Master Thesis CSM 2019
Name: Rosalie Azzi
Student Number: 2303620
Date: 30-09-2019
Word Count: 23.600
Convert radicalisation
Towards a more nuanced perspective using
a process- oriented approach
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Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION ... 3 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE ... 4 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE ... 5 STRUCTURE ... 6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 7 RADICALISATION ... 7 VIOLENT EXTREMISM ... 9INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS ... 11
GROUP LEVEL EXPLANATIONS ... 13
STRUCTURAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS ... 14
CONVERT VERSUS NON-CONVERT ... 15
CONVERSION PROCESS ... 17 METHODOLOGY ... 21 RESEARCH DESIGN ... 21 SAMPLING OF CASES ... 21 DATA GATHERING ... 24 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS ... 25
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ... 28
Construct validity ... 28 Internal validity ... 29 External validity ... 30 Reliability ... 31 FINDINGS ... 32 TENSION ... 33
RELIGIOUS PROBLEM SOLVING PERSPECTIVE ... 38
RELIGIOUS SEEKERSHIP ... 41
TURNING POINTS ... 44
AFFECTIVE BONDS ... 49
EXTRA CULT AFFECTIVE BONDS ... 52
INTENSIVE INTERACTION ... 53
TIME FRAME ... 54
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ... 55
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ... 55
Similarities in conversion process between radicalised and non-radicalised converts ... 55
Differences in conversion process between radicalised and non-radicalised converts ... 58
CONCLUSION ... 62
LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ... 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 65
APPENDICES ... 72
APPENDIX A: TOPIC LIST ... 73
APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK ... 74
3 Introduction
Since the emergence of Islamic State (ISIS), foreign fighters joining the jihadist group have become a common occurrence for European countries. Van Ginkel and Entenmann (2016) estimated that since 2012 around 4300 foreign fighters have left Europe to fight in the group’s self-proclaimed ‘caliphate’. Barrett (2014) suggested that one in six European foreign fighters joining ISIS are converts to Islam from other faiths including Christianity, while some have a non-religious background. When looking at the European Muslim population, converts to Islam make up about 2.2 percent (Schuurman et al, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2017). In other words, the share of European converts that have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist movement is about seven times higher than the share of converts in the Muslim population in Europe.
Although the overrepresentation of converts in violent extremism seems to be confirmed on a European scale, exact numbers on converts’ involvement are hard to come by on a national one. Considering most Western states do not register their citizens’ religious affiliation, reliable information regarding the size of the Muslim community and the total number of converts within them is scarce and fragmented. Despite this, numbers on the amount of converts for the total Dutch Muslim population and on the involvement of converts in violent extremism seem to be available. Bergema and Koudijs (2015) have pointed out that converts to Islam represent about 14 percent of the total number of Dutch foreign fighters, whilst converts to Islam merely make up two percent of the Muslim population in the Netherlands (Stichting Bekeerling, 2016). Differently put, the share of Dutch converts to Islam who have left the Netherlands to fight in Syria and Iraq is seven times higher than the share of converts in the Dutch Muslim community. Moreover, women appear to make up a considerable proportion of the radicalised convert group. About 61 percent of the Dutch convert group that has travelled to Syria and Iraq is reportedly female, in spite the fact that female jihadists only make up 26 percent of all Dutch jihadist foreign fighters (Bergema and Koudijs, 2015).
These findings lead to the following question guiding this research: which
explanations can be found for why converts to Islam are relatively overrepresented among Dutch foreign fighters?
By analysing and comparing the conversion stories and experiences of Dutch radicalised and non-radicalised converts, this thesis aims to identify indicators that point in the direction of certain mechanisms that set some converts apart, bringing them to adopt radical interpretations of Islam and eventually getting involved in violent extremism. Hence, this
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thesis intends to contribute to explaining convert radicalisation using a process-oriented approach. A convert is defined here as an individual with a religious but Islamic or a non-religious background who adopts a Muslim identity (Karagiannis, 2012).
Academic relevance
A small number of researchers have looked specifically at converts’ role in (Islamist) violent extremism. However, a clear understanding of the issue has yet to emerge. The empirical research on the involvement of converts in violent extremism shows a fragmented and stereotypical picture. First, scholars seem unable to reach consensus on the explanations for the relative overrepresentation of converts in violent extremism (Bartoszewicz, 2012; Kleinmann, 2012; Benjamin, 2008; Mullins, 2015). Furthermore, by researching converts’ involvement in violent extremism, a body of literature has contributed to reinforcing the stereotypical view of radicalised converts as damaged, disillusioned and socially marginalised individuals seeking meaning who where easily preyed upon by recruiters (Kleinmann, 2012, Karagiannis, 2012, Wiktorowicz, 2005; Sageman, 2011; Uhlmann, 2016). This thesis aims to contribute to this debate by using empirical data on conversion processes of radicalised and non-radicalised converts.
Therefore this thesis focusses on conversion stories and experiences and these will serve as a starting point for constructing answers on a fundamental question: how do converts to Islam come to adopt radical worldviews and what sets them apart from those who do not? Hence, this thesis aims to explaining convert radicalisation using a more nuanced perspective. The qualification ‘nuanced’ is explicitly mentioned; as it is the intention of this thesis to avoid stigmatisation of Muslim converts. In light of this, two observations need to be made. First, there is no evidence for a clear relationship between conversion and radicalisation (Flower & Birkett, 2014). In other words, converting to Islam is not an indication that a person will radicalise. Therefore, conversion to Islam should not be seen as raising a security concern. Though perhaps an obvious point, the fact that there are far more Muslim converts who do not become involved in violent extremism deserves our attention. In particular, the academic significance of this study lies in its effort to compare conversion experiences of radicalised and non-radicalised converts. This study seeks to examine indicators that point in the direction of certain mechanisms that make some converts do radicalise. More specifically, analysing and comparing conversion stories of radicalised and non-radicalised converts can provide answers on what factors make it more likely that the conversion experience leads to
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the adoption of extremist worldviews. Hence, this research contributes to the development of a conceptual framework that helps to understand convert radicalisation.
Societal relevance
One of the main obstacles for early detection and intervention is the lack of knowledge among potential first line responders (social workers, community police officers, teachers) on convert radicalisation (Weggemans, et al (2014). A lack of knowledge can lead to situations in which signals are observed but are not linked to radicalisation and finally violent extremism. In other words, it remains unclear for first responders how to detect developments of convert radicalisation: which indicators point in the direction of radicalisation and ultimately to heading for Syria? Gaining new insights into the conversion process and the radicalisation of converts can increase the awareness and understanding of these processes among first responders, parents and friends of potential jihadist foreign fighters. Ultimately, this knowledge can contribute to strengthening (preventive) counter-measures that can battle the threat posed by the jihadist foreign fighter phenomenon.
Both departee and returnee foreign fighters pose a serious threat to the international community and in particular to the country they might return to as more foreign fighters are expected to return home for the coming years (Mehra, 2016). Foreign fighters represent a significant threat for a number of reasons. First, foreign fighters engage in combat in Syrian and Iraqi territories after joining the jihadist group (Ibid.). Second, foreign fighters could decide to leave the former physical Islamic State territory and join another (local) conflict in order to continue their jihad (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016). Third, they can provide the jihadist movement with the human capital that is needed to operate in foreign countries. Once they have travelled to Syria or Iraq, foreign fighters can recruit operatives and make them commit terrorist attacks in Western countries without even returning home (Malet, 2015).
Additionally, they can use their training in terrorist tactics and new connections to establish new terrorist networks that can commit attacks at home (Ibid.). Apart from the physical threat jihadist foreign fighters pose, they pose a significant non-physical threat. Both departee and returnee foreign fighters can be involved in producing and disseminating jihadist propaganda (Fisher, 2015). Furthermore, foreign fighter parents can indoctrinate their children with jihadist ideology. These activities are crucial for the survival and enlargement of the jihadist movement. Despite years of counter-terrorism measures conducted by Western countries, it is estimated the jihadist movement counts 230.000 militants spread across approximately 70 countries (Clarke, 2018).
6 Structure
This remainder of this thesis is built up as follows. Chapter two will present the theoretical groundwork that outlines the current literature on converts to Islam, their process of radicalisation and the conversion process. Also, it aspires to conceptualise the concepts of conversion to Islam, radicalisation, violent extremism and foreign fighting. The third section describes the research design. Choices and limitations will be explained here. Thereafter, the fourth chapter will provide the analysis of the results, in which the research findings will be presented. Chapter five provides a discussion of these findings and links all the findings together. After that chapter five will present a conclusion by answering the research question, providing a critical discussion of the limitations to this study and suggesting avenues for further research.
7 Theoretical Framework
This chapter discusses empirical research on radicalisation, violent extremism and the process of radicalisation and religious conversion. After reviewing the literature on radicalisation and violent extremism, previous research on the radicalisation process will be outlined. The radicalisation section will be guided by the question to what extent the radicalisation process of converts and non-converts differs. In three subsections individual-level, group-level and structural-level factors and mechanisms influencing the radicalisation process will be discussed for both groups. Lastly, a theoretical framework for the process of religious conversion will be provided.
Radicalisation
The concept of radicalisation gained prominence in the public debate after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 when policymakers formulated the term ‘violent radicalisation’. Before 2001, the term ‘radicalisation’ had been rarely used in academic literature. Ever since 9/11 ‘radicalisation’ has become central to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy-making (Kundnani, 2012). Furthermore, the establishment of ‘counter-radicalisation’ programmes in European countries have contributed to the institutionalisation of the term. The focus on radicalisation has served as an important part of the search for the root causes of terrorism. Politicians, policy makers and academics have come up with a variety of alleged causes of radicalisation’s presumed end product – terrorism. These alleged root causes include poverty, inequality, political oppression, alienation, identity issues and rejection of the West (Schmid, 2013; Choudhury, 2007; Pape, 2006). The variety of the identified root causes demonstrates the contested nature of radicalisation. However, most radicalisation research does indicate that there is no single cause but a complex mix of internal and external pull and push factors leading to radicalisation of individuals (Kjok & Hegghammer, 2002; Hegghamer, 2013; Midlarsky, 2011). In other words, a number of factors can contribute to radicalisation, but none suffices independently to explain the drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.
One could argue academic researchers also found it hard to agree on the definition of radicalisation, as there is no universally accepted definition in academia or government. Early definitions of radicalisation referred to the actual use of violence (Della Porta, 1995). These studies were conducted in the context of violent groups (clandestine groups). However, with the focus on religiously inspired terrorism in recent years, the notion of radicalisation has altered as well. Some scholars have been in particular concerned with the phenomenon of
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young Muslims with Western socialisation who joined militant Islamist groups. Much of this body of research sought to explain processes of individual radicalisation and ways of becoming part of violent groups (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Borum, 2011; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Against this background, more recent definitions of radicalisation centre around adopting and possessing extremist worldviews. Della Porta and LaFree (2012) conceptualise radicalisation as a change in perceptions towards polarizing and absolute definitions of a given situation, and the articulation of increasingly radical aims and objectives. While acknowledging the absence of clear and universally accepted definitions of radicalisation, Veldhuis and Staun (2009) operationalise the concept as the ‘active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals’ (p. 4). Following this line of thought, Borum (2011) refers to radicalisation as the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs. In his operationalization Schmid (2013) gives meaning to ‘extremist’ by describing radicalisation as the movement away from moderate or mainstream attitudes. In a similar vein, although more succinctly put, Neumann (2003) describes radicalisation as ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’ (p. 4). Despite its lack of analytical depth, this notion accurately depicts the phase radicalisation entails. This is important as this study intends to make the distinction between radicalisation (aims and perceptions) and violent extremism (behaviour, actions). More specifically, using Bakker and Grol’s (2017) and Schmid’s (2018) conceptualisations, this study refers to radicalisation as the process whereby an individual develops the willingness to accept the utmost consequence of a certain view that no longer recognises the existence of the dominant political order as appropriate or legitimate It describes violent extremism as converting this willingness into actions that fall outside the boundaries of the democratic legal order. In light of the scope of this study, distinguishing between radicalisation and violent extremism is critical. This study examines indicators that point in the direction of certain mechanisms or explanations of why converts are relatively overrepresented amongst Dutch foreign fighters. Foreign fighters actually engage in violent extremist actions by joining the Islamic State. In other words, this study investigates conversion to Islam and violent extremism with radicalisation as an intermediate step towards violent extremism. Although linked, radicalisation and violent extremism must not be understood as necessarily depending on each other. Holding views that reject the dominant political order do not always result in the conversion of these views into violent actions. Individuals voicing the most extreme aims are not necessarily the ones engaging in violent extremist actions. Gallup and Pew surveys suggest that seven percent of the world’s
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Muslim population – around 100 million people – are sympathetic to ‘jihadi’ aspirations, although most of them refrain from engaging in violence (Atran, 2010). However, radicalising by developing and adopting radical worldviews that justify violence is one possible pathway into violent extremism. Hence, ideology and action are sometimes connected, but not always.
Violent extremism
As mentioned above, in this thesis, the term violent extremism is used to refer to engaging in violent extremist actions. Simply put: putting extremist thoughts into action. Violent extremism as a concept entails two aspects: extremism and violence. Building on Neuman (2003, p. 874), extremism in this study refers to political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of foreign fighters leaving liberal democracies to fight in the ‘caliphate’ this could be applied to ideologies that oppose the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The violent aspect of the concept then refers to the violent means used to achieve the ideals and goals related to the extremist ideology. The concept of violent extremism is highly contested (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009). Given the fact that academics and governments cannot reach consensus in defining terrorism, it is not surprising that a great diversity of views exists in defining concepts such as violent extremism. Although the discourse of counter-terrorism policy-making has changed from a ‘war on terrorism’ to ‘countering violent extremism’ the questions of which ideas and among whom remain unanswered or ignored (Payne, 2009). Conventionally, the term ‘extremism’ is understood as attitudes and ideologies that deviate from the norm, however that element alone is not a sufficient basis for defining security threats and ultimately constructing counter-policies (Ibid.). Often the concepts violent extremism and terrorism are used interchangeably. While the concepts are related, there is a distinct difference between the two. Violent extremism aims to further particular extremist beliefs through the use of violence. This includes foreign fighters fighting in the self-proclaimed caliphate of the Islamic State, but it can also include violent protests and communal violence such as religiously motivated assaults.
Conversely, when it comes to terrorism it is less about the motivations behind the violent means, but more about the strategy in itself. More specifically, terrorism is a specific form of political violence that is focused on provocation and inciting fear (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2010). For that matter, violent extremism is broader than terrorism. Despite the abundance of literature on violent extremism, little attention has been given to defining the concept. The violent extremism literature employs the concept in way that suggests it is
self-
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evident and self-explanatory. This might be explained by the fact that the notion of violent extremism has a basis in government policy rather than in scholarship. Instead of providing what constitutes violent extremism, often the literature focusses on countering violent extremism and processes that lead to violent extremism (Borum, 2011; Conway, 2017; Kruglanski et al, 2014). This is in particular problematic as it is impossible to formulate strategies that aim to respond to, or prevent violent extremism without having an actual understanding of the definition of the concept. Yet, in Schmid (2014) a definition can be extracted from his analysis. He refers to violent extremism as ‘embracing offensive violence as an instrument to advance towards their version of utopia’ (p. 18). Utopia in this respect can be understood as a state or system that institutionalises certain extremist worldviews and beliefs. Schmid (2014) gives joining the Islamic State as a part of practicing the ‘jihad’ as an example of violent extremism. Mroz (2009) describes violent extremism as ‘the absence of reason, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life’. Unlike Schmid (2014), Mroz (2009) solely focusses on the violence part of the concept. For that reason, Mroz’ (2009) definition of violent extremism seems to be too narrow. While the use of violence is critical in the concept of violent extremism, it is also important to underline the fact that the violence is used, as a method to further certain believes or worldviews.
This thesis aims to look at indicators that point in the direction of certain mechanisms or explanations of why converts to Islam are relatively overrepresented in the Dutch foreign fighter group. As has been indicated in previous paragraphs, the process of radicalisation can be seen as a pathway into violent extremism. Taking this into account, the question rises whether the radicalisation process of converts differs from the radicalisation process of non-converts. A body of literature has paid attention to this topic by identifying individual-level, group-level and structural level mechanisms in the radicalisation process of converts and non-converts who ultimately engage in violent extremism (Kleinmann, 2012; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Uhlmann, 2016, Karagiannis, 2012). The following sections further discuss this line of empirical research. This discussion is divided into three parts. Part one looks at individual level factors mechanisms. The second one incorporates studies that focus on group level explanations. Part three has a structural level perspective. The last part of this chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the concept of religious conversion, which will allow for the assessment of the conversion process.
11 Individual level explanations
Bartoszewicz (2013) underlines that when it comes to understanding convert radicalisation, factors at the individual level of analysis are of crucial importance. Her argument centres around a convert’s likeliness for radicalisation being closely linked to identity and belonging. Bartoszewicz (2013) emphasizes the importance of the converts pre-existing image of self and society. It is argued that individuals who are at ease with their own sense of identity are less vulnerable to the adoption of extremist worldviews after conversion (Ibid.). The same rationale applies to their views of society. Converts who embrace Islam out of negative attitudes towards Western norms, values and culture are more prone to radicalisation than converts who embrace Islam out of positive sentiments (Ibid.). These findings concur well with the argument made by Van Den Elzen (2018) that individuals who undergo negative emotions including hate and anger at a critical moment are more likely to go down the radicalisation path than those who experience positive feelings such as joy. The latter group is more likely to go further in an ordinary conversion process. Hence, for both Van Den Elzen (2018) and Bartoszewicz (2013) the likeliness of convert radicalisation is closely linked to the personality of individuals. Kleinmann’s (2012) findings appear to corroborate with Van Den Elzen’s (2018) and Bartoszewicz’ (2013) conclusions. In a study on Sunni (convert) militants, Kleinmann (2012) found that individual factors including identity issues and cognitive functions play a more important in the radicalisation process of converts than they do for born Muslims.
Consistent with Wiktorowicz (2005), Kleinmann (2012) refers to the importance of cognitive openings - possibly traumatic personal experiences that can set a period of religious seeking into motion – prior to radicalisation. The rationale behind this follows that negative psychological experiences and extreme events can reject previously accepted worldviews and accept new ones, including radical ones. In this way, a cognitive opening can pave the way for radicalisation. Such psychological experiences can create grievances. A radical religious ideology can then be of use as it can fulfil a quest of dealing with those grievances. Wiktorowicz (2005) describes this problem solving mechanism as religious seeking. Barrett (2014) also underlines that convert radicalisation may result from having a problematic background including family problems or deaths, a history of abuse, addiction or rape or time spent in prison. However, it is crucial to indicate that there are many individuals who share an identical background yet never become involved in activities related to violent extremism. Therefore, these findings do not provide a conclusive answer to why some converts become involved in violent extremism. Another individual-level factor explaining convert
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radicalisation that can be identified in the literature includes the lack of knowledge of Islam (Uhlmann, 2016); Ahmed, 2016; Krishna, 2015) and the ‘converts zeal’ (Benjamin, 2007; Uhlmann, 2007). The ‘convert zeal’ argument states converts are more likely to embrace a new religion in a more fanatical and strict fashion because of their desire to show dedication to their newfound faith and community (Benjamin, 2007; Uhlmann, 2007). Silber and Bhatt (2007) added to this that converts could be considered most aggressive because of their need to prove their religious convictions to their companions. Furthermore, Grignard (2008) emphasised that the zeal to prove the depth of their engagement applies to those from marginalised segments of society. In other words, Grignard asserts here the failure of the affirmation of their individual identity in society can be considered as a catalyst driving individuals to become precisely what the newfound community would like them to be.
Conversely, Van Den Elzen (2018) argues all jihadists coming to Syria need to prove their trustworthiness and religious convictions to the same degree because both converts and non-converts go through identical phases of socialisation and interaction in their process of radicalisation. Bartoszewicz (2012) also strongly disagrees with the notion of the ‘convert zeal’ and the suggestion that the lack of religious grounding makes an individual more prone to radical interpretations of Islam. Brown (2018) follows this line by asserting the idea of the convert zeal shows a lack of understanding of the conversion process, converts’ experience and their motivations. Moreover, Brown (2018) argues the notion falsely portrays religion as an individual concept as it neglects the role of collective belonging in considering convert radicalisation.
Barrett (2014) found that most converts in his study were to some extent disillusioned with Western life and reported having a problematic background such as alcohol abuse prior to converting. Mullins (2015) found that jihadi converts more frequently suffered from mental health issues than non-convert jihadis. Kleinmann (2012) also reports a higher incidence of mental health problems amongst the Sunni militants in his study than among the general population. Despite his strong emphasis on individual factors, Kleinmann (2012) is hesitant about solely attributing convert radicalisation to individual-level factors. Instead, Kleinmann (2012) emphasises more group level perspectives of analysis by stressing that “for both converts and non-converts, radicalisation is also the result of recruitment by militant movements or radical friends and family. Internal mechanisms alone are not sufficient for radicalisation” (p. 279). These findings fit with Wiktorowicz (2005) who found that for both converts and non-converts a cognitive opening (individual level factor) and socialisation (group-level factor) are necessary for radicalisation. Differently put, a person with a
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problematic background leading to a cognitive opening is unlikely to radicalise unless others introduce him or her to specific radical messages. Following Kleinmann’s (2012) and Wiktorowicz’s (2005) line of thought, one could argue that convert radicalisation should not be understood as solely the consequence of individual-level factors and therefore attention should be drawn to a wider array of analytical perspectives, in particular group-level and structural factors.
Group level explanations
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Wiktorowicz (2005) argues that besides individual level factors, group level factors contribute to the radicalisation of converts. More specifically, Wiktorowicz (2005) notes the importance of social networks in the process of (convert) radicalisation. In his four-component developmental model for radicalisation, Wiktorowicz (2005) suggests that converts and non-converts ultimately become indoctrinated into violent extremist movements through a process of socialisation. A cognitive opening and the process of religious seeking do not guarantee radicalisation and eventually violent extremism. Openness to new extremist ideas does not translate into adopting extremist ideas and acting upon them. Individuals need to be convinced of the cause of the extremist ideas and that the cause of joining a group that adhere to such beliefs is worth the risks and costs of belonging In several cases in Wiktorowicz (2005) friends and family introduced converts to violent extremist movements.
Taking this into account, one could argue the socialisation factor plays an important role in the process of radicalisation and in influencing (convert) radicalisation in general. In particular, given the importance of the radical ideology and the difficulty of indoctrinating individuals to the extent that they are willing to adopt high-risk activism for a radical Islamic group. Kleinmann (2012) describes radicalisation through socialisation as horizontal radicalisation. According to Kleinmann (2012) horizontal radicalisation is a significant mechanism for both converts and non-converts. In multiple cases, converts were radicalised by groups of friends, family members or other social contacts (Ibid.). Sageman (2011) agrees with this by claiming that radicalisation of both converts and non-converts is a collective rather than an individual process in which friendship and kinship play an important role. Similarly, Karagiannis (2012) found that a number of converts and non-converts in his sample of European jihadists were set on the path towards involvement in violent extremism by the influence of friends, relatives and partners with extremist views. In his study, Karagiannis (2012) describes different cases of converts and non-converts radicalising within certain
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groups. In all the described cases, both the converts and non-converts radicalised through engaging with radical groups and volunteering to participate in various activities within these groups (Ibid.). In light of the above-mentioned arguments, the ‘convert zeal’ mechanism can also be considered an important group-level factor as the pressure to be part of the new religious group initiates the socialisation process in the convert. Hence, the presence of the new religious group in the convert’s life influences the socialisation of the convert into the new group.
More recent attention has focused on the role of social media as a group level mechanism for radicalisation. Mullins (2015) attributed the increase in (convert) radicalisation in the United States to the growing importance of social media as a ‘vehicle for terrorist propaganda and recruitment’ (p. 78). In the same vein, Kleinmann (2012) reports on the emerging role of social media in the radicalisation process as multiple cases of convert and non-convert Sunni militants in his study started their path to radicalisation online. Thus literature focussing on the role of social media in the radicalisation process suggests social media can be a catalyst driving both converts and non-converts to become violent extremists. On the supply side, social media facilitates the rapid spread of radical ideas and views across large distances, thus enabling recruitment and ultimately radicalisation to take place faster than ever before. On the demand side, it allows individuals to communicate with online radical intermediaries.
Structural level explanations
Besides focussing on individual and group level explanations, Mullins (2015) draws attention to the role of socio-economic variables. According to Mullins (2015) socio-economic deprivation contributes considerably to convert radicalisation. Additionally, Mullins (2015) claims converts, perhaps more than any other group, fit the notion of people being drawn to jihadist violent extremism as a result of marginalisation. Conversely, Cesari (2008) found that the majority of radicalised converts were not marginalised delinquents at all, indicating these converts are not embittered victims of oppression. Yet, Uhlmann (2008) and Krishna (2015) assert that for both converts and non-converts their socioeconomic background is vital in their radicalisation process. Other studies highlight the role of racism, political discrimination and grievances, and repression in explaining radicalisation. Kleinmann (2012) included cases of non-converts and converts affected by racism in his sample. Wiktorowicz (2005) also notes that feelings of marginalisation due to racism, blocked social mobility and economic hardship can be considered important contributors to the process of (convert) radicalisation. More
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specifically, Wiktorowicz (2005) asserts for both converts and non-converts these feelings are important in creating cognitive openings to radical views.
Other cases of non-converts and converts in Karagiannis (2012) radicalised due to political grievances relating to for instance political conflicts. Radicalisation due to political grievances in response to political trends or events, one could argue, is being reinforced by the increasing use of new (social) media. The use of different media platforms allows converts and non-converts to familiarise themselves with the injustices and oppression Muslims are confronted with. Given that non-converts and converts perceive themselves as part of a broader Muslim community, the exposure to these injustices increases the likeliness of perceiving political grievances (Ibid.). These findings suggest that structural level mechanisms including socioeconomic deprivation, discrimination, repression and political grievances can play a role in the radicalisation process of both converts and non-converts. Yet, in all the cases in which converts and non-converts were affected by structural level issues, they were additionally affected by group level factors. This suggests that for both converts and non-converts who are affected by structural level factors, group level factors are also necessary for radicalisation.
Convert versus Non-convert
The research touched upon in the previous paragraphs indicated that individual level, group level and structural level factors can play a role in the radicalisation process of both converts and non-converts. Despite the emphasis on individual level factors in the convert radicalisation process, it is argued a combination of factors from different levels is necessary for converts and non-converts to radicalise (Kleinmann, 2012). In other words, in order for radicalisation to occur for both groups, the individual and structural mechanisms need to be complemented by factors at the group level (Kleinmann, 2012; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Karagiannis, 2012). Likewise, Van Den Elzen (2018) suggests the mechanisms and processes for radicalisation of Muslim converts and non-converts do not differ. While situational contingencies do differ for converts compared to Born Muslims, their processes of radicalisation are similar (Ibid.). Differently put, the presence of different individual, group and structural level factors in the process of radicalisation can create different situational contingencies for both converts and non-converts, but their radicalisation process itself remains comparable. In the same manner, Karagiannis (2012) found processes of radicalisation differ little between converts and those born into a religious group. Other literature on convert radicalisation follow this line of thought by underlining that there is no
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key factor that leads to the radicalisation of converts (Ahmed, 2016; Barrett, 2014; Ferguson & Binks, 2015; Arasli, 2011).
Following Wiktorowicz’s (2005) rationale, it can be argued that converts and non-converts both experience a cognitive opening caused by different factors varying from traumatic personal experiences to political conflicts feelings of discrimination. Subsequently, this cognitive opening creates the willingness to adopt radical worldviews. Eventually group level factors influence the process of socialisation through which the converts and non-converts become fully indoctrinated into a violent extremist movement. Taking all this into account, it appears that convert radicalisation does not differ from non-convert radicalisation. As the above mentioned findings do not put forward explanations for the disproportional involvement of converts in foreign fighting, possible explanations for the overrepresentation should not be sought in understanding the differences between converts and Born Muslims engaging in violent extremism. Mentioned explanations including holding political grievances, having a problematic background or being socially marginalised were all found to be key factors in the radicalisation process of converts. Valuable as these findings are, they raise a fundamental point; namely that many people, converts or otherwise, have similar experiences but do not radicalise or turn to violent extremism. Studying convert radicalisation using a control group of non-converts will not contribute to understanding what processes or characteristics set converts that radicalise apart.
Although a considerable body of literature has centered around drawing this comparison, doing so would only reinforce the stereotypical view of radicalised converts as damaged persons or as individuals seeking meaning who where preyed upon by recruiters (Kleinmann, 2012, Karagiannis, 2012, Mullins, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Sageman, 2011; Uhlmann, 2016). Instead, the conversion process itself should be looked into in order to understand what processes or characteristics set those converts who do radicalise apart from those who do not. In particular, considering Bartoszewicz (2012) asserts ‘conversion to Islam, has an immense impact on the subsequent being a Muslim’ (p. 20). Hence, one could argue the key to understanding convert radicalisation lies in their conversion experiences. Comparing radicalised with non-radicalised converts may reveal what makes the former stand out. More specifically, analysing and comparing conversion stories of radicalised and non-radicalised converts can provide answers on what indicators point in the direction of certain mechanisms that make it more likely that the conversion experience leads to the adoption of radical worldviews. Hence, control groups of non-radicalised converts are necessary to determine what sets those who do engage in violent extremism apart from those who do not.
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Maintaining a process-oriented perspective allows moving beyond stereotypical notions of convert radicalisation and can provide a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon.
Conversion process
In order to systematically analyse and compare the conversion process of both radicalised and non-radicalised converts a theoretical framework is needed. Whilst acknowledging that the process of religious conversion is so complex that the steps involved can by no means be precisely demarcated to a definite beginning and ending, a given set of steps enables us to make sense out of the complex reality of the conversion process. That is to say, tracing the steps of conversion can provide a set of lead indicators that point in the direction of certain mechanisms. This thesis uses the seven-step religious conversion model by Lofland and Stark (1965). Although their model involves rather basic and abstract principles of conversion as it is based on one group, namely the American Moon movement, Lofland and Stark (1965) argue the model reveals basic principles that are applicable to a general conversion process. In light of the complexity of the conversion process and the different natural histories of conversion patterns of different religions, the general principles provided by Lofland and Stark (1965) can merely be used as a guideline as it can help identify certain phases or conditions under which religious conversion occurs. Additionally, the conversion patterns of one religious group will by no means necessarily record the conversion patterns of another. Hence, findings presented in this thesis may be observed in the context of other conversion processes, yet they cannot be generalised to other religions.
With their most widely cited conversion scheme in the sociological literature, Lofland and Stark (1965) empirically identified conditions under which conversion occurs and grouped them into seven stages: tension, problem-solving perspective, seekership, turning point, cult affective bonds, extra-cult affective bonds and intensive interaction. To account for the conversion process in their study Lofland and Stark (1965) classified two genres of conditions or factors: predisposing conditions and situational contingencies. Predisposing conditions are present before conversion. To become a potential convert, a person must: (1) experience enduring personal tensions; (2) operate within a religious problem-solving perspective; (3) define him/herself as a religious seeker. The four situational contingencies describe the actual process of conversion. More specifically, a person becomes a convert when: (1) he/she meets a religious group at a turning point in life; (20) is invited to form affective bonds with one or more members of the group; (3) lacks affective bonds with persons outside the group, or loses them and (4) is exposed to intensive interaction with the
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group in order to become an agent of the group. Lofland and Stark (1965) claim that the seven steps represent necessary and sufficient conditions for conversion.
The first step identified by Lofland and Stark (1965) is one of the predisposing conditions they describe: tension. More specifically, an individual acutely experiences personal tensions, especially due to inability to realise personal aspirations. These tensions can include unpleasant feelings of frustration, deprivation or strain over quite a longer period of time (Ibid.). Additionally, Lofland and Stark (1965) assert that converts experience these tensions more severely and over longer time spans. Importantly, Lofland and Stark (1965) suggest that perceived tensions are necessary but not sufficient for religious conversion to occur in the sense that they create disposition to act, yet the tensions do not indicate how to deal with them. In other words, Lofland and Stark (1965) note that it is important to take into account that the perceived tensions can be resolved in many different ways apart from religious conversion. Thus, Lofland and Stark (1965) assert experienced tensions are part of the necessary scenery for the religious conversion stage, but the rest remains to be constructed in other steps.
The second step as described by Lofland and Stark (1965) is the problem solving-perspective. In this phase the ‘pre-convert’ uses a religious perspective to define his or her problems (Ibid.). Lofland and Stark (1965) argue there are three perspectives of solutions that exist in modern society: psychiatric, the political and the religious. When a political or psychiatric perspective fails to solve the experienced tensions, an individual can turn to a religious problem solving perspective. In the cult that Lofland and Stark (1965) studied, the pre-converts retained a general propensity to impose religious meaning on events. In relation to the previous, tension phase, one could argue pre-converts are restricted to seeing religious solutions available for acutely felt problems. With this religious outlook, pre-converts can find themselves in phase three: seekership.
In this phase Lofland and Stark (1965) suggest that pre-converts come to perceive and define themselves as religious seekers: individuals searching for a satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve their tensions, and they take action to achieve this end (Ibid.). Differently put, seekership can be seen as ‘openness’ to a variety of religious views. It should be noted here that ‘religious seekers’ are not to be seen as anomic fanatics frantically chasing after meaning, but rather individuals who seem curious about religious matters. Hence, Lofland and Stark (1965) assert seekership provides the minimal points of ideological congruence to make individuals available for religious conversion.
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In the fourth phase, the turning point, Lofland and Stark (1965) turn to necessary situational factors. Turning points can be described as events that make the pre-convert come to the realisation that some action is required to deal with his or her problems (Ibid.). Lofland and Stark (1965) argue the significance of turning points lies in their ability to increase the desire to take action whilst giving the pre-convert new opportunities to do so. Causes of turning points in Lofland and Stark (1965) mostly involved loss of employment or completion/failure or withdrawal from school. This frequency was in part due to certain demographic characteristics of the sample in Lofland and Stark (1965).
Lofland and Stark (1965) suggest the next phase in line is the phase of ‘cult affective bonds’ (p. 871). Affective bonds between the potential convert and the new religious group must be developed, if the bond does not already exist, to further draw the potential convert down the road to full religious conversion (Ibid.). Lofland and Stark (1965) deem the development of affective bonds necessary as it bridges the gap between first exposure to the new religious message and accepting its truth. That is to say, pre-converts develop affective ties with the new religious group or some of its members whilst they can initially regard the message of this religious group as problematic.
In the sixth phase, the ‘extra-cult affective bonds’ phase, Lofland and Stark (1965) assert that the potential convert gets emotionally detached from members outside the new religious group (p. 872). More specifically, either the potential convert already lacks affective bonds to society in general or his or her emotional attachment to others outside the new religious group becomes neutralised by the group (Ibid.). In this regard, it is argued that affective bonds outside the new religious group have to become fragile and weak otherwise to facilitate complete religious conversion.
Lofland and Stark (1965) describe the final stage as the ‘intensive interaction’ phase in which the potential convert is exposed to daily frequent intensive interaction with members of the new religious group and participation in religious activities. In this stage an individual reaches complete conversion and becomes a ‘total convert’ (Ibid.). Lofland and Stark (1965) add to this that potential converts failed to become total converts when intense interaction was absent. This finding points to the cumulative nature of the phases as described by Lofland and Stark (1965). In other words, it is argued that an individual needs to go through all phases in order to experience complete conversion. However, this suggested accumulation is questionable considering merely labelling a sequence of stages does not specify the causal relationships responsible for religious conversion. Kox et al., (1991), Rudy and Greil (1984) and Richardson et al., (1978) presented empirical support for this argument by testing Lofland
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and Stark’s (1965) model on different religious groups. More specifically, Kox et al., (1991), Rudy and Greil (1984) and Richardson et al., (1978) found that some cases involved the conditions as described by Lofland and Stark (1965) whilst a number of them were found not to be universally necessary. Drawing on these observations, one can argue the phases identified by Lofland and Stark (1965) are rather independent than sequential. In light of this, this study expects that some of the conditions/stages described by Lofland and Stark (1965) will be present in the conversion stories of respondents.
Figure 1: Lofland and Stark’s Model of Religious Conversion 1) Tension
Unpleasant feelings of strain, deprivation or frustration
2) Problem-Solving Perspective
Religious perspective to define problems
3) Seekership
Self identification of a religious seeker
4) Turning Point
Significant event that makes the individual come to the realisation that action is required to turn the situation around
5) Cult Affective Bonds
Contact between potential convert and members of new religious group
6) Extra Cult Affective Bonds
Decrease in contact between potential convert and members outside new religious group
7) Intensive Interaction
Daily frequent interaction with members of new religious group and participation in new religious group activities
21 Methodology
As can be concluded from the above, this thesis aims to investigate how the conversion experience of radicalised converts differs from those who do not. More specifically, it aims to develop a better understanding of convert radicalisation by analysing and comparing conversion stories of radicalised and non-radicalised converts. This chapter will focus on methodological underpinnings, the method used for data gathering and the operationalization of the concepts. Finally, the validity and reliability of this study will be discussed.
Research Design
This study involves an explorative qualitative research guided by the question: which
explanations can be found for why converts to Islam are relatively overrepresented among Dutch foreign fighters? In order to answer this question primary data (interviews) and
secondary data (observational data) were used. The gathering of primary data was conducted over an eight-week period. In order to realise a robust, yet academically feasible research design given the time and available resources, eight cases of non-radicalised converts to Islam were selected for this study. Additionally, eight radicalised converts to Islam were derived from the observational data. By using the observational data for the analysis of the radicalised converts and the data from the interviews, the two groups were compared. This comparison was carried out using the indicators that will be discussed in more detail in the next sections. Besides using the theoretical framework to identify dimensions in the conversion process in order to find starting points for the two groups going in a different direction, the method of inductive coding was used. In light of the exploratory nature of this thesis, it is considered valuable to employ inductive coding as it enables this thesis to emerge theoretical content from the content of the raw data and to utilise coded segments of the data that do not fit the dimensions as outlined by Lofland & Stark (1965). In this way, this thesis aims to do justice to the complex reality of the conversion process.
Sampling of cases
The decision to compare radicalised and non-radicalised converts to Islam instead of comparing radicalised converts to Islam and radicalised ‘born Muslims’ proceeds from the aforementioned findings presented by Van den Elzen (2018), Karagiannis (2012) and Kleinmann (2012). As concluded before, they, and other previously mentioned research on the radicalisation process of converts and non-converts, suggest that the mechanisms and processes for radicalisation of Muslim converts and non-converts do not differ. These
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findings indicate that not the radicalisation process but the conversion process itself deserves our attention as a potential source of answers for why some converts radicalise. To be more specific, considering that the process of adopting radical or extremist views is similar for both converts and non-converts, attention should be given to examining what factors make it more likely that the conversion experience leads to the adoption of radical or extremist views. Comparing radicalised with non-radicalised converts may enable this study to see what makes the former stand out, whereas comparing radicalised converts and radicalised born Muslims would be futile. The observation that both converts and non-converts experience a similar radicalisation process, removes the common ground necessary for comparison of the two groups. Additionally, in the case of comparing radicalised converts and radicalised non-converts, given that the radicalisation process for both groups is similar, attention will be drawn to individual, group and structural-level explanatory variables. While focussing on these variables underlines the influence of a multitude of factors why some converts to Islam become involved in violent extremism, it would not provide a clear answer on what factors might make it more likely that the conversion experience leads to the adoption of radical or extremist views. In other words, using this approach would merely confirm the observation that converts radicalise for a wide variety of reasons and thereby fail to assess what sets those converts who do become involved in violent extremism apart from those who do not. Besides, focussing on converts’ personality traits and backgrounds or on group dynamics would contribute to the stigmatisation of converts as damaged persons or as religious seekers who are easily preyed upon by recruiters, and ultimately to constituting converts to Islam as a security threat. In order to improve our understanding of convert radicalisation while bearing in mind that most converts to Islam never become involved in radicalism or violent extremism, this thesis takes a process-oriented approach and therefore compares the conversion stories and experiences of radicalised converts to Islam with non-radicalised converts to Islam.
More specifically, this thesis will only compare cases of non-radicalised converts to Islam and converts to Islam who radicalised and ultimately left for Syria or Iraq1
.
The relevant converts for this thesis are the ones who radicalise and ultimately engage in violent extremism in addition to the converts who do not radicalise at all. In the end, this thesis is aimed at investigating indicators in explaining the relative overrepresentation of converts in
1 That is to say, Converts who did radicalise but did not leave the Netherlands to join the armed struggle in Syria
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the Dutch foreign fighter group. The data gathering consists of observational study of selected radicalised converts and interviews with selected non-radicalised converts to Islam, and are selected via purposive sampling, convenience sampling and snowball sampling strategies. A number of reasons can be identified that underlie these sampling strategies. First, purposive sampling was needed to select cases according to the purpose of this thesis in order to provide useful and real data for this study. Considering this thesis is interested in the relative overrepresentation of converts in the Dutch jihadist foreign fighter group, only Dutch converts to Islam are included as the concept of ‘jihad’ defined as the armed struggle is Islamic (Sedgwick, 2015).
This does not imply that every convert to Islam supports this type of jihad but it rather means that converting to Islam is a prerequisite for believing in the jihad. Additionally, as mentioned before, when it comes to the group of radicalised converts, only data of Dutch converts to Islam who radicalised and ultimately left for Syria was included. In light of the sensitive and personal aspects of the individual conversion process, convenience and snowball sampling was necessary to gather data of non-radicalised converts to Islam. That is to say, someone’s conversion story or experience is personal and can therefore be a sensitive topic to talk about which means that it is necessary to take into account that not every respondent that will be approached might be willing to talk about their experiences. Two respondents of the non-radicalised group were selected by using convenience sampling. More specifically, these two respondents were part of the researcher’s own social network. The research advantage of convenience sampling is that it contributes to building trust with respondents. Building trust is in particular relevant for the purpose of this thesis since someone’s conversion story and experience can be closely intertwined with their private life. Consequently, establishing a higher level of trust can improve the quality of the data.
Other Dutch non-radicalised converts to Islam were selected using a Facebook group of Dutch Muslim students. The respondents who were selected through this group acted as enablers to reach other non-radicalised converts to Islam for interviewing. In this sense, the snowball method also contributed to building trust considering trust may be developed as referrals were made by acquaintances or peers rather than by other formal methods of identification. Hence, the snowball sampling allowed for the recruitment of other respondents who met the previously described eligibility criteria. The total number of respondents to be interviewed was set at eight and their age ranged from 19 years to 35. Males formed 25 percent (2 respondents) of the respondents and females 75 percent (6 respondents).
24 Data gathering
The data gathering for this thesis involved conducting semi-structured face-to-face interviews (primary data) besides using observational data (secondary data) collected by previous research (Bakker & Grol, 2017; Rueb, 2018; Sterkenburg, 2015; Weggemans et al. 2014; Van San, 2015). The challenges that proceeded from using the observational data will be discussed in more detail later this chapter. Using observational data for the radicalised converts was necessary due to ethical and security concerns. Given the secretive nature and security concerns of interviewing radicalised converts, gaining access to this group is extremely difficult. A number of the radicalised converts were killed in battle in Iraq or Syria, are presumably still in Iraq or Syria or are in prison in the Netherlands. Hence, in light of their role of professional researches, previously mentioned researchers have managed to get access to radicalised converts. The in depth stories of radicalised converts written by Bakker and Grol (2017), Rueb (2018, Sterkenburg (2015) and Van San (2015) can provide valuable insights when it comes to understanding their process of conversion. Considering the aim of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of the conversion process of radicalised and non-radicalised converts to Islam, interviews are considered a suitable method of data gathering as they enable to explore and investigate underlying themes related to the individual conversion process.
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews offer the possibility of modifying lines of enquiry in a way that surveys or structured interviews do not. Answers provided by respondents can be probed, enabling them to explain or elaborate on what they have said. Thus, data of a rich quality can be gathered that allows for respondents to provide detailed information about their experiences, stories, feelings and motives related to their conversion process. The face-to-face interviews were administered with the aid of a topic list as the main guide of the interviews. In this way, the respondents had some leeway to venture their thoughts, which contributed to gaining a deeper insight of the concepts.
Moreover, it often allowed the respondent to touch upon other relevant themes in their conversion process without intervention of the interviewer. When the interview would go astray, the topic list led the interview back on track. The topics and the related questions used in the list are based on the conversion phases or themes identified by Lofland and Stark (1965) and applied to conversion to Islam. How these themes or concepts were measured in the interviews will be explained in the next section. The interviews were anonymised to allow data to be shared whilst preserving the privacy of the respondents. Moreover, the interviews were recorded with the consent of respondents and transcribed afterwards. To locate the
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answers provided by respondents, a codebook (Appendix B) was developed to make the transcripts (Appendix C) and the portraits quantifiable and to reflect the themes identified by Lofland and Stark (1965).
Operationalization of concepts
This section explains how the theoretical concepts as discussed in the previous chapter were used to analyse the data. To ensure the systematic gathering of information from the interviews and the observational data, this thesis uses the stages of the religious conversion process as outlined by Lofland and Stark (1965) as a framework for analysing the conversion stories of the selected Dutch converts to Islam. Indicators measuring every stage were extracted from Lofland and Stark (1965) and applied to conversion to Islam. The questions in the topic list used during the interviews (Appendix A) relate to these indicators and these indicators were used in the codebook (Appendix B) that was designed to code the interviews and the observational data. For the tension phase, the feelings as described by Lofland and Stark (1965) including feelings of frustration, deprivation and strain were used as indicators to measure the level of tension the converts felt before converting to Islam.
Lofland and Stark (1965) described a religious problem solving perspective as a perspective that seeks solutions for acutely felt tensions in religion. Building on Lofland and Stark (1965) indicators that will be used to measure this perspective include imposing religious meanings on events and experiences, expressing the need for religious rules and structure. In other words, looking for answers and truth in Islam. Lofland and Stark (1965) outlined religious seekership as being curious about religion and taking action in dealing with their tensions. Indicators that measure patterns of religious seekership include self-identification of being religious or spiritual, expressing curiosity about religion, looking into other religions than Islam before converting to Islam and deeming other religions than Islam as inadequate compared to Islam. The strength of the patterns of religious seekership relate to the development of curiosity about Islam or other religious affiliations and to the length of the quest for religious identity.
Concerning the turning points described by Lofland and Stark (1965), they are generic in nature and can be applied to conversion to Islam. Events that make the convert realise action is required to deal with the felt tensions can include multiple events including death, marriage, feuds, illness etc. A number of events have been listed as indicators in table 1, however when converts expressed in interviews how certain events affected them and played a key role in their conversion process, these events or experiences were also listed as turning
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points. In this thesis affective bonds were described as social ties with Muslims, every contact with Muslims that made the convert come closer to Islam were coded as affective bonds. The extra cult affective bonds theme was measured by looking at the converts’ social ties outside the new religious group. More specifically, extra cult affective bonds were measured by analysing to what extent the convert had less contact with non-Muslim social ties during their conversion process. Lastly intensive interaction, building on Lofland and Stark (1965), was operationalized as increasing contact with converts’ Muslim social ties and taking part in religious activities including going to Mosques and taking religious classes. However, in light of technological advances and online communication channels, online activities with other Muslims and intensive exposure to online Islamic content were also used as indicators for measuring intensive interaction.
27 Table 1: Operationalization of the concepts related to the conversion process as outlined by Lofland and Stark (1965)
Concept Indicator Source
Tension -Feelings of frustration
-Feelings of deprivation -Feelings of strain Interviews + Observational data Religious problem-Solving perspective
-Feeling the need for religious rules or structure -Imposing religious meanings on events
Interviews + Observational data
Religious seekership -Self identification of being religious
-Being curious about religion -Deem other religions than Islam inadequate
-Looking into religions (including other religions than Islam)
Interviews + Observational data
Turning Point -Personal relationship -Death in the family -Family feuds
-Loss of employment -Failure or withdrawal from school -Events of political repression, torture or discrimination Interviews + Observational data
Affective bonds -Contact with Muslims Interviews + Observational data
Extra-cult affective bonds -Less contact with non-Muslims
Interviews + Observational data
Intensive interaction -More contact with Muslims -Taking part in (religious) activities with other Muslims -Taking part in online
activities with other Muslims
Interviews + Observational data
28 Validity and reliability
Four tests have been commonly accepted to assess the quality of empirical social research (Yin, 2003). These four are a differentiation of the two concepts of quality, validity and reliability, which are applicable to different steps in the research.
First, the validity of this thesis will be assessed on three different levels: construct, internal and external. Validity in this thesis is subject to the question as to whether what has been measured is representative (valid) for what was intended to be measured (Smith in Kumar, 2011). Differently put, was measured what was meant to be measured? Subsequently, the reliability of this thesis will be assessed.
Construct validity
Construct validity reflects the conceptual and operational link, and examines to what extent the correct operational measures are used to measure the theoretical concepts (Yin, 2003). The indicators used to assess tension, religious problem-solving perspective, seekership, turning points, cult affective bonds, extra-cult affective bonds and intensive interaction have been extracted from previous research (Lofland & Stark, 1965), which have been combined and contextualised to the domain of conversion to Islam. To put it shortly, Lofland and Stark’s (1965) model of conversion is meant to be suggestive, not constricting. Moreover, Lofland and Stark (1965) have argued that the principles in their model are applicable to a general conversion process towards a different perspective and their model has been widely applied to empirical material from diverse religious groups (Austin, 1977; Snow and Phillips 1980; Richardson et al, 1978). In this sense, the generality of their model allows for the inclusion of a variety of factors and forces that may be operative in the conversion process and therefore the model does justice to the personal and dynamic nature of the conversion process. However, it should be taken into account that applying the phases by Lofland and Stark (1965) to conversion to Islam does stretch the use of concepts. However, this is not considered to be an issue for this thesis as the principles provided by Lofland and Stark (1965) will merely be used as guidelines to comprehend the complex reality of the conversion stories and experiences. Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, it is not expected that all themes as discussed by Lofland and Stark (1965) need to and will be present in the conversion stories, rather it expects that some themes may be present in the conversion stories.
