The EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer

Before moving on to the analysis of aspects of EU governance in these policy frameworks, a short but clear overview is outlined of what ‘governance’ exactly entails. Although there exist numerous complex types of governance, this study will keep to the general concept of governance for this analysis. Mark Bevir in his Governance: a very short introduction, defines governance as the process of governing over social systems through power, laws, norms and language. This can be a government, a family, a tribe or any organisation such as the EU (Bevir, 2012, 1). It is different from ‘government’ because it rather focuses on social practices and affairs. In our analysis, the EU as an organisation is portrayed that governs through power and laws over its member states. This chapter focuses on the EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer in an ‘external’ region (the Arctic), where it has no real

‘governance power’, but has some influences. How is this constructed in EU policy discourses?

Geopolitical ideas of the EU have always been focused on the EU being a supporter and promoter of shared and explicit principles (Bialasiewicz, 2008, 76). In recent decades, this is increasingly expressed in EU foreign policy frameworks and is set out in a number of policy documents. European geopolitical ideas for the Arctic (in the twelve policy documents this investigation has analysed) all come down to ideas such as responsibility, helping through dialogue and security issues. There are five key geopolitical ideas that scholars such as Raspotnik and Osthagen identify in these documents: “The EU as the leader to tackle climate change; as a sustainability manager; as governance stabiliser and enhancer; as a promoter of the rights of indigenous peoples; and as guardian of animal welfare” (Raspotnik 2018, 133–140; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019) These are all very altruistic ideas for the

Arctic that seem to contain no self-interest at first. The moralistic language in these policy documents regularly contain words such as ‘protect’, ‘preserve’ and ‘responsibility’ (High Representative, 2008). One could question whether it is the EU’s responsibility to ‘protect’

this region. In any case, some EU officials view it this way. An official at a 2012 European Parliament-Arctic meeting in Brussels remarked that the EU is the best actor to tackle the climate issues in the Arctic. The EU thus, regards itself as a past, present and future regional actor to solve the issues in the Arctic region (Raspotnik 2018, 172–73).

In order to reach these objectives, the EU has initiated an official Arctic policy since 2008. It is rather a ‘policy’ and not an ‘initiative’ or a ‘partnership’, while the EU is not working

‘with’ the region, but rather ‘for’ the region (Kobza, 2015, 4-6). As Kobza explains the concept of an (EU) policy: “An ‘EU policy’ to be worth its name must fulfil at least three criteria: establish a new course of EU action concerning a given issue, with identifiable goals, be indefinite in time (thus no seasonal actions) and normally also have its own financing” (Kobza, 2015, 5). But what kind of EU policy belongs to the Arctic then? Is it foreign policy? Kobza (2015, 6) believes it is everything and derives from the policy documents an ‘umbrella character’ - as he calls it - and mentions security, defence, environmental issues, energy, fishing, climate issues, research and development, maritime and (social-) dialogue. A similar note was given by an interviewee from an Arctic think tank related to a European University, who mentions this notion of ‘cross-cutting’ in which all these various topics intersect with each other. As Stepien and Kobza argue and Raspotnik explains as well: “For the EU, the Arctic region is not simply a matter of foreign policy, it is an unconventional policy mix of internal, cross-border and external policies” (Raspotnik, 2019, 14).

And what kind of policy does the EU implement for the region? Usually, scholars distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power operated by actors. Positioning military operations is typically a form of hard power policy. The EU predominantly operates via its soft power practices (this is mentioned in the previous chapter as well). For the Arctic region, the EU has implemented a ‘soft external policy’ approach. Scholars identify the main objective of the EU for the Arctic (Kobza, 2015; Raspotnik, 2019), which is to become an international geopolitical player in the region and to increase its influence. The EU does not force its objectives via ‘hard’ policy and legislation. Kobza (2015, 7) identifies two reasons why the EU maintains this soft approach. The EU wants to maintain its ‘good’ example for the world as a democratic actor for other players. Second, the EU could operate independently within almost every area of Arctic policy, but is limited by the European Economic Area (EEA) and EU relations. As Kobza explains: “In the Arctic, the European Union’s offer must, so to say, be judged on its own merit: because the EU cannot influence the Arctic partners by the above-mentioned tactics, it must convince them that its proposals

can be valuable and useful for them” (Kobza, 2015, 7). Some important elements of this soft policy approach are the financial subsidies of the EU to Arctic regional development and to circumpolar research in order to create an image of the EU as an ‘equal partner’, which Raspotnik (2018, 80-81) calls an unus inter pares.

However, there seem to be some EU-arctic divisions. Multiple interviewees mention the exasperations felt by members of the Arctic Council and especially by Norway and Canada because of the EU’s interventions and its “self-perception as an epitome of what is right and safe” (Raspotnik, 2019, 13). As the interviewee from an Arctic think tank in Europe noted:

“The people living in the northern regions of Norway do not even like Oslo as an ‘external’

governmental actor”. Let alone an external institute as the EU, in which Norway is not even a member of. Here we see the clear aversions some regional areas in the Arctic have against outside governmental intentions. But then there exist other divisions between Arctic states and the EU. The most important example of the division between the EU and the most important Arctic states is the ban on seal products (Sellheim, 2015). An expert on EU affairs from a European think tank who was interviewed for this research confirmed this as well.

The ban on seal products is a perfect example of problematic legal incompatibilities between the EU and certain Arctic states. The EU finds difficulties in working with states (Norway and Canada) that practice illegalities for the EU. The ban on seal products was implemented in 2010 for animal welfare in the Arctic (one of the key Arctic ideas of the EU that scholars mention).

When reading and analysing the policy frameworks, there seems to be a tendency in these policy documents of depicting the EU as a coherent and joint player/actor (HR, 2008;

EP, 2008; 2014; GS, 2016; HR, 2016). However, scholars such as (Stepien, 2015; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2014) (and some interviewees) call for a necessary distinction between all the different EU institutions, actors and voices that have various different interests. Not to forget all the different member states (-27). There exists a general neglect of this complex and diverse range of different voices. As some interviewees explain as well, it is necessary to recognise that some people working in the, e.g. commission, parliament or European Union External Action Service (EEAS), may have different opinions and plans for certain Arctic issues.

Prior to the ‘Arctic hype’ in 2007-2008, as some scholars call it, there exist few mentions of the Arctic and certainly no strategic and geopolitical mentions for this region in EU foreign policy documents. In the (2003) European security strategy, there is not even one mention of the Arctic. Then, with the (2007) An integrated maritime policy for the European Union, the Arctic is mentioned carefully and only twice. The document mentions the important oceans

for maritime EU policy and ‘the Arctic ocean’ is one of them. Subsequently, in the (2014) update on integrated maritime policy for the EU, this remains the same.

The (2007) maritime policy document later on introduces the presentation of the (2008) report that came the following year. Then, in the Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance, the European Parliament stated that it is vital to highlight the importance of Arctic governance and called for a “standalone EU Arctic policy urging the Commission to take a proactive role in the Arctic” (Resolution 2008). This is repeated in the 2008 Communication as well. Words such as ‘crucial’ and ‘important’ for the Arctic often pass here in these documents. Supporting governance could create investments via the European Investment Bank (EIB) in various Arctic regions in areas such as transport, environment, infrastructure and energy.

The EU claims its links to the Arctic in the foreign policy documents as legitimate via

“a unique combination of history, geography, economy and scientific achievements” (2008).

The 2008 communication, which was the first official Arctic policy, sets out three main interests and action propositions for EU Member States and EU institutions for the Arctic.

These are: Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, promoting sustainable use of resources and contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance (2008). The last one is intertwined with the other ones in the sense that according to the EU, coherent EU governance for the Arctic is needed to achieve these objectives. Later on, in the communication (2008), the document sets out three distinct policy objectives for EU Arctic governance. These are security and stability, strict environmental management, including respect of the precautionary principle and sustainable use of resources, as well as open and equitable access. But it is also important to keep a lively dialogue between other states and actors in this ‘multilateral’ Arctic governance, and the EU should not exclude any other Arctic EU Member States or Arctic countries of the EEA/EFTA. The document also introduces thirteen distinct proposals for action, which range from applying for a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council to creating a European Arctic Information Centre in agreement with the Nordic countries (2008). The document concludes with the statement:

“The present Communication should also lead to a structured and coordinated approach to Arctic matters, as the first layer of an Arctic policy for the European Union. This will open new cooperation perspectives with the Arctic states, helping all of us to increase stability and to establish the right balance between the priority goal of preserving the Arctic environment and the need for sustainable use of resources” (2008). It seems a bit vague and open for multiple interpretations: ‘Helping all of us’ and ‘to increase stability for preserving the environment and sustainable use of resources’.

In other foreign policy documents, we see similar remarks and mentions, but in the (2012) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, there exists no

distinct direct subheading regarding EU Arctic governance. The document seems to focus more on the increased urgency on climate and environmental issues. Whereas ‘governance’

is mentioned six times in the 2008 communication, there is not one mention in the 2012 communication. There is but one mention of supporting the region’s ‘stability’. The (2012) document does mention the ‘important’ role the EU has to play in supporting the international co-operation between members of the Arctic Council, including indigenous organisations.

Also, although there is no explicit mention of government ‘enhancing’ and ‘stabilising’, elements of the EU’s Arctic contributions are extensively set out. These are fighting climate change, research on the Arctic environment, investing in sustainable development in the North, Reducing future uncertainties and monitoring changes in the Arctic region and shipping and maritime safety (2012). The use of three distinct linguistic notions of Arctic policy are mentioned here as well and that keeps returning in these documents. These are knowledge, responsibility and engagement. The terms are explained as follows. ‘Knowledge’

in the sense that the EU wants to support research and knowledge for the environmental and climate challenges in the Arctic. ‘Responsibility’ for supporting economic development that is based on sustainable usage of resources. And, ‘engagement’ as in keeping up constructive ‘dialogue’ with the Arctic States, Arctic Council and indigenous organisations.

This supportive and moral language is often repeated in the (2016) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated EU policy for the Arctic. It introduces and regularly repeats that a stable, prosperous and sustainable Arctic is both important for the region and for the EU. The EU has strategic interests in playing an essential role for the region. Also, in the Global Strategy (GS, 2016, 38-39), this is expressed in stating that the EU has these strategic interests in letting the Arctic remain a ‘low-tension’

area. “...with ongoing cooperation ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal framework, and solid political and security cooperation. The EU will contribute to this by increased and strengthened research and action on climate and environmental issues, sustainable development, telecommunications, search and rescue and dialogue and cooperation with the Arctic states, institutions and local and indigenous organisations.” An interviewee from an Arctic institute confirmed this by stating that the EU can help define best practices through their three member states (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) to support sustainable development and environmental protection, but also with establishing legally abiding agreements. An example the expert gives is the 2018 commercial fishing ban agreement which was signed by the five Arctic coastal states and the large fishery nations (The US, Canada, Norway, Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Iceland, Denmark and the EU) that bans commercial fishing in the central Arctic ocean. AnInternational agreement that will protect vast areas of the Arctic sea that have opened up as the ice melts and was highly supported by the EU. As David Balton, the former US ambassador for oceans and fisheries,

said: “There has been a lot of work in the last decade to try to strengthen various regimes of governance and to improve international cooperation about the Arctic. Is there more that we need to do to improve Arctic governance? That will be a key question.” (Fiona Harvey, 2018).

The EU is an experienced bureaucratic institution and operates through regulated and legal systems that govern interactions. Because of this, according to Bachmann (2015, 698), the EU has an advantage compared to other actors in the international theatre. The EU aims to construct a system of “global governance conducive to its model of operation and its values” (Holden, 2016, 17). The EU is, however, not a realist geopolitical power because it has no capabilities to act and react immediately to external (geopolitical) actions. Moreover, as various scholars have argued, the EU cannot operate in an inconsistent and ‘ad hoc’

environment of interaction. European geopolitical action is therefore at its finest when the international system is regulated and predictable. The Arctic region, from 2007-08, has proved to be the opposite. The five geopolitical ideas of the EU were meant to act as a way to govern this unregulated and undefined geopolitical area.