Social Theory of World Politics

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Social Theory of World Politics

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Social Theory of World Politics

expanding structural constructivism through a reconstitution of identity

(final version)

Thesis to obtain the Master’s Degree Modern History and International Relations

at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen August 29, 2012

by Tim Star

Supervised by prof. dr. J.H. de Wilde

Name : Tim Star

Adress : Heymanslaan 39a

9714 GH Groningen

Email : t.star@student.rug.nl

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Now I’ve read some books and I’ve grown quite brave if I could just speak up I think I would say

that there is no truth there’s only you and what you make the truth

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Introduction

This thesis will revolve predominantly around one of the most famous works within IR of the past decades: Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander Wendt. Appearing exactly ten years after Nicholas Onuf’s first introduced constructivism into IR with Worlds of Our Making, it is often taken as the embodiment of the “Constructivist turn” in IR that took place in the 1990’s. Its influence is apparent from the many articles that take it as a benchmark for constructivism when needing a point of reference for constructivist IR to be juxtaposed against something else and the numerous panel discussions, journal issues, and books that have Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics as its sole subject are another testament of its impact.1 Notwithstanding its importance in giving a voice to constructivism as an antithesis against the traditional neo-realist and neo-liberal paradigms, Social Theory of International Politics does not speak for all constructivist scholars in IR and Wendt faces his share of critics within the constructivist realm. Although his theory is still relatively uncontested at the systemic level, its method has come at a price that is mostly recognized by more radical constructivists who feel that Wendt has not gone far enough in problematizing the world of international politics and that he still adopts problematic assumptions from the traditional paradigms.

Though an admirer of the way he criticized the traditional theories and managed to fight neo-realism on its own turf, I contend with those who would have wanted to see him go further. To explore this possibility, this thesis asks the question whether Wendt’s social theory can be expanded with a more comprehensive understanding of identity in order to formulate a theory on the level of world politics that allows for the internal differences between its actors. In order to come up with an answer I will turn to the work of scholars of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), in particular that of Walter Carlsnaes, for help. Carlsnaes formulated a three dimensional framework for policy analysis that shows some similarities to Wendt’s theory. Hoping to profit from the actor based approach of FPA, a comparison shall be made in order to come up with ideas to enrich the social theory of Wendt in the aspects mentioned. Moreover, the work of FPA

1_{See for example: Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds., Constructivism in International Relation; Alexander}

Wendt and His Critics (New York: Routledge, 2006). And Journal for International Relations and Development 4,

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scholars shall also be used as a means to fill the observed gaps in Wendt’s structural theory concerning the issue of the identity formation process and the empirical observation of thereof.

Similar to the Waltzian neo-realism Wendt confronts, he explicitly takes the system consisting of states as his subject of analysis and aims formulate a theory that explains the behavior of states in general, as opposed to their particular actions in particular situations. The state as a central subject remains thereby unquestioned, although its content is exposed to problematization in a way that traditional theories had not done. Working from the assumption that identities are the foundation on which the behavior of states is built, Wendt aims to take the identity formation process of states as an integral part of his theory. This way he asks the question how states within the system come to want what they want as opposed to why they do what they do. In doing so however, Wendt refers solely to the part of identity that lies in the interaction between states, even though it is acknowledged that there is more to the concept than just that.

In our attempts to get a theoretic grip on the complex reality, simplifications and abstraction of the world we aim to explain are both inescapable and necessary. However once we lose sight of the compromises made in our desire to clarify the complex and unravel the entangled, we run the risk of deluding ourselves by reifying as self-evident that which is not, or need not be. State centrism and the neglect of the particularities of different states are two such potentially harmful reifications Social Theory of International Politics contains and it is these two aspects this thesis aims to confront. Apart from potentially causing a simplified view of the world that loses sight of some real complexities, the issues point to an underlying Western-centrism of IR as a discipline based on assumed universalities that may not be as universal as they are brought forth to be.2 At a time when many Western states are economically outperformed by sub-altern nations and when the formal top down institutionalism of Europe is confronted with crises while the Southeast Asian nations are calmly continuing to conduct their informal mode of diplomacy, it seems even more necessary to question the Western universalisms inherent to IR. This concerns both the need to question the content of theoretical

2_{For an extensive discussion of the Western-centric view of IR as a discipline see: Pierre P. Lizee, A Whole New}

World; Reinventing International Studies for the Post-Western World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). And

for alternatives: Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on

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concepts like “state” or “power” within IR as a discipline, as well as the need for an appreciation of the particular differences in internal organization of states that are to be found in the real political world out there.

Hoping to contribute to just that, this thesis will elaborate on Wendt’s theory to see whether it can be cut loose from the reifying and reductionist elements it has quietly taken over from structural realism. Perhaps there is even more potential hidden in Wendt’s constructivism for IR than what it has already brought to the discipline of IR so far. This thesis will look to explore this potential by setting itself a double task. The first is to expand the theory to include more than just the states alone, and following from this, the second goal is to enrich it by taking a more complete version of identity into account. In striving to accomplish both these goals, the thesis hangs on to his major line of thought concerning the idea that identities play a central role in determining the behavior of actors and that understanding the process of how states come to want what they want is the most vital question if we want to theorize international/world politics. World politics shall throughout be used to refer to the political processes between actors that take place on a global level and that includes multiple actors such as states, International Organizations (IO’s), Multinational Companies (MNC’s), and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s) This serves to distinguish it from Wendt’s international system which consists of states exclusively.

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identity. Given the aim to move from international to world politics, such research design would ideally also include a case study involving interaction between different types of actors.

Even in absence of an empirical case study, this thesis aims to contribute to IR theory in three ways. Firstly, it will hopefully enrich the understanding of world politics by showing how other actors apart from states can be included in models for explaining behavior. This would be an improvement on current variants of Realist theory and Wendt’s social constructivism because treating the system of states as an isolated realm of like units turns a blind eye to the reality in which other actors play a role as well. Secondly, ignoring the internal differences between actors negates another important part of the identity picture that is supposed to explain behavior. By making these particular elements endogenous to theory, identity as a whole can be used as a theoretical concept that allows for the differences between actors to serve as important determinants of behavior. Last but not least, in addressing these two points, this thesis will contribute to IR theory by looking to improve Wendt’s ideas with regard to the mutual constitution of the system and its units that is such an important part of his constructivism.

In order to address the aforementioned issues in Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics, the first chapter will look at the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). By juxtaposing Wendt’s systemic approach with a view that is more actor focused, it will be inquired whether a combined effort between the subfields of structural IR theory and FPA can yield any guidance in overcoming the main points of criticism against Social Theory of International Politics. The aim is to see whether there is any useful common ground between the two subfields that may carry the seeds for improvement. The second chapter will elaborate on the main points of critique against the structural approach of Wendt and will consequently suggest that these problems can be overcome through rethinking the concept of corporate identity and refocusing the attention on corporate agency.

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I The General, The Particular, The Similar

Since the centuries political scientists first started to engage in the topic of how different political entities interact with each other, International Relations (IR) evolved into a fully fledged independent academic field in the beginning of the 20th century. As most academic disciplines, IR developed its fair share of different subfields, two of which are structural IR and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). These two branches are each characterized by taking a different level of analysis the basis of their inquiry. Whereas FPA starts at the actor level of analysis, structural IR is more concerned with examining the functioning of the system as a whole. Given that the goal of both FPA and IR is to explain the way states or other actors in world politics go about their business and account for the factors that determine their actions, the outset here is to inquire whether the two different branches of IR can help each other. Instead of holding on to an antagonistic relation in which one subfield is not interested in the particular/generalizing type of research of the other, this chapter aims to search for a shared area of interest and a potential opening for reconciliation.

Structural Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

Although FPA is nowadays mostly accepted as a sub-discipline of IR, its presence in the field has not always been an easy fit. Right from its emergence, FPA was considered to be closer attached to the field of public policy than that of IR.3 In the 1950’s and 60’s, the works of Richard Snyder, James Rosenau, and Harold and Margaret Sprout which served to bring the decision-making process of foreign policy under the attention, laid the foundation the discipline would be built on during the following two decades.4 After this fertile period in FPA however, the developments came to slow down. One of the reasons was that Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP), a major branch of FPA grown from behavioral political science and devoted to generating

3_{Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse,} and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 331.

4_{For a thorough overview of the Classic FPA as well as the most important approaches consequentially developed}

see: Valerie M. Hudson, "The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis," in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors,

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agent-general knowledge based on the conduction of large-n empiricism, did not yield the results that had been hoped for.5Although this by no means reduced the entire field of FPA to a failed project, it was now left with a wide variety of approaches and theories that did not manage to present itself like an academic whole. Meanwhile in the 1980’s, the attention for IR theory led by Waltzian neo-realism was growing, without FPA playing a significant part in this.6

Despite the challenging effect these developments had on FPA’s position as a major sub-field of IR, the good news was that the end of the Cold War brought along a renewed interest in actor-specific theory. FPA was revived within IR as it could hopefully provide the explanations for change in international politics that structuralist IR theory could not offer.7 Nowadays, the case for FPA to remain a sub-field of IR is first of all supported by the argument that it is able to counterbalance the American development of IR toward an increasingly structuralist approach. The widespread feeling emerging after the Cold War that neo-realist structuralism was insufficiently able to explain the international developments that occurred may not be solved by a shifting to a constructivist approach while maintaining a strictly structural view. Secondly, as Valerie Hudson argues, FPA can help significantly in overcoming the rationalist view of actors in IR. FPA is what she calls the “ground” of IR theory forming the “conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occur.”8 Without FPA, IR would remain a mere abstraction.

Structural IR theory and FPA can complement each other because they each focus on the particular part of analysis the other neglects. Structural theorists in IR are not primarily interested in causes at the unit-level, but instead choose to treat states as so-called black boxes, whose actions are determined by their structural environment. How this environment works and how it guides the behavior of states is what they aim to theorize. They have no analytical interest in the internal domestic processes as a source interests and explanatory cause of behavior.9 Alexander Wendt makes this explicit in stating that “the real interests of agents are dependent upon and thus

5_{Carlsnaes, Foreign Policy, 333 Also: Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the} Ground of International Relations," Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005), 14.

6_{Carlsnaes, Foreign Policy, 331.}

7_{Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations, 13.}

8_{Ibid., 1.}

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explainable only by the external or social structural context in which they are embedded.”10 On the contrary, for many scholars of FPA it is precisely this black box of structural theory that they take as their explanans.11Even though scholars of FPA are scattered along the entire ontological spectrum from individualism to holism and they do not all ignore structural factors, their strength lies definitely in actor specific theory.

Despite their apparent compatibility, the step to integration seems one too far given that where structural theory aims to understand behavior in general; FPA wants to explain behavior in specific. Integration in this sense is impossible because structural theory has defined itself as such that it would by definition not get involved with the understanding of actor specific behavior. Structural theory in that sense is happy to erect the walls that limit its own view. Bearing in mind that what they do still have in common is the understanding and explanation of international behavior, a further examination of both approaches might still be fruitful if for a moment we forget about the antagonistic relation concerning the general vs. the specific and look for shared understandings in joint interests

The Agent-Structure Problem

One of the main battles of IR over the past decades has been the agent-structure debate, which was fought within both subfields of the discipline.12 The debate concerns the problem that

10_{Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization} 41, no. 3 (1987), 360.

11_{Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations, 2; Valerie M.}

Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Mershon International

Studies Review 39, no. 2 (1995), pp. 209.

12_{For examples of this enduring debate see: David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?"}

International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989), pp. 441. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, "Beware of Gurus: Structure

and Action in International Relations," Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991), pp. 393; Alexander Wendt, "Levels of Analysis Vs. Agents and Structures: Part III," Review of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1992), pp. 181; Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent Structure-Problematique in International Relations Theory," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 ( 1997), 365; Colin Wight, "They Shoot Dead Horses Don't they?: Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999), 109; Roxanne Lynn Doty, "A Reply to Colin Wight," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999), 387; Colin Wight, "Interpretation all the Way Down?: A Reply to Roxanne Lynn Doty," European

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despite it being “plausible to believe that the properties of agents and those of social structures are both relevant to explanations of social behavior (…) we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship.”13Notwithstanding the difference in approach between FPA and structural theory mentioned above, it is not necessarily the case that the former automatically side with agency and that the latter swear by structure, as we shall see below. The instigator of the debate in IR was Alexander Wendt who in 1987 came out with an article aptly titled: “The Agent Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.”

Through an analysis of the two structural theories of Kenneth Waltz and Immanuel Wallerstein, Wendt concluded that it is better to treat actor and structure as ontological equals instead of prioritizing one over the other. Wendt argued that Waltz’ neo-realism by (implicitly) prioritizing units over system, cannot account for the generation of units because the system is defined solely by those same units.14 The system thus lacks explanatory power and Waltz ends up with a reductionist theory.15 World-system by Wallerstein on the other hand, becomes determinist because it grants the system explanatory power over its units, while leaving the system itself unexplained.16 For both theories this is a consequence of the treatment of their primary units of analysis as given and unproblematic.17 In an attempt to avoid both reductionism and determinism, Wendt sought to refrain from choosing a primary unit and instead maintain a position in which both units and system are truly of equal importance.

From an FPA perspective, Walter Carlsnaes confronted the same problem in his article: “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”. Similar to Wendt, he contended that as long as one of the two concepts is explained by the other, the other remains unproblematized in its own right.18 Carlsnaes maintained that no existing branch of FPA was able to deal with this problem in a satisfactory way and explain the policy of states by referring to the dynamic process between structures and agents in which one is not fully dependent on the

13_{Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, 338.}

14_{Ibid., 342.}

15_{Wendt’s reading of Waltz’ Theory of International Politics as being a bottom-up system does not go entirely}

uncontested see: Hollis and Smith, Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations, pp. 393-410.

16_{Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, 347-48.}

17_{Ibid., 348.}

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other.19 In order to define the relationship of agent and structure as one in which both are equal in their explanatory power over the other, both Carlsnaes and Wendt resorted to structuration theory as defined by the sociologist Anthony Giddens.

Structuration theory offers a way to conceptualize agents and structures on a meta-theoretical level and is thereby not concerned primarily with the content of theory (who are actors, what comprises the system) itself. Wendt took two important points from this theory which offer a solution for the ontological agency-structure dilemma. The first is that structuration theory accepts the reality and explanatory importance of irreducible and unobservable social structures that generate agents. This follows the thesis of scientific realism holding that even if some structures cannot be observed, they should nevertheless be treated as real entities because they generate effects that are observable.20 The second point is that agents and structure are joined in a dialectical synthesis in which none is subordinated to the other in terms of explanatory power. Instead of prioritizing one over the other in terms of explanatory power, Giddens’ structuration theory holds that both agency and structure presuppose each other in a mutually constitutive relationship and that one does not come ontologically prior to the other.21 These points will later form the basis for his own structural theory of IR.

Carlsnaes acknowledged the same characteristics of structuration theory and elaborated on what consequences this meta-theoretical framework would hold for the sub-field of FPA. First of all it would require FPA not to deal with structure as a given unchangeable framework, but instead as being a codetermined result of actions by its agents.22 Secondly, it holds that FPA must look beyond the intended outcomes of policy action and also take into account the unintended outcomes of policy action as these have equally constitutive effects on the structure.23 From an actor perspective thirdly, this means that they too should not be treated as given, but as dependent and shaped by environmental structures in which they are embedded and which at all time underlie their actions.24 Finally, there is the issue of what Carlsnaes calls “policy constitution through discourse”, referring to the idea that discursive processes that establish

19_{Ibid., 256.}

21_{Ibid., 359-60.}

22_{Carlsnaes, The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis, 260.}

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structures and inform policy decisions are subject to change over time as well. This means that as the dynamic evolution of concepts changes their understanding by actors, the structure as a collective understanding is also affected by this.25

Realism itself also tried to find a new way to come to terms with the unit and structure domain of foreign policies of states. In a wave of FPA labeled neo-classical realism, scholars tried to reconcile the structural and the domestic domains of politics, trying to avoid the mechanic exclusively top-down approach of neo-realism, while still maintaining the importance of structure as a constraint on foreign policy. In short, neo-classical realists argue that the foreign policies of states are driven primarily by its place in the system and their relative material capabilities, but that the systemic forces must first be translated at the unit-level where intervening variables determine the final policy outcomes of specific states.26 This way, one is able to account for variations in state behavior that might occur despite similar systemic pressures. By introducing intervening variables at the unit-level, neo-classical realists aimed to build a bridge between structural realism and actor-specific theory.

Although neo-classical realism hereby manages to incorporate both levels of analysis in their analysis, the central problem structural realism suffered in the eyes Wendt is not overcome. The properties of states are still treated as exogenously given and their interests are considered to be shaped by their relative power capabilities.27 What is questioned are merely the domestic factors that constrain/enable the fulfillment of these structure-generated interests. As the properties are left unchangeable, so is the structure as a whole. Hence, the reproach of reductionism remains, because the system cannot shape the interests of states, but merely condition their behavior. A second problem is that, even though neo-classical realism pays a lot of attention to the perception of the decision maker as an intervening variable, it is still an utterly material approach. Perception may play an important role in understanding international behavior, it is restricted to the perception of material capabilities. Moreover, some scholars argue

25_{Ibid., 262.}

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that even perception of other’s capabilities of others is in large part influenced by one’s own relative possession of material capabilities.28

The two major objections against classic IR theory are left firmly in place by neo-classical realism, which does not get rid of reductionism. To counter this, both the structural theoretic approach of Wendt and the FPA approach of Carlsnaes defend a mutually constitutive relationship of actors and system. This is helpful for each in the sense that it provides a more satisfactory way to conceptualize both the internal and external domain of states, while maintaining the liberty of choosing their own explanans: the specific or the general. In order to do so, both resort to a constructivist view of international politics. The following sections will elaborate on their basic constructivist assumptions and the follow up to their contributions to the agency-structure debate.

Structural Constructivist Theory

In a reaction to the material theories, constructivists in IR stress the importance of the ideational factors for understanding international politics. According to them, the effects of material factors on shaping behavior and interaction are dependent on the dynamic interpretation of these factors.29 Material factors only derive meaning from the ideas in which they are embedded, which are attributed to them by humans. Weapons for example, will only be perceived as a threat as long as there is a relationship of enmity underlying them. On the one hand, the conviction that an independent reality exists, but that its meaning is constructed by the ideas attached to them, distinguishes constructivism from the more radical critical theories like post-structuralism ,which denies the existence of a knowable objective reality altogether. On the other hand it separates them from rationalists who believe that reality is entirely independent of cognition, locating it on an epistemological ‘middle ground’.30

From this constructivist approach, Wendt develops his own structural approach to international politics in which agents and structures are mutually constituted. Contrary to Waltz,

28_{Ibid., 159.}

29_{Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International}

Relations 3, no. 3 (1997), 322.

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Wendt argues that (1) the key structures of the state system are intersubjective rather than material, and (2) that state properties are in important part constructed by these (social) structures, rather than given exogenously.31 Hereby, Wendt aims not just to explain behavior of states - in fact he claims that he is not interested in that – but rather how the social structure shapes the identities of agents within that structure in a top down manner. At the same time however, it is acknowledged that these social structures exist only by virtue of collective cognition by the actors. They are thereby creating the social structures from the bottom up, making agents and structures two mutually constitutive and ontologically equal entities.32

Wendt is explicit in his choice to come up with a social theory of states, meaning that in his Social Theory of International Politics, there is room for only the state as an actor. Hereto he first argues that states can be corporate agents as long as there exists an “idea” of corporate agency and a decision structure that institutionalizes and authorizes collective action by the members.33 He continues with an explanation of identity, which form the basis for interests, which ultimately motivate behavior.34Identity is in large part constructed by structure and at the same time ultimately accounts for the interests and action of agents which create the structure. It is thus the key concept in the mutually constitutive relation because by problematizing this internal property of states as opposed to treating it as given, change now becomes a possibility at the unit, and consequently at the structure level.

In order to explain how identities are formed, Wendt first divides the concept into four different categories: corporate identity, type identity, role identity, and collective identity. The former two are intrinsic parts of identity, while the latter two strictly exist in relation to others.35 Corporate identity refers to the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities. An actor can possess only one such identity and for Wendt, all his actors being states,

31_{Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," The American Political Science}

Review 88, no. 2 (1994), 385.

33_{Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 218.}

34_{Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International}

Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), 398. It must be noted that identity can refer to many things and that in social

science it is often required to mean many things. The discussion whether its use has become so diffused and its meaning so all-encompassing that the concept should no longer be used at all is left aside here. Identity shall through this entire thesis be understood as self-understanding or the way an actor sees itself. For an extensive discussion see: Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity"," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000), 1.

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they have the same corporate identity based on their endowment with an institutional legal order, a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, sovereignty, territory, and a society.36 The corporate identity in this case also comes with objective universal intrinsic interests: physical survival, autonomy, collective self-esteem, and collective economic well-being.

The second category, type identity, is not a priori defined and also not relational. Type identity refers to labels that can be applied to agents who share or are thought to share some characteristic(s) in appearance, behavior, value, skills, knowledge, opinion, and so on.37 Other than with corporate identity, agents can possess multiple type identities. Examples for individuals are heterosexual or German, and pacifist or communist for states. Type identities are at base intrinsic as they do not by necessity depend on Others for their existence. As such they are exogenous to the state system.38 Role identities on the contrary exist only in relation to Others. Role identity can be described as how an actor sees itself in relation to an Other. Wendt emphasizes the roles of enemy, rival, and friend, which form the basis of his argument that there is no such thing as one logic of anarchy, but that anarchy is a function of the role identities among agents. Would an actor come to identify itself with the Other to such an extent that it perceives the interests of the Other as if they were his own, Wendt speaks of collective identity.

For all the importance attached to identity and the need to endogeneize the concept, there are two remarks to be made concerning Wendt’s elaboration. The first follows from the fact that his Social Theory of International Politics is explicitly a theory of the international state system and is constructed as such by the way the corporate identity of the agents is defined. Wendt justifies his approach by stating that notwithstanding the importance of other actors, his goal is to create a theory of the system of states, which necessarily presupposes the state as its sole actor.39 It seems therefore inappropriate to attack Wendt on the grounds that his theory does not allow for any actors apart from states to play a role in international politics, but nevertheless we can elaborate on his choice.

36_{Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 201-13.}

37_{James D. Fearon, What is Identity (as we Now use the Word)? (Stanford University: Unpublished Paper, 1999),}

17.

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Wendt’s theory of international politics presupposes the state as primary and only actor in international relations. Because of the static character of corporate identity of Wendt’s corporate agent, there is no room for diversity, evolution or change of these actors. As Wendt contends that the state will not necessarily remain the primary actor it is today – some might even argue that its current dominance in IR theory and discourse is already contestable – it would be interesting to see if Social Theory of International Politics could help us in developing more pluralist conceptions of global politics. In order to make such an attempt, one would have to unbracket the definition of corporate identity as well. Two scholars who have also identified this problem are Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase. In “Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in constructivist IR Theory” they propose to problematize the concept of corporate agency as a new step in IR theory development. They aim to lift Wendt’s ontological constraints in order to be able to explain the appearance, disappearance, and transformations of political actors. This way corporate agency would no longer be reserved exclusively and eternally to the state. Based on the sociational theory of the German sociologist Georg Simmel, it is argued that both social and corporate identity-formation are integrated parts of an interactive process that generates and is at the same time generated by actors.40 Opening up corporate identity in such manner greatly increases theoretical complexity and unfortunately the authors have so far not followed up their article with a more thorough discussion of suitable methods for sociational theorizing.

What is however more striking than the a priori exclusion of non-state actors in itself however, is that Wendt’s treatment of corporate identity does not get rid of some of the important characteristics of the neo-realist theories it argues against. Corporate identities are still considered as given and existing outside of social dynamics either between or within states. The corporate interests of states are still stated independent of the systemic theory as well, with survival still given as most important.41 A second limitation, which seems less of a deliberate choice by Wendt, regards the concept of type identity. The problem follows from his concern with the understanding of state behavior in general as opposed to explaining unit-behavior in specific. Type identity for Wendt is intrinsic to the state and therefore exogenous of the system. With identity as the source of interests, Wendt’s claim that structures do not merely affect

40_{Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase, "Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist}

IR Theory," European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (2003), 11.

41_{Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Cultural International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," in The Return of Culture}

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behavior, but at the same time construct the properties of states is undermined. If Wendt’s goal is to explain the patterns of interaction based on identities and interests that are socially constructed by the system, the internal construction of type identity becomes a serious problem. The explanatory realm of Social Theory of International Politics is incomplete if identities that form interests that motivate action are outside of its theoretical scope. The cognitive context that states operate in and upon is neglected in favor of a purely behavioral view of international politics hiding the actual social dynamic process giving meaning to real world factors. Viewed as such, identity is not endogeneized far enough.

At least on a subconscious level, this tension seems to be acknowledged by Wendt, but yet he does not treat it in detail. While he occasionally hints at the limitation, nowhere does he address this shortcoming, let alone attempt to justify it. In a sparse mention of type identities, Wendt says that they “are rooted in intrinsic features of material actors and as such constituted exogenous to the state system, but its social meaning and consequences are endogenous.”42 It is treated as an innocent detail as Wendt does not elaborate on the consequences of this statement for his argument that state identities stem from the social structure. As corporate identity remains outside of his theoretical scope as well, the importance of identity seems restricted to social identity, meaning those categories that depend on relational context. The other parts are by definition exogenous of the system. As his corporate identity implies universal and objective interests, that part is accounted for, but type identity is not. Part of the agent’s identity remains thereby curiously unexplained.

In articles preceding Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt does mention the problem in light of the role of domestic politics. Although he is convinced that the system affects the properties of agents, he refuses to fully reject the influence of the domestic in determining these properties. However, the question what role internal factors play exactly in the identity formation process is left uneasily unanswered or sometimes even unasked.43 By stating that his aim is to conduct structural research and ask “how possible” questions as opposed to asking historical “why” questions that engage in the realm of the actual, it sounds like Wendt is pushing the issue aside as if it belongs strictly to the domain of foreign policy analysis, and historical

42_{Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 293.}

43_{Wendt merely states that “(i)f domestic factors are the decisive determinants of state identity and interest (…)}

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research. Although he says that institutional organizational structures may also be important for explaining the subjectively perceived interests of agents and may even be crucial for determining imperatives of state practice, it is not this explanation of individual momentous policy action that Wendt has in mind for his theory.44Instead, his aim is to work on a higher macro-level.

Identity is taken as a central explanatory subject by Wendt but the choices made concerning the level of analysis of his theory on the one hand, and the ontological subject of his theory on the other hand, diminish its content. Its significance has been reduced to a concept that is necessarily relational. Aspects of identity that are not primarily relational are treated exogenously and are thereby robbed from their explanatory potential when it comes to state behavior. As the next section will demonstrate however, these ignored parts of identity can do a lot to help the understanding and explaining of state behavior.

Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

The implications that follow from Carlsnaes´ structurational solution to the agency-structure problem point FPA in the constructivist direction as well. His recommendations have not fallen onto deaf ears as a plethora of constructivist approaches has appeared since his article. After the Cold War, IR scholars unsatisfied with the inability of the traditional theories to explain change in world politics and struck with an ubiquitous sense that real world concepts like culture, identity, and nationality were factors in international politics of such importance that they could no longer be ignored, reacted.45 In what has been labeled ‘the constructivist turn in International Relations’, an entire wave of scholars in the mid 1990’s tried to come up with alternative

45_{Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in The Culture of National}

Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York etc.: Columbia University Press,

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explanations for international behavior based on the importance of ideational factors and the view that these are dynamically constructed by social context instead of given.46

As mentioned earlier, Carlsnaes argues for a focus in FPA on the ways the policies of agents affect structure (albeit unintended), how structure affects the properties of agents, and how policies are formed through discourse. The similar lines of argument dominate throughout a collection of essays, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, concerning the role of culture and identity in national security.47 In an introductory chapter, Jepperson et alii explain that the main lines of argument of the collection are that (1) institutional elements shape both the interests and identities of states, that (2) variations in state identity affect national interests and policies, and that the configurations of state identities also affect the structures.48 Following both Carlsnaes and Jepperson then, constructivist accounts of FPA can be divided in a top-down, a bottom-up, and an internal argument. For reasons of contrasting and comparing FPA with structural theory, the internal argument is most interesting because it is exactly that argument which Wendt leaves to others. The question then is what such actor-specific accounts of constructivist FPA look like.

What all constructivist accounts of FPA share is a rejection of identities and interests as givens.49 Scholarly work in IR has developed along the previously mentioned lines of argument indicated by both Carlsnaes and Jepperson. In National Interest in International Society for example, Martha Finnemore uses a number of case studies to argue that structures play an important role in the formation of state interests.50 Residing on a similar system-level as Wendt finds himself, she argues that international organizations play an important role for states in defining what they actually want. She reverses the causal arrows of interest formation by claiming that states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by international organizations.51 Given the constructivist claim of mutual constitution, others have

46_{The term was first used in a review article by Jeffrey T. Checkel. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in} International Relations Theory," World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998) 324-48.

47_{Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York etc.:}

Columbia University Press, 1996), 562.

48_{Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National}

Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York etc.: Columbia University Press, 1996), 52-53.

49_{David Patrick Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist}

Approach," Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 1 (2007), 29.

50_{Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press, 1996), 154.}

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argued the exact opposite as well. Amitav Acharya, for example stresses that the formation of normative institutions is in large part a bottom-up process.52

For reasons of contrast and compare however, it is most interesting to look at the FPA works that take as its starting point the internal culture of the state and its decision making, because this is exactly the process that structural theory chooses to neglect. One such branch of literature, rooted in classical FPA, is Role Analysis.53 Role Analysis aims to understand international behavior in terms of the different roles that states take on and act upon in international politics. It also aims to explore the sources of these roles.54 There are three recurring analytical tools throughout the literature that play an important part in explaining acceptance and execution of roles by states: national role conception, role prescription, and role performance.55 A national role conception refers to how a state, most often by virtue of its policymakers, views itself in relation to its external environment.56 It reflects its position in international politics as well as it attitudes and preferences.57 Role prescriptions refer to the normative expectations of roles that are held by the environment. These stem from outside the state itself and hold a view of what is deemed appropriate behavior when enacting a certain role, thereby exerting a restraining function on behavior.58 Finally, role performance is formed by

52_{Amitav Acharya, "Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the}

Third World," International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2011), 95.

53_{The work that placed role theory on the map was: K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign} Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970) 233-309. His work has received follow up in: Stephen G. Walker, ed. Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). And:Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed. Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era : Foreign Policies in Transition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997). Examples of contemporary literature on role theory are: Ulrich Krotz, "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy: France and Germany Compared," Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper 02.1 (2002).Ibid. Elin Hellquist, "On the Risks of Concept Misformation in European Studies; Normative Power Europe Under the Magnifying Glass," Paper Presented at the Swedish Network for European

Studies in Political Science Sodertorn University College,15-16 March, 2007 (2007).Ibid. And Lisbeth Aggestam,

"Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach," in Rethinking European

Union Foreign Policy, ed. Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004),

81-98.

54_{Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, 246 See also: Le Prestre, Role Quests in the}

Post-Cold War Era : Foreign Policies in Transition, 7.

55_{Isabel Ferreira Nunes, "Multilevel Role Prescriptions: Portugal, NATO and the CFSP" (doctor degree, University of} Twente, 2006), 32-34. Role performance is in some literature also termed role incorporation.

56_{The classical view that national role conceptions are to be formulated and measured within the policy making}

elite of a state does nowadays not go uncontested. E.g.: Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012), 5.

57_{Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, 245-46.}

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actual state behavior and activities undertaken to implement the national role conceptions and/or prescriptions.59

Both national role conceptions as well as Wendt’s definition of role identities refer to the way an actor views oneself. The difference is that Role Analysis takes this to be an actor’s view toward its external environment, while for Wendt it is limited to its view in relation to an Other. Wendt therefore limits himself to the roles of enemy, rival, and friend, while the list in Role Analysis literature (e.g.: ally, isolate, regional leader, pro-European) is much larger and more specific. Furthermore, national role conceptions are considered a part of state and national identity, stemming from a collective sense of history, memory, and socialization.60 This goes against the idea that roles are conceived from scratch upon a first encounter between actors as Wendt wants us to believe.61 By relating the conception of roles to societies’ understandings of themselves, albeit through policy makers, role concepts can potentially bridge the domestic and the international level of analysis.62 This way it can offer insights concerning the sources of identities and interests.

Whereas Role Analysis deals with a part of identity that is dependent on a social context, there is also a part of FPA that focuses on the purely intrinsic part, reminiscent of Wendt’s type identity.63 Several FPA scholars however have the importance of internal cultural factors in explaining state policies. Thomas Berger is one such scholar who has emphasized the importance of domestic cultural factors that impact the way states respond to the structural conditions under which they operate.64 In his account, political culture is defined as “those cultural beliefs and values that shape a given society’s orientation toward politics”, the development of which is a dynamic social process.65 By establishing the way a state views itself throughout time and consequently analyzing the process preceding actual policy decisions it becomes clear to what extent internal forces as opposed to external forces play a role in international behavior. In his

59_{Ibid., 240.}

60_{Krotz 6.}

61_{Wendt, Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 403-05}

62_{Le Prestre, Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era : Foreign Policies in Transition, 6,9. See also: Hudson and Vore,}

Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 226.

63_{Role theory can deal with both the intrinsic and the extrinsic part of identity. Le Prestre for example does both}

and distinguishes them terming them identity and status respectively. Le Prestre, Role Quests in the Post-Cold War

Era : Foreign Policies in Transition, 10.

64_{Berger, Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan, 319.}

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double case study concerning both Germany and Japan, Berger finds that the policies of both countries remained true to their own core cultural principles despite the significant changes they faces in their structural environments.66 In a similar fashion, Thomas Banchoff sets out to develop an analytical framework to pinpoint state identity and its effects on state action.67 In a case study concerning Germany and its policies toward European integration, Banchoff analyzes first the established German identity and its persistence for a given policy area over a period of time. He then demonstrates how this idea of identity shapes the interests of the German state in this specific policy area. The conclusion of this exercise is that the bracketing of domestic politics as systemic theory does, makes it unable to specify state identity in specific cases and can thereby not explain state behavior.68 These examples – and there are many more – serve to indicate that the non-social part of identity does have significant influence on state behavior and should not be neglected.69

In addition to showing how internal identity processes matter for international politics, another virtue of FPA compared to structural theories is that is able to say something about how these identities and interests are actually constructed. It can devote attention to how discourse is able to fundamentally reshape the conceptual grasp of reality by which is can limit or expand the available courses of action.70 In an analysis of the identities and foreign policies of the Soviet Union in 1955 and Russia in 1999 for example, Ted Hopf sets out to investigate the formation of interest based on internal identity processes, similar to Berger and Banchoff. Through an analysis of the dominant images portrayed in the domestic discourse, Hopf argues that an important source of identity lies within the state itself. Even the identities of Others stem in part from the

66_{Ibid., 356.}

67_{Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," European Journal of International Relations 5,} no. 3 (1999), 259.

68_{Ibid., 262.}

69_{Other examples of actor-specific accounts of foreign policy that emphasize the internal construction of identity}

and interests are: David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities

& Foreign Policies, Moskow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad : Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Hongyi Lai, The Domestic Sources of China's Foreign Policy : Regimes, Leadership, Priorities and Process (London: Routledge, 2010).

70_{Björn Wittrock and Peter Wagner, "Policy Constitution through Discourse: Discourse Transformations and the}

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domestic discourse instead of actual interaction.71 Jutta Weldes, another constructivist FPA scholar, argues not only against the assumption that national interests are given, but also analyzes the process through which interests are linguistically constructed.72She argues that interests have to be constructed by state-officials as meanings on the basis of which they can interpret events and act upon. Adding emphasis to the constructivist argument that it is the meaning attached to physical factors what really matter, she elaborates on the construction of meaning through linguistic processes of articulation and interpellation that keep the national interest under constant construction.73Following her other scholars of FPA have taken this linguistic approach even further, connecting it to cognitive psychology as well.74 Whether one uses the images from popular textbooks, the political narratives used in decision making, or a linguistic analysis of popular metaphors, the point is that FPA is able to analyze the construction of identity and interests while the structural account of Wendt reduces it to an exercise of social learning based on the occasional encounter with like units.75

Common ground

When it comes to the proposed solution to the agency-structure problem, constructivist structural theory and constructivist FPA are not necessarily that far apart. What separates them most is their desire to explain the general functioning of the system and the actor-specific policy actions respectively. Despite their different levels of analysis however, each subfield places interests and identity at the centre of analytical attention providing an opening for approach between them. This chapter has also shown however, that the treatment of identity in constructivist structural theory leaves the concept only halfway problematized and in large part still given, similar to the neo-realist understanding it argues against. Scholars of FPA in turn, have worked identity as a much broader concept, emphasizing both the interactive, as wells as the internal aspects of identity. They have shown that the neglect of type identity in analysis leaves a large part of

71_{Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moskow, 1955 and 1999, 10,16.} 72_{Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (1996), 275.} 73_{Ibid., 286.}

74_{William Flanik, ""Bringing FPA Back Home:" Cognition, Constructivism, and Conceptual Metaphor," Foreign Policy}

Analysis 7, no. 4 (2011), 423.

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II Unchain and Rebuild

The previous chapter has shown that despite the difference in primary level of analysis, FPA and constructivist structural theory share a focus on identity as a central concept in explaining state behavior. It also showed that Wendt’s use of identity is incomplete according to his own definition of the concept. His theory deals merely with the dynamics of role identities and their reciprocal effects on both system and parts, while the content of type identities and corporate identities are deliberately ignored. Although the previous chapter indicated that the gap concerning type identities can largely be filled by scholars in the field of foreign policy analysis, corporate identity is left un(der)theorized.

This chapters starts by addressing three main points of critique with regard to Social Theory of International Politics, which are all concerned with its state centric approach. Each of the first three sections deals with how a particular choice Wendt makes in constructing the basis of his theory leads to a certain reification of the state as the one and only actor and limits the reach of his theory. The exclusive role of states as actors in international politics will be discussed first, followed by the assumptions that they are fixed entities and the view that they are real persons. After illuminating the problematic consequences of these aspects, corporate agency and the gap Wendt leaves with respect to this concept will be addressed, which consequently paves the way for a revision of his idea of corporate identity. Both these concepts are amended to increase the role of emergence vis-à-vis reification in Wendt’s framework. The point of this is to eventually attribute to identity as a whole, the importance it deserves in systemic theory.

State Centrism part I: Actors are states

A first step in the physical construction of Wendt’s theory is positing it as a theory of international politics, which by definition presupposes the state since “there cannot be a state system without states any more than there can be a (human) society without people.”76 Social Theory of International Politics is thereby explicitly created as a theory about the state system,

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not about global politics. States are seen as the principal actors governing the legitimate use of violence, which Wendt considers one of the main subjects in IR.77 This is not to say that interstate politics in reality are all there is, but it serves as a self-imposed theoretical demarcation that places the state system outside of world politics as a whole in order to get a better analytical view of the subject. The critique that it can thereby not explain situations that involve any non-state entity is inherent in this decision and taken for granted by Wendt.

Notwithstanding the power such ontological demarcations can yield in offering explanations regarding the interaction between the chosen subjects, such simplifications also increase the distance between theory and the reality it wants to explain, perhaps unnecessary. Excluding other actors on the international level compromises the ability to explain the reality of state action in two important aspects. First, there are other actors – IO’s, NGO’s, TNC’s -interacting and operating with states at the same political level as states among each other. Their number and importance have increased greatly over the past decades and are likely to continue to do so. Excluding them would not do justice to their capabilities to influence states and cooperate with them. Although it is unlikely that such actors will replace the system of states and national governments in the near future, they currently exist side by side with states and the study of their interaction and interpenetration is therefore a necessary part of IR as a discipline.78 Negating these actors in analysis would suggest that there is another system that operates on a similar level and that these systems can be separated from each other, which is impossible.

Secondly, from a constructivist perspective, taking states as the sole actors denies the power that non-state actors on the global political level have in shaping not just the behavior, but the identities and interests of states as well. Neo-realism and liberal institutionalism have traditionally maintained a functionalist or instrumentalist view of IO’s as mere promoters of the interests of the states that created them, or serving as an arena for discussion.79 Constructivists

77_{Ibid., 194.}

78_{Clingendael Strategic Monitor: Continuity and uncertainty in a Changing World, available in Dutch only: Jaïr Lijn} van der and Andrea Teftedarija, eds., Clingendael Strategische Monitor 2012: Continuïteit En Onzekerheid in Een

Veranderende Wereld (The Hague: Instituut Clingendael, 2012).; Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World

Politics," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 255-74.

79_{Remi Maier-Rigaud, "International Organizations as Corporate Actors: Agency and Emergence in Theories of}

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have argued to the contrary, that they are willful actors that instead of being dominated by state interests, are able to change the state’s perception of their interests and to affect their identity.80 There is no reason to assume that the identity of IO’s will always be dominated by the principal interests of their creators. Instead, IO’s develop their own corporate culture consisting of their own norms and preferences to guide their behavior.81 Moreover, they derive independence and autonomy from the rational-legal authority they embody, as well as from the knowledge, experience, and technological expertise they control.82 Based on this authority and expertise, they are able to affect the norms, legitimacy, and culture that constitute the practice of IR in Wendt’s theory. By forcing themselves into the process of mutual constitution that is so crucial, they deserve to be incorporated into the system themselves. Negating them in this sense decreases the value of the sole interactive part of identity Wendt chooses to problematize in order to explain behavior.

By choosing beforehand to theorize only state interaction, the question whether it would even be possible to extend his line of reasoning from interstate politics to world politics remains unasked. Acknowledging the influence of non-state actors demands letting go of the notion that states are the only actors operating on a worldwide stage. The deliberate choice made by Wendt to make states his sole focus of analysis is not only problematic because it is no longer sufficient to explain world politics, it is also theoretically problematic because of the way these external agents are able to affect the properties of the systemic parts. Because of these abilities it must be inquired whether it is possible to extend the theory beyond states alone and enable an analysis of world as opposed to international politics.

State Centrism part II: States as given

The second step in the physical construction of Wendt’s theory is formulating the definition of his central actor. After taking the state as sole actor in the international system, it is presumed

80_{Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, "Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions,"}

Millennium - Journal of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2002), 576-77.

81_{Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,"}

International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999), 706.

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that these states are defined by a number of exogenously given properties which form the content of their corporate identity. According to Wendt, “the essential state is an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimized use of organized violence over a society in a territory.”83 The exact content and form of all these properties does not fall under the heading of corporate identity and may vary between states as they can differ in political or economic systems, and in the size and type of their society and territory. What all states share however, are the five mentioned properties which constitute the only requirements for entities to qualify as states.

The five combined properties that constitute statehood are given and hence unchangeable. The assumption that the corporate identity of states is fixed leaves Wendt susceptible for critique similar to that which he himself directed at Waltz. Wendt accused Waltzian neo-realism of being reductionist because it led “to an understanding of system structures as only constraining the agency of preexisting states, rather than (…) as generating state agents themselves.”84 Such a lack in generative capacity applies to Wendt’s reasoning as well, because as long as corporate identities of actors are fixed, the system will not be able to have any generative effects on them. The same holds for his treatment of type identity, which is also left out of the equation leaving role identity as the only source that can both generate and be generated. The system is thus only able to affect one third part of its units. What is left as changeable is the way states interact within the given system, whether they behave toward each other as friends or enemies, whether they choose to conquer or to cooperate. How states choose to play the game of politics is still up to them, but both form and nature of the players themselves are given. The fixed properties under the corporate identity of states partly impede the possibility of systemic effects on the units, weakening the claim of mutual constitution. The same holds in reverse, where as long as corporate identity is free from dynamics, the system consequently will remain static.

Apart from damaging his theoretical claims, fixing the state is dangerous for another reason. By taking a Westphalian definition of the state as central to his theory, Wendt is vulnerable to two particular arguments against state centrism in IR. First, Wendt’s definition of the state is based on a conception of the state that is at most applicable to Europe over the past

83_{Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 213.}

Social Theory of World Politics