Daniël Bossuyt
Research Master Urban Studies, University of Amsterdam 2015-2016 Supervisor: Federico Savini; Second Reader: Wouter van Gent
Word count: 10216(excluding abstract, bibliography and footnotes).
13-08-2016
Postpolitical parties?
Electoral dynamics of port redevelopment: a comparative study of
Amsterdam and Stockholm
Abstract.
This paper investigates the way in which party politics impinge on port redevelopment in Amsterdam and Stockholm, making an empirical contribution to the debate on postpolitics in planning theory. It analyzes partisan agendas, issues therein, and the language uses. A tendency towards depoliticization in port redevelopment can be observed, which rests on a partisan convergence over ideals, such as sustainable urban development and compact city, which are generally left unspecified. Consensus depends on a strong belief in technology to resolve conflicts arising from land-use tensions. Parties that do not share this belief are put out of the debate. Postpolitics’ use as a fruitful analytical concept is put into question.
Key words: postpolitics; party politics; sustainable urban development; port redevelopment; Amsterdam; Stockholm
Introduction
Slowly but steadily sustainability has become a pervasive goal for city authorities across the globe. Sustainability may translate into spatial strategies of open space preservation, transit-oriented development or port redevelopment (Krueger & Buckingham, 2012). Nevertheless, what counts towards the goal of sustainability is prone to political selectivity and may vary across and within urban contexts (Connelly, 2007). The concept embodies a consensual and conflict-free form of politics. While seen as a blessing by some, others have appealed that such politics cannot exist and that the denial of political differences falsely obscures political conflict. The use of sustainability has been linked to the emergence of a ‘postpolitical condition’ (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2009, 2010). This entails the demise of party politics, a rejection of ideological struggles and an emergence of a technical mode of governing. “In postpolitics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats” (Žižek, 2000: 198).
A growing body of literature has engaged with the concept of postpolitics to scrutinize the changing nature of planning in relation to these processes of depoliticization. (Raco, 2005; Raco & Lin, 2012; Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010, 2012, 2014; Oosterlynck & Swyngedouw, 2010; Metzger et al. 2014). Drawing on postfoundationalist political theory1 (Mouffe, 2005; Ranciere,
1999, 2001; Žižek, 2000), these authors urge against an overemphasis on consensus. This
concern is driven by a disillusionment with communicative and collaborative planning paradigms, which, instead of living up to the promise of furthering progressive goals, have in fact helped realign planning as a tool to pursue economic growth. Emphasis on consensual stakeholder incorporation has not brought in more democratic involvement, but has served as a way to silent dissent. As Mouffe argues (2005: 11): “Every consensus is based on acts of exclusion”. Terms such as sustainability play a key part in this. These seem uncontroversial and ‘progressive’ but may in fact limit political debate to questions of means, rather than why.
The concept of postpolitics has not been exempt from critique. Authors have argued that it does not suffice to simply label phenomena as ‘postpolitical’, as this runs the risk of obscuring
complexity (Bylund, 2012). There is uncertainty about the nature of ‘postpolitics’ and a need to further specify what it counts towards it (Metzger, 2014). In addition, less is known about how the concept is affected by different urban contexts (Raco & Lin, 2012).
An empirical gap exists with respect to the role of political parties in the context of postpolitics and planning. In the framework of postpolitics, partisan politics have been dismissed as a “thing of the past” (Mouffe, 2005: 1). Their nature has been argued to have changed for the worse, having become ideologically indistinct and out of touch with society (Crouch, 2004). Yet, their exact role has only been dealt with in broad brushstrokes and has scantily been investigated. Conventionally, political parties play a key role in the planning process. Elected officials provide accountability and ultimately decide on land-use. Nevertheless, their role within planning also remains under investigated (Campbell, 2001; Savini, 2013). Political parties provide an entry point for researching the mechanisms and nature of postpolitics in relation to urban planning. A tension exists between the abstract postpolitical characterization of ideologically indistinct political parties, the function parties fulfill in the planning process in terms of decision-making and the expectation that parties must draw lines of division in order to draw votes.
In this paper, I investigate how political parties impinge on port redevelopment. By looking at partisan agendas, issues and language I aim to contribute to an empirical investigation of postpolitics. It is expected that parties engage and converge over clarity-averse planning concepts, such as sustainability. A process of depoliticization can be witnesses as issues are framed as technical instead of political. As a result, political debate remains means-based, rather than dealing with larger ideological normative questions on the future. Language in political discussions takes on a technical nature. Postpolitics is demonstrated not to be an absolute condition. While port redevelopment follows a trend of depoliticization and ideological visions are largely absent, consensus is also dependent on parties’ embrace of an ecological modernist conception of sustainability.
A comparative mixed-methods approach was used to investigate the relation between electoral dynamics and two planning projects in Amsterdam & Stockholm. The Haven-Stad and Royal Seaport represent redevelopment of industrial ports into mixed-use urban zones. These cases have been chosen for their ongoing nature, salience and emphasis on sustainability, creating a starting point for an empirical investigation of postpolitics.
In this paper I first engage with the literature on postpolitics and sustainability in relation to the electoral dynamics of urban development. Then, I move on to my analytical framework and case selection strategy. This paper analyses the cases of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and Stockholm Royal Seaport, using data collected between September 2015 and July 2016 from 23 interviews, council reports, electoral documents, policy reports and planning documents. Conclusively, I scrutinize postpolitics in respective port redevelopment projects according to partisan agendas, means and language.
The postpolitical condition and sustainability
The notion of postpolitics originates as a critique of the belief that a post-ideological and conflict-free era had emerged following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama (1989; 2006) infamously claimed the ‘end of history’, and adversarial confrontation between left and right could be considered relics of the past. It was believed that now liberal democracy had triumphed, politics could deal with managing the economy, working towards collective agendas, and finding
consensual win-win solutions through rational deliberation (Beck 1994; Giddens 1994)2.
This ‘postpolitical vision’ was dismissed by a strand of post-foundational political theorists (Mouffe 2005, Rancière 1999; 2001, Žižek 2000). These authors problematize the idea of an inclusive consensus based on reason, arguing that “every consensus is based on acts of exclusion” (Mouffe, 2005; 11). At heart of this rejection lies a double conceptualization of
‘politics’ and ‘the political’ (la and le politique or der Politik and dem Politisichen (Marchart, 2007: 14). Politics refers to the “set of practices through which an order is created”, while the political refers to “the dimension of antagonism constitutive of human societies” (Mouffe, 2005: 9). Politics refers to the exercise of power through institutions that create social order and day-to-day governmental routines. In contrast, the political refers to ever-present fundamental political differences. The problem with the ‘postpolitical vision’ is that it fails to see that ‘the political’ dimension can never be ignored or completely reduced. In other words, conflict is always the starting point for politics. As Rancière puts it, the beginning of politics lies “in the lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order” (1999: 16).
Postpolitics refers to a situation in which these differences – the contingency of any social order – are suppressed in the name of consensus (Mouffe, 2005: 5). For post-foundational political theorists, the liberal emphasis on individualism and belief in inclusive consensus have brought about a consensual governing, the rejection of (irreducible) ideological divisions and a
technocratic approach to politics and a moralization of conflict. Since confrontation cannot
unfold politically, the ‘political’ dimension will play out morally, or culturally (Mouffe, 2005: 72). Confrontation is not defined in either left or right, but rather in being right or wrong.
Swyngedouw (2007, 2009, 2010) theorizes postpolitics in relation to contemporary urban environmental politics. Concepts such as sustainability appear uncontroversial and
commonsensical at a first glance, providing goals to which all sorts of interests can subscribe (Raco & Lin, 2014). However, Swyngedouw asserts that sustainability and sustainable urban development instigate a depoliticized, technical form of politics by limiting disagreement to choice of technology and details of implementation, rather than “future socio-environmental possibilities” (2010: 228). His critique departs from a relativist conception of the ‘environment’, ‘sustainability’ or ‘the people’, terms that cannot be objectively be determined. These terms are used as justification for policy interventions, but within what ‘socio-ecological order’ is never questioned. Put simply, Swyngedouw believes the progressiveness of sustainability is void when capitalism is not questioned. When this does not occur, the ‘political’ is cut short. Particularly problematic is how no one can consciously be against sustainability. As a result, disagreement and divergent views are muted. Consequently, politics becomes a technical endeavor. “Decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert knowledge, and not of political position” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 225).
The implications of consensual and ambiguous sustainability have been picked up by a growing body of literature on the material and discursive nature of urban sustainability agendas (Krueger & Gibbs, 2007). Urban authorities prefer to put sustainability, sustainable urbanism, or
sustainable cities as self-evident norms. Yet, there are different and conflicting interpretations of what counts towards these. Literature suggests four ways of dealing with the ambiguous and multiple nature of the concept of sustainability (Connelly, 2007). The first is to ignore it
altogether and present it as unproblematic, yet difficult to attain. This is the preferred approach by governments and municipalities (Connelly, 2007). The second is to acknowledge ambiguity, but to resolve it by explicitly selecting an interpretation, as is done in the Brundtland report (WCED 1987). Nevertheless, operationalization remains a matter of debate. A third is to make the ambiguity explicit, in an axis of ‘weak’ versus ‘strong sustainability’ (Neumayer, 2003). Connelly (2007) adds a fourth way, which is to understand sustainability as contested. In planning, this may be mapped out according to different goals, such as economy, environment, and equity, between which an equilibrium is unreachable (Campbell, 1996). Following the fourth conception of sustainability, the concept of a ‘sustainability fix’ seeks to understand the
complexity of governance dilemmas, compromises, and opportunities associated with urban sustainability agendas (While et al. 2004: 551). These agendas are affected by contrasting political demands, social pressure and market imperatives. The fix sheds light on how sustainability is tangled up in dilemmas between environmental, economic, and political demands. The outcome of these dilemma’s depends on political contestation (Savini, 2013). The notion of postpolitics has been taken on in planning theory to criticize collaborative and communicative approaches. At the heart of these approaches lies an emphasis on open and discursive reasoning. However, these never appear to touch upon fundamental ‘political’ questions on what goal planning serves, what society we want, and who decides so (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012; Metzger et al. 2014). Communicative and collaborative
approaches encourage participation, but only within an established framework. Consensus around themes such as sustainable development is problematic. Similar “loosely defined and hard to refute ‘feel good’ issues and labels […] deny legitimacy and influence to more radical alternatives” (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010: 804). Sustainability promises economic growth, alongside improvements with regard to environmental protection and social equity (Haughton et al. 2008). As a result, it has been argued planning may contribute to depoliticization and the marginalization of alternative viewpoints.
Postpolitics has quickly gained ground in planning theory, the application of the concept is wide and varied and as a result the concept may have reached a point of over comprehensiveness. Phenomena ranging from from the Britiish planning system (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010; 2011), Swedish parks (Bylund & Byerley, 2014), the regeneration of the London South Bank (Baeten, 2009), environmental movements in French middle-sized cities (Beal 2012), Colorado’s front range (Mitchell et al.2015) and discussions on night flights at Zaventem airport
(Oosterlynck & Swyngedouw, 2010) all have been labelled as postpolitics. The concept is rephrased as a postpolitical ‘state’ or ‘process’ of postpoliticization, or put as a theoretical framework, a conceptual lens, or a condition. Altogether, it has become clear what exactly counts towards the concept, which may have reached a point of theoretical maturity.
Postpolitics use as an analytical concept is questionable. Swyngedouw implies an all-or-nothing binary of the ‘properly political’ on the one hand and a ‘postpolitical condition’ on the other. While effective from a polemic point of view, a similar conception of postpolitics is of less use for empiric analysis, as it is overtly structuralist and static (Cochrane 2010, Bylund 2014).
Simply labelling planning as postpolitical does not render the formal political scene irrelevant. Within planning, a decision is taken to intervene in the built environment, closing down
multiplicity into singularity. A fruitful question could be not whether postpolitics exists at all, but rather how it ‘works’ within particular areas (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010; 2012; Johnston et al. 2014, Metzger et al. 2014). In this sense, it may refer to processes of depoliticization and a loss of ideological divisions. In this paper, political parties provide a point of entry for answering the question of how postpolitics operates.
Electoral dynamics of urban development
Political parties play an important role in the planning process. Elected official stand accountable for planning policies and have a key decision-making role. Though their role can be described as pivotal, the relationship between elected officials and the actual planning process remains under researched (Campbell, 2011; Low, 2007). A disjuncture between traditional political science, which has paid more attention to parties, and the political-economic inspired field of urban politics may lie at the root of this gap (Sapitochne, 2007).
Political parties are classically defined as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office” (Sartori, 1976: 63). They play a central role in democratic representative democracies through their aggregative and deliberative functions. In power, they offer direction to government, and
through elections they allow citizens to choose between policy alternatives. Downs theorized that (1957) parties behave as rational vote-maximizing entities that will adjust their own policy stances in order to maximize votes given a certain fixed vote distribution. Such rational-choice explanations of partisan behavior continue to hold popularity in political science to this day (Soroko & Wlezien, 2010; Karol, 2009).
Rational-choice explanations of elections are not exempt from critique as it has been argued that they overestimate the role of structure and voters’ rationality. Information is never complete and voters are therefore only rational to a limited extent (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005). On these grounds, voters may not completely be able to reliably ascertain partisan policy positions, or to evaluate party performance (Bawn et al, 2012: 1). Moreover, the idea that voters are capable of selecting parties close to their position in political space doesn’t fit well with evidence that voters usually know little about politics (Page & Shapiro, 2010). The expectation that parties will locate the median voter under any circumstances effectively over privileges structure vis-à-vis agency. Individual choice and ideas are eliminated in favor of the fixed rules of the game.
Urban development is driven by city-leading coalitions consisting out of business groups and elected officials (Stone, 1987; Kantor et al. 2005). These sets of actors reflect the dual logic of economic incentives and electoral power consolidation that drives urban development. Local politicians and parties may define policy objectives, legitimize policy, and ultimately approve the land use plans according to which building rights are issued (Savini, 2012: 65). Yet, elected officials lack the capital to start land development. Private developers must then be involved, to bear costs and leverage value. The formulation of win-win situations for private and political actors can work through symbols or rhetoric (Dembski & Savini, 2016). Parties may engage in urban transformation when it provides them with an opportunity to strengthen electoral alliances. Vote-maximizing behavior is thus translated into spatial intervention.
The under investigated role of political parties and electoral dynamics within planning is
especially salient with relation to the notion of postpolitics, which has commented on the role of political parties only in broad brushstrokes. Political parties are claimed to have become
indistinct or irrelevant by post-foundational theorists. For example, Swyngedouw (2010: 228) argues that “a cursory analysis of green politics whether from the movements or parties signals a rapid transformation from a politics of contestation, organized action, radical disagreement and developing visionary alternatives to their integration into stakeholder-based negotiation
arrangements aimed at delivering a negotiated policy”. Crouch (2004) uses the concept of
‘postdemocracy’ to refer to the institutional expression of postpolitics, referring to an absence of political differences. Moreover, Crouch asserts that parties increasingly function as professional-electoral organizations preoccupied with attracting votes, and less so with reflecting societal interests. Parties have become obsolete in shaping policy, caused by an ideological convergence or blandness, contributing to a process of depoliticization (Mair, 2006).
Notwithstanding the validity of the claim that parties have become indistinct, undifferentiated and bland, planning still entails decision-making on certain trade-offs in which elected officials play a key part. These trade-offs may concern choices between economic growth, environmental protection and social equity. For example, port redevelopment involves significant investments. It provides an economic opportunity to local municipalities and may have socio-cultural
consequences for local communities (Savini, 2013). Within port redevelopment, conflicts arise from a desire to accommodate urban growth and a preference to keep vital port activities, and tensions can mount between legislation on noise and pollution and building houses, between the costs of investments versus the costs of living in the neighborhood, and between ambitions to set high environmental standards and the need to form a coalition with developers to adhere to these. Such political dilemmas are unavoidable, though postpolitics might imply a
depoliticization of the debate on these trade-offs
A postpolitical reading of the relationship between electoral dynamics and planning could imply that parties converge in urban development agendas, yet may politicize during elections, as they still act out of a self-interest for votes. Traces of postpolitics can possibly be ascertained through partisan agendas, the nature of issues discussed and the language in which these are embedded, as the analytical framework demonstrates next. It can be expected that parties must still
mobilize interests and ideas during elections, as part of their electoral function.
Agendas, issues and language
Political parties are explored across three interrelated characteristics: agendas, issues and language. First, an ideological convergence is expected about scarcely defined feel-good urban ideals such as ‘sustainability’, ‘sustainable urban development’, ‘urbanity’, ‘the compact city’, or ‘the smart city’. These appeal to everyone and allow for a framing of ideological goals in an ambiguous, commensurable and non-confrontational ways. These ideals promise social equity, environmental protection alongside economic growth and are a hence an effective tool to build consensus and co-opt or silent dissenting views. Operational definitions are usually avoided. A narrative of ecological modernization underpins most partisan conceptions of sustainability. This turns issues into a technical point, as illustrated below. Second, issues revolve around questions of means, instead of “why”. In port redevelopment, the overall goals of housing provision, jobs, and ‘sustainability’ are less often a topic of discussion. Instead, political issues revolve mostly around how to achieve these goals. Argumentation relies on ideas presented as objective facts. The inherent tensions of port redevelopment, environmental protection vis-à-vis economic growth, are treated as technical obstacles. Among parties there is a strong faith in the capacity of technological solutions to resolve problems. A positive-sum vision of sustainability opens up space for a confrontation-free decision-making. Third, the language of debates becomes increasingly technical. As political consensus predominates, means are discussed rather than goals. The public justification of policies is shrouded in technical-legal language, rendering politics a technical character in which an opus moderandi of of ‘what works, works’ prevails.
Methodological Note
In order to answer how party politics impinge on port redevelopment, a comparative case study of two planning projects in Amsterdam & Stockholm has been set up. A case study is an
“empirical inquiry that investigates social phenomena within its real life context”. Two main reasons justify the selection of this method. As this papers seeks to better understand the notion of postpolitics, it makes sense to study the social phenomenon with attention for contextual
factors (Yin, 2009). Second, a case study is a key method to gain in-depth understandings of causal mechanisms and processes (Gerring, 2009).
The comparative element is important, as it forms an important explanatory factor. As set out in the previous paragraphs, this paper is not about demonstrating the validity or falsifiability of postpolitics phenomenon, but instead about exploring how postpolitics works in the relationship between party politics and planning projects in different urban contexts. For a case study to illustrate a broader phenomenon, it must be representative of other cases to a larger extent. In this sense one can speak of a typical case (Gerring, 2007). Both Amsterdam & Stockholm know port redevelopment projects in which sustainability plays a pronounced role. Stockholm Royal Seaport and Haven-Stad have been chosen for their on-going nature, salience, and respective emphasis on sustainability. Moreover, it was expected that the ongoing and complex character of these projects enabled an investigation of possible political controversies and characters. In terms of space, the boundaries of the planning projects and municipalities are taken as borders. This does not mean that my study is limited to the municipal scale. Due to the multi-layered nature of territorial governance, other scales are expected to come into play. Nevertheless, for the research the planning projects and associated scale provide the empirical entry point. Data were collected through fieldwork in Amsterdam and Stockholm. The period for fieldwork in Stockholm lasted from August, 2015 until January, 2016, the one in Amsterdam from February 2016 until June, 2016. A methods approach was used to analyze the two cases. A mixed-methods approach may be defined here as mixing different sources of data (Johnson et al. 2007). The use of different data facilitates data triangulation (Denzin, 1978). Through this, the study aimed to create a thicker and richer set of data and cross-verify findings (Jick, 1979). The triangulation in this data is of a simultaneous nature and happened throughout the fieldwork period (Morse, 1991) and findings are used to complement one another in the analysis stage. The primary source of data consisted of expert interviews, council reports, electoral documents and policy and planning documents. A secondary body of data consisted of newspaper articles and election results. Expert interviews were conducted with a total of 13 people in Stockholm and 10 in Amsterdam3. Council reports on the relevant planning projects were collected and
analyzed. Electoral documents consist out of two types: coalition agreements between 1998 and 2016 were analyzed, as were electoral party documents for elections between 1998 and 2016. The study was limited to the main parties in Stockholm and Amsterdam because of temporal constraints. For Amsterdam these are the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), Democraten’66 (D66), the Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA) and GroenLinks (GL). For Stockholm the parties analyzed are Socialdemokraterna (S),
Moderaterna (M), Kristendemokraterna (KD), Centerpartiet (CP), Liberalerna (L), Miljopartiet (MP) and Vänstern (V). The study used a purposive sampling approach. On the basis of initial desk-research I had made a list of key figures involved in these planning projects and party representatives involved with urban development issues. Interviews were conducted to clarify the perspectives, opinions, and language of key figures. To ease access with figures I invited them to put us into contact with their colleagues and acquaintances working on similar issues.
Analysis of data was performed through a thematic analysis and process tracing (Bryman, 2008). Through a thematic analysis I wanted to create an index of themes and subthemes. These themes are listed into a matrix. Subsequently, this framework was applied to the interview transcripts and documents. Through this, I hoped to gain insight into the viewpoints of parties on the issues relevant to the planning projects. The methods helped to understand the issues actors discussed, and what language they used in presenting these. The process tracing was done through the construction of planning timelines that I developed throughout and after the fieldwork. In these timelines I listed dates, events in the party-political field, such as elections and decisions, and planning decisions.
There are several limits to these study. First of all, because of the case study nature of this research, there are shortcomings in terms of external validity. The degree to which findings can be expected to be generalizable across social settings is limited. Nonetheless the goal of the study was not so much as to either falsify or verify theories, but rather to enrich understanding of causal mechanisms, and to further explore the role of political parties and the notion of postpolitics. For these reasons, I would like to argue that the internal validity is its main strength. The theoretical ideas expressed in this paper were developed in strong congruency with the observations made. Records were kept of all phases of research. A diary documented steps taken during the fieldwork period and notes made of documents. All interviews have been transcribed. All this ensures a certain measure of dependability (Guba & Lincoln, 1986).
Political change in sustainable Stockholm
Stockholms political landscape is marked by repeated coalition changes, a decline of the voter-base of the traditional left, and a growing environmental agenda (Lilja, 2008). In the past two decades, power has shifted between blocks almost every elections. Overall, the conservative-liberal block – borgerliga (M, FP, C) – has been stronger than the socialist block (S, V). in recent times. In 1998, the conservative-liberal party Moderaterna (M) became the biggest for the first time, marking the decline of the Social Democrats (S). An environmental agenda emerged first in the late sixties and early seventies. By the end of the seventies, all parties were talking of
environmental issues in city budget debates (Gunnarsson-Östling et al, 2013). These issues were first mobilized by the Centre Party (C), most notably in the elections of 1970 and 1973. Later on, the Stockholm Party (SP) would do so in the eighties. Its role was taken over by the Green Party (MP) from the nineties onwards (Lilja, 2011). This green dimension transcends the traditional left-right divide. The Centre Party tends to form coalitions with the conservative-liberal block, whereas the Green Party does so with the Socialist block, though not being considered a part of it. Although ‘green’ issues were put forward by specific parties initially, support for ‘the
environment’ or ‘sustainability’ has become common across the election programme, as demonstrated by parties’ electoral programmes.4 Environmental parties do not distinguish
4 Moderaterna. (2014). Vi tror på Stockholm. Valmanifest 2014 för Moderaterna i Stockholms Stad. Stockholm: Moderaterna;
Socialdemokraterna (2014) Valprogram 2014-2018 för S i Stockholms stad: En stad – En Gemensam Framtid. Stockholm: Socialdemokraterna; Miljöpartiet de Gröna Stockholms Stad. (2014) Miljöpartiet i Stockholm Stads kommunpolitiskaprogram. Stockholm: Miljöpartiet de Gröna.
themselves by support for green issues on their own, but rather by being critical of car traffic as in the example of the Centre Party and Green Party, or a critical stance to building on green space.5
The strong partisan consensus on environmental issues rests on the idea that environmental issues are not ideological, but inadvertent external problems that can be fixed through adequate scientific knowledge. 6 Such ‘ecological modernist’ thinking has been present since the seventies, as demonstrated by the cities first ‘environmental action programme’ in 1976 (Gunnarsson-Östling, 2013). Such ecological modernist thinking has persisted over time. For example, the most recent strategic vision, titled ‘Vision 2030 – a world-class Stockholm’, states that “technical developments and economic growth create good conditions for an ecologically sustainable society” and that “new technical innovations have solved many environmental problems” (City of Stockholm: 2007: 6).
In addition to the depoliticization of environmental issues, the environment conceived as sustainability has become a key element in Stockholms strategy to be an attractive and world-class city.7 Whereas in the sixties and seventies the environment (miljö) was the more important
concept, it has gradually been replaced, in the course of the nineties and in this century, by more comprehensive ideals of sustainability (hållbarhet), sustainable development (hållbar utveckling) or ecofriendliness. The strategic vision emphasizes that “Smart solutions make it easy for all Stockholmers to live environmentally friendly” (Stockholms Stad, 2015: 6). The two biggest parties, the Moderates and Social Democrats, both agree in that Stockholm is growing, urban development has to be accommodating towards growth and that smart, technical solutions make sustainable economic growth possible. In debating Stockholm Environmental Programmme for 2016-2019, a council member of the Social Democrats states: “sustainable construction is key to a growing city and a condition for continuing growth with as little environmental damage as possible”.8All parties are favorable towards the goal of sustainability and see it as an integral part
of Stockholms growth agenda. Nevertheless, operational definitions of sustainability are generally avoided in partisan and policy documents.
The combination of sustainability, ecological modernist and urban entrepreneurialism is
demonstrated clearly in the 2010 comprehensive plan – The Walkable City.9 The plan is ostensibly
a child of the political coalition of conservative-liberals that ruled the city between 2006 and 2014. The plan, serving much more as a strategic guiding plan than its ’99 predecessor, posits Stockholm’s goal to become a globally competitive and attractive city.10 In terms of land use
policies, the plan sets out a further densification of the inner-city, mixing of uses, and
redevelopment of industrial land. Here also technological solutions are key to achieving the city’s ambitious environmental goals, such as the aim to be a fossil fuel free city in 2050. It showcases the persistence of ecological modernist-thought: “continued developments in environmental
5 Interview with Alderman of Environment of the Green Party (December, 2015).
6 Interview with Environmental Strategist of the City of Stockholm (January 2016); Interview with Associate Professor of KTH
(October 2015).
7 City of Stockholm (2007) Vision Stockholm 2030 - Ett Stockholm i världsklas. 8 Wanngård, K. (2016, April 4). Kommunfullmäktiges Protokoll. Stockholm Stad. 9 City of Stockholm. (2010). Promenadstaden. Översiktsplan för Stockholm. 10 Interview with strategic planner of the City of Stockholm (November 2015).
technology are crucial for the chances of achieving its climate goals” (Stockholms Stad, 2010: 10). The Walkable City puts densification forward as a key to achieving the goals of growth and
sustainability.
Table 1: Election results in Stockholm Municipality 1973-2014. Number of seats11
Others. KD M FP C SP MP S V Total Borgerliga Socialist Others
1973 0 0 23 12 15 - - 42 9 101 50 51 0 1976 0 0 27 13 12 - - 40 9 101 52 49 0 1979 0 0 31 12 6 3 - 39 10 101 49 49 3 1982 0 0 34 6 6 3 0 41 11 101 46 52 3 1985 0 0 33 14 0 4 0 40 10 101 47 50 4 1988 0 0 28 13 5 8 0 36 11 101 46 47 8 1991 6* 3 32 12 1 3 2 33 9 101 45 42 14 1994 0 0 29 9 5 2 8 37 11 101 43 48 10 1998 0 6 35 9 0 3 6 29 13 101 44 42 15 2002 0 5 27 17 0 0 6 35 11 101 44 46 11 2006 0 3 41 10 1/ 0 10 27 9 101 52 36 13 2010 0 1 38 10 3 - 16 25 8 101 51 33 17 2014 9** 2 28 9 3 0 16 24 10 101 40 34 27
*: Nya Demokraterna (NYD) (6) Borgerliga (Right) = M + FP + C Socialist Parties = S + V **: Sverigedemokraterna(SD)(6); Feministiskt Initiativ(FI)(3) Others: KD + SP + MP + NYD
Cracks in depoliticization may emerge when parties challenge the belief that technology renders win-win solutions achievable. Such ‘political’ moments become apparent in the debates on car traffic or high-rise buildings. In the current coalition there are tensions between the Social Democrats and Green Party. The first strongly believes in cars as a dominant mode of transport and argues that technology will make it possible to continue future car use. However, the Green Party argues that technology alone cannot account, and wants to bring down car traffic in the city.12 A city council member for the Social Democrats argues: “Some people in the Green Party
are really conservative when it comes to technology. In about twenty years from now so, I think, they [cars] will be environmentally friendly, much more than today”.13 Similarly, the Centre Party
sees densification through high-rise buildings as a key green strategy. The Green Party, however, sees high-rise buildings as an inherent threat to the Stockholm cityscape. These challenges are dealt with not in terms of content or ideology, but instead by portraying the Green Party as “culturally conservative” or “anti-urban”.14
11 Statistika Centralbyrån.
12 Interview with alderman for environment (MP) (November 2015). 13 Interview with city council member (S) (December 2015).
Stockholms attributions to sustainable development have been put into spatial practice through the example of eco-profiled neighbourhoods. The first of which was Hammarby Sjöstad, a brownfield redevelopment project which was put forward as an eco-profiled Olympic village as part of the city’s 2004 Olympics Bid. Although Stockholm never got the Olympics, construction of the eco-profile neighbourhood continued. Hammarby Sjöstad became a flagship project for Stockholms sustainable reputation, as well as a showcase for Swedish eco-technology. This reputation was further cemented by the receipt of the 2010 European Green Capital Award.15
Across the political spectrum, there has been strong support for Hammarby Sjöstad. For the Social Democrats, the neighbourhood’s sustainable ambitions aligned well with the national policy of a ‘green welfare state’ (Metzger & Olsson, 2013). The conservatives realized that the neighbourhood had great potential in terms of city marketing. In the past, conservatives had generally been positive towards environmental issues but had not as readily embraced these to the same extent as other parties had.16 However, the 2006 elections marked a change, as the
conservatives started to fully on embrace the sustainability agenda. To some extent this reflects a co-optation of the environmental agenda: in one way this deflects critique, in another way it allows them to recouch their electoral image in a different way. It was at this time that the party also adopted the slogan of “the Swedish Workers’ Party”. In response, the Green Party has tried to distinguish itself by being ‘more’ sustainable. This distinction does not show in the proposition of different urban development agendas, but rather by sharpening their sustainable ambitions in technical terms. For example, the goal to become a fossil fuel free city was put forward by ten years and moved from 2050 to 2040 when a Red-Green (S, V, MP) coalition regained office in 2014.
Stockholm Royal Seaport. Planning for a ‘world-class environmental district’
The Stockholm Royal Seaport displays a coupling of growth and sustainable ambitions, a strong belief in the capacity of technology to solve environmental issues, and Stockholm’s priorities as a post-industrial knowledge economy, centered around innovative businesses, trumping ‘old’ industrial functions, such as oil and container shipping.
First known as the Värtan-Frihamen-Loudden area, it comprises a port area containing a ferry terminal, container terminal, oil depot, coal plant and gasworks. It first had been designated for redevelopment in the city’s 1999 Comprehensive Plan.17 The port’s physical proximity to the city
center had rendered it a desirable strategic location, to achieve the city’s goals of densification and an expansion of the city center. 8 The Seaport, much like its predecessor Hammarby Sjöstad, had been an ‘ordinary’ transformation project of industrial land until the ruling conservative-liberal coalition decided in 2007 that the port had to become an environmentally profiled area. It was subsequently coined the Stockholm Royal Seaport. The project ought to make space for 10.000 new homes and 30.000 new jobs. A single strategic vision was created for the entire area
15 European Commission. (no date). European Green Capital. 2010 Stockholm. Retrieved July 13, 2016, from
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/europeangreencapital/winning-cities/2010-stockholm/
16Interview with former alderman for environment and real estate (M) (November 2015)
and twelve different detail plans for sub-areas, planning in the Stockholm Royal Seaport takes place incrementally. When it first was designated as an area for urban development, all of the industrial activities were still on-going. The strategic plan proposes a combination of housing and industrial activities. The ferry and container terminal could stay through an extension of the Värtapiren, whereas the coal plant and oil depot would have to be relocated.
A partisan-wide consensus on Stockholm as a sustainable and growing city, based on a post-industrial knowledge economy, made the debate on port redevelopment project largely one of technical concerns.18 Stockholms Hamnar AB, the semi-private port authority that was the main
user of the area, published a port vision in 2004. The vision proposed a change of port operations and component uses, was ultimately translated into a port strategy document, issued on the 31th of August, 2005: “Att hamna rätt” Förslag till hamnstrategi för Stockholm19 (To land up right.
Proposal for a port strategy for Stockholm). In this port strategy, redevelopment and relocation are proposed as a win-win situation. Valuable space in the port area will be freed up for housing. As for the port, relocation of activities to Nynäshamn or Södertälje would make it possible for the port to expand physically, whereas ferry and cruise activities could be retained through an
extension of the Värtapier.
Council discussions on the port strategy highlight the partisan consensus on the port
redevelopment and relocation. As a consequence, disucssions are relegated to numerical and technical affairs mostly.20 Parties try to differentiate themselves through numbers. For example, in their 2010 electoral programme the Social Democrats state that “We want to put high
environmental and climate goals for the city and we think that the borgerliga majority had had too low ambitions in their environmental efforts” (Socialdemokraterna, 2010: 5).21 During the
council debate on the port strategy, the Left and Green Party challenged for example the
efficiency of the new location and the safety of the new container port, whereas the wider goals of port relocation, expansion, and freeing up space for housing were not. In the end, the port strategy was unanimously backed by all political parties. As Leif Rönngren, social democrat and commissioner for development, stated during the 2006 debate on the strategy: “Pleasing and of particular importance is the broad and block-transcending support of this strategically important case”.22
The Loudden oil terminal illustrates that environmental concerns were on the agenda, but not directly at the expense of economic functions. A decision to close down Loudden was decided on in 1998, fueled by the Stockholm Party who had a gatekeeper role in coalition talks.
Nevertheless, an immediate shutdown could not occur immediately for two reasons. First of all,
18 See for example: City of Stockholm. (2001). Kommunfullmäktige. Motion 2001: 29; Stockholms Stad (2003, March
3). Kommunfullmäktiges Protokoll
19 Malmsten, B. (2005). Förslag till hamnstrategi för Stockholm: Att hamna rätt. County Administrative Board of
Stockholm, 2005.
20 City of Stockholm.(2001). Kommunfullmäktige. Utlåtande 2006: RIII (Dnr 309-3360/2005). "Att hamna rätt". slag
till hamnstrategi för Stockholm.
21 Socialdemokraterna. (2010). Valprogram för socialdemokraterna i Stockholm. ”Ge Stockholm nya möjligheter”.
Stockholm: Socialdemokraterna.
22 City of Stockholm. (2006, June 12). Protokoll fört vid Stockholms kommunfullmäktiges sammanträde i Stadshuset
contracts with oil companies ran until at least 2011. Second, a new location would have to be found for oil activities, as Loudden had an important role, in terms of oil provision for the entire region.23 Nevertheless, it took until 2014 before a solution was found. Neighboring municipalities
were not eager to take on the Stockholm oil terminal. The process to close down Loudden was not fought in the political arena, but largely outside of the city council, were consultants tried to organize consensus and agreement among the different stakeholders.
The decision to turn the Stockholm Royal Seaport into an environmentally profiled area was motivated by a political desire to have a new flagship project to market Stockholm’s green image, a “Hammarby Sjöstad 2.0”. For the city planning department, it was an opportunity to “do a better project than Hammarby” and a chance to “get more finances for the project”.24 The
project was selected by the international Clinton Climate Intiative (CCI). As a part of the
international Climate Positive Development Program, this initiative seeks to create a “benchmark for sustainable urban developments” (Website KTH). In practice, this entailed that Stockholms planning department could draw on international funding to realize the project.
Figure 1: Location of Stockholm Royal Seaport in Stockholm
The Royal Seaport does much for Stockholms sustainable reputation on face value. ‘Dirty’ industrial land is redeveloped, saving green space. The proximity of the Royal National City Park further cements this green image. The environmental profile was unanimously backed in the city council. Concerns in the debate were limited to the issue of following up on sustainability targets,
23 Nilsson, K. (2007, 1 January). "Louddens avveckling skjuts på framtiden". Dagens Nyheter. Retrieved from
http://www.dn.se/sthlm/louddens-avveckling-skjuts-pa-framtiden/ on 26/06/2016.
and whether the environmental profile is adopted on-time to make a difference.25 Very similar
points had been raised before, in an earlier policy evaluation of how Hammarby Sjöstad’s environmental profile had impacted its performance with respect to sustainability (Brandt & Iverot, 2011). Later debates would similarly discuss technicalities, or on the desirability and sustainability of high buildings.26
An analysis of the political debates on the Seaport and its environmental profile reveals a strong consensus among parties on the qualities that contribute to desirable urban development: urbanity, mixed-use, compactness, and densification.27 Sustainability is advocated as a goal that
flows naturally from these qualities. A compact, dense, mixed district promotes public transport and walking (The Walkable City), it enables for better energy efficiency and saves green space. The Stockholm Royal Seaport is a widely backed project in the political scene, because it unites all of these qualities. The desire to create mixed-use dense urban zones with an explicit
environmental image sits well with various political interests and presents an ideal win-win scenario. It suggests that Stockholm can grow further, in an environmentally justified matter, and provides an incentive for developers to build denser and higher, thereby pushing up returns on existing land. In sum, coalition shifts have only marginally impacted the planning process of the Stockholm Royal Seaport. In the first place, all political parties agree on the main project goals of port relocation, redevelopment, and freeing up space for housing and (knowledge) workspaces. As mentioned by the leader of the Seaport project, the influence of the Green Party has been noticed, as the project was forced to be more careful with regard to green space preservation.28
Creativity and Sustainability in Amsterdam
Amsterdam, a city with a strong tradition in social democracy and an emphasis on welfare
policies, has in recent times transitioned, following an entrepreneurial urban growth agenda. This change is electorally manifested by a decline of the traditional left, and the ascent of new
political groups that claim liberal discourses of entrepreneurialism (Savini et al. 2016). The Labor Party (PvdA), traditionally the strongest party in Amsterdam, has been challenged by upcoming progressive liberal parties such as Democrats’66 (D66) and the Green-Left (GL). Electorally speaking, these parties specifically cater to ‘urban’ and ‘progressive’ values. In this respect they signify a transition from traditional left values towards post-materialist individual values. This transition culminated in the victory of the social liberals at the expense of the Labor Party in 2014, who found themselves out of government for the first time since the Second World War (See Table 2). The Labor Party and Liberal VVD, who may in the past have stood for class-based identities, have similarly started to embrace urban values propagated by the progressive liberal parties.
25 Interview City Council Member (M). (2016, January); Interview City Council Member (S). (2016, January). 26 See for example: City of Stockholm. (2014, April 7). Kommunfullmäktiges Protokoll.
27 See for example: City of Stockholm. (2005, August 31). Kommunfullmäktiges Protokoll; City of Stockholm. (2015,
November 19). Kommunfullmäktiges Protokoll; City of Stockholm. (2016, April 4). Kommunfullmäktiges Protkoll.
Across the political spectrum, there is a broad support for the creative city agenda that play a prominent role in shaping Amsterdam’s spatial policies (Peck, 2012).29 The city’s spatial planners have adopted the idea that policy goals should be formulated around the desires and wants of a ‘creative class’. These highly-skilled knowledge workers are attracted to certain values, such as individuality, tolerance and meritocracy. The city attempts to foster these through ‘creative’ policies such as the Broedplaatsenbeleid, In terms of housing the necessity to pull the creative class has translated into deregulation and policies of state-led gentrification (Van Gent, 2013). Table 2: Election results in Amsterdam City Council 1974-2014. Number of seats30
Others. VVD CDA D66 PvdA GL* SP Total
1974 0 8 7 1 17 12 x 45 1978 0 7 8 3 19 8 x 45 1982 0 10 6 2 17 10 x 45 1986 2 7 6 3 21 6 0 45 1990 5 7 5 9 12 7 0 45 1994 5 8 3 8 14 6 1 45 1998 4 9 3 4 15 7 3 45 2002 4 9 4 3 15 6 4 45 2006 0 8 2 2 20 7 6 45 2010 3 8 3 7 15 7 3 46 2014 2 6 1 14 10 6 6 45
*GroenLinks is the result of a merge in 1990 between CPN, EVP, PSP and PPR. These parties have been counted together to account for the GroenLinks votes from 1974-1986
Environmental issues are integrated into the creative city agenda, where ‘the environment’ is conceived of as a clean, attractive living environment, which is on its own turn is seen as conducive to the city’s attractiveness. The title of the city’s latest strategic plan highlights this coupling of economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability in its title “Amsterdam 2040: Economisch Sterk en Duurzaam”. The plan states that “Clean air, characteristic buildings and a clean, green public space are aspects through which the city can attract people and companies”.31 Institutionally speaking, environmental and sustainability efforts are not seen as
separate policy domains, but rather integrated into existing items, such as water management and planning (Uittenbroek et al. 2014).
The city’s planning department felt it should demonstrate the reconcilability of sustainability and economic growth in order to get political actors from various denominations on board.32 By
29 Interview with former alderman of built environment (GL). (March, 2016); Interview with councilmember (VVD)
(May, 2016).
30 Source: Onderzoek, Informatie en Statistiek. Gemeente Amsterdam.
31 Gemeente Amsterdam. (2011). Amsterdam 2040: Economisch Sterk & Duurzaam. Page 6. 32 Interview Strategic Planner & Editor Structuurvisie 2040 (June, 2016).
showing that these goals are not polar opposites, but complementary, the planning department could prevent that the strategic plan would “end up at the bottom of the stack” and become ineffective. Planners put sustainability to use as a political tool to get support from disparate political interests.
The morphological ideal of a ‘compact-city’ complements the vision’s goals of economic growth and sustainability. This approach has been well-present before in planning practice in the Netherlands since the seventies (Van der Waals, 2000). Its core tenet is that a compact urban form fosters sustainability communities through decreasing traffic and protecting environmental areas (De Roo, 2000). A compact city approach entails further densification and intensification of urban space within the A10 ring-road, which helps create a desirable ‘urban’ milieu, on its turn conducive to attracting creative knowledge-workers.33
Haven-Stad. Transformation and contestation.
The strategy of densification and redevelopment creates conflicts between current land-use and future land-use in the northwestern parts of the area within the A10 ring road. Here, ambitions to densify and create a mixed urban district clashes with current port and housing functions, as demonstrated in the case of the Haven-Stad port redevelopment. The area of Haven-Stad (see Figure 2) in Amsterdam was put forward by the 2011 strategic vision “Amsterdam 2040: Economisch Sterk en Duurzaam”. Encompassing 650 hectares of port and industry within the A10 ring-road, the area had been under scrutiny as a possible site for housing development as early as 2007. The strategic vision introduces three future scenarios in which parts of the port are to be redeveloped from a monofunctional industrial zone into a mixed-use urban zone, with room for housing, workspaces and port activities.
As elaborated upon by the 2013 Haven-Stad study, the first scenario departs from current norms for sound and noise and seeks to maintain these as a limit for up to where housing can be build.34 Legal barriers provide a barrier for developing more housing. The second scenario seeks to push this legal barrier towards the west, allowing port to remain only if they are more clean and silent. In the third scenario, the ring road is presented as the new border between port and city, which would imply that all current port activities within the ring road have to give in to a new urban district. The third scenario entails the most sizable relocation and transformation, making place for 19000 new houses. The first scenario would allow for 4000 extra houses and the second for 13000. The different scenarios vary in implications for port and industrial activities currently present within the ring road. The Green-Left had a strong preference for the third scenario which entails large-scale relocation of port activities. The Conservative-Liberals (VVD) on the other hand prefers the first scenario.
In recent times, scarcity has become defining for the port of Amsterdam, leading to tensions both with neighboring municipalities as well as within the city. Over the decades as ships became bigger and the port needed more space, the morphological heart of the port had gradually move
33 Ibid.
downstream towards the Noordzeekanaal. Derelict industrial and port spaces that had been left behind in its wake had been developed into new residential areas over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, such as along the IJ-banks and the Eastern Docklands (Savini et al. 2016). Since the late 2000s, space in the port area has become scarce, while the city keeps growing.
Figure 2: Location of Haven-Stad in Amsterdam35
The Red-Green (PvdA; GL) coalition that ruled the city from 2006 to 2010 stated the intention that the port should densify on existing land, rather than expand onto neighboring green spaces. “We are running into various environmental limits. The consequence of further port growth should not be that we exceed those limits”.36 There is political opposition against transforming
environmental spaces into port areas, particularly from the Green-Left within the Amsterdam city council, as well as neighbouring municipalities (Wiegmans & Louw, 2011). Intensification of existing port space is seen as a solution to the problem of scarce space, providing some sort of technical solution to a growing port and growing city.37
In general, there is a convergence between parties with respect to their acknowledgement of the ideal of the compact city, as well as the goals of economic growth and sustainability. The
consensus is illustrated by the 2010 electoral manifesto’s of Green-Left and VVD, which both cite sustainability, creativity and compact city extensively.38 However, there are also differences.
These differences can be summed up in the extent to which parties believe that the development
35 Includes Houthavens sub-area which has been on-going before Haven-Stad.
36 Municipality of Amsterdam. (2008). Slimme haven. Havenvisie gemeente Amsterdam. 2008-2020. Page 8. 37 Port of Amsterdam (2015). Visie 2030 Port of Amsterdam. Port of partnerships.
38 GroenLinks Amsterdam. (2010). Groen Werkt! Verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2014; VVD (2014) Werk voor iedereen. Een liberale economische agenda voor werk, werk, werk in een mooier en veiliger Amsterdam.
of a post-industrial knowledge economy should go at the expense of old industrial economic functions. Party political disagreement has provided a barrier to unbridled redevelopment of the port of Amsterdam. For the Green-Left (GL), the transformation of port into a mixed-use urban zone aligns well with decreasing industrial production, cutting down on visibly polluting activities and pushing forward their morphological ideal of a compact, functionally mixed city. For other parties, such as the liberal VVD, port redevelopment presented a threat to companies’ economic interests and that of the city as a whole. Yet, the issue of port does not form a very pronounced issue in times of elections. Political parties and voters tend to be interested in other issues, such as housing or, more recently, overcrowdedness.39 Whereas in 2010 the VVD, a party traditionally
representing interests of port companies, stressed the importance of a ‘diverse urban economy’40, such themes are absent from the 2014 VVD electoral programme.41
The political debate on the Haven-Stad redevelopment strategy displays a general consensus on the necessity of urban development and the construction of more housing. More contested issues arise with respect to the environment, which is conceived of as green space and legal-environmental rules, and with retaining vital port activities.42 Parties acknowledge that
intensification offers a solution to the problem of balancing environment, housing and industry. It provides a technical solution, allowing the port to grow while preserving green space. Relocation is argued to be costly and to go at the expense of green space. The economic upturn of
Amsterdam is seen as a positive wave that has to be taken advantage of.43 Even the conservative
liberals, who traditionally backed the interests of the port, were unsettled by the rapid post-crisis growth of Amsterdam and started to doubt whether port industry should be kept within the A10 ring road, or whether they ought to capitalize on the rapid growth the city has experienced in recent times.44
Tensions have emerged from the combination of port activities, housing and green space, which may be solved through management techniques in which external consultants and planners play a leading role. Tensions result from a dilemma between land-use regulations governing existing uses and emerging land-uses (Savini, 2013). As ports attempt to relocate activities to peripheral smaller municipalities, the latter may appeal against these using environmental arguments. Similarly, companies within Amsterdam fear that the construction of new housing might affect noise and pollution regulation at their expense. The Stuurgroep Visie Noordzeeknaalgebied 2040 was a cross-municipal partnership-led organ whose role was to explicitly build consensus among Amsterdam and neighboring municipalities. In the process, there was no room for overt conflict or contestation over the why and what of port development. Instead, planners acted principally as consensus-builders among different political stakeholders from the municipalities involved.
39 Interview with official of the Port of Amsterdam (May, 2016); Interview with Port Advisor of ORAM business
network (May, 2016).
40 VVD. (2010). Dit is ons Amsterdam. Verkiezingsprogramma VVD Amsterdam 2010-2014.
41 See for example: VVD. (2014). Werk voor iedereen. Een liberale economische agenda voor werk, werk, werk in een mooier en veiliger Amsterdam. Verkiezingsprogramma VVD Amsterdam 2014-2018.
42 Amsterdam City Council. (2014, July 4). Voordracht van het college van burgemeester en wethouders van 23 april
2013 tot vaststellen van de transformatiestrategie Haven-Stad: Sterke stad – Slimme Haven (Gemeenteblad afd. 1, nr. 527).
43 Interview City Council Member (GL). (June, 2016).
Another example is the Covenant NDSM-Houthavens.45The NDSM and Houthavens are former
port areas close to housing. Local companies present in these areas had appealed against the city’s urban development strategies. They feared that new housing would mean stricter
environmental norms, driving up companies’ costs. On the other hand, the municipality wanted to retain these port companies such as Cargill, ICL Fertilizers and IGMA in the city as they were seen as providing an important economic function. The conflict between these port companies was solved through a long mediation process, resulting in the Covenant Houthaven-NDSM-werf. In the covenant, the municipality promised to lay off development plans until 2028 and the companies on their turn promised to do their best to reduce environmental pollution in terms of noise and smell. These examples represent approaches for dealing with conflict that put
achieving consensus ahead of discussions about desirable longer-term socio-economic futures. The coalition consisting out of VVD, D66 and the Socialist Party (SP) that took over in 2014 ensured that companies currently active in the port would not be forced to relocate, at least not before 2040, when the current strategic vision ends.46 Although there is a broad consensus
across parties on the urban development framework for Amsterdam, views differ on what this should entail for companies currently active in the port. The Green-Left would rather see said parties move, arguing that a more efficient and intensive use of the corresponding locations could free up space for housing, in areas currently in use within the ring. The Port of Amsterdam houses a large proportion of oil and coal activities, which the Green-Left cites in their arguments supporting the relocation of port activities.47
Questionable postpolitics
In this paper I have scrutinized the way in which party politics impinge on port redevelopment in Amsterdam and Stockholm, making an empirical contribution to the debate on postpolitics in planning theory.
A tendency of depoliticization was witnessed in two cases: Stockholm Royal Seaport and Amsterdam Haven-Stad. This depoliticization rests on a partisan convergence towards specific typologies of urban development and an embrace of technology as a tool to create win-win situations in overcoming environmental issues. Across parties there exists a preference for ‘urban’ built environments that comprise dense, functionally integrated mixed districts. Alongside the depoliticization runs an electoral change, in which social-democratic dominance was succeeded up by the emergence of liberal-progressive constituencies. The emergence of the latter accompanied a preference for ‘compact’ and ‘sustainable’ urban built environments, though the precise causality is difficult to ascertain. The issue of port redevelopment is generally left unspecified in elections. As port redevelopment does not signal any ostensible electoral faults, the issue has hardly any use in attracting voters.
45 The Houthavens represent a subarea of the Haven-Stad area.
46 D66, SP, VVD. (2014). Amsterdam is van iedereen. Coalitieakkoord 2014-2018. 47 GroenLinks Amsterdam. (2010). Groen Werkt! Verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2014.
The concept of sustainability allows for the creation of consensus, as it may represent a disparate set of interests to which all parties can subscribe. Frequently the term is left unoperationalized, as specification may go at the expense of its consensual appeal. Sustainability figures more prominently in the developments in Stockholm, where it rests on a strong historical legacy. In Amsterdam the term is frequently used in conjunction with other, broadly agreed upon goals, such as creativity.
A precondition for consensus is a strong belief in technology’s capacity to overcome
environmental issues. The language usually employed by politicians is hardly technical and, when confrontation arises, conflict is typically cast in moral terms as, conforming to a certain
‘moralization of politics’. Opposition is not disqualified in terms of content, or ideas, but rather by positing opponents outside of the norm, through labels such as ‘anti-urban’.
Although there is a clear tendency of depoliticization and parallel partisan convergence, there are different degrees to which parties think redevelopment should have negative ramifications for industries currently active in the respective ports. In Stockholm a stronger partisan consensus exists on relocation of certain activities, which should make place for mixed-use urban zones. In Amsterdam more interpartisan conflict on these issues was witnessed. Scarcity in terms of space is a defining condition there, making relocations more difficult. Disagreement and conflict arising from land-use dilemmas was dealt with in Amsterdam through mediation procedures, signifying an increased role of experts. Nevertheless, positive structural economic conditions are
increasingly used as an argument in favor of urban transformation and port redevelopment. The concept of postpolitics departs from a theoretical juxtaposition of the ‘political’ on one hand, and the postpolitical on the other. This contrast does not fully capture the particular ways in which electoral dynamics affect party redevelopment, which involves both undifferentiated, converging agendas, as well as conflicts over contesting land-use. As a result the analytical application of postpolitics is only fruitful to a limited extent. It is problematic that post-foundationalist political theory suggests that ‘the political’ emerges only when actors step outside of the formal hierarchical process and express claims that upset consensus.
The conceptual vocabulary of postpolitics rests on a conception of democracy that stretches beyond the formal, procedural sphere. A theoretical preference can be seen to assign the ‘proper political’ to actors outside of parliaments and city halls, such as social movements. Political parties exist by virtue of being official, institutionally organized electable groups of people with a single set of ideas. Parties, however, are no singular actors; they consist of different electoral groups. To build a political coalition out of these different groups one has to find a middle-ground. This contributes to the feeling of ideological sameness and blandness, in which the postpolitical diagnosis of partisan demise finds its appeal.
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