The role of water in the relationship between Jordan
and Israel
Bachelor’s thesis BSc. Political Science – University of Amsterdam Robert Dielemans – 11041463 – 28-01-2019
3 Table of Contents Introduction 3 Theoretical framework 6 Method 13 Chapter 1 16 Chapter 2 19 Chapter 3 22 Conclusion 30 Discussion 33 Literature 34
4 Introduction
In recent years there has been a lot of discussion about the role water plays in conflicts. This discussion has been ongoing, especially in the Middle East where climate change results in desertification and declining volumes of fresh water. The most interesting discussion right now is taking place in Israel and Jordan as they face the new challenge of a continuing drought threatening the already fragile peace.
So why is this so fascinating? Israel is one of the larger powers in the region, possessing large technological capabilities, which means that Israel probably is the best suited to deal with this treat. On the other hand, Israel has been at war with all the nations it borders, which becomes an even larger problem considering it shares it’s fresh water resources with these countries. Till this day the relationships between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries are very complicated (Marteu 2018). The most notable relation in the context of water, is between Israel and Jordan, since Jordan and Israel use the same water sources where they get the largest part of their fresh water.
A lot can be said about how difficult this relationship can get. Speaking at the 2008 World Economic Forum the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon explained the dangers that water scarcity can bring when he predicted that the next generation of conflicts will be about water (Bancala and Dabalco 2008). This coincides with the views held by some scholars, which have been named the water wars theory. According to one of these scholars Ashok Swain who wrote the article ‘Water Wars’ the shortages of water are only going to exacerbate the existing conflicts, while creating new ones in water scarce regions (Swain 2015). The water wars theory is in stark contrast with the hydro diplomacy theory in which Sosland argues that the preference to cooperate over shared freshwater arises when multiple parties are present (Sosland 2007). These two theories are the most dominant when it comes to the role that water plays in international relations. When it comes to the specific case of Jordan and Israel and the role of water in their relationship. The 1994 peace treaty is the obvious starting point as it ended their most serious conflicts since the establishment of the independent state of Israel. What, however, has remained unclear is what the role of water has been since the establishment of the 1994 treaty. Several important factors have changed, most importantly the recent series of droughts that have been affecting the area (Creighton 2018).
5 Taking these changing factors in to account the research question becomes: “What role has water played in the relationship between Israel and Jordan since the 1994 peace treaty?”. The first reason for choosing 1994 as the ‘starting date’ is that in 1994 the peace deal between Jordan and Israel concerning the large Jordan River water basins came into effect (Sosland 2007). The second reason joins together with the scientific relevance of this thesis, as we currently have a solid understanding of the situation and the events leading up to the 1994 peace deal between Israel and Jordan.
The sub questions by which the analysis shall be structured are:
1. How did the 1994 peace deal come to be? This first chapter sets out to explain the setting at the start of the relevant period in this thesis.
2. How do Jordan and Israel each view water scarcity? If there isn’t a drought or scarcity of water in general, then there isn’t anything to cooperate or fight about. Hereby giving support to the assumption, which is made in this research, that water is actually a problem in the region.
3. To what extent does the drought in Israel and Jordan create opportunities for cooperation or causes for conflict? In the third chapter the variables, which are based on the theoretical framework, will be investigated to determine whether the hydro-diplomacy or water wars theories are suited to explain the relationship between Israel and Jordan or that a synthesis of these theories can help explain the relationship between Israel and Jordan.
The social relevance of this subject is quite large. It lies in the fact that with better
understanding of the tensions that exist in the region conflict can be avoided. To have a more complete view on the region and be able to work towards a longer lasting peace between Israel and its neighbours, it is vital to understand that the tensions between Jordan and Israel are not just about religion or ethnicity, but also about issues like water scarcity. This is especially important when taken into account the international alliances of Israel, as most western powers, most notably the United States as usual in the region, are guaranteeing the independence of Israel. But even without its allies Israel has a terrifyingly well trained and extremely well-equipped army.
The social relevance is not just regional, as this thesis also touches upon the water wars – hydro diplomacy debate, which will become an increasingly more relevant debate as global fresh water levels will continue to drop as global warming continues to harm the
environment. Having a good understanding of how conflict possibly can be avoided over water will make sure it does not get the same status, as a generator of conflict, oil has at this
6 moment. However, the world is fully aware conflict can be the result of the international oil demand. Water is not yet viewed as an important variable the same way as oil is viewed. But it will become just as and maybe even more important.
The scientific relevance mainly revolves around the water wars – hydro diplomacy debate. As the goal within this thesis is to another case to this debate, namely the case of Jordan and Israel. This is a particularly interesting case as it can be seen as most likely scenario for the water wars theory. This is because the two nations both have securitized water management, meaning that it is not privately or corporately controlled (Weinthal et al. 2015: 293-307). It is however controlled by the respective states and it is rightfully seen as a vital interest.
Therefore, this thesis will be adding more examples of the double roll water has played and can play in international relations to the already advanced debate.
7 Theoretical Framework
The research question is “What role has water played in the relationship between Israel and Jordan since the 1994 peace treaty?”. There are two theories which focus on water as a source of potential conflict and the complexities which come with the division of water. This
‘water’, when it is used in these theories consists of fresh water, which can be either drinkable or be used for food production.
The first is is the water wars theory, this theory states that riparian states often disagree on water allocations and as a result of climate change the nominal fresh water numbers have begun to decline. When this happens, and water becomes more and more scarce, the water wars theory states that the states, which are most affected by this will set out to protect their vital interests. This will lead to a zero-sum game as all countries in dry regions will try and collect and protect as much fresh water as they can, even if that comes at the expense of their neighbours. What usually happens when states enter into a zero-sum game is that they
inevitably see themselves being forced to resort to violence. Therefore, this theory argues that water scarcity inevitably results into water wars (Swain 2015).
The second theory the water-diplomacy or hydro diplomacy theory. This theory states that the scarcity of water in a region will motivate state actors to work together. Because both actors are interdependent. Water scarcity can mean scarcity in availability due to physical shortage, or scarcity in access due to the failure of institutions to ensure a regular supply or due to a lack of adequate infrastructure (UN 2018).
The Water Wars Theory
The water wars theory revolves around the basic principle that water scarcity leads to
conflict. Based on this principle several authors have made the prediction that wars will erupt revolving around water. This prediction seems to be a relative recent trend in academic debates (Fröhlich 2013). The arguments for this prediction consist of two central global developments: the continuing growth of the global population and climate change. The continuing growth of the global population leads to an ever-increasing demand for food. This in turn leads to an increasing demand for water, specifically clean and fresh water (Fröhlich 2013). For many countries, the need to secure access to water resources takes on ever greater significance. This has led some scholars to grant water the status of a strategic resource. One of these scholars is Klare who in his book brings water to the same level as oil and gas
8 (2002). Hereby linking water to the resource scarcity literature. He, for example, argues that the policy for the majority of the countries in the world has shifted from being determined by the ideological polarization of the cold war, to the securing or obtaining of access to different resources.
Klare makes the link to economic demands. He suggests that resources have become so important, because of the increasing focus on economic policy. This results in an increasing demand of all kinds of production: industrial, agricultural and services. To sustain the growth there is the assumption of an impending scarcity of particular resources in the near future, which will lead to controversy regarding the ownership of these resources. The demand for water is growing because the world population is growing, and states want to satisfy the consumption needs of their citizens. To this end water and oil are the two most important resources according to Klare and because of that, they are the two most sensitive. Not only is the world industry and agriculture highly dependent on these resources, water is also a basic human need. Klare predicts that by the mid-twenty-first century consumption will equal the total available amount of fresh water. The ensuing shortage will cause tension and may lead to conflict over the access to, and distribution of, water resources, especially where a water basin crosses an international border. Whilst Klare does not argue that all future conflict will be about resources, he nonetheless views water-conflicts as very likely (Klare 2002). Even though most of the water conflicts do not result in an armed conflict, he claims that it is now widely accepted that resources and environmental factors, particularly those associated with fresh water, play an important role in local, regional, and even international disputes.
But it is not just on the state level that conflict is present or threatening. Bencala and Debelko argue that when moved past the traditional classic realist focus on states, analysis on the subnational level shows large amounts of violence in the conflicts revolving around water (Bencala and Debelko 2008: 22). These conflicts do not involve state-led armies, but rather local groups and militias who are confronted with the high stakes that these conflicts bring. As in many of these conflicts the losing side of the conflict will be left to deal with extreme shortages of water. These conflicts usually result from the pricing of water or the construction of dams as these pose a very rapid change in the current situation, which more often lead to violence (Bencala and Debelko 2008: 20-26).
9 Homer-Dixon puts the emphasis on the role of social factors. He argues that a water conflict often is the result of a combination of scarcity and social factors (Homer-Dixon 1999: 16-18). He says that the source of a water-related conflict usually is more complicated than water sharing alone. When the level of intensity in a conflict is combined with the basis of the conflict, it would be possible to conclude that an actor can use water resources to pursue different strategies, at different stages during the conflict. Adding water to an existing conflict can cause an escalation in the conflict, which can be either helpful or detrimental to the peace process. When a party is able to combine different aspects of a conflict to result in one strategy, an actor could become a lot stronger. This means that conflicts about water are not just interstate conflicts. Because when water issues are combined with other local or low intensity conflicts, it can influence attitudes at higher levels and may even cause tension in an entire region (Homer-Dixon 1999: 80-85).
He further argues that several factors influence the intensity of a water-related conflict, which does not necessarily mean that the conflict will advance to a regional level, but rather that the conflict could turn violent more quickly. The first is the level of scarcity combined with a potential lack of organization of the available water resources in the area. The second is the historical context of ownership or partnership of the water sources. The third are the
underlying causes of the conflict, the reinforcing cleavages. The fourth is the possibility of access to alternative water resources or to achieve an agreement about other water sources. The fifth is the relative power of other interested actors, like powerful allies who will prevent the conflict from escalating too far (Homer-Dixon 1999: 73-80).
The disputes concerning river-water sharing, usually arise among the riparian states on three grounds: quantity, quality, and control. The different views concerning the quality and control issues are relatively easier for states to deal with, as they often can be settled with financial and technical support (Swain, 2001). “The quality issue, which had been the cause of disagreement among the riparian states in Europe’s Rhine and Danube and with North America’s Colorado River in the past, has resulted in peaceful and cooperative arrangements” (Swain 2001: 444). The disagreement over control can be easily settled with what Homer-Dixon describes with his fourth point of the access to alternate water resources. Examples of this are the water related issues associated with the Columbia River and Parana River in the relatively water abundant Americas which have been settled for some time. However, water is not easily replaced, so when it comes to the problem of it being in a reduced quantity, the problem is much more difficult to address. The quantity factor in many cases threatens to
10 destroy existing cooperative arrangements and causes the parties to take conflicting positions. Haftendorn offers another factor to analyse the cause of conflicts about water (Haftendorn 2000). She identifies the criteria for the causes of conflict to be: water use, water quality and water distribution and availability. By water use, she means not only the use of water for transportation, as in shipping, but also the use of water in building a dam, which may have consequences for other riparian states. The quality of water may cause a conflict in the case of pollution, when one state experiences polluted water caused by another state upstream. The distribution of water may cause a conflict when one of the riparian states experiences a relative shortage of water in one of their basins. This becomes a real threat of degrading into a war when limited availability is added to this.
The Hydro Diplomacy Theory
In the academic debate about water-related conflicts, the majority of authors challenge the assumptions of the water wars theory. These authors do not argue that no water-related conflict may lead to war or that there are no water-related conflicts. They do however argue that the potential for cooperation is much greater than the potential for violent conflict. They support this with numbers on water conflicts. Fröhlich argues that of “1,831 documented interactions between river adversaries, the large majority, namely 1,228, were cooperative” (Fröhlich 2012: 241). Adding to this she states that water agreements are extremely durable, even military conflicts often do not alter them. One example she gives is the agreement between India and Pakistan on the Indus, which has survived numerous, sometimes violent, disputes between the two parties. It is a common and often-expressed assumption that “the next war in the Middle East will be about water” (contended, for instance, by former UN general secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali). The neo-malthusian reasoning behind this
supposition—growing population plus scarce and decreasing water resources equals violent conflict over water—has proven both exceptionally powerful and empirically untenable. It is one of the fundamental findings of the academic studies on the topic of ‘water conflict or cooperation’ of the last thirty years that international water wars and ensuing global repercussions are not to be expected: “International wars about renewable resources like water are not very likely, since the utilisation of renewable resources can neither easily nor quickly be converted into power” (Fröhlich 2012: 141) (Peres 1993). Wendy Barnaby recently contended in an essay that “countries do not go to war over water, they solve their
11 water shortages through trade and international agreements.” (Barnaby 2009: 283). Barnaby’s explanation is that global trade in “virtual water” the water embedded in food products allows arid countries like those in the Middle East to meet their water requirements without resorting to conflict. She states that countries who have water shortages all import grain. She points out that more 'virtual' water flows into the Middle East each year embedded in grain than flows down the Nile to Egyptian farmers.
Avraham Tamir wrote as early as 1988: “Why go to war over water? For the price of a weeks fighting, you could build five desalination plants: no loss of life, no internal pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend in hostile territory.” (Tamir 1988). These statements are backed up with ample evidence. The “International Freshwater Treaties Database” of Oregon State University lists more than 400 water agreements, among them more than one hundred post-1945. Of 1,831 documented interactions between river adversaries, the large majority, namely 1,228, were cooperative. In addition, water agreements tend to be very durable: Even military conflicts often cannot harm them. One illustration of this is, the previously mentioned, agreement between India and Pakistan on the Indus, which has survived numerous, in part violent, disputes between the two parties. (Fröhlich 2012: 138-143). Barnaby says on whether water scarcity or water resources in general may cause
conflict, that it is reasonable to conclude that water scarcity and shared water resources do not cause conflicts, rather more cooperation (Barnaby 2009: 280-284).
However, according to Swain, there are requirements for hydro diplomacy. He states that there needs to be an effective water regime. In order to achieve an effective water regime in a hostile environment diplomacy serves an ‘adjusting’ function, through the framework of negotiation, mediation and good offices. These combined elements of a water regime together create the fundamental framework of hydro diplomacy (Swain 2015). River sharing makes it a lot easier to come to an agreement because an agreement can more likely be developed among the contending riparian states over the quantity allocation of a river resource, when there is enough unused water left in the river. An example of this is the agreement concerning the Indus River which came to be in 1960 between two traditionally competing rivals, India and Pakistan, because nearly 80% of the river water was running into the Arabian Sea, unused by both riparian countries. But there are more examples such as the 1959 agreement on the sharing of the Nile River, which was reached between Egypt and Sudan. These situations change however, when large quantities of water do not remain unused. Then, with increasing water demands upstream and less availability of unused water, these rivers can
12 become a source of serious tension among the major riparian countries. The increasing
riparian demand has also raised doubts about the continuation of the existing water sharing arrangements on the Euphrates–Tigris river systems. Water-scarce riparian states have been able to find cooperative solutions in the last two decades rather than enter into violent
conflict. Signing of agreements on water sharing may be easy, but the real problem is how to keep the agreement viable. Sometimes in spite of reaching an agreement, riparian states find that their discontent has not dissipated as many upstream countries believe they should have complete control over the flow of the rivers and withdraw water according to their demands. In some cases, when the downstream states are often more powerful in economic and military terms, they challenge the upstream countries’ rights over the river flow, like Egypt, India, and Israel. (Swain 2015: 444-445)
Just as the hydro diplomacy theory came as a criticizing response to the water wars theory, the hydro diplomacy theory has also faced criticism. Swain describes the difficulty of maintaining these agreements, which is often neglected in the hydro diplomacy literature. Because these water treaties face danger to their survival if they fail to receive support from an effective institutional arrangement for proper water control. Allotted water in the existing sharing agreements in most of the cases is unable to meet the increasing demand. The scope of this problem becomes clear by examining the river water in the arid and semi-arid regions of the world, which is becoming more limited due to increasing impacts of global climate change. Therefore, he concludes: “Global climate change has the potential to alter the water security landscape in a very significant manner in the near future” (Swain 2015: 446). This is not the only criticism that the hydro diplomacy has faced. Another theory: the hydro hegemony states that it is not hydro diplomacy that keeps the peace but rather the hegemonial position of one of the involved parties. According to Wegerich the hydro hegemony consists of three elements (2008: 71-88). The first is the position of power and data and the power of data in influencing or defining the discourse in one’s favour. The second element is the water control, which is mostly about technological superiority as there is a linkage between having an advanced water supply infrastructure and having water control. The third element is that the hydro hegemony is not only about water allocations, but also about hydro ‘power’. Which state is better equipped to keep hold of the water if it would come to a conflict, since
upstream riparian states have a clear advantage over the downstream riparian states? (Wegerich 2008: 71-73) When analysing the fact that power asymmetries influence the outcome of the water division, Wegerich states that it is not in the hegemon’s interests to
13 move away from domination and move towards cooperation and mutual agreements, as it would lose some of its beneficial position. Therefore, it is not always in all the actors best interest to seek a water treaty. Although that is the general assumption made in the hydro-diplomacy theory (Wegerich 2008: 85-88)
14 Method
In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the research question: “What role has water played in the relationship between Israel and Jordan since the 1994 peace treaty?”, certain choices have been made. To answer the question, the choice has been made to conduct a literature study. In this literature study the data will consist of literature, and data relevant to the case of Israel and Jordan will be analysed by using the variables which are based on the two main theories concerning water. Before getting to the analysis, it is important to
understand the historic context in which the relation between these two nations lies, and the full scope of the water situation in both countries to understand the problems.
The variables, which are going to be used to analyse the relationship, are based upon the two theories and the criticism on these theories. From the water wars theory three variables arise that in some way or another gets used by all authors. These are the quantity of water, the quality of water and the control over water. Disputes over water sharing usually arise among the riparian states on these three grounds.
Quantity is not just the nominal amount of water flowing though a river. Although this is a part of it, the conceptualization made by these scholars goes further than this and also involves accessibility of the water. The infrastructure is also an important factor, as some countries have been limited, not by amount but rather by being unable to transfer the water to the correct places (Swain 2015) (Haftendorn 2007). The data for this variable will be drawn from primary scientific sources such as several United Nations water reports as well as from the Global Water Institute (United Nations 2017 - 2018) (Global Water Institute 2013). Adding to this will be secondary scientific sources such as the books by Klare and Shiva, who not only use a lot of data but also provide the data with the relevant context (Klare 2002) (Shiva 2016).
Quality is about the uses of the water. Some water cannot be drunk, but sometimes it can be used in the agricultural sector and therefore can still be used and still counts as water that is being consumed by a human. Quality however goes further as it also broaches on the subject of pollution, which can occur through shipping and, recreational activities, as well as
improper wildlife management. Especially when it comes to chemical waste in water which functions as a drinking water source the issue of quality is paramount. The data for this variable will be drawn from primary scientific sources such as several United Nations water
15 reports, as well as from the Global Water Institute (United Nations 2017 - 2018) (Global Water Institute 2013).
Control is about who gets to do what with the water. Infrastructural projects like pumping water out of a basin to use as drinking water, is just one of the issues: it can also involve the building of dams, canals etc. Any project that disturbs the water flow is an issue about control. Each of these three examples can be the source of conflict when it comes to the control over water and is therefore the starting point. The data for this variable will be drawn from secondary scientific sources such as the books by Klare and Shiva, who not only use a lot of data but also provide the data with the relevant context (Klare 2002) (Shiva 2016). Just as variables can be derived from the water wars theory, they can also be derived from the hydro-diplomacy theory. They are: effective institutional arrangement, long-term vision and international agreements. These three variables intend to show whether there is sustainable cooperation in place.
As stated, these variables are derived from the hydro-diplomacy theory, which poses that in the event of water scarcity nations will cooperate rather than getting into an armed conflict. Therefore, establishing water treaties. Because these water treaties face danger if not enforced and manged correctly. It is paramount to their survival that they do not fail to receive support from an effective institutional arrangement for proper water control. The data for this variable will be drawn from secondary scientific sources such as the books of Chellaney and Pangare (Chellaney 2013) (Pangare 2014)
Second, the long-term vision is about the availability of any long-term solutions to the water scarcity. Are the treaties resilient enough to survive over time and have the long-term needs of all parties involved been taken into account? Are there, for example, any potentially untapped water sources, which in the long term, might alleviate some of the pressure? The data for this variable will be drawn from primary non-scientific sources such as non-scientific articles concerning the Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline.
Third, the international agreements variable is about what kind of agreements there are between nations, not just between the two riparian states themselves but also strong allies which might be able, like Wegerich states, to force the parties to renegotiate the terms with the threat of violence. These agreements are also about the availability of ‘virtual’ water, as mentioned by Barnaby. This virtual water is usually not fresh water, but rather water which is absorbed in food imports, which reduces the need for water in that country. The data for this
16 variable will be drawn from secondary scientific sources such as the books by Peres and Sosland (Peres 1993) (Sosland 2007).
17 Chapter 1: The 1994 Treaty
The 1994 treaty or officially the "Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", came into existence in 1994 after years of negotiating. The treaty settled many disputes between the two countries. It adjusted the rules in many land and water disputes. It also created the foundation for the development of broad cooperation in tourism and trade. It included a pledge that neither Jordan nor Israel would allow its territory to become a staging ground for military strikes by a third country. Finally, it also required Israel to support the construction and development of a modern medical centre in Amman, Jordan.
The preface to this treaty was years of negotiating, in which the United States was
instrumental. In his book Sosland argues that the preference to cooperate over shared fresh water arises when a third party is present. The riparian states of Jordan and Israel are
interdependent on the basin’s waters, making it difficult for them set aside their differences. These differences had been developing for several decades and came to the surface in several, some of them armed, conflicts. This meant that the negotiations had to be secret and bilateral, and interstate relations were secretly improving (Sosland 2007). Since Israel and Jordan were both allies of the United States, they could benefit from the superpower’s interest in
facilitating tactical functional cooperation. Jordan relied heavily on the Yarmouk’s waters to irrigate its Jordan Valley and provide drinking water to Amman, its capital. Israel relied on the Yarmouk to provide water to very important farmers near the Yarmouk. As the intake to the Jordanian Canal required dredging, the monarchy turned to the United States to
coordinate a meeting with Israel over the Yarmouk. Having just completed the Camp David Accords that neutralized the border with Egypt, Israel was interested in improving relations with Jordan and securing a second border as well. The prospects for secret bilateral relations between these riparians also improved because Jordan was confronted with threats from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and from Syria. Through its alliance with the United States and improving relation with Israel, Jordan was able to balance these threats. Together, these forces facilitated what became known as the secret “picnic table” talks, during which engineers met to allocate the Yarmouk (Sosland 2007).
The period in which the picnic table talks took place was marked by unstable cooperation. On the one hand there were moments of great political tensions, when Israel and Jordan both threatened to end the talks. On the other hand there was also some successful
behaviour-18 altering cooperation with help from the United States, who pushed for further cooperation. Such tension, which involved placing the military along the border in preparation for war, arose as Israel or Jordan cheated in an attempt to augment its own share of the river, as when Israeli farmers, dissatisfied with the water they received, augmented the flow unilaterally. Sosland argues that these secret meetings laid the groundwork for the 1994 Israeli–Jordanian Peace Treaty by building trust and confidence between these adversarial states. But these were not the only threats to the treaty (Sosland 2007).
Israel and Jordan had at this point in time been in conflict for a considerable amount of time. Which meant that these talks took place against a background of historic conflict. Sosland discusses the Jordan Basin in the period from 1920 to 1956, a period of conflict during which the United States attempted to achieve a basin-wide accord. One such effort was the Eric Johnston mission, which failed, because of the complex interests involved in multilateral negotiations and the mediations’ public nature. Nevertheless, the Johnston Plan partially succeeded as it managed to organize Israel and Jordan’s development of the international basin, and it became the baseline for all future negotiations (Peres 1993). However, in the period from 1957 to 1967 this relatively good start was threatened. The relationship became so bad that the United States got involved to prevent the water dispute from escalating into a war. However, after the Six-Day war in 1967 talks began concerning the Yarmouk at first, but were later expanded to many other aspects. This process took another 27 years and serious involvement by the United States (Sosland 2007).
A big factor in bringing both parties to the table, throughout the negotiations and in successfully concluding them with a treaty, were the United States (Peres 1993) (Gelvin 2016). Without making this thesis all about the United States in order to understand the processes leading up to the 1994 treaty, it is important to understand their policies towards the Middle East in general. After the Second World War the global order gradually changed, with the absolute turning point being the Suez-crisis, as the British Empire lost its
hegemonial position. With the withdrawal of British and French influence in the Middle East a power vacuum was created which the United States came to fill. Even before the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, The United States established itself as the predominant power in the Middle East (Gelvin 2016: 300-302). According to Gelvin the best way to understand the American interests and policies in the region is to look at the description of the policies as presented by Peter Constable to the US congress (ibid: 304).
19 He described the 6 goals for the United States in the Middle East. First and most importantly was the containment of the Soviet Union. From 1953 to 1964 the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev sought influence in parts of Middle East, (namely Egypt, Syria and Iraq) trying to use the anti-imperialistic sentiments in these countries. The second goal was to ensure Western access to the large oil reserves in the Middle East. Until 1969, this oil was not meant for the United States itself, but rather for the European and Japanese economies, whose recovery was deemed to be necessary by the Americans to stop the Soviet expansion in those parts of the world. The third goal was to ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts and
maintaining the power balance in the area to make sure Arab countries would not turn against them and maybe ally themselves to the Soviet Union. The fourth goal was to ensure that states in the region were being economically strengthened to prevent any social revolution. The fifth goal was the preservation of the Israeli territorial integrity and independence, this was later enhanced under John F. Kennedy who was the first to start calling Israel an ally. The final goal was maintaining sea lanes and lines of communication to ensure that the United States and Europe were connected to Asia (Gelvin 2016: 304-309). Throughout the twentieth century these goals at times came at the cost of one another. However, protecting the territorial integrity of Israel was one of these goals and the best way to do this was to promote the establishment of strong long-lasting treaties.
In the end with help from the United States, Israel and Jordan succeeded when the
negotiations led to the establishment of the treaty. In this treaty they adopted among other things an article concerning the water rights of both parties. In this article, Article 6, both parties state the water rights and describe that there is an understanding that the current water situation in the basin is insufficient to meet their needs. The parties recognize that more water can be achieved through cooperative measures, “including projects of regional international co-operation”. Both parties have the right to allocations of water from the Jordan River, Yarmouk River and Araba/Arava groundwater (Treaty of Peace, 1994).
20 Chapter 2: Water Shortage in Israel and Jordan
The water situation in Israel is dire. In 2019 it is entering its sixth official year of official drought (Staff 2018). Many of Israel’s lakes, riverbeds and aquifers are at unprecedented 100-year lows, with the Sea of Galilee dangerously close to its “black line,” the level below the intake pipes of the water pumps that send the lake’s water to nearby towns.
In 2018, the Water Authority once again rolled out a public ad campaign entitled “Israel is drying out… again,” aimed at reminding Israelis that saving water at home is still important. To emphasize the point, the authority said if the drought continues for another year, it would start imposing limits on Israelis’ water consumption (Staff 2018). These campaigns are not new in Israel. As they were quite common in the past. For years, public service
announcements warned Israelis to save water: this ranged from the government urging
Israeli’s to take shorter showers, but also urging them to plant more drought resilient gardens. The goal was to conserve and recycle as much water a possible (Creighton 2018). These campaigns ended however when Israel invested heavily in desalination technology and professed to have solved the problem by tapping into the abundant waters of the
Mediterranean Sea (Creighton 2018). However, desalination doesn’t provide enough for all water consumption, and when groundwater is suffering from drought and the Sea of Galilee, which gets fed by the Jordan River is suffering from drought, conservation is still needed (Mekorot 2019). Adding to that is that in July of 2018 researchers who monitored nearly 200,000 people in Israel found that those who were drinking desalinated water showed an increased risk of heart disease as compared to those consuming natural water (Staff 2018). This puts the future of desalination in a troubled position.
In Jordan the situation is not much better, frankly it is much worse. Overall, the freshwater available per person in Jordan has gone down from 3.600.000 litres per year in 1946 to just 145,000 litres per year in 2018, putting the nation far below the level of “absolute scarcity“ by UN standards, which is 500,000 litres per person per year (Rasjekar and Gorlick 2017) (United Nations 2018). This might still sound like a lot, but this number takes into account the water used in producing the food and other goods people use on a daily basis. Water usage in the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom for example, is on average slightly more than 12m litres per person per year. Adding to the demand for water resources has been the increase in Jordan’s population in recent years – in part due to receiving around a million refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war.
21 Mohamed et al have conducted an extensive study on the water indicators such as rainfall, groundwater and soil precipitation levels in Jordan. This research found that climatic changes are negatively impacting the yearly precipitation because of the changing rainfall patterns and in the decreased amount of precipitation. Consequently, there is an increasing abstraction of the groundwater resources in order to match the needs and usages of the growing population, negatively impacting the groundwater recharge. Finally, the article also showed that the relation between different drought indices is affected by the natural conditions, especially the relation between the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI), and the Standardized Water-Level Index (SWI) (Mohamed et al. 2018).
More specifically, the article showed that the SWI reflects much more extreme drought events than the meteorological indices. In fact, this index is associated with the variation and decrease in rainfall amounts in addition to the increasing groundwater abstraction. Other trends that have been registered by this study are the decreasing in discharge rates of springs within the targeted area; the lowering of the groundwater stable levels and the deterioration of the groundwater quality through the increase of the salinity in the groundwater (Mohamad et al. 2018). Some off the rainfall stations have suffered several periods of drought before, mostly in 1993. However, this was never in combination with the extreme low values of ground water. These levels now show the highest extreme drought.
Despite its fragile state, little research has been done to investigate how Jordan’s water security will fare in an ever-warming climate. The latest study by Rasjekar and Gorlick, published in Science Advances, uses regional climate simulations and hydrological models, and the research finds that climate change could both increase the number and severity of droughts in Jordan during this century (Rasjekar and Gorlick 2017). In a scenario without global efforts to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions (a scenario known as “RCP8.5”), Jordan could experience a 30% decline in winter rainfall and a 4.5 °C rise in annual average temperatures in the period from 2017 to 2100. This is mostly caused by the fact that Jordan receives the bulk of its rainfall during the winter season (Rasjekar and
Gorlick 2017) (Jerusalem Post 2018). These changes could cause “meteorological” drought, a measure of low rainfall, to occur in 28 out of every 30 years by 2100, compared to 7 out of 30 in 2017, the researchers say (Rasjekar and Gorlick 2017). Apart from becoming more
frequent, these droughts are also likely to become more severe. The research states that by 2100, 15 out of every 30 years will experience an extreme rainfall deficit, a precursor to
22 severe drought. Such a severe deficit has never been seen since the start of the water
23 Chapter 3: Analysis
To answer the research question: “What role has water played in the relationship between Israel and Jordan since the 1994 peace treaty?”, this chapter analyses the literature, and data relevant to the case of Israel and Jordan, by using the variables which are based on the two main theories concerning water. The variables derived from the water wars theory are the quantity of water, the quality of water and the control over water. The variables derived from the hydro-diplomacy theory are: effective institutional arrangement, long-term vision and international agreements.
Quantity
Quantity is not just the nominal amount of water flowing through a river. Although this is a part of it, the conceptualization made by these scholars goes further than this and also involves accessibility of the water. The infrastructure is also an important factor, as some countries have been limited not by amount but rather by being unable to transfer the water to the correct places (Swain 2015) (Haftendorn 2007). The data for this variable will be drawn from primary scientific sources such as several United Nations water reports as well as from the Global Water Institute (United Nations 2017 - 2018) (Global Water Institute 2013). Adding to this will be secondary scientific sources such as the books by Klare and Shiva, who not only use a lot of data but also provide the data with the relevant context (Klare 2002) (Shiva 2016).
Jordan is dependent on water from the Jordan river basin and its tributaries, it uses around 290 million m3 per year from the basin. The largest external surface water sources in the country are the Jordan River and the Yarmouk River. The rivers are affected by the seasonal variations and the natural flow in the Yarmouk River is estimated to approximately 400 million m3. Besides supplying Jordan with surface water the Yarmouk River also supplies Israel with around 100 million m3 of the flow. The Yarmouk River is of high importance for the Jordan River since it also supplies water to the King Abdullah Canal (KAC), which is an important backbone for development in the Jordan Valley. Overall, the freshwater available per person in Jordan has gone down from 3.6m litres per year in 1946 to just 145,000 litres per year in 2018, putting the nation far below the level of “absolute scarcity“, which is 500,000 litres per person per year (Rasjekar and Gorlick 2017). In a bid to achieve water security, Israel has opened five desalination plants since 2005 and plans to expand that effort
24 in the coming years. Roughly 40 percent of Israel’s drinking-quality water now comes from desalination and is expected to hit 70 percent in 2050 (Creighton 2018). Some say Israel’s technological prowess may not be enough to overcome the forces of nature. “Nobody expected five years of drought in a row, so despite our desalination capacity, it’s still a very, very grave situation,” said Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s Minister of Energy (Creighton 2018). Shiva also describes the doubts he has about the reliance on technological solutions when it comes to water scarcity. In his book he describes how from the Nile to the Ganges in India the technologies used to extract water in the most arid regions in the world have not seen any fundamental changes in the last 15 centuries. He goes even further by stating that the new technologies used to extract ground water are less efficient than the centuries old methods. He describes how in the northern part of India for example the local population has
abandoned all the ‘modern’ irrigational systems and have reverted to their ancient methods (Shiva 2016). Obviously, India is not the same as Israel, but it does justify formulating the question: “Are technological developments really able to offer the long-term solutions the region so desperately needs?”.
Quality
Quality is about the uses of the water. Some water cannot be drunk, but sometimes it can be used in the agricultural sector and therefore can still be used and still counts as water that is being consumed by a human. Quality however goes further as it also broaches on the subject of pollution, which can occur through shipping and, recreational activities, as well as
improper wildlife management. Especially when it comes to chemical waste in water which functions as a drinking water source the issue of quality is paramount. The data for this variable will be drawn from primary scientific sources such as several United Nations water reports, as well as from the Global Water Institute (United Nations 2017 - 2018) (Global Water Institute 2013).
When it comes to the quality of the water resources of Jordan and Israel there are not that many issues. Like all drinking water the water has to be treated in a specialized facility, but there are very few issues concerning pollution. Because water is so scarce in the area, people who live in the most arid regions of the world have learned to be very careful with their water. Obviously, there will always be some pollution but the pollution levels are so low that it can be filtered out by a water treatment plant (United Nations 2015). The quality of the
25 water in Jordan river basin and its tributaries is sufficient and is therefore very unlikely to cause conflict. However, questions have been raised about the quality of the desalinated water from the Mediterranean, which has been linked to heart disease (Staff 2018). Further research is now being done, as the research has yet to be verified and repeated.
Control
Control is about who gets to do what with the water. Infrastructural projects like pumping water out of a basin to use as drinking water are just one of the issues. It can also involve the building of dams, canals etc. Any project that disturbs the water flow is an issue about
control. Each of these three variables can be the source of conflict when it comes to water and therefore is the starting point to analyse any potential conflict concerning water between Jordan and Israel. The data for this variable will be drawn from secondary scientific sources such as the books by Klare and Shiva, who not only use a lot of data but also provide the data with the relevant context (Klare 2002) (Shiva 2016).
In 1964 Israel hijacked the waters of the Jordan River (Pearce 2006). One day the Jordan River ended into the Sea of Galilee, the next a dam, constructed by Israeli engineers, blocked its outflow. From an engineer’s perspective the dam was very impressive. Politically it was less of a success as neither Syria nor Jordan had given permission to build this dam. This action was the largest and final act in a game of tug of war revolving around the Jordan river. The result was the Six-Day War (Pearce 2006). The 1994 peace treaty has settled many of the issues which were raised in this period. Crucially however it has not ended all of them. Meaning that in some areas the true control over the river is unclear. The mandate to solve any of these issues has been given to the joint water committee, this committee however has no authority to overrule decisions made by the national governments (Governemnt of Israel 2019). This means that because the Jordan River is changing as a result of climate change and is drying up, there is a threat of a unilateral approach from either party to secure a larger part of the Jordan river by building dams. However, with the level of cooperation over the last few years between Jordan and Israel this seems unlikely. But circumstances can change very quickly, and the joint water committee is not strong enough to alter this. Klare also describes the problems that appear when talks start about giving up control over water to other actors. The main problem concerning control is that: “For many of these countries, disputes over water have taken on a deeply emotional or symbolic character, as matters of national survival
26 and identity.” Even in instances where there is no evidence to support that this will be the case (Klare 2002: 161-164).
Effective Institutional Management
Because water treaties face danger if not enforced and managed correctly, it is paramount to their survival that they do not fail to receive support from an effective institutional
arrangement for proper water control. The data for this variable will be drawn from
secondary scientific sources such as the books of Chellaney and Pangare (Chellaney 2013) (Pangare 2014)
The water agreement ratified in the 1994 treaty has a functional cooperation foundation, which facilitated a cooperative process of confidence building in a tense political
environment. Elements of this process were the providing information, reducing transaction costs, making commitments more credible, establishing vocal points for coordinating, and facilitation the operation of reciprocity. Nonetheless, the overlaying or underlaying conflict among all the riparians has yet to be resolved. Certain water matters have not been properly addressed, and water scarcity remains a part of the political landscape. Water has been a central issue during the peace process. It alone temporarily deadlocked the negotiations for the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, as well as the Israel-Palestine negotiations in the same period (Sosland 2007: 159).
In the case of the Jordan River Basin, the treaties and river basin institutions build up a significant institutional capacity for managing the water resources in a collaborative and peaceful way. Both treaties refer to the Committees’ role in dealing with conflict
management of water related issues. Also, the structures for the joint water committees are equally organized. Furthermore, the joint water committees have the mandate of including other representatives in the decision-making processes by taking in expertise through consultations of experts. They also have the mandate to establish subcommittees on water related issues. These measures are typical Transboundary Water Management mechanisms involving not only political representation but also experts and other representatives (Pangare 2014). Water agreements are considered to be critical in reducing poor management and decrease the possibilities of conflicts erupting on water related issues.
27 The mandate of the joint water committee is declared to be permanent but only during an interim period. How long the interim period will last is not acknowledged. Furthermore, the committee is declared to have a lot of power in the management of the water resources. The joint water committee is supposed to operate jointly and collaboratively with both parties represented on tasks such as supervision and enforcement. Yet, there has been criticism, specifically towards the joint management stating that the joint water committee does not operate in the way it is declared in the water agreement. The joint water committee has the decision-making mandate on authorization of a large variety of water related issues, such as drilling wells or building reservoirs. In some of these cases, the parties in the joint water committee also have a veto right. The World Bank has criticized the joint water committees for using the veto right abundantly. For example, Israel has used the veto against proposed Jordanian projects in a number of cases concerning acquiring new water resources. Israel has a strategic control in terms of water resources and can be considered to be a hegemonic riparian. The unequal power asymmetries between the parties and unclear provisions within the agreement weaken the joint management potential of the joint water commissions (Pangare 2014).
Transboundary Water Management mechanisms within water treaties consider regulations on water quantity, water quality, hydrological events and dynamics in various ways (UN Water, 2008). The Israel-Jordan treaty affirms seasonal allocation provisions from the Jordan River and Yarmouk River to both parties. The allocations proclaim that Israel has a responsibility to supply Jordan with 20 million m3 of water from the Jordan River in the summer and during the winter period Jordan can store a minimum average of 20 million m3 of the water floods from the river. Further on, Jordan is entitled to 10 million m3 of desalinated water from the saline spring diverted into the river and the Yarmouk River is declared to directly supply both parties. Israel can pump 12 million m3 during summer and 13 million m3 during winter. Jordan is declared to be eligible to the rest of the waterflow during the summer and the winter from the Yarmouk River (Brochmann 2012: 141-163). Although the treaty describes seasonal allocation provisions, there are no direct indications made to the provisions based on climate variability. Furthermore, the treaty does not mention hydrological conditions or dynamics in the region, nor does it assert flexibility mechanisms.
28 Israel’s water management includes four government institutions.
Name Sector Activities
Israel National Water Co. (Mekorot 2019)
Municipalities, Water
Infrastructure development, Licensing and allocation, Operation and
maintenance, Policy and strategy Hydrological Service Water
Authority (HSWA)
Water Licensing and allocation, Policy and strategy
Ministry of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources
Dams, Wastewater, Water
Infrastructure development, Operation and maintenance, Policy and strategy
Water Authority Water Policy and strategy (Aquastat 2019)
In Israel there are four government-controlled institutions that manage water. The obvious leader in terms of water would be the designated Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Recources, however this is not the case as the final decision in most important matters lies with the Water Authority. The Water Authority officially answers to Minister of Energy, who in turn works closely together with the Ministry of Defence (Government of Israel 2019).
Long-Term Vision
The long-term vision is about the availability of any long-term solutions to the water scarcity. Are the treaties resilient enough to survive over time and have the long-term needs of all parties involved been taken into account. Are there for example any potentially untapped water sources, which in the long term might alleviate some of the pressure. The data for this variable will be drawn from primary non-scientific sources such as non-scientific articles concerning the Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline.
Regional Cooperation Minister Tzachi Hanegbi said Israel is expected to officially approve the Red Sea-Dead Sea Project with Jordan. “This is important for regional cooperation,” Hanegbi said in an interview. “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was convinced that
29 peace has a price, and he agreed to it.” The Red Sea-Dead Sea Project, an idea conceived in the early 2000’s, envisions a pipeline connecting the Red Sea port of Aqaba to an area by the south-eastern coast of the Dead Sea, both within Jordanian territory. This project will provide drinking water to water shortage suffering Jordan. In the deal it also states that Palestinians will be able to buy desalinated water from the Jordanians. This has been a major concession for Israel. “This is the largest joint project in the Middle East between Israel and an Arab state,” Hanegbi said, according to the report. “Jordan has severe water issues and Israel wants to maintain Jordan’s stability. It’s the country with which we have our longest border.” Jordan and Israel are each pledging $40 million a year for 25 years for the $2 billion project, according to the report. Brine from the desalinization process will be poured into the Dead Sea, which has been receding at the rate of one meter annually, which could cause harm in the long term (Lenntech 2019). The project will also include the construction of a
hydroelectric plant to provide power to both Israel and Jordan (Deane 2019). The importance of The Red Sea-Dead Sea Project can not overstated, as nothing can better alleviate water insecurity and build a long lasting inter-riparian peace than joint projects combined with institutionalized cooperation on shared water resources (Chellaney 2013, 225-227). However as has been seen with the pipeline which was proposed by Turkey in 1986, sometimes these projects can become the cause of suspicions (Gazprom 2019). Suspicions that these pipelines are meant as tools to expand the sphere of influence of nations. In the case of The Red Sea-Dead Sea Project this is unlikely to transpire as this pipeline would be in its entirety within Jordan borders. Therefore, the more powerful Israeli state is not likely to be able to use this pipeline to grow Jordan’s dependence on Israel.
However, the project has not come without problems. On 23 July 2017 a Jordanian teenager delivering furniture to the Israeli embassy stabbed a security guard. The guard opened fire, killing both his assailant and an innocent bystander. Jordan allowed the guard (and the rest of the embassy staff) to leave the country. Hours later Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, invited the guard to his office and embraced him. Jordan was furious and barred Israeli diplomats from returning until the guard is prosecuted. High-level talks on water projects were suspended (The Economist 2017).
30 International Agreements
International agreements are about what kind of agreements there are between nations. Not just between the two riparian states themselves but also strong allies which might be able, like Wegerich states, to force the parties to renegotiate the terms with the threat of violence. But it is also about the availability of ‘virtual’ water, as mentioned by Barnaby. This virtual water is usually not fresh water, but rather water which is absorbed in food imports, which reduces the need for water in that country. The data for this variable will be drawn from secondary scientific sources such as the books by Peres and Sosland (Peres 1993) (Sosland 2007).
International agreements are extremely important. Starting with the 1994 peace treaty where in Article 6 it declares the parties water rights and describes that there is an understanding that the current water situation in the basin is insufficient to meet their needs. The parties recognize that more water can be achieved through cooperative measures, “including projects of regional international co-operation”. Both parties have a right to allocations of water from the Jordan River, Yarmouk River and Araba/Arava groundwater (Treaty of Peace, 1994). This has laid the foundation for the establishment of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Project, which is mentioned earlier under long-term vision but also falls within the international agreements’ variable. Also, in 2019 it seems unlikely that the United States will stop seeing protecting the territorial integrity of Israel as one of its main goals in the Middle East. The best way to do this was and will be in the future to promote the establishment of strong long-lasting treaties. This means that The United States is likely going to keep ‘playing’ the role of a strong third actor to push these nations to cooperate with each other. Finally, large food imports of
agricultural products are still going into the Middle East. Increasing their virtual water levels. However, of these products, rice is the one source most used for direct human consumption, especially in the Middle East. However, the world is getting close to the maximum volumes of rice it can produce (Chellaney 2013: 116). As the largest exporters of rice, Thailand, Vietnam and Pakistan have also been coming under greater water stress. Rice cultivation consumes large quantities of water. It seems very unlikely that the production of rice is going to increase, rather it is more likely that the total production volume is going to decrease in the foreseeable future.
31 Conclusion
This year the Israel-Jordan peace treaty will see its 25th birthday. In that time the relationship between Israel and Jordan has remained complicated. Not reaching the absolute low point of 1964 when Israeli engineers constructed a dam which blocked large amounts of water from going downstream towards Jordan and Syria. This came within a period where both countries diverted streams off the Jordan river. But there were also moments when these nations
overcame their differences and came together to establish the 1994 treaty. This led to the research question: “What role has water played in the relationship between Israel and Jordan since the 1994 peace treaty?”.
In recent years there have been many prominent figures who have voiced their opinions on the role of water in international relations. This thesis starts with the speech of United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon. He predicted that the next generation of conflicts will be about water. This view coincides with the views of many authors of the water wars theory. This theory encompasses the belief that water scarcity either creates conflicts or aggravates them. As a response to the water wars theory the hydro diplomacy theory came into existence. This theory directly contradicts the water wars theory, as it states that
countries are much more likely to cooperate to deal with water scarcity than to devolve into a conflict.
From these theories I formed the following variables. From the water wars theory, the variables, quantity, quality and control were formed. From the hydro diplomacy theory, the variables effective institutional management, long-term vision and international agreements were formed.
To provide the analysis with the right context the question: “How did the 1994 peace deal came to be?” was asked. To come to this treaty, huge differences had to be overcome. This meant that most of the talks were conducted in secret, outside the scrutiny of other countries. Except for the United States, who were able to push both countries to come to an agreement. Which meant that they were successful in the end and Jordan and Israel both signed the 1994 treaty. The most important part of this treaty when it comes to the fresh water sources, was Article 6, which declares the water rights of both parties.
Next the question “How do Jordan and Israel each view water scarcity?” was discussed. In Israel the drought has raised questions about the desalination strategy. About 40% of Israel’s fresh water comes from the desalination plants and there are plans to expand this to almost
32 80% in the next decades. However, recent studies have linked desalinated water with an increase in heart disease and, in the short term will not be possible to fulfil the complete fresh water demand. As bad as this seems, it pales in comparison with the situation in Jordan. In 2018 on average a Jordanian had access to 145,000 litres of water, which is far below the level of the UN standard of absolute scarcity of 500,000 litres per person per year. The most worrying part is that the droughts are predicted to harshen over the next decades. This makes the situation in both Israel and Jordan quite dire.
The final question is “To what extent does the drought in Israel and Jordan create
opportunities for cooperation or causes for conflict?”. This is where the variables come into play: quality, quantity, control, effective institutional management, long-term vision and international agreements.
The quantity of water that is available in Israel and Jordan isn’t enough. The levels in Jordan are far below the levels of what the United Nations describe as ‘absolute scarcity’. In Israel, the desalination plants are not able to successfully fill in the shortages in the short term. In the long term it remains unclear whether desalination is the answer.
The quality of the water is acceptable. The pollution levels are so low that they can be dismissed. This does not come as a surprise as the people who live in one of the driest places on earth have learned to be very careful with water.
The control over water has been settled in the 1994 peace treaty. However, it has not ended all disputes, as in some areas the true control over the river is unclear. The mandate to solve any of these issues has been given to the joint water committee, this committee however has no authority to overrule decisions made by the national governments. This means that both countries can put their foot down and veto any decision made.
When it comes to effective institutional management, the decision-making authority is not powerful. The joint water committee has the decision-making mandate on authorization of a large variety of water related issues, such as the drilling of wells or building of reservoirs. The parties in the joint water committee also have a veto right. The World Bank has criticized the joint water committees for using the veto right abundantly. In Israel, the decisions
concerning water are made by the water authority, which directly reports to the Minister of Energy. Which means that the joint water committee does not have the power to enforce their decisions.
33 The long-term vision for the relationship is marked by both countries striving for more
regional cooperation. The example that is given in this thesis is the Red Sea-Dead Sea Project in Jordan. It is an important step forwards towards further regional cooperation, as this is the largest joint project in the Middle East between Israel and an Arab state.
When it comes to international agreements, apart from the 1994 peace treaty, there are two important treaties which have an impact on the relationship. The first is the alliance between Israel and the United States which has operated as a third actor in the conflicts between Israel and Jordan. This relationship seems to be stable. Second is the continuation of large imports of agricultural products which raises the level of ‘virtual’ water. This has been getting under increasing pressure as the largest exporters of rice themselves have come under larger water pressure.
The analysis of these variables together with the answers to the other questions leads to three key points. Answering the research question, are the following key points: first, the problems that water scarcity brings between Israel and Jordan are a part within a larger conflict. This conflict includes territorial disputes and the question of Palestine within a troubled Arab-Israel relationship.
Second, water is a symbol in this region. Just like people associate the possession of oil with having power. Within both Israel and Jordan, the possession of water gives the appearance of power. This makes giving up a water source, no matter its size or real potential, extremely difficult as it becomes a matter of national pride. When you put this on top of the troubled Arab-Israel relationship, it becomes impossible for either side to simply give up any water source.
The third and final point, which also marks the social relevance, is that even though Israel and Jordan have had their fair share of conflicts, and even war, they disagree on many matters. They have to share most of their water resources with each other, which provides insufficient amounts for both parties. There has actually been an increasing amount of cooperation between Israel and Jordan, with the latest example of this being the Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline. This is a very important step, as it shows how two countries with a very difficult history can come together and cooperate on this project.
34 Discussion
In this thesis the weakness lies within the subject. The problem with analysing environmental factors and resources is that they don’t stop at manmade borders. The largest rivers in the world sometimes flow through up to seven nations. This is also the case with the Jordan river and its tributaries. Besides being located in a politically unstable region, the waters of the Jordan River Basin are intensively exploited which is affecting the salinization and deterioration of the water resources. This is not done by just Jordan and Israel but also by countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Making it difficult to focus on just two of these countries. The Jordan River is also one of the most endangered rivers in the world and is highly dependent on waterflow from upstream in the basin. The five neighbouring states are all dependent on the waters of the basin, although some more than others. This gets even more complicated when taking into account the fact that there are no multilateral
management structures managing the basin due to the political tensions between the neighbours. This has made writing and researching important parts of this thesis very complicated and in the end made its conclusion perhaps incomplete.
Having said that, it does make clear what the future research on this subject should entail. Pushing the boundaries and researching the Jordan River on a more international level. Because even though there are some very promising developments, such as Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline, there are still many problems in the region.
The main issue going forward however, is that observations are showing less rainfall in the region as a result of climate change. In the long term this will cause a further decrease in the surface water and decrease the levels of groundwater, even further. The 1994 treaty is not prepared for climate change. The water part of the agreement does include transboundary water management mechanisms, but none that are capable of dealing with this threat. The pressure of finding solutions for the climate change will most likely be put on the joint water committees, but it seems unlikely that they will be able to deal with this climate change. Which means that the cooperation between Jordan and Israel seems very promising, but the increasing level of drought in the region poses a serious risk to the relationship between the two countries.
