azerbaijan Since Independence, 396.}

106_{Shirinov, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance,” 2.}

107_{Svante E. Cornell, The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment (SIDA, 2002), 130,}

http://www.sida.se/contentassets/64b77c17742d485ebd4e90af0505719d/the-south-caucasus-a-regional-overview-and-conflict-assesment_953.pdf.

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture