How to reform the EU-Budget? How to limit and hence to trust the EU- Leviathan?
Leen, A.R.; Stivachtis, Y.A.
Citation
Leen, A. R. (2010). How to reform the EU-Budget? How to limit and hence to trust the EU- Leviathan? In Y. A. Stivachtis (Ed.), The New Europe: Politics, Economics, and Foreign Relations (pp. 253-264). Athene: ATINER. Retrieved from
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I HOW TO REFORM TIIE EU BUDGET?
HOW TO LIMIT AND HENCE TO TRUST THE EU LEVIATIIAN?
Auke
R. LeenFaculty of Law, Department of Tax Law and Economics Leiden University, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Constitutions should say
no. The treaty of Lisbon, though no real
constitution,definitely
says yesto
almostall
possible spending andtaxing
possibilitiesof
the EuropeanUnion (EtD.
Thereis no limitation to the
tasksthe EU can do;
theprinciples of
subsidiarityand proportionality are, in this
respect,no
effective safeguardsfor
restraints in thepolitical
process.In
apublic
consultation paper, the European Commission asksits
citizens and Member Statesto
come upwith
ideashow to reform the EU Budget. The key
research challengeof our
paper---toanswer the
consultationpaper---is to give a novel angle from the point of
constitutional economics towards
the
selection amongthe
altemative budgetary powers made available to theEU.
Our central questionis: How to
reform theEU
Budget? Our central goal is tolimit
and hence to trust theEU
Leviathan.Keywords: Constitutional
Political
Economy,EU
budgetBACKGROUND AND APPROACII TO TIIE PROBLEM
After
the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty (2004) in 2005 by French andDutch
voters,a
revisedTreaty (2001) is put up for ratification in the
Member States.If ratified, it will
enterinto force on I January 2009. A revision of
the
budgetary powers of
the EU,
however, should be a priority.
Why? It the 'no' of
the French and Dutch citizens was a revolution, the
truth
counts that at least halveof all
historic revolutions were fiscal revolutions(Net
2002). Citizens do want to feel protected from an almost automatically ever-growingEU
budget.If it
shouldgrow, it should grow willingly
andby the
consentof the citizens.
Hence the consultationcall by
the European Commission (2007)is, in the words of Dalia
Grybauskaite (European Commissionerfor
Financial Programming and Budget),indeed, a 'unique, may be once-in-a-lifetime opportunity', to discuss
a fundamental review of the EU Budget.The
rðad towardsa revised
budgetas
suggestedby the
Commission'sconsultation paper, just as the approach after the rejection of the
draftConstitutional Treaty, can be a very toilsome process inside the realm
of
partisan(Member
States') advocacy.Solidarity, for
instance,has to be bought with financial pet
projectsfor individual Member
States.Or, alternatively,
budget reform is discussed by the direct application of abstract ethical nonnsin
a vacuous (without a model of governmental-political behavior) institutional setting.Moreover,
fiscal
decision-makingis often
basedon the rule that
policies haveto
pose aslittle
resistance as possiblefor
themajority that
must approveof
them.
The
feeling, often, dominatesthat
someone elsepays (Spicer,
1995). Totrust on the goodwill of the Member
Statesor the
membersof the
European Parliament is no solution either.In
thefour
years before 2005,no
memberof
the US congress has on total votedfor
a reductionin
government outlays, though the rhetoric to speak of fiscal discipline was on the rise (Dircksen, 2005).The paper shifts the grounds for the debate on the
reform of
the EU budget towards a fundamentalreview: it
focuses onthe
choices among quasi-permanent constraints(within which
alternativesshould the EU's budgetary powers
be exercised) and not, as is usually the case on choiceswithin
given constraints. The paper adopts a rule-based perspective on theEU
Budget:we
do choose budgetary rulesof which we know that,
onoe selected,they will remain in being over
an indeterminatelylong
sequenceof
budgetaryperiods. We should take literally
Grybauskaites
remark about an "once-in-a-lifetime possibilþ". The rules
are quasi-permanentand long-lived. Members
Statesare unable to predict with
precision whattheir position will
beat
anyparticular moment in the future. In
particular,they
are presumedto
be unableto identify their position (a veil of
ignorance) either as payer
or
as spending beneficiaryin a
sequenceof
separate budgetary periods. History shows that these kindsof
debate about a frameworkfor political action, not an instrument thereof, have been possible and fruitful
@uchanan, 2001¡, Elster, 1 99 1).
The paper, also, stays
within the
frameworkof an individualistic
market ec'onomy. Why does the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) set outindividual
freedom as one of the core values of the EU?It
is a goodin itself; it
represents human nature. We can only make real choices based on individual freedom. Freedomis
also essentialto
develop as a moral being. Man isfirst
andfor all
a spiritual being. The choices, e.g., we make to help other people, have to be taken in freedom.Individual
freedom, however,is
also a necessityfor our
economic order:the market
economy.Not only, quite visible, the climate and the
physicalcharacteristics
of the
Member Statesdo differ, but,
lessvisible, though of
more importance, alsomen in their
preferences andknowledge do differ. A
market economy,as
hasbeen
emphasizedby the Austrian-bom economist
Friedrich Hayek, isto
make optimal useof
those differencesin
knowledge (1982,Vol.
1).Hence, the problem in a market economy is not
to
give the central authorities, beit
Brussels
or
a local government,all
the extra knowledgeit
needsto
pursuepolicy.
The problem is to give each individual all the extra knowledge he needs, mostly
in
theform of
price(profit)
signals, so he can decidefor himself how to
pursue his own goals. In this way, society does make useof
often-unique knowledge of local circumstances and preferences that dodiffer
in time. Knowledge that isdiffrcult
toÕ
centralize.
An
idea asvalid for individuals
asfor
countries and hasfound
its expression, though unsuccessfully as areal constraint o theEU
budget, in the ideaof
subsidiarity.The focus
of
the paperis
on the normative evaluationof
budgetary rules.We do also
suggestthat those rules do
createtrust and facilitates a
robust democratic debate.The
emphasisis not, as is usually the
case, basedon
a benevolentEU, to
enhance economiceffrciency (making the EU 'work
better') and/orto
increasethe equity of
budgetrules. We will put to test a
dif[erent approach:an
analysisthat we define by the limits it
placeson the
powersof
Brussels, an egoistic despot,
to 'tax
and spend'. Thoughthe model of
a budget-maximizing
Leviathan-likeEU
bureaucracy,a discretionary
agency,may
seem extreme,the
normslaid down may
possibleprove
acceptableas
embodying a minimax strategy: to ensure that the best remains apossibility by
guarding against the worst.POLITICAL ECONOMY
In
the middleof
the previous century, Hayek (1939;cf. Hayek
1949, pp. 255-72) wrote that democracy caî only under very restricted conditions be transposedto
a supra-national organtzation.His
American counter-egoMilton
Friedman said the same asfar
as finances are concerned.If
you apply both ideasto the
situationin
Europe,we
haveto
concludethat the EU is not only missing the
necessary homogeneity to form clearpolicy
goalsin
a democratic way,but it
misses aswell
the stimuli not to waste money.
FRIEDRICH
IUYEK
Why is it
so hardto
expect concretepolicy
goals andfiscal
constraintfrom
the European parliament---the most democraticinstitution of
the EU?Of
course, very general objectives (e.g., prosperityfor
everyone)will
be easyto
agree on.After that, however, it becomes difficult. Concrete objectives will be difficult to formulate. The
countries of the EU differ too much in culture, history
and
economic development. Every choice supposes a
balancing of the
pros and cons
(cp. Hayek, Ll944l,
1986, p.
168). The revised Services Directive of
2006, e.g., is
supposed to
show the
social face of the EU. No worker from
Eastern Europe,
however, will
be glad with the 'social protection' of the
revised directive or
the
'social clause' in the new Treaty of Lisbon. V/ithin a relatively
homogeneous
country like the Netherlands, however, the original directive would
be no problem.
Every plumber from the north of the
Netherlandsis welcome in the
south.Likewise, the Netherlands, e.g.,
is
supportingwith
alow price of
gas a nationalpride: the agìiculture of
vegetablesin
greenhousesin the west of the
country.However, the very same solidarity
for
ã, ê.9., Spanish nationalpride is
something completely different. The same goes for the other way around1
4 Hence,
if a
parliament cannotgive
and agreeon policy
objectives, the European Commission remains de facto the administration. Often below the guise, thatit
concems only a technical afflair. That is hardto
maintain. Over a changein policy, no
matterhow technically it does look like, the
parliament belongs to
decide. Moreover, also the Commission has to
do with
the various wishes of
the
Member States that do make up the members of the Commission.
Besides that, large countries
will
never transfertheir
economic power to Brussels.The
courseof
eventsre the reformation of the
Pacton Stability
and Growth in the early years of this century and watered down version of the original rulesin
2005is
characteristic thereof.It is
naiveto
expectthe
same reformsif
afew
small countries had broken the rules. Therefore,we
can expect that the newrule on
decision-makingby the way of a qualified majority, to
be introducedin
2014, basedon the
doublemajority of Member
States and people, 55yoof
theMember
States representingat least
650/oof the Union's population, will
be violatedif it
should be of a disadvantage to large countries.MILTON
FRIEDMAN
The EU, also, has hardly any incentives not to waste money. As
Milton
Friedman says, the best guarantee not to waste money is that the same person both owns and does spend the money (U9791,1981,p.
146). For then we can expect that you loanon
the penny and seesto it
thatyou do
getvalue for your
money. Membersof
parliaments
or
commission members, however, do spend others men's money, on behaveof, often
again, other men. Thatis
almost a guaranteefor
ineffective andinefficient
spending.Of
membersof a local parliament we can
expect some restraintin
spending the taxpayers' moneyof their own
citizens. Whatto
think, however,of
aq Fastern-European memberof
theEU
parliamentwho
does spend the moneyof
West-European taxpayers at projectsin
Eastern Europe?To
sâtisfu the membersof
parliamentof
Western-European countries pork-barrel legislationwill
rise.Not
much different as is presently the casein
theUS
where the supportof
congressional representatives hasto be bought with financial
presentsþet
projects)
for their local
constituents.In
short,we will
seemore
signs along the roads that state, 'This project has been realizedwith
the help of theEU'. A
project,if
the Member State hadto
decide and payfor itselt it would
not have spent the money on.In
sum, cultural andpolitical
differences makeit difficult to
have a fiscal constitutionin
the senseof
anall-out
democratic processin which
majorities do decide. We can transpose democracyto a
supra-national organizationonly
undervery
restricted conditions (cp.Gillingham
2003).It
is, however, the popularthing to
do. The solidarity and trust that is necessaryfor
concrete policieswithin
theEU
is very
tenuous.Even within one country if things do differ like
language(Belgium), rèligion
Q.,lorth-Ireland)or
economic development(North
and South-Italy)
solidarity is hard tofind. All
of these situations do charactenze the situationwithin the
European parliament.Policies, no matter how good the
inlentionst
behind
them, which
are possiblefor
eachof the countries
separately, are no optionfor
the EU as a whole. Europe lacks the necessary homogeneity; priorities cannotbe
set.To
transferauthority
and hencepolicy to
Brussels hasits limits.
Hence,
of an (in the future)
democratically chosen Chinese parliamentwith its
approximately 3000 members we can expect morepriority
setting then by the 751members of the European parliament. China with its fifty minorities
but overwhelming majorityof
almost 95 per cent Han Chinese is more a unity then the 27 members of EU are.CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOI/IY
Constitutional economics is both
thinking
outside thebox
and backto
basics.For the EU it is scientifically largely
unchartedterritory. For
James Buchanan the European constitution is an opportunity,EU
citizens needto
grasp,for
going back to constitutional basics(1991,I996a).
The constitutionalist mindset, however, that says that persons oweloyalty to
the constitution rather thanto
the government, is (has become) foreignto
Europeanthinking (1996b,2003;
cp.Hayek,
1960). The idea that there are,or
should be, anylimits
on the powersof
the govemment has largely passed from the contemporary scene.This lack of
a constitutional mindset is also partofthe
problem this research program has to tackle.Of
central importanceis that
constitutionalism canbe the
coreof
fiscal constraintsin
which subsidiarity (the primaryliability for
the solutionof
problemslies with the
smallest functionalunit)
and the consentof free individuals
(trust),two
of the main problems of the EU, are of central importance.JAMES
BUCTANAN
In
constitutional economics@ucharnn,200I), we
definethe
rulesof the
socio- economic-political game. We haveto
maketwo
sortsof
constitutional decisions.First, we
must choosefrom
possible constitutional (so-calledhigher law)
rules.Behind a veil of
ignorance,countries and people
chooseelectoral and
non-electoral
constitutionalrules. No one knows his future position. (Of all
the Member States, Germany broke the rules of Pact onStability
and Growth. Thoughbeforehand Germany was a most unlikely candidate.) It is at this initial
constitutional decision stage, where we choose the basicfiscal
arrangements, that citizensnot
only canreally
control the state,but
widespreadpublic
agreement ispossible
(Brennanand
Buchanan,2000). This since the
prospectfor
general agreement changes dramaticallyif we allow for
someintroduction of
ignorance and/or uncertaintyinto
the Member States' calculus. The prospectsof
agreement relate directlx to the predicted lengthof life
of the tax reform. Then wewill
tend toopt for
rules that are ofair'. Hence the measuresto
be discussedbelow
are meant notjust for
the upcoming, 2013, sixth financial frameworkbut 'forever'.
Besides,it is
always easierto
secure agreement on a setof
rules thanto
secure agreementa
for
exampleon who is our favorite player. The tone of the
discussions is theoretical and argumentative. Gainsfor
all members are real.Second,
we have to state rules for day-to-day policies within
the framework.Making
decisionsby majority
ensures theworkability of
thepolitical
process.The tone of the
discussionsis one of weighting up
interests andbargaining @lster, 1991). Ordinary politics, post constitutional choice, tends to be conflictual. The reformed
EU
treaty, however, gives unanimous consent a smallerrole, without making the distinction
betweenthe just-mentioned two
sortsof
decisions.
Part
of
thediffrculty of our
answeris
constitutionalilliteracy.
'We have to shoreup
constitutional understanding: the choiceby individuals, who
are relatedone to
anotherin an
anticipatedset of
interactions,of a reciprocally
binding constraint. Rules and institutions rather than outcomes should be the focus (Hayek, 1960; Sowell, 1999).In general, orthodox public ftnance,with
its emphasis on thedirect
applicationof
normativecriteria to tax
arrangements, doesnot
give us an understandingof
observedfiscal
processesin the EU nor is it a basis for
improvement on grounds that are acceptable to the taxpayers. As we do test in this paper, the logic of a constitutional approach can give such an interpretation,just
asit
gave an analytic interpretation of the popular tax revolts sweeping across the U.S.in the late 1970s.
A
constitution contains a principle-basedlimitation
of the roleof
govemment in society and defines the basic rules for ordinary politics. A
constitution is a framework for
political
action, not an instrument for action.THREE METIIODS TO CONSTRAIN THE EU LEVIATHAN
If political and cultural
dif[erences do exist, and freedom of choice
and free
initiative
of citizens is important limiting
constitutional rules do make sense. There
are no unique constitutional solutions; several combinations of
electoral and non-
electoral rules are possible. Also, which reform of the EU budget is necessary? V/e
can look
back and learn from history.
We look
at what did
shape the
American
fiscal constitution (Friedman, 1986; Hayek, 1960; Sowell, 1999). If
the problem is
to carry over
tasksto
supranational authorities, asis the
casein the
Treatyof
Lisbon, we do feel
protectedif
these supranational authorities can acton
three provisions.Firstly,
and mostimportantly,
on provisionsthat lay
out the(limited)
range and scopeof
activities that are appropriatelyto
be undertaken. Secondly, on provisions that state a bicar^neralfiscal
(constitutional) framework, andthirdly,
on nondiscriminatory rules.THE TASKS OF THE
EU
If the problèm is how to establish a limited
government, we can look at
the
constitution of
the U.S. In
the U.S., two
authorities are of
interest: the authorities
in
eachof the
states andthe
federal govemmentin
V/ashington.Is that not
tooa
7 much govemment?
Not if
both authorities competewith
each otherin
the sensethat they
each havetheir own branch of power. We can guard a
branchif
aconstitution does support us. Further, as has been said
by
James Madison, oneof
the
foundersof the American constitution, in the U.S. constitution the
centralauthorities do
havelittle and limited and the
statesdo have many and
large competences. The former has powers related to foreignpolicy
and national defense.The latter has powers related
to the
criminaljustice
system and the protectionof
the
family. In
the Treatyof Lisbon,
however,the
opposite seemsto
be the case:there seems
to
belittle
that doesnot fall
under thejurisdiction of
Brussels. The Treaty describes tasks that the EU has to do underall
circumstances (e.g., customs, competition and monetarypolicy, fishing,
trade andthe internal
market policy),tasks that can be
appropriatedif
necessary(e.g., environmental policy
and consumer protection) and tasks theEU
supports (e.g.,tourism) (Treaty,2004
and 2007).Power, however, wants more power,
all to the
goodor to
the bad. Hence, everypossibility, how artificially, the EU will
useto
enlargeit. The
mannerof
subsidizing activities,
for
instance, enorrnously enhances the influenceof
the EU.Suppose
the EU gives a subsidy of
50Yoto a certain activity. That is
almost blackmail; no local government,in their
good mind,is
opposedto it.
For the local authoritiesthe
gainsof the activity
hasto be only halve of the total
costs (cp.Edwards,
2005). The
pressureto
acceptthe subsidy is
enormous.'Matching'
grants do unlock an acute gold rush.Even, however,
if
the given task for the (federal) central authorities is small, the pressurefor
growthis
enormous.For
instance,the EU
authorities do have a stakein
border crossing interests.Title
1,art.3:2
and 3 of the new treaty says that 'TheUnion
shall offer its citizensaî
areaof
freedom... without
internal frontiers and that the Union shall establish an intemalmarket'.
That, however,is
a licensefor
govemment involvement; at leâstit
was in the US,in
approximately everything.Look at what did
happenin the US. According to the
constitution,the
federal authorities may not meddlewith
agriculturein
the separate states.Yet---with
the constitutionallyrule
and powerof the
authorityover
interstate tradein
hand---it states how many acresin
the separate states haveto
remain wasted.How
can the federal authorities motivatethis? A
farmerdid grow
grainon his
"wasted" land and fed the grain to his cattle.At first
site, no interstate trade seemsto
take place.The Supreme Court, however,
did
argue thatif
the farmer hadnot
grown grain on his wasted land, he would have boughtit.
He, also, influenced the priceof
grain on the market and so interstate trade (Snyder, 1998).In
general, evenif
thereis
a clear separationof
powers andlimitation of
tasks, as
in the
US, central government often grabsthe possibility to
enlarge its powers.What
then canwe
expectof the
descriptionof
tasksin the
treaty?In
general, the tasks
of
theEU
tasks are many and hardto control by
a democratic decision-making process.A
processin
which everyone thinks that other people do payfor
a certainpolicy
and changing majorities have to be bought, time and again.An
ever-increasing government budget might be expected.a
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality did not give
anyrestraint in the past and will probably not do in the future. The principle of
subsidiarity
saysthat oin
areaswhich do not fall within the EU's
exclusive competencethe Union shall act only if and in so far
asthe
objectivesof
the proposed action cannot be sufFrciently achieved by the Member States but can, by reasonof the
scaleor effects of the
proposed action,be better
achievedat
theUnion level'
(art. 5:3,2007).
Under theprinciple of proportionality,
'the contentand form of Union action shall not
exceedwhat is
necessaryto
achieve the objectives of the Treaties' (art. 5:4,2007).
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF EU
DECISION-MAKING
For Hayek it is
necessaryto
createa Legislative
Assembly (upper house) that states the rules and a Governmental Assembly (ordinary legislature or parliament) that administrateswithin
those rules (1982,Vol.
3).A
new and differently elected and organized Legislative Assembly should draw up semi-permanent fiscal rules, and should not be subjectto
influencesof
particular groups.In
the EU, however, there is an intentional combination, the decision-making (institutional) triangle,of
the European Commission, the European Council and European Parliament. A1l
of
whom
statewhat
the budgetis
and make thepolicy within it
(Treaty, 2004 and 2007). Consequently, the proposed changein policy of
theEU from
unanimity tomajority rule is no
effective constraint onthe
exercise andgrowth of EU
power (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000).Constitutional
economicsis both thinking
outsidethe box
and back to basics. For the EUit
isscientifically
largely unchartedterritory.
Hayek's modelof
bicameralism
for
fiscal powersfor
example,to
my knowledge, has never been partof
any.political
agenda.It
isthinking
outside the box of mainstream public finance.In
due cÒurse, the separate'tax'ation
chamber" can even'growinto
an institution whereall
legislation in theEU
is made independently from the direct policy useof
it.
THE RULE OF I¿IW AND EU NONDISCKIMINATORY RULES
ON SPENDINGDemocratic
politics
should be more than groups or Member States each seeking tofurther
particular interest. The ultimatejustification of collective
action should be the persuasive forceof
nondiscriminatory objectives (Hayek, 1960). For Buchanan and Hayekthis
means the extensionof
the legal traditionin
'Westemcivil
orderof
nondiscrimination, the rule
of
law, to the workingsof
ordinary politics: notlimiting
benefits to membersof identified
groups or countries. Nondiscrimination is alreadythe rule on the taxing
sidebut not on the
spending sideof the EU
budget. Theprinciple disqualifies all
programsthat target
personsand Member
States whoqualif,/ in accordance with identification by ethnicity, location,
occupation,
industry, or activity (Buchanan, 2000).
CONCLUSION AND SIJMMARY
The
EU
treaty misses an essential ingredient that should be present: a process bywhich
whoever has the power can be constrained.This will in
effect give a basisfor
the founding valuesof
theEU,
especially the onesof
freedom and the ruleof law. In
general,the EU budget hovers
betweenone that
redistributes money between members and one that achieves certainEU-wide
policies. The budget isthe
causeof
manyof
the bitterest arguments between the Member States. Often,the objective of
spending seemsto
beto
achieve acceptablenet
balances rather than agreedpolicy. It
has been said that theEU
budget has never been used as a meansto
meet the objectivesof
theUnion but
rather as a negotiatingtool for
its members.If fiscal dissatisfaction in the EU is the result of a growing
tendency in which majorities do
decide, and
hence does give
changing majority
coalitions
political authority
and hencethe opportunity to finance their
special interests,within that framework we can never solve the problem. There is
anotherpossibility.
Form thepoint of view of
constitutional economics three things are necessary. One, we need afiscal
constitution on the basesof
a clearly enumeratedlist of
tasksfor
theEU.
Second, we haveto split fiscal
powers: the establishmentof
a separate legislative branchof
theEU
that does state the principles of taxation and another branch that makespolicy
inside those rules. Presently, however, oftenmajority by
meansof the
European Commissionand the
European Parliament does setthe fiscal rules
aswell as
doesmake policy inside
those ruleson
a seemingly endlesslist of
possible tasks.Third, EU
benefits should not be limited to special groups or countries.In the wake of the
demiseof the
proposedConstitution,
insteadof
the present non-constitutional approach, a model constitutionfor
theEU
budget can become an agenda-setting focalpoint for
a futureEU policy. A
fiscal constitutionis
a means proportionateto
the problem at hand.A fiscal
constitution (1) can be areal possibility. In history, constitutional
debatehas
always been possible andfruitful. (2) It
createstrust
betweenthe
states.A
shared framework facilitates a robust democratic debate.(3) It
makes subsidiarity a realpossibility.
The market economy functionswithin a limited
government.Moreover (4) it
substitutesfor improving
the morals betweenMember
States. Just as the market economy doesthe
sameby
steering self-interested human behaviorwithin
a constitutional order of private property.In
sum, the paper showshow
we can use the reformed newEU
budget by imposing constraining rules to promote solidarity and trustin
the settingof
anEU
Leviathan. Insteadof
emphasizing effrciency,to
up-date goals and means, and/orto aim
at greater fairness the paper shifts the emphasis to the makingof
authentic+
rules: the design
of
possible constraints on a revenue-maximizingEU."."u.rr.t0
of their voluntáry consent (an intemal criterion based on the desires of the Member States themselves)
it
is acceptable to the Member States that are to be subject to it-No extemal criteria,
and hènceno
agreementover the
goodnessor
badnessof
these
criteria
used, e.g.,allocative
effrciencyor
equal treatmentfor
equals, are necessary. The shared frameworkof
a modelEU
budget(politically
independentfiscal rules)
createstrust and social
cohesion betweenthe Member
States, the European parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers.It
facilitates a robustdemócratic debate within a consistent, transparent and reliable policy
and legislation framework. Member States can anticipate making appropriate behavior adJustments, including those made overa long-term
planningperiod'
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