Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture
University of Groningen (Home)University of Göttingen (Host)
June 2014
Eurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament:
Roles of Opposition in Transnational Political Parties
Submitted by:
Nicolien Warnars S2409534 (Groningen) 11331364 (Göttingen)
Supervised by:
Dr. Marek Neuman (Groningen) Dr. Tobias Jakobi (Göttingen)
MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Nicolien Warnars, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Eurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament: Roles of opposition in transnational political parties”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Table of Contents
Introduction 4
1. Literature Review
Historical Background
Euroscepticism and Public Opinion Euroscepticism and National Politics Role of Radical Political Parties
7 7 9 10 13 2. Theoretical framework Definition of Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism in the European Parliament Euroscepticism in European Political Groups
Political Opposition in the European Parliament Types of Eurosceptic MEPs
Roles of Eurosceptic MEPs Combined Theoretical Framework
15 15 20 21 22 25 27 30 3. Research Design Case Selection
Data Collection: EPRG Database
Data Collection: Parliamentary Activity of MEPs Research Limitations Independent MEPs 33 33 34 35 36 36 4. Analysis
Introduction of Case Study – Europe for Freedom and Democracy
Introduction of Case Study – European Conservatives and Reformists
Data Analysis - EPRG Database Political Orientation and Identity
Policies, Parliamentary Power and Representation Analysis of MEP Parliamentary Activity
37 37 40 43 44 48 53 5. Discussion
Results and Theoretical Framework Alternative Theories
Roles of Non-Eurosceptic MEPs
Institutional Structure of European Parliament Role of National Political Background
Introduction
Since the introduction of international cooperation in Europe after the Second World War, the European Coal and Steel Community has developed into the European Union of today. This development has led to the fact the EU has become a major actor in the field of European politics, economics and culture. The EU is generally considered as a ‘work in progress’ and unfinished project of European integration.1
The ongoing integration on the European level have, however, has raised many questions and doubts on this issue among politicians and citizens. The last decade and the Eurocrisis have particularly increased these signs of opposition against the European project, and Euroscepticism became anoften-heard term in both the media and academia.2
A large part of the criticism towards the European Union is pointed at its institutional structure, the legitimacy of a supranational governmental body and the democratic deficit of the Union.3 The European Parliament provides a unique opportunity to study opposition to European integration, as it is the only direct elected institute of the European Union. However, when looking at the massive amount of available literature on Euroscepticism, the main focus generally lies on the national political arena and the public opinion on European integration. Even though these two factors and Euroscepticism within the European institutes such as the European Parliament are strongly connected, it should be noted that the question of internal opposition forces within the European Parliament has been neglected by but a few scholars in this field of study.4The Eurosceptic forces in the European parliament, directly elected by the European public, forms an interesting phenomenon, as they are part of a governing institute they oppose to.5The hostility of the Eurosceptic MEPs against the institute they are part of has become a major cause of concern related to the
1
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Europe's blues: Theoretical soul-searching after the rejection of the European Constitution," PS: Political Science & Politics 39, no. 02 (2006): 247-250.
2
Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers, "Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism Mapping Scepticism in European Countries and Regions," European Union Politics 6, no. 2 (2005): 224.
3
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 3 (2006): 533-562.
4
Nathalie Brack and Olivier Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” in Euroscepticism. Images of
Europe among mass publics and political elites, ed. Dieter Fuch, Raul Magni-Berton and Antoine Roger
(Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2009), 254.
5
Karlheinz Neunreither, "Governance without opposition: the case of the European Union," Government
functioning of the European Parliament (EP).6 As not much research has been done related to the identity, motivations and attitudes of MEPs that belong to Eurosceptic political parties, it is of increasing importance that more information comes available on this interesting group of Eurosceptics in the EP, and how these politicians function within this organization.7Therefore, the goal of this research is to study the behavior and attitude of Eurosceptic MEPs in order to find out how Euroscepticism influences the functioning of politicians on European level, and to help the reader understand how Eurosceptic opposition forces work in the European Parliament. For the analysis of behavior and attitudes of Eurosceptic MEPs, the existing theoretical framework of Natalie Brack will be used.8 The research question on which study will focus on is:
How does the role and behavior of Eurosceptic MEPs in transnational groups differ from other MEPs, based on the theoretical framework of Nathalie Brack?
Answering this question will cast light on the still unclear situation of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament. At the time of writing, the next European elections are only a couple of weeks away. As shown by the election polls in various Member States, Eurosceptic parties are about to again gain more seats than in the previous parliament.9 When trying to understand Euroscepticism as a phenomenon, it is important to also study the consequences of the increasing popularity of this movement, and how it is displayed in political institutions such as the European Parliament.
The research structure, designed to provide the reader with a logical path throughout the study, will be briefly discussed. The first two chapters of the research will be dedicated to a literature overview and a literature analysis. The first chapter deals with the former, and presents an overview of the main theories and concepts related to Euroscepticism. It will mainly discuss two major fields of study regarding Euroscepticism, that of the role of national politics and public opinion. These theories have been the main focus of scholars working in the field of opposition to European integration, and cover a variety of approaches and perspectives on the topic of
6
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs”, 253.
7
Roger Scully and David Farrell, “MEPs as Representatives: Individual and Institutional Roles,” JCMS 41 no.2 (2003): 271.
8
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs”, 271-272.
9Simon Usherwood, “Eurosceptic parties will have success in the 2014 European elections, but their
Chapter 1. Literature Review
This chapter will provide a literature overview of research done on the topic of Euroscepticism since the emergence of the term. First, the historical background of Euroscepticism will be briefly discussed. Secondly, the two main fields of study regarding Euroscepticism will be explained; Euroscepticism in national politics and Euroscepticism in public opinion.
Historical Background
Even though the term Euroscepticism is mostly recognized in academic literature in the period after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, many scholars argue that the term has emerged in the field of European Studies from the first moments of cooperation at the European level. However, Euroscepticism has indeed entered the academic debate most clearly in the post-Maastricht period.10 Before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in 1992, the relative low level of Euroscepticism compared to later periods is also known as ‘permissive consensus’ among the European citizens.11 During this period, the European project was in general considered as an ‘elite’ project, mainly directed by political elites and without much involvement from the public.12 This was mainly due to the fact that during the initial years of the European Community, integration on European level was primarily directed towards economic aspects, and included mainly technical aspects such as the dissolving of trade barriers.13 As shown by opinion polls measuring public support for the European project, such as the Eurobarometer survey, the public was in favor of European Community integration or had no clear opinion on it.14 During the 1990s, more public and media attention was given to European integration after the Single European Act and the TEU. This shift was caused by the fact that the European Community was expanding their competences
10
Renee Buhr, “Seizing the Opportunity: Euroscepticism and Extremist Party Success in the Post-Maastricht Era,” Government and Opposition 47, no. 4 (2012): 551.
11
IanDown and Carole Wilson, “From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining Dissensus’: A Polarizing Union,” Acta Politica 43, no. 1 (2008): 27.
12
Liesbet Hooghe, "Europe divided? Elites vs. public opinion on European integration," European Union
Politics 4, no. 3 (2003): 287.
13
Thomas Christin, “Political- and Identity-based Support for European integration: An Analysis of Member States and Candidate Countries” (PhD dissertation, University of St. Gallen, 2008).
from purely economic issues towards new domains of policy. This new areas included monetary, foreign and security issues.15 This change of EU competences was perceived as a transfer of sovereign power from the EU Member States towards the European Union, which had a significant effect on the perception of the public on European integration.
The first rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark is a clear sign of an increasing interest in EU-affairs, and officially marks the end of the permissive consensus on European integration among the European public.16 The Dutch and French no-vote towards the European constitution in 2004 added another blow to the European integration process, and even led to an indefinite period for ratification in order to give Member States time to reflect on the proposal for a European Constitution.17 The increase of public interest for the European project led to more voices opposing European integration, and as stated by Hooghe and Marks, the permissive consensus was replaced by what they call a ‘constraining dissensus’.18
Together with an expanding role of the EU in the daily life of European individuals, the salience of the EU and its activities increased during the post-Maastricht period. A variety of issues did increase this visibility, such as the move towards the integration of policies in the domain of security, defense, immigration and asylum. Besides this, institutional changes as the agreement on qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union and the increase of power of the European Parliament contributed to more central role for European integration in national politics and public discussions. Although a complete historical overview would be too lengthy to include in this research, one can conclude form this section that the study of Euroscepticism is challenging for a variety of reasons. Mostly, the term Euroscepticism is adaptable depending on the political timespan in the EU, and as it is not a static term, this makes it harder to define it as a concept.19
Although it is hard to define a term such as Euroscepticism as it encompasses a variety of perspectives, it is useful to have a general working definition of the term. For
15Buhr, “Seizing the Opportunity,” 551.
16Down and Wilson, “From ‘Permissive Consensus to ‘Constraining Dissensus’,” 26.
17 Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “The End of Europe?,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 55.
18
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 7.
19
Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Contnuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?,” Journal
this study, the definition developed by Taggart will be used, who identifies Euroscepticism as a term that “expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.”20
In the following subsections, two different perspectives will be analyzed in order to provide the reader with a broader knowledge on Euroscepticism.
Euroscepticism and Public Opinion
As stated before, academic research in the domain of Euroscepticism has evolved in roughly two separate spheres; the sphere of public opinion and the sphere of domestic political parties. Even though these are closely related, most scholars perceive Euroscepticism as either a top-down or a bottom-up process, the first supporting the theory that national political parties play the biggest role in the development of Euroscepticism, the latter supporting the theory that Euroscepticism is mainly a movement of the masses.21 Obviously, interaction between the two fields of study is crucial in this sense, as they cannot be understood separate from each other. However, in order to explain what topics have been researched in Euroscepticism studies, the following paragraph will first focus on an analysis of Euroscepticism following the perspective and role of the public, later in this chapter the perspective of Euroscepticism in national political parties will be explained.
The analysis of public opinion on European integration has played an important role from the beginning of the academic debate on Euroscepticism. After the evaporation of the permissive consensus among the European public on the developments of European integration, much research has been done in order to analyze the phenomenon of growing mass discontent with the European project. In order to explain the reasoning behind citizens’ support or opposition towards European integration, three main domains of explanation can be offered by reviewing existing literature.22 These three domains of theory include economical factors, loss of a feeling of identity and political cueing theories. Basically, these are all factors that can be
20
Paul Taggart, "A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems," European Journal of Political Research 33, no. 3 (1998): 366.
21Gamze Avci, “The Nationalist Movement Party’s Euroscepticism: Party Ideology meets Strategy,” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 3 (2011): 436.
22
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European
recognized in the debate on Euroscepticism in national politics, but with a bottom-up instead of a top-down perspective. Even though it is important to recognize the role of public opinion and its effect on national politics, it is beyond the scope of this study to go into detail on this aspect of Euroscepticism, as this research focuses on Euroscepticism in the European Parliament and therefore mainly focuses on Euroscepticism in a political setting.
Euroscepticism and National Politics
Within the national political arena Euroscepticism has long remained a phenomenon on the periphery of the party system. The permissive consensus and the overall lack of discussion on European integration issues prevented many parties from adapting statements on European topics until roughly after the Maastricht Treaty. 23 Euroscepticism was mainly confined to the territory of small and mostly radical left- or right-wing parties. The situation changed drastically after the dilution of the permissive consensus on European integration, and was further enhanced by the growing popularity of radical parties that started to play a more important role the national parliaments of the Member States.24Since the growing popularity of Eurosceptic from the beginning of the 21st century, this political movement has received much attention from academics in political science. In the existing literature on Euroscepticism in national politics, two main lines of thought prevail. On the one hand is the perspective that parties exploit Euroscepticism based on a party strategy, whereas others state that Euroscepticism can come forth out of party ideology. These two different perspectives will be briefly explained in the following paragraphs.
According to the first perspective mentioned above, Euroscepticism can be primarily identified as a political strategy developed to gain popularity among the voting public.25This statement is supported by the so-called ‘integration effect model’.26 The model takes three factors into consideration in order to explain how political parties use Euroscepticism in order to gain votes, and when this strategy will be most successful. These three elements consist of: demand, political opportunity space and
23
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government Participation and Party Positions on Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 1 (2013): 17. 24
Ibid., 17. 25
supply. The first factor of the model, demand, indicated the need for Anti-EU sentiment among citizens. A political party that addresses an issue that is regarded as irrelevant by the public will pass by largely unnoticed. The second element of the modelindicated by Taggart and Szczerbiak as the political opportunity space.27 This indicates whether the mainstream parties within a national political arena already address a certain issue, which would be Eurosceptic points of view in this case. When mainstream parties already provide a Eurosceptic perspective, the chance that opportunistic parties will be able to win the public over with a comparable point of view is small. Political parties that succeed to provide a Eurosceptic alternative when there is indeed demand for such a perspective among the public and the national settings provides a political opportunity space are most likely to rapidly gain votes. This strategy will enable parties to move from the borders of the political spectrum towards the middle with a Eurosceptic attitude.28This theory states Euroscepticism in politics origin in many cases from this strategy in order to gain popularity instead from party ideology.29
The fact that Eurosceptic attitudes seem to appear in both right- and left-wing parties suggests that strategy motives play a significant role, as it seems unlikely that these groups share the same ideology. However, some scholars disagree and argue that there are otherexplanations for this shared ideologythat go beyond the traditional division of political beliefs.30 A widespread theory supporting this statementconcludes that nationalism is the common denominator for Euroscepticism among left- and right-wing parties31 Traditionally, Euroscepticism is has been often connected to right-wing nationalistic parties. However, research shows that some radical left-wing parties operate under a comparable ideology deeply rooted in nationalism.32 Before diving into the rationale behind the link between nationalism and Eurosceptic parties, it is important to define nationalism in order prevent confusion. As a lengthy discussion on the definition of nationalism is beyond the scope of this research, a much-recognized definition of Breuilly will be used, who defines nationalism as:
27
Taggart and Szczerbiak, “Coming in from the Cold?,” 34.
28André Gingrich, “Neo-nationalism and the reconfiguration of Europe,” Social Anthropology 14, no. 2 (2007): 215.
29Buhr, “Seizing the Opportunity,” 550. 30
Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism,” European Journal of Political
Research 51, (2012): 505.
31
Ibid., 504. 32
“a political movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”33
Nationalism as an ideology mainly poses value on unity, autonomy and identity, but fails to provide answers for many social questions such as justice and welfare issues.34 Because of this, nationalism is often recognized as a ‘thin’ ideology that is not often used in a pure form, but is rather adapted as additional component to a variety of political views.35 This feature is exactly what makes nationalism accessible for parties that are normally far apart on the traditional political spectrum.36Based on these different approaches, two types of nationalism are recognized by research on Euroscepticism: ethnic and civic nationalism.37
Ethnic nationalism can often be recognized in the politics of right-wing parties. This type of nationalism perceives the nation as a homogeneous and static unit that should be protected from influences from the outside. The EU, a heterogeneous community by definition,promotes inclusive culture by supporting cultural and workforce mobility.38 Radical right-wing parties that underwrite the values of ethnic nationalism oppose European integration related to this inclusive nature, as this imposes a threat on their national community and cultural identity.39
Civic nationalism on the other hand is based on inclusiveness and citizen equality. Even though nationalism and left-wing political ideology are in many cases treated as complete opposites, civic nationalism can actually often be recognized amongst radical left-wing parties. Main characteristics of radical left ideology includes characteristics such as the rejection of capitalism, equal distribution and the combination of economic
33John Breuilly, “Dating the nation: How old is an old nation?,” in When is the nation? Towards an understanding of theories of nationalism, ed. Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac (London: Routledge,
2005), 16-17.
34
Anthony Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 24.
Lauren McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?," The Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002): 554.
35
Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,” 509. 36
Michael Hechter, Containing nationalism(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.
37Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,” 508. 38Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,” 510. 39
Sofia Vasilopoulou, "European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition,"
and social rights.40 Halikiopoulou et al explains the relationship between civic nationalism and the political left-wing on European level as follows:
“As the radical left may only pursue class interest within the territorial framework of the nation-state, it equates nation with class, counter-posing quite abstract internationalism to a pragmatic support for nationalist struggles.”41
The anti-EU sentiments of the left-wing parties stem from the perceived neo-imperialist nature of European integration. As class and nation are treated as exchangeable concepts, the European project is looked upon as a form of national exploitation.42 Contrary to radical right-wing parties, the left does not fear a loss of homogeneity but does feel a threat of capitalist supranational exploitive powers and the domination of elite groups over the lower classes created by the European integration project.43Based on the explanations of ethnic and civic nationalism, academic literature argues that Euroscepticism can indeed come forth from political ideology.
Both ideology and strategy offer interesting perspectives when analyzing the origin of Eurosceptic views carried out by political parties. For this research, not only the origin of Euroscepticism but also the implementation of Euroscepticism coming forth from these approaches is of relevance. Research shows that left-wing parties are generally more interested in transforming the European project, whereas the radical right is often opposed to the EU and European integration by definition.44 This shows a cleavage of both party families on what is also known as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, which will be explained later in this research.45
Role of Radical Political Parties
It can be concluded from the paragraphs above is that overall radical political parties seem to form important actors in both perspectives on Euroscepticism. Radical parties
40
Luke March and Cas Mudde, "What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation," Comparative European Politics 3, no. 1 (2005): 25.
41Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,” 511. 42Ibid., 511.
43
Ibid., 512.
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 8 (2002): 967.
44Niccolò Conti and Vicenzo Memoli, “The Multi-faceted nature of party-based Euroscepticism,” Acta Politica 47, no. 2 (2012): 105.
45
from both the right and left seem to occupy the political opportunity space left empty by mainstream parties, and seem quite successful in doing so because of the demand for a Eurosceptic alternative.46Besides this, the fact that Euroscepticism can be traced back to nationalistic ideologyalso seems to cause an apparent connection to radical political groups. A fundamental component of nationalism is that it supports a community feeling based on sentiment and emotion.47 This emotional component tends to create radicalization within the parties fueled by nationalism.48 It is important to keep the connection between Euroscepticism and radical party behavior in mind, as the Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament observed in this research often have members coming from parties indicated as radical or extreme in both national and European setting.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, this part provides an overview of existing literature on Euroscepticism, explaining what scholars have been focusing on over the last decades. The overview shows that public opinion analysis as well as the discussion of the role of national politics has dominated the overall research on Euroscepticism, while significantly less attention has been paid to other important factors, such as the role of the media, NGO’s, trans-national cooperation and European institutions.49 This research primarily focuses on Eurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament in order to contribute to a more holistic approach towards Euroscepticism, by researching one of the often-neglected parts of academic research on Euroscepticism indicated above.
46Buhr, “Seizing the Opportunity,” 553. 47
Michael Freeden, “Is nationalism a distinct ideology?,”Political Studies 46, no. 4 (1998): 752.
48Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,” 509.
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework
After discussing the main developments in the field of Euroscepticism, the following chapter will provide the main theoretical basis for this particular study on Euroscepticism in the European Parliament. The first part will consist of the definition of Euroscepticism and how Euroscepticism will be approached in this research. Besides this, the available literature on Eurosceptic MEPs will be discussed in the light of the existing literature on this topic, as well as their behavior and representative roles.
Definition of Euroscepticism
Over the last decades, the term Euroscepticism has been used in a large variety of contexts, and has developed as a concept over time resulting of the ongoing European integration and the political debates connected to this development. As a result, Euroscepticism tend to be used as a general term, bundling a large variety of attitudes towards European integration under the overarching umbrella term ‘Euroscepticism’.50
Regarding this approach, the definition of Paul Taggart is most useful. He defines Euroscepticism as an inclusive concept that involves any critical attitude towards European cooperation, which:
“expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.”51
As noted in much literature related to Euroscepticism, this definition gives a good indication of Euroscepticism as overarching concept, but is relatively broad.Therefore, Taggart and Szczerbiak developed a conceptualization that divides Euroscepticism in two main categories: ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism.52Hard Euroscepticism can be defined as:
50
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality,”inOpposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism: Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, 127-150
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 241
51Taggart, “A touchstone of dissent,” 366. 52
“An outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining Members of the EU.”53
On the contrary, the other form of Euroscepticism is defined as ‘soft’, and is explained as follows:
“Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and (….) implies that if there were alterations to either a policy area or a shift in national interest, European integration in its current form could be supported or even encouraged.”54
Even though the notions ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism provide an elaboration of the original definition, the two categories still lack some elements which are necessary in order to use efficiently in scientific research. Soft Euroscepticism is described in a way in which basically every disagreement on any European policy can be interpreted as Euroscepticism. Also, it is not completely clear what criteria are used that separates the two forms of Euroscepticism from another.55 In order to come up with an even more precise definition of Euroscepticism, Kopecky and Mudde have developed a model that categorizes different views on the European Union, based on two dimensions in order to create a multi-dimension approach. In order to do this, they built on David Easton’s differentiation between various systems of supporting political organization. 56 According to Easton’s model, support for European integration can be divided into diffuse and specific support for the European project. Diffuse support includes the supporting of the general principles behind European integration. Specific support, on the other hand, means support for the actual development of European integration in practice, which mainly consists of the creation of the European Union and all elements that came it.57Kopecky and Mudde have translated diffuse and specific support into two explanatory dimension of attitudes towards the EU and European integration in general, in order to create a more holistic approach towards Euroscepticism. The first dimension mentioned here, the diffuse support for European integration, can be used to separate
53
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU candidate
states of Central and Eastern Europe(Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2001), 10.
54
Ibid., 10.
55Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European
Integration in East Central Europe,”European Union Politics 3, no. 3 (2002), 300.
56
David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall, 1965), 124. 57
the so-called Europhiles from the Europhobes. As the name suggests, Europhiles underline the basic ideas of European integration and are in favor of a strong cooperation between EU Member States on both political and economic level, and do not directly object diminishing national sovereignty in order to obtain common goals.58Europhobes on the other hand do not support the basic principles of European integration, which resulted in the creation of the European Union.59In short, these two aspects can be understood as two opposite sides on a scale on which support for European integration is measured.
The second dimension of the model presented by Kopecky and Mudde, specific support for the European Union, is created in order to separate the so-called EU-optimists and EU-pessimists.60Again, these two terms indicate two extreme points on a scale reflecting attitudes, but this time concerning sentiments towards the European Union as an institute. EU-optimists show a supportive attitude towards the EU, either because they are satisfied with the way the EU has been developed and its current status, or because they are in favor of the general direction in which the EU as an institute is heading in the near future.61On the opposite side in the second dimension are the EU-pessimists. This group has a more negative stance towards the EU and its development, or are pessimistic about the future plans of further integration. This does not automatically means that EU-pessimists do not agree with a EU-membership by definition, but that the EU has developed in a way that does not agree with certain ideals of these pessimists considering European integration.
When the two dimensions described above are combined into a multi-faceted approach towards attitudes on European integration and the EU, a model with four categories that indicates four attitudes towards the European Union is created, as displayed inFigure 1.62The four groups developed by Kopecky and Mudde are Euroenthousiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects.63 In the following paragraph, these four groups will be briefly explained in further detail, as understanding the rationale behind the division of these groups is an important basis for the empirical
58Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 301. 59
Ibid., 301.
60
Ibid., 302.
61Agnes Batory, “Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of EuropeanIntegration,” (paper presented
at the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, Manchester, United Kingdom, 10–12 April 2001), 9.
62
Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303.
63
part of this research. In order to circumvent confusion, a slight change is made in the terminology of Kopecky and Mudde. As this study considers all above-mentioned groups except Euroenthousiasts as Eurosceptic, a subgroup with the same name will endanger the clarity of this paper. Therefore, the sub-group Eurosceptics will be replaced by the term Eurocritics. Unless explained otherwise, the term Euroscepticism will refer to the definition as given by Taggart, and is given before in this chapter.
parties that often take active part in the national government.64 The next group, the Europragmatists, is a group that has not received much attention by other researchers so far. Even though this group does not support European integration in itself, and can even be called Europhobe, they do support the EU. In general this group consists of parties that do not have particularly strong ideological ideas towards European integration, but do see the benefits of the EU and its institutions based on pragmatic and utilitarian deliberations.65 Parties in this category in general judge the EU in a positive light, as they perceive membership to the EU as beneficial for national interests.
The third group mentioned in the model consists of the Eurocritics (called Eurosceptics in Figure 1). This group does indeed support European integration, but show a negative attitude towards the EU as an institute. It might be that this group feels that the EU is developing in a wrong direction, or that competences are transmitted to the EU that should have stayed within national sovereignty. Finally, the last group is what Kopecky and Mudde call the Eurorejects. This group does not support any form of European integration, nor does it have a positive attitude towards the EU. Many Eurorejects oppose membership to the EU and loss of national sovereignty towards institutions on the European level.66The model presented by Kopecky and Mudde in the paragraphs above is a good alternative for defining attitudes towards European integration and the EU, as it is more inclusive and specific compared to other existing definitions. It includes not only those that completely oppose to the European project, but also those who have a more nuanced stance towards European integration. However, it should be noted that the model presents an ideal division of attitudes, although in practice it may be harder to differentiate between the separate groups.67 It is important to notice that this model recognizes Eurocritics as Europhile, which means that this group does support the basis of European integration but criticizes the way the EU is executed. This group is therefore not opposed to cooperation at international level and supports integration in order to reach towards more prosperity in individual Member States and Europe. 68 In this research, Eurosceptic attitudes include Europragmatists, Eurocritics and Eurorejects, as they can all fall within the definition given by Taggart. The different ‘shades’ of Euroscepticism, however, are of great
64
Taggart and Szczerbiak, “Coming in from the Cold?,” 34. 65Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303. 66
Ibid., 302.
67
Ibid., 304.
68
importance as explanatory factor when looking at the behavior and attitudes of Eurosceptic MEPs in the European parliament.
Euroscepticism in the European Parliament
The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the available literature on Euroscepticism in the European Parliament, and the development of Eurosceptic groups and alliances within this body.
In the early years of the EP, from 1952 to 1979, the Members of the European Parliament were directly appointed by the national governments of the participating Member States. This meant in practical sense that the Euroenthousiasts were overly represented in this period of time, whereas anti-EU sentiment was somewhat stifled within this particular institution.69This changed after the electoral procedure for the European Parliament was introduced, and countries such as Denmark and Great Britain entered the EU.70 The introduction of the elections itself was not uncontested. Advocates in favor of elections on European level stated that introduction of the elections would entail a boost of politics at European level as the European Parliament would become an important player that would support European integration.71 The opponents of this development did fear that the EP might become a greater power than national assemblies, and that this would lead to a loss of national sovereignty.72Remarkably, though the European Parliament is a very relevant player in the studies concerning Euroscepticism, only few academic studies deal with the phenomenon is this particular context. Because of the increase ofEurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament over time, it is of significant importance to enlarge knowledge about the Eurosceptic movement in the European Parliament.73
Euroscepticism in European Political Groups
As indicated in the previous chapter, Euroscepticism can be found mainly in political parties that have a nationalistic ideology, either on the left- or right-wing political
69Nathalie Brack, “Euroscepticism at the Supranational Level: The Case of the ‘Untidy Right’ in the
European Parliament,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 1 (2013): 87.
70
Brack, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs”, 253.
71
Ibid., 253.
72
Roger Scully, Becoming Europeans? Attitudes, Roles and Socialisation in the European Parliament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5.
spectrum.74Existing research on Euroscepticism in the EP has mainly focused of right-wing Eurosceptic alliances in the European Parliament, whereas cooperation of left-wing Eurosceptic parties in the EP has been less visible than their right-left-wing counterparts.
Based on the often nationalistic ideology of Eurosceptic parties, transnational cooperation proved to be difficult for many Eurosceptic parties as it clashes with the pursuing of only national interests, and a significant number of attempts of transnational cooperation between these parties in the European Parliament have indeed proved to be unsuccessful.75 As stated by Fieschi:
“… the difficulties encountered by [right-wing Eurosceptic] parties in attempts to form parliamentary groups [in the European Parliament] are indicative of the primacy of nationalisms which undermine any potential for ideological alliances.”76
According to Fieschi, the reasoning behind the European parliamentary system is based on the suppressing of national interests and to base cooperation on mutual ideological attitudes. This has proven to be difficult for radical right-wing parties in general.77 Therefore, Startin concludes that cooperation of right-wing Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament mainly rests or strategic considerations rather than purely ideological motives.78 However, this does not mean that they have complete different points of view. Immigration issues as well as the focus on national identity are in general common ground and can form a solid basis for cooperation on international level, even though beliefs and ideas on other topics differ.79Different opinions on European topics make it hard for Eurosceptic alliances to find a cohesive basis for cooperation, as none of these parties are generally willing to make concessions on national issues. As mentioned in the chapter before, Euroscepticism can be seen as a wide spectrum with varying levels of consensus on European integration and the role of
74Halikiopoulou et al, “The paradox of nationalism,”
504.
75
Nicholas Startin, “Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation,”Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 4 (2010): 431.
76 Catherine Fieschi, “European Institutions: The Far-Right and Illiberal Politics in a Liberal Context,”
Parliamentary Affairs, 53 no. 3 (2000): 518. 77
Ibid., 518.
78Startin, “Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament?” 431. 79
the European Union.80 Therefore, Eurosceptic right-wing parties have had many difficulties in the past to form a transnational group in the European Parliament, as they often do not agree on core European issues such as the role of the EU institutions, security and environmental issues.81Besides this, the European Parliament often poses an existential dilemma upon Eurosceptic right-wing parties. These political parties, promoting the national political arena as the only legitimate governing body, are often more successful in the European elections compared to the national ones.82
The European elections, or second-order elections, have become a place where right-wing parties gained popularity by posing national before the European interests, and often even proved to be a political breakthrough for these parties in the domestic political arena.83This paradox is certainly valid for most Euroreject groups. Being part of the EP and cooperation within European alliances in itself is something these groups are less willing to do, as their main mandate reflects national sovereignty as a core value. This research is aiming to gain better understanding of the internal forces within Eurosceptic coalitions in the European Parliament, and to see whether the attitudes of the MEPs that are part of these coalitions can be explained according to existing models explained later in this chapter.
Political Opposition in the European Parliament
During the theoretical part of this research, attention has been paid to the different approaches towards Euroscepticism. The two main approaches discussed are the approaches based on political party-based Euroscepticism and public opinion or citizen’s attitudes towards European integration.84
Besides these, two other approaches exist, even though they are less frequently recognized as separate elements. The first of these is what is called the discourse approach. This approach deals with the way in which European integration is being discussed in media, among the public as well as
80Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303. 81
SimonUsherwood, “The Shifting Focus of Opposition to the European Union,” Journal of
Contemporary European Research 9, no. 2 (2013): 280-281. 82
Simon Usherwood, “Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France and the UK: The European Union as First-Order Politics,” Journal of European Integration 29, no. 1, (2007): 4.
83
MichaelMinkenberg and Pascal Perrineau, “The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004,”
International Political Science Review 28 no. 1 (2007): 34.
political debates.85 This approach combines elements from the two main approaches together with discourse by other actors, such as the media. The discourse approach concludes that the root of Euroscepticism can be found in the ongoing debate on European integration, and the increase of negative elements connected to it.Scholars in this field of study conclude that so-called justifications for the European project have lost support as old justifications such as security and peace in Europe have faded into the background, even though it once was the main building block of European integration.86
More important for this research, however, is the fourth main approach of research in the field of Euroscepticism. This approach addresses the political system of the European Union, and identifies Euroscepticism at the roots of EU polity and the flaws within this system.87 This approach identifies the democratic deficit as one of the main causes of Euroscepticism. This is an element that can be found abundantly present in the Eurosceptic quarters of the European Parliament, and is apparent by the fact that many Eurosceptic MEPs protest against the democratic insufficiency of the European Union and its political institutions.88According to existing literature, the democratic deficit is a topic that is often brought up by Eurosceptic parties in the EP, even though the fact that expansion of the powers of the EU and its institutions in order to fight the deficit is contrary to the wishes of these parties.
Although often used as a weapon in the debate by Eurosceptic MEPs, the democratic deficit is not a topic brought up solely by this group, but is a recognized and much debated issue in politics and academia. The core of the democratic deficit in the European Union in general and the European Parliament specifically, can be found in what Neunreither identifies as governance without opposition.89 The structure of the European Parliament is based on national democratic values but without the traditional majority and minority represented in the basis. Even though the European Parliament as gained more power of the past decade, it is still quite limited for the only elected body of the European Union in assuming overall responsibilities when compared to national
85
Pieter de Wilde, "Under what Conditions does Euroscepticism Flourish? An Evaluation of Different Approaches and Empirical Findings" (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2010), 6.
86
Paul Taylor, The end of European integration: anti-europeanism examined (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 3-5.
87De Wilde, “Under what conditions does Euroscepticism flourish?,” 6. 88
Bernd Spanier, Europe, Anyone? The “Communication Deficit” of the European Union
counterparts.90As there is no official government, or majority coalition in the EP that functions as traditional government comparable to national systems of the Member States, there is also no opposition with the power to overthrow the governing coalition. The lack of opposition in the European Parliament is causing instability, as it seems that there is no alternative for European citizens wishing to express dissatisfaction with the current policy and thus no democratic counterpart for the acts of the EP.91
The dynamic of the European Parliament is based on compromises rather than the traditional dynamic between coalition and opposition representation. Eurosceptic MEPs and groups in the European Parliament do attempt to form an opposition within this European institution, and are definitely the most visible in terms of forming an alternative for dissatisfied voters. Neunreither has analyzed three types of political opposition in the European Union, namely systematic, politics-oriented and policy-oriented opposition.92 The latter, the form of opposition focused on policy, is the opposition that would provide the most productive in terms of opposition in the EP, as it is directed towards content that is actually discussed in the European Parliament. The first two, systematic and politics-oriented opposition, are more directed towards the institutional structure and overall rationale behind European integration.93 Opposition in the European Parliament in the form of Eurosceptic MEPs and factions are mainly these last types of opposition, although there are some MEPs that identify themselves as Eurosceptic but focus their opposition mainly towards EU policy. It is important to understand the different forms of opposition related to different forms of Euroscepticism by Kopecky and Mudde as discussed in the chapter above, as they are strongly interlinked. Whereas systematic opposition is closely related to the Eurorejects, politics-oriented opposition is linked more to Europragmatists. Policy-oriented opposition would be strongest related to the attitude of the Eurocritics as explained by Kopecky and Mudde, a constructive form of criticism based on positive feelings towards European integration but skeptical about the current way the EU is developing in.94 In the following paragraphs, the behavior of Eurosceptic MEPs will analyzed. In the last part of this chapter, a framework will be developed combining all these
90
Neunreither, “Governance without opposition,” 420.
91
Peter Mair, “Political Opposition and the European Union,” Government and Opposition 42, no. 1 (2007): 7.
92
Neunreither, “Governance without opposition,” 429.
93
Ibid., 429.
94
theoretical parts in order to construct a more holistic approach for understand Euroscepticism in the European Parliament.
Types of Eurosceptic MEPs
In order to analyze the behavior of Eurosceptic MEPs who are allied to a transnational Eurosceptic coalition in the European Parliament, the framework developed by Nathalie Brack and Olivier Costa will be used in this research. Brack and Costa developed a typology to categorize Eurosceptic MEPs according to their behavior, based on both quantitative and qualitative research conducted in the European Parliament with MEPs who proclaim to be Eurosceptic.95The model of Brack and Costa is constructed out of two parts. First, four types of Eurosceptic MEPs are indicated. From these types, Brack and Costa found four so-called or roles, or forms of behavior as displayed by these Eurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament. In the following paragraphs, this model will be explained in detail, as the framework will be used as basis for the analysis later in this research, combined with the theoretical concepts described earlier in this chapter.
First of all, Brack and Costa have developed a model in order to categorize MEPs according to their ideological beliefs. This is done through a two-dimensional framework, including two main criteria, the level of criticism of European integration as a political project and the level of criticism on the present state of the EU.96 This two-dimensional model creates four types of Eurosceptic MEPs, as displayed in the Figure2.97As can be noticed, the dimensions used by Brack and Costa are to a certain extend comparable to the values used in the framework of Kopecky and Mudde. The following paragraphs will briefly explain the different MEP types in more detail and combine it with the theory developed by Kopecky and Mudde.
95
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 254.
96
Ibid., 255-256.
97
The Anti-EU MEP can be considered as what Kopecky and Mudde indicate as a Euroreject, as this MEP opposes both European integration and the implementation in the form of the EU. The resigned MEP opposes strongly to European integration as well, however has a more moderate attitude towards the EU and its functioning, and has adopted an constructive attitude in order to make sure their Eurosceptic opinion is heard in the European Parliament.98 In terms of the framework of Kopecky and Mudde, this group can be considered as Europragmatists.99On the other hand, the minimalist MEP does not strongly oppose to European integration as such, but strongly disagrees with the present form of the EU and promotes national sovereignty.100 Finally, the Reformist MEP has moderate criticism towards both European integration and the EU as implementation of the integration project, and is mainly focused on redesigning and adapting the EU towards the ideology from their respective political party.101 When comparing the types of Brack and Costa with the model developed by Kopecky and Mudde, the last two types of MEPs would be most compatible with Eurocritics in the model of the latter, whereby the Reformist MEP can be considered as lighter Eurocritics
98
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 258.
99
Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303.
100
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 258.
101
Ibid., 258.
compared to the minimalist MEP.102 As can be concluded from the paragraph above, both models, even initially dealing with other subjects (one with MEPs, the other with national political parties) are strongly connected and display the same features. The exception is the category indicated by Kopecky and Mudde as Euroenthousiasts, which is not included in the study of Brack and Costa, but this can be logically explained by the fact that the latter only investigate Eurosceptic MEPs, not an overall attitude towards European integration and the EU as Kopecky and Mudde did.
Roles of Eurosceptic MEPs
The next step in the model of Brack and Costa is the development of roles or behavior displayed by Eurosceptic MEPs based on the different types of MEPs. In Figure 4, the connection between the types of MEPs and the roles is illustrated.103In this paragraph these roles concerning the parliamentary activities of Eurosceptic MEPs will be further explained. It should be noted that these roles are based on ideal-type roles of MEPs, not a perfect representation of reality. First of all, there is the MEP that is called the Absentee MEP.104 As one can see in Figure 4, this group belongs to the Anti-EU type but falls a little outside the spectrum. This is because this group is hard to identify and to analyze the motives behind this type of behavior. The Absentee MEP is – as already expected - not very active in the European Parliament, as this type of MEP rarely is present at EP meetings and does not take part in the political life of the EP. The motives for absenteeism of these Eurosceptic MEPs can vary considerably.
First, there is the activist type of absenteeism. This includes basically MEPs that are protesting against European integration and all institutional procedures connected to it, therefore also the European Parliament. This type of MEP refuses to take part in any parliamentary activity.105 Next, there is the group that is identified as ‘utilitarian-absentee’.106
This group is more focused on the national political arena and sees the European Parliamentary elections as second-order politics, and only uses these elections
102
Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303.
103
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 272.
to gain more support for national themes.107 Mostly smaller and alternative political parties adopt this strategy. Lastly, Brack and Costa also name the absentee MEP that is opportunist, consisting mainly of MEPs who have no real interest in the European Parliament and its political activities but are interested in the side benefits of being a MEP.108 This group is considered marginal and therefore not further included in this research.
The next role is closest related to the Absentee MEP in the model developed by Brack and Costa is the Orator MEP. This type of MEP is mostly concerned with public addresses and the spreading of information, mainly to their national public.109 They do not contribute to parliamentary activities and debates in a constructive way, but try to defend their standpoints and take time to argue against European integration. They often use their position in the EP to gather information that underlines their position towards
107
Liubomir Topaloff, Political parties and Euroscepticism (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 57-58.
108
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 264.
109
Ibid., 262.
the EU, especially information concerning failings of European institutions such as fraud and corruption.110 The way in which the Orator behaves in the European Parliament sometimes causes unpopularity among the other MEPs, and is therefore in many cases excluded from parliamentary activities such as sitting in a committee or being responsible for parliamentary reports. They do make statements in EP debates, but often only to protest against the procedure, and by questioning the legitimacy of the European Union. This group often protests by not voting in the EP, and does not necessarily respect the Rules of Procedure put in place by the EP in order to make processes more efficient. One of the main concerns of Orator MEPs is to inform the local population about the EU, what is happening in the European Parliament and why this will have negative effects in the light of national interests.111
The third role of Eurosceptic MEP is the Pragmatic MEP (not to be confused with Europragmatists discussed earlier in this research, although they share a strong connection).The Pragmatic MEP is comparable with the Orator based on their ideas, as they both want to promote their Eurosceptic views.112 The pragmatic MEP does not try to block the functioning of the European Parliament, nor does he wish to undermine the European political system. However, the main goal is to obtain a balance between the expression of Eurosceptic views while also pursuing results based of the functioning of the EP.113 As the Orator, the Pragmatic MEP is well aware of the fact that a Eurosceptic resolution will never be adopted in the European Parliament, but instead of protesting against this principle, the Pragmatic MEP will try to amend resolutions put forward by other MEPs and limit the scope of the adopted resolution. In order to obtain this, active participation and good relationships with other MEPs are required. Pragmatic MEPs ask questions during sessions, take up responsibilities and vote more frequently than Orator MEPs.114 In Figure 4, the model reflects both EU-Reformists and EU-Minimalists as Pragmatic MEPs. The EU-Reformist does display pragmatic behavior in the sense that this MEP will abide by the rule in order to change as much as possible according to his or her political views. The EU-Minimalist is reflected by the model as a Pragmatic MEP, but is in my opinion closer related to the Orator group. The behavior of the EU-Minimalist, as described by Brack and Costa is as follows:
110
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 263.
“….the ‘minimalist’ MEPs, who do not much believe in the possibility of reforming the Union, but actively denounce the failings of the EU to the European and national general public.”115
This behavior seems to be more aligned with Orator behavior, therefore this study will make use of a slightly adapted version of the model designed by Brack and Costa, where the EU-Minimalist displays behavior that is more aligned with the Orator MEP than the Pragmatic MEP.
Finally, the last MEP role identified by Brack and Costa is the Socialized MEP.116 Even though there is no proof that Eurosceptic MEPs become more pro-Europe after entering the European Parliament, the process of becoming familiar with the functioning of the EP and the working methods will probably have some effect on the attitudes of MEPs. The Socialized MEPs are the best example of this. This group is more than the other Eurosceptics adapted to the working environment of the European Parliament; they abide by the rules and make use of it in order to obtain their goals.117 If this means that they have to express their Eurosceptic views less clearly in the EP, this does not scare them off. The Socialized MEP can be found in European coalitions that are not by definition recognized as Eurosceptic, as they dot not object to join these bigger coalitions and make use of the network and power of these coalitions and try to use them in their own favor.118 This type of MEPs often assumes responsibilities over reports, sits in committees and takes active part in other parliamentary activities. Because of the reasons explained above, these MEPs are also harder to recognize as Eurosceptic MEPs as they are less outspoken than the other types discussed.
Combined Theoretical Framework
This research is trying to explain the behavior of Eurosceptic MEPs in the European Parliament that are part a Eurosceptic European group in order to gain deeper knowledge on the functioning of this type of opposition in the EP. The information that is presented in this chapter forms the theoretical framework on which the research is
115
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 266.
based. However, it is not sufficient to understand the separate pieces of academic research on their own, as a more holistic approach can enlarge our understanding of the types of behavior of MEPs when this information is used in combination. When conducting the literature research, a strong connection between the existing researches was found. Even though focusing on different main topics, one can distinguish a certain kind of trend with goes through existing literature as a red thread.
In Figure 4, the literature of the previous chapter is presented as one complementary framework, combining the findings of the scholars described earlier in this chapter. The first factor represented in the model is the type of Euroscepticism in the first column. This row represents the various forms of Euroscepticism as presented by Kopecky and Mudde.119 As can be noticed, is the category Euroenthousiasts not included in this model, as the main focus of this study is to analyze behavior of MEPs with a critical stance towards European integration in general or the European Union as political institution.
In the second column, the types of MEPs as indicated by Brack and Costa are connected with the different types of Euroscepticism, based on reasoning earlier described in this chapter.120 As can be seen in the model, both the Anti-EU and the Minimalist MEP are representing Eurorejectionism as type of Euroscepticism. Although
119Kopecký and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism,” 303. 120
Brack and Costa, “The Role(s) of the Eurosceptic MEPs,” 272.
they both fall in the same category, EU-Minimalists are less opposed to European integration in general compared to Anti-EU MEPs, and have different ways of expressing their political preferences. However, they do share the same rejecting attitude towards the EU as a political institution; therefore in this model they are both identified as representing Eurorejects.
In the third column, types of opposition as identified by Neunreither.121 This column represents the next step after the type of Euroscepticism and type of MEPs, representing how these factors translate into one of the three different forms of opposition. The last column relates back again to the MEPs, this time indication their role representing how they express this form of opposition in the European Parliament.122 As can be seen in Figure 4, three so-called ‘pathways’ are created. The first represents Eurorejectionism as an ideology leading to Anti-EU and Minimalist MEPs, who will in turn mainly display systematic opposition, expressing this opposition by fulfilling the roles of Absentee and Orator respectively. The second row shows the Eurosceptic attitude, which will lead to the Reformist type of MEP who will mainly focus on policy-oriented opposition, and expresses this generally in the role of the Socialized MEP. This type of Eurosceptic MEP tries to adapt mostly to the every day functioning of the European Parliament, and tries to represent their voters as much as possible by influencing the policies developed by the EP.
Finally, a Europragmatic outlook will be foremost adopted by the Resigned MEP, who will be focused on a politics-oriented opposition as this type of MEP both criticizes European integration as a project as well as the current design of the EU, but adopted a more constructive attitude compared to Anti-EU and Minimalist MEPs and focuses mainly on the political structure in the European Parliament. The Resigned MEPs adopt the role of Pragmatic in the EP. It should be noted that this model is providing an ideal framework used to explain the roles and behavior of MEPs, trying to represent reality as close as possible for a theoretical framework, nevertheless not giving a perfect representation of reality.
121Neunreither, “Governance without opposition,” 429. 122
