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Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture University of Uppsala (Home)
University of Groningen (Host)
February, 2011
EU and Nagorno-Karabakh rhetoric versus reality?
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MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Arpine Martirosyan hereby declare that this thesis, entitled ―EU and Nagorno-Karabakh: rhetoric versus reality‖, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References. I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Signed
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Abstract
The collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a chain of conflicts that had been well hidden during the Soviet era. The aim of this study was to discuss the role of the European Union in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, one of those conflicts that burst into a full-fledged war from 1991 to 1994. The conducted research targeted the European Union policies of conflict prevention and resolution as a means to contribute to the settlement of the conflict.
The research analyzed the Union‘s policy documents and the importance they attribute to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by relating the stated goals and objectives to feasible positive changes in the situation. In this way, the research aimed to show the extent to which the European Union has been positively contributing to the conflict dynamics.
Despite the expressed willingness and commitment to contribute to the conflict settlement, the European Union is still keeping a reserved stance in this conflict by limited participation and engagement. In addition, the research found that certain shortcomings related to coherence and consistency of the Union‘s policies with regard to this conflict make the Union‘s involvement and contribution to it less effective.
The findings of the research argue for a greater role and involvement of the European Union in this conflict given the considerable stability threat that both the Union and its neighborhood are posed to in case of an outbreak of hostilities.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ... 3
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms ... 6
Acknowledgements ... 7
1. Introduction ... 8
1.1.The Research Question and Thesis Contribution ... 10
1.2.Methodology ... 12
2. Conflict Prevention and Resolution: from broad to narrow ... 14
2.1. Defining ways to stability ... 14
2.1.1. Conflict Prevention: what does prevention imply? ... 14
2.1.2. Conflict resolution and third parties in a conflict ... 17
2.2. The European Union policies on conflict prevention and resolution ... 23
2.2.1. EU and Conflict Prevention ... 23
2.2.1.1. Long-term or structural instruments ... 27
2.2.1.2. Short-term or operational instruments ... 28
2.2.2. EU and conflict resolution ... 29
3. Nagorno-Karabakh: then and now ... 32
3.1. Prehistory and identities ... 32
3.2. Modern history and the conflict ... 35
4. The EU and Nagorno-Karabakh: cooperating or ignoring? ... 39
4.1. The EU and South Caucasus: motives behind the interest ... 39
4.2. The EU and the NK conflict: the visibility of the invisible involvement ... 40
5. The EU instruments aimed at the NK conflict prevention/resolution ... 46
5.1. The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus ... 46
5.1.1. Conclusions ... 52
5.2. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) ... 53
5.2.1. Conclusions ... 62
5.3. Eastern Partnership (EaP) ... 63
5.3.1. Conclusions ... 67
6. Conclusions and Recommendations ... 69
6.1. Conclusion ... 69
6.2. Recommendations ... 70
5 Appendix ... 78
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Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AP- Action Plan
CEPS- Centre for European Policy Studies CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy EaP- Eastern Partnership
EC- European Community
ECSC- European Coal and Steel Community ENP- European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPNK- European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the conflict over Nagorno- Karabakh
ESDP- European Security and Defence Policy EU-European Union
EUSR- EU Special Representative IA- International Alert
ICHD- International Center for Human Development NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NK- Nagorno-Karabakh
NKAO- Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast NKR- Nagorno Karabakh Republic
OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA- Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PM- Prime Minister THM- Town Hall Meetings
TACIS- Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States TSFSR- Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics
UN- United Nations
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Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Ph.D. Cand. Christofer Berglund and Ph.D. Cand. Bastiaan L. Aardema, for their considerable help and valuable guidance from the very first to the final level of this research, as well as for the time they cordially and patiently dedicated to our discussions.
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1. Introduction
If war is the violent resolution of conflict, then peace is not the absence of
conflict, but rather, the ability to resolve conflict without violence.1
The ability to resolve conflicts is an urgent need taking into account all the seemingly endless conflicts the world faces today. The international community is not always reacting adequately to conflicts and is not always making the necessary steps to resolve conflicts. In order to find ways to resolve a conflict, the very understanding of what a conflict is, is needed. For this, there will be a need to understand why a conflict erupts here and now, and not there and another time. The assessment of a conflict is important in defining ways to resolve it. The international community has an immense responsibility to prevent and to resolve conflicts.
This thesis discusses one of the most protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus that burst into a devastating war between post-soviet and newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan. The unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) is not only a threat to regional security and peace, but can cause formidable stability and security problems beyond the Caucasus in case of re-escalation of hostilities. This paper analyzes the role of the European Union (EU) in the prevention and settlement of the NK conflict. A broader aim of this research is to show the relation between the general EU conflict prevention/resolution policies and a case conflict history where the implementation of these policies is conditioned by geographical, geopolitical and other factors. The EU actions are discussed here in the framework of prevention-resolution, since the NK conflict will probably need not only to be solved but to be prevented from re-escalation given the military rhetoric of the conflicting sides.
As it becomes obvious from the outset, the NK conflict prevention/resolution is viewed in this research through a third party intervention, which, within the scope of this thesis, is the European Union.
The research on the EU‘s role in the NK conflict is challenging due to the Union‘s little and indirect participation in the process of the conflict‘s settlement. The aim of this
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9 paper also completes the interest behind this research. Interestingly, the Union‘s relations are not very strong either with Armenia or Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Union has no direct presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, the EU has clear interest in the settlement of the NK conflict. Defining conflict prevention as one of its foreign
policy main objectives2 during the Gothenburg programme for the Prevention of Violent
Conflict in 2001, the EU assumed the responsibility to implement necessary measures to prevent violent conflicts. So, it is intriguing to research on the EU‘s role and policies in regard to the NK conflict given the complexity of the formulated situation. The interesting factor, which is at the same time a problem, is that the EU tries to establish itself as a political actor in regard to a conflict the direct sides of which are not having neither strong dependency from the Union, nor a highly expressed wish to adopt the European standards of politics and governance. This is explained by the fact that the sides of the conflict adhere to different powers for political or military support: Armenia‘s best ally is Russia, and Azerbaijan‘s major ally country is Turkey. In other words, it is both interesting and important to know how the EU tries to positively influence the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh not being the most influential actor in this particular conflict case. In addition, compared to the other South Caucasian conflicts such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU‘s involvement is relatively reserved in the case of the NK conflict.
The EU, being a successful peace project based on a common market, has its own approach and style to conflict prevention and resolution. The EU believes that ―peace
depends on development and development depends on peace‖3
. Based on this, the EU carries out its ‗soft‘ policy of economic and social developments, which the Union accounts for preventive measures.
2
Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, 15 and 16 June 2001,12.
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10 1.1. The Research Question and Thesis Contribution
The EU is known for its commitment to conflict prevention. The Union has stated to be deeply concerned over the violent conflicts in the world and particularly in the
developing countries.4
The Union has mentioned on many occasions that the South Caucasus is of significant importance to the Union‘s interests, and that the resolution of the South
Caucasian conflicts is in the EU‘s interest.5
The conflicts in the South Caucasus are potential threats to the Union‘s own stability. With this purpose, the Union has developed a set of regional initiatives and included the South Caucasian states in them. These initiatives target democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and are aimed at conflict prevention and conflict settlement as a final achievement.
Building democracies in the South Caucasus is a challenging initiative. The South Caucasian states still resemble Soviet style governance. They are corrupted and suffer
from serious human rights and democracy deficit.6 Bringing the rule of law and good
governance to these states is a long and challenging process. Moreover, the EU efforts to try to bring peace and stability in the region and to settle regional conflicts are hindered not only by a lack of the rule of law or other democratic values, but also by a lack of wish on local levels.
Having this in mind and in consistency with the aim of the thesis, the central research question to be investigated is as follows:
To what extent have the EU policies adequately contributed to the prevention and resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
A set of sub-questions that will help to answer the principal research question and build the logical and coherent structure of the thesis chapters are as follows:
4
H.E. Jean De Ruyt on behalf of the European Union, ―EU Presidency Statement - Prevention of armed conflicts‖ (New York, July 12, 2001), http://europa-eu-un.com/articles/en/article_66_en.htm. (Accessed 3 October 2010)
5 Dag Sourander, ―The EU's External Relations: Relations With Certain Countries of Regions: The
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)‖ (European Parliament, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.4.3.pdf. (Accessed 3 October 2010)
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What does the EU mean by conflict prevention and resolution, and to what
extent and how does this relate to the concepts of international conflict prevention and resolution?
What is the history behind the NK conflict and what are the conflict
dynamics?
What are the EU motives to engage with the NK conflict, and to what extent
is this involvement visible?
What are the EU policies launched in regard with the NK conflict
prevention/resolution, and to what extent are these policies conducted in a coherent and consistent way?
The thesis hopes to open up a debate over the necessity and encouragement for a better and deeper EU involvement and engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict prevention and resolution. For this purpose, the thesis will suggest its recommendations at the end of the paper.
12 1.2. Methodology
The research aims to find the answers to the posed questions by investigating the EU official policy papers as primary source database. The research based on primary sources of EU official documents will allow to point out the EU‘s official stand in regard to the NK conflict. These documents represent the official positions of the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.
The time span of the EU involvement in the NK conflict is discussed throughout several phases covering mainly the period from 2001 to 2010. This includes as well statements about considering the South Caucasus in general with more attention, which eventually brings the EU closer to the NK problem. The documents to be analyzed in regard to the EU instruments launched for the NK conflict prevention/resolution include the period from 2003 to 2010. There are few documents from earlier period (1988, 1990) when the EU was still a European Community (EC). The documents from this time period show the European Parliament‘s stand in regard to the events taking place at that time in Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The secondary sources rely on the policy and briefing papers worked out by various international crisis management and conflict prevention networks, such as Crisis Management Initiative, European University Institute, European Peacebuilding Liaison, Conciliation Resources, International Crisis Group, etc.
13 around NK thus showing the extent to which the theoretical part meets the practical one in carrying out prevention-resolution policies.
The literature review of conflict prevention, resolution, and third-party intervention conducted in the research will help to build an understanding of how these policies are interpreted and meant to work in the international politics. These concepts will then be compared to the concept of conflict prevention and resolution adopted by the EU in order to see to what extent the EU policies on conflict prevention/resolution relate to the concepts of international conflict prevention and resolution.
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2. Conflict Prevention and Resolution: from broad to narrow
2.1. Defining ways to stability
Stability is a much cherished status. The European Union aims at achieving political stability in its neighborhood as a means to secure itself from any instability threat that might arise because of its neighbors. Given the EU‘s enlargement and the geography it encompasses, the EU comes closer and closer to regions that suffer from instability and protracted conflicts. With this purpose, the EU has developed a number of initiatives and has included its neighbor countries in these projects as a way to guarantee its own stability and security. A good number of activities done with this purpose are being carried out by the EU in its neighborhood. Since some neighbor or to-be neighbor regions are known for their long and protracted conflicts, the EU has launched different activities to ease these tensions aiming at conflict prevention and resolution. Stability is also of prime importance to the EU in the South Caucasus given the Union‘s energy
interests in the region.7 Hence, within the framework of this thesis, both conflict
prevention and conflict resolution are viewed as mechanisms to achieve stability.
This chapter studies different concepts of international conflict prevention and resolution and the role of a third party in these policies. The chapter also analyzes the EU conflict prevention/resolution policies in order to see to what extent and how they relate to the concepts of international conflict prevention and resolution, thus covering the first sub-question.
2.1.1. Conflict Prevention: what does prevention imply?
Conflict is a conscious, but not necessarily a rational phenomenon. It is what the parties
involved want, need or are obliged to.8 There is no one and only definition of conflict
7 European Parliament, External Relations Committee, South Caucasus: EU must play greater role in
stabilising the region, say MEPs, 2010,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20100406IPR72190. (Accessed 3 October 2010)
15 however. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim define conflict as a ‗perceived divergence of interest,
or a belief that the parties‘ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously‘.9
Although there is a tendency to view conflict as a negative social phenomenon, some
scholars argue that conflict can bring about positive changes as well.10 Nevertheless, in
the international arena, conflicts are conceived to have violent or destructive outcomes. Hence prevention of a conflict should be attributed more attention and importance. This should be done from economic perspectives as well, since resolution or conflict settlement is a more expensive process than prevention. The EU also shares this view. In 2001, speaking on behalf of the European Union on the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Jean de Ruyt stated that conflict prevention ―is much less costly in human
and financial terms than managing and settling conflicts once they have occurred.‖11
While peacekeeping is regarded as one of the main components of conflict
prevention12, this argument falls out from the research limitations of this thesis given
that the EU practices no peacekeeping activities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Also proceeding from the fact that the EU launches no military actions in regard to the NK conflict, conflict prevention in this context is a prevention of armed conflict and not an armed prevention of conflict.
The sixth Secretary-General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy as an action to ―prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when
they occur.‖13
With regard to Boutros Ghali‘s definition, EU‘s preventive policies will be viewed as activities conducted to prevent the existing dispute from escalation into conflict, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, from re-escalation. The report of the UN Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict states that for the preventive actions to be effective, they should be undertaken at the earliest stage of a conflict. The preventive actions, as the report continues, should address the deep-rooted causes of a
Press, 1992), 11.
9
Dean G. Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social conflict: escalation, stalemate, and settlement (McGraw-Hill, 1994), 5.
10 C. R. Mitchell, ―Evaluating Conflict,‖ Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 1 (1980): 62.
11
Jean De Ruyt on behalf of the European Union, ―EU Presidency Statement - Prevention of armed conflicts.‖ http://europa-eu-un.com/articles/en/article_66_en.htm (Accessed 3 October 2010)
12 Ralf Bredel and United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Long-term conflict
prevention and industrial development: the United Nations and its specialized agency, UNIDO (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 3.
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16 conflict by implementing short-term and long-term political, humanitarian, institutional and other measures assumed by the international community ‗in cooperation with national and regional actors‘.14 This statement is of special importance due to the EU‘s refusal to get engaged in dialogue with Nagorno-Karabakh itself. This, however, will be discussed later in the thesis.
While conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy are not mutually exclusive and refer to a greater extent to one and the same thing, preventive diplomacy can be regarded as a part of general conflict prevention. For example, the Carnegie Commission has offered a framework of operational prevention measures that can be used to stop violence in short terms. The measures include (1) early warning and response; (2) preventive diplomacy; (3) economic measures in the form of sanctions and
incentives; and (4) the use of force.15 The Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly
conflict distinguished between operational and structural conflict prevention strategies.16
Operational or short term preventive measures are used in cases of emergency. Structural or long-term prevention is said to be the prerogative of states or organizations who besides being interested in preventing conflicts, have a strong motivation for creating an environment where conditions for stable trade or other initiatives are
ensured.17 The EU preventive policies, as will be discussed further on in the research,
are more structural in nature.
Structural prevention according to the Carnegie Commission targets the root causes of conflict, meets people‘s basic social, cultural, and humanitarian needs, deals with rebuilding the societies affected by war or conflict. Structural strategies address the
international legal system and dispute resolution mechanisms as well.18 Economic and
financial assistance is also a means to prevent or resolve conflicts. Moreover, as argued, building healthy market economies within societies on their way to democracy is a
distinctive road to structural prevention.19 To what extent the EU‘s structural preventive
14
Report of the Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict (United Nations, 2001), 2.
15
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary (Washington, DC, 1997), 40.
16
Ibid., 37.
17
Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment, eds., Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Organizations and Institutions (Lexington Books, 2004), 6.
18
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary, 69.
19
17 diplomacy targets root causes of conflict or implements other strategies brought forward by the Carnegie Commission, will be shown in the chapters to follow.
Emma Stewart, on the other hand, argues that there is not an exact definition to conflict prevention. Conflict prevention, according to Stewart, implies ―identification of the causes of conflict, and entails attempts to address these causes before the outbreak
of violence.‖20
Conflict prevention, in other words, in the international arena refers to attempts by third parties to prevent a violent conflict from outbreak. As different from all the previous attempts to define conflict prevention in this paper, Ramsbotham et al. call conflict prevention a misnomer, since it is not only impossible to prevent conflict from occurring, but it is undesirable also, because conflict is necessary for social change
to take place.21 Thus, conflict prevention as such is not aimed at eliminating something
necessarily bad, but at preventing armed conflicts or mass violence from breaking out.22
In other words, conflict prevention is not in the actual prevention of a certain conflict, but of its outcomes.
2.1.2. Conflict resolution and third parties in a conflict
Peter Wallensteen views conflict resolution as ―a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with and/or dissolve their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one
another.‖23
Nevertheless, it is arguable whether a conflict is considered to be resolved only because there is no use of arms, since absence of war does not mean peace. James Schellenberg, on the other hand, defines conflict resolution as a process where the
parties consciously settle the issues between them.24 Nevertheless, if the willingness to
settle disputes do not occur on voluntary and conscious basis, a third party intervention is an alternative to conflict resolution. The intervention, however, does not imply
20 Emma J. Stewart, The European Union and conflict prevention: Policy Evolution and Outcome
(Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2006), 14.
21 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (Polity, 2005), 107.
22 Ibid. 23
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding conflict resolution: war, peace and the global system (SAGE, 2007), 14.
18 immediate and positive results either, since it can get as protracted as the conflict itself, as in the case of the NK conflict. Schellenberg distinguishes several main approaches in the practice of conflict resolution among which mediation or a third party that helps those in conflict to come to a mutually acceptable solution and arbitration, or a third party to give its arbitrary decision based on prior agreement reached with the conflict parties.25
There are numerous questions to be asked in regard to third parties. It is important to understand for those in conflict what the interveners can contribute or how they are to broker peace and keep it under control.
Lars Kirchhoff distinguishes between two different roles third parties can play in conflicts. The first is the role of a third party as an intermediary. As opposite to this, third parties, having their own interests in the outcome of a conflict, can also claim a form of participation in a conflict in order to integrate their own claims and interests
into the process.26 Kirchhoff also distinguishes between interested third parties and
non-interested third parties. Thus, non-interested third parties are ―actors who, without being principal actors, have a legal/moral/economic interest in the scenario which is not peripheral.‖ On the other hand, non-interested third parties are those who do not have relevant interests involved or only very peripheral ones, so as they have no decisive
effects.27 The EU, in this sense, can be found somewhere in the middle: on the one hand
it clearly has economic interests in a stable and conflict-free South Caucasus, on the other hand its policies have no decisive force, at least in the NK conflict.
There are many means available for the intervener to mediate peace. Third parties in a conflict may play a crucial role for the further development of conflict activities. Theoretically, a third-party aims at preventing or helping to resolve conflicts. Ronald J. Fisher argues that third-party interventions differ in the degree of the power that the
interveners exercise on the process and outcome of the conflict.28 Fisher distinguishes
25 Ibid., 15.
26
Lars Kirchhoff, Constructive interventions: Paradigms, Process and Practice of International Mediation (Kluwer Law International, 2008), 80-81.
27
Ibid., 87.
28 Ronald J. Fisher, Methods of Third-Party Intervention, Berghof Handbook for Conflict
Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001), 1, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/fisher_hb.pdf.
Online version available at: http://www.berghof-
19 three levels of influence by a third party: the high level, where disputes are considered by means of arbitration; the middle level, where a powerful third party can use punishments or the stick to achieve a settlement; and the low level, where the third-party will at least try to make a dialogue between the conflicting parties possible, to help them to understand the problem and to work on restructuring the relationship
between the parties.29 Within the scope of this research, the third-party notion will be
analyzed on the middle and low levels. According to Fisher, mediation is one of the
most acknowledged modes of non coercive intervention.30 However, mediation as such
is not discussed in this paper in depth given that the official mediation in the NK conflict is carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group and the EU does not have an important mediation role in the conflict. France, being a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, represents its own position and not the EU‘s.
For a third party or parties to be successful, they need to be familiar with the culture of the conflicting parties or societies. As Fisher argues, third parties need to gain ‗cross-cultural sensitivity‘ to understand in depth the ‗cross-cultural aspect of the conflict and the mentality of the parties of conflict. Most importantly, as he argues, interveners must not
impose their own cultural models of intervention on other people.31 Kevin Avruch and
Peter Black suggest a similar framework. They argue that the third-party interveners should give conflict a cultural analysis. The cultural analysis of a conflict, as they argue,
should be preliminary to other aspects of third-party intervention.32 Cultural analysis is
important in order to understand what framework to apply to a given conflict when acting as a third party. Without a thorough knowledge of the conflict‘s origins, of its background, its cultural and historical aspects, it may be quite challenging to try to achieve a solution. They see a conflict as a result of cultural differences as interpreted
by the parties on the same issues.33 Even if some conflicts are not initiated because of
cultural ‗misunderstanding‘ the knowledge of a cultural background is important in
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 20.
31 Fisher, Methods of Third-Party Intervention, 18. 32
Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, ―Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: problems and prospects,‖ in Conflict resolution theory and practice: integration and application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo Van der Merwe (Manchester University Press ND, 1993), 133.
20 order to assess correctly the parties and their activities. Culture is often used as a tool against the other party to trigger crisis.
Robert Nalbandov states that the duration of peace established after third-party
interventions is indicative of the success of third party actions.34 However, there are
third-parties whose actions cannot be seen in a short term.
The EU is a good example of a non coercive third party in the NK conflict. There have been no big interventions from the EU side, however its interventions come in the form of slow, structural changes that might, or might not affect significantly the outcome of the conflict. Hence, when speaking about the EU as a third party and the way it intervenes in the given context, the traditional models of third-party intervention should be put aside. Intervention itself is not the most correct term to apply to the EU‘s launched activities in regard to the NK conflict. The right word to use would be contribution to the prevention-resolution and eventually peace-building initiatives in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Third parties preferably need to be strong powers, as argued by Tocci. They need to have the necessary skills and resources aimed at coming to quick agreements by
offering new incentives to settle the dispute.35 Whether the EU is a strong power or not
is a disputable question, given that powers differ in different dimensions. The EU, nevertheless, has a good number of economic, financial and political instruments to be a more successful third party. This is, however, left for future discussions in this paper.
Michael Brown distinguishes ten policy tools available to the international actors when appearing as a third party and three main policy tasks. They are confidence-building measures; humanitarian assistance; mediation; traditional peacekeeping operation; fact-finding; multifunctional peacekeeping operations; military and economic assistance; judicial enforcement measures; arms embargoes and economic sanctions; and military force. The policy tasks are conflict prevention, conflict management, and
conflict resolution.36 With regard to the EU, this research targets some of the policy
instruments as suggested by Brown. Since the EU does not practice military power in
34 Robert Nalbandov, Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009), 2. 35
Nathalie Tocci, ―Conflict Resolution in the European Neighbourhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor‖ (European University Institute, 2004), 5,
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/publications/.
21 Nagorno-Karabakh, its contribution to the NK conflict prevention-resolution is void of military elements. Hence, the research targets other than military means at the EU‘s disposal, among which economic assistance, judicial enforcement measures as well as other confidence building initiatives.
As for policy tasks, Ramsbotham et al. draw a definition of these by carefully differentiating the policies from each other. Thus, conflict management is generally used to show the positive outcome of conflict, whereas conflict resolution implies
addressing and transforming the ‗deep-rooted sources of conflict.‘37
For Ramsbotham et al. conflict resolution does not aim at eliminating a conflict, but rather it is ―to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social
and political change.‖38 Niklas Swanström and Mikael Weissmann view conflict
prevention as a ‗set of instruments‘ used to prevent disputes from developing into active conflicts. Conflict management focuses on limitation of a conflict without necessarily offering a resolution, whereas conflict resolution aims at solving the incompatibilities
that cause a conflict by making the parties ‗accept each others‘ existence‘.39
However, within the framework of this research, conflict resolution is viewed not only as an action aimed at solving incompatibilities, but at minimizing these incompatibilities as to avoid violence that they can raise.
Alan Tidwell views stability as the ‗final component‘ of a successful outcome of
conflict resolution40. For Wallensteen, conflict resolution is a process by which
escalation turns into de-escalation and polarization is replaced by positive interaction.41
On the other hand, he also argues that conflicts are only transformed and not
eliminated42. Nathalie Tocci supports this statement by saying that trying to eradicate
conflict is mostly a futile thing to do and the best that can be done is to minimize the violence.43
37
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary conflict resolution, 29.
38
Ibid., 30.
39
Niklas L.P. Swanström and Mikael S. Weissmann, ―Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration‖ (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Programs, 2005), 5,6.
40
Alan Tidwell, Conflict resolved?: a critical assessment of conflict resolution (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001), 160.
41 Wallensteen, Understanding conflict resolution, 34. 42
Ibid., 39.
43
22 There are also many ways in which conflict resolution is understood. As Alan Tidwell
argues, ―conflict resolution means different things to different people‖.44
The Western concept on conflict resolution, as Tidwell goes on arguing, includes non-violence, fairness, empowerment and fundamental principles such as human rights, human needs,
etc.45 This is more or less, a conflict resolution model practiced and promoted by the
EU.
Departing from the belief shared by many scholars that there is no permanent resolution to a conflict and that conflicts are managed and channeled into a peaceful process instead of eliminating it, this research will place EU involvement in the NK conflict in the framework of preventing a re-escalation of violence and reaching stability in the region. EU activities aimed at ending hostilities and supporting peace-building will be viewed as conflict resolution initiatives.
Summing up what has been written on conflict prevention, resolution and the role of a third-party in a conflict, it is possible to define what conflict prevention, resolution and third-party involvement mean in the scope of this particular research paper.
Within the framework of this thesis, the research adopts the concept of conflict prevention suggested by Emma Stewart, according to which conflict prevention means ―identification of the causes of conflict, and entails attempts to address these causes
before the outbreak of violence.‖46
Although all the definitions brought in the research were sharing the same concept and principles, Stewart‘s definition is more explicit and concise and contains the main key ideas of conflict prevention.
For conflict resolution, the thesis adheres to the definition of Ramsbotham et al., according to which, conflict resolution does not aim to eradicate a conflict, but rather ―to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent)
processes of social and political change.‖47 Given that certain incompatibilities are
difficult to eliminate as a result of which conflict resolution becomes even a more difficult task to achieve, the definition of Ramsbotham gives a better idea of what conflict resolution implies, at least in regard to the NK conflict.
44 Tidwell, Conflict resolved?, 8. 45
Ibid., 17.
46
See 20
23 The definition of a third party is a combination of concepts offered by Kirchhoff. Thus, a third party is an intermediary that has its own legal/moral/economic interests and can have its own claims in the conflict outcome depending on the level of interest it has in a given context. This definition makes it easier to view the EU‘s role and interests in the NK conflict.
2.2. The EU policies on conflict prevention and resolution
2.2.1. The EU and Conflict Prevention
It has been widely argued that the EU is more an ‗economic superpower‘ than a political actor, or is simply a ―‗political dwarf‘ unable to exert influence in international
politics.‖48 Over the last few years, however, the EU managed to acquire a better
political status by increasing its engagement in preventive diplomacy in regions or countries in or prone to conflict. ―The emergence of conflict prevention in the EU external relations discourse is intimately connected to Western Europe‘s desire for stability on its periphery, and the development of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP).‖49 Indeed, the EU itself can be considered as a conflict prevention plan,
a peace project, based on the common market. It is admirable how the EU succeeded in bringing the two historical rivals Germany and France into coexisting side by side peacefully and prosperously by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Thinking of a violent or armed conflict among EU Member States seems unbelievable now. Conflict prevention is one of the Union‘s main policies. The Gothenburg programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict adopted by the European Council in 2001 showed that the EU is committed to conflict prevention.
The adoption of conflict prevention as one of the Union‘s main policies had economic motives as well apart from peace aspirations. Being the largest humanitarian
aid donor in the world50, the EU spends billions of Euros on post-conflict rehabilitation
48 Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in international politics (USA: Rowman & Littlefield,
2001), 1.
49
Emma J. Stewart, The European Union and conflict prevention: Policy Evolution and Outcome (Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2006), 93.
24 issues. It is thus much more profitable to prevent than to cure later. Preventing a conflict from the outset costs less than trying to resolve it or get engaged in post-conflict rehabilitation works. Thus, for example, in the year of 2002, the EU spent €
277,236,341 on post-conflict rehabilitation in Africa.51 In the case of Georgia, the EU,
not being able or willing to prevent the conflict, ―paid twice‖ by deploying around 300 monitors in 2008 instead of the 150 monitors that the Union avoided to deploy in 2005.
Moreover, it allocated about € 1 billion to post-conflict rehabilitation.52 Whereas, if
those conflicts were prevented or managed in time, the costs could have been less. Moreover, being the world‘s biggest trade block, the Union viewed peace as a required
precondition for secure and stable trade between its partners.53 It has also been
mentioned that the EC/EU trade policy contributes to conflict prevention as a means for
economic growth and poverty reduction.54 Consequently, the presence of a conflict will
negatively affect the trade between the Union and its trade partners.
It is interesting to note, however, that the research did not find one clear and specific EU definition to conflict prevention and resolution. There are different interpretations of what conflict prevention and resolution imply, but there is no one common way to define a conflict prevention and resolution. It is, thus, worthwhile mentioning what the EU means by conflict prevention. The 2007 Presidency report to the European Council stressed that the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict highlighted the importance of ―addressing conflict in a coherent manner along clear political priorities, ensuring that early warning is followed by early action and that the EU instruments for
both long term and short term prevention are being enhanced.‖55 As will be discussed
later, the EU strong rhetoric on how its conflict prevention policies should be, does not always meet its ambitious statements.
Union, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/238.
51
―Post-conflict rehabilitation and the EU: at the crossroads,‖ the Courier ACP-EU n° 198 May-June 2003,http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier198/en/en_034.pdf
(Accessed 26 November 2010)
52
Nicu Popescu, ―The EU‘s Conflict Prevention Failure in Georgia,‖ Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 2009, http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5198 (Accessed 26 November 2010)
53
Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wouters, eds. The European Union and conflict prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004), XXV
54
European Commission, ―Communication From The Commission on Conflict Prevention,‖ November 4, 2001, 8,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001_211_en.pdf. (Accessed 12 October 2010)
55
25 The main goal behind conflict prevention for the EU has been said to be the ―intention to help drive and sustain peace and tackling the underlying causes and emerging
consequences of violent conflict.‖56
The Council in its Common Position of 12 April 2005, Article 2 says that the EU action shall cover ―conflict prevention by seeking to address the more structural root causes while targeting the direct causes - trigger factors
- of violent conflicts.‖57 The Member States consider the basic causes of conflict to be
as follows:
Economic hardship
Lack of respect for human and minority rights
Political, Economic and social inequality
Lack of democracy58
The EU, therefore, has worked out a checklist of conflict root causes which by 2000 was as follows:
Legitimacy of the State
Rule of Law
Respect for Fundamental Rights
Civil Society and the Media
Relation between communities and Dispute-Solving Mechanisms
Sound Economic Management
Social and regional Inequalities
Geopolitical Situation59
It is however difficult to ascertain that this list covers all basic conflicts causes. The EU constructs its policies around and based on the values it has, but it seems to pay less importance to conflicts that erupt because of territorial disputes, for example, which is
56
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Five Years After Göteborg: the EU and its conflict prevention potential: Conflict Prevention Partnership Report (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office), 9.
57
―Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005,‖ Official Journal of the EU, (2005) http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:097:0057:0062:EN:PDF (Accessed 12 October 2010)
48 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Polity, 2008), 169. 59
European Union ―Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict” (2000)
26 not included in any of the above mentioned categories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union violent conflicts broke up in the South and North Caucasus, the root causes of which were territorial disputes among former Soviet Republics. Those conflicts exist until now with some of them breaking into war recently as well (Georgia-South Ossetia and Abkhazia), but the EU does not regard territorial disputes as a root cause. This, however, has not always been the case. The inconsistency of the EU approach to defining root causes of a conflict can be traced by reading the European Parliament resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh. In this resolution, the root cause of the conflict is said
to be of territorial nature.60 Conflict of this kind are sometimes based on primordial
national concepts and are more difficult to eradicate by means of financial or other investments the EU makes.
The EU believes that treating the root causes of conflict requires achieving structural
stability in all spheres.61 By saying structural stability, the EU understands sustainable
economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, all this with the ability to bring change without resorting to conflict. Moreover, all the above-mentioned elements
need to be dealt with in an integrated way.62 Integration policy aims at integrating the
states affected or prone to conflict by offering cooperative initiatives with the latter. Cooperation implies that both sides, i.e. the EU and the other party have obligations to fulfil. In the EU‘s political framework, the success of the cooperation depends on the other part‘s commitment to the EU‘s values as precondition among other things for peace. Nathalie Tocci argues that one of the most successful mechanisms at the EU‘s
disposal to make the other party fulfil its obligations is the policy of conditionality.63
Conditionality implies that unless a condition is fulfilled, there is no reward. In other words, the EU turns to conditionality, i.e. restriction or refusal of cooperation in various spheres, in order to make the other party meet the Union‘s demands, which can serve as a good instrument for conflict prevention or resolution.
60
Official Journal of the European Communities, ―Resolution on the Situation in Armenia‖ No. C 12 /146 (February 19, 1990)
61 European Commission, ―Communication From The Commission on Conflict Prevention.‖
(Accessed 12 October 2010)
62
Ibid.
63
27 The Member States agreed on ―the principles on which conflict prevention should be based such as democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and human dignity, as well as on the means to be employed for concrete actions, with priority in civil
area-trade, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, etc.‖64 To complete its
preventive diplomacy, the EU has worked out a number of instruments and mechanisms that have been launched in different countries addressing different conflicts.
The rule of law, human rights and democracy are the EU‘s priority values which are regarded as prerequisites for peace and stability. The EU‘s exceptional style of ‗soft‘ power targets poverty, lack of democracy, lack of respect for human rights and other vitally important issues trying to improve them by a number of instruments at its disposal. These instruments have a long-term/structural and short-term/operational nature. The EU preference in conflict prevention methods goes to the long-running ones, therefore it has shaped a good number of long-term instruments. On the other hand, in situations where immediate involvement is needed, long-term tools do not serve the purpose. Hence the EU started regarding short-term instruments with greater importance as well. This is not to say, however, that long-term instruments are meant only for resolution and short-term ones are meant only for prevention. These instruments are aimed both at prevention and resolution and can serve for both policies by complementing each other when needed. Both long-term and short-term instruments have sufficient funding and are said to be designed to address the needs of the proposed checklist and to target the agreed causes of conflict.
2.2.1.1. Long-term or structural instruments
Long-term conflict prevention instruments aim at implementing EU‘s universal values in conflict zones by making sure that by the time they start working, peace will become inevitable. Keeping to long-term tools, the EU tries to restructure the country in conflict. Regarding economic, social and human rights issues as main causes of conflicts and by outlining a checklist that observes the absence of EU values in this or that place, long-term instruments aim at changing a system from the inside, little by little, not by overtaking a country militarily, but by making the system better, more
64
28 democratic, more ‗Europe style.‘ In this way, peace could be a remaining value and not a contested condition.
Long-term prevention is said to be the prerogative of states or international organizations who besides being interested in preventing a particular conflict, are
strongly interested in creating a stable environment for trade and other initiatives.65 It
could also be argued that the EU gives what it has, that the adherence to structural approach backed up by the Union‘s formidable financial investments in conflict zones, is explained by the absence of sufficient military potential or united European army or other means to employ sufficient military force. Not totally void of reasonable arguments, it could still be argued that the EU adheres to the best success of its conflict prevention policy: end of further wars between Germany and France and thus in Europe by bringing the two at a round table of economic partnership. As the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou pointed out ―the only way to deal with conflict effectively is to address effectively the root causes through a long-term structural
prevention policy.‖66 Hence, considering structural prevention as a guarantee to lasting
peace, the EU promotes its soft diplomacy thus standing apart from other regional powers that prefer military short-term solutions to conflicts.
2.2.1.2. Short-term or operational instruments
In some situations the long-term conflict prevention approach together with instruments at its disposal do not work. Certain situations require immediate intervention. For such acute situations the EU has a set of instruments available as well. When the conflict already exists, some quick reaction should include reducing the tension and preventing conflict outbreak and trying to terminate the conflict itself. These tasks were to a greater extent developed under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU short-term instruments are also soft in nature since they seek to prevent by not involving military force but by addressing other means at its disposal such as economic partnership, various types of cooperation, etc. Whether short-term instruments are more
65 Schnabel and Carment, Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, 6. 66
Sarah Bayne, Conflict Prevention and the EU: from Rhetoric to reality (International Alert and SaferWorld, 2003), 1,
29 efficient than the long-term ones is a contested question since they target different situations having a common goal. Anyhow, the importance of short-term measures are not to be underestimated due to the fact that it takes time for long-term tools to start working while conflicts can erupt in the meanwhile, requiring immediate actions. Flexibility and quick reaction could best describe how short-term tools should be. The EU has a set of diplomatic and humanitarian instruments aimed at short-term approach that partly are of economic and partly of political nature.
Among EU‘s long-term and short-term preventive instruments that are also aimed to help resolve the NK conflict, the thesis will discuss the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Eastern Partnership (EaP).
2.2.2. EU and conflict resolution
Europeanization has many definitions. Its meaning, purpose and implications have been given different explanations. Nevertheless, for this thesis, the definition offered by Claudio M. Radaelli will be considered. Hence, Europeanization refers to ―processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‗ways of doing things‘ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics...‖67
In other words, Europeanization is a process of ‗EU-ization‘. Georgi Kamov argues that the Europeanization is the Union‘s foreign policy instrument. Hence, it can be a conflict prevention-resolution instrument as well. Coppieters et al. argue that Europeanization is a tool to deal with conflict resolution by, to a certain degree,
integrating the conflicting sides into the European system.68 For the sake of its own
security and stability, the EU is interested in having conflict free neighbours. Nevertheless, as an analyst from the European Union Institute for Security Studies mentioned, the extent to which the EU is willing to get engaged in conflict settlement in its neighbourhood depends on the willingness of the conflicting parties to involve the
67 Claudio Maria Radaelli, ―Europeanization of Public Policy,‖ in The Politics of Europeanization,
eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Maria Radaelli, eds., The Politics of Europeanization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.
68
30
Union in their issues.69 Both EU policies of conflict prevention and resolution are aimed
at providing a stable and secure environment in and around the EU. It is interesting to note, however, that the research did not find one clear and specific EU definition to conflict prevention and resolution. There are different interpretations of what conflict prevention and resolution imply, but there is not one common way to define a conflict prevention and resolution.
Despite a lack of one and specific definition to conflict prevention and resolution, as already mentioned, it is, nevertheless, possible to build some definition for the EU policies in regard to conflict prevention and resolution based on the material researched. Thus, for the EU conflict prevention is a policy for retaining peace and avoiding undesirable consequences of a violent conflict by tackling the root causes of conflict. Peace, in its turn, is required for secure and stable trade and social development. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, is a more long running objective which consists in bringing the social and political level of conflict regions to the EU standards, thus building remaining EU values that will positively affect conflict resolution.
The built concepts are shown in Table 1 as a set of definitions going from broad to narrow, i.e. from concepts of general/international conflict prevention and resolution to the EU concepts for the same policies.
Table 1.
Conflict Prevention -General Conflict Prevention-EU
Identification of the causes of conflict, and attempts to address these causes before the outbreak of violence
Policy for retaining peace and avoiding undesirable consequences of a violent conflict by tackling the root causes of conflict, where peace is required for secure and stable trade and social development
Conflict Resolution- General Conflict Resolution- EU
Transformation of actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change
A long running objective which consists in bringing the social and political level of conflict regions to the EU standards, thus building remaining EU values that will positively affect conflict resolution
69
31 In conflict prevention both broad and narrow definitions underline the importance of tackling the (root) causes of conflict and avoiding violence before it breaks out. Nevertheless, in the narrow definition there is an accentuated trade and economic interest behind conflict prevention. This is, perhaps, understandable, due to the fact that the EU came into being as an economic partnership. This line of conduct, i.e. giving more importance to trade relations, will be further observed in the EU policies in regard to the settlement of the NK conflict. In conflict resolution, both definitions share the same idea, nevertheless, it is possible to say that the broad definition of conflict resolution implies more direct participation, whereas the narrow definition is more specified and identified in terms of the wished outcomes.
Thus, whereas the EU concepts of conflict prevention/resolution relate to a greater extent to the concepts of international conflict prevention and resolution, the EU tends to underline the importance of conflict prevention and resolution in terms of trade, economic and social factors as well. It regards a conflict to be a serious hindrance to these objectives.
It should be furthermore mentioned, that in policies regarding conflict prevention and resolution, the EU has stressed its adherence and commitment to the principles and
purposes of the UN policies.70 This is of dual significance though. On the one hand, the
EU relies on an organization that has more experience and skills in conflict prevention and settlement, on the other hand, a political actor who defines conflict prevention as one of its main objectives should have its own framework for these policies. These shortcomings in the EU conflict prevention policies and the EU‘s ‗habit‘ to rely on or refer to other organizations should be kept in mind throughout the whole research paper. The examination of the EU activities in regard to the case study conflict of this research will show that the EU practically does the same; i.e. relies or refers to the OSCE.
70
32
3. Nagorno-Karabakh: then and now
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is often believed to have begun with the tragic events of 1988 when the massacres or Sumgait and Baku Armenians took place in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the roots of the conflict are in a much earlier period, and for this purpose, the research will address the earlier developments of the history of Nagorno-Karabakh as well in order to show that the ‗brotherhood‘ much propagandized by the Soviet authorities was artificial and of a made-up nature.
This chapter introduces the history of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the history behind the NK conflict. The history of the conflict is important in order to understand the existing incompatibilities between the conflicting sides. Therefore, this chapter describes the history of NK in two different time periods (ancient and modern), and describes the problem of identities of the sides of conflict. It also describes the current situation and the current conflict dynamics thus covering the second sub-question of the research.
3.1. Prehistory and identities
Karabakh is a Turkic translation of a Persian name of the region, Bagh-e-Siah meaning ‗Black Garden‘ and Nagorno meaning Mountainous in Russian. The name itself suggests that the region has been under domination of different powers. Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of wider Nagorno-Karabakh, or Artsakh in Armenian. Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani historians claim for their own people residence in the region from ancient
times. Ancient foreign and Armenian historians placed Artsakh in Ancient Armenia. 71
Azerbaijan, on the other side, claims that it is the legal and historical heir of the Caucasian Albania (not to confuse with modern Albania). This claim, however, is supported only by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This claim is even more contested given
71
Strabo, Geography, vol. XI, chap. 14,5 (Loeb edition, vol. 5), 320- 325; Movses Khorenatsi (Moses of Khoren), History of the Armenians, vol. II; chap. 44-45 (English trans. ByThomson, R.,
33
Azerbaijanis‘ own claims of Turks being their ancestors.72 It enters into contradiction
with the Azerbaijani version of being the heir of the Caucasian Albania, which disappeared several centuries before the first Turkish invasions into Asia Minor.
In the ‗Declaration on the establishment of the Council on strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey‘ the Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Recep Tayyip
Erdogan refers to Turkey and Azerbaijan as ―one nation, two states.‖73 The President of
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, in the same declaration, reaffirms that his country and Turkey
are brothers in blood.74 Michael P. Croissant addressing this argument, says that
Azerbaijanis were always content to identify themselves with Turks. Moreover, he supports other scholars who see the origin of the terms ‗Azeri‘ and ‗Azerbaijani‘ as
products of the 20th century, prior to which they were referred to as ‗Caucasian Tatars‘
or simply ‗Tatars‘.75
Other scholars have referred to Azerbaijanis as Muslims,
Caucasian Turks or Shiah Mohammedan.76 It is interesting to note, that the pretext
brought by the Caucasus Bureau of the Bolshevik party on the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 1921 was based on the ―necessity of establishing national
peace between Muslims and Armenians.‖77 These facts are enough to assert that before
very lately, the self-perception of Azerbaijani people in regard to their own identity has been quite vague. On the other hand, the Armenians‘ perception of themselves as a distinct group with distinct ancient history and culture is seen as been the same
throughout centuries.78 However, since this historic debate requires a longer time and
dedication, the further consideration of this argument will be left for another research due to this paper‘s length limitations.
72 Jed C. Snyder, ed., After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia (Washington, DC:
DIANE Publishing, 1997), 146.
73
Official web-site of the President of Azerbaijan, ―President of Azerbaijan - Declaration on the establishment of the Council on strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been signed,‖ http://president.az/articles/721/print?locale=en.(Accessed 19 October 2010)
74
Ibid.
75 Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: causes and implications (Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1998), 7,8.
76
Luigi Villari, Fire and sword in the Caucasus (T. F. Unwin, 1906), 20. (The printed version can be found at: http://armenianhouse.org/villari/caucasus/fire-and-sword.html); Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16: Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London: Textor Verlag, 1916), 99. ( The printed version can be found at: http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1915/bryce/)
77
Thomas De Waal, Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war (NYU Press, 2003), 130;Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: a legal appraisal (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 4.
78
34 As it has been mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph, the Sumgait events of 1988 were not the first sign of conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and the problems did not appear in one day. Sumgait events were not the first case of violence towards Armenians in Azerbaijan. In this regard, Thomas de Waal mentions that ―horrible as the pogroms were, the death toll in Sumgait was far smaller than that of the
massacres in Baku in 1905 and 1918.‖79
Emil Souleimanov, when referring to the events of 1905, describes the riots as a provocation by Russia during which masses of
Azerbaijani people attacked prosperous and rich Armenian craftsmen and traders.80
Luigi Villari has also written on the 1905 events. In his book written in 1906, he
described how the outraged tartars burnt hundreds of Armenian-owned oil wells.81
Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned facts, the claims that the tensions between Azerbaijanis and Armenians began only in 1988 are void of basis. Moreover, the root causes of the conflict are told to date back to an even earlier period. Having a history that places Armenia among one of the most ancient countries in the world, it was for the most part under foreign domination. Greater Armenia was divided into Eastern (what is now most of the modern republic of Armenia) and Western (what is now most of the Eastern Turkey) parts. The Eastern part was long under Persian domination. However after the Russo-Persian wars Eastern Armenia became part of a Tsarist Russia. The treaty of Gulistan signed after the 1812-13 Russo-Persian war led to
the annexation of Karabakh to Russian rule.82
Not going any deeper into the historical developments of Nagorno-Karabakh, it is worth mentioning a few facts before reaching the period where the final status of NK was decided by the Soviet authorities. Thus, after the collapse of Tsarist Russia, three new independent states were formed in 1918: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The independence had a life of a few years though. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia came into being in 1920-1921. The three states formed the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics (TSFSR) making one of the founding components
79
Waal, Black garden, 44.
80
Emil Souleimanov, ―The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ in OSCE Yearbook 2004 (CORE | Centre for OSCE Research, 2004), 203, http://www.core-
hamburg.de/CORE_english/pub_osce_inh_04.htm.
81
Luigi Villari, Fire and sword in the Caucasus (T. F. Unwin, 1906), 191-208.
