Think tank influence on the European Neighbourhood Instrument: On the different strategies used by think tanks to exert influence

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Think tank influence on the European Neighbourhood

Instrument: On the different strategies used by think tanks to

exert influence

Marieke Haak (S1622439)

Public Administration MSc – International and European Governance Supervisor: V.P. Karakasis MSc

Second reader: Dr. V.E. Pattyn 18-6-2020

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1. Introduction

The COVID-19 crisis has affected several areas in the EU and while the crisis is still ongoing, Commission president Von der Leyen has presented details of the upcoming COVID-19 recovery plan. Among others, the plan intends to fund public investment and reforms within the European Union. Additionally, the EU has shown commitment towards leading

international efforts towards global recovery and showing global leadership. This is

demonstrated through their intentions to work closely and reinforce cooperation with Africa and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood (Rios, 2020; Ujvari et al., 2020). In the immediate neighbourhood the EU can help in addressing the socio-economic impact of the crisis, help in consolidating health defences for the short term, and investing in infrastructure on a long term basis (European Commission & European Council, 2020; Pisonero-Hernandez, 2020).

The recent COVID-19 crisis recovery plan shows that the EU puts its own member states first, but special attention is given to states in their immediate neighbourhood. One of the reasons for cooperating with neighbouring states is the intention of the EU to take on a global leadership role in the crisis. Additionally, the EU works with its Eastern and Southern Neighbours to encourage growth in stabilisation, security, and prosperity. This partnership is translated through the European Neighbourhood Policy (European External Action Service, 2016).

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was set up as a framework for the period after the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The goal of the ENP was to create the closest possible degree of political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration with neighbouring countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2004; European External Action Service, 2016). As a response to the developments in Arab

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developing a deep and sustainable democracy and inclusive economic development. In 2015 the ENP was reviewed again and this led to a communication that stated the need for a more strategic, coherent, focused, and flexible ENP that should be reached through differentiation, focus, visibility, flexibility and ownership. In 2017 the European External Action Service and the Commission published a report on the implementation of the 2015 Review. This report highlighted the more flexible approaches taken in the years before and showed how resources were used more efficiently (Damen & Jongberg, 2019; European Commission, 2015, 2017a).

The EU foots the fulfilment of ENP objectives through financial support using the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). The ENI replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2014 and is effective from 2014 to 2020. The

instrument is managed by the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation, EuropeAid. The ENI is used to advance relations and goals by giving incentives and rewards, but also through offering funds. Agreed policy objectives are described in and turned into concrete actions through the ENI (Damen & Jongberg, 2019; EU Neighbours Portal, n.d.). In 2017 a review of the EU’s external financing instruments was conducted, one of these instruments examined was the ENI which was covered in a separate staff working document. On the 18th of April 2018, the Parliament adopted a report on the implementation of these instruments. Concerning the ENI, the report called for more flexibility, better use of incentive-based approaches, and better coordination between regional and bilateral programmes (Damen & Jongberg, 2019; European Commission, 2017b). As mentioned above, the ENI has been active since 2014 and is divided up into two phases. The first phase of the ENI programmes ran from 2014 to 2017 and the second phase runs from 2018 to 2020. In both time periods, a document has been published to describe the priorities and objectives of that period in a Multi-annual Indicative programme of the measures that will be taken. As will be

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Identifying changes made between two time periods is the first step towards finding out how and why changes occurred. Without a doubt, certain focusing events and other external circumstances such as the migration crisis and the 2015 Paris Attacks have influenced policy. However, there are also changes that cannot be directly explained by looking at the circumstances at the time. Between the initial ENI programmes in 2014-2017 and the final programmes of 2018-2020 a timeline of different steps exist. Among others, this timeline includes the 2015 Midterm Review of the ENP, the 2017 Joint Report on the

implementation of the 2015 Review and a Midterm Review of the EU’s external financing instruments. Some ideas that came forth in the final ENI already came into play in one of these aforementioned documents; other ideas seem to be related to the at the time important events. In any case, tracing back to the origins of these ideas can provide insight into which actors are able to exert influence on the ENP and in which phase of the 2014-2020 time period these ideas came into light.

This research looks specifically at the influence of think tanks on the changes made in the ENI. This is important because it is yet unknown how these changes have developed over time. Are the changes indeed based on the 2017 Mid-term Review of Neighbourhood-wide measures as mentioned in the introduction of the 2018-2020 programme or have other documents also had an influence? And if these documents had an influence, who are the actors that contributed to reviews, conducted reviews, written documents or have tried to exert influence in other ways? As will be demonstrated in the conceptual framework, think tanks are actors present in a policy subsystem. The subsystem in this research is the European Neighbourhood Policy subsystem. The conceptual framework will also demonstrate how the role of knowledge in policy has been neglected over time, especially in the light of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the application of theories on a European level. This research will shed light on how think tanks have had or attempted to have an influence on the

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changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument between the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2020 instruments. This is relevant because of two reasons. First of all, this research extends existing theories and fills a gap by applying those on a European level and on a different case study. As will be demonstrated, the role of the knowledge community in influencing policy has been neglected over time and this research can help to fill that gap in the light of the ENP. Second, by shedding light on the potential influence of think tanks in European policy, actors active in a subsystem will be more aware of these forms of influence and have the opportunity to keep that factor in mind in the future.

1.1 Research Question Elaboration

The main focus of this research will lie on the Neighbourhood Wide Programme. This research focuses on the objectives, priorities, and challenges as set in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes analysed. The following section will provide a concise overview of the programmes and the changes; concrete examples will be discussed in the analysis chapter. In the general programme from 2014-2017 the strategic priorities’ focus lies on four points; building a partnership for inclusive economic development and integration; building a partnership between people, among others through higher education; targeted capacity

building through EU norms and standards and creating a regulatory framework and finally an incentive-based approach through financial allocations (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2014, pp. 4–5). In the 2018-2020 programme the focus still lies on economic development, but the programme adds ‘sustainable’ and elaborates on how economic development should focus on sustainable energy and transport, and how it should address climate change and the environment. The focus on partnership between people stays present, however, the focus has shifted to opening up higher education and rephrased this as ‘Investing in Human Development’. Targeted capacity building is not present, but the priority ‘building institutional capacities for good governance’ is related to this. This capacity is more

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defined and also focuses on EU norms, standards, and commitments to improve public administration capacity. (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2018, pp. 6–7). The incentive-based approach is mentioned, but no longer a numbered priority. As mentioned above, strategic priorities have been refocused and now prioritize supporting stabilisation according to the 2018-2020 programme. The four goals that will be pursued through the strategies are first good governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The second goal concerns economic development for stabilisation. The third security, and the final migration and mobility (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2018, p. 5). What is new in the 2018-2020 programme is the focus on security and migration. This new focus could of course very well be due to the events as discussed in the background; however, the analysis chapter will elaborate further on this. The 2018-2020 programme pays even more attention to security by mentioning that deterioration of the political situation and the fragile security environment in the

neighbourhood, as well as the economic situations, can be risks (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2018, p. 12). The challenge of migration is addressed through investing ‘across the Neighbourhood and Africa’. Furthermore, Africa is now also mentioned as a receiver of the European Fund For Sustainable Development and the new European External Investment Plan (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2018, pp. 5–7). The presence of Africa in the 2018-2020 programme is interesting, considering the continent was not even mentioned once in the 2014-2017 programme. However, where Africa gained a presence in the new programme; the Russian Federation disappeared and is not mentioned in the 2018-2020 programme. The following sentence changed: ‘In addition to the ENI programmes, ENP Partner Countries and the Russian

Federation are also eligible to benefit from other EU instruments that are global in their nature and not specifically tied to the geographical region of the European neighbourhood’

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(European Commission & European External Action Service, 2014, p. 3). This sentence has been changed in a way that does not specifically mention the Russian federation anymore. The 2018-2020 MIP states ‘In addition to the ENI-wide measures and other ENI programmes, partner countries are also eligible for support under a number of other EU instruments that are global in their nature and not specifically tied to the geographical region of the European Neighbourhood’(European Commission & European External Action Service, 2018, p. 3).

To conclude, when comparing the strategic priorities one can identify a stronger focus on sustainability, access to higher education, and good governance. However, when looking from a more detailed level one can also identify a less specific mention of Russia and more specific mention of Africa. This research focuses on how think tanks have had an influence on the changes in the European Neighbourhood Instrument as described above. The research question is thus: How have think tanks had an influence on the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument between the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2020 instruments?

1.2 Conceptual lens and methodology

To answer the research question, this research sets three expectations using existing theories. The first expectation builds on Campbell & Pedersen (2015) and their theory about

knowledge regimes and Craft & Howlett (2013) and their research on policy advisory systems. The first expectation is that think tanks have a European character and relevant location in systems such as knowledge regimes and policy advisory systems. Knowledge regimes are institutions of knowledge that are part of a policy subsystem. Finally, a policy advisory system relates to the sources of policy advice used by governments in the policy-making process. The second expectation is that think tanks use positive and negative feedback to gain or maintain influence. This expectation is built on the theory of punctuated

equilibrium by Baumgartner & Jones (2009) and supplemented with research by Timmermans & Scholten (2006) on positive and negative feedback in scientific venues. Punctuated

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equilibrium refers to periods of stability, alternated with periods of rapid change. Rapid change mostly occurs when significant attention is given to an issue. Positive feedback is when feedback is used to attack the policy monopoly, negative feedback is feedback that maintains the policy monopoly. The third and final expectation is that think tanks have influence because of their use of strategic ideological positioning. This expectation is based on the research of Lerner (2018). Strategic ideological positioning is when actors adhere to values strategically in order to address the targeted audience in a way that aligns with their values.

To answer the research question relevant data had to be collected and analysed. The data this research collected consists of think tank articles, blogs, and books. All of these documents are found through the websites of the think tanks that will be analyzed in this research. This research focuses on two think tanks: CEPS and ECDPM. Where CEPS is a very big, well-known think tank that discusses a great variety of subjects, ECDPM is a smaller think tank that mostly focuses on one subject, namely on inclusive and sustainable development. The choice for these two think tanks is made to see whether differences can be identified between these two think tanks and whether this could potentially be related to their size and scope.

The research method used to answer the research question is process-tracing. Using process tracing this research will analyse think tank documents and their contribution to the 2014-2020 timeline of EU documents. The method of process tracing is most suitable for this research as process tracing research can help in revealing causal mechanisms that led to the outcome. This research is thus X-focused as it does not focus on the outcome (Y), but on the actions that can potentially lead to the outcome, which are the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The input (X) is the role of think tanks and the output (Y) is the MIP that was implemented from 2018 and onwards. The last step of the research method is to

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apply tests to the evidence. By determining whether evidence is necessary and/or sufficient it can be concluded if the evidence supports the hypothesis.

1.3 Structure

After the introduction, this research will introduce the conceptual framework and show how the role of knowledge has been neglected over time, especially in European policy-making. Next, the conceptual framework introduces relevant concepts and the theories used to create the expectations about think tank influence. After the conceptual framework, the methodology will elaborate on the research design and methods and account for the choices made and the limitations and validity aspects of this research. Subsequently, the analysis chapter will first provide a short insight into the context of external circumstances that could have influenced the timeline. Next, divided into three steps, think tank material will be analysed in order to determine whether think tanks have had an influence on the final European Neighbourhood Instrument or on any of the related EU documents that have impacted the final ENI. The analysis chapter will end with a discussion of the limitations, recommendations for further research, and insightful findings. Finally, this thesis will end with a conclusion.

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2. Conceptual Framework

This thesis focuses on the influence of think tanks on the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument between the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2020 instruments. This chapter will provide the necessary concepts to understand through which mechanisms think tanks could potentially have an influence on policy. The first part of this chapter will first discuss the role of knowledge in the literature on the ENP and following discuss the concept of the policy cycle and show in which phases think tanks are likely to be active and determine which phases are most interesting for this research. Following, this chapter discusses the concept of policy subsystems and subsequently

combines this with the theories of Campbell & Pedersen (2015) on knowledge regimes and Craft & Howlett (2013) on policy advisory systems to form the first expectations. Next, this chapter discusses the theory of punctuated equilibrium by Baumgartner & Jones (2009) supplemented by the research of Timmermans & Scholten (2006) on positive and negative feedback in scientific venues. Following, this chapter will discuss the competitiveness think tanks deal with and combine this with the theory of strategic ideological positioning by Lerner (2018). Finally, this chapter will end with a conclusion that shortly summarizes the

expectations for the research question that come forth of the discussed theories.

2.1 The role of knowledge

The book ‘The European neighbourhood policy in perspective: context, implementation, and impact’ alleges to look at sources that have an influence on the development of the policy. The focus lies on whether neighbourhood countries or the EU itself is able to influence the policy. According to the authors, the EU only gives the Neighbourhood power over when they want to implement measures, and not on how they want to do this (Whitman & Wolff, 2010, p. 164). This book thus puts the majority of influence at the EU, but does not specify which institution or set of actors specifically possesses this influence.

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The European Neighbourhood Policy has also extensively been discussed by the Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, a book to which many scholars have made contributions. This book provides an overview of the ENP and discusses themes,

developments and dynamics in the policy framework and is according to the book itself, the first of its kind on the ENP (Schumacher et al., 2017). Part III of the book looks at ENP policy-making and the institutional dynamics, actors, and financial instruments involved. This part looks at the role and influence of the European Commission, Member States, the

European External Action Service, and the Parliament (Schumacher et al., 2017). The book uses process tracing to uncover the process of EU policy decision-making. It is argued that EU decision-making is a multi-actor bureaucratic process and that most critical junctures have been initiated by member states. Furthermore, the European Commission is the main player regarding decision-making and the EEAS is an important supporting actor (Schumacher et al., 2017, pp. 208–209). The European Parliament struggles with legitimacy issues. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament gained more formal competencies and was able to enhance influence through informal means. The 2015 ENP Review has been more inclusive, but the book acknowledges that it is difficult to predict whether the parliament will be able to play a significant role in the neighbourhood (Schumacher et al., 2017, pp. 230–231).

This book thus points to the European Commission as the main player in regards to decision-making, but also acknowledges that the EEAS, Member States and the European Parliament play a role as well. Interestingly, similarly to the first book, this book does not examine the role of knowledge actors such as think tanks. While think tanks do not have formal decision-making authority, yet they are actors that produce documents on the ENP and could be involved in informal processes. Even more interesting is the fact that researchers who are active in think tanks as well have contributed to this handbook. That fact alone already shows that think tanks are able to exert some kind of influence. The fact that the role

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of knowledge is not discussed in a handbook on a certain policy, shows that there is a gap in the literature concerning the role of knowledge. This research will attempt to fill this gap on the role of knowledge and specifically the role of think tanks in the ENP and ENI.

2.2 Think tanks in the policy cycle

The European Union, as an economic and political union, makes policy. So does the directorate-general for European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, as this directorate-general is responsible for the European Neighbourhood Policy. Policy is made through different steps and goes through different phases before it eventually is implemented. Policy theory has made progress in uncovering mechanisms and structures through creating policy cycles, clarifying stages of said cycle, and using the concept of a policy subsystem. Lasswell (1956) first came up with the idea of a framework in the form of a policy cycle (Lodge et al., 2016). Lasswell originally came up with the seven categories intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. The concept has since then been refined by several scholars (Anderson, 2014; Howlett et al., 2009; Lodge et al., 2016).

A more understandable version of the cycle has been proposed by James Anderson (2014) in his book on public policy making, which was originally published in 1975. He proposes five phases that are problem identification, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (pp. 3-4). Though articles differ in the number of phases and the words used for the phases, the general stretch tends to be the same; phase(s) where the problem gains attention, creating policy, implementing policy, and evaluating policy. This research uses as defined by Howlett et al. (2009), namely agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation (pp. 10-14). This distinction between the phases is widely used, has clear borders between the phases, and is understandable. Using these phases

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It is however not undisputed in which stages think tanks tend to be active. While Timmermans & Scholten (2006) focus on the roles of scientific venues in the policy system they portray science institutions as a venue for agenda-setting (p. 1105). Adding to this, it is interesting to note how Laswell (1956) referred to the first stage as ‘intelligence’, where intelligence and knowledge had to be gathered, a task that can be carried out by think tanks. Campbell & Pedersen (2015) on the other hand show that knowledge produced by knowledge regimes can be used for formulating and implementing policy (p.681). As shown by Howlett et al. (2009) think tanks also review policies and are active in political evaluation (pp. 184, 189, 290). An example of think tanks being active in the evaluation stage is the 2017

assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy done by CEPS, where the ENP is assessed and evaluated using literature as a building block in the evaluation (Kostanyan et al., 2017). Though think tanks are not directly involved in the decision-making process, indirect involvement is possible through the stages of agenda-setting and formulation as mentioned above. The agenda-setting phase decides what issues will be on the agenda and on what issue decisions will be made. The formulation phase decides how policy is formulated and is what is decided on. This is also shown in a paper produced by the European Policy Centre that focuses on the role of science in the decision-making process in the European Union. The authors show that the EU uses evidence coming from the scientific community to support decision-making in several policy areas. Furthermore, scientific advice is used in the process through scientific assessment. This means that experts assess knowledge and implications of the scientific evidence used. Ways of how this is done differ per policy area (Allio et al., 2006, p. 8). . This leads to the conclusion that think tanks are involved in all phases of the policy cycle. However, as noted by Abelson (2002) think tanks do not always select the same stages in the policy cycle to become involved. The decision depends on the available resources (p.

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64). This research mainly focuses on the agenda-setting and evaluation phase as these overlap. When evaluating the first phase, the agenda is set for the second phase through the evaluation of the first phase. As this research focuses on the review of the period from 2014 to 2017 and on how the priorities set in the period of 2018 till 2020 came into play, these phases of the policy cycle are the most interesting in this research.

2.3 Policy subsystems

Another concept used in policy theory is a policy subsystem. Sabatier (1988) defined a policy subsystem as a set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem. New policy subsystems can emerge when a group of actors becomes dissatisfied about a particular problem as it is treated by existing subsystems, which leads to them forming their own subsystem (p. 138). The European Neighbourhood Policy subsystem has formed around the policy itself, encompassing the DG for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Union External Action service, and more societal and political actors. Think tanks are actors that are able to get involved in the policy subsystem. Sabatier

introduced the concept of an advocacy coalition and elaborates on how competition between advocacy coalitions in the subsystem can lead to policy change (p. 148). An advocacy coalition is a collection of actors from public and private institutions and from all levels of government who share a set of beliefs and want to achieve goals related to these beliefs through participating in the policy process. The success these collations have in reaching their goals depends on the coalition’s resources, such as expertise (Sabatier, 1988). Howlett, Ramesh & Pearl (2009) conceptualize a policy subsystem as the actors and institutions found in an issue area, and the interplay and mutual interaction of these actors, institutions, and their ideas takes place (p. 81). This definition provides a more concise and clearer definition as explained by Sabatier (1988) but is along the same lines. Furthermore, the authors add that societal actors in policy subsystems consist mainly of interest groups,

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research organizations, and business and labour. These organizations can bring among others expertise and information and can seek to influence policy outcomes; this can of course also refer to think tanks (p. 87). This is in line with the advocacy coalition as described by Sabatier (1988) who described how coalitions try to influence policy decisions to reach their own goals. Think tanks could be a part of an advocacy coalition in a policy subsystem and work together with policymakers to reach these goals.

2.4 Knowledge regimes and policy advisory systems

A policy subsystem thus encompasses the actors and institutions found in a policy area; the European Neighbourhood Policy in this case study. This research connects this concept to the theory introduced by Campbell & Pedersen (2015). The authors show that the way knowledge regimes are organized is influenced by the organization of surrounding political and economic institutions. This leads to knowledge regimes having national characters. Knowledge regimes are institutions that are part of a policy subsystem. The authors analyse several knowledge regimes in France, Germany, and the USA. This research, however, concerns the European Neighbourhood Policy and focuses on a European instead of a national level. Therefore the theory of Campbell & Pedersen (2015) will be extended and applied on a European level. The expectation is that the organization of the surrounding European political and economic institutions influences the organization of knowledge regimes that exist on a European wide level. Think tanks can be seen as part of a knowledge regime and should thus according to this theory possess a specific European character.

The fact that knowledge regimes are shaped by their surrounding institutions can also be connected to the mapping of advisory systems as shown by Craft & Howlett (2013). Think tanks could be placed in the long-term anticipatory and substantive policy advisory content category which is named ‘evidence-based policy-making’ (pp. 193-194). This distinction between advisory systems is made on the content of their advice. When focusing on the

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location of think tanks researching the European Neighbourhood Policy they could be placed in a location external of the government, with low government control (pp. 189). The authors show how the advisory systems have changed because of externalization and politicization. Externalization is the consultation of outside experts, whereas politicization concerns the use of partisan political advice from inside the government itself. Externalization is most interesting as think tanks, as mentioned above, fall into the category of actors that are under low government control and are external to the government. Craft & Howlett argue that these dynamics have blurred the lines between content made by internal and external sources and the lines between technical and political dimensions. The result of this is that influence can lie in different places in the advisory system, meaning that think tanks have the ability to have an influence on policy as well (pp. 188-192).

Combining these theories, think tanks are expected to have a specific European character as they are shaped by their surroundings. Furthermore, they produce long-term anticipatory and substantive policy advisory content and thus engage in evidence-based policy-making advice. Though think tanks are external to the government and are subject to low levels of government control, they are expected to have the opportunity to exert influence over policy outcomes.

2.5 Positive and negative feedback

Policymaking is a complicated process that encompasses more than simply writing policies and voting for them. The path towards implementing a successful policy knows several stages that have been extensively described in the literature (Anderson, 2014; Howlett et al., 2009; Lodge et al., 2016). These stages do also exist in policy subsystems, which also encompass many actors. Furthermore, like Sabatier (1988) described, think tanks can be among the actors of a policy subsystem and advocacy coalition who try to influence policy making to achieve goals related to shared beliefs of the coalition. The role of scientific venues in policy

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subsystems has been discussed by Timmermans & Scholten (2006), whose theory will be applied in this research as an expectation.

Their theory of positive and negative feedback by scientific experts draws on Baumgartner and Jones’ concept of punctuated equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium means that there are periods of stability, alternated with periods of rapid change. Rapid change mostly occurs when significant attention is given to an issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, pp. 18–21). A way to give different attention to an issue is through issue expansion. This can be done through venue shopping or changing the policy image. The policy image concerns how a policy is understood and what policy areas it covers. This can lead to a broad public having an interest in an issue when it suddenly expands to more policy areas. A policy image can be changed by changing the frame in which it is understood. This can be done through among others describing the policy with different words and selecting on which information the focus lies (pp. 25-27). Besides changing the framing of the policy image, venue shopping is a

phenomenon that is also used for issue expansion. When venue shopping, actors change the arena where the policy issue is discussed. Baumgartner & Jones focus on policy venues; venues where decision-making authority lies (p. 31).

Timmermans & Scholten extend research on the punctuated equilibrium as they focus on different types of venues related to policy-making, more specifically on scientific venues. The authors focus on what role a scientific venue can have in a policy subsystem. Their research shows that scientific venues were important as they created positive and negative feedback between experts and policymakers, either challenging or sustaining monopolies in the policy subsystem. Negative feedback tries to take away threats that exist against the policy monopoly. Positive feedback can support evidence for alternative policies and thus challenge the existing policy monopoly (p. 1107). Baumgartner & Jones (2009) have also discussed positive and negative feedback. They connect negative feedback with periods of stability, as

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this form of feedback supports the existing policy monopoly. However, positive feedback in the form of shocks can lead to divergence from the normal situation. Besides that, this form of divergence may lead to new periods of stability where the system settles at a different point than before (p. 18). Furthermore, Timmermans & Scholten show that science can be used for depoliticization through using a technocratic model in policy-making. When the policy monopoly is maintained and stays stable, issue expansion and politicization can be averted (p. 1114).

The authors show how the advisory systems have changed because of externalization and politicization. Externalization is interesting as think tanks, as mentioned above, fall into the category of actors that are under low government control and are external to the

government. Craft & Howlett argue that these dynamics have blurred the lines between content made by internal and external sources and the lines between technical and political dimensions. The result of this is that influence can lie in different places in the advisory system, meaning that think tanks have the ability to have an influence on policy as well. Building on these theories the expectation is to see that think tanks use positive and negative feedback to stay relevant in the policy field. Even if think tanks are not able to create

politicization or issue expansion it can be expected that think tanks use negative feedback to stay involved with the status quo, or use positive feedback to form bonds with the opposition. Though not creating politicization or issue expansion, think tanks can use positive and

negative feedback to stay or become relevant and involved in stages of the policy process to eventually have an impact on the final policy decision. Failing to do so leads can lead to a loss in the competitive marketplace (Abelson, 2002).

2.6 Competitiveness and identification with values

Besides a European character, their respective places in policy subsystems and knowledge regimes, and the use of positive and negative feedback, this research looks at the

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competitiveness among scientific venues related to independence and identification with specific values.

As shown by Abelson (2002) think tanks try to shape the policy preferences of their targeted audience, for example, they try to target their research and recommendations to politicians who may be in favour of those ideas (p. 11). Campbell & Pedersen (2015) also show that in all three of the countries they analyzed, movements towards more competition, but also towards more coordination and cooperation were identified (p. 47). Howlett et al. make a distinction between think tanks and academic researchers at universities by showing that the first are interested in a broad range of policies, while the latter are more specialized. Besides, think tanks are often more ideologically motivated and are thus more partisan. However, at the same time, they try to maintain an image of autonomy from governments, or the European Union in this case (p. 72). Furthermore think tanks seek originality and put effort into publicizing their findings, try to find quick responses to current events, and create short papers that read quickly and easily (pp. 72-73).

The think tanks analyzed in this research (CEPS and ECDPM) both describe themselves as independent and do not mention any values in the about section on their websites (CEPS, 2019; ECDPM, n.d.). However, using the above information it can be

expected that they identify with specific values to some extent, to shape the policy preferences of their targeted audience more efficiently. The targeted audience supposedly also adheres to certain values and think tanks can adhere to values strategically in order to engage in strategic ideological positioning to maximize their influence. This mechanism has been introduced by Lerner (2018) who shows that this is the case in the United States Congress. This research extends on this by looking into whether strategic ideological positioning is also used as a strategy within the European Union. This expectation is in line with Stone (2007) who describes how ‘Some

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organisations claim to adopt a ‘scientific’ or technical approach to social and economic problems. Others are overtly partisan or ideologically motivated’ (Stone, 2007, p. 6).

Interesting is the use of the word ‘claim’ which implies that this may not fully be the case in reality. Furthermore, Stone argues that think tanks are not simply informants who pass on research to policy; studies have shown that think tanks among others help to provide conceptual language, paradigms, and examples that become the assumptions for policy-makers (p. 26). Providing insights from research in order to improve policy-making is thus not that straightforward.

This adds to the expectations concerning a specific European character, being able to exert influence despite their location in the system and the use of negative and positive

feedback to stay relevant. Expectations thus are that the competitiveness of the think tank area may lead to think tanks using strategic ideological positioning to maximize their influence. Besides, adhering to strategic values or ideologies, or values that are similar to certain ideologies, gives more opportunities and aspects on which positive or negative feedback can be provided.

2.7 Explanatory mechanisms and answer-expectations

Out of the theories discussed in the first section of this chapter, several potential explanatory mechanisms come forth. This research expects the answer to be one, or a combination of these mechanisms. Think tanks are expected to have a specific European character as they are shaped by their surroundings. Additionally, they create long-term anticipatory and substantive policy advisory content and thus engage in evidence-based policy-making advice. Though think tanks are external to the government and are subject to low levels of government control, they are expected to have the opportunity to exert influence over policy outcomes. These theories provide expectations about the position of think tanks in the policy system.

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More specific explanatory mechanisms are positive and negative feedback and strategic ideological positioning. Building on Timmermans & Scholten (2006) en Craft & Howlett (2013) the expectation is to see that think tanks use positive and negative feedback to stay relevant in the policy field. Even if think tanks are not able to create politicization or issue expansion it can be expected that think tanks use negative feedback to stay involved with the status quo, or use positive feedback to form bonds with the opposition. When not creating politicization or issue expansion, think tanks can use positive and negative feedback to stay or become relevant and involved in stages of the policy process to eventually have an impact on the final policy decision.

As for strategic ideological positioning, expectations are that the competitiveness of the think tank area may lead to think tanks using strategic ideological positioning to maximize their influence. Besides, adhering to strategic values or ideologies, or values that are similar to certain ideologies, gives more opportunities and aspects on which positive or negative

feedback can be provided. To understand these changes and to see whether the potential answer expectations could be true this research uses process-tracing and examines think tanks’ publications, as will be elaborated on in the following methodology chapter

2.8 Conclusion

This conceptual framework discussed the concepts of the policy cycle and a policy subsystem and showed where think tanks fit in these concepts. Think tanks are suspected to be active in every stage of the policy cycle, though this depends on the resources of a think tank. The evaluation and agenda-setting phase that are connected in the cycle are most interesting for this research. Furthermore, the European Neighbourhood Policy can be seen as a policy subsystem, where think tanks are one amongst several kinds of actors that are active in the subsystem. Furthermore, this conceptual framework elaborated on several theories that can

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form expected answers on the research question. These theories can be grouped into three groups, though a combined answer may also be possible. Expectations thus are that

Think tanks have a:

I: European character and relevant location in systems such as knowledge regimes and policy advisory systems

And think tanks either have influence because of their

II: the use of positive and negative feedback

And/or

III: the use of strategic ideological positioning

As this research uses these theories, it is expected that the think tanks will have an influence on policy through one of these mechanisms, or a combination of them. This research will extend these theories by testing them, which will strengthen their credibility if proven to be applicable in this case study. Furthermore, while applying all theories on a European level, this research specifically extends the theory of Campbell and Pedersen (2015) and Lerner (2018) to a European level in order to fill a gap in the research field.

.

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3. Methodology and Research Design

The purpose of this study is to find out which actions have led to the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument between 2014 and 2018 and to illuminate the

plausibility of the theories as discussed in the previous chapter. This research is a qualitative research project as it uses the qualitative method of process-tracing and compares different moments in time in the ENI. It focuses on whether, how, and why a potential cause can influence a specific change. Qualitative research is most suitable for this study because it is important to be able to ‘read between the lines’ and find key messages in documents in order to find out what is meant by the authors. Only in this way is it possible to find out whether and in what way think tanks have influenced the changes in the European Neighbourhood Instrument and thus answer the research question. Understanding underlying messages and meanings of publications is difficult if not impossible through quantitative research. This research is X-focused as it does not focus on the outcome (Y), but on the actions that can potentially lead to the outcome, which are the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The input (X) is the role of think tanks and the output (Y) is the MIP that was implemented from 2018 and onwards.

In order to find out which actions could have led to the outcome, this research uses process tracing. Process tracing is used when there is an outcome of which we do not know the cause. The outcome, Y, in this case, is the MIP of the ENI implemented from 2018 and onwards. In order to explain the outcome process tracing attempts to identify factors that contributed to the outcome. Process tracing is case centric instead of theory centric. Through process tracing research can attempt to open the ‘black box’ and reveal the causal

mechanisms that led to the outcome (Punton & Welle, 2015). In order to identify possible causal mechanisms, the last step is to apply tests to the evidence. By determining whether evidence is necessary and/or sufficient it can be concluded if the evidence supports the

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hypothesis.

This research focuses on the changes that have been made on the programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the financial arm of the European

Neighbourhood Policy between 2014-2017, and 2018-2020 as described in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes. These programmes are especially interesting as they provide not only a view on how money is divided, but also an overview of the challenges and priorities and expectations set by policymakers in line with the European Neighbourhoods Policy. This study will mainly focus on the objectives, priorities, and challenges as set in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes analysed. Furthermore, focusing on the European Neighbourhood Instrument is interesting as it was set up on the 11th_{of March in 2014 (Damen & Jongberg,}

2019) and thus has a clear starting point. The revisions made in 2017 and 2018 provide a second observing point which provides the opportunity to observe the changes that have been made between the starting point in 2014 and the revisions and adaptations made in 2017 and 2018. The Multiannual Indicative Programmes state to have been adapted following a ‘desk review’ done in 2017 by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission and its services (European Commission & European External Action Service, 2014). The focus lies on to what extent points brought forward in external evaluations (which are conducted by think tanks) or other publications by think tanks can be identified within the ENP review as published in 2017 by the European Commission and in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes itself. By also focusing on whether ideas that come forth of think tanks are identified in the MIP and not in the midterm review, one can identify whether there is a possibility that think tanks potentially have other ways of indirectly influencing policy through hidden channels that cannot be exposed through document analysis and process tracing. This will be done through process tracing to test expectations as mentioned in the theoretical framework.

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3.1 Think tanks

This research focuses on two specific think tanks; CEPS and ECDPM. CEPS stands for Centre for European Policy Studies. They describe themselves as a leading think tank in EU affairs and claim complete individual independence of their scholars, CEPS itself does not take positions (CEPS, 2019). CEPS is incorporated in this research as they are a big think tank and have written many policy contributions and publications on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Besides, as they claim independence it would be interesting to see whether different views are observable in their publications. ECDPM stands for the European Centre for Development Policy Management and like CEPS claims to be independent. Their main objective is to make policies in Europe and Africa for inclusive and sustainable development (ECDPM, n.d.). Unlike CEPS, ECDPM has a more specific area of research; something that can also be observed in their publications and blogs. In some cases, other think tanks may be mentioned in this research as evaluations may be a result of cooperation between think tanks outside of the scope of this research. However, the main focus lies on CEPS and EDPM. The contrast between a bigger, more general think tank and one that is more specific could

potentially lead to new discoveries about whether they may use different strategies to exercise influence.

3.2 Data collection

Firstly, the documents concerning the European Neighbourhood Instruments have been collected through the website of the European Union External Action Service1. The Joint Communication and Report from 2015 and 2017 have been collected through the website of the European Commission2 and can be found by using the search option in the document repository. By filtering on year, the documents will show up. The staff working documents

1

https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy%20enp/8410/financing-enp_es

2_{https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/key-documents_en}_,

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have been accessed through using a search engine, as these do not show up on official EU websites. However, the staff working documents are accessible through links in PDF format3 and stored in a drive by the author of this paper. Finally, this research uses material published by think tanks in the form of books, research papers, and blogs. This material is accessible through the website of CEPS4 by pressing ‘publications’ and selecting EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy. On the bottom of the page, all publications and projects on that topic are listed. Material that comes from ECDPM can be found on their website5 by using the search bar and the search terms ‘ENI’ and ‘ENP’. Besides using documents, this research will also use newspapers and articles to show the circumstances and events that may have happened between 2014 and 2018, as these may also have had an influence on the outcome.

3.3 Focus

This research applies process-tracing through analysing documents. These written documents are produced at the same time of the moment they describe and provide a close look on events. Moreover, they do not change over time. Disadvantages of documents are however that they can be difficult to locate and that they reflect the point of view of the person or organisation that produced the sources. The latter, however, is no problem for this research as it focuses on how think tanks influence decisions and not on what the objective truth is. Data will be analyzed by focusing on the key differences as identified in the previous chapter. Furthermore, all documents are thoroughly analyzed in order to find the underlying meaning of sentences, paragraphs, or whole texts. The focus lies on to what extent papers written by the think tanks align with the priorities written in the 2014-2017 papers as well as the changes made when comparing these priorities to the 2018-2020 documents. If think tanks’ ideas align

3_{http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_staff-working-document_en.pdf} 4_{https://www.ceps.eu}

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with those written in both of the documents, we can determine that there is a case of negative feedback that supports the current policy. If think tanks’ ideas do not align with the 2014-2017 documents, but do with the 2018-2020 we can determine that the outcome has

potentially been influenced by the think tanks.The analysis will thus pay special attention to these subjects, but will not omit looking at the priorities as they were before as this negative feedback. Furthermore, this research will focus on the discourse of the articles to look at the contextual meaning of them in the bigger picture. In every step, the evidence weight for assessing influence will be assessed. After discussing the three steps, the weight for the hypotheses will be obsessed.

3.4 Evidence testing

In order to find out how and whether a potential cause influenced the changes in the European Neighbourhood policy Instrument, evidence has to be found in the collected data. The

collected papers can be considered as a whole, but specific paragraphs can also be more important than others. Furthermore, the authors of the papers should be considered in order to see if they could have had an influence on policy through different channels, such as meetings with politicians, policy-makers, or attending certain events.

After collecting all data and determining which parts of the collected data can be seen as evidence for the hypothesized expectations as formulated in the second chapter, evidence has to be tested. Through determining whether evidence is necessary and/or sufficient it can be concluded if the evidence supports the hypothesis and how certain and unique the evidence is. All pieces of evidence should be individually weighted using the hoop, straw-in-the-wind, smoking gun, and doubly decisive categories. If evidence is a straw-in-the-wind, it is neither sufficient nor necessary to establish causation. A hoop is necessary, but not sufficient. A smoking gun is sufficient, yet not necessary. Finally, doubly-decisive evidence is sufficient and necessary to establish a causal relationship. All evidence that can support the expected

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causal mechanism is thus assigned weight, in the end, the causal mechanism can only be as strong as the evidence for the weakest links (Punton & Welle, 2015, p. 7).

3.5 Validity

External validity relates to what extent the results of research can be generalized. As this research is a case study and illuminates the plausibility of theories as discussed in the

conceptual framework, external validity is not relevant and does not exist beyond the testing of theories. Internal validity however concerns the accuracy of the research design, which is relevant. Though this research aims to achieve high internal validity, threats to internal validity lie in the data collection. Institutions such as the European Union exert control over what is published; certain documents and background information may be missing in the timeline of documents or have slipped through search engines. It is therefore important to keep in mind that documents do not form a complete picture, as they are always incomplete and selected by the institutions that published them. Furthermore, bias is also a possible threat to internal validity. When testing whether a hypothesis is true, the researcher must ensure that they do not select data that confirms their hypothesis. This research will therefore focus on evidence that can confirm and evidence that can reject the expectations. Besides that, all evidence will be tested to rule out pure chance. The final threat to internal validity is that there is a possibility that think tanks have other ways to exert influence than using written

publications. Meetings behind closed doors and informal conversations are possibly not documented and may have influenced the outcome. These are channels for influence that cannot be easily exposed through document analysis and process tracing and are something to keep in mind when drawing conclusions on causal mechanisms.

3.6 Conclusion

To conclude, this research is qualitative and will use process tracing to uncover what mechanisms led to the outcome of the changes made in the MIP implemented from 2018

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onwards. The main focus lies on the midterm review of 2017, as the MIP’s state that changes are based on that review. Furthermore, the think tanks this research focuses on are CEPS and ECDPM. One think tank being big and more general, whereas the other is more specific can provide insights on how strategies may differ depending on the think tank’s size and research interests. External validity is not applicable in this research as this is a case study. Internal validity is ensured through taking the selective character of the documents in mind, testing evidence, and gathering evidence that can confirm and gathering evidence that can reject the hypothesis.

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4. Analysis

This research tries to find out what influence think tanks had on the changes made in the European Neighbourhood Instrument between the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2020

instruments. To find out what happened in the black box that led from the initial situation (the 2014-2017 programme) to the outcome (the 2018-2020 programme) we have to uncover the black box and find out what led to the outcome through process-tracing. In order to find out how and whether a cause influenced the changes in the European Neighbourhood policy Instrument, evidence has to be found in the collected data. A distinction will be made between three separate time periods. The first from the 2014-2017 ENI programmes until the 2015 Joint Communication European Neighbourhood review. The second from the 2015 Review until the 2017 Report on the implementation of the 2015 Review. Finally, the third time period covers the time from the 2017 Joint Report until the 2018-2020 ENI programme. Changes that were found between the initial ENI and the initial ENI were for the general neighbourhood a stronger focus on climate action and good governance, less mention of Russia, and more of Africa.The three expectations set by this research about think tank influence are that think tanks have a European character and favourable location in systems such as knowledge regimes and policy advisory systems and have influence because of the use of positive and negative feedback and/or the use of strategic ideological positioning. This chapter will first focus on the time period from the first ENI programme until the Joint Communication in 2015. Next, the period from the Joint Communication in 2015 until the Joint Report in 2017, and finally the period from the Joint Report until the External

Financing Instruments Evaluation and the following 2018-2020 programme will be discussed. In each time period, the evidence for influence will be weighted. Subsequently, the timeline as a whole will be analyzed combining the three preceding parts together, where the focus will lie on the hypotheses. Finally, this chapter will end with a conclusion.

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Context

Besides think tanks and other actors, external events could also have had influence. This section will provide a short overview of the most important events that happened throughout 2014 and 2018 that could have had an influence on the ENP and ENI. 2014 saw Ebola becoming a Global Healthy Crisis, the crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in Ukraine, the border conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the rise of ISIS (Keneally, 2014). 2015 saw the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the European Refugee Crisis, and the November 2015 attacks in Paris (Keneally, 2015; Moran, 2016). 2016 saw the US presidential election, the Syrian civil war, the vote for Brexit, the Zika outbreak, terrorist attacks in Belgium, and a failed coup in Turkey (Adams, 2016; Lindsay, 2016). 2017 saw more terror attacks in

Barcelona, Manchester, and London and the inauguration of President Trump (Adams, 2017). 2018 until May saw the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, former Russian double agent (BBC News, 2018), and another terrorist attack in France (Le Parisien, 2018).

4.1 Period I: 11th_{of March 2014 -18}th_{of November 2015}

The first part of this analysis focuses on the time period from the first ENI programme until the Joint Communication in 2015. The first ENI programme was adopted on the 11th of March in 2014 and covered the time period 2014-2017, the 2015 Joint Communication Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy was adopted by the Parliament on the 9th_{of July 2015 and}

the final version published on the 18th of November (Damen & Jongberg, 2019). As the political environment changed since the start of the ENP, the Commission and Member States called for a review of the ENP. This review was launched by President Juncker in November 2014 (European Commission, 2015b).

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The 2015 review’s full title is ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ and was proposed by President Juncker. There have been several consultations that led to responses of among others, member states, EU institutions, international organisations, and also think tanks (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The 2015 review discusses how a new ENP should take stabilisation as the main political priority. Besides, there should be a greater focus on differentiation and

acknowledging that not all partners want to follow EU rules and standards while others do. It is mentioned that it has to be acknowledged that partners have different aspirations and that relations should reflect that more. Furthermore, partnerships should be focused on fewer priorities. This point is also an aspect that came forward in the analysis of the differences between the two time periods, as the many priorities tend to be confusing (European Commission, 2015a).

Additionally, effective ways have to be sought out to promote good governance practices. The review shows that a key to stabilising societies lies in inclusive economic development and providing prospects for youths, as lack of opportunity can be a root of instability which increases vulnerability to radicalisation. This is also in line with the new consultation that the ENP should do more to support civil society. That will be done in the form of supporting citizen’s ability to hold governments accountable, and through paying attention to human rights, gender equality, and non-discrimination. Also, a new focus on working together on aspects of security, conflict prevention, and terrorism and anti-radicalisation should emerge. This new focus is more important after the November 13th attacks in Paris (European Commission, 2015a).

Partners of the EU have signalled their interest in the EU as a partner for economic development and modernisation, including creating jobs for youths. This is related to the

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interest in mobility and the possibility to work and study in the EU. The ENP will also try to have a new outreach beyond the boundaries of the ENP area and focus more on new

frameworks related to shared challenges such as migration, energy, security, and health. Also, in order to ensure more effective delivery, this review recommends that the financial

instruments (ENI) should be more flexible. This means setting aside financial resources until they have to be used for unforeseen circumstances or other urgent programmes. Unused funds should be able to be carried to the next year. Finally, the ENP should focus on clearer

communication and more visibility (European Commission, 2015a). The suggestions as set in the 2015 Joint Communication thus tend to be in line with the changes identified between the two time periods. It is however the question whether these changes come forth from think tanks and their ideas or whether it was purely EU institutions and Member States that influenced the changes? The 2015 Staff Working Document can provide more insight into the think tank ideas that have been recognised by the EU as the document analyses among others what think tanks have contributed to the consultation process. As compared to the 2014-2017 ENI programmes, this Review puts forward new points such as more differentiation, a focus on fewer priorities, supporting citizen’s ability to hold governments accountable and the fact that this Review urges more attention to human rights, gender equality, non-discrimination, security, conflict prevention, terrorism and anti-radicalisation. The negative feedback in line with the existing policy this review provides consists of the mention of promoting good governance, stabilising society through economic development and education, (more) support for civil society, and partnering with EU partners in economic development and modernisation.

2015 Staff Working Document Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy

The 2015 Joint Staff Working Document ‘Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy’ accompanies the above Joint Communication document. It summarizes the results of the

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consultation done on the ENP, as well as existing evaluations. This document is interesting as it focuses on what particular actors have suggested, also including think tanks. Though think tanks and their standpoints may be mentioned in this document, it does not mean that these points also come forth in the Joint Communication or the new ENI in 2017-2020. It does however give the option to show that certain points of view were recognised, and even when not used this can be a form of positive feedback.

First of all, some think tanks have expressed that the EU should use their

comprehensive approach as a central approach and combine all the policy areas (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3). This is in line with think tanks’ suggestion that the ENP is not a single policy, but more of a toolbox with several instruments from different policies. These tools should be able to be used in more effective ways outside of the ENP framework

according to the think tanks. However, member states and EU institutions suggested that it is the existence of the policy framework that strengthens commitment to individual tools and resources (European Commission, 2015b); this suggestion seems to not have been used in the final review.

Think tanks also expressed the importance of ongoing regional cooperation for both neighbourhoods. A minority of responses, either from Member States, think tanks, or academics, suggested that the ENP should be split into two policies, one Eastern and one Southern. Think tanks have also suggested that the EU has to focus on energy security, climate policies and related subjects (European Commission, 2015b, pp. 13–14); ongoing regional cooperation is mentioned in the review, a split is not. Climate policies and energy security are indeed new focuses mentioned in the 2015 Review.

Furthermore, think tanks have criticised the ‘West’ for trying to impose its own norms, standards, values, and economic interests in the regions. Besides, but less extreme, think tanks have also implied that a better balance has to be found between promoting values and interest.

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The EU should recognise that the EU norms are not for everyone. A more pragmatic way of doing this would be by using shared interests (stability, security, energy, migration, trade) (European Commission, 2015b, p. 15). The 2015 review mentions how it will try to focus more on shared challenges, additionally they will use more differentiation.

Finally, think tanks recommended a more effective and impactful communication strategy. The EU was not visible enough, they suggest people to people contact, student exchanges, visa facilitation; hearts and minds have to be won over (European Commission, 2015b, p. 18). This is also mentioned in the review.

Not all suggestions done in the 2015 Staff Working Document can be seen in the final 2015 Joint Communication. However, we can see that think tanks have tried to challenge the policy monopoly through positive feedback, an example being the criticism on imposing western values and the suggesting of the ENP not being one single policy, but more of a toolbox. Member States and EU Institutions have contradicted this, by saying that the single policy is what strengthens cooperation. Besides, negative feedback is also used whereas suggestions to focus on among others climate cooperation and sustainable energy have been made, something that is along the lines of what was already mentioned in the 2014-2017 programmes. The think tanks have merely suggested putting more emphasis on these issues.

In order to find out how the think tanks that will be analysed in this research, CEPS and ECDPM, have contributed to the suggestions as put forward in the 2015 Joint

Communication, the next section will analyse papers put out by these think tanks and collect evidence on whether or not CEPS and ECDPM have had an influence on the 2015 Joint Communication review.

Think tank documents

Between the adoption of the ENI programme 2014-2017 and the adoption of the Joint Communication in 2015, several documents produced by think tanks can be found. This

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section will discuss them in chronological order. In the 3rd of September 2014 CEPS Commentary ‘How should the EU respond to Russia’s war in Ukraine’ the author discusses shortly how not supporting Ukraine militarily defeats the EU foreign and security policy, as the Eastern Neighbourhood will not be a zone of peace and stability that accepts EU norms; something that is not in the EU’s interest. The author thus implies that the EU should support Ukraine in its conflict against Russia in order to keep aligning with their set goals (Blockmans, 2014, p. 4). This article focuses mainly on the interests of the EU; keeping the Neighbourhood a safe and secure area that accepts EU norms and acts as a buffer against Russia. Though the article focuses on stability and on EU norms and values, something that also comes forth in the 2015 Review, the evidence for the influence of this article is necessary, yet not sufficient and thus a hoop. It affirms the

relevance of the hypothesis and the fact that there could be influence, but does not confirm this as it is not proven that CEPS directly influenced the review.

The 17th of October 2014 CEPS Essay ‘Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for the area that lies in between’ once again focuses on Ukraine and how the ongoing crisis threatens the country’s stability and warns that this crisis may lead to a divided neighbourhood where countries in the

neighbourhood choose between Russia or the EU, two actors that compete for influence. The authors argue that, due to path dependency, the partner countries in the Eastern

Neighbourhood are more familiar with Russia as opposed to the EU. However, the EU is seen as a template for transformation and reform which makes them more attractive. The authors propose a two-dimensional strategy for the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood; becoming more self-critical and reflexive on their own policies and more responsive towards Russia’s

initiatives. Flexibility means among others that a one-size-fits-all policy should not be used. The EU should aim to take into account the partners' specificities more. Responsiveness

Think tank influence on the European Neighbourhood Instrument: On the different strategies used by think tanks to exert influence