Obstacles and options in global environmental governance : towards a better engagement across the political spectrum : a study based on the Common Fisheries Policy debate during the Brexit campaign

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P u b l i c P o l i c y a n d G o v e r n a n c e

Obstacles and Options in Global Environmental Governance:

Towards a better engagement across the political spectrum

A study based on the Common Fisheries Policy debate during the Brexit

campaign

Benedetta Sala, Student Number 11260882 23 June 2017

Supervisor: Dr R.J. Pistorius

Second Reader: Dr. Conny Roggeband Word Count: 22.076 words

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Abstract

The thesis explores the crisis of global environmental governance. The topic is approached by intertwining social constructivist thought and discourse analysis, conceived as both theory and method. The research seeks to highlight the role played by specific worldviews, or ideologies, in the process of ‘framing’ global environmental policies. The thesis finds that the discourses surrounding global environmental governance are currently based on a ‘Progressive-Liberal’ ideology. However, the dominant worldview is challenged by a revival of ‘Conservative-Populism’, which creates alternative discourses for what concerns environmental management and the role of global institutions in it.

The issue of framing is linked with the concept of echo chambers, that create rival discourses while hindering communication and exchange between them. Two separate echo chambers are analysed as separate and non-communicating contexts of political debate.

The case study of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (EU CFP) and Brexit sets an example and shows how the mechanism of echo chambers works in practice; and it can provide lessons for moving towards a better engagement for global environmental governance across the political spectrum. The policy proposed and recommended in this thesis is based on the practice of reflexive policy analysis, and argues that integrating local knowledge into global environmental discourses could potentially allow more space for dialogue, learning and participation. It could also bring to a more accurate representation of the issues at stake, and a more effective management of the environment.

The thesis concludes that incorporating lessons from interpretive, reflexive policy analysis, based on the EU CFP and Brexit case study, would allow to ‘re-frame’ the issue of global environmental governance. This case study sets an example for future research in other controversial areas of global environmental governance, such as adaptation to climate change and measures to tackle it.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Robin Pistorius for his dedication and help. His guidance has been essential in the development of this thesis. His constant and valuable supervision ensured the smooth running of the project. I would also like to thank Dr. Conny Roggeband for the time taken to read and asses this piece of work as a second reader. Finally, a big thank you to my Master class colleagues, who have kept me motivated and happy throughout the journey we have taken together, and to my family for always supporting me.

Benedetta Sala, June 2017 Benedettasala94@gmail.com

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Glossary

Echo Chamber

An ‘Echo Chamber’ is used to mean separate and non-communicating context of political debate. An echo chamber is formed when, people upholding a specific perspective, promote their discourse or communicate their opinion (on a policy issue or on a political debate) among people of similar views – therefore without engaging in dialogue across different views.

The echo chamber model suggests that a political conversation is locked within groups of similar political views.

From Section 3.3 a): “The echo chamber effect takes place when actors sharing the same views engage

in an information-sharing process, meaning that the result of such process merely reflects the views of the actors involved, without facing challenging, or different opinions. The process further evolves into ‘reinforcing spirals of knowledge’ when actors in the echo chamber continue to prefer the same type of information sharing systems, by for example selecting only media outlets holding partisan views or by engaging within the same old circle of participants.”

Discourse

Discourse is conceived as theory, method (Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L.; 2002) and

subject in this research.

It is understood as a particular way of talking about the world. Simply put it is defined as what can be said, and thought, but also who can speak, when, where and with what authority” (Ball, 1990:17). It is regarded as an active process with embedded meanings, social relations, and power relations that has the capacity to construct political realities. The discourse itself is constructed by actors, and on the other hand, it constructs possible ways to interpret the world.

Environmental Elite

Is interpreted as a global network of actors involved in environmental causes, at many possible levels, ranging from students believing in sustainable development and celebrities spreading awareness, through local politicians battling for environmental protection, to experts, members of the epistemic community, environmental NGOs, scholars and practitioners of global environmental governance. Actors in this group are seen as very sophisticated, cosmopolitan and highly educated members of society, that for these reasons are ‘perceived’ as an elite by ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘climate sceptics’.

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Ordinary Citizen

Are groups of people with relatively low or inconsistent understanding of climate change and environmental issues. They have psychological barriers in understanding measures of environmental governance, often due to their lower educational level, or due to the influence of scepticism exerted on them. They are regarded as a vulnerable group of people that can be easily influenced by conservative and populist pressure groups, as the latter strategically frame their discourse and opinions to specifically appeal to this section of population. They are important for their potential ‘’spill-over’’ effect (Haas, 1964), and because the implementation of the global environmental agenda at the local level ultimately depends on them.

Global Environmental Governance

Comprehends organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and norms that regulate the processes of global environmental protection (Najam et al. 2006). In this thesis, GEG is viewed as a set of mechanisms and rules prescribed by the intersections of governments at various levels: by the EU and UN at the global level; by national governments at the national level; and ultimately by local governments. The focus of the thesis is especially placed on the global and national level governments, while the local level is actually studied through the role of ordinary citizens and environmental NGOs (therefore not essentially from a ‘governmental’ perspective).

Progressive-Liberal

Is understood as a loose ideology, leaning between left green radicalism and centre-liberalism in the political spectrum. The loose ideology is based on values that embrace openness to change, self-transcendence and is more predisposed to an equitable division of resources. It is assumed, based on Withmarsh and Corner’s (2017:123) elaborations, that those who fall into this category are more concerned about environmental issues, and more likely to accept measures of global environmental governance.

Conservative-Populist

Is used to mean a right-leaning ideology, and its related social movement, based on self-enhancing, individualistic values and a desire to conserve and respect tradition and

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national identity. The term populism enhances the idea of a social movement for the

people, as opposed to an imagined elite.

Individualistic and hierarchical individuals that fall into this category tend to be more likely in favour of flexible environmental reforms that maintain free markets. They are also less likely to perceive climate change as a threat and, often, do not feel compelled to adopt a sustainable behaviour (Withmarsh and Corner, 2017:123).

The two political ideologies taken into account can be also seen as sorts of ‘appreciative systems’ from which individuals, scholars, or policy activists construct their frames. Frames, Framing, Re-framing

Frames are the lenses through which one sees and understands reality; they are inherently linked to one’s lived experience, contextualised knowledge, place in society and derived worldview. Framing is the process of one group in spreading its view and logic about a topic, or issue. Rein and Schoen (1993:146) refer to it as “a particular way of representing knowledge”; and also as a “process by which a central organizing frame is embodied in a policy position”.

Re-framing is a process that implies reflection in making sense of the interaction of different frames looking at the same topic or issue.

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List of Abbreviations

BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China BBC British Broadcasting Company Brexit British Exit (from the European Union) BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

Clexit Exit from International Climate Change Agreements

COP Conference of the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

E.D. Environmental Discourse E.I. Environmental Ideology

EPA Environmental Protection Agency (of the United States of America) ETS Emission Trading System

EU European Union

EU CFP European Union Common Fisheries Policy FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GEG Global Environmental Governance

IEEP Institute for European Environmental Policy IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IR International Relations

MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreement MPs Members of Parliament

MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield NGO Non-Governmental Organization

PECH European Parliament Committee on Fisheries TAC Total Allowable Catches

UK United Kingdom

UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States of America

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Chapter 1 – Introduction to the Thesis

1.1 Introduction and Problem Field

The thesis starts from the assumption that global environmental governance (GEG) is paralysed. International agreements on climate change are viewed as a big failure, reflecting Goldin’s (2013) assumption that global governance in general is failing.

The thesis, by acknowledging the crisis of global environmental governance, aims to highlight a problem of policy framing and engagement within the context of climate change issues and environmental governance, in order to understand what can be done to improve the situation.

Years of negotiations under UN guidance went from imposing strict targets for emissions reductions with the Kyoto Protocol, towards a more flexible, pledge-and-review logic with the Paris Agreement (Falkner 2016). Global environmental governance reached the peak of failure at COP15 held in Copenhagen, 2009: the most salient characteristic of the talks was large opposition to a strict mode of supranational governance dominated by target goals, and a deep North-South divide (Dimitrov 2010). A few years later, at COP21 in Paris, the international community seemed to have understood that national self-determination, cultural and economic differences were challenging factors to the status-quo of global environmental governance, therefore a major shift was implemented: towards a more flexible scheme, based on individual inputs from national governments to pledge for emission reductions and other measures of environmental protection and climate change strategies; also called the ‘pledge-and-review’ logic by Falkner (2016).

The new logic has seemingly learned from past mistakes of GEG by re-distributing decisional power to nation states, instead of continuing to push for a universal agreement on climate change. The history of GEG and climate change provides us with the adequate background in which to position the problems of GEG in respect to domestic politics. Today more than ever, domestic politics worldwide is shifting the balance of power and seeking institutional changes for a new age of globalisation, towards more democratic and localised governance. This thesis puts the focus on the GEG crisis, by highlighting tensions between the global and the local, problems of engagement and communication, and the threatening revival of populist anti-environmental rhetoric. The thesis aims to find the way out of this chaos with a policy recommendation directed to the EU, based on the

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case of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Brexit, arguing that a re-framing of the policy (and climate change policies more generally) is necessary.

Most recent scholarship (Whitmarsh and Corner 2017; Feldman et al. 2014; Dunlap 2013) has analysed the role that political ideology, identity and the media play in driving political intentions and opinion on climate change policies. Such scholarship has traditionally focused on the US context, since it is one of the most sceptical nations over anthropogenic global warming. Whitmarsh and Corner (2016), with their most recent research, are pioneers in the emerging field that considers the effects of political ideologies on environmental policies at the European level, by taking the UK as a case study. I believe that more research is strongly needed because of the new political scenario dominated by a revival of populism and nationalism worldwide, and especially in a variety of EU countries (Wodak and Boukala, 2015). The new political tendencies will have an enormous impact on voting intentions on future environmental and climate change policies on a global, European and national level (Johnston, 20171_{). In this thesis,} it is asserted that, if supporters of global environmental governance, want to prevent opposition to progress for the environmental protection agenda, they must take action and face the challenges of populism to turn them into an opportunity to re-frame the policy problem(s), engage in a better environmental conversation across the political spectrum, and finally break the echo chambers that are perpetuating competing environmental discourses.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis: Research Question and Sub-questions

The main research question of the thesis is:

What are the obstacles and options to improve public consensus on global environmental policies?

The aim of the main research question is to identify obstacles that are hindering measures of global environmental governance, and also to find potential options for improving public consensus and engagement for global environmental policies. The

1_{Johnston, (2017) for the Independent.} http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/donald-trump-100-days-president-climate-change-global-warming-nature-catastrophic-dangerous-weird-a7701906.html last accessed 9 June 2017

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question will be answered using a social constructivist approach to discourse analysis. The analysis will be based on the EU Common Fisheries Policy debate as reported by British media in 2016 and 2017. The answer to the thesis will be structured into three parts. The first part starts in Chapter 3, and introduces the reader, first, to the contemporary crisis of global environmental governance, and then, presents the issue of echo chambers in creating competing environmental discourses. Here, the questions I attempt to answer are: Section 3.0) ‘What has generated the crisis of GEG and what have been the measures adopted to solve it?’ and Section 3.1) ‘Who participates in global environmental governance, given the claims that it is considered an elitist practice?’. I will present the debate about elitism and environmentalism, and then, in Section 3.2, move onto considering what determines the ordinary citizens’ perception of, and attitude towards global environmental policies.

Subsequently, the thesis then turns to the matter of ‘Echo Chambers’, believed to be partly responsible in generating the crisis of GEG. I will explore the mechanisms of the echo chambers (in Section 3.3) and show how they are thought to work, according to scholarly literature. The features of the “Progressive-Liberal” and “Conservative” echo chambers will be discussed. To conclude this part, I will summarise the key lessons that we can learn from the acknowledgement that echo chambers in environmental discourses do exist and play a significant role in determining people’s participation and understanding of environmental causes, and I will also point out that the global environmental society shall improve its engagement strategies, given claims about its (perceived) elitist structure.

Moving into Part Two, Chapter 4, the thesis takes a more empirical turn, as the attention is solely focusing on the selected case: the EU CFP debate during the Brexit campaign. The reader will first be introduced to the debate (Section 4.1), the main issues will be presented. Then, the scope and features of the CFP as presented by the EU will be included (Section 4.2). The following section (4.3) attempts to understand how the EU frames the new CFP and academic policy documents will be taken into consideration too. In Section 4.4, the EU CFP’s environmental discourse will be classified, and in Section 4.5 the problems and critiques of the CFP will be discussed as part of the discursive struggle taking place among different worldviews at stake.

The second part of the case study starts in Section 4.6. The debate is approached by looking at how issues are reported by selected British media in 2016 and 2017. The newspaper discourse analysis seeks to reveal how the public understands and intervenes in the debate, and is also used to find discourse coalitions and stakeholders involved in

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each discourse and how they influence public opinion. The Progressive-Liberal and Conservative claims will be presented separately, and will be analysed through coding techniques. The strengths and weaknesses of both discourses are discussed in Section 4.7.

The third part of the thesis, starting from the fifth chapter, focuses on how to make a policy recommendation based on reflexive policy analysis. Chapter 5 adapts the lessons learned from the discourse analysis together with notions of interpretive and reflexive policy analysis, so to envision a policy recommendation that seeks to improve the EU CFP, and more broadly to set an example for other environmental policy issues. The recommendation will be based on key concepts of local knowledge, dialogue and participation and policy reframing.

The conclusion is presented in Chapter 6. It provides a consistent summary of the main topics discussed and arguments deducted from each chapter.

Ideas for further research mark the end of this thesis, mentioning that the theoretical and methodological approach chosen in this thesis is valid not only in reference to the context and case study of the EU CFP and Brexit, but can also be applied to other environmental issues, especially climate change. The overarching ambition of this thesis is that it will stimulate more thought on the importance of Conservative and populist movements, especially in Europe, and their potential impact on the environment.

1.3 Motivation and Social Relevance

The motivation to write the thesis derives from the urge to improve public consensus on environmental policies. The thesis does not seek to find a comprehensive answer or solution to the problem(s) discussed, but seeks to explore the possibilities in relation to the chosen case, in the attempt to raise awareness on the dramatic situation that global environmental governance is now facing in world politics. The scope of this thesis is also that of creating stimulus for further research on the intersections between media (and social media), political ideologies and environmental policies.

Recent global political tendencies show a revival of populist, nationalist and right-wing movements (Wodak and Boukala, 2015). Given the recent election of US president Donald Trump and the outcome it is having on environmental protection, with the

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President’s plans to terminate the EPA and exit from the Paris Agreement,2_{both on a} national and a global scale, it is increasingly necessary to pay attention to the role of right-wing voters and their political engagement on matters of environmental reforms and climate change (Inglehart and Norris, 20163_{). The US has a long history of intertwined} climate scepticism linked to conservative politics, Giddens (2008:6) calls “climate change sceptics” those who claim that global warming is not produced by human activity. Marshall (2014) recognises that climate denial does exists along the mainstream consensus on climate change – it is an inherent part of it. The ‘denial machine’ is described by Dunlap (2013:692) as a disinformation campaign that has used the complexities of environmental issues “and the inevitable uncertainties involved in scientific research to generate scepticism and denial” about environmental governance. The campaign has featured a coalition of industrial interests together with conservative foundations and think tanks “greatly aided by conservative media and politicians” (Dunlap 2013: 692; Oreskes & Conway, 2010, Powell, 2011, Feldman et al. 2012). Conservative science sceptic coalitions generate uncertainty to their advantage as the greater uncertainty there is, the less space science will have in the decision making process. This is a significant trend shaping the world of policy-making, Rein and Schoen (1993) in fact note that scientific approaches are losing relevance in policy-making as they become ever more contested by public opinion.

Nationalist right-wing movements are changing European politics too, meaning that they could have long-lasting effects on European environmental policies, therefore a study on how to engage with these supporters is societally relevant in order to ensure public support for environmental policies across the political spectrum, on a global scale.

Research has shown that right-of-centre and far-right political ideologies:

 Do not endorse action on climate change, especially in Anglophone countries where science deniers are more active (Dunlap 2013, Withmarsh and Corner 2017)  Are increasingly sceptical of supra-national, global institutions (such as the UN and EU) – and therefore this could have a reverse effect on international treaties and policies on climate change. This factor could significantly slow down progress and international cooperation (Goldin, 2013; Falkner 2016).

2_{Johnston (2017)}

http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/donald-trump-100-days-president-climate-change-global-warming-nature-catastrophic-dangerous-weird-a7701906.html last accessed 9 June 2017 3_{Inglehart, R.F., and Norris, P.( 2016). “Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and} cultural backlash. Harvard Kennedy School of Government”.

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 Have values clashing with actions for environmental protection (Withmarsh and Corner, 2017)

Today, the global narrative on climate change is often appealing to left-of-centre voters, mostly because of how such discourse is framed and the terminology used – however it is still possible to re-frame the narrative to make it appealing for a broader political spectrum. The proposed research question seeks to find ways to improve the mainstream discourse used for political communication on climate change, it proposes a re-framing of such discourse to make it compatible for people with more diverse political ideologies.

The suggested re-framing of the policy discourse (discussed in Chapter 5) would happen by incorporating notions from the reflective, interpretive school of thought in public policy (Yanow, 1993; 1997; 2004, 2007; Verhoeven and Duyvendak, 2015; Rein and Schoen, 1993; Fischer, 2003; Hajer and Uitermark, 2008), arguing that more attention needs to be paid to aspects of social learning, local knowledge, dialogue, policy meanings and interpretation. The thesis supposes that, since competing policy (and environmental) discourses exist, they ‘construct’ different realities, and therefore different policy paths can be envisioned – these are debated in the policy and discourse struggle (See sections 2.1 and 4.5). However, the dominant discourse, represented by the environmental global society4_{, has locked itself in an echo chamber that impedes further engagement with} public of different political views, making it impossible to reach a solid agreement on environmental reforms, from climate change policies to fisheries management, and therefore constituting a main obstruction for sustainable development.

1.4 Methodology, Part 1

The methodological approach is discourse analysis, plus the use of secondary sources. The use of secondary sources consists in a qualitative and quantitative analysis of recent scholarship on the following themes; communication and media in the context of climate change, global environmental governance, populism and nationalism in Europe, environmentalism and elitism. The most appropriate method for conducting the research is discourse analysis, especially because of its interpretive focus on situated processes of meaning production, lived experiences, agency, local knowledge, and because it is largely inspired by policy framing, social movements and communication science. Discourse

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analysis is the most useful methodological tool to study political meanings beyond the surface in texts (Schneider, 2013).

The study of the research will consist in a discourse analysis at the European level, by taking the British case of the Common Fisheries Policy debate during the Brexit campaign as discussed in the media in 2016 and 2017. It is a deductive case study, used to test and validate the theories advanced so far primarily in US context, which are evaluated through the use secondary sources. This specific case has been chosen for a variety of reasons: primarily because the case can be combined with hypotheses advanced in the scholarly literature about Anglophone countries, climate scepticism and political ideology. Then, also because the CFP case was strategically used by Leave campaigners – so it has been particularly relevant to analyse their discourse and discover how they deploy emotional tactics and touch only certain aspects of the policy; the choice of this case has allowed me to see in first person the interplay of power, ideology and discourse in action during a major political upheaval in Europe. Under practical aspects, it has been chosen for its accessibility (both in terms of language and availability of content), and having myself lived in UK for three years, I had already a clear idea of what the political situation was like in the country, before and after Brexit, and most importantly I was already familiar with British media before undertaking this research, already knowing well the partisan division of each newspaper and their background history. Both my own bias, and media bias have therefore been taken into account.

Using Jørgensen and Phillips’ (2002) definition of discourse, conceived as a particular way of talking about the world, discourse analysis will be the analysis of how communication is structured according to different patterns. As such, it will explore the role of communication and language used for societal and cultural developments in environmental governance.

Discourse is alternatively defined as “what can be said, and thought, but also who can speak, when, where and with what authority” (Ball, 1990:17). Furthermore, “discourses embody meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity, and power relations … Thus, discourses construct certain possibilities for thought […] and exclude or displace other combinations” (Ibid.).

The main application of discourse analysis would be to investigate the implications inflicted by political identity for questions of power, legitimacy and democracy in global

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environmental politics. How are policies and claims of expert knowledge on environmental matters constructed and communicated to the wider public? What is the role of the media? Who consumes competing knowledge claims, and why? The methodology attempts to answer these questions in a critical way with the aim of identifying possibilities for innovating current policies and discourses.

The discourse analysis is divided into two parts: one focusing on discourse coalitions, with the use of secondary data (literature analysis) that will study the network of relations among stakeholders that exists in competing environmental discourses (Chapter 3). The literature explored covers different but interrelated topics, namely: general literature on environmental governance (Falkner, 2016; Goldin, 2013), environmentalism and ideologies (Whitmarsh and Corner 2016), climate scepticism (Dunlap 2013), role of the media in reporting environmental issues (Feldman et al., 2014), public discourse on environmental issues and engagement (Auer, 2000; Swin 2014), and environmental discourses (Dryzek, 1997, 2013)

A second discourse analysis will be conducted using empirical discourse analysis of newspaper articles and policy documents about Brexit and the Common Fisheries Policy topic (Chapter 4).

The steps of the discourse analysis are:

a) Establishing the context, i.e. Brexit and the EU CFP debate. Parameters for collecting sources are individuated; the collection of the sources was solely made online, inserting key words on Google Search and Google Scholar. First, an overview of the most prominent British media was considered in order to pre-select publications. Sourcing was finally done by inserting the name of the newspaper/media + ‘Brexit’ + ‘EU CFP’. Then, the media outlets with several articles on the topic were selected, that is why for example “The Sun”, leader in the UK newspaper industry (Chepkemoi, 20175_{), does not appear among the selected} media since it only produced one article on the issue. Thirty-four newspaper articles have been selected and analysed in total, these have been selected among the most prominent British newspaper outlets, in accordance with their political orientation. The Telegraph, the Daily Mail and the Express were chosen for the conservative side, while BBC, the Guardian and the Independent for the progressive-liberal, plus, an additional three articles from miscellaneous sources

5_{http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-are-the-most-popular-newspapers-in-the-united-kingdom.html}_last accessed 4 June

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were added to balance out results: one from regional Belfast Telegraph, one from international The Times, and finally one from business-oriented Bloomberg. The material is contextualised by taking note of who published what and when. b) Exploring the production process, means a more thorough background check of the

information and the producer. The key is finding institutional links to answer questions like: what is the general political orientation of the paper? Or: Are claims supported by evidence? If yes, who provides the evidence? What is the targeted audience? This process is itself about the analysis of the medium, in order to understand how meanings and political messages are framed.

c) The third step is coding. It is a technique employed in discourse analysis that simply put is about assigning attributes and tags to textual units of analysis. The methodology of the newspaper analysis uses the online coding software called Dedoose. The purpose for this is to analyse story lines, to uncover recurring patterns and to empirically prove that discourse coalitions exist and do play an important role in British media as they influence voting behaviours and understanding of policy mechanisms. After the code application has terminated, the software automatically creates qualitative and quantitative charts, the results will be presented, then critically analysed and discussed in Chapter 4. Coding techniques will be covered in the fourth chapter, prior to the presentation of the analysis.

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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework: a Social Constructivist Approach

The approach adopted by this thesis is social constructivist. The theory has been chosen because of its multi-disciplinary vision that spaces from politics to linguistics, in the attempt to understand how the political world is socially constructed by meanings, interpretation and therefore discourses, filtered through the interplay of ideologies, identities and representation.

The theory has also been chosen for its affinity with the subject of post-modern public policy. The application of constructivist thought would allow the thesis to fulfil its scope of investigating social issues that cannot be fully grasped by other, ‘more fixed’, theories in political science. The theory is also chosen because of its politically neutral stance, because positivist, ‘traditional’ approaches to international politics, most notably (Neo-) Realism and (Neo-) Liberalism, and also other approaches of critical theory in international politics, like Marxism, belong to a specific political colour and therefore cannot be easily adapted to what aims to be a neutral study of a governance problem and policy issue.

2.1 A Social Constructivist Approach

The constructivist school of thought followed by the thesis is the one initially developed by Alexander Wendt in Social Theory of International Politics (1999). The book applies a constructivist approach to the study of international relations. It emphasises the role of socially shared ideas and norms in defining state behaviour in the international arena. The basis of social constructivism is that reality, or in this case international politics, is not pre-determined but rather subject to beliefs, or ideas, which are subsequently subject to change and never fixed, as these are constructed in processes of social relations between individuals, or states.

International relations are not determined by nature nor material forces but are rather defined by the social relationships that stem from shared ideas, culture, identity and

discourses. Moreover, constructivist thought attributes much more importance than other

international relations theories to the role of non-state actors, individual and collective identities or knowledge. Constructivism is keen in investigating how states respond to, and how international cooperation is shaped by ideas, discourses, collective values and social identities. Same goes for the determination of interests and for the allocation of power in

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world politics. Using Wendt’s words (1999:166) “shared ideas making up norms, institutions, threat-systems and so on […] constitute the meaning of the distribution of power.”

It is worth pointing out that ways of representing the world are not neutral but reflect the different experiences, identities and social relations that shape one’s character and understanding. These features do play an exceptionally active role in creating and changing world representations, and also discourses that we make about them.

Discourse is a key term in this thesis, and discourse analysis is conceived as both theory and method of the research. The term discourse is itself vague, there are no strict definitions of it. Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002) define discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world, or an aspect of the world”. Rein and Schoen (1993:145) use the term policy discourse to indicate “the interactions of individuals, interest groups, social movements, and institutions through which problematic situations are converted to policy problems, agendas are set, decisions are made and actions are taken. In this thesis I will refer to discourse as a way of talking about rules, norms, practices and sets of beliefs in a specific context. The given context here is global environmental governance, as such the discourse I am referring to is environmental. Therefore, the environmental discourse will be a particular way (or ways) of talking about rules, norms, practices and sets of beliefs in global environmental governance. Power and ideology accompany the concept of discourse. Particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world are competing in a perpetual struggle to achieve hegemony (Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L.; 2002). In this sense, hegemony will be the dominance of one discourse over the others. Discursive strategies exerting leverage on a specific ideology to achieve hegemony are evaluated and understood through Gramscian lenses too.6_{The concept of hegemony, in the context of discourse and policy-making, can be} understood as a set of processes by which a (dominant) group is able to persuade other actors to be aligned to the dominant objectives, values, and interests7_{. However, such} dominance might be contested in circumstances of crises or ‘inequality of rewards’ (Parmar, 2012:1).

Ideology is inherent in each discourse or perspective, as it provides the basis for viewing things differently from other approaches – in this thesis two ideologies, and two discourses will be analysed: the progressive-liberal and conservative. Ideologies are in

6_{Gramsci A. 1966; Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce} 7_{Adapted from I. Parmar (2012:1)}

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competition among each other in a discursive struggle (Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. 2002:6), and use power to achieve hegemony. Power can be seen as a machine of social interaction that exerts the leverage of persuasive language, meanings and emotions to aggregate support and stimulate cultural change (Guzzini, 20058_{; Jørgensen, M. and} Phillips, L. 2002:). People’s selves can be therefore manipulated through social interaction, i.e. the power of discourse, ultimately the power of ideas (Kayser, C., 2015).

Overall, it can be postulated that social constructivist theory is particularly suitable to understand the changing world of IR in a post-nationalist and increasingly globalised era, where non-state actors and emerging voices and identities are expected to play a defining role in creating new discourses and new mechanisms of cooperation.

Constructivist thought will be taken further in depth by using the work of public policy scholars such as: Yanow (1993, 2004, 2007); Verhoeven and Duyvendak (2015); Rein and Schoen (1993); Fischer (2003); Hajer and Uitermark (2008). These authors have all adopted a constructivist approach in their work, however they have significantly added value and new insights to the theory. They have developed a social constructivist thought in policy analysis that is also reflexive and interpretive. By focusing on a particular subject such as policy analysis, social constructivist and reflexive ideas are much more practical and understandable for making sense of the complex issues of global environmental policy-making and governance.

Meanings, beliefs and ideas are not fixed, objective realities but are rather subject to interpretation, hence special attention should be paid to them in the evaluation of policy processes (Yanow, 1993, 1997, 2004, 2007), since as constructivism supposes they have the power to shape politics and therefore the outcome of environmental reforms. Paying attention to these matters requires a very subtle understanding and analysis, that is possibly achieved by re-adapting the work of scholars Yanow (1993, 1997, 2004, 2007) and Hajer and and Uitermark (2008) most importantly. These scholars have largely used constructivist, reflexive and interpretive methods of analysis for policy-making. Yanow (1993, 1997, 2004, 2007), like Wendt, has specifically developed her thought starting from idealist social theory, which posits that “people act toward objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have for them” (Wendt 1999:140). She has further elaborated on how meanings behind certain policies, and the way they are communicated to the public, affect the latter’s understanding of such issues and determine the final relationship of the public and the implementation of policies.

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The interpretation of policy meanings constitutes an essential part in the process of policy-making, which is often overlooked and under analysed. Interpretation (of meanings behind policies) is a powerful tool, it is like a catalyser: it has the power to boost policy-making; however when overlooked it can prove to be a major obstacle between the public and the policy-making machine.

2.2 Ideologies and the environment

By focusing on ideology, and the discursive power that comes with it, it is possible to unveil and predict what the approaches to understanding the environment will be like. As previously said, the thesis will analyse respectively the ‘Progressive-liberal’, and

mainstream, environmental discourse, and the ‘Conservative-populist’ understanding (and/or rejection) of it.

The mainstream environmental discourse leans to the left in the spectrum of political orientation, meaning that on the other hand, in principle, right-wing ideologies reject (some of) the pillars of environmentalism (Whitmarsh and Corner, 2017:122).

Whitmarsh and Corner (2017:122) claim that political orientation and ideology are amongst the most significant influences on attitudes on environmental politics. They further argue (2017:123) that: “the role of values, worldviews and as a consequence, political ideology, are among the key predictors of scepticism and engagement”. For example, evidence (Brown and Kasser 2005; Corner et al., 2014; De Groot and Steg, 2008; Poortinga et al., 2004; in Withmarsh amd Corner 2017) has shown that people leaning towards self-transcending values (as altruism, forgiveness, loyalty) have higher interest in environmental issues and are less likely to be sceptical about climate change, hence more likely to be engaged in sustainable behaviours, while people of self-enhancing values (materialism, ambition, self-determination) are less likely to show interest in environmental issues and participate in sustainable initiatives. Similarly, people withholding egalitarian/communitarian ideas about social arrangements are more supportive of environmental reforms that regulate the market, while, on the other hand, people with individualistic/hierarchical views are more supportive of free market mechanisms (Withmarsh and Corner 2017:123). The values and worldviews presented above are key determinants of one’s political ideology. People supportive of right-wing ideologies usually have self-enhancing values and embrace individualistic/hierarchical views, in turn this could predict non-acceptance of environmental governance and scepticism about climate

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change. Withmarsh and Corner (2017:125) argue that: “the convergent evidence reviewed suggests that certain elements of right-of-centre belief systems are not a natural fit with the dominant social and cultural understanding of what climate change means (Hulme, 2009)”. The point then becomes: are right-wing ideologies inherently incompatible with environmentalism or is there a problem of framing and representation in mainstream policy solutions? This question will be ultimately approached and answered through Chapter 3, 4 and 5. The work further digs into the possibility of framing environmental discourses to improve public engagement among the political spectrum.

Withmarsh and Corner’s (2017) theories about the relationship of values, worldviews, ideology and environmentalism will be guiding concepts adopted in this thesis, as much as the intent of understanding problems of policy framing will be the ultimate scope of this project.

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Chapter 3

Part 1 The Crisis of Global Environmental Governance and Echo Chambers in

Environmental Discourses

3.0 Introduction

“A succession of crises that result from increased integration will lead to a backlash. Citizens will see increased integration as too risky. They will become increasingly xenophobic, protectionist, and nationalist.”

Goldin, I. (2013:1) Divided Nations

Najam et al., (2006) define global environmental governance as the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and norms that regulate the processes of global environmental protection. In this thesis, GEG is regarded as the set of institutions and rules that govern the regulation of the environment and the climate change regime. Global environmental governance has developed rapidly since the late 1970s and it continues to do so today, being subject to crises and shifts of interests and values in global politics. The UN has been the most prominent organization leading the institutionalisation of GEG, by creating respective agencies as the UNFCCC, UNEP, and IPCCC; it has established a climate change regime and holds annual COPs. The other major supranational institution dealing with global environmental issues and climate change is the EU, which is responsible for meeting targets set by the UNFCCC and for developing and implementing policies. The EU has set its 2030 climate and energy framework, the roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy by 2050, the EU Emission Trading System among other initiatives (European Parliament Factsheets on the European Union, Climate Change and the Environment, December 20169_{). The mainstreamed type} of GEG set out by the UN and the EU is now facing major challenges due to the shifting balance of power occurring: on one hand rising powers (also referred to as the BASIC group) mean that the South has became a more important actor and decision maker in global environmental politics (Brutsch and Papa, 2013), while on the other hand nationalism in the North prevents leaders from making radical decisions (Goldin 2013,

9_{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.4.2.html}_{last accessed 17} June 2017

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Beck 2010). This thesis will in particular focus on the latter issue, by paying attention to the tensions arising between movements of global integration and governance vis-à-vis social movements of nationalism and protectionism.

It can be argued that global environmental governance is failing, and global institutions are unfit for purpose (Goldin 2013:2). Most scholars tend to be very critical of the current supranational order governing the environment and climate change. International cooperation is stalled, so far the only multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) ever reached has been the Kyoto Protocol, which after its expiration date has not been replaced by a similar agreement. Instead, a new type of logic entered GEG with the Paris Agreement of 2015, known as the ‘pledge-and-review’ logic (Falkner 2016), which attributes more power to nation states and relies on their will to pledge for the cause. The Paris Agreement in question signifies a major shift in GEG and, potentially the start of a new era after the peak of the crisis with the Copenhagen Accord. The Copenhagen Accord, stipulated in 2010, was one of the most widely criticised negotiations ever happened in the history of international relations. The result was a weak and vague agreement that had inexorably acerbated the hostility between North and South and further fragmented countries over GEG measures (Dimitrov 2011). In the years following Copenhagen, there has been a build-up of momentum in favour of sovereign decision making processes rather than increased integration through supranational arrangements (Falkner 2016). This poses a significant challenge to the ‘status-quo’ of GEG itself, meaning that our society is closer to a different era. Our global society is questioning the role and the legitimacy of GEG and its institutions, in view of recent crises of cooperation and of issues of sovereignty. Therefore the thesis will be moving onto the next question, asking ‘Who participates in global environmental governance?’ in the ultimate attempt to find what is the meaning and role of GEG nowadays, in view of its elitist perception.

3.1 Who participates in global environmental governance, given the claims that it is increasingly regarded as a practice for the elite?

I believe it is relevant to ask ‘Who participates in global environmental governance, given the claims that it is increasingly regarded as a practice for the elite?’

This question seeks to invoke a diagnosis of what is regarded to be one of the main problems in global environmental governance: the fact that the principal actors in global

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environmental governance speak to a rather limited elite audience (Auer, 2000), rendering all efforts undertaken so far (UN COPs, international environmental treaties and so on) ineffective (Goldin, 2013). Dimitrov (2010) argues that global leaders have mostly engaged with peers global leaders worldwide, in the attempt of stimulating global and local action. Plans for global action are often decided ‘behind closed doors’ by state leaders and diplomats. However, when the proposed actions are brought back to the national level, these are often met with a backlash, therefore causing roadblocks in further global negotiations on the environment or climate change. Moreover, global impacts strictly depend on local action, a phenomenon that stays restricted to local elite members of the environmental society (Grin, 2010). Local action remains confined within the boundaries of the environmental society’s niches or does not take off at all when it faces opposition from local actors who have not been engaged in the discourse (Ibid.).

Recent scholarship (Auer, 2000, Swin 2014) has highlighted that also non-state actors and ordinary citizens are influential players in international environmental affairs. Auer (2000) points out that national governments hesitate to adopt policies that challenge the preferences and habits of these actors (Auer, 2000:155), meaning that national governments cannot bring about sustainable development without overcoming cultural and psychological barriers to sustainability of ordinary citizens at the local level. National governments are traditionally seen as main participants in global climate negotiations, and their failure in implementing the global agenda at the national and therefore local scale undermines their commitment to sustainable development on a global scale. These claims can explain the current stalemate in the GEG, resulting in the lack of implementation of top-down global environmental policies at the local level. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of local actors and ordinary citizens, while studies on global environmental governance have traditionally focused on the role of institutions and national governments. However as Young (1997) reports a more complete understanding of local actors in global environmental politics is needed.

Apart from state actors, Auer (2000) has identified another salient group of participants, that lie somewhere between the state and ordinary citizens: elite non-state

actors.

Elite non-state actors are understood, in Auer’s words, as the network of global civil society actors, which stands somewhere above the individual and below the state and transcends state boundaries. In international environmental affairs elite organizations such as national and international NGOs are prominent actors. These underpin the essence of

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the slogan that global solutions require local approaches, and embody it as a rule of conduct. Many scholars believe that elite environmental NGOs are uniquely equipped to mobilize local institutions to address global environmental problems. In contrast with state actors, these NGOs have the advantage of focusing their attention on singular environmental issues, making it more simple, for instance, to create substantial policy-making options for government advices: their expertise, engagement and focus are therefore incredibly valuable. The lack of territorial and sovereign alliances and their transparency are other bonuses.

However, students of global civil society contend that NGOs and other elite non-state actors, despite their sophistication, are still less successful than non-states in influencing the lives of ordinary citizens, and that therefore global civil society is unlikely to replace the state system as the main source of global environmental governance (Haas, 1964; Auer, 2000; Young, 1997). This is why an even stronger role for the state is indeed regarded as necessary in influencing ordinary lives, and cooperation in integrating the elite’s knowledge in a democratic way could mean the achievement of great progress in terms of sustainability, at a local, national and global level.

Auer (2000) notes that the regime efficacy significantly depends in large part on the behaviour of actors and institutions that are not members of the classically conceived regime of state actors and/or elite non-state actors. The efficacy of regime therefore is ultimately rooted in the actions of ordinary individuals.

It is increasingly necessary to understand the mechanism and role of local institutions in global environmental politics, because, as Auer (2000) argues, the effectiveness of international environmental policy depends on the compatibility of bottom-up and top-down institutional arrangements (2000:156). Local action is indeed regarded as the key to success of global sustainable development.

It is possible to read Auer’s (2000) text as a subtle critique of global environmental governance for being elitist and primarily oriented to global institutions and national governments, while neglecting the role of local institutions, and, most importantly ordinary citizens. He in fact argues that: “ordinary citizens determine the success or failure of global policy prescriptions for problems like climate change and overpopulation” (Auer 2000:156). The author reattributes the attention towards the role ordinary citizens play within the field of global environmental governance, and also condemns global institutions for addressing policy prescriptions to a restricted target of elite actors. This therefore implies that ‘glocal’ environmental problems are unlikely to be tackled effectively if policymaking only derives

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from the interaction of states and intergovernmental organizations. A broad inclusion of a variety of (non-state) actors is indeed seen as a step forward for ‘glocal’ environmental governance. Non-state actors and ordinary citizens are influential in the way their behaviour and good will can potentially have positive spill-over effects into the arena of high politics (Haas 1964:48).

Overall, the role of main actors (such as states and the international system, working in cooperation with elite non-state actors like environmental NGOs and epistemic communities) in promoting environmental policies on a global scale, can be criticised for being elitist, for not taking into account different worldviews, and for not engaging in a proper manner with people of ‘ordinary’ backgrounds that do not have the means or posses sufficient understanding of environmental issues (Auer, 2000; Beck 2010). These facts result in the de-legitimisation of GEG institutions in view of the ordinary citizens’ perception that GEG does neither involve them in the discourse, nor represent their opinion, therefore rendering such institutions and related policies to appear less democratic than they actually are. To conclude this section it is possible to finally state that:

Research in GEG has found that recent decades have been characterized by inconclusive international negotiations on environmental issues and the disagreement among politicians (Goldin, 2013; Falkner, 2016).

The environmental elite has selected policy remedies whose implementation does not require broad based public participation (Auer, 2000). This is harming democracy and also delegitimizes the role of international treaties and institutions, these types of arrangements, also given their relatively low success, need to be rearranged to meet the needs and will of the people for the environment’s sake. At the rhetorical level, this issue has already been brought to attention, elite state and non-state actors have called for a more diverse participatory constitutive assembly to tackle environmental problems (Auer, 2000, Young, 1997).

3.2 What determines the ordinary citizens’ perception of, and attitude towards (global) environmental policies?

Given the ultimate importance attributed to ordinary citizens for the success of GEG measures discussed in the previous section of this thesis, the study will now investigate what determines and shapes the perception of this very important group ultimately

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influencing GEG. This section (3.2) will now attempt to answer the following question: What determines the ordinary citizens’ perception of, and attitude towards, global environmental policies?

First of all it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘ordinary citizen’. This section is mostly based on Auer’s (2000) work, the author however does not provide a concise definition of the term. The thesis refers to ‘ordinary citizens’ as a group of people that cannot be regarded as experts, politicians or academics. Ordinary citizens are people with a low or average understanding of environmental issues, which mostly rely on partisan and less expert sources of information (Auer 2000; Feldman et al. 2014) and therefore have inherent psychological barriers to their understanding of environmental issues (Swin 2014:91). Overall, it seems easier to talk about ordinary citizens as ‘laypersons’ too, which Dunlap (2013:691) describes as those who do not fully understand the causes of environmental protection, or the measures taken to regulate human impact on the ecosystem.

Ordinary citizens presumably acquire knowledge over global environmental policies and politics through the media, and within their social circle (which could be family and friends, the local community, or a political association). It is clear that these two components in each person’s life (i.e. media exposure, and its social circle) play a key role in determining the political character of the individual (Swin 2014; Feldman et al. 2014). The two components are interdependent from the moment that the social circle can pre-determine the political inclination of the individual, which consequently will choose information sources that align with their political predispositions (Feldman et al. 2014; Mutz and Martin 2001). Recent scholarship (Feldman et al. 2014:1) has highlighted the fact that partisan media outlets are rising, meaning that it is becoming more common and easier for people to ‘insulate’ themselves in echo chambers where they are exposed to content that is consistent with their opinions while shielded from dissenting views (Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Stroud (2011) and Feldman et al. (2014) have shown that, in the United States, the use of such selected material significantly increases extreme and polarized attitudes towards global environmental discourses. Based on the above scientific work, in this thesis it is assumed that the use of selected media not only increases extreme attitudes, but also generates the so called ‘self reinforcing spirals’ model. The latter, not only influences individuals’ beliefs about environmental discourses, but also presumes that the ‘reinforced’ beliefs consequently push the individual to further selective exposure according to his/her predetermined views. This model therefore further strengthens

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extreme views over time, making it less likely for the individual to break out from its selective echo chamber.

According to scholars studying the effects of environmental discourses, ideologies and media exposure, the phenomenon called ‘self-reinforcing spirals’ (Slater 2007; Feldman et al. 2014) has been identified in recent years, and it is currently affecting the way people react to international environmental treaties, national policies for environmental protection and/or climate change, and so on. The work of Feldman et al. (2014), based also on previous research (Slater, 2007), has shown that selective media exposure is affecting both types of partisan views (i.e. Progressive-liberal and Conservative) over environmental discourses, whereas exposure to conservative media is linked to non-acceptance of climate change policies or dis-appreciation of environmental discourses, and conversely exposure to mainstream liberal-progressive media makes the individual more likely to accept and be supportive of global environmental governance discourses (Feldman et al. 2014:4, 5, 6).

The phenomenon of self-reinforcing spirals can also be valid for discussing the communication framework of global institutions and NGOs, for the way they determine what media and communication outlets are considered worth for spreading their information, and how they aim to engage with people. Following the logic, global institutions and NGOs active in the field of environmental governance and protection will therefore choose certain communications channels that are aligned with their political ideology, rather than try to diversify their communication audience. This will mean that the message of these organisations and institutions will not reach a broad and diverse audience, but will stay within the niche of people that is already interested in the cause in a first stance. Therefore, the message will have a very limited impact and will not result in any mutual understanding or discourse.

The fragmented media circumstances therefore might actually render more difficult the mutual understanding over environmental issues between the policy makers and the public.

Once that the impact of media exposure has been explored, the attention will now focus on the role that (political) beliefs and ideologies play in determining one’s approach to environmental discourses. Given the fact that the phenomena of echo chambers and of self-reinforcing spirals exist and affect the way people react to environmental affairs, it is necessary to look more in depth at how new political ideologies could potentially affect

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one’s understanding of environmental discourses, especially at the European level, where such phenomenon is still understudied.

Political orientation and ideology are among the most significant influences on public engagement on environmental matters (Whitmarsh et al., 2017; Hornsey et al., 2016; Clayton et al., 2015; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). Given the research area of this thesis, the attention will be particularly cast on the relation of populism (or also conservative ideologies more generally) and the environment.

Conservative, populist voters tend to be less concerned, more sceptical and less receptive to messages about environmental problems, especially climate change. The commitments to legally binding international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement of 2015, or on issue specific policies such as the EU Common Fisheries Policy, will depend more and more on domestic politics. Falkner (2016) has noticed a shift in global environmental governance implying a new logic in international treaties: GEG, with the Paris Agreement, is moving towards a pledge-and-review logic that attributes more power to domestic politics, compared to the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord which sought to impose stricter targets set at the supranational level and resulted in a failure (Falkner 2016, Dimitrov 2010), given the unacceptability at the national level of such targets. If domestic politics is to determine the success of GEG, and since domestic politics is highly influenced by party-politics, which is oscillating towards more conservative and protectionist approaches, the international society shall be better equipped to address their policy proposal not only to diplomats, businessmen and elite NGOs, but also to ordinary citizens with different views and opinions.

It has been discussed that consumption of like-minded media by both conservatives and non-conservatives promotes polarization and does not bring mutual understanding nor does it stimulate an inter-partisan conversation (Slater 2007; Feldman et al. 2014, Dunlap 2013, Swin 2014). Moreover, it is argued that this situation actually drives a self-perpetuated cycle that reinforces extreme attitudes on environmental discourses, as according to Feldman et al. (2014). The cycle, also known as the self-reinforcing spirals model, generates what are regarded as echo chambers in environmental discourses. The echo chamber argument states that a conversation, or simply a view, over a given environmental discourse, is locked within a group of actors and media outlets that hold

Obstacles and options in global environmental governance : towards a better engagement across the political spectrum : a study based on the Common Fisheries Policy debate during the Brexit campaign

P u b l i c P o l i c y a n d G o v e r n a n c e