• No results found

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture"

Copied!
104
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Udine University of Groningen

June 2012

The Euro as a Symbiosis of Economic and Cultural Integration

A Multidimensional Analysis of the Single Currency’s Role in the

European Integrative Process

Submitted by: Fedir Razumenko 108272, S2145154 f.razumenko@student.rug.nl frazumenko@yahoo.com Supervised by: Prof. Claudio Cressati, PhD Ms. Monique Westra, LLM MA

Place, date Groningen, 11 June 2012

(2)

2

MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Fedir Razumenko, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “The Euro as a Symbiosis of Economic and Cultural Integration”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed

(3)

3

Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ……….. 4

Introduction ………. 5

Chapter I Theoretical Approaches to the Socio-Cultural Research into the Euro 8 1.1. Problem Statement and Research Framework ………... 8

1.2. Research Method ……….... 9

1.3. Aims and Relevance ………... 14

Chapter II On the Representation of the Euro ... 16

2.1. Vision of the Community through the Prism of the Euro…………... 17

2.2. Public Opinion and the Euro ……….. 20

2.3. Iconographical Representation of the Euro Coins ……….. 24

2.4. The Euro’s Role in Mediation of a European and a National Identity 29 2.5. Conclusion ……….. 31

Chapter III Overview of the Economy-related Impact of the Euro in Europe .... 33

3.1. The Euro Area as a Unique Currency Union: Weighing the Pros and Cons ……… 34

3.2. Does an Economic Dimension Require Political Cohesion? ………. 44

3.3. Divisive Issues over the Debt Crisis and the Euro’s Role in It …….. 55

3.4. The Link between the Euro and the Present Crisis ……….... 60

3.5. Conclusion ……….. 63

Chapter IV Analysis of the Euro Interfacing Society with Economy ... 65

4.1. Social Integration: the Democratic Deficit Hits the Currency ... 66

4.2. Too Much Integration Too Fast? ... 71

4.3. Public Opinion and the Euro ... 77

4.4. Conclusion ... 82

Summary Conclusions ... 84

Bibliography ... 89

(4)

4

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BIS Bank for International Settlements

Bln Billion

CEO Chief Executive Officer

ECB European Central Bank

EFSF European Financial Stability Facility

EMS European Monetary System

EMU Economic and Monetary Union

ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism

ESCB European System of Central Banks FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GDP Gross Domestic Product

LTRO Longer-term Refinancing Operation M&A Mergers and Acquisitions

Mln Million

NCB National Central Bank

OCA Optimum Currency Area

SEPA Single Euro Payments Area SGP Stability and Growth Pact

TARGET Trans-European Automated Real Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer TEU Treaty on European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TM Trademark

(5)

5

Introduction

Over six decades the integration process in Europe has occurred progressively, with critical junctures marking its key stages which, supposedly, have not ever triggered dire consequences for the population. However, the closing phase on the journey to a fully integrated Europe – the single currency – has proved to be a deviation from the norm. It is the ultimate test for Europeans to show in practice how much of common purpose they share and to what measure joint efforts have made the community tightly knit. A lengthy heated discussion on whether the European currency union is an aberration has been taking place for several years. Lately, the financial and sovereign debt crises have sharpened this growing realisation and have brought to the fore a range of contentious issues related to the euro. Perturbed by the turmoil in the euro area, the general public wants to know how and why economic policies in the community aimed at establishing stability, soundness, and sustainability of the common market with ensuing various benefits have turned out to be bounden duties. The reasons behind this unforeseen transformation have been obscure. This study will elucidate which unknown motives prompt stealthy movements toward deeper integration by means of the euro, what potent forces exert influence on the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and how the past and future expectations about the common currency’s socio-cultural potential are matched by the current situation.

(6)

6 euro issues from both regional and local dimensions. Regional, because the euro shields the whole EU in times of trouble, and local, inasmuch as the euro is also a part of the cultural project (the currency’s design incorporates a plethora of aggregate European features). Given the current crisis of confidence in the euro, it is of paramount importance to reinstate and reinforce the significance of the euro in the European Union so that EU states not participating in the euro zone will follow member states’ footsteps to join it and finalise the process of EMU construction.

Economic issues are directly connected with cultural ones. Nobody will argue that the introduction of the euro has contributed immensely to the emblematic representation of the EU. Cross-border interactions in the form of common currency exchange (coins with depictions of national heritage and standardised banknotes) constitute precisely the kinds of social communication that increases the density of interaction, generates shared identities and, ultimately, new perceptions of community. Such perceptions engender widespread support for common European values and foster closer ties among EU states, particularly in economic terms, which might serve as an effective counterweight to the power of other global players. Political elites feel a strong centripetal pull toward European incremental cooperation on all fronts because national differences across the EU still remain tangible. The latter-named constitute a series of problems for a seamless integration because member states, being at variance with each other at a national level, hinder the implementation of crucial policies requisite for improving the state of current affairs. As a consequence, candidates for the euro area membership are hesitant whether to join it or not, which projects negative images on a regional and global scale (e.g. the ASEAN has become wary of emulating a European course of action in the monetary sphere).

Being a currency without a state,1 a so-called orphan currency, the euro incrementally steps up all-European integration efforts. Regardless of an imperfect institutional framework, the EMU gravitates towards more articulated political governance which is, to date, highly fragmented. If anything, it would be grossly misleading to extrapolate the initial success of the single currency into the future. In time to come, the euro is likely to confront at least two difficult tasks: a weakened socio-cultural cohesion caused by a stateless status and a slow long-term growth due to the crises along with the economic adjustment after the enlargements, which is

1 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The euro and its central bank: getting united after the union (Cambridge,

(7)

7 complicated by a multispeed constitution of the monetary union. Provided that the euro acquits itself well in the current vicissitudes of the post-crisis period, the growing pressure of success will overstep existing cultural boundaries in Europe. The latter will be possible through partially resetting mental programming of nations constitutive of Europe in the direction of common mission realisation.

(8)

8

Chapter I

Theoretical Approaches to the Socio-Cultural Research into the Euro

Taking into account that the research touches upon cultural, socio-political and economic issues, the major complication is to assemble the complex subject matter so that it does not focus on purely monetary, i.e. recondite questions. In light of the interlocking nature of above-mentioned aspects it is the objective of this research to show how these diverse strands blend in the common currency to make a difference to the integration process in Europe. Hence, the undertaking to combine cultural, economic and socio-political threads from different sources poses a challenging difficulty which is coped with by way of arranging a multi-layered research framework.

1.1. Problem Statement and Research Framework

(9)

9 mixed influence be qualified as favourable, detrimental or both depending on the occasion? Besides, are the EU administrative practices (a democratic deficit, a blitz enlargement, a top-down social integration) being transplanted into the euro area? What is the probability of rating these unilaterally promoted institutional practices efficient among the wider public? In other words, how are they perceived by the citizens?

The thesis is organised in such a way that each chapter gives answers to the above-mentioned subquestions step by step so as to come up with a response to the problem question. Accordingly, the thesis consists of four chapters including this one which explains how the topic is approached. Chapter II addresses the issue of euro’s representative features and its role in forming a virtual community through identification. Chapter III discusses the singularity of the EMU in which political and economic factors intersect making a difference to the integration process. In this connection, the relationship between the debt crisis and the euro is analysed here as well. Chapter IV deals with the question of social involvement in the decision-making procedures promoting sustainable integration in the community. This chapter also looks into the peculiarity of enlargement process in the EMU and the public opinion about the euro-related issues. Conclusions at the end of every chapter provide a review of main points. Finally, summary conclusions give a bird’s-eye view of the study and answer the research question.

1.2. Research Method

It is assumed that there exists one error-free, multipurpose methodology when scholars debate over which set of approaches to select.However, this assumption is not correct. A choice of the best methodology hinges on the issues, dilemmas and problems requiring solution at a specific moment of time. Provided that a series of different methodologies comprise proscriptive and prescriptive canons suitable only for particular problems, one should take into consideration limitations inherent in every approach, which preclude a researcher from analysing an issue from many angles. In view of this and the fact that present research has to do with two subject matters, it may be inappropriate to employ one theoretical framework.

(10)

10 of globalisation. In this regard, it is relevant to delineate how the concept of “culture” is construed in the research.

This research will subscribe to the opinion that the definition of culture takes an umbrella term character, namely it encompasses social, economic, political and cultural proper constituents. At the level of the European Union, culture fashions inherent preferences of the community and its leaders. Together with political ideology and economic imperatives, a cultural heritage component impacts the decision-making of the euro zone actors. Regardless of numerous internal disagreements in the transnational network, the EMU is permeated with a common cultural vantage point embodied in the euro.

A polysystem theory of culture (Even-Zohar; Hofstede)2 underpins the foundation of this research. It considers culture as a system containing several subsystems or interrelated levels (political, economic, and social) grounded on each and every activity executed by operative participants. It may be inferred from this that a polysystem approach takes interest in most of the actions manifested in a certain subsystem. Hence, culture is not viewed as a broad, unspecified area, but as a Russian doll, an entity including identical, though different in scale, elements. Therefore, culture is looked upon from a systemic-constructivist perspective.

Another conception of culture is evident in the research as well, that which is “based on the uniquely human capacity to classify experiences, encode such classifications symbolically, and teach such abstractions to others.”3 Thus, culture includes beliefs, ideas, language, customs, codes, taboos, institutions, works of art, tools, techniques, ceremonies, rituals and symbols (the euro).

The euro’s contribution to the sense of belonging among Europeans with the introduction of banknotes and coins in 2002 should not be ignored, although it appears to be impervious to objective measurement. The analysis of cultural features of the euro is based on a cross-cultural comparison, which seems to be an effective means to take stock of national and European identity content. The research will make use of

2 Itamar Even-Zohar, Papers in Culture Research. (Tel Aviv: The Culture Research Laboratory, 2010), http://www.tau.ac.il/~itamarez/works/books/EZ-CR-2005_2010.pdf (accessed 20 September 2011). Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, 2 rev. ed. (New York etc.: McGraw-Hill, 1997); Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA etc.: Sage, 2001).

(11)

11 qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff; Ringer),4 simultaneously with theories of identity construction and social psychology theories (self-categorization and social identity theory),5 which will enable a study of the representation of European and nation state identities (Anderson; During; Fornäs; Hymans; Kaelberer; Risse; Shanahan; Shore)6.

The investigation into the economic side of the euro is carried out by means of brief macroeconomic analysis, monetary economics (De Grauwe; Jovanovic; Kenen; McKinnon; Mongelli; Mundell)7 revealing primary spheres of interest. In particular, insights will be gained from the long-run economic growth area of macroeconomics which helps us to understand the dynamics of currency functioning. Moreover, the research taps into economic sociology (Simmel; Parsons and Smelser; Ingham)8 in order to fathom and grasp the subtleties of the role of money in modern culture. Economic sociology is instrumental in the research because it postulates that it is conceivable to conceptualise society as a social system including several subsystems, of which the economy is one. The other subsystems interact with the economic one and altogether serve essential functions in maintaining the social system as a whole. This interpretation of society and economic sector strikes a harmonious note with an overarching systemic-constructivist paradigm.

Further, to broach an economic subject in relation to the common currency, the research will draw on international relations theories.9 Following the paradigm offered by Arthur Koestler and encapsulated in a coinage “bisociation” (which signifies the

4 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology 2 [rev] ed. (Thousand Oaks,

CA etc.: Sage, 2003); and Fritz K. Ringer, Max Weber’s Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., etc.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

5 Derek Chadee, Theories in Social Psychology (Chichester etc.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

6 See Bibliography: Anderson,Benedict: 1991; During,Simon: 2005; Fornäs,Johan: 2007; Hymans,

Jacques: 2004, 2010; Kaelberer, Matthias: 2007, 2009, 2010; Risse,Thomas: 2003; Shanahan,Suzanne: 2003; Shore,Cris: 2000, 2012.

7 See Bibliography: De Grauwe, Paul: 2007, 2009; Jovanovic, Miroslav: 2005; Kenen, Peter: 1969, 2008;

McKinnon, Ronald: 1963, 2005; Mongelli, Francesco: 2009, 2010; Mundell,Robert: 1961 (1973), 1998, 2000, 2011.

8 Georg Simmel, David Frisby, and Tom Bottomore, The Philosophy of Money, 3rd ed. (London etc.:

Routledge, 2004); Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956); and Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge etc.: Polity, 2004).

9 See Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th [international] ed. (Boston,

(12)

12 linking of two unrelated or marginally related planes of thought or knowledge)10 the survey into the euro will take on a dual, sometimes dichotomous, character in view of intersecting realism and liberalism theories.

It has long been alleged that realism is not able to give a convincing exposition of new developments (for instance, regional integration).11 Likewise, globalisation advocates have contended that the primary actor of realism, the state, appears to be moribund compared with non-state actors, like increasingly potent regional institutions (the ECB) and transnational corporations (e.g. Royal Dutch Shell plc, Eni S.p.A).

Realists have championed partition as a solution to the majority of civil, ethnic and other strife in contrast to liberals, who tend to reaching power-sharing consensus and creating multicultural states. Contrariwise, it is argued by realists that ethnically heterogeneous states, being a worthy aspiration for world peace, enjoy a low success rate.12 In accordance with realism, anarchy can be eradicated by virtue of forming a central government and subordinate structures, whilst partisans of liberalism espouse a network-oriented state or supra-state governance with a relative autonomy of local administration (the EU, the euro area).

In view of the globalisation, realists have turned to asserting that basic transnational governance is workable, however it depends very much on the power distribution (the EU versus constitutive members). At the same time, casting doubt upon the scope to which the world has become more or less interdependent, realists maintain that global forces acting above/below the nation-state are not going to overshadow it. As a logical extension of this argument, realism constantly makes us think about nationalism, playing a significant part in the euro area, which continues to be a factor in world politics to reckon with. For all the attempts of federalists to revive idealist feelings, Europe remains split by various national disagreements and interests as it is united by a common good.13 Consider, for example, the struggle of the euro zone countries to opt in the enlarged European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).

For the time being, integration efforts both at regional and global levels are explored through the prism of liberal institutionalism which is regarded by many international relations scholars to pose the most persuasive challenge to the neo-realist

10 Tony Greenfield, Research Methods for Postgraduates, 2nd ed. (London etc.: Arnold, 2002). 11 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to

International Relations, 5th ed. (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2011), 88.

(13)

13 line of thought. The beginnings of this variant of neo-liberalism date back to the functional integration studies of the 1940 – 1950s and the 1960s regional integration scholarship.14 The foundation of integration theory was laid by David Mitrany in his pioneering work A Working Peace System (1943)15 which argued that transnational cooperation was a sine qua non in order to sort out common problems. He explained this with introducing a new concept “ramification” by which he meant the high probability that collaboration in one economic sector would prompt governmental bodies to spread this extent of cooperation to other fields. What is more, it is stated that the cost of withdrawal from cooperative obligations soars up the more involved the states are in an integration process.16 This research will further elaborate on the “spill-over effect” of the euro and touch on neofunctionalism, proposed by Ernst B. Haas, in order to grasp the role of politics in the process of integration.

The above-mentioned studies suggest that the path towards prosperity and peace can be blazed by independent countries pooling their resources and sometimes partially yielding their sovereignty to mould integrated communities in order to react to regional setbacks or advance economic growth. The EU is one such entity that has been established as a regional community for promoting multilateral collaboration in many domains of human activity. The euro area appears to be another such entity taking advantage of closer integration and increased fusion of functional roles to promote economic well-being. Supporters of community building and integrative efforts have had a strong motivation to take issue with predominant realist thinking due to the developments of the two World Wars. Integration theories, firmly entrenched in liberal reasoning and given publicity in the wake of World War II, were more pragmatic than and not so idealistic as the liberal internationalism that prevailed policy talks following the First World War. However, the best explanation of current events in the euro area seems to be provided by the third wave of liberal institutional scholarship in the 1970s, the complex interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye).17

Last but not least, the terms “cooperation” and “integration” are conceptualised in the research as mutually complementing, yet the former has a narrower scope than the latter. Cooperation presupposes that actors involved in it maintain primary competence

14 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 2011, op.cit., 120-121. 15 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle books, 1966). 16 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, op.cit., 2011, 138.

17 Op.cit., 142-144. See also: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed.

(14)

14 areas and channel their efforts to improve their activity in specific domains. At the same time, there is no pooling or yielding of sovereignty (e.g. the creation of overarching institutions). In contrast to cooperation, integration implies the sharing of major competences in which the decision-making is partially delegated to other actors. Integration reaches its pinnacle in transforming into a union in which primary competences are fully transferred to an authorised entity.18

1.3. Aims and Relevance

The research will adhere to a view that economic might of the euro impacts cultural and socio-political integration efforts across Europe to a certain extent. However, the aim will be to corroborate the statement or disprove it in the course of research. In this endeavour, the research will also look into how the euro blends national and supranational features: economic well-being, prosperity, cultural values, identification. The two latter features are exemplified by the symbolic representation of the euro (especially coins) showing a national perspective combined with a pan-European vision, whilst two former have to do with manifold economic advantages of the monetary union.

Economic dependence has been a starting point for the European integration which, having accumulated many-layered socio-cultural characteristics, has transformed into the monetary union. The relevance of this research resides in the fact that it elaborates on the most evident manifestation of European integrity – the EMU with its single currency, the euro. Besides, the inquiry into the topic will contribute to broadening understanding of the euro’s role in the European integration process and encourage other researchers to add to the existing body of knowledge. It is worthwhile to note that the importance of this research is enhanced by comprehensive analyses of public opinion polls (Eurobarometer,CNN International) and current informed opinion on issues related to the euro in the authoritative press (The Financial Times, The Economist etc.). Lastly, the research is pertinent because it builds a bridge between Culture Studies, Economics, and International Relations. This modest contribution, therefore, will consist of incorporating the three.

18 Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos, Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration, ed. K.

(15)
(16)

16

Chapter II

On the Representation of the Euro

It is common knowledge that money is a medium of exchange that operates “as a unit of account, a store of value, and a means for deferred payment,”19 but it can also function like language, as a medium of communication.20 The interchange of words fulfils a multiplicity of purposes the primary of which is to get the message across and, in a similar vein, the swap of banknotes and coins performs actions of buying and selling which inform the community about the needs, fashion, feelings etc. Besides, apart from a purely economic understanding of the store of value function, there is a culture-imbued sense: the currency carries in itself an imprint of values immanent in the society, which form the identification system for its members. Consequently, the money along with the language define the society in which they are used and are unified by a particular culture in the broader sense. The peculiarity of the euro, being, as any kind of money, at the intersection of economic and cultural forces,21 consists in the fact that the currency brings together several communities. A common language bonds different social groups that become a dominant community with a resultant effect of assimilating weaker collectivities which otherwise go extinct. But what are the consequences of the common currency? The assimilation and partial subjugation seem to be out of the question due to the nation states’ overriding ambitions to be equal in the union. What remains is to convince citizens that the euro will assist in creating a multistate community with individually conserved national attributes and with implanted perception of belonging to all-European values. This chapter will elucidate how the representational side of the single currency manifests itself to cope with the task of so-called integration by stealth.22 In this connection, some thought-provoking questions arise: How tangible is the link among the euro’s imagery, the reconfiguration of

19 Jonathan Law and Gary Owen (eds.), A Dictionary of Accounting (Oxford Reference Online: Oxford

University Press, 2010), “money”,

http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t17.e2247 (accessed 27 January 2012).

20 Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge etc.: Polity, 2004), 60.

21 Gerard Delanty, Community. Key Ideas. 2nd ed. (London etc.: Routledge, 2010): 1-31. See also:

Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 13.

22 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the would-be world power: the EU at fifty (Cambridge etc.:

(17)

17 national identities, and the transformation of supranational ones? To what extent do national and European identities converge in the iconography of the euro to produce beneficial effects for promoting integration?

2.1. Vision of the Community through the Prism of the Euro

It is not a secret that the idea of common currency was embedded in the European project from the very beginning in order to reinforce prevailing identity constructions. Images of a shared cultural heritage demonstrate that the euro is, to a certain degree, also an attempt to mould a European identity. The currency is an all-out effort to create substance out of the form and endow it with a symbolical meaning, which makes Europe a part of everyday life. In line with the conceptualisation of cultural polysystem as software of the mind, suggested by Geert Hofstede, the euro being a symbol represents a superficial manifestation of culture which lends itself to interpretation through multifarious practices.23 Decision-makers, who came up with the idea of the euro in multiple national variations, must have thought that unimaginable circulation patterns would incrementally dilute the foreignness of various forms. They would carry on being singular and foreign, but not “irretrievably alien, a message of unthreatening diversity emerging from every pocket of change.”24 In this relation, let us briefly examine representative features of the euro banknotes and coins with a special emphasis on culture-orientedness and social neutrality.

The banknotes, being identical across the euro area, have been inspired by the architectural styles of seven consecutive epochs in Europe’s cultural history – Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo, The age of iron and glass, Modern twentieth century architecture.25 This thematic range underlines a common cultural heritage of the nations of Europe and conveys an unambiguous European message to the world. It also takes into consideration very different approaches, so that banknotes display impartiality and absence of national bias. It stands to reason that a European identity depicted on the bills is multiple, unique and dynamic, and it combines the continent’s past with its future.26 The European flag and map of Europe are featured

23 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, 2 rev. ed. (New York etc.:

McGraw-Hill, 1997), 4-10.

24 Llewelyn Morgan, "Heads or Tails?" History Today 55, no. 8 (August 2005): 27. 25 European Central Bank, The Euro. Our Money, (2002), 4,

http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eurobren.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2011).

26 European Central Bank, How the Euro Became our Money, (2007), 24,

(18)

18 as the most eye-catching symbols of the EU. It is by no coincidence that the gateways and windows embody a view toward the future and that bridges stand for linkages between people. In addition, as Johan Fornäs, a specialist in culture studies, puts it, there is an entrenched European dialectics in the symbols of windows, doors, and bridges: closure versus opening, division versus unity, boundary versus open border.27 Moreover, as a matter of fact, euro banknotes are evocative expressions of dematerialisation and abstraction. Instead of depicting concrete places and historical figures, they simply show architectural styles conjuring up some conceptual recognition. Thus, this post-modernist nature of the euro bills, implying that the cultural authority is partially rejectedin view of blending various artistic styles and conventions, allows for a democratic vision of the joint production of meaning.28

A negative interpretation of the euro notes’ abstract character has become popular and topical as well. Sterile images without recognisable places and people, supposedly, signify a predominance of bureaucracy, a reign of dehumanised supranational machine.29 The absence of heroes or other prominent personages is sometimes ascribed to a quite unpalatable fact that, supposedly, nobody has ever aspired to jeopardise one's life or career for the benefit of the common currency. The euro has come into being as a collegial decision of states to improve cooperation and create more integration.

At the same time, the chronological sequence of artistic styles of the banknotes from the lowest denomination can be explained as the story of advancement.30 Arguably, judging by the incessant progress of civilisation and the role of money in it, the euro has been conceived to symbolise the very apogee of this constitutive cultural integrity and its further natural continuation. According to the polysystem theory, the currency exhibits the inextricable fusion of culture in its narrow sense and socio-economic aspects, which is the focus of this research.31

27 Johan Fornäs, Reading the Euro: Money as a Medium of Transnational Identification (Linköping

University Electronic Press, 2007), 12, http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-41544 (accessed 14 September 2011).

28 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Money for Mars? The euro banknotes and European identity,”

(Draft chapter prepared for Robert Fishman and Anthony Messina, eds, The Year of the Euro), 2004, 10-11, http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~hymans/Hymansfishmess.pdf (accessed 11 June 2011).

29 Cris Shore, "The Euro Crisis and European Citizenship: The Euro 2001-2012 – Celebration or

Commemoration?" Anthropology Today 28, no. 2 (2012): 8, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy-ub.rug.nl/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2012.00859.x/abstract (accessed 9 April 2012).

30 Cris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London and New York:

Routledge, 2000), 31.

(19)

19 The euro coins have a common European side and various national sides, with images differing from country to country. In other words, they are identical from the obverse side, though their reverse side exhibits national and/or European symbols. The common side of the coins spotlights the continent of Europe symbolising the unity of the EU. The European Central Bank construes this by putting a special emphasis on the design’s intended aim to promote European identity construction.32 Besides, the design of euro coins suggests that Europe is not a “fortress” by indicating its location on the globe and the absence of frontiers to the east.33

The situation is quite different with the reverse side, the object of this analysis. The selection procedure for the design of national sides has been subject to individual countries’ considerations. Though, two peculiarities have to be preserved on the reverse: the date of minting and the twelve stars, the symbol of the EU.

The imagery of banknotes and coins gives an ample opportunity to disseminate a particular vision of the community. It has been argued that a state can transmit or reproduce national discourses in the form of banknotes and coins.34 This reproduction involves the inevitable portraits of monarchs, national heroes, pictures of relevant symbols of national identity, and so forth. The euro bills and coins, however, have been designed to project another image, that of Europe. It may be argued that the currency’s appearance has undergone a unique transformation from a state-bound idolatry to a community-based relevance. The single currency has even helped to spread a favourable self-representation. The euro, for instance, has enabled Germany to rejoin symbolically the continuity of European culture and history, which is reflected in the euro banknotes. Faceless artistic styles mitigate Germany’s problematic national history. Similarly, in the words of professor Elie Cohen, an expert in political economy and international economics, renouncing the lira and franc by Italy and France respectively, because of

32 European Central Bank. How the Euro Became our Money, op. cit., 28.

33 Thierry Vissol, “The Euro: Outcome and Element of the European Identity” (edited version of a talk

given in a Series of Conversations with Europeans about European Identity under the title of “When Was Europe?,” organized by Professor Jay Winter, the Council on European Studies at YCIAS, the Whitney Humanities Center, and the Yale Department of History, 2003), 22-23,

http://www.theothersideofthecoin.eu/db/files/Vissol_outcome_and_effect_of_european_identity.pdf (accessed 18 May 2011).

34 Marcia Pointon, “Money and Nationalism,” in Imagining Nations, ed. Geoffrey Cubitt (Manchester and

(20)

20 long-standing inflationary problems, in favour of the euro was not a relinquishment of national identity.35

Moreover, the imagery of the euro bills and coins has been instrumental in forging in people a sort of emotional bonding with the representation of Europe. A deliberate attempt at an identity construction in designing the euro symbol testifies to this fact. The European Central Bank points out that a striking symbol has been indispensable for the currency. The instruction continues saying that both the name and the symbol have to be identified with Europe, be attractive and spelling-friendly. The letter epsilon from Greece, the cradle of European civilisation, has been selected, in a slightly modified form, as the symbol. The letter’s horizontal middle line has been split in two parallel ones with the intended implication of stability.36 Thus, the currency makes a European identity more tangible and gives a concrete European symbol that implants another constitutive part of ‘Europeanness’ into a day-to-day life. This symbol features on the multitude of registered trademarks the most vivid of which have been selected for illustration in Appendix A.37 What is remarkable in the selection is that the area of sign’s distribution has extended vastly, even going beyond borders of the EU, since the announcement about the adoption of the common currency. Nevertheless, the euro zone’s public remains inert despite attractiveness of the currency,38 as the next section shows.

2.2. Public Opinion and the Euro

Theoretical philosophising on the euro’s role in integration processes, even if backed up by substantial evidence, cannot be indicative of the current situation in European reality. What can really shed light upon the identity construction influenced by the euro are opinion polls measuring the impact of the currency on European citizens. To make the analysis of public opinion comprehensive, a comparative paradigm has been applied for tracing not only factual trends, but also plausible interpretations of data concerning the euro from a cultural perspective. Three surveys of

35 Elie Cohen, “The Euro, Economic Federalism, and National Sovereignty,” in The Idea of Europe: From

Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 265.

36 European Central Bank, “How the Euro Became our Money,” (2007), 10,

http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/euro_became_our_moneyen.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2011).

37 See Appendix A for the overview of trademarks inspired by the euro symbol.

38 Eloi Laurent, "Eurozone: The High Cost of Complacency," The Economists' Voice: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 5

(21)

21 euro attitudes have been looked into to achieve this aim.39 In September 2007, the public opinion survey undertaken by Eurobarometer 287 in thirteen euro area members asked more than 13,000 citizens whether they considered it was a good thing or a bad thing that euro coins had different national sides and what the reasons were if it was regarded as a good thing. The survey as of December 2010 was conducted in 16 member states, with representative sample sizes amounting to 1000 or more respondents in each country. The survey as of October 2002 was carried out in 12 member states and in Denmark, Sweden, the UK, with representative sample sizes amounting to 500 or more respondents in each country. The findings of both touch upon feeling a bit more European by using the euro and citizen’s satisfaction within the euro area.

The survey done by Eurobarometer in 2007 revealed that citizens view much more as a good thing than a bad thing that euro coins have different national sides.40 57 per cent of informants answered in the affirmative, 28 per cent believed it was neither good nor bad thing, and only 9 per cent expressed negative views in this regard, 6 per cent did not know. The most positive about the two sides were Luxembourgers (82%), the Greeks (78%), the Finns (77%), the Dutch (76%), while not so vocal supporters were from Austria (53%), Spain (46%), Portugal (43%), and Italy (31%).41 The subsequent question, which concerned the reasons that explain best why it is good to have various reverse sides, had possible options of response: it is an expression of the cultural diversity in Europe, a national symbol of the country is likable, variety makes coins more interesting, and other.42 The majority of respondents, 65 per cent, opted for the first answer, that national sides are seen as an expression of Europe’s cultural diversity. The strong adherents represented Germany (70%), France (69%), and Slovenia (66%), whereas the reluctant supporters were from Greece and the Netherlands (both 57%), Luxembourg (56%), and Italy (48%). More than twice lower than in the first category were the percentages of informants who liked to see a national symbol (30%), and thought that various coins were more interesting (28%). These findings suggest that the original assumption about the euro coins design, which enhances

39 See also how the effects of the euro were perceived by Europeans five years after its introduction

across the euro area in Lars Jonung and Cristina Conflitti, “Is the euro advantageous? Does it foster European feelings? Europeans on the euro after five years,” Economic Papers 313 (2008): 1-41,

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications (accessed 10 June 2011).

40 TNS Opinion & Social, Special Eurobarometer 287 / Wave 67.3: “National sides of euro coins,” Full

Report (Brussels: European Commission, September 2007), 24-25.

(22)

22 cultural identification of citizens in both European and national directions, has turned out to be correct. However, the evolvement of more European-biased system of coordinates is a more contentious issue.

Surprisingly enough, affective feelings towards Europeanness, which are begot by the euro circulation, have not contributed to the development of a European identity. Opinions relating to the probable role of the euro in developing a European identity have sharply deteriorated as compared to those observed in 2002, when the single currency was introduced. In 2010, 77 per cent of respondents of the euro area countries believed that the single currency had not influenced their European identity.43 Just approximately one fifth of interviewees (22%) agreed that the euro made them feel more European than before. In contrast, the survey of 2002 showed that more than half of respondents (59%) were in accord with the fact that the euro plays a role in developing a European identity.44 However, more than two-thirds (67%) of respondents of the euro area countries were of the opinion that having the euro was a good thing for Europe.45 Therefore, it may be deduced that the global financial crisis has weakened the euro positions in the minds of Europeans. To put it differently, in all probability, the euro image has suffered not from the lack of integrative forces characterising the currency, but from economic instability and anxiety, which have beset Europeans.

According to the report of Eurobarometer 306, there are still countries supporting the trend that the euro will develop European identity in spite of an overall attenuation of this feeling: Maltese, Irish and Slovene respondents were prone to say in 2010 that the euro made them feel more European (about 37, 36, and 34 per cent respectively). Simultaneously, the least inclined interviewees to say that the euro has changed something regarding their European identity were from the Netherlands (approximately 85%), Austria (appr. 80%), and Germany (appr. 79%).46 The analysis of 2002 survey results has demonstrated that respondents from Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg were most likely to say that the euro made them feel more European (about 73, 69 and 64 per cent respectively). The opposite views were voiced by Greece, Austria and the Netherlands (appr. 58, 56, 55 per cent respectively).47 Therefore, it can be inferred from

43 The Gallup Organization Europe, Flash Eurobarometer 306: “The euro area, 2010” (Brussels:

European Commission, 2010), 10-11.

44 EOS Gallup Europe, Flash Eurobarometer 121/4: ‘‘Euro Attitudes – Euro Zone” (Brussels: European

Commission, 2002), 43-44.

45 Op. cit., 9.

(23)

23 the polls that Ireland was and remains the most positive about the euro’s part in identity creation, while Austria and the Netherlands are less enthusiastic in this respect. It could be argued that these data indicate an inherently local situation with communities’ desire to preserve dominant associations or to detach itself from existing allegiance to a big neighbouring benefactor.

Are Europeans satisfied with results the euro has produced? This is significant because Europeans’ satisfaction with the euro directly bears on positive image construction, its spreading and long-term establishment. The survey of 2010 gave an affirmative answer to the question above in the form of more than 60 per cent of interviewees across the euro zone in favour. Among the top countries in which the euro was considered a good thing were Ireland (appr. 84%) and Luxembourg (appr. 81%). Whereas the lowest proportion of supporters was from Portugal (appr. 61%).48 Back in 2002, the situation with happiness about the currency was similar enough. The ratio of those respondents considering themselves satisfied was the highest in Luxembourg (84%) and Ireland (77%). Germany was shown to be quite unhappy about the new currency with a 57 per cent informants being discontent.49

Regarding socio-demographic aspects, the profile of European citizens who positively associate themselves with the euro tends to be: men, more educated, from metropolitan areas.50 This big picture illustrates that the target audience reached belongs to a particular stratum in the euro area pecking order and constitutes a category of people most interested in the currency effects. Additionally, assumptions concerning the elite and the income status of people in favour of the euro can be derived from these aspects, but that will be wishful thinking without evidence at hand.

Generally speaking, the figures provided serve to demonstrate that the euro has embarked on the course of becoming a symbol with which citizens identify the European Union. Moreover, this is an explicit indicator that the euro plays an important part in integration processes. At present, one can draw parallels between the conceptualisation of the euro and the EU, which signifies a great leap in the direction of forming an identity marker51 being the focus of the following section.

48 The Gallup Organization, 2010, op. cit., 70. 49 EOS Gallup Europe, 2002, op. cit., 47.

50 The Gallup Organization, 2010 andEOS Gallup Europe, 2002, op. cit.

51 Thomas Risse, “The Euro between national and European identity,” Journal of European Public Policy

(24)

24

2.3. Iconographical Representation of the Euro Coins

Over almost a decade the euro zone members have experienced a ripple effect of the currency’s iconography. Polysemantic symbols and images on the banknotes and coins have had more than sufficient time to supplant national popular attitudes, at least partially, by a European framework of reference. The past national currencies are progressively disappearing from European’s mental pictures, which leaves room for an enriched conceptual understanding of Europeanness. The latter means that states constituting Europe hold a similar dominant system of values and the obstacles on the way of constructing a shared identity space at the supranational level are not insurmountable. Jacques Hymans, an associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California actively researching national identity, contends that the degree to which similarities in identity content are perceived is much more significant for identity creation than de facto sameness.52 With this finding taken into consideration, the research will carry out a brief comparative analysis of the euro coins’ iconography concerning the notional representations of a particular nation in juxtaposition with others.

The advent of the euro has been a landmark event in both the establishment of the EU as a nearly fully-fledged supranational entity and the promotion of a revolutionary idea regarding novel iconography. As Bruce Carruthers, a professor of comparative sociology, economy and society, puts it, a standard monetary iconography underlines the connectedness of money to political sovereignty.53 In the case of the euro this political sovereignty can be construed as integrity and shared outlook of the seventeen euro area member states embracing a clear vision of Europe through images and symbols on the coins. The monetary imagery carries decipherable meanings communicated on a daily basis to the general public. This process of labelling and associative links formation makes coins a meaningful object in a community.54 It is people who create meaning behind the coins’ plain iconography giving only a direction for interpretation. Therefore, money and society make an essential mutually complementary relationship of real and imaginary. It is real because of material

52 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective

Identity,” European Journal of International Relations 10 (2004): 25.

53 Bruce G. Carruthers, "The Meanings of Money: A Sociological Perspective," Theoretical Inquiries in

Law: Vol. 11: No. 1, Article 4 (2010): 59, http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol11/iss1/art4 (accessed 10 July 2011).

(25)

25 presence of the currency, and it is imaginary since the symbolism of euro is permitting of diverse interpretations. Moreover, as has already been stated, the currency projects a lot of abstract images susceptible to the influence of collective identities. Various degrees of abstraction realised in the euro allow users to associate with it and to develop individual visions of the community. Besides, the euro imagery reveals a pervasive European ideal of equality (coins display whatever a nation-state desires) along with a ubiquitous presence (banknotes represent blurred pictures). It may well be argued that both these features imply that “Europe is all around us – but is nowhere in particular.”55

Nobody will argue that identities of different nations are unique and to a greater extent immutable across vast territories and in the course of years, not to say decades. Likewise, it may be argued that it takes generations to construct a new identity of the European community.56 The currency has an objective to propagate and evince the core of nation’s accumulated pride and joy through iconography. Different countries employ their currency in order to “send value and ontology messages that are likely to be appreciated by the proverbial ‘man in the street’.”57 What is more, in such a way nation-state elites promote devotion to the values in vogue at a particular stretch of time. Germany epitomises this concept. Its advocacy for the euro and a European political union goes well together with the state’s enduring positive perception of integration and Europeanised nation state identity. It was the German political elite, not the general public, who consensually agreed to surrender the Deutsche Markto the advantage of the euro.58

The iconography of euro coins needs to be scrutinised in order to understand better the above-mentioned. First and foremost, what catches the eye is a disproportionate number of images representing different countries. The quantity ranges from one to eight according to the coins’ denomination. Austria, Greece, Italy, San Marino, and Slovenia ostensibly show all various icons on their coins, whereas only one representative image is depicted on the coins of Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Vatican. The number of distinct icons on coins

55 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective

Identity,” European Journal of International Relations 10 (2004): 22.

56 Gideon Rachman, “Europe has yet to make Europeans,” The Financial Times, 9 April 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/735ef582-8188-11e1-8aae-00144feab49a.html#axzz1rXTDTx4t

(accessed 10 April 2012).

57 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “East is East, and West is West? Currency iconography as nation-branding in the

wider Europe,” Political geography 29 (2010): 98.

58 Martin Marcussen et al., "Constructing Europe? The Evolution of Nation-State Identities," in The Social

(26)

26 amounts to three of the other euro area members: Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. The whole series of the latter countries’ icon distribution is homogeneous, but for one state – Finland portraying discrete images on €2, €1, 50 cent coins (with a 50 cent repetitive motif along the denomination sequence), while other countries render identical images on €2, €1; 50-, 20-, 10 cent; and 5-, 2-, 1 cent coins. Surprisingly enough, the stratification of countries with similar patterns of image distribution does not uncover substantial differences in views between Southern and Northern Europe, or between the West and the East of the continent. Taking into account that designs of coins have been selected in the majority of cases by a public opinion poll and a national panel, this finding may serve as a proof of concerted efforts working toward uniformity and equal, heterogeneous distribution of prominent features among various countries. It has emerged from the comparative study of the euro coins through the prism of content analysis that a national identity owes its re-formation to both interior (i.e. national) and transnational forces shaped by the European Commission, at least as far as iconography is concerned.

For the purpose of the research the images displayed on the reverse side of the euro coins from seventeen countries together with Monaco, San Marino and Vatican have been grouped under fifteen categories alphabetically:59

Buildings and Monuments: AUT (2), DEU (1), ITA (3), SMR (5), SVK (1), SVN(1).

Drawings and Pictures: ITA (2), SVN (1).

Emblems: FIN (1), DEU (1), MLT (1), MCO (1), SMR (1), SVK (1). Fauna: CYP (1), FIN (1), GRC (1), SVN (2).

Flora: AUT (3), FRA (1), DEU (1). Geographical Map: EST (1).

Outstanding Figures: AUT (2), FRA (2), GRC (3), ITA (1), SMR (1), SVN (3), ESP (1), VAT (1).

Monarchs: BEL, LUX, MCO, NLD, ESP. Mountains: SVK (1), SVN (1).

Musical Instruments: IRL (1). Mythical Objects: GRC (1).

Religious Edifices: AUT (3), MLT (1), SMR (1), ESP (1).

59 See Appendix B for a detailed description. A number in parentheses stands for dissimilar icons within a

(27)

27 Sculptures: ITA (1).

Ships: CYP (1), GRC (3).

Symbols: CYP (1), MLT (1), MCO (1), PRT (3).

The broadest category (eight states) includes Outstanding Figures, whereas the narrowest categories (one state) comprise Geographical Map, Musical Instruments, Mythical Objects, and Sculptures. The fact that numerous countries fall into the Outstanding Figures category is axiomatic: public symbols, such as political figures and people from the art world, are normally pictured on national currencies. In general, it is one of the main functions of currency iconography to convey a message about which historical figures merit public recognition. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the same purpose is pursued by featuring sovereigns, Juan Carlos I for Spain, Queen Beatrix for the Netherlands etc. Monarchies issue coins with the ruling sovereign engraved due to historical tradition or constitutional reasons.60

The choice of outstanding figures for several coins has not been reasonable from a financial point of view, though, culturally speaking, more than appropriate. Miguel de Cervantes on Spanish 50-, 20-, 10 cent coins was frequently arrested for tax fraud and, in fact, conceived Don Quixote while serving a term of imprisonment. Similarly, Dante Alighieri, portrayed on Italian €2 coins, despised money hoarders so much that in the first part of his Divine Comedy, Inferno, he sends miserly people to the fourth circle of hell, where they are destined to roll giant stones incessantly. In the same fashion, Austrian €1 coins showcase Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart who had financial problems all his life, died bankrupt and was buried anonymously in a common grave.61

As for the narrowest categories, two countries, Estonia and Ireland, deserve close attention for the reason that their coins feature a geographical image and the Celtic harp respectively. Striking seems the fact that these icons are depicted on all the euro coins. However, in this manner both states position themselves in a specific way: Estonia – spatially (as an independent territory), and Ireland – temporally (as an ancient polity with long-standing traditions). Moreover, two incomparable decisions stand behind the approval of the designs: the Irish government resolution and a public competition with

60 European Central Bank. How the Euro Became our Money, (2007), 28,

http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/euro_became_our_moneyen.pdf (accessed on 3 May 2011).

61 Aravind Adiga, "Euro Cash," Money 30, no. 13, December 2001, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-

(28)

28 a telephone-voting across Estonia.62 Here, an unchangeable conflict of opposites in the form of ruling elite and ordinary people is observed. Nonetheless, the outcome of this struggle has turned out to be more or less the same for the iconographic representation of the coins.

In terms of general view, all coins demonstrate an intriguing aspect of neglecting grandeur which every nation can pride itself on. Almost no remarkable national images are depicted on the coins. This significant characteristic adds weight to a statement that the euro is aimed at reaching a balanced integration on the continent where the modest experience of life matters the most, rather than self-glorification.

One more salient feature of the euro coins iconography becomes noticeable on a French 50 cent coin and a Slovenian 5 cent coin which portray a Sower. Although a description sheds light on the reasons behind the choices made – a traditional feature of French coins and stamps since 1898 (France) and Ivan Grohar’s painting “The Sower” (Slovenia)63 – the original rationale of these symbols requires further clarification. The French sower is female (as another figure, Marianne), whilst the Slovenian one is male (as two other figures). Can there be any parallels drawn between these national identities to incorporate them under one roof of Europeanness? Apparently, the answer to the question is in the affirmative, since France and Slovenia along with 15 other countries share a fundamental European cultural characteristic – Christianity. The image of a sower features several times in the Bible, for instance in the New Testament, the Gospel of Mark 4: 1-20. The multifaceted sacral meaning of the Parable of the Sower carries life-affirming ideas for many people, which underscores the importance of icons being signified on the euro coins.

Aforementioned Marianne on the 5-, 2-, 1 cent French coins sets the stage for the imagery evolvement considerations. She is regarded as a national symbol in France, the incarnation of French Republic. Nonetheless, the ECB gives its own interpretation of the icon: “this modern, timeless graphic represents France, which stays true to itself, whilst integrating into Europe.”64 Portugal’s €1 and €2 coins depict the Royal seal of the first king Dom Afonso Henriques (1144) with tiny coats of arms and castles. In its

62 The European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, The euro, Euro notes and coins, National

sides, Ireland and Estonia, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/cash/national/index_en.htm

(accessed on 7 May 2011).

63 The European Commission, France and Slovenia,

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/cash/national/index_en.htm (accessed on 7 May 2011).

64 European Central Bank, The euro, Coins, France, http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/html/index.en.html

(29)

29 turn, the image is described in the following way: “this symbolises dialogue, the exchange of values and the dynamics of the building of Europe”.65 In the end, alpine primroses are featured on the Austrian 5 cent coin, which is explicated as “symbolising a duty to the environment and the part Austria is playing in the development of a Community environmental policy”.66 Consequently, here a process of incremental iconographic development in the direction of symbolism expansion is observed. In other words, original meanings of symbols gain additional connotations linking Europe and individual states. The following section has more to say about the latter.

2.4. The Euro’s Role in Mediation of a European and a National

Identity

The euro establishes a perceptible connection between European institutions and everyday lives of the citizens. This linkage makes Europe real by materialising it as a social system. The statement that money has to do with not only economics and finance, but also with nation- and state-building is well-known to Europeans.67 Moreover, money is among the most significant identity indicators in people’s day-to-day lives. In line with economic sociology postulates, money embodies the most remarkable symbol of the completely dynamic nature of the world.68 In the words of Georg Simmel, a sociologist and philosopher, “money has provided us with the sole possibility for uniting people while excluding everything personal and specific.”69 Therefore, images of a currency are usually chosen meticulously in order to correlate with historical and sometimes national symbols of different states.

It is debatable whether citizens identify with the euro as their new currency or not, though there is a strong agreement in the euro area that the introduction of the currency highlights a historic event for the European Union.70 The euro has left a discernible trace on the identity map of Europeans inside and outside the euro area by becoming a symbol of European integration within a relatively short period of time. The currency

65 European Central Bank, The euro, Coins, Portugal, http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/html/index.en.html

(accessed on 3 May 2011).

66 European Central Bank, The euro, Coins, Austria, op. cit.

67Kathleen R. McNamara, “Towards a federal Europe? The Euro and institutional change in historical

perspective.” in The State of the European Union, ed. Tanja A. Borzel and Rachel A. Cichowski, vol. 6 of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 314.

68 GeorgSimmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. by David Frisby (ed.) and Tom Bottomore, 3rd ed.

(London etc.: Routledge, 2004), 510.

69 Op. cit., 345.

(30)

30 contributes to a deeper integration, social cohesion, and promotes a sense of belonging. Complementing other symbols of identity creation, the currency gives an incentive to its users to identify with each other and conceive of themselves as integral elements of the integration project. “Attitudes towards the euro are closely linked to identification with the EU … the euro may serve as … a unifying medium on the way towards European integration.”71 In this sense, the euro can be compared to other symbolic efforts to create European consciousness, such as the European anthem, day, flag, motto,72 and now passport. One may venture to say, however, that any kind of money, by its nature, is not an ideal means for a collective identity. The single currency, in particular, does not permit to differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’ within the euro area, though the opposition is valid between the euro and non-euro zone members. Thus, it should be borne in mind that the relationship between identity and money is quite abstract rather than evident and concrete.

It is common knowledge that identities are in constant flux, they are not fixed categories. National and European identities can exist together as parts of multiple identities. There is no inherent interdependence between a national and a European identity.73 Whilst these identities may be in a state of conflict, they do not constitute a binomial opposition.74 Since a European identity can only stem from diversity and inclusiveness, it can coexist with other identities. What is more, it has to go on developing alongside other identities, rather than to substitute for them. If one wants to get the grasp of the concept of a European identity, it is of paramount importance to consider identity as a multilevel construct. In conformity with the social identification theories,75 a European identity would not exist due to the strength of other strata of identity if one had an idea of it as of an isolated concept. Being a part of a hybrid identity, the euro does not require an identity foundation as solid as national identity: polycentric entities (the European Union) need composite identities. Therefore, it is not right to think of a European identity and a national one in terms of interaction in which

71 Katja Meier-Pesti and Erich Kirchler,”Nationalism and patriotism as determinants of European identity

and attitudes towards the euro,” Journal of Socio-Economics 32 (2003): 694.

72 EUROPA, The EU at a glance, The symbols of the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/index_en.htm

(accessed on 13 December 2011).

73 Martin Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity,” European Societies 2 (2000): 125.

74 Suzanne Shanahan, “Currency and Community: European Identity and the Euro,” in Figures d'Europe

Images and Myths of Europe, ed. Luisa Passerini (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A., 2003), 162.

75 Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah, “Self-Categorization and Social

Identification: Making Sense of Us and Them”; Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner, “Social

(31)

31 a gain for one side entails a corresponding loss for the other side, that is, an increase in one identity decreases another. Professor Matthias Kaelberer, who specialises in international relations and focuses on various aspects of European politics and international monetary relations, admits that such a lopsided view of identity leads to a zero-sum understanding of community, which does not encapsulate the dynamics of heterogeneous communities.76 Nobody has to select among them, as Europe is constituted of “imagined communities” which supplement each other.77

The euro makes one think how far Europe has evolved as a community on a daily basis. Professor Kaelberer claims that the euro is allegedly the most advanced representation of a European community.78 A common European space has been instituted by the European Economic and Monetary Union. The single currency serves as a means of a Europe-wide communication. People engage in transactions in the same kind of money, recognise it as ‘their’ money even if they deal with a foreigner. The prices across seventeen European states have become comparable in the same “language”. From this perspective, identity is no longer solely coupled with an individual nation state, and the euro can serve as a driver for collective identity formation.79

2.5. Conclusion

One step further towards establishing a European community, the emergence of EMU with the most recognisable European symbol – the euro, may prove to be a big leap forward to a cherished cultural unification. The single currency brings into being a symbolical dimension of the EU by dispensing with a state-circumscribed idolatry for the sake of community-based associations.

The euro has become an object of converging national and European identities the boundaries of which tend to get more and more indistinct. Besides, the common currency has come to be a symbolic marker allowing people to identify with Europe via everyday social and discursive practices. Albeit, there are no unequivocal signs from the public so far indicating whether the euro has been a relevant factor in creating

76 Matthias Kaelberer, “The Euro and the European Demos: Money and Community beyond the

Nation-state,” Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 24, no. 4 (2010): 488.

77 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

(London: Verso, 1991).

78 Matthias Kaelberer, "Trust in the Euro: Exploring the Governance of a Supra-National Currency,"

European Societies 9, no. 4 (2007): 633.

79 Kenneth Dyson, “EMU as Europeanization: Convergence, Diversity and Contingency,” Journal of

(32)

32 associative links with the EU. The analysed opinion polls suggest that the single currency has just started a lengthy process of European identity moulding. The significant change in the public perception concerning the role of the euro in developing a European identity since 2002 testifies to the fact that more efforts should be channelled in this direction.

The euro’s iconography serves as transnational force acting like a catalyst in the course of European integration. The imagery of banknotes and coins facilitates the diffusion of the community’s vision by means of emphasising the ideals of equality and omnipresence. Images of the euro coins resonate with both European and national representations, though with a slight preponderance of the latter. The opinion polls have demonstrated that different national sides of the coins is a good thing which contributes to expressing cultural diversity. Thus, the euro adequately amplifies the motto of the EU and adds to a socio-cultural integration

It is shown in this chapter that the connection between the iconography and the national representation is neither tenuous, nor strong on account of a perceptible presence of European sentiments. However, the public opinion surveys have revealed that the formation of favourable all-European attitudes is possible by virtue of representational constructs. The dissemination of representations inspired by the euro, like trademarks, gives substance to the idea.

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

Commission To The European Parliament And The Council An Area Of Freedom, Security And Justice Serving The Citizen Stockholm Programme, P7_TA-PROV(2009)0090, Brussels, 2009b..

Additionally, as Ewick expresses it, social movements are generally understood “as forming and developing reflexivity, over time, rather than as discrete,

The International Free Market discourse is mainly concerned with neoliberal norms and values, whilst the Fair Trade one is centered on norms and values on social injustice and

According to the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Parliament, this leads to a situation in which Baku can cherry-pick reforms that are “suitable for the preservation of

In response to our main question – namely how the travelers introduced by Roberto Bolaño in his short stories enunciate Europe as translations, based on the textual and

7 Therefore, the goal of this research is to study the behavior and attitude of Eurosceptic MEPs in order to find out how Euroscepticism influences the functioning of

It depended on the political will of national authorities (and, to an extent, on the monitoring of the Commission) to enforce the rules which were laid down. These pitfalls lay

In this chapter, I would like to investigate both a European and a Japanese adaptation of Grimm‘s fairytales, secondly I would like to establish how and why these