What are the consequences for EU citizenship when a Member State leaves the European Union? – The case of the United Kingdom.

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Master Thesis - What are the consequences for EU citizenship when a Member State leaves the European Union? – The case of the United Kingdom.

Research question - What are the consequences for EU citizenship when a Member State decides to withdraw from the European Union, and for their citizens living in another Member State?

Student: Tim Blijham

Supervisor: mr. dr. A.C. van Wageningen Second supervisor: dhr. dr. C.U. Noack Master: Governing Europe

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Index

Introduction p. 4

Chapter 1 – Citizenship p. 6

1.1 Introduction to citizenship p. 6

1.2 Citizenship and nationality p. 6

1.2.1 Recognition of citizenship under international law p. 7

1.3 Roots of modern citizenship p. 8

1.3.1 Political citizenship p. 8

1.3.2 Civil citizenship p. 10

1.4 Modern citizenship p. 11

1.5 Concluding remarks p. 12

Chapter 2 – European Union citizenship p. 14

2.1 Introduction Union citizenship p. 14

2.2 Legal status Union citizenship p. 15

2.2.1 Union citizenship and the rights of free movement and residence p. 15

2.2.2. Direct effect of article 21 TFEU p. 16

2.2.3. Union citizenship and member state nationality law p. 17 2.2.4. Union citizenship and ‘wholly internal situations’ p. 19

2.3 Political rights Union citizenship p. 21

2.4 Concluding remarks p. 22

Chapter 3 – Union citizenship and treaty withdrawal by Member States

3.1 Introduction p. 24

3.2 Consequences of treaty withdrawal for EU citizens p. 25 3.3 EU Legal solutions to protect citizenship p. 27

3.3.1 Categories of British citizens and their right to reside after Brexit p. 27

3.3.2 Union legislative measures p. 28

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3.4 International law solutions p. 31 3.4.1 Residence rights, human rights and the ECHR: the Kurić formula

p. 31 3.4.2 Acquired rights and the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties p. 34

3.5 Concluding remarks p. 37

Conclusion p. 40

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Introduction

In this MA thesis, I examine the form of citizenship that all European Union (EU) nationals have in common, that of EU citizenship. The aim of this thesis is to research the event of a Member State leaving the EU, and what happens to the EU citizenship possessed by their nationals. On 23-06-2016, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave the EU by a democratic referendum. Following this decision, the UK government handed over their letter of resignation on 29-03-2017, and for the first time set the wheels of Article 50 TEU in motion.1 The use of Article 50 TEU set in motion a whole array of complex mechanisms, challenging the forward motion of deeper EU integration. On the individual level, this leaves us with the question what is going to happen to the EU citizenship rights of UK nationals. The main focus of this thesis is the situation of UK citizens in the EU and their Union citizenship rights, not the situation of EU citizens living in the UK, although this will be alluded to if relevant.

During interviews conducted in Brussels, the current public debate assumes that EU citizenship is automatically lost for British citizens after the Brexit. In this thesis however I will discuss scenarios where this would not necessarily be the case, and research how EU citizens could legally see their rights protected. What for example happened to EU citizenship as a fundamental status of the citizens of the Union, as first uttered in Grzelczyk? Is EU citizenship a status so profound, that it transcends mere institutional arrangements, and becomes almost a fundamental right? Or do we, as Davies puts it, see citizenship as a ‘Contingent status of convenience, a discount card in the supermarket that is Europe’?2_{As observed in the media,}

there are loud calls for the preservation of EU citizenship rights coming from both the UK and EU side.3 It is however evident that the loss of EU citizenship would result in the loss of substantive rights for the former EU citizens.

The withdrawal of the UK from the EU will reduce the size of the EU legal order, raising issues for the 1.2 million Britons living in the EU, and the 2.1 million EU citizens living in the UK.4 The reduction in size of the EU legal order represents the de-application of all the norms of this legal order in the territory of the withdrawing Member State, and the loss of rights for the citizens of the withdrawing Member State still residing in the Union. This leads to the main research question: What are the consequences for EU citizenship when a Member State decides to withdraw from the European Union, and for their citizens living in another Member State? To answer this research question, I will first examine the history of citizenship, going back as far as ancient Greece to explain the different forms of citizenship as they developed over time,

1_{A. Hunt, ‘Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU’,}

http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 retrieved on 29-05-2017.

2_{D. Davies, ‘Union Citizenship – Still Europeans’ Destiny after Brexit?’,}

http://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/07/07/union-citizenship-still-europeans-destiny-after-brexit/ Retrieved on 29-05-2017.

3_{O. Garner, ‘After Brexit: Protecting European citizens and citizenship from fragmentation’,}

EUI Working Papers, nr. 2016/22, p. 19.

K. Allen, ‘UK business groups call for economy to be put first in Brexit talks’

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/18/uk-business-groups-call-for-economy-to-be-put-first-in-brexit-talks-single-market retrieved on 16-06-2017.

4_{British Future, ‘Report of the Inquiry into securing the status of EEA+ nationals in the UK’,}

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from political citizenship, to civil citizenship and social citizenship. Putting EU citizenship in context with other forms of citizenship is necessary to be able to analyse the concept. The different forms of citizenship discussed will lay the base for interesting parallels and analyses in connection with the notion of EU citizenship that is central to this thesis.

In the second chapter, the legal meaning of EU citizenship will be discerned, providing the basis needed to in the final part answer the question what happens to EU citizenship if a Member State decides to leave the EU. The official introduction of EU citizenship in the treaty of Maastricht in 1992 has not brought about a notion that remained static, but one that has grown along in importance with the further development of the EU. Key features and rights of EU citizenship will be examined, both legal and political, along with landmark CJEU rulings that have altered our understanding of EU citizenship. The analysis of jurisprudence is paramount to grasp the notion of EU citizenship, as this notion was not only developed by legislators, but has been defined by the CJEU as well.

The third chapter will research the consequences of a Member States withdrawing from the EU. To do so, this thesis will assume that no deal is struck between the EU and the UK concerning EU citizenship. The consequences of such a hard Brexit are discussed. The 1.2 million UK citizens living in the EU are not a homogenous group, so first a distinction between them and the potential consequences of this distinction are made. Various scenarios and legal options, both on the EU and international level, are discussed to provide potential solutions to the EU citizenship conundrum.

Three main developments and observations will be discerned in this paper. Firstly, that of EU citizenship and Member State citizenship being compared to the ancient civil and political forms of citizenship. Interesting parallels are discerned, displaying an intriguing relationship between the contemporary notions of EU and Member State citizenship. Secondly, the new paradigm that EU citizenship was ushered into by the post-Maastricht Treaty case law. This marks a new development where the EU is moving away from being a sole instrument for the integration of the internal market, and is moving towards a Union where the rights and interests of its citizens are protected as well. Finally, it will be researched how the different groups of (ex) EU citizens could see their citizenship rights protected post-Brexit. This thesis will show that citizens in multiple situations will potentially see their EU citizenship rights safeguarded by EU and international law.

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Chapter 1 – Citizenship 1.1 Introduction to citizenship

This chapter of the paper aims to give the notion of citizenship some substance, by researching what the notion of citizenship entails in comparison with nationality, in relation with international law and the historical development of citizenship. Being able to grasp the notion of citizenship is paramount to the further research of this paper, and will provide context to the notion of Union citizenship and how Union citizenship will develop if a member state decides to leave the European Union.

In the first section of this chapter, the difference between citizenship and nationality will be explained. While often understood as being very similar to one another, two different legal frameworks are reflected in these notions. This section continues to explain citizenship and its recognition by other states according to international law by discussing the Nottebohm case. The clarification of the concept of citizenship in this section will provide useful insights when comparing it to Union citizenship later on in this paper.

In the second section, this paper will explore the roots of modern citizenship, that can be traced back all the way to ancient Greece. The ancient definition of a citizen as ‘one who rules and is ruled’5 may still apply, but has evolved over time. The politcal form of citizenship found in ancient Greece can still be seen as the cornerstone of modern citizenship, albeit in a different and less direct form. The model of direct democracy would no longer be manageable in the contemporary world, as this would put too much of a strain on the citizens of the states. This is why the legal notion of citizenship provides a counterbalance to political citizenship, by ensuring that the citizens of a state are able to see to their private interests and are safeguarded by the law whilst doing this.

In the final section of this chapter, the modern notion of citizenship as it is known in the nation state and combines the political and civil form whilst adding the social citizenship dimension, is discussed. The theory of T.H. Marshall has been very influential in the post-war research on citizenship, and has laid the foundation of modern citizenship. This chapter discusses the foundations of the notion of citizenship, and by doing so stresses the unique position of Union citizenship, the only successful form of citizenship beyond the nation state.6 National citizenship proved to be one of the determining factors of the bond between a citizen and their state, and for the European Union to continue its relevance to their citizens, notes need to be taken from national citizenship.

1.2 Citizenship and nationality

Sometimes used interchangeably, the terms citizenship and nationality are different in the technical legal sense. The concepts of both notions are rather similar, but citizenship and nationality reflect two different legal frameworks. While both terms identify the legal status of an individual in relation to the state membership of the individual, the term citizenship is

5_{J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’, in R. Bellamy and A.}

Palumbo ed., Citizenship, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, p. 5.

6_{K. Rubenstein, ‘Globalisation and Citizenship and Nationality’, University of Melbourne}

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confined to domestic legal forums, and the term nationality to the international law forum.7 According to Weis, ‘conceptually and linguistically, the terms citizenship and nationality emphasize two different aspects of the same notion. Nationality stresses the international, citizenship the national, municipal aspect’.8

Nationality refers to the legal bond with a state, under international law. In practice, this means that nationality can ensure rights of entry for a national, and the possibility of diplomatic protection on the international plane.9 Furthermore, nationality also means that states have the general right to refuse to extradite their own nationals to other states who request their surrender.10 In the Nottebohm case, the International Court of Justice referred to nationality as a ‘’legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’’.11_As

nationality is understood under international context, citizenship is understood to fall under domestic law. In for example the United States, a distinction is made between nationals that are citizens, and nationals that are not.12_{Citizenship can give an individual the right to vote, or}

participate in the political life of the state, but citizenship alone is not a guarantee for these prerogatives. This leads to a situation where under international law, an individual who possesses a nationality has a legal bond to the state, whether this individual is a citizen of this state or not. Nationality is the demarcation of nationals from aliens, this does not however imply the enjoyment of rights. Citizenship is a set of entitlements conferred or denied often irrespective of nationality.

1.2.1 Recognition of citizenship under international law

In general, international law does not impose restrictions on the discretion of a state to grant nationality. States have a wide range of discretion regarding how they award an individual with their nationality, and other states will generally presume that the grand of nationality is effective. According to international law however, states are not obliged to recognize and give legal effects to an act of granting nationality by another state, when the grant of nationality by said state is not in accordance with international law. This notion is elaborated in the aforementioned case of Nottebohm. This case concerned a German national, who conducted business in Guatemala and has also lived there for most of his adult life.13_{After Germany}

initiated the second world war in 1939, Nottebohm applied for the Liechtenstein nationality, and was granted this nationality in October of 1939. After the acquisition of his new found Liechtenstein nationality, Nottebohm resided in Liechtenstein for seven weeks, before returning to Guatemala. Despite his Liechtenstein nationality, Nottebohm was declared an enemy alien by Guatemala and deported back to Liechtenstein, while his property was confiscated. Liechtenstein responded by going to court, asserting that Guatemala had broken international

Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, nr. 69 (2004), p. 4.

8_{P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, London: Stevens 1956, p. 5.} 9_{P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, London: Stevens 1956, p.29} 10_{K. Rubenstein, ‘Globalisation and Citizenship and Nationality’, University of Melbourne}

11_{Nottebohm Case, 1955.}

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law in relation to their national, Nottebohm. At the hearing, the International Court of Justice held that Nottebohm’s new nationality was not effective in accordance to international law.14

Nationality, according to the Court, was ‘a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’.15_{Continuing, the Court stated that nationality may}

only need to be recognized in the international arena when ‘the legal bond of nationality accords with the individual’s genuine connection with the state which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection against other states’.16 Citizenship is therefore left to the state to grant, and is binding in the state once recognized. For nationality, to be recognized in the international arena, the grant of nationality has to fulfil the obligations as laid out by the Court in the Nottebohm case. States are thus not always obliged to recognize the nationality granted by other states.

1.3 Roots of citizenship 1.3.1 Political citizenship

The republican and political definition of citizenship stems from ancient Greece, and is described in Aristotle’s Politics. In this book, the model for republican citizenship are the members of the Athenian Polis, a small society compared to the great co-ordinated societies that could be found in the river valleys of Mesopotamia, China or Egypt. According to Aristotle, human beings were political animals, because it is our nature to live in political communities.17

This did however not mean that everyone was entitled to be a citizen in the Polis. People played the roles appropriate to their natural station in life. The citizen is the one who both rules and is ruled.18_{The citizen of the Polis is the highest order, as it does not only rule over things, animals,}

slaves and women, but a citizen also rules over one’s equal, namely other citizens.19 Citizens join each other in making decisions, and citizens respect the authority of the other fellow citizens once a decision, better known as a law, has been made.

Equality is thus a key notion of citizenship, notwithstanding that in ancient Greece the greater part of the human species was excluded from access to this equality. Equality was something of which only few are capable, and even today equality has prerequisites that are not always easy to achieve. In the Polis, a citizen must be a male of at least 20 years of age, of known genealogy as to being born in an Athenian citizen family, a patriarch of a household, a warrior and a master of the labour of others, most notably slaves.20_{The Aristotle understanding of}

citizenship is thus defined by class, gender, and race, conditions that have persisted in Western culture ever since and are now attacked to create true equality among the citizens of the world.

15_{Nottebohm Case, 1955, para 23.} 16_{Nottebohm Case, 1955, para 23.}

17_{R. Bellamy, ‘Citizenship’, in G. Klosko ed., The Oxford Handbookof the History of}

Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2011, p. 2.

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Citizenship was not something to be taken lightly, expectations for the citizens where high, leading to a rigorous separation of public and private life, from Polis and Oikos.21_{The private}

life of the citizens was to be looked after by the women and the slaves of said citizen, leaving them free to engage in political relationships with his equals.22 As citizens are those who rule and are ruled by in turns, many citizens could not avoid holding public office at some point in their lives.23 Holding public office however was a fairly full time occupation, leaving a citizen’s slave and women to maintain his household.24 Politics was seen as a good in itself, not the prerequisite of the public good. What is of importance is the freedom to take part in public decisions, not the content of the decisions taken.25 Citizenship is not just the means of being free, but is the way of being free itself.26

While the Greek model of citizenship was a privilege to a selected minority, the model did provide a considerable degree of popular control over government by the people. It gave us the word democracy from the Greek words Demos, people and Kratos, rule. This model however can be considered to be double oppressive, in the sense that it not only oppresses individuals who were not citizens, such as women and slaves, but was also oppressive of its citizens by demanding that they sacrifice their private interests to the service of the state.27 This also left these two forms of oppression invariably linked, in the way that citizens could only dedicate themselves to the public life if their private lives were maintained by their women and slaves. Equality among the citizens and participation in public life are key aspects for the republican model of citizenship. To the republican account, citizenship must involve rights and practices of political participation to achieve common goods.28 The people are not property of their states, but a part of it because the government of the state is a public matter and therefore are the rulers themselves.29_{Liberty is seen as a civic achievement that stems from the fact that all citizens}

have an equal say in ruling the polity.30 The contemporary notion is a more inclusive definition of citizenship. A change in the form of self-government can also be discerned, from direct

28_{R.M. Smith, ‘Modern Citizenship’, in E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner ed., Handbook of}

Citizenship Studies, London: Sage 2002, p. 109.

29_{R. Dagger, ‘Republican Citizenship’, in E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner ed., Handbook of}

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participation to indirect representation.31 The rule of law is also evident in republican citizenship, with the people abiding to the rules that they themselves had a voice in making. 1.3.2 Civil citizenship

Aristotle described human beings as political animals, who emancipated themselves from their personal possessions in order to engage in public life among equals. The Roman jurist Gaius took a different approach to human beings, them not being political and aspiring to an ideal, but to a citizen being a legal being, existing in a world of actions, persons and things regulated by law.32 Civil or legal citizenship has private interests and their protection by the law at its core. In the case of Roman law, legal status and thus citizenship belonged to the owners of property, and extended to their possessions.33_{Since possession also included slaves, a free man}

was someone who owned himself.34 A citizen became someone who was free to act by law, free to request and expect to receive the law’s protection, a citizen of a legal community, and of a legal standing in that community.35

As Rome expanded over the ages, culminating into an empire, Roman citizenship also changed, being reduced to a legal status. The population of conquered territories were given a version of Roman citizenship, while being allowed to retain any form of citizenship status that was already in place in their territory. The Roman citizenship was merely a legal one, one without the right to vote, additional to the political form of citizenship that might already be in place. This development created a situation where the political and the legal community were pulled apart, a development that perhaps could also be discerned in contemporary Europe. The scope of law encompassed the entire empire, and thus went beyond the political borders of the conquered territories. This situation is explained by the famous case of St Paul, who announced himself to be a Roman citizen, and thus possesses a legal status that results in him being immune to arbitrary punishment while not being a member of the political citizenship of the area. In the case of St Paul, citizenship does not entail taking part in public life, but being able to claim certain legal rights that encompass the entire empire. This means that he is protected by rights and immunities that are outside the jurisdiction of the political communities.

Legal citizenship became a notion that meant that someone was free to act by law, free to ask and expect the protection of the law, thus becoming a citizen of a legal community. This is something that is now safeguarded by Articles 19, 263 and 267 TFEU. This draws on the various legally defined uniform rights and immunities available to the citizens of this legal community, that in itself is made up of many political communities.36 Hence, law was denoted

31_{R. Dagger, ‘Republican Citizenship’, in E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner ed., Handbook of}

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to be something imperial, universal and multiform.37 Legal citizenship entailed the right to sue and be sued in given courts, as opposed to the republican citizenship notion of rule and be ruled. This detachment of rulemaking from the public creates advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantage of the legal community, as described above, is that it is able to encompass political communities, and hold their officers and rulers to account for their actions through the law, limiting the possibility for arbitrary action. Through the law, citizens are able to pursue their private interests by exchanging and engaging with each other through the channels provided by the law. The disadvantage lies in the situation that the citizen no longer rules or is ruled by its equals, but becomes subjects of the law’s empire, and are ruled by it rather than ruling themselves.

1.4 Modern citizenship

Between notions of the public, political citizen and the private, legal citizen, rests the tension that the former expects citizens to fully immerse themselves in the public life to rule, and the latter places the private life on the central stage and thereby leaving its citizens to be ruled. In the modern democratic era, set off by two great revolutions in America in 1776 and France in 1789, this tension between political and legal citizenship was confronted. A dualism can be observed, where the political citizen acts as a collective agent, referred to as the ‘nation’, or the ‘people’ in the constitutions of these modern democracies. The public duty of the political citizen gets assigned to a single, constitutional moment that enables them to elect the institutions who rule them. This leaves the citizen to pursue their personal, private interests under the law, safeguarded by the legal rights of liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

The nation states that emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth century struggled with this tension between political and legal citizenship. Every nation state had its own way of mixing and implementing elements of both these forms of citizenship. The nation state was something that was in itself a mix between the city state and the empire, and tried to combine key advantages of legal and political citizenship whilst avoiding their disadvantages. The city state was seen to be too small to survive military aggression of empires, while the empire was too large to allow for meaningful participation politically. Although not providing an as participatory form of rule as the Polis, the nation state did have a credible form of democracy, leaving the citizens to pursue their own interests.

Modern democratic citizenship, combining political and legal citizenship, was not something that citizens received overnight. The sociologist T.H. Marshall established the standard narrative of the evolution of this notion. Citizenship was seen as the product of the interrelated processes such as state building, emergence of the commercial and industrial society, and the creation of a national conscience, or an ‘imagined community’, a phenomena described by B. Andersson.38 These three developments were driven forward by class struggle and war. These developments are attained by the citizens in three periodic stages, according to Marshall, identified as the civil, political and social.39_{Marshall neglected the external side in his analysis,}

what separates the citizens from the non-citizens, taking for granted that the territory of the state

39_{M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Intergration and the New Spatial}

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was already in place.40 Civil citizenship appeared in the 18th century. These rights are necessary for individual freedom, and are comprised of liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.41 Political citizenship emerged in the 19th century, and is described as the right to participate in political life, through the political institutions in place, both active and passive.42_{The third and}

final stage appeared in the 20th century, called social citizenship. These social rights gave citizens right to social welfare, and to be enabled to live a civilized existence in accordance to the standards prevailing in society.43 Social citizenship provides us with what we now refer to as the welfare state and social democracy.

Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity, that would be able to integrate groups that were previously excluded from society, to provide a source of national unity.44_{Marshall especially}

focused on the working classes, because their lack of economic resources and education left them excluded from common culture, something that should be a common possession and heritage of a nation and its citizens.45_{Marshall’s view that citizenship would culminate in an}

ever more inclusive and egalitarian form is however contested.46 This view stems from the post war period, where the economies of the Western European countries where in the ascendant and the welfare state was not only consolidating but expanding. The economic downturn and recessions that occurred ever more frequently from the 1970s onwards, showed that the process of an ever more inclusive and egalitarian citizenship was not an irreversible process. The oil crises of the 1970s showed that welfare state and social citizenship prerogatives are clearly reversible and not to be taken for granted.47

1.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, the ground notion of citizenship and its history has been discerned. First the notions of citizenship and nationality, which are often used interchangeably, have been disentangled, as citizenship signifies the domestic legal forum, and nationality is confined to the international legal forum. Citizenship is for the state to acknowledge to their nationals, whilst nationality is bound to rules of international law, as the Nottebohm case has illustrated. The political notion of citizenship as described by Aristotle describes the republican, public

40_{M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Intergration and the New Spatial}

Politics of Social Protection, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 38.

41_{M. Mann, ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, in R. Bellamy and A. Palumbo ed.,}

Citizenship, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, p. 28.

44_{W. Kymlicka, W. Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on}

Citizenship Theory’, in R. Bellamy and A. Palumbo ed., Citizenship, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, p. 60.

45_{W. Kymlicka, W. Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on}

Citizenship Theory’, in R. Bellamy and A. Palumbo ed., Citizenship, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, p. 60.

47_{B.S. Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of Citizenship’, in R. Bellamy and A. Palumbo ed.,}

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form of citizenship where the members of a state are not ruled, but rule themselves and are only ruled by those to whom they are equal. These notions still are the backbone of the current citizenship as it is known all across the EU, albeit more inclusive than back in ancient Greece and changed to a form of indirect representation to keep it manageable.

Legal citizenship is one where the citizen is seen as a legal being, that is regulated by law in a world of actions, persons and things. During the Roman empire, citizenship changed along with the empire as it further expanded. Roman citizenship was additional to any form of citizenship status already in place, and provided a legal basis to fall back on regardless of where the Roman citizen would find himself in the empire, creating a situation where political and legal citizenship were pulled apart.

The combination of the political and legal citizenship is a trend that can be discerned with the emergence of nation states, and is referred to as modern democratic citizenship. It added a third layer to citizenship, a social dimension that gave citizens’ rights to social welfare schemes, and provided another source of national unity as Marshall referred to it as a shared identity, integrating groups previously left out from society.

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Chapter 2 – European Union Citizenship 2.1 Introduction Union citizenship

Citizenship of the European Union (EU), was officially introduced by the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Back then, article 8(1) EC described Union citizenship as: ‘’Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’’.48 Albeit that Union citizenship is complimentary to national citizenship, Union citizenship is still understood to be the first post-national citizenship in the world.49 As opposed to the ius soli or ius sanguinis practiced by the Member State, Union citizenship can be best referred to as ius tractum, as Union citizenship is purely derivative.50_{The rights that are conferred onto EU nationals by Union citizenship have been}

expanded, modified and reinterpreted in the light of the EU integration process. The current rights of Union citizenship are laid down in articles 20 to 25 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and comprise the following rights:

• To non-discrimination on the basis of nationality when the Treaty applies51

• To move and reside freely within the EU52

• To vote and stand as a candidate in the European Parliament and municipal elections53

• To be protected by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other EU country54

• To petition the European Parliament and complain to the European ombudsman55

• To contact and receive response from any EU institution in one of the EU’s official languages as laid down in article 55 TEU56

• To access the European Parliament, European Commission and Council documents under certain conditions.

• To directly call upon the European Commission (EC) to bring forward an initiative of interest to the citizens, using the citizen’s initiative57

Since its introduction, the importance of Union citizenship has grown over time, as citizenship is a key mechanism for inclusion and exclusion, a concept that distinguishes insiders from outsiders. In this ever-globalizing world, where international migration flows are driven upward by political, demographic, economic and climate factors, citizenship is ever more important to define the demos of a nation and indeed the EU itself. 2.9 percent of the current world population lives outside their country of origin, and in 2011, 6.6 percent of the EU population was foreign born.58 An interesting observation is the inability for an individual to renounce his

48_{G.R. de Groot, N.C. Luk, ‘Twenty Years of CJEU Jurisprudence on Citizenship’, German}

Law Journal, nr. 15 (2014), p. 822.

49_{P. Mindus, ‘Dimensions of Citizenship’, German Law Journal, nr. 15 (2014), p. 735.} 50_{D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficulut}

Relation Between Status and Rights’, The Columbia Journal of European Law, nr. 2 (2009), p. 181. 51_{Art. 18 TFEU} 52_{Art. 21 TFEU} 53_{Art. 22 TFEU} 54_{Art. 23 TFEU} 55_{Art. 24 TFEU} 56_{Art. 24 TFEU}

57_{Art. 11 TEU, Art. 24 TFEU}

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or her Union citizenship, even though this is considered to be a fundamental right across the globe.59_{The foundation of the European citizen being a bearer of legal rights and the centre of}

deepening integration can be traced back not only to the wording of the treaties, but to the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the Van Gend en Loos case, the CJEU ruled that EU law ‘’…Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage’’.60 With his ruling, the CJEU ensured that European citizens were able to use primary and secondary Union law for their fulfilment, conferring upon them ‘direct effect’ for individuals. With cases such as Francovich v Italy, a refined construction has been established to make these norms enforceable in the member states’ their legal orders, and on top of this it has been justiciable by the national courts,61 and by the CJEU itself.62 This construction has culminated into the creation of a community space where the citizens of the European Union can pursue life plans, supported by the guarantee that similar to their domestic legal orders, an extensive degree of promotion and protection of their legal rights is ensured. In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, these aspects are even explicitly listed and guaranteed, through the ‘’creation of an area of freedom, security, and justice.63

2.2 Legal status EU citizenship

In the case of Grzelczyk , the CJEU first uttered the phrase that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of Member States’.64 This ruling is exemplary for the development of the legal concept that is Union citizenship, from a merely symbolic gesture at its conception towards an independent source of rights for member state nationals and their family members.65 From the outset however, the CJEU also made abundantly clear that it does not intend to use Union citizenship ‘to extend the scope rationae materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with Union law’.66

2.2.1 Union citizenship and the rights of free movement and residence

Legally, the introduction of Union citizenship has changed little relating to the laws of the free movement of persons.67 The right to move and reside freely in the territory of another member state that is linked to Union citizenship in article 21 TFEU, is still subject to limitations and conditions as laid out by the treaty and secondary law, such as for example the directive 2004/38. The Court has however made an effort to, within the current ambit of the law, create a general right of free movement for Union citizens. The CJEU has continued its effort to give substance to Union citizenship through its rulings such as Baumbast, Chen, Rottmann,

59_{W.T. Worster, ‘The constitutionality of the Taxation Consequences for Renouncing U.S.}

Citizenship’ Florida Tax Review nr. 9(11) 2010, p. 931.

60_{Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, p. 12.} 61_{TFEU art. 267.}

62_{TEU Art. 19.}

63_{Charter of Fundemental Rights of the European Union (2000)} 64_{Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, para 31.}

65_{P. van Elsuwege, ‘Shifitng the Boundaries? European Union citizenship and the Scope of}

Application of EU Law’, Legal issues of Economic Integration, nr. 38(3) (2011), p. 263.

66_{Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Kari Ueacker and Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen}

(1997), para 23.

67_{F. Amtenbrink, H.H.B. Vedder, Recht van de Europese Unie, Boom juridische}

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Zambrano and McCarthy. These cases track the development of the notion of Union citizenship by the CJEU, evolving Union citizenship beyond its internal market roots. Union citizenship has come to mean more than just solving problems for citizens who encounter problems and irregularities when crossing intra-European borders, but the Courts less functional approach has showed that the cross-border element is no longer the sole ground for application of EU law, but that the effective enjoyment of Union citizenship now takes the central stage.68

2.2.2 Direct effect of article 21 TFEU

The first step was to recognize the direct effect of article 21 TFEU, that made it possible for EU citizens to appeal to this article.69 This meant a departure from existing law, namely the three former resident directives that were later replaced by directive 2004/38. The introduction of Article 20 TFEU did not only mean that the rights of residence of citizens covered by the citizens’ directives were moved from a legislative footing to a Treaty footing, but also had some significant legal consequences.70_{In Baumbast, the Court ruled that a citizen of the Union who}

no longer enjoys a right of residence as a migrant worker in the host member state, thus no longer falls under the scope of what is now directive 2004/38, can still enjoy a right of residence in the host member state as he is a citizen of the Union, and can directly apply for article 21 TFEU.71 The limitations and conditions that article 21 TFEU is subject to according to the Treaty, must be interpreted and applied in accordance with Union law, in particular the principle of proportionality.72

After the Baumbast ruling, the Court confirmed in the Chen ruling that article 21 TFEU confers a directly effective right of residence on Union citizens, even when they do not fall within any other existing EU status category, as the citizen central to this case was a new born baby. The Chen case revolved around the granting of residence rights to a Chinese mother in the United Kingdom on the basis of the Irish nationality of her baby daughter. It was more usual for dependent relatives in accordance with article 2(2)(d) and 7(2) of 2004/38 to derive a right of residence through the EU citizenship of their provider, but in the case of Chen the reality was the other way around, with the EU citizen being dependent on a third country relative to reside in the member state. The Court eventually ruled that a refusal to grant a right of residence to the mother of a EU citizen, who is the primary caretaker of this citizen and enjoys sufficient resources and health insurance, ‘would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect’.73

To recapitulate, the Chen ruling confirms the earlier discussed Baumbast ruling in two ways. For starters, it confirmed that the rights of movement and residence derived from Union citizenship as laid down in article 21 TFEU are directly effective, autonomous, and do not depend on possession of any previously existing EU status category.74 Secondly, the conditions and limitations that the right to move and reside freely within the member states are subject to,

68_{Case C-34/09, Zambrano, para 42.} 69_{C-413/99 Baumbast, para 84.}

70_{P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law: text, cases and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press}

2011, p. 826.

71_{C-413/99 Baumbast, para 94.} 72_{C-413/99 Baumbast, para 94.} 73_{Case C- 200/02 Chen, para 45.}

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must be interpreted and applied in a proportionate manner that ensures that they are not unduly restricted in their exercise.

As can be discerned from this case law, article 21 TFEU does create and confer a directly effective right for Union citizens to appeal to. This directly effective right expands the rights conferred to Union citizens, making it possible for non-economically active persons to move and reside in another member state because of their capacity as Union citizens. This marks a change for Union citizenship that is far from symbolic, but instead creates a Union citizenship more inclusive and less market oriented, and additionally makes the European project more social and less market oriented too.

2.2.3 Union citizenship and Member State nationality law

The importance of the principle of proportionality also became apparent in other case law concerning EU citizenship law. Up until the Rottmann case, nationality matters such as the acquisition and loss of the nationality of a Member State, were in the strict competence of the Member States themselves and not regulated by EU law.75 Member States use different admission criteria that could be both over and under inclusive.76 In practice, this leads to a situation where some Member States like Cyprus and Malta have lenient criteria for the acquisition of their nationality and thus Union citizenship, whilst other Member States may have restrictive naturalisation criteria and may exclude large groups of third country nationals from EU citizenship. These conflicting regulatory practices could lead to perceived inequalities and injustice.77

The case of Rottmann concerned the by birth Austrian national Dr. Janko Rottmann. Rottmann was facing prosecution in Austria on suspicion of fraud, and fled to Germany in 1995. Settling in Munich, Rottmann applied for the German nationality, which he was granted in 1999 through naturalization. By becoming a German national, Rottman lost his Austrian nationality in accordance with Austrian nationality law.78 In the month of August in 1999 however, the German authorities were informed by their Austrian counterparts that a warrant for Rottmann’s arrest was still out in Austria, causing the German authorities to revoke Rottmann’s new found German nationality by administrative decision in 2000.79_{By not informing the German}

authorities about the ongoing investigation in Austria, Rottmann obtained the German nationality by deception, resulting in its revocation. Rottmann’s legal status thus underwent a dramatic change, as he went from a notional of an EU Member State and thus an EU citizen, to someone who is now stateless. Additional to being stateless, Rottmann also lost his EU citizenship, causing the German court where he challenged his nationality loss to turn to the CJEU with two preliminary questions: first, does Community law preclude the loss of Union citizenship due to the by internal law of a Member state lawful revocation of its nationality, with statelessness as a consequence? And second, if the aforementioned is the case, which state is required to readjust its nationality law, the naturalizing state or the original one?

Law Journal, nr. 15 (2014), p. 826.

76_{E. Ersboll, ‘Nationality and Identity Issues - A Danish Perspective’, German Law Journal,}

nr. 15 (2014), p. 835.

77_{E. Ersboll, ‘Nationality and Identity Issues - A Danish Perspective’, German Law Journal,}

nr. 15 (2014), p. 852.

78_{Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 26.} 79_{Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 28.}

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The Rottmann case stirred up a lot of debate, as the Member States felt that the EU had no competence to meddle in the nationality laws of the Member States, as they can point to Declaration no. 2 that is attached to the Maastricht Treaty. The Court however argued differently, stating that in accordance with the cases of Grzelczyk and Baumbast, Union citizenship is to be regarded as a fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, and that as the case of Michelletti already made clear, Member States must have due regard to EU law, when exercising their powers concerning nationality law.80 Member States still have the competence to decide how their nationality is acquired or lost, especially if it has been acquired on fraudulent terms such as in the case of Rottmann. In its ruling however, the CJEU stated that a principle of proportionality needs to be applied to the decision that withdraws the nationality of a Union citizen.81_{The principle of proportionality entails taking into account the}

consequences of the decision for his family and his rights as a Union citizen, and if it is possible for the individual to recover its original nationality, and that the loss of nationality is justified in relation to the gravity of the offence committed.82_{The principle of proportionality in relation}

with EU law is also additional to any principle of proportionality already in place at the national level.83

Member State nationality law and its relation to EU law has undergone perhaps a minor, but very important change. No longer are Member States completely sovereign concerning their nationality law, as is first observed by the Court in Micheletti, as nationality law must always be in due regard with EU law. This road set out by the CJEU in this case is followed by the Rottmann case, where a principle of proportionality must be applied when someone stands to lose his or hers Union citizenship. The Rottmann ruling is thus a controversial one, especially for the Member States. These argued that the CJEU was overstepping its bounds in the case of Rottmann, as the Member States referred to Declaration no. 2 that is attached to the Treaty of Maastricht, which reads that: ‘The question whether an individual possesses the nationality of the Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned’.84

With the introduction of EU citizenship the Member States probably already saw some issues arise concerning their autonomy regarding nationality matters in conjunction with EU citizenship. Member States feel that determining who its nationals are should be left exclusively to the Member States, and are not keen to share this with the EU level. In the case of Rottmann however, the CJEU waivers the right of the Member States that they are solely responsible for the acquisition and loss of nationality, by adding the principle of proportionality. The argument of the CJEU is that Member States have the right to shape their own nationality law, insofar as this is done with due regard to EU law, with the principle of proportionality applying when an individual is prone to lose his or hers EU citizenship. The exclusive domain and competence of the member states to be completely sovereign concerning nationality matters is thus declining, as the Court extends the scope of EU law. This grants the EU influence or indirect influence on the reserved domain of nationality law, thereby changing and making the reserved domain for

80_{Case 184/99 Grzelczyk, para. 31, Case 413/99 Baumbast and R, para. 82, Case}

C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 43.

81_{Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 59.} 82_{Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 56.} 83_{Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, para. 55.} 84_{OJ 1992 C 191, p.98.}

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Member States smaller.85 Similar to the Baumbast case, the principle of proportionality must also be observed when article 20 TFEU comes into play concerning nationality matters. 2.2.4 Union citizenship and ‘wholly internal situations’

The case law discussed thus far, always contained a cross border element that enabled the CJEU to rule on the matter at hand. Before the introduction of EU citizenship, EU law and rights could not be invoked in a ‘wholly internal situation’ as the cases of Saunders and Morson and Jhanjan have showed in practice.86 After the introduction of Union citizenship, there were cases that tried to challenge the ‘wholly internal situation’ approach by the Court, such as in the cases of Kremzow and Uecker, where the factual contexts were similar to those of Saunders and Morson and Jhanjan. The Court ruled however, that EU citizenship law still did not extend the scope of the Treaty to cover ‘wholly internal situations’ which otherwise had no link to EU law. However, another development concerning Union citizenship and ‘wholly internal situations’ can be discerned.

The Case of Ruiz Zambrano concerns Colombian, non-EU parents of two EU-citizens born and residing in Belgium. These children possess the Belgian nationality, and have never left the state. The parent and main provider for the family, Mr. Zambrano, gets denied a permit to continue his residence in the Belgian state, and is also not allowed to continue his employment. The consequences of this decision by the Belgian state is that the Zambrano family will have to leave Belgium and return to Colombia, but Zambrano argues that this is conflict with the right of his two children to enjoy the rights Union citizenship confers upon them. Eight Member States intervened in the case, arguing that the case at hand concerned a ‘wholly internal situation’ and that EU law on citizenship was not applicable. The Court however, ruled otherwise. After having ascertained that directive 2004/38 is not applicable to the situation of the Zambrano family, as this directive can only be applied to a cross-border situation, the CJEU continued by citing article 20 TFEU. According to the Court, ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’.87

The notion of ‘genuine enjoyment’ is what is crucial to the reasoning of the Court, and something that supersedes the presence of a cross-border element. If, like in the Zambrano case, a Member State refuses to grant a right of residence to a third country national with dependent minor children who are nationals of said Member State and also have their place of residence in this member state, this refusal would impede the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on these children by the virtue of their status as citizens of the Union. In other words, preventing Union citizens to enjoy their genuine enjoyment of the Union citizenship rights, takes precedent over whether or not a cross-border element is present. This leads to a situation where the Member States remain exclusively competent to grant nationality and to handle purely internal situations, but that the exercise of this competence may never undermine

85_{H.U.J. d’Oliveira, ‘Court of Justice of the European Union Decision of 2 March 2010, Case}

C-315/08 Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern Case Note 1 Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship?’, European Constitutional Law Review, nr. 7(1) (2011), p. 148.

2011, p. 829.

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the very essence of Union citizenship as in the case of Zambrano.88 By not only employing the cross-border element to decide whether or not EU law can be applied, but by using the implications for the effective benefits of EU citizenship rights as the yardstick, this approach counterbalances the most problematic examples of reverse discrimination.89 This prevents a situation from taking place where EU law is only applicable to those who can afford to create, a sometimes tenuous, cross-border link and those who do not have these resources. It could also be argued that the Union has moved beyond the uniquely economic reasoning of cross border thinking, and given EU citizenship and the rights associated a life of its own.90 This approach by the CJEU constitutes another step towards what Advocate General Sharpston refers to in her opinion as ‘true citizenship’.91 No longer are EU citizenship and rights conditional by a citizen’ travelling history, service provision in other member states, or the thickness of their wallet.92 The dismissal of the cross-border element can be seen as a paradigm shift in EU citizenship law.

However, the Court does not award just any situation with the label ‘impediment of genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’, the gates to unconditional application of EU citizenship legislation have not been opened by the Zambrano case. Just two months later, in the case of McCarthy, the Court rejected the claim of an Union citizen who had both the Irish and British nationality, and who for her entire life lived in the UK, and argued that she and her Jamaican husband had a right of residence deriving from EU law.93 McCarthy argued that because of her Union citizenship, her husband, who was a third country national, would enjoy derived residence rights. The CJEU rejected McCarthy’s claim, distinguishing it from the Zambrano case by arguing that UK law in her case did not have the effect of obliging her to leave the territory of the EU, and thus not depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred by the virtue of the status as a Union citizen.

The crucial factor in determining whether EU law is applicable in internal situations is thus that of the perceived difference in the degree of dependence and vulnerability of the EU citizen family member.94 In the case of McCarthy, the fact that the person seeking a derived residence status was het adult spouse, as opposed to Ruiz Zambrano where it was the parent of two dependent children, evidently made a difference for the Court when reaching its verdict. Even though in both cases the family life of the Union citizen would be greatly affected, it was only in the Ruiz Zambrano case that the Court was willing to treat it as a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights of EU citizenship. The case law thus brings us to the conclusion that the introduction of Union citizenship in articles 20 and 21 TFEU have conferred more legal protection onto its bearers, up to the point where even a ‘wholly internal situation’

90_{D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’,}

ELJ nr. 19 2013, p. 9.

91_{Opinion of A-G Sharpston, Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 3.}

ELJ nr. 19 2013, p. 9.

93_{Case C-434/09 McCarthy}

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is not enough to stop EU law from protecting it citizens. The notion of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred by virtue of the status as a Union citizen’ however, could use some determination as to demarcate the exact meaning of the notion.95 So far, the CJEU only clarified that if the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of the rights conferred by Union citizenship are breached, EU law directly applies, regardless of the existence of a cross-border situation. The question that remains however, and is unanswered by the McCarthy case, how this ‘genuine enjoyment’ is exactly defined by the Court, to ensure legal certainty for Union citizens. So far, the main emerging element is found in the Zambrano case, and is that the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of EU citizenship is confined to not being forced to leave the territory of the Union. If this one element however, would turn out to be the all right that defines the ‘genuine enjoyment’, this would seriously undermine the potential of EU citizenship.96

2.3 Political rights Union citizenship

In the previous section of this chapter, we have only examined articles 20-21 TFEU concerning the right of free movement and residence. The other articles concerning Union citizenship are articles 22-25 TFEU, that confer a number of rights that are more of a political citizenship footing. The most critical of these are the rights of alien suffrage, and the rights for EU citizens to actively and passively make use of electoral rights in their host Member State.97 Article 22 TFEU provides that individuals in possession of Union citizenship shall have the right in a Member State other than the state of their nationality to vote and stand as candidates both in municipal and European Parliament elections, under the same conditions as the nationals of the host Member State.98 It should however be noted that article 22 TFEU does allow for the possibility of derogations.99

An important case concerning these active and passive electoral rights is the case of Eman and Sevinger, concerning two Dutch nationals resident of the Dutch island of Aruba, who were denied their application to be enrolled on the register of electors for the election of members of the EP, on the ground of their habitual residence in a territory of an overseas countries and territories.100 The CJEU argued that every person who holds the nationality of a Member State, is a citizen of the Union as laid down in article 20 TFEU. Continuing, the Court argued that this status is possessed regardless of whether this Union citizen is resident in an overseas country or territory, and Eman and Sevinger thus enjoy the rights conferred to them by the Treaty.101 In the judgement however, the CJEU declined to determine the rules regarding passive and active election rights in overseas countries and territories, observing that the then articles 189 and 190

ELJ nr. 19 2013, p. 10.

ELJ nr. 19 2013, p. 16.

2011, p. 848.

98_{Directive 93/109/EC concerning the EP, directive 94/80 concerning municipal elections.} 99_{P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law: text, cases and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press}

2011, p. 848.

Law Journal, nr. 15 (2014), p. 825.

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EC Treaty do not apply to these overseas countries and territories.102 Continuing, the Court held that the current situation in the Overseas territories of the Netherlands, where Dutch nationals are not allowed to vote for the EP elections, while other Dutch nationals residing in a non-Member State are accorded this right, is a violation of the principle of equal treatment, and thus in violation of community law.103_{European citizens thus have a right to vote for the EP, the}

parliament that represents them at the European level, and the ruling of the Court that safeguarded these rights shows that the right to vote for EP elections is in fact a normal incident of EU citizenship.104

The actual exercise of electoral rights by Union citizens has however not been very substantial, as the Commission noted very low rates of voter registration and low number in exercising the right to vote as well. The Commission is however attempting to cut the red tape concerning the exercising of electoral rights, as the Commission criticised provisions in several Member States that restrict or prohibit non-nationals from establishing or joining political parties, as they are incompatible with the rights of EU citizenship.105

Article 23 TFEU, which provides that Union citizens have the right to the protection of the diplomatic authorities of any Member State if in a third country where their own Member State is not represented, has been part of the 2007-2009 Commission action plan to ensure and enhance legal protection in this area.106 The Lisbon treaty also added a new paragraph to article 23 TFEU, providing a legal basis to use a special legislative procedure to establish measures necessary to facilitate diplomatic and consular protection.107

The provisions of Article 24 TFEU enabling the citizen’s initiative has a lot of democratic potential, but it remains to be seen if it becomes an effective means of democratic engagement and mobilisation within the EU, as the Commission is not legally obliged to follow up on these initiatives.108

2.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has established a brief and concise overview of the legal notion of EU citizenship. When compared to the first chapter and the historical notion of citizenship, an interesting analogy can be discerned. The nationality of a Member State, and the citizenship that is derived from this notion, has become a striking resemblance of the political ideal of citizenship that has its roots in the Greek Polis. It enables the citizen to become someone who governs instead of being governed, and to fulfil their public duty. European citizenship, especially up to the point of the Rottmann and Zambrano rulings, with its internal market roots can be seen as a more legal form of citizenship, with its roots in the Roman empire.

Law Journal, nr. 15 (2014), p. 825.

103_{Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, para. 50-60.}

104_{J. Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union, Cambridge,}

Cambridge University Press (2007), p. 10.

105_{Com(2008)85, para. 4.4.} 106_{Com(2007)767.}

2011, p. 849.