Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture
University of Strasbourg University of Groningen
August 2017
Evaluating the Comprehensive Approach of the European
Union
From a regional conflict prevention strategy to the guiding principle of the
European Union’s foreign policy
Submitted by: Christopher Heumann Student Number University of Strasbourg: 21516912
MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Christopher Heumann, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Evaluating the Comprehensive Approach of the European Union – From a regional conflict prevention strategy to the guiding principle of the European Union’s foreign policy”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Index
1. Introduction ... 4 1.1 Research Question ... 5 1.2 Literature Overview ... 8 2. Methodology ... 13 2.1 Theory ... 13 2.2 Method ... 143. Defining the EU comprehensive approach ... 19
3.1 Background of the comprehensive approach ... 19
3.2 The principles of the concept of the comprehensive approach ... 23
3.2.1 The core principle of an integrated approach ... 25
3.2.2 The principle of tailored approaches to the root causes of conflicts ... 29
3.2.3 The principle of early warning and early action ... 32
3.2.4 The principle of the EU as a global actor ... 35
3.2.5 The principle of supporting a multilateral and rule-based world order ... 38
4. Evaluating the EU comprehensive approach ... 42
4.1 EU external action in Somalia ... 42
4.1.1 Background of the crisis in Somalia ... 42
4.1.2 EU external action in Somalia ... 43
4.1.3 Evaluating the EU comprehensive approach in Somalia ... 45
4.2 EU external action in Mali ... 48
4.2.1 Background of the crisis in Mali ... 48
4.2.2 EU external action in Mali ... 49
4.2.3 Evaluating the EU comprehensive approach in Mali ... 50
4.3 EU external action in Ukraine ... 53
4.3.1 Background of the conflict in Ukraine ... 53
4.3.2 EU external action in Ukraine ... 54
4.3.3 Evaluating the EU comprehensive approach in Ukraine ... 55
5. Conclusion ... 59
6. Bibliography ... 62
6.1 European Union Documents... 62
6.2 Books and Articles ... 63
6.3 Dissertations ... 65
6.4 Press ... 65
6.5 Websites ... 66
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1. Introduction
“What we need, what our citizens need is not an endless hypothetical debate, be it on EU army or on changing our treaties, what we need to do it is to use the instruments, all the potential, all the tools we already have.” 1
In the opinion of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini stated above, European citizens need to see action on behalf of the European Union rather than hypothetical debate. Indeed, a fundamental mission of the EU is to convince its citizens that it can effectively deal with the issues it is facing.2 In 2009, Jean-Yves Haine remarked that “The EU, by identity
rather than practice, presents itself to the world as a unique and successful civilian and ethical actor”.3 Has identity since translated into practice? An important testament of ‘actorness’ in this
regard is the implementation of the Common Defence and Security Policy by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the framework of the EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and resolution. Originating in the mid-1990s, the comprehensive approach can be defined by the five principles of integrating available foreign policy instruments, tailoring policies to the root causes of conflicts, implementing early warning systems and early action, the conceiving of the EU as a global actor with unique capabilities and the support for a multilateral, rule-based world order. In this research, it will be tested to what extent the conceptualization of the comprehensive approach has been translated into concrete EU external action. Through case studies of implementations of the comprehensive approach in Somalia, Mali and Ukraine, common successes and shortcomings will be pinpointed with the aim of generating an overarching evaluation of the reality of the comprehensive approach.
The notion of a foreign policy of the European Union has in the past often been met with humour and has been questioned in its very existence. Considering the nature of the EU as an organisation between sovereign states with their own foreign policy agendas, it would indeed seem peculiar for an EU foreign policy to materialize. The decade following the turn of the millennia has been especially indicative of lacking common foreign policy vision among EU member states. Bringing a potent EU institution to life to solidify EU tools of foreign policy,
1 Federica Mogherini, ‘Opening Speech by the High Representative/Vice President’ (2016 EDA Conference,
Brussels, 10 November 2016).
2 Federica Mogherini, ‘Speech by the High Representative/Vice President’ (Willy Brandt Lecture 2016, Berlin, 7
December 2016).
3 Jean-Yves Haine, ‘The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, International Journal 64, no. 2 (2009),
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member states of the European Union created the EEAS, formally launched in 2010, with the treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Enough time has passed for the EEAS to impact the EU’s ability as an actor in international relations and therefore, ten years after the treaty of Lisbon, the question of the validity of an EU foreign policy should be revisited by examining how successful the HRVP and the EEAS have been in fulfilling their set role. In official accounts, the role of implementing external action on behalf of the EU is defined by the framework of the comprehensive approach. Starting as a regional strategy for conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, it has evolved into the declared working principle for all EU external action.
After elaborating on the research aims this research intends to address, the introduction will also provide an overview of the literature relevant to the topic of the comprehensive approach of the European Union. Afterwards, this research will thoroughly examine the origins of the comprehensive approach as a doctrine of EU external action and generate a definition of the comprehensive approach by the official account of the EU. This definition will be confronted with the reality of the comprehensive approach’s implementation through case studies of Somalia, Mali and Ukraine. Finally, conclusions will be reached on to which extent the implementation of the comprehensive approach adheres to its conceptual principles. It will also be attempted to identify successes and shortcomings that reach over multiple implementations of the comprehensive approach to help answer whether it can truly be considered a credible framework for EU foreign policy.
1.1 Research Question
This research aims to demonstrate the consistency of the EU comprehensive approach as the working principle for EU foreign policy and trace its origins. In other words: Is the concept of the comprehensive approach as presented by the EEAS and the European Commission effectively implemented in practice? And if it isn’t, are there principles or aspects of the comprehensive approach that the EU consistently succeeds or fails to apply in its efforts of crisis prevention and resolution?
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approach among the foreign policies of global actors. As the EU vowed to apply the principles of the comprehensive approach to all EU foreign policy, a detailed account of its origins is valuable. In testing its legitimacy, this research will significantly contribute to the understanding of to what extent the foreign policy of the European Union can be considered new and exceptional. For this reason, this research reaches beyond basic policy implementation studies.
To attempt to answer the primary research question, it should be divided into the following elements, which will be attended to over the course of this research:
▪ How is the concept of the comprehensive approach of the European Union defined in the rhetoric of its institutions, where does it come from and how has it evolved?
▪ Does the implementation of the comprehensive approach of the European Union adhere to its stated principles and is it consistent across multiple cases?
▪ Can the comprehensive approach be considered the working principle of EU foreign policy? To provide an account of the EU comprehensive approach’s contribution to the EU’s ability to form foreign policy, the relation between the concept of the EU comprehensive approach and the practical implementation of it needs to first be demonstrated. A thorough analysis of the roots of the comprehensive approach in EU policy has not yet been conducted. This research will first provide an accurate definition of the EU’s narrative of its comprehensive approach and then test its consistency by examining of its implementation. Drawing from sources starting from 1996 until 2017, this research regards the relevant and perceivable origins of the EU comprehensive approach to lie in Communication from the Commission to the Council on The EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa of 1996.4 Although the CFSP stretches back to its establishment by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the studied timeframe begins in 1996, as the early beginnings of the CFSP show insufficient similarities to the comprehensive approach as outlined in the Global Strategy of the EEAS5 in the present.
The motivation to conduct this research stems from the essential question in European studies whether the European Union can be considered an effective actor that is able to fulfil the expectations of its citizens in mastering the challenges of an increasingly complex security situation. The EEAS is young and therefore has a slim track-record and an even slimmer
4 Commission of the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and beyond, SEC(96) 332, Communication from the Commission to the Council, (6 March
1996).
5 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for
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collection of assessments of it. Yet there are indicators, especially in light of the current refugee crisis, pointing to the increasing relevance of the EU in providing European citizens with security and a voice on the international stage. Of the existing assessments of the comprehensive approach, most are focused on case studies of specific missions, operations or countries in which the approach was implemented. There is little research focused on an evaluation taking into account the combined implementations of the comprehensive approach to form general conclusions. There is also a lack of studies on the topic of the origins and development of the comprehensive approach, which is a gap that should be addressed especially if the approach is becoming the guiding principle for EU foreign policy.
The observations gained through such a study are valuable in answering some of the larger questions about the EU that is preoccupying not just academic circles, but the wider public as well since the euro crisis and the Brexit vote.6 Furthermore, with the election of Donald Trump to the office of President of the United States, it is uncertain to what extent the EU can rely on its traditional partner in dealing with crises and conflicts in general. Angela Merkel pointed out in May 2017, that “the times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over” and that “we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands.”7
Although not referring directly to the US, the speech during which this statement was made came three days after President Trump’s first official visit to Brussels, which included meetings with EU officials and leaders of NATO member countries. The role of the European Union as a global actor and security provider is a timely issue, to which the topic of a coherent EU foreign policy is central. This research will contribute to the question of to what extent the EU’s foreign policy is dependent on its traditional security framework linked to the US and NATO.
However, it is the German head of state who made these comments, which leads to the question of whether decisions concerning the CFSP are rather intergovernmental or supranational. For example, since the Greek debt crisis captivated public attention starting in 2010 at the latest, the public of some member states became nervous about the prospect of a German hegemony within the EU. On the other side, Germany itself appears to be reluctant to seize this role. The study on the consistency of the implementation of the comprehensive
6 1. Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, and Dorothy Manevich, ‘Post-Brexit, Europeans More Favorable Toward EU’,
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 15 June 2017.
7 Jon Henley, ‘Angela Merkel: EU Cannot Completely Rely on US and Britain Any More’, The Guardian, 28
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approach contributes to the understanding of the power distribution of member states and the sharing or integration of competences, even though it is not the primary research aim.
Finally, the European Union and its member states often claim that their foreign policy action is tied to high moral standards. The comprehensive approach is a good example of this mindset, as it fosters sustainable development through security. The endgame is stability benefitting the interests of the EU and its member states, but it is made a point that this should not be achieved at the expense of the countries in which the comprehensive approach is applied. Regarding EU interests, although not the focus of this research, the diversity of actors next to EU institutions and member states that form these interests needs to be pointed out. For instance, the motivations for the application of the comprehensive approach includes economic interests in the development and arms industry sector. How these are linked with the manifestation of political goals should be addressed by more specialised studies on the political sociology in Brussels and member states.
1.2 Literature Overview
The theoretical material in the study of international relations relevant to the understanding of the European Union’s comprehensive approach derives from a multitude of academic strands. In this fashion, the rationalization of the comprehensive approach of the EU finds its roots in Functionalism and Liberalism in International Relations. ‘Comprehensive’ studies of the EU comprehensive approach themselves are so far rather scarce, nonetheless an overview of existing research on the topic will be provided.
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the potential for the creation of wealth.8 A modest parallel to the EU comprehensive approach can be drawn here already, as the comprehensive approach emphasises on rationality in its coordination of all available foreign policy tools in the prevention and resolution of crises. When applied, the comprehensive approach’s objective is to maintain peace and promote stability with the goal of benefitting prosperity. The functionalist Inis L. Claude’s Swords Into
Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization9 is much more closely connected with the underlying principles of the comprehensive approach of the EU. In the third edition of the book published in 1964, Claude was very early in identifying the UN’s practices in the Congo as ‘preventive diplomacy,’ as well as pointing out the emerging importance of development aid in subsequent editions of Swords and Plowshares.10 Claude thereby is one of the first to describe the tools being used in the EU’s comprehensive approach today, even though his analysis was focused on the United Nations. With the emergence of additional integrationist and interventionist theories in international relations, Functionalism has been pushed to the margins of the academic debate in international relations.11 Yet there have been
attempts to bolster its relevance. In relation to the topic of the EU comprehensive approach, these attempts include Craig Murphy demonstration of functionalism as a powerful approach to conflict resolution12 and David Long’s rather negative evaluation of early bids of the EU as a security provider.13
Liberalism in the study of international relations offers a whole spectrum of varying directions of thought. Relevant to understanding the comprehensive approach of the EU are predominantly the strands of Liberal Institutionalism and Liberal Internationalism. The former emphasises on the cooperation between sovereign states manifesting itself within international organisations, while the latter can be drawn from to examine the actual policies associated with the comprehensive approach. Serving as the theoretical framework for this research, Liberal Institutionalism explains the reasoning behind the decision of member states of the European Union to “outsource” portions of their foreign policy and will be explored in more detail in the
8Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (Cosimo, Inc., 2007).
9 Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (Random
House, 1964).
10 Charles C. Pentland, ‘Inis Claude’s United Nations: Swords into Plowshares Revisited’, International Journal
68, no. 1 (2012): 151–66, 154.
11 Lucian Ashworth and David Long, New Perspectives on International Functionalism (Springer, 2016), vii. 12 Craig N. Murphy, ‘The Functional Approach, Organization Theory and Conflict Resolution’, in New
Perspectives on International Functionalism, ed. Lucian M. Ashworth and David Long, International Political
Economy Series (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999), 84–104, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-27055-2_5.
13 David Long, ‘The Security Discourses of the European Union: A Functional Critique’, in New Perspectives on
International Functionalism, ed. Lucian M. Ashworth and David Long, International Political Economy Series
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methodology chapter. When concerned with intervention in sovereign nation states with the goal of crisis prevention and crisis resolution, the theories of Liberal Internationalism need to be mentioned. Broadly speaking, this theory represents the employment of liberal principles in the foreign policies of liberal states,14 a practice visible in European foreign policy for at least the past two decades.15 For this European brand of Liberal Internationalism, Jean-Yves Haine identifies the two primary principles of preventive engagement and effective multilateralism.16 Unfortunately for the theory of Liberal Internationalism, interventions that include stated goals of promoting humanitarian objectives have been facing immense scepticism since the disaster of the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.17 This setback however in no way means an end to the theory as a whole. At the World Economic Forum at Davos in 2017, the Secretary General of the United Nations António Guterres remarked that “Prevention cannot be – especially when we speak of the prevention of conflict – cannot be reduced to some form of diplomatic action. No, prevention needs to be a comprehensive approach, (…).”18
Now proceeding to orientate the comprehensive approach itself in the field of international relations, it should be said that even though the term of comprehensive approach appeared as early as 1996 in the context of an EU regional conflict management strategy,19 it
was not widely used to describe EU conflict prevention and resolution frameworks for more than a decade. Other terms used to refer to the approach include for instance Civil-Military Coordination.20 Seen as a meaningful attempt to streamline EU external action, the European
Security Strategy (ESS) published in December of 2003 outlines the essentials of the
comprehensive approach, notably its core assumption that “security is a precondition of development.”21 The term of ‘comprehensive approach’ however cannot be found in the
document. “Comprehensive EU policy” and “a comprehensive EU approach” appear in the
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2008,22 but as policy recommendations rather than an overarching designating term for the policy. The term is
14 B. Jahn, Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice (Springer, 2013), 13.
15 Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘Liberal Internationalism’, in Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy (Sage
Publications, Incorporated, 2015).
16 Jean-Yves Haine, ‘The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, (2009), 457. 17 Ibid., 458.
18 António Guterres, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Remarks at the World Economic Forum’, 19 January 2017. 19 Commission of the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and beyond, (6 March 1996).
20 Nik Hynek, Consolidating the EU’s Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination and the
Future of EU OHQ, PE 433.822, March 2010.
21 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December
2003), 2.
22Javier Solana, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a
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conclusively coined in 2013 with a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council titled ‘The EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis. Possibly for this reason, next to the healthy scepticism towards the claim of an existing and effective foreign policy of the European Union, researchers have been shy in utilising the term when analysing EU foreign policy. Reflecting this tendency, handbooks on EU foreign policy such as Karen E. Smith’s European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World make no mention of an ‘EU comprehensive approach’, yet extensively evaluate the comprehensiveness of the policies. Smith for instance reaches the conclusion that the “EU’s human rights policy is not comprehensive.”23 Other literature published before the year of 2013 mentions ‘comprehensive
planning’ regarding crisis-management instruments24 or “EU comprehensive Security”25. Thus, it is important to note that the study of the EU comprehensive approach is older than the widespread use of its term.
In the majority of studies, the EU comprehensive approach’s track record is shown in a rather negative light. Although most researchers affirm that the European Union is well suited for the implementation of comprehensive policy in conflict prevention and resolution as it has access to a “complete civil-military ‘toolbox,’”26 meaning the wide-ranging competences of its
institutions, the verdict is in general that the EU comprehensive approach lacks coordination and fails to produce decisive results. A study conducted by Nicoletta Pirozzi for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces published in June 2013 states that in order for the EU to become a more effective security provider, “a much more integrated framework of inter-institutional cooperation” is needed.27 For the case of Somalia, a study by Kerstin Petretto and Hans-Georg Ehrhart published in 2014 claims that while the naval Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR Somalia) was successful in curbing piracy off the coast of the country, the civilian aspect of state building was neglected: “It is not necessarily the Somali people who are at centre stage, but rather potential threats that emanate from the country for the EU and its partners.”28 Another high profile case of the comprehensive approach is the EU’s
23 Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). 24 Eva Gross, EU and the comprehensive approach (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies,
2008), 10.
25 Carmen Gebhard and Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, ‘Making Sense of EU comprehensive Security towards
Conceptual and Analytical Clarity’, European Security 20, no. 2 (June 2011): 221–41, doi:10.1080/09662839.2011.564613.
26 Eva Gross, ‘Towards a comprehensive approach? The EU’s Contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in
Afghanistan’, Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 28, no. 4 (2010), 228.
27 Nicoletta Pirozzi, ‘The EU comprehensive approach to Crisis Management’, EU Crisis Management Papers
Series, June 2013, 17.
28 Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Kerstin Petretto, ‘Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU comprehensive approach Work?’,
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adoption of it for the crisis in Mali. In her master thesis at the University of Leiden, Malou Snijders notes that the principles of the comprehensive approach were swiftly adapted into a common EU strategy when the conflict erupted, but that the political and military training pillars failed to deliver adequate results.29 Predominantly, existing evaluations thus conclude that the essential principles of the EU comprehensive approach are applied to varying degrees and that short-term objectives of keeping the peace through military action are successful. However, the long-terms goals of state building are far from accomplished. The evaluations of the three cases in this research will be more accurate than existing studies, as they are based on a more complete definition of the comprehensive approach. Before the exhaustive account of the origins of the comprehensive approach in this research, such a definition had previously not been generated.
Regarding the literature introduced above, this research will contribute in situating the comprehensive approach within the mentioned schools of thought in the study of International Relations and attempt to generate a more unified evaluation of the EU comprehensive approach. Functionalism’s emphasis on common rather than national interest is at the heart of the principles of the comprehensive approach and this research will establish to what extent the common interest actually supersedes the national interest of EU member states, as opposed to the interest of the people the approach is supposed to benefit. For Liberal Internationalism, comprehensive foreign policy measures not just of the EU but of any significant international player represent a sensible amelioration of the failed approaches that discredited foreign interventions based on liberal principles throughout the 2000s. This research would contribute to the understanding of whether comprehensive policy could serve as a credible alternative. Finally, much of academic scrutiny on the EU comprehensive approach has been focused on individual cases. This research hopes to provide overarching conclusions on the consistency of the implementation of the comprehensive approach.
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2. Methodology
2.1 Theory
The theoretical lens made use of for this research is Liberal Institutionalism. This research adopts the assumptions of this theory in its perception of the order among states in international relations. Institutional Liberalism, of the rationalist tradition in the study of international relations, attributes a significant role to international organisations such as the European Union or organisations of lesser integration but broader membership such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Especially in the case of the EU, international organisations enable member states to achieve outcomes that would be unavailable to them individually.30 Although admitting that these organisations can be autonomous actors to some extent, Institutional Liberalism also draws from the realist tradition in recognizing that sovereign nation state actors still retain the most influence and are still the primary driving force in cooperation between states as manifested in these international organisations. Moreover, states are predominantly inclined to engage in cooperation only to maximise their own absolute gains. Finally, Liberal Institutionalism does recognise that international organisations can develop a degree of autonomy, but even then, their actions would still be fuelled by the framework of power and interest. In fact, when the theory was first introduced in 1977,31 it was argued to be a viable alternative to Realism in International Relations studies. However, a fundamental difference between the two traditions prevents most hardcore realists from acknowledging the relevance of Liberal Institutionalism as “unlike realism, it strives for, and believes in improvement of the human condition and provides a rationale for building cooperative institutions that can facilitate better lives for human beings.”32 For this research,
this means that while importance is attributed to the European Union and the EEAS as an actor, it is acknowledged that the primary driving force behind the actions of the EU are its member states. Although expanding the EU’s capacity for action with the creation of the EEAS and the position of HRVP, the treaty of Lisbon also formally institutionalized the intergovernmental European Council as a decision-making body. Expanding the role of an international
30 J. Jupille and and J. A. Caporaso, ‘Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations
and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 429–44, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.429, 430.
31 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston:
TBS The Book Service Ltd, 1977).
32 R. O. Keohane, ‘Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism’, International Relations 26, no. 2 (1 June 2012):
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organisation between states without diminishing the role of states within fits into the narrative of the Liberal Institutionalist school of thought.
Robert Keohane refers to institutions as “general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized”33 and identifies two different strands of the “Rationalistic Approach” and the “Reflective Approach” in Liberal Institutionalism. For the undertaking of this research in assessing the credibility of the EU comprehensive approach, Liberal Institutionalism becomes helpful in the question of whether the comprehensive approach can indeed be considered a “general pattern or categorization of activity.” Examining whether the principles of the comprehensive approach are consistently present in its applications determines whether the comprehensive approach can be considered an international institution in the eyes of Liberal Institutionalism. The “Rationalistic Approach” assumes that specific international institutions appear only when there are potential gains for a state actor, while the “Reflective Approach” assumes that international institutions “are often not created consciously by human beings but rather emerge slowly through a less deliberative process”.34 This research makes use of the “Reflective
Approach” due to two essential aspects of the comprehensive approach: Looking at the origins of the comprehensive approach, it becomes apparent that the policy emerged slowly over more than a decade rather than with a single policy decision of the European Council or the HRVP. This research explains how the principles of the comprehensive approach developed from a regional strategy towards the single issue of conflict management in Africa, to the guiding principle of all EU foreign policy. Second, the principles of the comprehensive approach are closely linked with humanistic values that the EU and its member states generally identify with. The method used to determine the extent of which the comprehensive approach can be referred to as an institution is presented in the next section.
2.2 Method
As Robert Keohane, a leading author in Institutional Liberalism, argues, “there is no strict relationship between the degree of institutionalization of an institution and its importance to world politics.”35 Stating that the new institutions of the EEAS introduced by the treaty of
33 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4
(December 1988): 379, doi:10.2307/2600589, 383
34 Ibid., 389.
35 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions And State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory
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Lisbon increased the significance of the European Union on the world stage simply because they exist is indeed insufficient. The degree of validity and effectiveness of the EU comprehensive approach in crisis prevention and resolution in the end determines its impact more than its existence on paper. There is usually a gap between the conceptualization of a foreign policy approach and the given actor’s implementation of it in practice, which can manifest itself either by the failure of set objectives or a discrepancy between the envisaged action and implemented action. This research therefore sets out to determine whether the comprehensive approach of the EU exists outside of conceptualization and rhetoric. Once a clear definition of the comprehensive approach has been established with the method of content analysis, a multiple case study approach of implementations of the comprehensive approach will determine its consistency and thereby its degree of ‘institutionalisation.’
To assess the validity of the EU comprehensive approach, this research uses a mixed method in content analysis. The phrase being mentioned for the first time in 194136, “content
analysis is the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes.”37 This research provides an empirical definition of the comprehensive
approach’s principles and implementing bodies using the method of quantitative or ‘conceptual’ content analysis. With this approach, the leading elements of the comprehensive approach are coded into categories that will be identified within the EU sources that outline the comprehensive approach. The categories are established by an inductive approach of examining the sources first and subsequently identifying the dominant principles. However, since the concept of the comprehensive approach changed over time, the process of its evolution also needs to be documented. For this purpose, the method of qualitative or ‘relational’ content analysis will be made use of. With this method, the content categories established with the first step of quantitative analysis will be looked at more closely, identifying developments within the categories over time. Furthermore, some categories present in the earlier stages of the comprehensive approach that disappear by the time of the publication of the EEAS Global Strategy could be linked to categories that only appear at a later stage of the studied timeframe. This approach can thus not be definitively placed in the divide between positivism and interpretivism. Even though it does aim to establish a definition of the components of the comprehensive approach that aims be as empirical as possible, the approach of content analysis needs to be interpretive as well, due to the comprehensive approach’s characteristics
36 Neil J. Salkind, Encyclopedia of Research Design (SAGE, 2010), 233.
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changing nature and sometimes ambiguous statement of its objectives. Nevertheless, covering all aspects of the conceptualization of the EU comprehensive approach, the account aims to offer a comprehensible and an as exhaustive as possible description of the comprehensive approach as it has existed on paper since 1996. It should be noted that, as Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune point out in their handbook on qualitative research methods of 2012, the methods of quantitative and qualitative content analysis are not distinctively delineated: “content analysis is not inherently either quantitative or qualitative.”38 Additionally, Christopher Lamont in his guide to research methods in the study of international relations claims that “qualitative methods are neither exclusively empiricist nor interpretative” and that “quantitative data can also be of use to the interpretive researcher.”39 For the conducted research, this means that a purely qualitative or purely quantitative research method would both neglect indicators needed for an exhaustive account of the principles of the comprehensive approach.
The basis of this account are primary sources in the form of EU publications such as communications from the European Commission or policy documents of the EEAS. The choice of using exclusively EU sources may seem biased, but in the case of the research of this research is justified by the aim of defining precisely the EU concept and narrative of its comprehensive approach. Secondary sources from media, think tanks and academia would not add to this aspect of this research, but will be considered after an EU definition of its comprehensive approach has been extracted. The timeframe chosen for these sources starts with the Communication from the Commission on the issue of conflicts in Africa in 1996 until the publication of the Global Strategy by the EEAS in 2016.
The second part of the research are three illustrative case studies of selected implementations of the EU comprehensive approach. Making use of the categories acquired through content analysis, this part will test to what extent the EU comprehensive approach has been applied in the missions in Somalia, Mali and Ukraine. Starting in 2008, 2013 and 2014 respectively, these three cases are within a suitable timeframe for the aim of this research. It is recognised that three cases of the implementation of the comprehensive approach represents a large set of evidence. However, with the aim of evaluating the consistency of the comprehensive approach and its viability as an overarching working method for EU foreign policy, this research is obligated to examine a wide and diverse range of evidence. Furthermore, since the
38 Bruce Lawrence Berg and Howard Lune, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Pearson,
2012), 354.
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application of the comprehensive approach in these three cases has already been subject to the scrutiny of academic study, it would be redundant to repeat the process in this research. To evaluate the comprehensive approach in this multiple case study approach, academic sources of previous case studies are relied on, which will be specified in the relevant chapter. This is justified by the fact that this research’s focus is not the individual case studies, but rather an overall evaluation of the application of the comprehensive approach and its viability as guiding principle for EU foreign policy. Thereby the three cases of Somalia, Mali and Ukraine have also been chosen due to their high profile in media and academia as compared to other examples of EU foreign policy such as external action in the Central African Republic or Georgia. In the divide between positivism and interpretivism, the multiple case study approach cannot be situated definitively neither.
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3. Defining the EU comprehensive approach
In this chapter, the concept of the EU comprehensive approach is examined with the purpose of tracing its origins and pinpointing its principles. First, the historic circumstances that engendered the outset of the comprehensive approach are presented. This type of insight is valuable for the subsequent content analysis of EU policy documents delineating the principles of the comprehensive approach, as it reveals the incentives and challenges of the EU to develop its own unique approach to the prevention and resolution of international crises.
3.1 Background of the comprehensive approach
Progressing at an irregular pace, the integration process of the European Union is characterized by multiple failed attempts of political integration that would have granted the EU, or before it the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, sufficient competences to become a recognizable actor on the world stage. Early attempts at developing “hard power” within the Community that could have been deployed as foreign policy tools, the European Defence Community in the 1950s, failed to convince. The primary concern of European states west of the iron curtain was the threat of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and in the end a transatlantic approach to security with NATO was the favoured solution.
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More missions followed in the Balkans, but also in more distant hotspots with for instance EUPOL Afghanistan launched in 2007.
In view of the manner with which the EU dealt with the challenges of the post-cold war environment in Europe, it can be easily perceived where the origins of the EU comprehensive approach lie. The earliest example of shifting focus of EU priorities in the post-cold war setting are the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ Formulated after an EU Council meeting in June 1992, the tasks include the availability of military troops of the member states of the Western European Union (WEU) to post-Cold War priorities such as humanitarian missions, conflict prevention, peace-keeping or post-conflict stabilisation. Military units were pledged to be made available not just to the WEU, but also to NATO and the newly established EU. Besides naming the new priorities, ‘the Petersberg Tasks’ also highlight the continuing tradition of indivisibility between European security interests and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Despite the transformation of the security threats the European continent was faced with, the close relationship with the United States and dedication to NATO persisted. As NATO was struggling to find a new role and safeguard its relevance in the post-Cold War environment, it also focused its attention on the resolution of crises. The Berlin Plus agreements, concluded in March 2003, facilitated cooperation between NATO and the EU, making NATO assets and capabilities available to the EU led Crisis Management Operations upon request. Although arguably in decline in recent years and now even put into question since Donald Trump ascension to the presidency of the US, the close relationship between the European Union and the United States endures and the EU is committed to NATO as the EU’s primary security provider.40 Nevertheless, the EU has gradually extended its own role in facing its security threats and fostering stability.
Notably in the context of strengthening the so-called ‘European neighbourhood,’ the EU has since the 1990s developed powerful tools to promote stability and development. The EU in this case is able to exert influence on the states in its neighbourhood in exchange for greater access to the EU and potentially even membership. Two distinct geographical spaces with differing EU neighbourhood policies can be identified: Firstly, post-communist central and eastern Europe and secondly countries bordering the Mediterranean, excluding the states that formerly constituted the state of Yugoslavia, for which the EU developed its own policy of the ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’ launched in 1999. Both eastern Europe and the Mediterranean states on the other hand fall under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood
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Policy launched in 2003, but are treated with different frameworks. Before the ENP was set up, the eastern and central European states of Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic countries initiated accession talks in 1993. Through the negotiations, the EU was able to exert influence on the development of these young democracies who would accede to the EU in 2004 and assist in fostering the prosperity that would guarantee stability. The same can be said for the accession process of Romania and Bulgaria, joining the EU in 2007, and Croatia, joining the EU in 2013. The instrument of accession negotiations was and still is a powerful tool for the EU, though the list of potential candidates for EU accession is considerably shorter now. The eastern European states remaining outside of the EU has little prospect of joining, but nevertheless are approached differently than the neighbourhood countries to the South. Aimed at concretely increasing linkages, the Eastern Partnership, launched at the Prague summit in 2009 is comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. One recent achievement is that, as of June 2017, Ukrainian citizens no longer require a visa for short-term visits to the Schengen area.41 The ‘Southern
Neighbourhood’ is embodied by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), created in 2008 and reinforcing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) or ‘Barcelona Process’ initiated in 1995. In contrast to the Eastern Partnership, the UfM is much more focused on fostering stability and prosperity, as well as transmitting cultural values, rather than opening borders. It comprises the 28 EU member states and 15 countries bordering the Mediterranean in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. Increasingly driven by the comprehensive approach in its execution, the ENP can be said to have provided much of the experience that laid the foundation for the development of the modus operandi in EU external action of the comprehensive approach.
Besides the European Neighbourhood policy, the origins of the comprehensive approach can be traced to concepts of the 1990s and along a line of EU publications, most of them being subject of the content analysis effort to generate a clear definition of the comprehensive approach. The rise of the concept of ‘Preventive Diplomacy’ and the later ‘Responsibility to Protect’ without a doubt provided an impetus for the EU to ramp up its efforts on conflict prevention. Prior to the formulation of the concepts that would develop into the comprehensive approach, the December 1995 European Council conclusion’s emphasis in conflict prevention and resolution is still laid on ‘Preventive Diplomacy.’42 In the Petersberg Tasks mentioned
earlier, a refocus on priorities also found in the comprehensive approach can already be
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identified. The principles of the EU comprehensive approach first appear in a Communication of the European Commission of 1996 on conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa,43 putting forward the concept of ‘structural stability’. Furthermore, the communication stresses the importance of early warning of the eruption of conflicts and the usage of all available tools the EU already has at its disposal. It also emphasises on support for the UN and democracy. Touching upon some of the elements of the comprehensive approach today, among them the central element of ‘comprehensiveness’, the 1996 communication should be considered part of the comprehensive approach’s origins even though it is focused on conflict prevention in Africa. The next step was to translate the approach to conflict prevention in Africa to conflict prevention anywhere in the world where it may be required. In the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention of 2001, the core idea of ‘comprehensiveness’, or in other words addressing all elements constituting structural stability in a unified manner, is referred to as “integrated approach.” It is here that the comprehensive approach has its origin, which will be thoroughly examined in the content analysis effort in the next section.
The post-cold war role of the EU was further institutionalized with the treaty of Lisbon in 2008, giving life to the External Action Service, streamlining the decision-making processes of EU external action, as well as integrating existing tools for conflict prevention and resolution. With the creation of the External Action Service, the framework of the comprehensive approach was supposed to define the face of the European Union on the international stage. The failed military interventions of the early 21st century, namely the invasion of Iraq, increasingly showed the devastating consequences of poorly planned missions and operations on civil society. As the European Security Strategy of 2003 remarks, “In almost every major military intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos.”44 In this context, the need
for a new model of intervention was required and in many circles this was the comprehensive model, meaning that instead of an emphasis placed on military force in the pursuit of security and in the prevention or resolution of crises, civilian and economic tools would be attributed equal importance. More importantly, all foreign policy instruments should be closely coordinated to form streamlined, effective action. After having used comprehensive action as a guideline for its missions and operations throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the EU comprehensive approach is now formally institutionalized and is the conceptual cornerstone of all EU external action.
43Commission of the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and beyond, (6 March 1996).
23 3.2 The principles of the concept of the comprehensive approach
Having discussed the historical circumstances that induced the development of the EU comprehensive approach and the EU institutions that bear the responsibility of implementing this approach, the creational process of the conceptualisation of the comprehensive approach will now be explored. Through the analysis of the EU publications representing ‘milestones’, or in other words significant advances in the conceptualisation of the comprehensive approach, a concise definition will be generated. With a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the primary recurring elements of the comprehensive approach are pinpointed and their relation to each other defined. The publications that are made use of are the Communication from the Commission to the Council on the EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa of 1996,45 the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention of 2001,46 the European Security Strategy of 2003,47 the Council Conclusions on Security and Development of 2007,48 the Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention of 2011,49 the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the comprehensive approach of 2013,50 the Council conclusions on the EU comprehensive approach of 201451 and the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016.52 These sources are
publications of different EU institutions, namely the European Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the European Commission and the External Action Service. The European Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives are institutions of intergovernmental nature, the first being composed of the heads of state of EU member states and the second of their representatives to the EU in Brussels. The European Commission and the External Action Service on the other hand represent the supranational aspect of the EU. The difference in bias needs to be noted. More specifically, the intergovernmental branch of the
45 Commission of the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and beyond, (1996).
46 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention,
COM(2001)211 final, (Brussels, 11 April 2001).
47 Javier Solana, The European Security Strategy, (2003).
48 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 2831st External Relations
Council meeting, (Brussels, 20 November 2007).
49 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, 3101st Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, (Luxembourg, 20 June 2011).
50 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises, JOIN(2013) 30 Final, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, (11 December 2013).
51 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, Foreign Affairs
Council meeting, (12 May 2014).
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European Council bears the responsibility of setting general strategic directions for EU policy, while the supranational branch is tasked with translating these directions into concrete policy. In the context of the comprehensive approach, this becomes apparent as the Commission documents are more likely to present concrete measures for EU institutions and EU member states to take. Both types of documents have been included in the content analysis conducted by this research, as both are equally well suited in identifying the principles of the comprehensive approach. As stated above, the primary difference is only that in the Communications of the Commission, the principles are added to with concrete proposals or the account of concrete action taken along the presented principles.
Other relevant documents that were excluded from the content analysis effort are the European Union Programme on Conflict Prevention of 2001,53 the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2008,54 the Concept on Strengthening EU mediation and dialogue capacities of 2009,55 the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone
Countries,56 the EU internal security strategy57 and the Council conclusions on progress in
implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence.58 Also relevant but
not listed are the Council conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. These documents were omitted from the corpus subject to the content analysis effort of this research due to them either only covering certain identified principles of the EU comprehensive approach or not adding any new elements to the principles that were not already mentioned by previously published EU sources covered by the content analysis. However, as part of the research process, they should be mentioned.
The effort of generating a definition of the EU comprehensive approach is inductive: The selected EU documents were analysed and subsequently the different elements, or as referred to in the method of content analysis ‘categories’, are pinpointed. More specifically, the starting point of the categorisation effort is the Global Strategy for the European Union’s
53 Council of the European Union, Draft EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 9537/1/01 REV
1, (Brussels, 7 June 2001).
54 Javier Solana, Report on the Implementation of The European Security Strategy, (2008).
55 Council of the European Union, Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, 15779/09,
(10 November 2009).
56 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone
Countries 2013-2020, SWD(2013) 227 Final, (Brussels, 19 June 2013).
57 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council -
The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 Final,
(Brussels, 22 November 2010).
58 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Progress in Impementing the EU Global Strategy in
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Foreign and Security Policy,59 chosen due to it being the most recent outline of the guiding principles and general working method of the EEAS and thereby EU foreign policy. Although the elements of the comprehensive approach are recurrent throughout the whole document, the chapter of “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises” is analysed for the purpose of categorisation.60 The patterns of the identified categories are then traced throughout the selected EU documents and the process of how the categorised principles developed is pinpointed. Focusing the analysis on this single chapter of the Global Strategy is primarily due to the focus of this research on EU external action towards conflict prevention and resolution. Since at least 2001, the EU “underlines its political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations.”61 The origins of the comprehensive approach
have thereby been focused on this domain, even though more recently the principles are aimed to be applied to all aspects of EU external policy and even internal policy.62
Rather than starting from the Global Strategy published in 2016 and then tracing back the identified principles through EU documents published before as was done during the research process, this section starts with the document that, in the opinion of this research, can be considered an early precursor of the comprehensive approach. For the sake of clarity, the analysed documents are indicated by their year of publication.
Before proceeding to trace the roots of the five identified principles of the comprehensive approach, it should be specified that the ideas of these principles did not appear with the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach rather assembled them into a single policy idea and from then on developed together in the framework of the comprehensive approach. Especially the fifth principle of a multilateral, rule-based world order has been part of the identity of the European Union since its early beginnings.
3.2.1 The core principle of an integrated approach
The first category identified is the core assumption of the comprehensive approach, which is that the sources of conflicts, as well as instruments available to address them, are numerous and diverse, yet very much interlinked and are required to be targeted in a consolidated manner to maximise the potential for successful outcomes. The relevant principle
59 EEAS, A Global Strategy for the EU, (2016). 60 Ibid., 28.
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in this case is the integration of responses to interlinked issues or sectors. Due to the multi-dimensional nature of the same conflict, the tools and instruments addressing these multiple dimensions need to be coordinated well for maximum effect. Central to this idea is the link between security and prosperity. One cannot hope to achieve one without bolstering the other. The EU in this fashion does not prioritise on developing new tools, but argues that the already existing tools at its disposal need to be integrated. Coordination and integration should also take place across all phases or cycles of a conflict.
1996 – Throughout the research process, the core principle of integrating available tools to deal with interlinked issues across multiple sectors has been traced back to the concept of ‘structural stability, which first appears in the communication on conflicts in Africa. This concept refers to “a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to violent conflict.”63 The
communication states that the above cited elements of the concept of structural stability “are interdependent which implies the need for a comprehensive approach.”64 This represents the
first mention of the need for a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated’ approach to conflict prevention and resolution. The Communication specifies that “operating with the term structural stability in no way implies a major departure from the current policies of the European Union,”65 but that what was still missing was “the linkage between this ‘political’ assistance, development aid, and the traditional foreign policy instruments.”66 This new concept of a comprehensive
approach also “should address the entire cycle of conflict and peace.”67 It should be pointed
out, that the early concept of the comprehensive approach in fostering “structural stability” accentuates on supporting the development of democratic structures, an element that would be attributed varying importance throughout the development of the comprehensive approach.
2001 – The primary development from the last document is that the term of ‘comprehensive approach’ is in the communication on conflict prevention of 2001 referred to with ‘integrated approach.’ Nevertheless, the concept of “structural stability” of the previous document is cited as basis for the ‘integrated approach,’ namely that all its elements “need to
63 Commission of the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and beyond, (1996), 2.
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be addressed in an integrated way.”68 A possibility for the change in the term used may be to improve the clarity of the concept, as the core principle of comprehensiveness refers to integrating tools dealing with issues that should be considered as integrated. Also in respect of improving clarity, the original term of ‘comprehensive approach’ encompasses the other four principles as well besides the core principle of an integrated response. In addition to the elements that were already presented in the previous communication, new elements of the comprehensive approach are introduced. Namely that “co-ordination between Commission and Member States activities must be ensured,”69 thus integrating tools not just on an EU level, but
widening the scale to include the tools available to EU member states as well.
2003 – The ESS is not especially innovative concerning the core principle of ‘comprehensiveness.’ To “bring together the different instruments and capabilities,”70 that
“diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda,”71 or that “greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also
embracing the external activities of the individual member states,”72 are all elements already
present in the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention or the European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts of also 2001.73 In the ESS, regarding
the interdependence of issues to be addressed in the context of conflict prevention, concrete emphasis is laid on the fact that “security is the first condition for development.”74 Essentially
focusing the efforts of implementations of the comprehensive approach on these two sectors, could be considered a new element.
2007 – Although the Council Conclusions on security and development reiterate the principles of the comprehensive approach that had been established earlier, no significant new elements are added to them. This is true for the core principle of comprehensiveness, as it is for the other four. The slow advancement of the comprehensive approach could be in part due to the ‘period of reflection’ following the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and characterised by uncertainty on the future of the EU. Nevertheless, it is important to include this document into content analysis to demonstrate the continuity of the comprehensive approach in policy formulations of the EU. Thus, once more, it is stated that
68 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, (11
April 2001), 10.
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Javier Solana, The European Security Strategy, (12 December 2003), 13. 71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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“the EU will endeavour to improve the coherence, efficiency and visibility of its external policies and build synergies between them.”75 Referring to the European Security Strategy of
2003, “inter-linkage between security and development should be seen as an integral part of the ongoing EU efforts.”76
2011 – Not adding new elements to the core principle of comprehensiveness of the comprehensive approach neither, the conclusions on conflict prevention of 2011 report on the progress of the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Namely, “substantial progress has been made in implementing the Gothenburg Programme and there are a number of positive examples where preventive action was successful.”77 The Gothenburg Programme refers to the
European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts78 published on June 7th, 2001 and contains the principles of the comprehensive approach as they were put forward by the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention of the same year. The 2011 Council conclusions also mention the policies and priorities that have been set by the European Security Strategy and its implementation report of 2008. In this context “EU instruments for long and short term prevention have been strengthened.”79
2013 – Citing that the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 “calls for consistency between the different areas of EU external action,”80 the joint communication on the comprehensive
approach thoroughly restates the already existing elements of the core principle, which are now empowered through the adoption of the Lisbon treaty. “Following the entry into force of the [Treaty of Lisbon] and the new institutional context it created, (…) the EU has both the increased potential and the ambition – by drawing on the full range of its instruments and resources – to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic.”81 New elements are added with the joint communication as well. Notably, the element of linking internal and external policies is first proposed in this 2013 document: “EU internal policies and actions can have significant external effects on conflict and crisis situations. Likewise, external action and policy can also impact on EU internal dynamics.”82 Concrete measures to “ensure
strategic and operational coherence”83 are proposed. The probably most significant milestone
75 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Security and Development, (2007), 1. 76 Ibid.
77 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, (2011), 1.
78 Council of the European Union, Draft EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, (2001). 79 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, (2011), 1.
80 European Commission and HRVP, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises,
(2013), 2.
