Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture

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Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Groningen

University of Strasbourg

June, 2017

A Triangle: The United States, the European Union and Turkey.

The United States’ View on the Possible Turkish Membership of the

European Union.

Submitted by Lianne Arentsen S2329735 21522217 +31629363179 l.arentsen.2@student.rug.nl Supervised by: Dr. Ine Megens, University of Groningen Dr. Samim Akgönül, University of Strasbourg

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MA Programme Euroculture

Declaration

I, Lianne Arentsen, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “A Triangle: The United States, the European Union and Turkey. The United States’ view on the possible Turkish membership of the European Union”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged within the text as well as in the bibliography.

I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed:

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Introduction

In this research, we will look at the triangle of Turkey, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). The focus will be on a specific element in this triangle relationship, namely the possible Turkish membership of the EU. Even more specifically, the focus will be on the American perception on this possible membership.

At the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Turkey was accepted as a candidate country.1 A few years later in 2005, the negotiations for Turkish membership in the EU started.2 However, now, twelve years later, the negotiations are not yet finished. In the 2016 European Parliament Resolution on the 2015 Report on Turkey, published in April 2016, the Parliament stated that it was

deeply concerned, in the light of the backsliding on respect for democracy and rule of law inside Turkey, that the overall pace of reforms in Turkey has slowed down considerably in recent years, and that in certain key areas, such as the independence of the judiciary, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, there has been a regression moving increasingly away from meeting the Copenhagen criteria to which candidate countries must adhere.3

These remarks are just one example of the conclusions that have been made about the EU-Turkey negotiations over the past years. Whereas Turkey did make some reforms in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, it was never enough to get through the negotiation process.4 An almost breaking point occurred in November 2016, when the Parliament voted to hit the pause button on the negotiation talks with Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded to this

1_{“Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999. Presidency Conclusions”, European Parliament, accessed}

May 18, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm

2_{“History”, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, accessed October 22, 2016,}

http://avrupa.info.tr/E.U.-and-turkey/history.html

3_{The Copenhagen criteria are all the essential conditions that a candidate country should meet before becoming a}

member state of the E.U. We will come back to this in the second chapter, “P8_TA-PROV(2016)0133, 2015 Report on Turkey, European Parliament resolution of 14 April 2016 on the 2015 report on Turkey (2015/2898(RSP))”, European Parliament, accessed October 22, 2016, http://www.E.U.roparl.E.U.ropa.E.U./sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0133+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

4_{The Copenhagen Criteria are the criteria that are essential conditions that a candidate country should meet before}

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5 decision saying: “the EU Parliament resorting to such a vote means it takes terror organizations under its wings, it takes sides with them”.5 Additionally recently, President Erdogan had a Turkish constitutional referendum that would increase the power of the Turkish President. With a minor majority of ‘yes’ votes of 51 percent, this means that Erdogan gets more power as President, and therefore the judicial and political system of Turkey will change drastically. Research group and think tank Brookings even states that “the changes would institutionalize a populist, one-man system that jeopardizes legislative and judicial independence and consolidates them in the office of the president”.6_{The referendum also had a negative impact on the relation between Turkey and}

some European member states, for example when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted to go to the Netherlands (and other European member states) to talk about the referendum to the Turkish citizens in those countries. Because the Netherlands was afraid of tension and could not guarantee the safety of the people at the locations where the speech would take place, the Dutch government requested the Turkish minister not to come. However, the Turkish minister of Family Affairs who was in Germany, did go to the Netherlands unannounced, which resulted in political tension.7

However, the US has openly supported the possible membership for years. It has encouraged the EU to accept Turkey to become a member.8 On December 11, 1999, American President Clinton made a statement on Turkey's European Union Candidacy, saying:

It is with great pleasure that I welcome the European Union's offer on Friday to Turkey and Turkey's acceptance of EU candidate status. The United States has long supported Turkey's bid to join the EU, in the belief that this would have lasting benefits not only for Turkey but also for all EU members and the United States.9

5_{James Kanter, “European Parliament Votes to Suspend Talks With Turkey on E.U. Membership”, New York Times,}

November 24, 2016, accessed January 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/E.U.rope/European-parliament-turkey-E.U.-membership.html

6_{Kemal Kirişci and Sinan Ekim, “The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained”, Brookings, April 13, 2017,}

accessed May 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/the-turkish-constitutional-referendum-explained/

7_{“Turks referendum: winst Erdogan officieel, herrieprotest Istanbul”, NOS, April 17, 2017, accessed May 25, 2017,}

http://nos.nl/liveblog/2168616-turks-referendum-winst-erdogan-officieel-herrieprotest-istanbul.html

8_{Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and}

Challenges for Turkey”, Turkish Studies 2, no. 1 (spring, 2001): 37.

9_{William J. Clinton, “Statement on Turkey's European Union Candidacy”, December 11, 1999. Online by Gerhard}

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6 In the statement, Clinton congratulated the Turkish President with the candidate status, and thanked the Greek and Finnish Prime Ministers for their effort in achieving this.10 This shows the open and positive American stance towards the Turkish membership in the EU. The reasons behind this support are various. Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz argue that “from an American perspective, the security producing credentials of Turkey were of greater importance than its immediate democratic deficits, constituting a strong basis for rapid progress towards EU accession”.11_Also,

Bruce Kuniholm states that “The United States, with its global responsibilities, has long supported Turkey because of its location and strategic importance in the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans”.12_{So, there are many reasons why Turkey’s entry in the EU would be beneficial for the}

American foreign strategy in the Middle Eastern and also European region.

However, as Sabri Sayari argues, the relationship between Turkey and the US has become a roller-coaster since the Iraq War in 2003.13 Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz agree on this. They write that “the failure of the Turkish Parliament to ratify a decision involving the deployment of American troops in Turkish territory on March 1, 2003, caused a major shock among the pro-Turkish Bush administration and the defense establishment in Washington”.14 The scholars call it “a major stalemate in Turkish-American relations”.15_{Additionally, the attempts of Turkey to}

obtain close ties with Syria and Iran raised questions in the US about the future and consistency of the pro-Western foreign policy of Turkey.16 Other recent events with Turkey and the international world of the past years are for example the failed military coup and the demands of Turkey to the EU to give information about Gűlen supporters, and other tensions with Turkish people who live in the EU Additionally, both the US and Turkey are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Turkey is seen as a very important ally to the US within NATO. We will come back to this in the analysis later.

10_Idem.

11_{Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, “The Turkey-E.U.-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?”}

Middle East Journal 59, no. 2, Changing Geopolitics (spring, 2005): 272.

12_{Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and}

Challenges for Turkey”, 13.

13_{Sabri Sayari, “New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 15, no. 2}

(2013): 129.

14_{Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, “The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?” 274,}

275.

15_Idem.

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7 After the failed coup in Turkey, the US (and EU both) openly disagreed with the failed coup, and there were rumors about a possible NATO leaving of Turkey after Turkish media reported about an American involvement in the coup attempt.17 Thus, it is obvious that the relationship between the US and Turkey experienced some negative effects in the past years. As a result, the question can be raised whether the American support for a European membership of Turkey is still present, and if so, why this American support actually exists. This will be the main focus of this research.

The main research question will be: what is the importance of the EU membership of Turkey

for American foreign strategy? Examples of sub-questions to this main research questions are: How has the American perception towards the Turkish membership in the EU changed between 2005 and 2016? What factors can play a role in these changes? Factors that will be discussed include for example the events mentioned above (the failed coup and NATO). Since the time period is set from 2005 (when the accession negotiations started with Turkey) until 2016, the focus will be on the two American Presidents who were in charge during this time period. So, this research is divided in the second term of the G.W. Bush Administration and the two terms of the Obama Administration.

This research will contain of a content analysis with mostly primary sources and secondary literature from scholars who analyzed the relationships between Turkey and the U.S and the EU, and the relationship between the EU and the US. These are for example Christopher Layne, and Ziya Onis. The latter is a Professor of International Relations and has done research on the relationship between the US and Turkey. Christopher Layne has written a lot on the American preponderance (foreign) strategy, which we will come back to in the upcoming chapter. Primary sources include newspaper articles between 2005 and 2016, speeches from former American Presidents Bush Junior and Obama, remarks after international political meetings, American policy memos, and interviews with the American Presidents. The analysis will be based on the works and theories of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. These sources will be used to see what the exact American perception of the Turkish membership in the EU is, and what factors influenced this perception.

17_{Peter Korzun, “Turkey on the Way to Exit NATO: No Reasons to Stay”, Strategic Culture Foundation, August,}

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Chapter 1 - Theoretical Background

This chapter will look at theories that will possibly fit the American perception on the possible membership of Turkey. This will contribute in understanding the foreign strategy of the US and how it responds to international events. Throughout the upcoming chapters in this research, we will refer back to the theory explained here. One of the main theories of international relations is realism. We will see whether this theory fits American foreign strategy on Turkey and the Middle East. First, the theory of realism will be discussed, followed by discussing two of the main political scientists who belong to the school of realism. In this chapter, we will also look at geopolitical strategy, a strategy that is used in realist thinking in international relations.In the end, a hypothesis will be formulated to support the analysis of this research.

1.1. Realism

Realism, known also as political realism, stresses the competitive and conflictual side of international politics based on national interests. The principal actors of this theory are states that are concerned with their own security and strategic and economic interests. They struggle mainly for more power or for maintaining their positions.18 Hans Morgenthau, one of the major political scientists of the twentieth century, puts ‘power’ at the center of his view on politics. Traditional methods of diplomacy played a major role in his theory.19 Another important name within realism is Kenneth Waltz. This American political scientist is known for the neorealist theory of international relations.20

1.1.1. Morgenthau

Hans Morgenthau is one of the most influential realist thinkers of the twentieth century. He places selfishness and power-lust at the center of human existence. Morgenthau introduced six principles that defined his theory of realism. These principles state for example that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Morgenthau also argued that international politics stands for states pursuing their own interests, which are defined

18_{“Political Realism in International Relations”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed January 31, 2017,}

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#HanMorReaPri

19_{The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, “Hans Morgenthau”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed February 22,}

2017, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hans-Morgenthau

20_{Andre Munro, “Kenneth N. Waltz”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed February 22, 2017,}

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9 in terms of power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power. This is exactly what the US does. American foreign strategy is all about having and gaining (world) power.21 However, Morgenthau also added to this power idea that the meaning of power can change. Morgenthau stated that power as an objective category “is not fixed once and for all”.22 The kind of interest determining the political action (of a nation state) depends on the political and cultural context in which this foreign policy is formulated. This goes for power as well. Power can mean anything that establishes (and maintains!) control from one entity over another.23_{So, this would}

mean that the power of the US could be on different levels, in different areas, and it could change over time. This is the case with the American perception on the Turkish membership: the EU could use this membership as a way to keep control over Turkey, and through Turkey keep control over the Middle East.

So, again, power is an important element in Morgenthau’s ideas. Morgenthau stated that the individual in the state of nature struggles for self-preservation. Besides that, the autonomous and unitary state is constantly involved in power struggles, balancing with power and reacting to preserve what is in the national interest.24 Morgenthau’s idea of realism fits the US international relations: according to Stanley Hoffman, Morgenthau could be called the US international relations founding father.25 The underlying political inspiration for Morgenthau’s idea of realism was that only a foreign policy dedicated to pursuing the national interest held out the possibility of preserving the peace. A negotiated settlement could ensue only if the superpowers pursued Realist statecraft based on the national interest.26 The national interest is something that forms the core of Morgenthau’s realism. This is reflected in a quote from one of his students who stated that Morgenthau “postulates that every nation by virtue of its geographic position, historic objectives, and relationship to other power centers possesses a clustering of strategic interests each more or less vital to its security”.27 Morgenthau’s ideas were especially placed on the international relations

21_{Christopher Layne, “Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy”, International}

Security 22, no. 1 (summer, 1997): 88.

22_{Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (7}th_{Edition), revised by Kenneth}

W. Thompson and W. David Clinton. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005), 10.

23_{Ibidem, 3-10.}

24_{Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton &}

Company, 2016), 78.

25_{William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 2, 3.} 26_{Ibid., 78.}

27_{Kenneth W. Thomspon, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,}

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10 of the twentieth century. This aligns with American foreign strategy: the US thinks in ways of power and power is the national interest of the US. However, Morgenthau also argued that US national interests have been consistent over time.28 This would imply that the American perception and support for the Turkish membership in the EU would have been consistent in the past decades too.

1.1.2. Kenneth Waltz

Kenneth Waltz is also a famous thinker in the area of international relations. He constructed structural realism, also known as neorealism. Waltz stated that states focus on their fundamental interest, which is to survive. So, instead of focusing on power like Morgenthau did, Waltz focused more on survival. He also argued that the structure of the international system should be examined through alliances and other forms of cooperation between states.29 This is one of the main differences between realism and neorealism. Realism does not think that international relations can be defined in a structure.30 This means that states are still the principal actors, and an international organization cannot be seen as a principal actor since it consists of states, and therefore cannot be put into a structure. One could see this with the US and NATO as well. Even though NATO exists for quite a while already, it are the main powerful states within NATO that decide the actions of NATO, for example the US It is also shown in the need of the US to keep Turkey on the ‘NATO-side’, something that we will come back to later in this research.

According to Waltz, two things define international structures: the ordering principle of the system (which is anarchy), and the distribution of capabilities across units. In an anarchic area, structures are defined in terms of their major units. Therefore: great powers are differentiated from others by the combined capabilities/power they have.31_{Another difference that can be noted}

between realism and neorealism is, according to Waltz, that means and ends are differently viewed, as are causes and effects. This is different from what realist thinkers believe. Waltz even mentioned Morgenthau and his six principles of political realism, when he argued that realist thinkers believe that causes run in one direction only, from interacting states to the outcomes that their acts and

28_{Ibid., 965-967.}

29_{Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 93.}

30_{Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1}_{(spring/summer,}

1990): 30.

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11 interactions produce. Neorealism states that causes run in two directions: “some causes of international outcomes are located at the level of interacting units”.32 Additionally, where Morgenthau argued that power is an end in itself, since power is an objective that is rooted in human nature, neorealist thinkers saw power also as a means, something that states can use. The ultimate concern for states is not power but security. Waltz stated that for neorealists, states are made functional by the restriction of structures. The principal differences between states are the capabilities of these states.33_{The security element is also an element that keeps coming back in}

the foreign strategy of the US. The US wants to secure its safety and power by influencing other areas in the world. Scholar Bryan Mabee also thinks that the realist approach to the US position in the world is significant. He states that first, realism gives a simple and elegant means of conceptualizing US power. Second, it is an ideal starting point for a way of thinking about the role of the US and its relation to the international system that is fully focused on the role of compulsory power, and arguing for the primacy of this type of power. And third, it has been a core way in which US foreign policy makers have seen the world since the Cold War period.34

So, the focus of this research is the American perception towards the possible Turkish membership in this realist way through American foreign strategy. This sounds complicated, but the American perception towards the membership is embedded in the foreign strategy of the US This foreign strategy is a grand strategy, where American policy is reflected in: it is a form of planning to the fulfillment of a long-term objective. Governments use this to define their policies.35 Through the grand strategy of the US, American foreign policy is defined. According to international affairs Professor Christopher Layne, the US grand strategy is a strategy of preponderance. Layne stated that key elements of this preponderance strategy are creation and maintenance of a US-led world order based on preeminent US political, military, and economic power, and on American values. The US tries to gain control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia. Layne argued that maintenance of economic interdependence is a measurement that the US uses to gain this international power, and, to keep its international power. After the Second World War, the US

32_{Ibid., 33.} 33_{Ibid., 36.}

34_{Bryan Mabee, Understanding American Power. The Changing World of US foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave}

Macmillan, 2013), 67, 68.

35_{Razvan Sibii, “Grand Strategy. Government Planning”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed February 28, 2017,}

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12 encouraged and supported the economies of the Western European countries and Japan. Layne states that while helping these countries rebuild, the US “maintained tight political control over them”.36_{The countries should be strong enough to help contain the Soviet Union, but not strong}

enough to challenge the American world leadership.37 An open, international trading system would also decrease the possibility for new situations like the one where Hitler came to power. It would bring peace and stability, which would make sure that there was no need for communism. The international trading system would also stabilize the power of the political national elites of the Western European states and Japan, who “would be predisposed by economic interest and ideology to pursue pacific foreign policies”.38_{As for the military element, the visibility of the US army, the}

actual presence of the US army and US military equipment also contributed to the US power abroad. So, all these elements contributed to the world power of the US We will come back to this later in this research.

All of this is exactly how (neo) realism is explained by both Morgenthau and Waltz. The US wanted to secure its position to make sure it would ‘survive’, and keep its power. Military, economic, and political power were tools that the US could use to gain more world dominance. As mentioned above, this realist and neorealist view is the basis of the American perception towards the world, and thus also towards Turkey specifically. However, there is another layer possible to distinguish within the actual strategy of the US, which is geopolitics.

1.2. Geopolitics

Just like realism, geopolitics is all about power and states. Here, it is about the power that a state can have over a certain area/space. A definition of geopolitics has been made by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, who called it the “science on the relations between the State and the space”.39_{There are different versions of geopolitics. Some define geopolitics as ‘seapower’: in}

the twentieth century this was for example the British Empire, because of the control of sea routes, and colonies overseas. Then there is also the idea of ‘landpower’: a major power with a big,

36_{Christopher Layne, “Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy”, 88.} 37_{Idem, 88, 89.}

38_{Idem, 91.}

39_{“Geopolitical Realism”, Katehon, accessed March 25, 2017, http://katehon.com/article/geopolitical-realism.}

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13 continental land. This was for example the Soviet Union. British diplomat Halford Mackinder stated that any state who was able to control through this power, would control world politics and pose the threat of a worldwide empire. Nicholas Spykman talked about a different version than seapower or landpower. He developed geopolitics with the ‘rimland’ region or Eurasia. This region stretches from Europe to East Asia, which could unite in the hands of one state, and the state that would control this part, would dominate the world.40

Halford Mackinder has influenced American scientist Nicholas Spykman. Mackinder formulated a geopolitical theory where interior Asia and the eastern part of Europe had become the center of the world (a so called heartland). This was the result of a decline of sea power against land power. Britain and the US had to preserve a balance between the powers who wanted to control this heartland.41 Spykman formulated the geopolitical ideas of Mackinder into the ‘rimland’ idea: the territory from Western Europe to the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific Zone, as mentioned above. He wrote about this idea in his book The Geography of Peace, which was published in 1944 while living in the US. Spykman stated that this ‘rimland’ region was crucial between the fight of the seapower (in this case the US) and landpower (the Soviet Union). The US had to establish American domination over Western Europe, and not allowing the expansion of Soviet influence. It was also of great importance that Turkey would join NATO, so other Arabic countries would be positioned towards the U.S, for example Iran.42

Even though the theories of Mackinder and Spykman are from the twentieth century, the idea of geopolitics is still relevant for the US foreign strategy. Only now, there are also more and different geopolitical actors in the world that the US has to keep in mind, for example the Islamic State (IS). These elements play a crucial role in the survival of states, and are therefore of great importance for states’ political strategies and in this case, the US geopolitical grand strategy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was the unipolar power in the world. One could state that the idea of economic interdependence of Layne, as mentioned above, would then secure this unipolar power of the US, and make sure that no new world power would rise. However, nowadays there are new influences and powers on the horizon, like terrorism. How does the US corporates

40 _Daniel _{H. Deudney, “Geopolitics”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed March 25, 2017,}

https://www.britannica.com/topic/geopolitics

41_{Gerald Roe Crone, “Halford Mackinder”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed May 2, 2017,}

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Halford-Mackinder

42_{More information can be found in Nicholas Spykman, The geography of peace (Hamden: Archon Books, 1944).}

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14 this in its policies? What is the perception of the US towards these new elements? The Middle East plays an important role with these new elements. One of the interests of the US is oil. In 2004, the US imported 58 percent of the oil that it consumed, compared to 34 percent in 1973.43 This oil comes from the Middle East. Then, there are the ideological developments in the Middle East, especially after the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington. The US first responded by starting a new geopolitical strategy on the Middle East: the War on Terror by the Bush Administration. The preference of the US in the 2000s was focused on democracy in the Middle East rather than for example Asia.44_{How does this fit in the perception of the US? Layne argued}

that the American strategy of preponderance can be geographically found in Europe, East-Asia and the Persian Gulf in areas which the US has a vital security interest. In short, one can see two vital security interests in these areas. In Europe and East-Asia, the rise of a new power could emerge. In the Persian Gulf, one can find a lot of oil.45 As mentioned before, after the Second World War the US supported Western-Europe and Japan to rebuild. It needed these areas as security zones against the Soviet Union. So, these regions had to be strong, but not that strong that they would be able to challenge the US power at that time.46 Thus, the American strategy follows the idea of the geopolitical interest of the ‘rimland’.

1.3. Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at realism, neorealism and the main element that is part of the US realist strategy, namely geopolitics. These theories are not easy to understand. These theories were chosen because by looking at realism and neorealism, the background and basis of the US geopolitical grand strategy can been explained. This will contribute in understanding the US strategy as it will be used in this research. Realism under Morgenthau puts the desire for power at the core of his argument, where Waltz in his neorealism argument stated that security, and thus survival, is for states more important than power. Geopolitical strategy fits the theories of (neo)realism, since it is used by states, and puts power central to the states’ policies. So, American foreign strategy can be seen through this realist, geopolitical vision. American foreign strategy is formulated using a geopolitical lens: the geopolitical areas in this thesis are the Middle East, and

43_{Jeremy Black, Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 223-228.} 44_{Jeremy Black, Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance, 223-225.}

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15 in a minor way also the EU. Whereas the theories described in this chapter might exist for quite some time already, it does not mean they are not applicable anymore. Yes, there are indeed new players on the stage, however, the main interests of all the players involved are still power and survival.

In this research, we will look at the perception of the US towards the possible membership of Turkey. We will look at the American foreign strategy through the lens of realism and geopolitics. This way, one will understand where American foreign strategy is based on, and it will be easier to analyze the strategy and the opinion of the US. What elements play a role? Does the membership matter that much for the US? As told in the introduction, the relationship between the US and the EU and between the US and Turkey has changed over the past years. What kind of strategy is the US using in its policies and relations? This research will only focus on factors within the EU, and factors in the Middle East.

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16 Turkey preferred.47 We will dive deeper into the elements that influence the relationship between Turkey and the US during the analysis.

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Chapter 2 – The United States and Turkey under the Bush Administration

This chapter will first give a short overview of the timeline of the possible Turkish membership in the EU, and secondly look into the American perception on the Turkey’s possible membership in the EU during the George W. Bush Administration. The focus will be on the second term of the Bush administration, since the official membership negotiations of Turkey started in 2005, when the Bush Administration was in charge in the US. This way, one can see how the Bush Administration responded to the start of the negotiations, and the possible membership of Turkey in general.

2.1. Start of the Negotiations

On the 3rd of October, 2005, the Council of the EU (Council) adopted the negotiation framework, and the negotiations with Turkey were officially opened.48_{What does this mean exactly? The}

European Commission (Commission) explains it as follows: when a country moves on to formal membership negotiations, it needs to make certain preparations. This means it should implement reforms necessary for the country to meet the conditions for joining. These are called the “accession criteria” or the Copenhagen criteria. These criteria are all the essential conditions that a candidate country should meet before becoming a member state. These include political criteria, such as stability of institutions and guaranteeing democracy, human rights and the respect/protection of minorities, and the rule of law. Then there are economic criteria, such as a stable, functioning market economy and the capacity to deal with competition and market forces. The final elements of criteria are administrative and institutional ones: capacity to effectively implement the EU acquis, and the ability to take on the obligations that are part of the membership.49 The EU acquis can be seen as the EU law: it is “the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states”.50 When all the necessary reforms have

48_{“Turkey”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, accessed}

January 21, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en

49_{“Steps towards joining”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations,}

accessed January 21, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining_en, and “Accession criteria”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, accessed April 13, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en

50_{“Acquis”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, accessed April}

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18 been implemented, and the negotiations have been completed to the satisfaction of all the member states and the country itself, the country can join the EU51

For Turkey, this meant that on October 3, 2005, the first chapters were open for negotiation. The chapters are part of the acquis (explained above) and are the basis of the negotiations. There are 35 chapters in total, and they each focus on a different topic. The first chapter focuses for example on the free movement of goods, the second on freedom of movement for workers and the third chapter focuses on right of establishment and freedom to provide services. So, the chapters of the acquis are part of the different areas for which the reforms are needed, and countries need to implement these reforms in order to meet the accession conditions.52 Already in June of 2006, the first chapter was closed for Turkey. This was chapter 25, science and research. However, the first problems were also noticed. On December 11, 2006, the Council decided that eight chapters would not be opened because Turkey refused to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus. So, it refused to recognize Cyprus as an EU member state.53 We will dive deeper into this conflict and other issues in the next chapter.54 Until Turkey recognizes Cyprus as an EU member state, eight chapters will not be opened for negotiations. Shorter said, until Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as an EU member state in the Additional Protocol, it will not be able to become a member of the EU

The first chapter that was provisionally closed, is also directly the only one that has been closed. Other chapters have been opened, for example financial control (June 2007), consumer and health protection (December 2007), environment (December 2009), and economic and monetary policy (December 2015), but many others are still closed. In total, one chapter has thus been closed, fourteen are open to negotiate, and twenty others have not been opened yet. More important, as

51_{“Steps towards joining”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations,}

accessed January 21, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining_en

52_{“Acquis”, European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, accessed April}

13, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en

54_{On Cyprus, different ethnic groups are living together. A small part of the population consists of a Turkish}

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19 mentioned in the introduction, on November 24, 2016, the European Parliament (Parliament) voted on hitting the pause button on the negotiation talks with Turkey.55 The relationship between the EU and Turkey is definitely not stable at the moment. No other nation state had such a long process to enter the EU as Turkey, and the Parliament’s vote of last November shows that it is not very likely that Turkey will become a member any time soon.

2.2. Support of the US

As mentioned in the introduction, the possible membership was heavily supported by the US When we take a look at a statement made by American President George W. Bush following discussions with Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey in October 2006, we can clearly see that the President is very supportive of the possible membership:

I made it very clear to the Prime Minister, I think it's in the United States interests that Turkey joins the European Union. And I congratulate the Prime Minister and his Government for the economic reforms that have enabled the Turkish economy to be strong, for the good of the Turkish people.56

Bush clearly stated it is in the “United States interests” that Turkey joins the EU. Turkey is an important ally of the US. This continued throughout his presidency. At the beginning of the remarks following a Meeting with President Abdullah Gul of Turkey on January 8, 2008, the American President said:

Turkey is a strategic partner of the United States. Relations between the United States and Turkey are important for our country. And we have worked hard to make them strong, and I believe they are strong. We deal with common problems.

55_{James Kanter, “European Parliament Votes to Suspend Talks With Turkey on E.U. Membership”, New York Times,}

November 24, 2016, accessed January 17, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/europe/european-parliament-turkey-eu-membership.html

56_{George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey”, October}

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20 One such problem is our continuing fight against a common enemy, and that’s terrorists and such a common enemy as the PKK. […] The United States is— along with Turkey, confronting these folks. And we will continue to confront them for the sake of peace.57

This is an interesting quote from Bush. He linked peace to the relationship with Turkey, and the importance of this relationship. Peace in the Middle East is an element that has been part of the Turkish-American relationship during the entire time of the second Bush Administration. For example, when we go back to 2006, the National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration was published. In this Security Strategy, the US openly talked about engaging in international conflicts to secure peace and democracy: the government stated that the “War on Terror is not over”.58 It mentioned what needed to be done in order to beat terrorism, and that “America will lead in this fight”.59 Bush mentioned the relationship between the US and Turkey, and the collaboration between them in order to achieve peace in international conflict areas many times. However, Turkey is not mentioned in the National Security Strategy of 2006 at all. The only reference to a link with Turkey could possibly be made when there is spoken about collaboration with NATO and the EU, since Turkey is an NATO member.60 This is striking, since collaboration with other countries is mentioned, for example the collaboration with the EU, Canada, Iraq, and the United Kingdom (UK).61 Since these countries are not mentioned that often either, the differences between mentioning these countries and Turkey in the Strategy are only minor. However, the expectation was to find more about Turkey in the National Security Strategy of 2006.

When we take a closer look at the actual policy actions of the US government, we can see that there were indeed some actions that show the US really wanted Turkey to become an EU member state. In 2005 and 2006, US House of Representatives members initiated two resolutions which stated that the US urged “the Republic of Turkey to comply with all European Union standards

57_{George W. Bush, “Remarks Following a Meeting with President Abdullah Gul of Turkey”, January 8, 2008. Online}

by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed April 13, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76244.

58_{“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, The White House (March, 2006): 8-10.} 59_Idem.

60_{We will come back to Turkey and NATO in chapter 3: External factors during the second term of the Bush}

Administration, Factors in the E.U.

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21 and criteria prior to its accession to the European Union”.62 There is unfortunately no information whether these resolutions were passed through the American Congress.

Another reason why the US wanted/wants to keep Turkey close to the Western world is the fact there is a total of 480 nuclear weapons at air bases divided over multiple European member states and Turkey. Additionally, there are still trainings on these air bases, as preparation for a possible nuclear attack. Captain Curry W. Graham from the US European Command stated that “the US still maintained a nuclear arsenal in Europe to support NATO’s strategic deterrence mission to maintain peace and stability in the region”.63_{The US needed and still needs to keep the}

European member states and Turkey close, in order to be able to keep its military and nuclear capacity overseas. This is an element of the geopolitical grand strategy, since the US still had military equipment in the region that were put there during the Cold War era, when the US had many military equipment in the European region to keep the Soviet Union on a distance.64 It was and still is in the US interest to keep power, and therefore also military equipment (military presence) in that specific region. It is part of the US geopolitical, foreign strategy. The US wants to have power in the ‘rimland’ (see chapter 1) and thus needs to show its power towards other entities, for example Russia. The presence of military equipment is an element that underlines this power.

The necessity of Turkey as an ally is also reflected in a statement made during a press conference after a meeting between the American Ambassador Wilson and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Burns with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on January 19, 2007:

Let me just conclude by saying that this has been a very, very good visit. I think there’s a high degree of unity between Turkey and the United States on the need for peace in Iraq, on the need for Iran to listen to what the world is saying – it should not become a nuclear weapons state. It should stop funding terrorist groups. On the need for support for Prime Minister Seniora in Lebanon and the need for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. So Turkey is our valued strategic partner. We look

62_{“H.Con.Res.493 - Urging the Republic of Turkey to comply with all European Union standards and criteria prior to}

its accession to the European Union”, Congress.gov, accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/493/related-bills

63_{Eric Schmidt, “Up to 480 U.S. Atomic Weapons Still Kept in Europe, Study Says”, New York Times, February 9,}

2005, accessed March 13, 2017,

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E4DF163AF93AA35751C0A9639C8B63

64_{Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy”, Council on Foreign Relations 85, no. 2}

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22 forward to Foreign Minister Gul coming to the United States in a few weeks. And we look forward to continuing this very important partnership that we have.65

Clearly, the US wanted Turkey’s help to restore peace in the Middle East, not only in Iraq, but also on the situation with Iran, in Lebanon and in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It shows that Turkey could be the local, Western guard of the US in the Middle East. This job possibility kept being mentioned in the following year. After a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister at the White House in 2008, President Bush called Turkey a strategic partner: “Turkey is a strategic partner of the United States. Relations between the United States and Turkey are important for our country”.66_{Not only did the American president state that Turkey is very}

important to the US multiple times, but at an EU-US meeting in Slovenia in June 2008, President Bush also addressed the link between Turkey and the EU: “we strongly believe Turkey ought to be a member of the EU And we appreciate Turkey’s record of democratic and free market reforms in working to realize its EU aspirations”.67

So, between 2005 and 2008, the Bush Administration was actively endorsing Turkey to get EU membership. This open support of the accession negotiations is part of the US foreign policy strategy, in the realist way (see chapter 1).If Turkey would become a member, the existence of a Western power in the Middle East has been secured. And, through this Western power, the American influence in the Middle East would increase. The US focused on the positive parts of Turkey rather than mentioning the negative elements. The US took a less strong stance towards Turkey on the area of democracy and human rights compared to the EU, in order to keep the strategic relationship on a positive note. This is reflected in a press statement made by US Administration Spokesman Sean McCormack on October 10, 2007 over House of Representatives resolution 106. This resolution stated that the American President should ensure that the annihilation of 1.5 million Armenians is seen as genocide, “and to recall the proud history of US

65_{R. N. Burns, “Remarks After Meeting With Foreign Minister Gul”, US Department of State Archive, January 19,}

2007, accessed January 25, 2017, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/79127.htm

66_{George W. Bush, “Remarks Following a Meeting with President Abdullah Gul of Turkey”, January 8, 2008. Online}

by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Accessed January 23, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76244

67_{George W. Bush, “The President's News Conference with European Union Leaders in Kranj, Slovenia”, June 10,}

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23 intervention in opposition to the Armenian genocide”.68 In a press statement, the Bush Administration responded to the resolution by stating that it regretted that the resolution had been approved. The Administration was opposed to the resolution because “passage of which may do grave harm to US-Turkish relations and to US interests in Europe and the Middle East. Nor will it improve Turkish-Armenian relations or advance reconciliation among Turks and Armenians over the terrible events of 1915”.69 This caution with taking a strong stance on these areas of human rights contradicts the policy of the EU, especially here in the accession negotiations with Turkey, where democracy and human rights played a major role.70_{This is reflected in the many reforms}

that Turkey needed to implement before it could become a candidate country.71 Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira stated that “the principles of human rights, peace, and democracy have been deeply embedded in the European integration experiment since its inception”.72 That the EU is strong on human rights is even more reflected in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. This Charter consists of all the rights found in the case law of the EU Court of Justice, the rights and freedoms in the European Convention on Human Rights, and other rights resulting from common constitutional traditions of the EU member states and other international instruments/organizations. Thus, the Charter shows the individual rights and freedoms of EU citizens.73

However, the US saw Turkey as something that could be very useful for its own interest, and therefore was willing to close an eye to the problems that Turkey had with reforms on for example democracy and the rule of law. This confirms that the US wanted to keep a good relationship with Turkey, and definitely did not want to offend it. During the already mentioned remarks from American Ambassador Wilson and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Burns on

68_{“H.Res.106 - Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution”, Congress.gov,}

accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/106?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.Res.+106%22%5D%7D&r=6

69_{Sean McCormack, “U.S. Administration Regrets House Foreign Affairs Committee Vote on H.Res. 106”, press}

statement on October 10, 2007, U.S. Department of State Archive, accessed March 12, 2017, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93421.htm

70_{Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, “The European Union as a Model Power: Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Human}

Rights in the Wider World”, in The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, edited by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 293, 294.

71_{“Turkey Progress Report”, European Commission (October, 2014): 4, 14-16.}

72_{Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, “The European Union as a Model Power: Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Human}

Rights in the Wider World”, 293.

73 _{“E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights”, European Commission, accessed May 29, 2017,}

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24 January 19, 2007, Burns did state that there had been a talk on the conflict regarding the membership of Cyprus, and that the US would continue to be actively involved with all parties involved in finding a solution to this conflict.74 In the upcoming chapters we will analyze if this was the case.

2.3. Conclusion

In the first years of the accession negotiations, the US was actively and openly supporting the possible membership. The US foreign strategy during these years was executed in a realist way. The security element played a major role in the strategy, and was visible in every policy move. Examples of this mentioned in this chapter are: interests of peace, strategic partnership for the Middle East, and nuclear weapons in Europe. This is contradictory to the policy of the EU, where democracy and human rights played a major role. It shows that the US saw Turkey as a nation state that could be very useful for its own interest, and was willing to close an eye to these other (negative) elements of the Turkish policy. However, it is striking that Turkey is not mentioned in the 2006 National Security Strategy at all. What we do know, is that the US under the second term of the Bush Administration was very open about the strategic element of Turkey in the Middle East (especially in speeches and interviews). The US focused more on the strategic relationship and the element of collaboration to fight terrorism in the Middle East, than on the democracy of Turkey. Yes, the US was supporting the Turkish membership in the EU, but from the statements made by the American officials it is obvious that this was a way to get Turkey close to the US and the Western world. It was an element in the realist foreign strategy of the US, in order to pursue the goal of keeping power interests.

74_{R. N. Burns, “Remarks After Meeting With Foreign Minister Gul”, US Department of State Archive, January 19,}

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25

Chapter 3 – External Factors during the Second Term of the Bush

Administration

After looking at the relationship between the US and Turkey and the possible membership of Turkey in the EU, this chapter will focus on other factors that have an effect on the perception of the US on Turkey during the period of 2005-2008. This chapter will be divided in two parts: the first part will focus on factors from within the EU, the second part will focus on factors from the Middle East.

3.1. Factors in the EU

3.1.1. Cyprus

One of the first international factors that comes to mind is the Cyprus conflict. Cyprus became an EU member state in 2004. However, Turkey and the Turkish citizens on Cyprus did (and still do) not recognize Cyprus being an EU member state. What is the background to this? In total, one fifth of the population of Cyprus consists of Turkish Cypriots, who are descendants of the soldiers of the Ottoman army that conquered Cyprus in 1571, and of immigrants from Anatolia who were brought in by the sultan’s government. More recently since the 1970s, immigrants from Turkey were send to the island to increase the Turkish work force.75

The area where the Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus live, is not under Cyprus’ control, but is under the control of Turkey. In 1960, Cyprus became independent, and also became a member of the United Nations (UN). However, after the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, the conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots intensified. In March 1964, the UN Security Council sent a peacekeeping force to Cyprus. After that, Turkey decided to intervene and sent an air force when fights broke out on the Northwestern part of Cyprus. Military forces from both Greece and Turkey were send to train forces on Cyprus. Another example of a violent element in the conflict was the coup of 1974, when part of the National Guard (led by officers from Greece) tried to assassinate the President of Cyprus. This attempt failed, and was followed by a Turkish attempt to overthrow the successor of the President who had fled in the meantime. This also failed, but in the end the successor had to leave due to the fall of the Greek Junta in July of 1974. Now, the person in charge was the head of the House of Representatives. The formal President returned

75 _David _Wathen _et _all, _{“Cyprus”,} _{Encyclopaedia} _Britannica, _accessed _May _23, _2017,

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26 in December 1974, but after a few months already, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. And, in 1983, the President of this Federal State broke off all intercommunal talks, and declared the area the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).This Republic’s independence is only recognized by Turkey.76

As described in chapter one, in 2006, the Council decided that eight chapters would not be opened because Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus as an EU member state.77 If Turkey did not recognize Cyprus as an EU member state, it would not be able to become a member of the EU itself. It is obvious that the US really wanted Turkey to become a member of the EU However, what happened with the negotiations during this time? The first chapter was closed in June 2006. During this time, the EU tried to convince Turkey to recognize Cyprus as an independent nation state. Because Turkey refused this, it made it hard for Turkey to join the EU at all. The Cyprus conflict is one of the items on the long list of remarks that caused a delay and even a standstill in the accession negotiations of Turkey. The struggles around violation of human rights, the escalation of violence in the southeast of Turkey, and the situation after the failed coup (the latter one will be discussed in chapter six) all contribute to the difficult relationship between the EU and Turkey.

What was the American view towards the Cyprus conflict? Back in 2006, the American President and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met in Washington D.C. After the meeting, there was a press moment, where both officials were present. Prime Minister Erdogan spoke about the meeting and stated: “We have also had the opportunity to discuss Cyprus, and I have expressed our sensitivities with regard to the issues related to Cyprus. And we had an opportunity to extensively discuss what we can do in the Middle East, what Turkey specifically can do in the Middle East”.78_{This quote immediately shows the bridge function of Turkey: Turkey is the}

strategic partner of the US in the Middle East. Regards to the Cyprus conflict, the US also showed its interest in the conflict, because it wanted this conflict to be solved in order for Turkey to become a member of the EU Then, on January 8, 2008, President Bush met with the Turkish President. There was a press background briefing on the meeting by a Senior Administration Official. The

76_Idem.

78_{George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey”,}

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27 Official answered questions regarding this meeting, for example a question about the Cyprus issue. The Official stated that both Presidents discussed the “need” for a solution to the issue, and that the President hoped that the process towards a solution could be moved forward.79 These two examples show that the US was interested in the Cyprus conflict, and was trying to support the process towards a solution of this conflict.

3.1.2. Enlargement of the EU

Where in 2004, no less than eight new member states joined the EU, in 2007, another group of nation states finally got the ticket to the EU In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus were granted full EU membership. Romania and Bulgaria were not considered ready yet. They were eventually allowed to join the EU in 2007.80 There were still some restrictions for these new member states, since they were considered not as developed as the other Western European member states. For example, Bulgaria and Romania were not yet in the Schengen area, but the citizens from these states could travel visa-free within the EU

These different enlargements of the EU have had positive consequences for the US. On the economical level, EU enlargement means that the higher tariffs for American products and firms will be terminated in the new member states. These higher tariffs were placed during the accession period of the nation states, while the tariffs on EU goods were lower. At some point, most EU products were even entering these states tariff-free. When the nation states have entered the EU, they have the same external tariff as the other EU member states, which includes lower tariffs for the American products and firms. The US can also benefit from a bigger single market in the EU There are no varying rules that have to be dealt with.81_{Thus, in theory, any new EU expansion}

(when the nation state concerning has trade with the US) is economically an advantage for the US. However, there are also some problems that occur with EU enlargement. It could mean a loss of agricultural trade, since for example many Eastern European member states have a lot of

79_{George W. Bush, “Press Background Briefing on the President's Meeting with President Gul of Turkey by a Senior}

Administration Official”, January 8, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency

Project, accessed April 14, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62247.

80_{“The Enlargement of the Union”, European Parliament, accessed March 25, 2017,}

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.1.html

81_{Michael Baun, “The Implications of EU Enlargement for the US”, Perspectives: Central European Review of}

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28 agriculture themselves.82 So in the end, the US will probably only support EU enlargement when it will not have negative consequences for the US.

Also on the area of security, EU enlargement was and will be beneficial for the US. The Eastern enlargement of the 2000s meant that the Eastern member states became more Western, so more focused on the EU and US instead of being under a strong influence of Russia. Additionally, the EU might be likely to increase its own defense policy, since more and more nation states are becoming part of the EU, while the neighboring regions are not always that stable. The need for an EU defense policy might increase. Enlargement also means that the EU becomes neighbors with countries that are not likely to become European soon, but will have closer ties with the EU because of the neighborhood.83 Additionally, the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU member state, does not involve any explicit costs for the US.84 Thus, it does not have any direct negative consequences for the US policy. This would add up to the other advantages of the EU membership of Turkey: Turkey would become an even closer ally in the Western world, so it would be on the same side as the US. This would mean that it would be easier for the US to influence the Middle East through Turkey. Turkey could be its Western partner in the Middle East, since the region of the Middle East would be the direct neighbor of Turkey.

3.1.3. NATO

Not only the EU is a Western link between the US and Turkey, NATO is also a Western link. NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance. It is founded on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed in 1949. There are 28 members, including the US, many European member states and Turkey. NATO has two elements: political and military.85 So, it promotes democratic values and prevents conflicts, but it also has the military capacity to get involved in conflicts. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, only three years after the initial start of NATO with EU member states and the US. This means that Turkey, the US and many EU member states have worked together for a long time already.

82_Idem. 83_{Ibid., 31-33.}

84_{Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, “The Turkey-E.U.-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?”}

Middle East Journal 59: 272.

85_{All the information about NATO (including all members) can be found on the website of NATO itself, “What is}

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29 Within NATO, Turkey has been an important ally of the US during the Cold War, and more current, Turkey has always supported NATO’s mission in Afghanistan (which was initiated by the U.S).86 Former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin was even appointed NATO Representative in Afghanistan in 2003.87 Furthermore, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO.88_{It was of great importance for the US to keep Turkey on the Western side. More}

specifically, the US wanted to keep Turkey on the American side, in order to conduct American foreign strategy in the Middle East. This is again an element of the realist strategy of the US in the past decades. However, during the Bush Administration between 2005 and 2008, this was not easy. For example, in May 2006, the Turkish government pulled out of a NATO military exercise in Canada to protest against Canadian Prime Minister Harper who stated that the killing of Armenians in World War I was genocide. Turkey also recalled the Turkish Ambassador from Canada. Additionally, the Turkish government also recalled its ambassador from France, to protest a bill that would make denying the Armenian genocide a crime in France.89 These events contributed to a difficult relationship between not only the US and Turkey, but also between EU member states and Turkey. It can be seen as just a minor statement that Turkey made, but it also shows that Turkey was not a solid, reliable partner in NATO. When Turkey could be offended, it could mean that the other NATO members would have to do without Turkey. The conflict about Cyprus also took its toll in the NATO especially since the accession of Cyprus to the EU Turkey, who is also member of NATO, refused to allow any progress in NATO-EU relations because of the Cyprus conflict.90

86_{Madeleine K. Albright et all, U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership. Independent Task Force Report No. 69}

(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), 3 and 7.

87_{“Hikmet Çetin”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 25, 2015, accessed May 23, 2017,}

http://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/who_is_who_116925.htm?

88_{“The Awkward Partners: Growing worries in the West over the risk of losing Turkey”, The Economist, September}

29, 2006, accessed April 2, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/7971046

89_{Christ Mason, “Turkey: Pullout From NATO Exercise”, New York Times, May 11, 2006, accessed April 2, 2017,}

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/11/world/11briefs-brief-005.html

90_{Sinem Akgul Acikmese and Dimitrios Traintaphyllou, “The NATO-EU-Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus}

Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture