A successful parliamentary lobby? The involvement of national parliaments in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy - the case of the EU's human rights sanctions regime

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A successful parliamentary lobby?

The involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s Common Foreign and

Security Policy – the case of the EU’s human rights sanctions regime

Master Thesis Political Science

Name: Cathelijn Padberg

Student number: s12283738

Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan Zeitlin

Second Reader: Dr. Sarah de Lange

Date of submission: 3 June 2020

Track: European Politics and External Relations

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Acknowledgements

It has been, and still is, a challenging time for the world. When my thesis journey started on the 3th of February, the Covid-19 virus still seemed far away. But we have learned that reality soon catches up with us in our increasingly interconnected world. While the long-term consequences of the virus are still difficult to grasp in their entirety, I would like to express my sincere condolences to all the people who have been impacted by the current situation. My thoughts are with you.

In these challenging and insecure times, it has been peculiar to write my Master Thesis. Nevertheless, I tried my best to make a small, yet substantive, contribution to the scholarly field of Political Science. I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have helped me during this challenging but rewarding process.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor dr. Jonathan Zeitlin for his fruitful insights, helpful comments and continuous support.

Secondly, I would like to thank the second reader, Sarah de Lange, for her time to review my thesis.

Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude to all the interviewees who were so kind to share their knowledge and insights with me, despite the current situation. Without your help, this thesis would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my peers. It was great to share our experiences together and learn from each other. I wish you all the best in the future.

Lastly, I am grateful for all the support I received from my friends and family.

Cathelijn Padberg

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Abstract

During the Foreign Affairs Council of 9 December 2019, the Member States of the European Union reached agreement on the desirability of the development of an EU human rights sanctions regime. The Dutch Second Chamber played an indispensable role in the realization of this regime and the decision-making process that preceded it. As such, it constitutes one of the very few cases where a national parliament had a concrete policy steering impact on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through its involvement. This Master thesis aims to assess (1) how, why and under which conditions the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament is able and willing to influence the EU’s CFSP, and (2) under which conditions such parliamentary involvement can have a concrete impact on CFSP decision-making outcomes.

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List of Acronyms

English

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

Civcom Civilian Crisis Management Committee

COHOM Working Party on Human Rights

COSAC Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU

CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy

CA Current Affairs

EAC European Affairs Committee

ECJ European Court of Justice

EEAS European Union External Action Service

ENP European Neighborhood Policy

EP European Parliament

EPC European Political Cooperation

EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office ESI European Stability Initiative

EU European Union

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

EUMC European Union Military Committee

EWS Early Warning System

FAC Foreign Affairs Council

HR/VP High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the Commission

IIA Inter-institutional Agreement

MEPs Euro-parliamentarians

MFF Multi Annual Financial Framework

MPs National Parliamentarians

NPRs National Parliament Representatives

OPAL Observatory for Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty

PNP Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments

PSC Permanent Security Committee

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

RELEX Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors

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TEU Treaty on the Union European

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN United Nations

Dutch

AO Algemeen Overleg (General Consultation)

AO-RBZ Algemeen Overleg Raad Buitenlandse Zaken (General Consultation FAC)

BNC Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (Assessment New Commission Proposals)

BPZ Bureau Politieke Zaken (Department of Political Affairs)

CoCo Coördinatie Commissie voor Europese Integratie- en Associetieproblemen (Coordination Committee for European Integration- and Association Problems)

DGPZ Directeur Generaal Politieke Zaken (Director General of Political Affairs)

DIE Directie Europese Integratie (Department of European Integration)

DIE-EX Directie Europese Integratie – Extern (Department of European Integration – External)

GA Geannoteerde Agenda (Annotated Agenda)

PV Permanente Vertegenwoordiging (Permanent Representation)

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Introduction

During the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 9 December 2019, the Member States of the European Union (EU) reached agreement on the desirability of the development of an EU human rights sanctions regime (kst-21501-02-2019). This regime will enable the EU to install targeted sanctions such as asset freezes or visa restrictions against human rights violators worldwide. As the High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR) Josep Borrell stated, this will give the EU “much more strength and capacity to act” and “affirm the EU’s global lead on human rights” (Brzozowski 2019). He thereby added that “human rights are a clear priority for Europeans” (Barigazzi 2019). These statements suggest that the new sanctions regime will be effective, and legitimate in the eyes of the European electorate, two qualities which often seem to be lacking in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP constitutes an intergovernmental policy area, meaning that national governments retain ultimate authority over the decision-making process. This governance structure is embedded in the traditional idea that foreign and security policy is the prerogative of the executive, in this case, the Member States. Hence, the CFSP is located at the interface of two domains that are problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy and control: foreign and security policy and European integration (Huff 2015, p. 396; Peters et al. 2008, p. 5). Whereas the potential for substantive national parliamentary oversight is limited due to the increasing supranationalisation of CFSP decision making and the absence of necessary scope conditions, supranational parliamentary control falls short considering the limited powers of the European Parliament (EP) in this domain. Some scholars have designated this the so-called “double democratic deficit” or “parliamentary vacuum” of CFSP governance (Born and Hänggi 2005; Thym 2006).

Remarkably, however, it appears that the Dutch Second Chamber played an indispensable role in the realization of the EU human rights sanctions regime and the decision-making process that preceded it. As such, it constitutes one of the very few cases where a national parliament had a concrete policy steering impact on the EU’s CFSP through its involvement, as such contradicting the idea of the CFSP as parliamentary vacuum. Hence, Dutch parliamentary actions even went beyond post-hoc scrutiny and focused on influencing the substance of the CFSP. How, why and under which conditions did this parliamentary advocacy materialize? But more importantly, why was it consequential in this specific case? Even though the Dutch Second Chamber can be considered a most likely case for active parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, this does not provide a comprehensive explanation

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for its successful lobby in the case of the EU human rights sanctions regime. Therefore, this thesis aims to assess what is distinctive about this case, as such disentangling the determinants and underlying scope conditions of the Dutch Second Chamber’s positive influence on the CFSP. In order to do so, this Master thesis reconstructs the decision-making process of the EU human rights sanctions regime and the role of the Dutch Parliament therein, by employing ‘explaining outcome’ process-tracing. The analysis draws on relevant documentation and nine open-ended semi-structured interviews with public officials from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) and Dutch parliamentarians from the standing Committee on Foreign Relations.

The research aims to contribute to the existing literature on national parliaments’ role in EU governance. Since the 1990s, the alleged democratic deficit of the EU and related calls for stronger input legitimacy has made national parliaments a new focus point in political science research (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 15). This spurred studies on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs. However, national parliamentary engagement with the CFSP has received relatively little scholarly attention and empirical evidence of its scope conditions and effectiveness remains scarce (Huff 2015, p. 397-398). Moreover, the current literature is overly focused on formal powers and institutional strength when explaining the materialization of parliamentary involvement. Hence, this thesis aims to go beyond these unilateral factors, as formal powers do not necessarily translate into corresponding parliamentary behaviour (See Auel 2007; Auel and Christiansen 2015; Herbel 2017). This thesis therefore makes use of Born and Hänggi’s (2005) theory of authority, ability and attitude in order to explain parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, which besides formal powers also takes note of parliamentarians’ capacity and political motivations. Furthermore, the research lacuna is even more pronounced when it comes to assessing the (in)direct impact of national parliamentary involvement on EU policymaking. Yet, assessing the influence of parliaments on EU policymaking is crucial in order to convincingly address the debate on de-parliamentarisation in the EU (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 25). Accordingly, this thesis makes a useful contribution to the literature by analysing the successful lobby of the Dutch Second Chamber for the realization of an EU human rights sanctions regime.

Hence, this thesis aims to answer two main research questions: (1) how, why and under which conditions is the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament able and willing to influence and/or scrutinize the EU’s CFSP? And (2) under which conditions can such parliamentary involvement have a concrete impact on CFSP decision-making outcomes? In order to answer

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the first research question, this thesis considers the Second Chamber’s formal instruments, working method, resources, staff support, level of expertise, and incentives and motivations for engaging with the CFSP. These elements reflect Born and Hänggi’s theory of authority, ability and attitude. The second question is answered by using so-called proxy criteria which assess the impact of national parliamentary involvement on EU policy outputs. These criteria are: (1) pioneer vs. passive player, (2) content vs. procedure, (3) constructive vs. restrictive attitude, (4) national vs. European perspective, and (5) national vs. European policy goals.

The thesis starts out with a detailed overview of the existing literature on the role of national parliaments in EU governance. The first part of the literature review focuses on the limits of national parliamentary control in the EU’s multilevel governance system as well as the institutional evolution of national parliaments’ role in the EU. This is followed by an in-depth assessment of cross-country variation in parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. The second part of the literature review focuses specifically on the CFSP, including a discussion of its de jure intergovernmental status and de facto supranational character. Moreover, it elaborates on the challenges of national parliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP and the role and competences of the EP in this domain. The literature review ends with delineating the trade-off between democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the CFSP. Subsequently, chapter 2 discusses the theoretical frameworks that are used for the analysis - the theory of authority, ability and attitude of Born and Hänggi (2005) and Rozenberg and Hefftler’s (2015) five ideal types of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Thereafter, chapter 3 and 4 elaborate on the research questions and corresponding methodology. Then, chapter 5 maps the Dutch Parliament in the EU parliamentary field according to Rozenberg and Hefftler’s typology. Chapter 6 subsequently applies the theory of authority, ability and attitude to the parliamentary activities of the Dutch Committee on Foreign Relations. Finally, chapter 7 reconstructs the decision-making process of the EU human rights sanctions regime.

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Chapter 1 - Literature Review

This chapter expands on two stances of literature: (1) the role of national parliaments in EU governance, and (2) the democratic legitimacy of the CFSP.

1.1 - National parliaments’ role in the EU

(I) The limits of parliamentary control in a multilevel governance system

Since the nineteenth century, parliaments have been at the core of democratic political systems across Europe (Zürn 2019, p. 988). They are regarded as “the embodiment of popular sovereignty”, “living symbols of democracy” and “ultimate expressions of popular democracy” (Zürn 2019, p. 988; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 2; Cygan 2013, p. 2). As representative institutions, parliaments are expected to reflect the views of citizens and translate these into concrete policy outcomes (Cygan 2013, p. 6). In addition to their legislative competences, parliaments control the government and secure ministerial accountability (van Mourik 2012, p. 15). Accountability implies that decision makers do not have unlimited autonomy but must justify their policy decisions and actions (Auel 2007, p. 495). This mechanism of parliamentary accountability is meant to keep the executive aligned with voters’ preferences in between elections and is embedded in the European parliamentary model whereby the executive is dependent on the support of the majority of the parliament for its survival (Crum 2018, p. 270; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 2). The literature identifies five typical parliamentary functions: (1) legislative, (2) budgetary, (3) elective, (4) representative, and (5) scrutiny and oversight (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 4). Yet, national parliaments are by no means a homogenous and unitary categorization, as there exist considerable differences between parliaments across the EU. If one seeks to establish a minimal definition, one could argue that national parliaments are “a collective body that is at least partially directly elected with the specific task of transforming bills into laws” (Rozenberg and Heffter 2015, p. 2). Besides this commonality, the differences between parliaments are numerous, encompassing for example variations in unicameral or bicameral chambers; voting rules and related levels of representativeness; the balance of power between executive and legislature; the (non)existence of a monopoly of legislative competences; and formal powers (p. 3-4). Ultimately, parliaments’ specific characteristics are dependent on the constitutional arrangement and customary practice of the country in question (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 4).

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Multiple scholars have pointed out that parliaments’ traditional functions are challenged once states become embedded in a multilevel governance system (see Cygan 2013; Mastenbroek et al. 2014; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015; Crum 2018). In recent decades, the unprecedented level of globalization and growing problem interdependencies have created incentives to cooperate across boundaries and spurred the development of global governance arrangements (Héritier 2003, p. 185). Whereas these differ significantly in terms of institutional design, the weakening of legislatures relative to executives seems to be a common trend across the spectrum (Scholte 2011, p. 11-27; Wouters and Raube 2012, p. 153; Zürn 2019, p. 989). This entails that the power of ministers, diplomats, public officials and independent administrators almost always surpasses parliamentary power in these international fora (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 2). As Zürn (2019, p. 988-989) explains, during the past decades we have witnessed a de-politicization process whereby decision making shifted from majoritarian institutions such as parliaments and political parties to non-majoritarian institutions such as international organizations and central banks. Since governments gained a prominent position in these new multi-level governance arrangements, they were increasingly able to circumvent their parliaments. Consequently, these institutions have been criticized for their lacking accountability and representativeness (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 2). However, as promulgated by the so-called ‘good governance’ discourse, these governance arrangements are based on a technical conception of accountability (Bartolini 2011, p. 3; Scholte 2011, p. 15). As Majone (2014) and Moravcsik (2018) explain, these apolitical governance systems are meant to de-politicize issues in order to ensure pareto-optimal policy-making outcomes (cited in Zeitlin et al. 2019, p. 3). Hence, the search for specialized and professional expertise in policymaking has endangered the traditional standing of parliaments (Peters et al. 2014, p. 430).

The EU also constitutes such a multilevel governance entity, where power has come to be shared across the national and supranational level and legislative competences have been (partially) delegated to the EU in a multitude of policy areas. This ongoing process of European integration has led to a certain deparliamentarisation of the EU, whereby national parliaments have been faced with decreasing legislative prerogatives and have been constrained in their ability to scrutinize policymaking, ensure ministerial accountability and fulfil their traditional role as intermediary between the electorate and the executive (Cygan 2013, p. 34-35; Hallerberg and Marzinotto 2018). This has arguably turned national parliaments into the “losers” or “victims” of EU integration (Cygan 2013, p. 3). The EU has simultaneously gone through a constitutionalization process in which the directly elected EP incrementally acquired new

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supervisory, budgetary and legislative competences (Maurer et al. 2005, p. 175). The Lisbon Treaty made the EP a co-legislator in many policy areas, meaning it holds an equivalent position to the Council of Ministers in EU decision making (de Bruijn 2011, p. 328). The EU’s different decision-making procedures ranging from supranational, intergovernmental, to experimentalist forms of governance condition the extent to which parliamentary control materializes, and at which level – national or European - it materializes (AIV no. 88 2014). The conventional guiding principle stipulates that democratic control and accountability should occur at the level at which decisions are taken (see van Rompuy et al. 2012). This suggests that the EU’s decision-making layers can be kept separate, whereby the EP scrutinizes in the EU realm, and national parliaments scrutinize in the domestic realm (Groen and Christiansen 2015, p. 45). However, as Crum (2018, p. 270) rightly points out, this is complex in the “in-between” cases where competences are shared, and both the EP and national parliaments are expected to control EU decisions. This dilemma became particularly evident in the EU’s new economic governance framework after the financial crisis, whereby the European Semester posed challenges to effective parliamentary control (see amongst others Crum 2018; Hallerberg and Marzinotto 2018; Rasmussen 2018). Hence, it is too simplistic to assume that political space – in which decisions are made – and social space – to which these decisions apply – are congruent in the EU’s complex multilevel governance system (Peters et al. 2008, p. 5).

(II) Democratic deficit revisited?

The academic literature on the role of national parliaments in EU policymaking (see amongst others Maurer and Wessels 2001; Raunio and Hix 2000; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Bergman et al. 2002, 2003; Auel et al. 2015) is anchored in the broader debate about the democratic quality of EU governance which began in the 1990s (see amongst others Scharpf 1999; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal and Hix 2006; van Meurs et al. 2015). Many scholars have acknowledged that the EU is an unique political entity with different democratic qualities than traditional deliberative and representative democracies. Assessing the EU therefore requires looking at alternative democratic credentials such as the indirect control by national representatives in the European Council and the Council of Ministers (Moravcsik 2002, p. 605). Yet, since national executives have extensive decision-making powers in the EU, they can easily circumvent parliamentary control, misuse their autonomy and neglect citizens’ interests (Antonescu 2013, p. 94; Follesdal and Hix 2006, p. 354). Hence, the power of national executives at the expensive of parliamentary control is considered an intrinsic element of the alleged democratic deficit of the EU (Antonescu 2013, p. 94; Follesdal and Hix 2006, p.

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537). This is not peculiar to the EU, as democratic deficits are considered the “global norm of international cooperation”. In this regard, the EU even constitutes a positive example since it has a directly elected parliament since 1979 (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 2). Although, despite the growing influence of the EP, as such securing a certain level of input legitimacy to EU governance, the EP is criticised for the absence of true political deliberation and its inability to hold national governments accountable as a collectivity (Cygan 2013, p. 5; Follesdal and Hix 2006, p. 534). Many scholars therefore believe that the EP does not hold the same democratic credentials as national parliaments, and hence cannot be considered an effective substitute (Cygan 2013, p. 2; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 1; de Bruijn 2011, p. 336). Accordingly, the EU’s democratic deficit can be understood as the “shortfall in the capacity of the supranational parliamentary power to compensate for the reduction of parliamentary powers at the national level” (Crum 2018 p. 271). Moreover, since national parliaments have lost their legislative prerogatives to the European Commission in a variety of policy domains, EU policies now emanate from an institution that lacks a clear political mandate (p. 269).

This suggests that the EU fails to ensure “responsiveness to citizens’ concerns as a result of participation by the people” – so-called input legitimacy (Schmidt 2013, p. 2). This underlines that the EU’s democratic deficit is not solely a representational or institutional problem, but rather a problem of the EU’s relation with its citizens (van Meurs et al. 2015, p. 447-448). European leaders do not deny this problem, exemplified by Macron’s latest initiative for citizens’ consultations, enabling citizens to express their views on the future of Europe (Butcher and Pronckute 2019, p. 80). However, such direct forms of democracy are often accused of window dressing rather than truly improving legitimacy (Cygan 2013, p. 9). Hence, a variety of scholars have suggested that the (in)direct involvement of national parliamentarians can effectuate the crucial democratic link between citizens and EU decision making (de Bruijn 2011; Cygan 2013; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015; Auel and Christiansen 2015). This is grounded in the belief that national parliaments “can ensure the very equal access to deliberation that characterizes democracy” (Peters et al. 2014, p. 430). Moreover, because citizens more easily recognize themselves in their national parliament, involving them in the EU can ensure that the European policy process is transparent for, accountable to, and representative of, European citizens (Cygan 2013, p. 6-7; van Meurs et al. 2015, p. 448). National parliaments can do so by: (1) holding ministers accountable in the Council; (2) ensuring that European competences are properly exercised; (3) benchmarking legislative proposals against subsidiarity; (4) indirectly steering EU policies in line with expectations from the electorate;

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(5) informing the public about EU policies; (6) producing expert knowledge about EU legislation; and (7) affecting the policy agenda by networking with EU institutions (Cygan 2013, p. 5-6; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 30-35). Through these activities, national parliaments can normalize EU policymaking in the domestic arena; ensure that citizens are represented in the EU’s decision-making process; and hold the government to account over the EU’s performance (Kröger and Bellamy 2016, p. 131; Hoerner 2019, p. 808; 818).

Despite these benefits, a few critical remarks should be made. Considering the increasingly Eurosceptic character of political parties in the EU, national parliaments can also become locus points for delegitimizing the EU (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 2). If national parliaments have overt national orientations or pursue negative politicization strategies, governments can be constrained in forging compromises (Benz 2004, p. 876; Zürn 2019, p. 983). This can impair the effectiveness of EU policies, and negatively affect what the EU can deliver to its citizens – so-called output legitimacy (Hoerner 2019, p. 806; 818). As Schmidt (2013, p. 3) rightly argues, “output policy and input participation may involve trade-offs, where less quality in the one is offset by better quality in the other”. Furthermore, the democratizing effects of parliamentary involvement will be contingent upon the level of trust in, and legitimacy of, the national parliament in question. While some citizens consider involving their parliament in the EU’s decision-making process as a natural solution to the EU’s democratic deficit, others might see it as aggravating the problem (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 5). All in all, the assumption that strengthening the role of national parliaments leads to policy outputs that better reflect the priorities of citizens remains a proposition in need of further empirical validation (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 263).

1.2 - The evolving institutional architecture of the EU: towards greater national parliamentary involvement?

(I) From the Treaty of Maastricht to the “Treaty of Parliaments”

The EU has been subject to continuous institutional change through successive Treaty reforms and Inter Institutional Agreements (IIAs) (Maurer et al. 2005, p. 176-179). National parliaments gradually gained a position in this evolving integrational trajectory (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 15). The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was the first Treaty that recognized that national parliaments should have some status within the EU. The non-legally binding declaration 13 called on governments to improve access to information, seen as the main imperative to ensure greater involvement of national parliaments (Cygan 2013, p. 70-71). This confirms the vision

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of separated administrative layers in the EU, making information provision a duty of governments rather than EU institutions (Groen and Christiansen 2015, p. 46). Albeit, as de Bruijn (2011, p. 330) and Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015, p. 10) point out, the declaration remained a perfunctory statement with limited juridical status. Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the principle of subsidiarity in order to assess whether EU action would be more effective than national, regional or local action. Although, the concept remained abstract and the Treaty did not specify mechanisms for its implementation. Hence, the innovations did by no means elude to formal parliamentarisation (Cygan 2013, p. 71). Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) specified national parliaments’ role further through the ‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments (PNP)’ and the ‘Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’. They recognized (1) parliaments’ right to enforce scrutiny reserves; (2) made timely and adequate information provision a legal obligation; and (3) specified a minimum scrutiny period of 6 weeks between a Commission proposal and the relevant Council meeting (p. 11). Moreover, the PNP formally recognized the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC) and granted it the right to issue recommendations to EU institutions1 (Cygan 2013, p. 72; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 11). Moreover, the Treaty obliged the Commission to send all its consultation documents, including Green and White Papers, directly to national parliaments (Groen and Christiansen 2015, p. 46). Still, the procedural innovations under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties failed to truly engage national parliaments in the EU’s decision-making process.

Since the 2000s, the EU was preoccupied with developing a new Constitution in which its democratic quality would be improved (Cygan 2013, p. 1). The Inter-Governmental Conference in Nice in December 2000 launched the debate on the future of EU integration and identified issues of concern, among them citizens’ disconnect and the delineation of powers between the EU and Member States. The subsequent year, the Laeken Declaration translated these issues into tangible objectives (p. 14). This Declaration marked the beginning of the European convention process (2002-2003) which provided national parliaments, euro parliamentarians and governmental representatives a platform to discuss the content of the envisioned European Constitution (de Bruijn 2011, p. 331). During this process, two working groups investigated the role of national parliaments. Working Group I focused on the

1_{COSAC was established in May 1989 in Madrid and consists of the committees of national parliaments of the}

EU occupied with EU affairs and representatives from the EP. It convenes bi-annually in order to foster inter-parliamentary cooperation.

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application of the subsidiarity principle and Working Group IV targeted procedural questions and issues of horizontal cooperation between national parliaments (Cygan 2013, p. 17). However, the negotiations which carried over into the Constitutional Treaty were to no avail. The failed ratification in the Netherlands and France underlined that further EU integration necessitated a renewed focus on citizens’ concerns and accelerated the debate about the role of national parliaments in the EU (de Bruijn 2011, p. 333). Yet, much of the provisions in the draft Constitutional Treaty were only slightly modified in the Lisbon Treaty (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 12).

(II) Innovations under the Lisbon Treaty and beyond

The Lisbon Treaty, the so-called “Treaty of the Parliaments” for the first time explicitly recognized the democratic credentials of national parliaments and acknowledged their essential role in ensuring a democratic future for the EU (Cygan 2013, p. 1). Article 12 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) explicitly states that “national parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union”. The most prominent innovation under the Lisbon Treaty was the establishment of new prerogatives for subsidiarity monitoring through the Early Warning System (EWS), which intends to increase the output legitimacy of EU legislation (Cygan 2013, p. 18; 68). It breaks with the traditional philosophy of separated administrative layers in the EU, enabling national parliaments to play an independent and direct role in the EU’s decision-making process (de Bruijn 2011, p. 331). Within 8 weeks after submission of a Commission proposal, national parliaments can send a reasoned opinion to the Commission, arguing whether the proposal is in line with the subsidiarity principle. If at least one-third of the parliaments2 casts a negative advice, the Commission is urged to reconsider - either maintain, amend or withdraw - its initial proposal3_{(Mastenbroek 2014, p. 1). In cases where a majority of} parliaments finds an infringement and the Commission still holds on to the proposal, the Commission is obliged to justify its decision to the EP and Council which are able to reject it4 (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 13). In addition to the EWS, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulated that the Commission is obliged to send both legislative and non-legislative proposals directly to national parliaments (de Bruijn 2011, p. 332; Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 267). Commission President Barroso already introduced this new working method in 2006. He also invented the non-binding ‘Political Dialogue’ which enables national parliaments to share their

2_{One quarter in the domain of Freedom, Security and Justice} 3_{The Yellow Card Procedure}

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opinion on Commission proposals on other aspects than the subsidiarity principle (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 14). Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon allocated parliaments the right to veto the application of the passerelle clause through which the European Council can decide to subject a policy area to qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of voting based on unanimity (p. 13). Despite the innovative character of these reforms, Cygan (2013, p. 70) points out that they have improved parliaments’ procedural abilities to scrutinize EU decisions rather than altering parliaments’ constitutional status within the EU, which remains marginal compared to the EP.

With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the discussion on the role of national parliaments in the EU did not come to an end. The outbreak of the financial and Eurozone crises amplified concerns about parliamentary accountability in EU governance (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 262; Liszczyk 2013, p. 1). National parliaments accused their governments of significantly undermining fiscal sovereignty (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. xiv). Consequently, some parliamentarians proposed the creation of a new supranational institution comprising MPs and MEPs from Eurozone countries with real oversight and scrutiny powers. Others called for a less invasive solution, namely, the creation of a sector-specific parliamentary conference in order to discuss Eurozone issues. These innovative ideas underline that the Lisbon Treaty was not the end, but rather the beginning of further institutional reform with regards to the role of national parliaments in the EU (Groen and Christiansen 2015, p. 56).

(III) National parliaments as competitive players

National parliaments have also actively adapted to their new European reality (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. i). In response to the substantial loss of legislative competences, parliaments have initiated several reforms which aim to strengthen their position in the EU (Benz 2004, p. 896; Auel 2007, p. 488). Ultimately, it remains the prerogative of each Member State to decide on the role of its parliament in the European decision-making process (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 6-7). Although, there are common trends in the way in which national parliaments have adopted to the pressures of Europeanization. Moments of treaty ratification provided parliaments with opportunities to duplicate what already existed in other Member States. But constitutional norms and best practices have also dispersed through forums of cooperation such as COSAC (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 7). Many Member States have instated scrutiny reserves, enabling parliaments to draft resolutions on EU issues before the Council adopts the final decision. Moreover, nearly all countries have set up European Affairs Committees (EACs) that are responsible for scrutiny of EU affairs. Additionally, some parliaments have instituted

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regulations that oblige their governments to provide comprehensive information on EU decisions (Auel 2007, p. 488-489; Herbel 2017, p. 162). Furthermore, national parliaments have created so-called National Parliament Representatives (NPRs). These civil servants reside in Brussel in order to improve parliaments’ information position, facilitate work visits to Brussel and enable direct networking with EU institutions (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 14; Högenauer 2015, p. 262). These reforms indicate that parliaments have tried to position themselves as competitive players rather than “losers” of EU integration (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 262).

1.3 – A bird’s eye view

(I) Comparison of national parliamentary involvement in the EU

Despite parliaments’ similar responses to the pressures of Europeanization, there are great variations in the scope and type of parliamentary involvement across the EU. It appears that the average level of parliamentary involvement in the EU has increased over time, and was elevated by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the beginning of the internal market program (1993), the Nordic enlargement (1995), and the Eastern enlargement (2004) (Winzen 2012, p. 664). Generally, the Northern European and Scandinavian Member States tend to be more active scrutinizers than their Southern counterparts (p. 664; 667). The overall ranking of institutional strength across the EU places the parliaments of Northern Europe in the upper spectrum, among them Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. These parliaments are followed by the in-between cases of France, Italy and the UK. In the lower range we can identify Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 268). The parliaments of the new accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe generally have more stringent parliamentary control mechanisms in place than the parliaments of the older Member States (Winzen 2012, p. 658; 665). Although, these studies assess parliaments’ institutional strength without linking it to actual parliamentary activity (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015, p. 36; Auel et al. 2015, p.60). Yet, it is inherently flawed to assess parliamentary involvement solely by focusing on formal rights, because these do not necessarily translate into corresponding parliamentary behaviour (Auel 2007, p. 488; Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 264; Herbel 2017, p. 163). The study of Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea (2015) provides a useful contribution to this empirical lacuna, offering an unique overview of parliamentary activity by 40 chambers of the 27 Member States. The aggregated data shows that parliamentarians have spent thousands of hours on scrutinizing and debating EU affairs; adopted more than 4000 motions and resolutions on EU decisions; and sent over 1500 reasoned

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opinions to the Commission between 2010-2012. This data supports the claim that national parliaments have become active players in EU affairs. However, the data also shows great variations between countries and chambers. Ranking the Member States according to their activity score shows that (1) Finland, (2) Sweden, (3) Denmark, (4) Portugal, (5) the German Bundestag, (6) Czech Senate, and (7) Dutch Second Chamber are in the upper spectrum.

Not only the scope of parliamentary involvement over time and between countries varies, but also the composition of the parliamentary instruments that legislatures employ (Winzen 2012, p. 668; Auel et al. 2015, p. 80). Hence, it is insufficient solely to provide a quantitative ranking of parliamentary activity. Rather, it is necessary to elaborate on the different ways in which national parliaments are involved in EU affairs. Most studies conceptualize parliamentary scrutiny as “the ability of parliaments to make government act according to its preferences” (Winzen 2012, p. 659). However, as Auel (2015, p. 263) points out, it is incomplete to focus on the policy-making function of parliaments, since they fulfil a wide array of tasks. That is why Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015, p. 27-30) have identified five ideal types of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs: (1) policy shaper, (2) government watchdog, (3) public forum, (4) EU expert, and (5) European player5. Whereas the three former categorizations reflect typical parliamentary functions - legislating, controlling and communicating - the latter two are distinct to the EU context. The ideal types are not mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, as some parliaments might fall into multiple categories or are excluded altogether. According to a large COSAC questionnaire, 92% of national parliaments attaches great value to indirect control instruments (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 14). This refers to parliaments’ ability to instruct and control governments in Council negotiations – conforming to ideal type 1 and 2. Hence, parliaments seem to prefer indirect engagement over an independent role in the EU policy process – conforming to ideal type 5. Although, parliaments use the new instruments such as the EWS and the political dialogue differently. Concerning the EWS, the Swedish Riksdag appears to be the frontrunner with 48 advices between 2010-2013, closely followed by Luxembourg (16), France (15), the Netherlands (14), the UK (13) and Poland (12). The least active parliaments are Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 17). Until now, the necessary threshold has only been reached twice – in the case of (1) the regulation concerning the transnational right to strike and (2) the

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proposal for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), suggesting a limited practical value (p. ii).

(II) Explaining cross-country variation in parliamentary involvement

The mixed empirical record shows that there persist large differences in the scope and type of parliamentary activity across the EU (Auel et al. 2015, p. 83). This suggests that parliamentary behaviour remains conditioned by domestic factors (Winzen 2012, p. 668; Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 269). A variety of scholars has attempted to explain this cross-country variation (see amongst others Born and Hänggi 2004, 2005; Auel 2007; Winzen 2012; Herbel 2017; Auel et al. 2015). Most academic studies cite institutional strength as prime explanatory factor (Auel 2007, p. 487; Maatsch 2017, p. 3). Institutionally strong parliaments that have extensive information rights and formal scrutiny instruments indeed appear to be among the most active parliaments (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 22). These formal powers can be both ex ante and post hoc6 (Huff 2015, p. 400). Several parliaments have the ability to impose legally binding mandates on their government, such as in Estonia, Austria and Poland. Moreover, the political mandates of the German, Finish, Swedish and Dutch parliaments are de facto binding (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 14-15; Huff 2015, p. 401). Contrarily, some parliaments cannot dictate or influence the government’s negotiating position ex ante but can only cast their opinion or scrutinize post hoc through inquiries, questions or reports (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 268; Huff 2015, p. 401).

However, it is mistaken to equate formal powers with active parliamentary involvement, since it implicitly assumes that national parliaments always use their powers (Auel 2007, p. 488; Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 264; Auel et al. 2015, p. 65; Herbel 2017, p. 163). Hence, it is necessary to look beyond formal prerogatives in order to see how instruments are used in practice (Kreilinger 2018, p. 326). As posited by principal-agent theory, the balance of power between the legislature and the government, so-called legislative-executive relations, determines to what extent parliaments can control their government (Raunio and Wagner 2017, p. 6; Herbel 2017, p. 162). One essential scope condition in this regard is the availability, accessibility and timely receipt of relevant EU documents such as legislative proposals and Council agendas (Auel 2007, p. 489; Groen and Christiansen 2015, p. 47). Some parliaments can oblige their government to provide additional information on EU legislation and the

6_{Ex ante: exert influence before the final decision is adopted.}

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decision-making process that precede it, such as in Finland, Germany or Sweden (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 14-15). Moreover, considering parliamentarians’ limited time and resources, they must make deliberate choices which EU policies to scrutinize. The rationalist approach suggests that parliamentarians only engage with EU affairs when the expected gains – policy influence or electoral win – exceed the potential costs (Auel et al. 2015, p. 65).

Moreover, parliamentarians’ ability to engage with EU affairs is also dependent upon their resources, expertise and number of supporting staff (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 9). This is intrinsically linked to parliaments’ different working methods. In some parliaments, the EAC is the prime or sole responsible for the oversight over EU affairs (centralized working method), whereas in other parliaments specialized committees are responsible for the scrutiny of EU decisions in their specific policy area (decentralized working method). Even though EACs have extensive knowledge on the functioning of the EU and an integrated view on EU issues, the broad scope of EU policies forces EACs to prioritize and hampers a high degree of specialization. Contrarily, specialized committees are often better suited to engage in well-informed scrutiny (Auel 2007, p. 489-499). Although, the differences between EACs and specialized committees in terms of capacity are marginal when compared to the great discrepancy between governments’ large ministerial bureaucracies and parliaments’ small infrastructures (Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 9).

The scope conditions identified above are all a-political in nature (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 3). However, as Born and Hänggi (2005, p. 11) point out, “authority” and “ability” are of no avail if parliamentarians are not willing to use the opportunities available to them. This willingness is affected by political considerations. Hence, it is essential to identify the underlying incentives and motivations of parliamentarians and political groups (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 264). Parliamentarians are inclined to engage in scrutiny of EU affairs if they expect to gain electoral or career benefits, or make a real policy impact. Concerning the former, the general sentiment towards the EU in a given population can induce or discourage active involvement in EU affairs. In countries characterized by high level of Euroscepticism, parliamentarians are more inclined to actively scrutinize EU affairs considering the high electoral impact. Contrarily, in Member States where European affairs play only a marginal role and the “permissive consensus” prevails, the electoral gains of active involvement are minimal (Winzen 2012, p. 666; Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 269-270). Furthermore, parliaments’ willingness to engage in scrutiny activities varies considerably across policy areas (Auel and Christiansen 2015, p. 269-270). As stipulated by the “negotiating approach”, the

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content and political salience of a policy dossier determines to a large extent if parliaments want to be involved in EU issues. This can be influenced by factors such as the level of media attention or the presence of lobby groups in a given society (Mastenbroek et al. 2014, p. 3). However, parliamentarians are not just “vote-, office-, or policy-seekers”, as this fails to account for ‘irrational’ behavior. Parliamentarians often spend a lot of time on drafting resolutions or writing parliamentary reports while being aware it will have limited impact on the eventual policy-making outcome or acquire attention from voters. In these instances, parliamentary involvement can be explained by parliamentarians’ individual incentives and role perceptions (Auel et al. 2015, p. 65). Role conceptions reflect the function of the parliament vis-à-vis the government, which can differ considerably across societies. For example, in some Member States the dividing line is not between the legislature and the government, but rather between the opposition and the coalition (Maatsch 2017, p. 3).

As Raunio and Wagner (2017, p. 7-11) point out, it is mistaken to treat parliaments as unitary actors. Rather, parliaments are “party-political institutions” composed of political parties and parliamentarians who have different interests and incentives for becoming involved in EU affairs. This can be the result of differing party ideologies or government-opposition dynamics. Previous studies have shown that social democratic, radical leftist and green parties are generally more in favour of extensive parliamentary scrutiny than right-wing and radical right parties. Additionally, left-wing parties are considered more inclusive and internationalist as opposed to the rather nationalist and militarist policy agenda of right-wing parties. Besides right-left wing divisions, the parliamentary majority and the opposition are also “two distinct agents of the electorate” (Auel 2007, p. 487). Whereas opposition parties tend to engage in active scrutiny if they have strong formal instruments to do so, coalition parties resort to scrutiny if the Minister in question is relatively weak (Herbel 2017, p. 162). Thereby, coalition parties are generally less inclined to control and influence the government because they risk undermining the trust between the government and the parliamentary majority. This can undermine the parties’ own credibility and give the opposition room for exploitation (Auel et al. 2015, p. 65). Hence, scholars distinguish between “monitory scrutiny” which aims to reduce the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the government and is the task of the whole legislature, and “political scrutiny”, which aims to assess the appropriateness of EU outcomes and is mainly done by the opposition parties (Auel 2007, p. 488; 500).

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Interim Conclusion I

The rise of multilevel global governance arrangements such as the EU has eroded parliaments’ traditional standing as prime democratic institutions in Europe. As European integration proceeded, so did the decay of national parliamentary power. While the EP was meant to fill this parliamentary vacuum, many scholars have criticized the EP for its inability to do so. Hence, the growing attention to the democratic quality of EU governance and arguments for stronger input legitimacy has made national legislatures a new focus point in political science research. The idea that national parliaments are an indispensable link between citizens and EU decision making was thus not only recognized in consecutive EU treaties, but also spurred the development of a new stance of literature. However, despite the broadening scope and diversification of the literature on national parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, there remains an important research agenda that requires further inquiry. As a variety of scholars has argued, current studies are overly focused on parliaments’ institutional strength and formal rights, without acknowledging that these do not necessarily translate into corresponding parliamentary activities. Hence, there is a need to assess which other intervening variables and scope conditions determine the materialization of actual national parliamentary involvement in the EU. Furthermore, the research lacuna is even more pronounced when it comes to assessing the (in)direct impact of national parliamentary involvement on EU policymaking. As Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015, p. 25) rightly point out, “knowing that parliaments are active in EU affairs is not enough to argue in favour of re-parliamentarisation if this activity is inconsequential.”

1.4 – Parliamentary engagement with the CFSP

(I) The CFSP’s legal base in the EU’s governance structure

Parliaments’ ability to influence or scrutinize EU policies is dependent upon the legal base and decision-making procedure of the specific policy domain. As stipulated by Article 24(1) of the TEU, “the Union’s competence in matters of CFSP shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security”. This means that the CFSP encompasses a broad spectrum of policies ranging from civilian and military missions, diplomatic efforts to ensure international cooperation, declarative diplomacy, to imposing restrictive measures on specific actors or entities (Eckes 2014, p. 7). While the CFSP is embedded in the Union’s broader external action, it excludes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), international trade, development policy and the accession process as these are grounded in different legal

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frameworks. The CFSP has a special place in the EU’s governance system since its legal status remains strictly intergovernmental. According to the EU treaties, the FAC is the prime responsible for defining and implementing the CFSP, while being steered by the general guidelines of the European Council (Thym 2006, p. 110). The Council can decide on either joint action or common positions (Riddervold and Rosén 2015, p. 401). The Treaty of Lisbon reiterated the CFSP’s intergovernmental character, denying the Commission’s right of legislative initiative and retaining the requirement of unanimity in decision making (p. 399). Moreover, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) does not have jurisdiction over the CFSP (Thym 2006, p. 113). Hence, the CFSP follows Crum’s (2018, p. 270) so-called intergovernmental model whereby Member States retain ultimate authority over decision making in the EU’s multilevel system. This entails that the democratic legitimacy of the CFSP depends on checks and balances - through the veto rights of national governments - and national parliamentary control (Wouters and Raube 2012, p. 6). Yet, since CFSP policies are often non-legislative in nature, national parliamentary influence and control is less institutionalized and automatic. This also means that the policy area has been excluded from the new control instruments such as the EWS established by the Treaty of Lisbon (Huff 2015, p. 396).

Due to the CFSP’s intergovernmental character, the issue of lacking democratic control seems less prominent than in other severely Europeanized policy domains. It is not likely that this will change any time soon, as the CFSP is shielded from far-reaching Europeanization due to firm opposition from a multitude of Member States. Moreover, foreign policy has generally always been considered an executive competence whereby national parliaments are accustomed to relatively limited scrutiny powers, even in states whose democratic quality is deemed very high (Huff 2013, p. 4; Born and Hänggi 2005, p. 2). Consequently, parliamentary engagement with the CFSP has received relatively little scholarly attention (Huff 2015, p. 397-398). With the notable exception of the recent literature on parliamentary scrutiny of military missions (see for example Dieterich et al. 2015 and Mello 2014), research on legislative-executive relations in the realm of the CFSP has fallen behind compared to the large volume of literature on the role of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process (Raunio and Wagner 2017, p. 1; Huff 2013, p. 5). However, assuming that foreign policy is subject to executive dominance, and hence academically irrelevant, is overly simplified if we do not have empirical studies that support this claim (Raunio and Wagner 2017, p. 2). Moreover, even though the CFSP seems purely intergovernmental, many scholars have noted the increasingly supranational elements of CFSP decision making, which impedes effective national parliamentary influence and control.

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(II) Beyond intergovernmentalism - the increasing supranationalisation of CFSP decision-making

A growing body of empirical studies has found that the CFSP can be better understood as a form of “supranational intergovernmentalism” than pure intergovernmental cooperation (see Howorth 2012; Ridderveld and Rosén 2015). Despite the merits of the intergovernmental approach, it does not reflect the day-to-day supranational functioning of the CFSP (Norheim-Martinsen 2010, p. 1360; Howorth 2012, p. 434). Many scholars have ascribed this to the increasingly independent and influential role of the preparatory institutions that work under the Council (Ridderveld and Rosén 2015, p. 400). In theory, the FAC is primarily responsible for CFSP decision making. However, in practice the Political Security Committee (PSC), a preparatory body comprising diplomats of all Member States, is seen as the “the political mind” of the CFSP (Thym 2006, p. 110). The PSC is mainly occupied with (1) responding to international crises, (2) managing the EU’s relations with third countries, and (3) overseeing military and civilian CSDP missions. All CFSP decisions are effectively pre-negotiated in the closed-off PSC meetings that take place twice a week in Brussel. During these meetings, the PSC mainly takes on a functional and problem-solving role, trying to find areas of agreement among the wide variety of Member States’ interests (Cross 2018, p. 920-921). Besides PSC meetings, other preparatory committees such as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) also pre-negotiate decisions and try to persuade Member States of policies that are different than they had originally anticipated. They thus have extensive powers and constitute “epistemic communities” in their own right (p. 915). This has led to a “Brusselization” of foreign policy, referring to the “continued convergence of national foreign policy preferences on the basis of a permanent and institutionalized discourse” (Thym 2006, p. 110). Similarly, Norheim-Martinsen (2010, p. 1361) argues that the permanent representatives in these preparatory bodies develop “some degree of collective sprit de corps”.

Additionally, the CFSP decision-making process has also become more supranational and complex since the creation of the EEAS - the diplomatic service of the EU. As Sjursen (2011) points out, the new structure makes allocating responsibilities and ensuring the accountability of European decision-making actors more difficult (cited in Huff 2015, p. 397). Moreover, Riddervold and Rosén (2015, p. 417) show in their analysis that the role of the Commission and the EP often goes beyond the intergovernmental procedures as proposed by the Treaties. Consequently, the increasingly Europeanized policy process, encompassing a

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variety of working groups, preparatory bodies and European institutions, is more difficult to monitor than before (Winzen 2012, p. 658). Hence, some scholars argue that the CFSP has “entered a slippery slope of integration”, whereby European actors have the power to steer policy-making outcomes (Herbel 2017, p. 163). Since these “hybrid” forms of integration are not formally considered to be supranationalisation, parliaments face difficulties in enhancing their oversight powers (Herranz-Surrallés 2019, p. 41). All in all, to the extent that this shift towards de facto supranationalisation is taking place, it could undermine the role of national parliaments in the CFSP (Norheim-Martinsen 2010, p. 1361).

(III) The challenges inherent in scrutinizing the CFSP

Beyond the challenges of increasing supranationalisation, academic studies point out that the CFSP domain is generally less suitable for public scrutiny than other policy areas (see amongst others Born and Hänggi 2005; Huff 2013, 2015; Raunio and Wagner 2017; Cross 2018; Herranz-Surrallés 2019). This is not necessarily the result of the absence of formal powers, as national parliaments have a wide array of instruments at their disposal to influence or control the CFSP. Formal powers can be divided in ex ante (mandates and troop deployment vetoes), post hoc (questioning, enquiry and votes of no confidence) and budgetary powers (Huff 2015, p. 400-401). Issuing legally or politically binding mandates to Ministers is considered the most powerful instrument to exert influence over CFSP decision making. Counterintuitively, mandating parliaments might even have more ability to influence the EU’s CFSP than national foreign and security policy, since their control over the Minister is greater in Council negotiations than in bilateral or multilateral fora (p. 401). As Raunio and Wagner (2017, p. 10) similarly point out, governments can more easily evade legislative constraints in singular situations, whereas parliamentary control is more institutionalized in systematic forms of international cooperation such as the EU. In addition to, or instead of, ex ante powers, parliaments can re-orient future political decisions or hold governments publicly to account through post-hoc scrutiny. Since this takes place after decisions have been taken, it is considered less effective than ex ante mandating (Huff 2015, p. 401). Furthermore, parliaments’ budgetary powers are limited, because the CFSP budget is part of the overall Community budget and hence falls outside the scope of direct national parliamentary scrutiny. Parliaments can only indirectly cast their concerns during the negotiations of the overall long-term EU budget, the so-called Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which sets the limits of EU expenditure for a period of at least five years (Huff 2015, p. 402). The CFSP budget excludes military CSDP missions, as these are funded by national contributions of the participating Member States or

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through the Athena mechanism7_{(Cîrlig 2016, p. 1-2). Parliaments’ formal powers over} decisions pertaining to national contributions to CSDP missions differ considerably across the EU, ranging from none (Bulgaria, Greece, Romania) to binding recommendations (Austria, Germany, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden or Spain) (Peters et al. 2008, p. 11-12).

Despite the existence of formal powers, challenges for parliamentary control over the CFSP remain particularly pronounced. Whereas foreign and security policy is already an area of executive dominance, this is aggravated by the fact that governments take decisions on a level even further removed from domestic legislatures (Wouters and Raube 2012, p. 8). In this multi-level structure, effective influence and scrutiny can only materialize when the CFSP decision-making process is completely transparent and public (Peters et al. 2008, p. 6). Yet, FAC meetings are highly confidential and often lack transparency (Cygan 2013, p. 24). As Cross (2018, p. 914) argues, “there certainly exists a ‘secret EU’ in the security, defense and foreign policy realm”. This problem is aggravated by the fact that national parliaments do not receive information directly from EU institutions. Hence, the executive acts as gate keeper and can conveniently decide to withhold information about their role in the decision-making process (Peters et al. 2008, p. 13). The problem of non-transparency cannot only be resolved by giving access to relevant documentation, since private deliberations and informal meetings will remain invisible (Cross 2018, p. 917). This secrecy leads to considerable information asymmetries between national parliaments and their respective governments (Raunio and Wagner 2017, p. 3). Consequently, it is nearly impossible for parliaments to assess whether governments’ actions are appropriate in terms of decision-making outcomes (Herbel 2017, p. 164). Moreover, international crises can escalate quickly and therefore require an immediate response, leaving ample time for parliaments to influence their government ex ante (Huff 2015, p. 597; Thym 2006, p. 125). As pointed out by Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015, p. 15), “the difficulty of legislatures in coping with fast track policies is a major source of executive discretion, especially in times of crisis”.

Additionally, many scholars have argued that parliaments lack the motivation to actively engage with the CFSP. They point out that parliaments are inclined to prioritize domestic matters over foreign policy, since they usually speak more to the electorate (Huff 2013, p. 597). Hence, parliaments do not mind delegating foreign policy to the executive, as it carries low political salience among voters and will not necessarily get MPs re-elected (Raunio and Wagner

A successful parliamentary lobby? The involvement of national parliaments in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy - the case of the EU's human rights sanctions regime