Conflict dynamics in irregular armed conflict
A comparative case study of Israel, Lebanon, Namibia and Sri LankaCapstone project of the MSc Crisis and Security Management Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Reed
Second reader: Prof. Edwin Bakker
Participants:
- Namibia: Jyrki Helminen (s1632434)
- Lebanon: Kyra Luchtenberg
- Israel: Vincent Nieuwpoort
- Sri Lanka: Lotte Westra
Abstract
Many factors cause and influence the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. Research has been done on single drivers influencing conflict dynamics, or on either the causes or the final de-escalation of the conflict. Additionally, popular discourses in conflict studies of a certain time period influence the way conflicts have been framed. In order to provide a broad and detailed overview of all the factors that could have driven the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation, a holistic analytical framework has been developed. The overall purpose of this project has been to create a framework that is applicable to all irregular armed conflicts.
The development of the analytical framework has been done by exploring the literature on conflict. The framework identified several factors that influence the dynamics of conflict: social cleavages; popular support; grievances; local politics; national politics; international politics; natural disasters; state action – coercive force; state action – policy solution; state capacity; strong/weak government; strategy of armed groups; capacity of armed groups; factionalisation; criminalisation.
The framework has been applied to four historical cases, conflicts which experienced periods of escalation and de-escalation. The historical analysis offered in-depth knowledge on the changing dynamics in the following conflicts: the Israeli Independence War (1947-1948), the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Namibian Independence War (1966-1990) and the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009). Information about the cases has been gathered by analysing primary sources and secondary literature, and conducting interviews. To structure the analysis, the conflicts have been divided into characteristic conflict phases. In order to gain new insights and improve the analytical framework, a comparative analysis has been performed. The comparative research offered several new insights. First, regional politics was considered to play a significant role in changing the dynamics in all four cases. Second, geography influenced the dynamics in both the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Therefore, these factors have been added to the analytical framework. Third, the comparative research indicated that the factors influenced the dynamics of the conflicts in different ways. Fourth, the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Still, several factors played a significant role in all four cases, for example, social cleavages, popular support, regional politics. A combination of factors explained the direction of the conflict in most of the phases, which makes the focus on a single driver or discourse incomplete. This shows the importance of using a holistic approach.
The research has also revealed several limitations of the analytical framework. First, it must be noted that the analytical framework offers limited insights with regard to the direction of the interaction. Second, a combination of factors might influence the dynamics rather than one factor on its own, for instance, armed groups use grievances, caused by social cleavages, to acquire new recruits. The analytical framework might cause too much focus on individual factors rather than interaction between them. Third, the exploratory nature of the research does not yet allow to generalise the outcomes, hence further research is necessary to improve and generalise the framework.
Keywords: conflict studies, irregular armed conflict, conflict dynamics, the Israeli
Independence War, the Lebanese Civil War, the Namibian Independence War, the Sri Lankan Civil War.
Table of content
Abstract ... 2
Table of content ... 3
1. Introduction ... 5
2. Literature review ... 7
2.1. Conflict emergence ... 8
2.1.1. Greed and grievance ... 8
2.1.2. Greed or grievance ... 8
2.1.3. Weak and failed states ... 9
2.1.4. Motives for rebellion ... 10
2.1.5. Civil war organisation ... 11
2.1.6. Social cleavages: a sociological approach ... 11
2.1.7. Contagion ... 12
2.1.8. Geography ... 13
2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-‐escalation ... 14
2.2.1. Socio-‐political factors ... 14
2.2.2. Wartime political order ... 15
2.2.3. War economies ... 16
2.2.4. Public support ... 17
2.2.5. State sponsored terrorism ... 17
2.2.8. Criminalisation of a conflict ... 21
2.2.9. Natural disasters ... 23
2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution ... 24
2.3.1. Settlements and peace processes ... 24
2.3.2. Spoilers ... 24 2.3.3. Governmental policies ... 26 2.4 Conflict theory ... 26 2.4.1.Theoretical foundations ... 26 2.4.2. Modern approaches ... 27 2.4.2.1. Shared framework ... 28 2.4.2.2. Multilevel model ... 29
2.4.2.3 Sociological institutional analysis ... 30
2.5 Conceptualisations ... 30
2.5.1. Conflict and civil war ... 31
2.5.2. Irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism ... 33
2.5.3 State-‐building ... 39
3. Methodology ... 39
3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods ... 39
3.2 Comparative historical analysis ... 42
3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies ... 42
3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies ... 43
3.5 Method of data-‐gathering ... 44
3.6 Analytical framework ... 45
3.6.1 Grounded theory approach ... 45
3.6.2 Structuring the analysis ... 46
3.6.3 Three realms of analysis ... 47
3.6.3 Operationalisation of the factors ... 49
3.7 Case selection ... 56
3.8 The utility of using phases ... 60
4. Namibian Independence War ... 61
4.1. Introduction ... 61
4.2. Case description ... 66
4.3. Case analysis ... 94
Abbreviations ... 131
Bibliography ... 132
Appendix I: Namibia – Interview of Prof. dr. Jan-‐Bart Gewald ... 134
Appendix II: Namibia – Interview of Lalli Metsola ... 136
Appendix III: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Marion Wallace ... 138
Appendix IV: Namibia – Interview of Dr. Henning Melber ... 140
Appendix V: Namibia -‐ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65 (1946) ... 149
Appendix VI: Namibia -‐ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 ... 152
Appendix VII: Namibia -‐ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 (1973) ... 154
Appendix VIII: Namibia -‐ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 146 (1976) ... 158
Appendix IX: Namibia -‐ United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 (1976) ... 162
Appendix X: Namibia -‐ United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) ... 165
5. Comparative analysis ... 167 5.1 Context ... 167 5.2 State ... 174 5.3 Non-‐state ... 178 6. Conclusion ... 180 6.1 Context ... 180 6.2 State ... 182 6.3 Non-‐state ... 183 6.4 Analytical framework ... 184 7. Discussion ... 184 8. Bibliography ... 186
1. Introduction
The post-cold war world has been marked by a number of high profile irregular wars, starting with the Balkan wars during the 1990s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s and the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolt’ that began during 2010. The total number of conflicts is much higher. This research will focus on finding what factors drive the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts. Which factors contribute to escalation or de-escalation of the conflict? Post-Napoleonic interstate wars have received a relative high interest from scholars, researching all mechanisms and variations of conflicts, contributing to a still evolving and
developing academic discipline. Irregular armed conflicts on the contrary, are less studied and draw less attention in the scholarly debate. Notwithstanding, the body of knowledge on irregular armed conflicts is evolving and growing. Most research on conflicts focusses on causes and reasons, and some to the mechanisms that influence or contribute to the end of the conflict. Comparatively, little research has been done on the dynamics during an irregular armed conflict. This appears to be an understudied research field.
Irregular armed conflicts are often intrinsically complex occurrences, making any attempt at analysis of current day irregular armed conflicts prone to failure. Current academic literature demonstrates a gap in literature in regard to a major, holistic analytical framework. Some research has been done on single drivers and their effects on an often small number (or even single cases) of cases. This research project aims to provide insights that contribute to narrowing this knowledge gap in irregular armed conflicts dynamics. Increased knowledge on this subject might contribute to more effective policies regarding irregular armed conflicts. It is expected this research will benefit future researchers endeavouring further into the subject, and analysts that work in the field of irregular armed conflicts. Furthermore political decision makers, either representing state or non-state actors, might benefit from an improved understanding of the effects of policies on irregular armed conflicts.
The primary research question that this research aims to answer is: What are the causal
mechanisms that drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in irregular armed conflict? This research project will be designed as a comparative historical case study, in
which four historical cases are selected, researched and analysed, followed by a comparative analysis. Four historical cases have been selected, and comprise the civil war in Lebanon, the civil war in Sri Lanka, the civil war in Israel and the Nubian independence war.
This research follows the following structure: the research starts with the extensive literature review, giving a broad overview of the existing academic literature on conflict studies and more specifically on contemporary approaches to the emergence and termination of conflicts. This is followed by the methodology chapter, where methodological choices, data gathering, analytical framework formation and case selection are explained. Here, the final analytical framework will be presented. This is followed by individual case descriptions and analyses. After this, the comparative analysis of the four conflicts is conducted, and the main findingsare presented. The research concludes with the conclusions of the comparative
analysis, and the discussion, which includes experienced limitations of the analytical framework and recommendations for future research.
2. Literature review
A review of the extensive body of literature on conflicts shows that the Cold War is a turning point in the history of conflict studies. The occurrence of conventional wars with states fighting states, such as World War II, is minimising over time, while another type of conflict characterises the post-Cold War period: unconventional conflicts (also called irregular armed conflicts or civil wars). Despite the fact that civil wars have been the most common type of armed conflict since the 19th/20th century, experts on conflict studies were focusing mainly on interstate warfare during the Cold War period. In the 1990s, a wave of civil conflicts took place (figure 1) that, in combination with the end of the Cold War, shifted the focus of conflict studies (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601). These conflicts have received increased attention from scholars since then, which leads to a wide range of literature, theories and conceptualisations. All this research aims to find out what factors cause conflicts and, to a smaller extent, what factors explain their dynamics (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
Figure 1. Number and percentage of countries with ongoing civil wars by year from 1945 to
2.1. Conflict emergence
2.1.1. Greed and grievance
A growing number of unconventional conflicts created an interesting question for further research: what causes these conflicts? The conceptual distinction between greed and grievance created probably one of the most influential theoretical debates in conflict studies. Paul Collier analysed statistical data of civil wars since the mid-1960s and concluded in 1999 that the grievance-based explanations of civil war were wrong. The focus should be on greed aspects in order to understand the causes of civil war (Berdal, 2005, p. 687). This greed thesis of Collier defines the circumstances under which greed driven wars are likely to break out, namely: a state that relies on primary commodity exports, in which the unemployment rate is high, and young, poorly educated men are in abundance. If such a state also experiences a period of rapid economic decline, a conflict is likely to break out. However, unconventional conflicts cannot be explained by economic factors only. They interact with grievances of socio-economic and political nature, which triggers the outburst of warfare (Berdal, 2005, p. 691). Grievance can cause a war when certain actions of a state create a large feeling of grievance among a minority population. When a minority experiences a high level of exploitation for a long time, they can decide to start a rebellion. These grievances can be experienced politically, such as the absence of suffrage, but also economically and socially (Collier & Sambanis, 2002, p. 4; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 88).
2.1.2. Greed or grievance
A further perspective on conflict dynamics is given by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, whose book (two volumes) consists of 18 case studies of internal insurgencies. Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin concluded that there was a significant correlation between country's dependency on primary commodity export and civil war, and the role of the ethnicity. The main analysis of Collier and Sambanis suggested that these conclusions needed to be revised. Broadly, their findings indicated that "resource predation might be the result of
pure ‘greed’ or only a side product of ‘grievance" (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). This led to a clear,
twofold conclusion. First, resource predation is not a correlation but a mechanism. Second, the correlation between the presence of natural resources and civil war is compatible with several alternative mechanisms (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Collier and Sambanis’ other major finding relates to the issue of ethnicity and its role in triggering civil war. In contrast to earlier
quantitative studies, which suggested that ethnic fractionation was not important in triggering civil war, several of their case studies provided different results. When ethnicity is operationalised into ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, the former can even contribute to peace by increasing the costs of coordinating rebellion across ethnic lines, whereas the latter can increase the risk of civil war. Tarrow explained this contradicting finding by using the work of Collier and Sambanis, and other researchers to define three possible mechanisms: mutual recognition between members of the same, and/or different, ethnic groups; fear of victimisation or exclusion, especially when ethnic divisions overlap with class cleavages; and civil society segmentation or interaction, where ethnic differences are bridged by instrumental interdependencies among ethnic groups, while their interactions undercut political entrepreneurs’ calls for ethnic mobilisation (2007, p. 595). In addition to resource predation and ethnicity, Collier and Sambanis indicated other possible relevant factors that might complicate the analysis even more. Examples are neighbourhood and spill-over effects, as a nearby insurgency might spread to countries whose internal indicators do not predict disturbances. Furthermore, civil wars may be part of regional cycles of violence (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Finally, Collier and Sambanis promoted the following hypothesis: "government repression increases opposition and, if repression is incomplete, it can lead to
violence" (Collier and Sambanis, 2003, vol. 1, p. 318, referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 595).
2.1.3. Weak and failed states
Fearon and Laitin wrote that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that increase the risk of insurgent wars. They argued that these factors are better predictors of insurgent wars than ethnic or religious diversity, or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination. They concluded that economic growth may correlate less with civil wars, but that the best change for preventing civil wars is to make sure that the government is well-financed and administratively competent (2003, p. 88).
Rotberg focused on the dynamics of nation-state failure. A state fails due to internal violence and the inability to ensure political goods to the public (2010, p. 10). The government loses its legitimacy, and the public does no longer see the nation state as legitimate. Rotberg distinguished strong from weak states. The capacity of a state is defined by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. Strong states have control over their
territories and deliver a variety of high quality political goods to the public, such as the political good of security. In contrary, in weak states the ability to provide an adequate measure of political goods is diminished (2010, p. 4). Overall, the idea is established that weak states are at risk of transforming into failed or collapsed states, which increases the risks of a civil war.
François and Sud (2006, p. 143) reinforced this idea that fragile states involved in civil wars are at risk of a conflict trap: a civil war causes the collapse of an economy and compromises the state system, which increases the level of conflict. Berdal (2005, p. 697) states that the appearance of a conflict trap may actually be the evolution of a state. An alternative system of power might occur at a local level that takes over the core functions of government. While the international community perceives the state as fragile, the state is establishing a new social order amidst the chaos.
2.1.4. Motives for rebellion
Two other researchers who have focused on the dynamics of contention in civil wars are Jeremy Weinstein and Stathis Kalyvas. Weinstein’s book Inside Rebellion represents a rational choice institutionalism approach, as it focuses on the organisation of rebellion by analysing the recruitment strategies of insurgency groups. Weinstein argued that recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. To make a distinction, he called highly committed individuals investors, and poorly committed individuals consumers. He argued that individuals make rational choices reflected by deliberate decisions, designed to maximise payoffs (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency based on a horizontal paired comparison between two forms of organisation of insurgency: activism and opportunism. - The first is
opportunistic rebellions, where participation involves fewer risks, short-term gains are more
likely, and low-commitment participants resemble consumers, whose commitment to the organisation is weak and who expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement (Weinstein 2006, pp. 9-10). The second type is called the activist rebellions. Here, participation is risky, short-term gains are unlikely, and high-commitment participants resemble investors dedicated to the cause of the organisation and willing to make costly investments of time and risk-taking in return for the promise of rewards in the future (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to
the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence (Weinstein 2006, p. 7).
2.1.5. Civil war organisation
Kalyvas analysed vertical relationships between centres and peripheries within civil wars. That is, relationships between the central ideological/political cleavage at the macro level, and the congeries of local conflicts and violence which these relationships either trigger or adapt to. Like Weinstein, Kalyvas refused to reduce his actors to people who join insurgencies either to satisfy their greed or to right their grievances (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). Instead, he sought to explain civil war organisation by two parallel classical disciplines: a Hobbesian
model and a Schmittian model. The Hobbesian model is "stressing an ontology of civil wars characterised by the breakdown of authority," (p. 376) in which violence is privatised. The
Schmittian model "entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and
beliefs", which "stresses the fundamentally political nature of civil wars and its attendant processes" (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). As Tarrow (2007) pointed out, Kalyvas found both
Hobbesian and Schmittian elements in the civil wars he studied (p. 592). His major finding detects the peculiar dynamic and extreme brutality of civil war violence and results from the Hobbesian and Schmittian interaction. As Tarrow summarised, Kalyvas saw violence as a process linking core cleavages and peripheral actors, which are connected despite the differences in their motives and alignments, by a set of alliances.
Perhaps a more general contribution regarding the methodological discussion that both Weinstein and Kalyvas made, is the recognition that there is a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592). This reaches beyond the ‘greed and grievances’ approach, necessitating a rich combination of methods for their detection.
2.1.6. Social cleavages: a sociological approach
Social cleavages derive, for instance, from religious, ethno-linguistic, center-periphery, and urban-rural differences. Any society has a cleavage structure. If the cleavage is not accommodated by responsive policies of the government, the divisions can lead to civil war or other types of severe conflict (Eagles & Johnston, 2008, p. 219). Rotberg (2010, p. 5) argued that most civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The presence of social cleavages within a society creates horizontal inequality, which leads to resentment or demands for equity. The lack of inclusiveness makes the costs of insurgency acceptable, increasing the probability of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002, p. 29)
confirmed that (religiously) divided societies are more prone to social-ethnic conflict. Disputes among religiously divided societies are particularly difficult to mediate, raising the probability of conflict. Religious differences, more than other social cleavages, can generate violence due to the exclusivity of religion (2002, p. 32). A person can only have one religion, whereas a person can speak multiple languages. Østby (2008, p. 144) argued that if the group aspect of inequality is considered, it can be observed that inequalities between ethnic or religious cleavages enhance both grievances and group cohesion, thereby facilitating the breeding ground for conflict. These systematic inequalities between societal groups reflect socio-economic polarisation, and can be defined as horizontal inequalities. He argued that horizontal inequalities increase the potential for a violent conflict (2008, p. 155).
In recent years, studies of civil war seem to have concluded that inequality created by social cleavages is not increasing the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other factors than ethnic or religious divisions are mentioned to explain the causes of civil war, such as economic variables, political systems, and geographical conditions that favour insurgency.
2.1.7. Contagion
According to Forsberg (2009), contagion effects in internal armed conflicts can be defined as a process whereby an internal conflict in one country affects the likelihood of a new internal armed conflict erupting in a neighbouring state at a later point in time (p. 9). Historical and recent examples clearly demonstrate that intra-state armed conflicts are often connected to each other. Among many examples are the civil wars fought in West Africa. Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. This finding, often referred to as the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, is considered empirically robust. In fact, it has been shown to be one of the most important predictors of civil war. Forsberg argued that this validates a growing consensus: one cannot focus exclusively on the domestic attributes of countries to explain civil wars. Modelling events and factors external to the countries experiencing civil war may be just as important (2009, p. 13). Forsberg focused in her study on when, how, why, and where conflicts generate contagion effects. Her analysis concluded that, given an on-going ethnic conflict among a set of neighbouring countries, those that share members of the groups involved in conflict are more likely to be targets than those lacking such bonds (the effect of transnational ethnic kinship linkages) (2009, p. 31).
Furthermore, given an on-going internal conflict (ethnic or non-ethnic), the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries is related to which neighbouring states are most likely targets of contagion effects. In addition, countries that are ethnically polarised, in the sense that there are a few equally (or roughly equally) strong contenders, are more likely targets of contagion effects. Finally, there was no support for the claims that concessions granted to rebel groups inspire other groups to rebel (2009, p. 32). Her other findings suggest that contagion is not limited to direct spill-over from conflict areas, but may be the result of inspiration and conflict by example. It may even indicate that the latter type of contagion process is more salient (2009, p. 33).
Kathman (2010) approached the question of civil war contagion from a third-party intervention point of view to find out what explains contagion. He stated that civil wars have a tendency to be geographically contagious. Neighbouring third parties thus face the threat of being infected by another civil war’s hostilities ( p. 990). According to Kathman, the robust finding in the study of conflict processes is that violence tends to diffuse geographically. Research on the diffusion of inter-state war is well established. War is not randomly distributed across space. Rather, conflict tends to infect those states with links to the original belligerents. These links may include shared borders, a military alliance, or an adversarial relationship, leading wars to attract more participants. Therefore, civil wars exhibit a distinct interstate dimension, as the ramifications of civil conflicts are rarely confined to the original war state (p. 992). Kathman pointed out that more recent work has uncovered a number of causal factors for the geographic diffusion of civil conflicts. Unrest tends to follow the flow of refugees. Cross-border ethnic ties also create opportunities for wars to spread. The territorial aspirations of rebel groups are also relevant, as secession breeds similar violence in contiguous territories, civil war creates demonstration effects for potential rebel groups in proximate countries, and civil war causes regional economic recessions. This can make rebel ideologies more attractive to recruits in neighbouring states (p. 992).
2.1.8. Geography
In three of the case studies in this research, geography appeared to be an important influence on conflict dynamics. Fearon and Laitin (2003) identified several factors leading to internal conflict in countries since 1945. They argued that ethnic or religious differences do not lead to conflict. Instead, they argued that the existence of conditions that enable rural insurgency cause the onset of a conflict. These include poverty (1) political instability (2) and geography (3). Geography, mountainous and rough territory in particular, is highly related to the onset of
a conflict. The countries with mountainous or rough terrain had a higher probability (a doubled risk) of civil war onset than countries with flat terrain.
With geography Fearon and Laiton (2003) referred to mountainous and rough terrain, in which insurgents can take refuge. In most cases, the insurgents are numerically weak in comparison to the state's security forces. Meaning, they need to be able to hide from the security forces and gain public support for their strife. Swaps and jungles, poorly served by roads, can be considered rough terrain that can be favourable to insurgents. Other aspects that might influence the conflict are the population distributions or food availability in mountainous areas. Do and Lyer (2010) reached a similar conclusion: geography is a predictor of conflict, since it influences the ability of the state to control insurgencies and the ease with which insurgents can start mobilising. Additionally, they argued that geography causes the intensity of the conflict to escalate after it has started, as the insurgency is able to persist. In this way, geography influences the persistence of rural insurgency.
2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation
As the previous chapter shows, many scholars are focusing on the causes of irregular warfare. However, the study of conflict dynamics is emerging. The extensive amount of research on the causes of irregular wars has created the careful assumption that both greed and grievance can cause conflict. Some presume that by applying these theories to the dynamics of warfare, the clarification of the continuation of violence is possible. However, this seems to be too optimistic. Most of the ideas about escalation of civil wars come from Cold War research, but more and more research has been done to find out what factors explain escalation and de-escalation in irregular warfare (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601-603). The next chapter will explicate theories on factors that might influence conflict dynamics.
2.2.1. Socio-political factors
Toft choose the factors ethnicity, nationalism, secession and self-determination to explain the onset of violence, how violence affects the dynamics of the conflict, and how violence ends (2012, p. 582). She concluded that groups that live in a self-claimed ethnic homeland and constitute the majority of the population are most apt to make ambitious claims about secession. If their claims are not accepted, they are most likely to use violence. Additionally, she also looked at the ending of conflicts. On this point, she concluded that in the case of secession wars, a negotiated settlement will only stop the conflict if the agreement includes a
credible threat of harm, should one of the parties infringe the settlement. Additionally, there should be credible guarantees of economic, diplomatic, and administrative support for the parties to keep their word. Toft concluded with the statement that these inclusive settlements are the only way to stop the violence and to prevent violence from coming back. The settlements should include these conditions in order to de-escalate the conflict (2012, p. 594-595).
2.2.2. Wartime political order
Staniland (2012) argued that "bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and
insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence" (p. 243). According to Staniland, wartime
political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. Orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty, to spheres of influence and tacit coexistence, to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder (2012, p. 243). Staniland continued that state and non-state actors both have cooperative and conflictual relationships that create dramatic variation in who rules, and how, in war. In turn, these wartime political orders shape patterns of violence against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war politics (2012, p. 243).
Staniland (2012) proposed a construction of a conceptual typology of six distinct wartime political orders (relationship between an armed group and a state): 1) active cooperation / shared sovereignty: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organisation retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability. Violence between the forces is minimised and institutionalised mechanisms for achieving joint goals are devised, even with no monopoly of violence); 2) active cooperation / collusion: a situation in which the state actively cooperates with non-state armed actors that are geographically intermeshed with its areas of operation. The violence that accompanies these orders will be different than a purely adversarial clash of wills. It is coordinated to target mutual enemies and reflect the political bargains made between the relevant actors; 3) passive cooperation / spheres of influence: segmented areas of control in which the state and its armed group agree to limit the boundary violations across each sphere. Ceasefire, informal truces, and agreements about where and when state and insurgent forces will tread are intended to manage spirals of escalation; 4) passive cooperation / tacit coexistence: involves the interweaving of state and non-state violent organisations in the context of fragmented, overlapping control. This order involves
careful attempts to limit the degree of active conflict and violence between states and non-state armed groups in intermixed daily life. Violence follows the implicit rules of engagement about what is and is not acceptable to each side; 5) No cooperation / clashing monopolies: order characterised by violent competition between the state and an armed actor that each control a distinct territory. Politics shape war aims, but this contest is a primarily military struggle with an emphasis on logistics, manpower, and arms; 6) No cooperation / guerrilla disorder: situation of fluid violence in which there are few clear norms or rules about the infliction of lethal violence when insurgent and state forces are intertwined in the same physical spaces. Violence is an embedded part of political, economic, and social life, lacking clear or institutionalised rules for the management of lethality (2012, p. 248-253). Staniland concluded that the distribution of control and level of cooperation between states and non-state armed groups vary considerably, creating different forms of wartime order (2012, p. 255).
Mukherjee (2014) examined why the longest insurgencies are usually characterised by low violence. By analysing several insurgencies based on minority ethnic groups aspirations, Myron Weiner found that in the medium capacity states, given resource constrains, the political leaders of the state prefer to ‘live with’ an insurgency that is less threatening, rather than forcibly suppress it. This causes some of these conflicts to have both long duration and low severity (p. 173). Mukherjee elaborated that those insurgencies that occur in peripheral regions of the country and fight for these aspirations, are the ones for which their medium capacity states follow a policy of containment, resulting in a low-level equilibrium of persistence violence (2014, p. 173). In turn, while the rebels do not really quit the fight, they keep their level of violence below a threshold level and thus help maintain a low-level equilibrium of violence (2014, p. 184).
2.2.3. War economies
The greed and grievance debate of the 1990s is built upon by, amongst others, Malone and Nitzschke (2005). They made a deeper analysis of the economic framework of irregular armed conflicts, and analyse the ‘war economies’, as they refer to it, and their links with international actors. While Colliers' ‘greed thesis’ is partially supported, Malone and Nitzschke (2005) argued that the correlation in the data is not a direct one, as bad governance is a common explaining factor. While greed might not be directly related with the onset of conflict, the analysis of Malone and Nitzschke (2005) showed that there is a big influence on
conflict dynamics. These influences are direct, as, for instance, a grievance based conflict transforms and becomes difficult to terminate for economic reasons. This transformation also changes the dynamics of actors. If large amounts of revenue are easily accessed and claimed, this might result in factionalisation and spread of interests, increasing Stedman’s (1997) spoiler issues. An important policy implication is that, in order to create peace, it needs to be more profitable than war. Relating to this is 'military fiscalism', which implies that there is a functional relationship between increasing military expenditure and economic growth. Emile Benoit was one of the scholars that found this correlation in developing countries (1978). This situation can influence conflict dynamics, for instance, when military employment creates more stable socio-political conditions and it becomes beneficial for the state to prolong the war.
2.2.4. Public support
In her book, Elisabeth Wood (2003) analysed El Salvador’s civil war by applying a wide range of methods from historical ethnography, supported by comparative analysis, to the micro level study. She focused on how collective action from below was sustained in the face of state violence. Her analysis suggested that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately (Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). However, her analysis also revealed that no standard economic or social measures predict which areas will support the guerrillas, and which will either remain neutral or support the government (Wood, 2003, p. 17-18, referred by Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). Wood explained this by arguing that "an emergent insurgent political culture
was key to generating and sustaining the insurgency despite its high costs" (Wood 2003, p.
225, as referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 593), meaning that people who joined the insurgency had a shared view/idea of justification and were willing to give the ultimate sacrifice.
2.2.5. State sponsored terrorism
Bapat (2012) started his work with this acute question: "why do some states engage in
coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals?" (2012, p. 1). This might give militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but also may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups to a level that sponsors cannot control anymore. To answer this dilemma, Bapat applied a game theoretical model of state sponsorship. He argued that state sponsorship represents a form of costly signalling that is useful in coercive bargaining,
as sponsorship increases the difficulty a target government will have in repressing the militants. This added difficulty can create a situation in which the government prefers making some policy concessions if the sponsor agrees to cease the militants’ attacks. However, with their new-found power, state-sponsored militants may be less willing to negotiate, and may punish the sponsor for making deals they believe are unacceptable. The increased risk of militant punishment can provide sponsors with substantial bargaining power (2012, p. 1). The theoretical model argues that state sponsorship serves to signal the tying of hands in bargaining with rival governments in two possible ways. First, sponsorship decreases the probability of a militant group being repressed, thereby increasing the probability that the group will be effective in accomplishing the sponsor’s policy objective. This enables the sponsor to demand more in negotiation by improving the sponsor’s value for the outside option associated with bargaining failure. Secondly, sponsorship gives the militants the power to punish the sponsor if it negotiates an unfavourable deal, enabling the sponsor forces to demand considerable concessions from the target government in exchange for abandoning the militants. (2012, p. 26). Bapat concludes by stating that, while the previous literature supports the major power prediction, the empirical test in this study provides evidence that sponsorship is more likely to occur if the potential sponsor is moderately weak (2012, p. 27).
According to Byman (2007), there are many different reasons why states support terrorists. Starting from a historical context, he referred to an observation made by Boaz Ganor. Until the mid-1990s, international terrorism was generally considered to be state-sponsored, as two competing super-power blocs, USSR and USA, fought the cold war by supporting terrorist groups ´belonging´ to their ideological camp. These organisations were perceived as proxies, an inexpensive tool to promote the superpower´s interests around the world and in conflict areas in particular. For other states, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, terrorism was considered a low-risk tool that could achieve various goals inexpensively in both the international and regional arenas (Byman, 2007, p. 87). Byman argued that among the reasons why states support terrorists, is that terrorists offer alternative means for states to influence their neighbours, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter U.S. hegemony, or achieve other aims of the state. Support for terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities, and it allows states to influence events far beyond their borders. Supporting terrorists can also serve a broader range of regime objectives from domestic to ideological (2007, p. 88).
Byman emphasised the need to make a distinction between different levels of state involvement in terrorism. He offers six categories of state support to terrorism: 1) strong supporters, 2) weak supporters, 3) lukewarm supporters, 4) antagonistic supporters, 5) passive supporters, and 6) unwilling hosts, each of them having its unique set of interaction dynamics. However, this co-operation might have negative consequences for the proxy organisations. They may find that they pay a high price for the support that they receive from a state, while losing their credibility, if it is perceived as being controlled by a foreign power. Furthermore, Byman concluded that a state’s influence sometimes leads a terrorist group to moderate its activities or become more pragmatic (2007, p. 88).
2.2.6. Terrorism and transnational criminal organisations
The decline of state sponsored terrorism led many scholars to believe that terrorists and transnational criminal organisations will engage in strategic partnerships. Dishman (2001, p. 43-56) reflects on the probability of cooperation between terrorist groups and transnational criminal organisation. He argued that the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation takes place in different degrees (2001, 47). Some terrorists might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to understand these transformations, Dishman looked into their aims and interests, and made the observation that terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, 44). The conclusion is made that the two groups will not intensively cooperate with each other due to their different aims and interests. The terrorist group is searching for a revolution or an independent territory, while the transnational criminal organisation aims to benefit from illegal activities. Therefore, terrorist groups do not want to engage in activities that portray them as criminal, and transnational criminal organisations do not seek unwanted attention and pressure of the government (2001, 50). Thus, the groups are more likely to use their so-called 'in-house' capacities to undertake criminal or political acts.
2.2.7. Counterinsurgency
As Gventer (2014) pointed out, Douglas Porch’s book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the
myths of the new way of war (2013), makes a powerful case study in the perils of using
historical analogies to derive recipes for today’s problems: a practice embraced by too many counterinsurgency converts during and after the Iraq Surge (Gventer, 2014, p. 250). Porch
argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim (Gventer, 2014, p. 249). Even in Iraq, studies revealed that the upward spiral of violence had coarsened attitudes among US troops toward Iraqi civilians whom many saw as complicit with the insurgency (Porch, 2013, p. 299). Gventer pointed out that the stated purpose of the Iraq Surge and the alleged implementation of COIN techniques was to give ‘breathing space’ to the country’s warring factions so that they could reach a peaceful, political settlement. Instead, it seems to have facilitated a consolidation of power by the country’s leading Shia factions and their Iranian patrons. Meanwhile, true ‘reconciliation’ remains out of reach as the country’s internal conflicts simmer away (Gventer 2014, p. 250).
Solomon (2015), proponent of critical terrorism studies, argued that success (in using traditional counterinsurgency campaigns) in a traditional realist sense is far from assured. Traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter-productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity, which is giving rise to radical Islamist movements. Therefore, traditional counterterrorism would only serve to perpetuate conflicts in these countries further, as is the case with, for example, the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency campaign against Islamist sect Boko Haram. Despite the enactment of an anti-terrorism bill, the closure of border, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of 30,000 security guards, the carnage in Nigeria continues (p. 219-220). Solomon aptly noted that the traditional counterterrorism perspective is short-sighted at best, as it has not served to ameliorate the terrorist threat in Africa (2015, p. 230). In Nigeria, not only has the Nigerian state been unable to resolve Boko Haram’s challenge military, but its own counterterrorism violence has also rendered even more illegitimate in the eyes of northern Nigerians (2015, p. 231). Solomon argued that states are using the terrorist label to maintain the status quo and attract foreign support. This form of ‘othering’ allows states to delegitimise these non-state actors. The terrorist label also serves to deny the context and conditions that give rise to such movements. Additionally, it allows one to ignore the complexity and the individual character of each of the movements under discussion (2015, p. 231). According to Solomon, the lack of knowledge about the real grievances driving Al Shabab, makes it impossible to make the distinction between sub-state terrorism (terrorism directed at local goals) and international
terrorism, or instance a global Islamic Caliphate pursued by Al Qaeda. When international actors do not distinguish between the two and support an illegitimate state with military training and equipment as well as intelligence and financial assistance, these groups often turn to the likes of Al-Qaeda to provide them with the means to conduct their attacks against the state. In this process, sub-state terrorism then morphs into international terrorism (2015, p. 231).
2.2.8. Criminalisation of a conflict
To discover how international and national criminal law impacts insurgencies, McKnight (2015) analysed the various responses to violations in Uganda, focusing on, for instance, the Amnesty Act, International Criminal Court indictments, and International Crimes Division. She pointed out that "the conflict in northern Uganda presents a unique study of international
criminal law and different responses to prolonged conflict, as seemingly every tactical and ideological method that has been implemented to instil and secure justice has failed to achieve either goal" (McKinght 2015, p. 193-194). As McKnight pointed out, in general the
problem of bonding rebel groups to human rights treaties is the fact that those laws are established by state consent. Nevertheless, some human rights treaties place explicit obligations on non-state armed groups, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically applies to armed groups (2015, 198).
Any activity falling outside applicable treaties or humanitarian provisions may still constitute a violation of customary international law and jus cogens crimes, such as the acts of torture (McKnight, 2015, p. 198-199). In case of Uganda and the atrocities committed by LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation in 2004 and issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and war crimes. As McKnight pointed out, these were targeted only against few central LRA personnel, leaving out all other insurgency groups, and government officials who had also violated humanitarian laws. This led to a decade of claims against ICC of ineffectiveness and failure (2015, p. 199-202). Furthermore, McKnight pointed out the ICC´s incapability to enforce its decisions, as one week after the ICC announced the opening of its investigations, the LRA killed 50 civilians in a refugee camp in Lira (2015, p. 206-207). This was followed by a creation of International Crimes Division, a national institution prosecuting international crimes through domestic
legislation. When the organisation started prosecuting criminals who had originally received amnesty, public trust and respect towards this institution was also put in question (McKnight 2015, p. 205). McKnight drew the conclusion from these observations that putting justice first, can lead to the impossibility of peace, as an insurgency leader feels he has to fight not only the government, but also the entire international community. Furthermore, careful timing and effective execution seems to be among crucial elements when international or national juridical processes are planned against insurgencies (2015, p. 207).
Dudouet (2011) examined the impact of anti-terrorist legislation, in particular the so-called ‘blacklisting’ regimes, on targeted entities as well as on third parties interacting with them for peaceful and constructive ends, and argues their impact to be ambivalent (p. 1). She pointed to the fact that the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are typically asymmetric in nature, with internationally legitimised state actors opposing non-state armed groups, often labelled or legally proscribed as ‘terrorist organisations’ (2011, p. 3). She described how one of the most immediate responses to the New York and Washington attacks was the establishment of so-called terrorist lists by the US government and the UN Security Council (and subsequently UN member states and the EU). Dudouet pointed out that, as there is no internationally-accepted legal definition of ´terrorism´, the task has been left to individual UN member states, which have interpreted it according to their diplomatic agendas or domestic interests (2011, p. 5). This received criticism, for example, from human rights lawyers, who have denounced blacklisting as an ideological and politically-biased tool that is blurring the distinctions between acts of violence against civilians and legitimate struggles for democracy or self-determination, by turning unarmed activists and their communities into ´terrorists´ (2011, p. 5-6). Dudouet argued that the behaviour of non-state actors, such as underground guerrilla organisations, is less likely to be affected by international sanctions, as they already perceive themselves as stigmatised and isolated. In fact, some organisations might consider proscription by their ‘enemies’ as a badge of honour (2011, p. 4). Furthermore, proscription can fuel radicalism and create direct impediments for humanitarian or political negotiations (2011, p. 5). As an example, Dudouet described that while terrorist lists are supposed to encourage armed movements to adopt peaceful strategies, the proscription of such actors in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Colombia, the Philippines, Palestine, and Nepal took place precisely while they were demonstrating their readiness to engage in dialogue and consider non-violent political strategies, inevitably leading to their re-radicalisation (2011, p. 5). Therefore she concludes that the banning and criminalisation of unarmed political or social movements
associated with blacklisted organisations has severe consequences for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, by granting these organisations an air of ´victimhood´ and increase their popular support (2011, p. 7). Hence, when applied unwisely, terrorist lists might interfere with efforts to find a political solution to asymmetric intra-state conflicts (2011, p. 1).
2.2.9. Natural disasters
Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman (2008), and Beardsley (2009) looked at the influence of natural disasters on conflict dynamics. Beardsley focused on how natural disasters can influence the trajectory of conflict and peace processes in intra-state conflict. He stated that if the insurgent group is depending on local support, it will be more responsive to community needs and therefore welcome disaster relief and diplomacy after a disaster. This will advance the peace process (2009, p. 641-642). Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman stated that after a disaster, informal networks are created, and disaster relief and diplomacy will occur. These will influence peace talks positively. On the other side, if, for instance, relief aid is distributed unequally, the conflict can escalate again (2008, p. 515). Although natural disasters do not occur frequently during conflicts, there are some important examples that show hows disasters change conflict dynamics, such as the 1998 drought in Sudan, the 2001 and 2005 earthquakes in India/Pakistan, and the 2004 tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka (Gaillard, Clavé & Kelman, 2008, p. 515).
Devit and Tol (2012) pointed out that "existing empirical research on the role of climate
change in violent conflict is limited and inconclusive. There is a consensus, however, that other, non-environmental factors dominate" (p. 130). Researchers refer to the findings of
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who were the first to suggest an ‘economic theory’ of civil conflict (rent-seeking by violence) and to test their predictions with data (Devit & Tol, 2012, p. 130). According to this strand of literature, people may fight over resources that are highly valuable and easy to smuggle, for instance diamonds, but they tend not to fight over bulky goods such as water and food. Climate- and weather-sensitive resources are therefore less conflict-prone (2012, p. 130-131). In an attempt to test this assumption, Devit and Tol developed a simulation model for the three-way interaction between civil war, climate change and development, in which they analysed civil wars in Sub-Sahara Africa. Their results indicated a clear statistical correlation between climate change and occurrence of civil war,
therefore leading researchers to suggest that at least in certain situations and regions, climate change increases the probability of civil wars (2012, p. 141).
2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution
2.3.1. Settlements and peace processes
Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) are not the only ones who have written about settlements and peace processes ending irregular wars. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012, p. 678-687) identified three paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist or insurgent organisations. The first paradox refers to the misuse of negotiations by the insurgents to stall time, in order to prepare for a next offense. It should be noted that the state can also misuse negotiations to stall for time. This abuse of negotiations is most likely to occur in the mid-phase of an irregular conflict, in which the state failed to defeat the insurgents, despite its advantages in power and resources. Insurgents misuse the negotiations to increase its military strength to ensure a decisive victory (2012, p. 678-681). The second paradox implies that negotiations may also lead to disagreements within the terrorist organisation, as not every member sees negotiations as a positive development. Thereby, negotiations can cause the group to split into factions, each subgroup defending their sphere of influence. The subgroups excluded from the negotiations might use violence to frustrate the process (2012, p. 682-684). Patrick Johnston (2007) suggested that some governments actually seek to fraction terrorist groups in order to exploit the largest factions, using them to combat the remaining subgroups. The third paradox relates to the durability of negotiated settlements. Negotiations sometimes lead to temporary peaceful settlements, but in most cases bring about lengthy peace processes. Also, parallel to the negotiations process, terrorist continue violent acts to increase their power. Therefore, it can be argued that military victories might offer better prospects for stability (2001, p. 685-687).
2.3.2. Spoilers
Stephen Stedman (1997) also studied the dynamics of the peace processes, and looked specifically into the factors that influence the peace process in a negative way, which he called ‘spoilers of the peace process’. Because conflicts are seldom straight forward proceedings with simple aims, Stedman argued that the negotiations to settle for peace are often seen by some actors as against their interest. This makes peace-making a dangerous and
difficult endeavour. If spoilers succeed, the results of ongoing conflict are often disastrous. Examples given by Stedman (1997, p. 5) are Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, where the casualty numbers of the ongoing conflict were multiple times higher than the number of casualties of the original conflict. Stedman argued that in order to prevent spoilers from succeeding, a thorough analysis and strategy is needed to deal with them. He categorised spoilers based on their position, inside or outside the peace process, the number of spoilers, and the type of spoilers. The ‘type of spoilers’ is further divided into three types: limited, greedy or total. The framework also categorises strategies for coping with spoilers, inducement, socialisation and coercion. Choosing the right strategy is hampered by uncertainty in the analysis of the spoiler. Multiple factors should be taken into account when dealing with spoilers, amongst others, which are: the strategic goals of the spoiler; the intent of its actions; the degree of commitment to the peace process; the degree of command and control on followers; and the degree of unity within the spoiler. There is often uncertainty regarding these factors and assessments have to be made based on intelligence. A peacemaker has to take these complex factors into account and assess the effect of actions on the spoiler, other engaged actors and external stakeholders.
Reiter (2015) researched the occurrence of spoiling attempts during peace processes. He stated that the literature on civil wars notes the extreme difficulty of maintaining civil war peace agreements. Within this context, spoiling, defined by Reiter as: "actions taken to
disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process" (p. 92), has been identified as a major
threat to civil war peace agreements. For instance, Angola and Rwanda experienced catastrophic violence when peace agreements failed (p. 90). Reiter’s analysis finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not typically assumed as common, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements.
According to Reiter (2015, p. 89), when spoiling does pose a threat to peace, it does so under specific circumstances, such as the moment powerful actors initiate a peace process, or when paramilitaries and/or state security forces have been excluded from the peace agreement. He concluded that the vast majority of spoiling is often dangerous and disruptive for society. However, most actors who resort to the spoiling strategy typically fail in their goals and pose little risk to signed peace agreements (2015, p. 105). Finally, Reiter referred to recent research, which shows that the way the events are perceived by the public, influenced by media
coverage, has a profound impact on the ultimate effect of spoiling, making the population either more or less willing to accept the loss of human lives as a cost of peace (2015, p. 107). 2.3.3. Governmental policies
The United States Institute of Peace´s special report addresses the following question: what
are the most successful governmental policies aimed at ending terrorism? This research is
conducted by drawing experiences from several civil conflicts. The report suggests that one of the most efficient approaches might be to apply strategies aiming to diminish popular support for the terrorists, hence reducing their strength (1999, p. 1). The report stresses the importance of understanding how the terrorist organisation and its decision making process works, which is crucial in choosing the right governmental policies (1999, p. 11). According to Martha Crenshaw, this can be attempted by analysing terrorist groups’ internal factors on the one hand, such as decision making, internal psychological dynamics, and external factors on the other hand, such as organisation’s strength compared to government forces, motivation (ideological or ethnical) and ties with external support. In addition, other factors to analyse are the tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, such as deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations (1999, p. 2-3). Based on these factors, Crenshaw described that the end of terrorism may result from situations as success of terrorists, preliminary success, organisational breakdown of the terrorist group, dwindling support, and new alternatives (other options for political change emerge) (1999, p. 3). She pointed out that governments’ ‘get-tough’ approach can possibly only create more violence, leading to protracted conflict (1999, p. 4). Crenshaw emphasised the importance of a right timing for the peace process, ideally when the government is strong and the terrorist organisation is undergoing a period of introspection (1999, p. 1, 11).
2.4 Conflict theory
2.4.1.Theoretical foundations
According to the literature scan, the conflict theory domain can be divided into classics and contemporary scholars. The foundation of the conflict theory is commonly associated with Marxism (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29-31), as Marx´s dialectical materialist account of history predicted that capitalism would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own destruction by a proletarian revolution, therefore emphasising the economic factors (Marx 1859, 1977). Two other classical conflict theorists are Ludwig Gumplowicz and Lester Ward, who introduced a more ethnological perspective to conflict. Gumplowicz´s approach emphasised that large complex human societies are evolved from war and conquest
(Gumplowicz 1884, 1963), whereas Ward´s approach gave more attention to the ´human factor´ and emphasised that the root of the societal conflicts lies in the human conflicted nature itself (Ward 1897). Further classicists are Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim´s approach focuses on crime, which he saw as the chief form of the social conflict. He stated that "crime plays a role in the evolution of morality and law" (Durkheim, 1938, p. 70-81). Whereas Marx emphasised the importance of "social structure", Weber emphasised the importance of "social action". This is the ability of individuals to influence the nature of their social relationships in sociologically significant ways (Livesay, 2015).
C. Wright Mills is usually credited as the founder of the modern conflict theory (Knapp, 2015). Central in his writing is the concept of 'power elite', as the 'national upper class' owns most of the country´s wealth. Mills was also concerned of the rise of militarism among the elites, because according to him, the rise of the military state serves the interests of the elite of industrial societies (Elwell, 2013). Another contemporary theorists is Gene Sharp, who argued that the source of any ruler´s political power derives from those over whom (s)he rules. Furthermore, the cooperation of those around a ruler is essential if (s)he is to have any power at all (Sharp, 2013). Finally, contemporary conflict theorist William Hulius Wilson emphasised the impact of racial inequality and rising economic inequality as a source of societal conflict (Wilson, 2003, p. 1096-1114). As a conclusion, Guy Hungerford presented a useful overview of the whole conflict theory domain by describing that conflict theorists see "that the society is made up of different groups who have competing or conflicting interests", and history "as the product of struggle" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, conflict theorists believe the main engine of change to be the "changing balance of power between
different groups and especially different classes" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29).
2.4.2. Modern approaches
While classic approaches have focused on certain factors as sources of conflict, modern conflict mapping recognises the need of analysing complex conflict systems. As pointed out by Ramsbotham (2011), this has been integral in the conflict resolution field from the beginning (p. 118). However, this does not mean that there is one overarching approach agreed upon by all the researchers of the field. On the contrary, there are several parallel and colliding approaches, emphasising different perspectives, factors and levels of analysis. This research attempts to combine the most essential approaches, and to present a holistic model coming together of different transdisciplinary frameworks. In the following part several
