The Arctic as a geopolitical region: A Critical Discourse Analysis of how the Arctic region is constructed in EU Foreign Policy frameworks Source: Maritimecyprus.com

(1)

The Arctic as a geopolitical region: A Critical Discourse Analysis of how the Arctic region is constructed in EU Foreign Policy frameworks

Source: Maritimecyprus.com

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities, University of Amsterdam Floris Westerhof

11997087

Main Supervisor: Dr A. Telford Second Examiner: Dr C. Vos 1 July 2021

(2)

(3)

Abstract

This study focuses on the Arctic region as a geopolitical region as outlined within EU foreign policy frameworks. Using a critical discourse analysis (CDA) and by interviewing numerous experts on EU Arctic policy and the Arctic region, this research analyses the policy discourse of foreign policy documents from 2008 until 2021 to get a better understanding of the Arctic as a geopolitical region from the EU’s perspective. This study ties into a relatively new discourse on the Arctic as an emerging geopolitical region in which the EU is becoming an increasingly important geopolitical player. This research finds that although the EU regards the Arctic as inherently linked to Europe, it finds some difficulties in participating with already existing governmental structures and geopolitical tensions with Arctic states such as Russia, Canada and Norway. And although the EU is very much aware of the emerging opportunities in the Arctic due to climate change, this analysis shows the EU is both willing to contribute and create opportunities in the region.

(4)

The Arctic region

Source: Sebastian Knecht Ⓒ

(5)

Acknowledgement

Writing this project has been a great and fruitful experience. I would like to thank everyone who has supported me during the process of writing this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank my supervisor, dr. Andrew Telford, for his patience and guidance during a difficult period of lockdowns and solely zoom sessions. I am grateful for all the time he has spent in helping me create this extensive work. I also would like to thank my second examiner and program coordinator, dr. Claske Vos. She has been a great support in every aspect of this year's MA program of European studies during a challenging year.

Floris Westerhof

(7)

Abbreviations

AAC - Arctic Athabaskan Council AC - Arctic Council

ACGF - Arctic Coast Guard Forum A8 - The Arctic eight

AIA - Aleut International Association ASFR - Arctic Security Forces Roundtable BRC - Barents Regional Council

CAP - Common Agricultural Policy CDA - Critical Discourse Analysis

CFSP - Common Foreign Security Policy DHA - Discourse Historical Approach EC - European Commission

EEA - European Economic Area

EEAS - European Union External Action Service EC - European Communities

EEC - European Economic Community EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

EFTA - European Free Trade Association EMU - European Monetary Union

ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy EP - European Parliament

EU - European Union

EIB - European Investment Bank

(8)

GCI - Gwich’in Council International

HR - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ICC - Inuit Circumpolar Council

IPS - Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Secretariat IR - International Relations

MS - Member State (Of the European Union) NATO - Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization NDI - Northern Dimension Initiative

ND - Northern Dimension

RAIPON - Russian association of Indigenous peoples of the North SC - The Saami Council

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(9)

Maps and tables

Maps

Map 1 The Arctic region 15

Map 2 The Arctic Circle 15

Map 3 The Pivot Area of Sir Halford Mackinder 21

Tables

Table 1 The EU’s arctic policy milestones, 2008–21. 17

Table 2 The features of classic geopolitics 21

Table 3 List of EU foreign policy documents 28

Table: 4 Indigenous organisations of the Arctic 42

Appendix

Example of the information sheet and consent form 62

List of official questions the interviewees were asked 63

List of interviewees 63

List of EU foreign policy documents 64

(10)

I. Introduction

Ever since the planting of a titanium flag on the bottom of the Arctic ocean by Russia in 2007, debates around the Arctic region have become increasingly geopolitical. As the region is full of resources and opportunities, several international players have progressively turned their eyes on the Arctic. One of these players is the EU, which has several special links to the region via its Arctic member states and by a unique mix of geography, history, economy and scientific accomplishments. Furthermore, because the region is specifically vulnerable to climate change and environmental issues, the EU has created a discourse in which it argues that the Arctic must be protected and that the EU must be a leader in this endeavour. It has constructed an Arctic policy from 2008 onwards in which it outlines its policy for this region.

This engagement with its northern neighbourhood and how the EU constructs this in its policy frameworks need to be further explored to get a better understanding of the EU as a geopolitical player in the Arctic region.

This paper is based on extensive research on EU foreign policy discourses and investigation of the EU as an unfolding geopolitical player in the Arctic region. Not a lot has been written on the Arctic as a geopolitical region since it has been regarded as a somewhat static area of marginal geopolitical importance. Over the last years, however, an increasing number of scholars have explored the Arctic as a geopolitical region and EU foreign policy frameworks in an Arctic context to understand the EU’s Arctic aspirations. Scholars have analysed these foreign policy documents through various ways of interpreting what the EU wants in the Arctic. This study, however, focuses on how the EU constructs the Arctic as a geopolitical region in twelve EU foreign policy documents through a critical discourse analysis based on a theoretical framework of critical geopolitics. Building on this scholarship, this project's research question is: How is the Arctic constructed as a geopolitical region in EU discourses on the Arctic? With these perspectives and approaches, this paper aims to establish a better understanding of the Arctic as a geopolitical region from the EU’s perspective. Thus, this study relies on an extensive critical discourse analysis (CDA) of four subjects and is supported by interviews with six experts on Arctic affairs and EU arctic policy.

These four subjects are governance, the EU’s relation to Russia, indigenous peoples and borders.

The paper begins with a substantive literature review on the EU as a geopolitical actor in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the EU in a geopolitical context.

Then, the Arctic region as a geopolitical region is outlined, which has seen a significant increase in geopolitical relevance. Subsequently, the EU’s Arctic policy is interpreted and explained, and last, a theoretical framework of critical geopolitics is outlined in order to form the foundation for this analysis of EU foreign policy frameworks translated into twelve foreign

(11)

policy documents. The discourse analysis will focus on how the Arctic is constructed as a geopolitical region in these documents. In order to get a clear understanding of this complex question, the research is divided into four distinct subjects that emerge in these policy frameworks and that are most relevant for answering this research question. These four are:

1) The EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer. This is an important geopolitical concept of the Arctic in which various political actors are involved. The EU increasingly tries to strengthen its governance in the region. 2) The EU’s (geopolitical) relation to Russia, which is almost inherent to the EU and its relation to the Arctic. 3) Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. This is an essential aspect for our analysis because people and where they are located is intrinsic to geography and geopolitics. The last analysis will focus on 4) Borders.

The Arctic borders and the EU’s perspective on these borders are important for our analysis as well, since borders are an essential geopolitical concept. How does the EU construct these concepts within its foreign policy discourse for the Arctic? All these analyses will contribute to the basis of the research on how the EU constructs the Arctic as a geopolitical region. In a time where the Arctic becomes increasingly more significant as a geopolitical region and where it is clear the EU wants to participate more in this region, an understanding of how the EU sees the Arctic is needed.

(12)

II. Literature review

In this part, a substantive review of the existing literature is outlined regarding the EU as a geopolitical player and the Arctic as a geopolitical region. This review will position the main topics and act as a theoretical background for this study. First, I will elaborate on the EU as a geopolitical actor. Second, an explanation of the Arctic as a geopolitical region is provided.

Third, I will outline what has been written about the EU’s policy on the Arctic as a geopolitical region and construct. Last, a theoretical framework of Critical Geopolitics is outlined to create the basis for this study’s Critical Discourse Analysis of twelve EU foreign policy documents.

1. The history of the EU as a Geopolitical player

I am aware that the EU is a collective of various institutions and member states. In this study, the assumption is made that the EU is a singular actor and is perceived as one by external actors in foreign policy. So when the question arises: What is the EU? I will maintain a basic assumption of the EU as a singular geopolitical actor that acts as such.

At the beginning of the EU’s existence - as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 - risks and threats were mostly internal since the end of the Second World War. During the 1960s and 1970s, the EC (European Communities) was still a minor actor in the world theatre of politics (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005, 535-36). It mainly focused on European and economic integration and international trade, and its external relations were predominantly via its former colonies. How different this is today. The EU has become a global geopolitical player in (international) trade, human rights, governance, promoting democracy and security. Although it does not really have any hard power through military operations and practices, it does have soft power through these mentioned aspects, such as promoting democracy and good governance in the world (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005, 356). It is important to define what hard and soft power is in this regard. As defined by Joseph Nye: “Hard power is the use of coercion and payment” (Nye, 2009, 160). Thus, by military force and economic means such as the economic sanctions/measures of the EU for Russia. Soft power is the ability to ‘attract’ and cooperate, which is in contrast with hard power (Nye, 2009, 160).

According to Hettne and Soderbaum (2005, 535-36), the EU’s presence in the world already has a substantive impact simply because of the sizeable economic weight the EU has in the world. Bretherton and Vogler (1999) correlate the concept of ‘presence’ with the concept of ‘actorness’, where a powerful presence implicates the capacity to act. The authors (1999) mention that this presence is especially tangible in the neighbourhood of the

(13)

EU. These are the South, East and the North (the Arctic). This is implemented in the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004 to support and foster stability, security and prosperity in the EU’s neighbouring regions.

With the gradual enlargements of the EU in the 1970s and 1980s, this ‘presence’

became even more prominent. Also, policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 1999 and the creation of the Single Market have unintentionally impacted the EU’s presence in the world. Essential with the Single Market was the ultimate initiation that led to the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Enlargement of Finland, Sweden and Austria in 1995 (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 5-6). All this even expanded with the further Enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013 and the creation of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the Eurozone. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 made all these enlargements possible. Another factor for the amplification of the EU as a geopolitical actor was the rise of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s that were strongly linked to thinking of economic globalisation (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 7). This expressed itself in the creation of the Single Market and the increase in international trade. This all contributed to an enhancement of the EU’s presence in the world as a geopolitical actor.

Where previously internal threats were the main issues for the beginning of the EU, it now has to deal with more external geopolitical affairs. Since the EU has expanded and integrated deeply, external threats are increasingly becoming a danger to European stability (Raspotnik and Østhagen, 2019, 3), with especially Russia’s and China’s increasing geopolitical presence over the last years (Germond 2013, 81; Rogers 2009, 847). But also other trans-national threats such as neighbouring wars, terrorism, immigration issues and climate change. Thus, it is vital for the EU to control and secure its borders and maritime regions and maintain a strong neighbourhood policy. This has been expressed in fundamental EU legislation with EU treaties over the years, in which the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 has been the latest. Ultimately these positions have resulted in different EU foreign policy paradigms, and in due course, these changes in foreign policy and security positions expressed themselves in various policy bodies such as the 2014 EU Maritime security strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy for foreign and security policy of the EU (Council of the European Union 2014; European Council 2003, 2008; High Representative 2016).

However, the EU rarely acts as a ‘hard power’ geopolitical actor with military means, but rather uses its ‘soft power’ in its neighbourhood, such as supporting democracy and security in certain regions. (Raspotnik, 2019, 4; Schott, 2007, 294).

All these leitmotifs have led to the construction of a supranational European cosmos with common values and the rule of law. It is not so much a geographical space but rather a European space of identity. As Raspotnik (2019, 5) then explains: “Eventually, these leitmotifs have not only influenced the way the EU perceives and interacts with its border

(14)

areas and neighbouring regions but essentially also ‘played a key role in the pursuit of political goals”. With this, we are now aware of the EU as a geopolitical player in the 21st century. We can now move on to how the EU as this new geopolitical actor manifests itself in its Northern neighbourhood: The Arctic.

2. The Arctic as a geopolitical region

The Arctic region is rapidly changing into an area of global interest. As Wegge and Keil (2018, 88) explain: climate change is not only changing the physical geography of the Arctic but also reshaping the political and scientific relevance of the region. Since the Russian flag-planting on the bottom of the seabed near the Lomonosov ridge of the Arctic in 2007, the Arctic - that before was seen as a somewhat irrelevant and static area - has become more and more prominent as a geopolitical region for the world and the EU (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Knecht 2013, 165). The reason for this Russian geopolitical endeavour at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean was the outcome of scientific predictions of the growing ice meltings and the record low average temperature in the region (Cosimo et al. 2008, 6). This

‘provocative’ action of Russia was witnessed via global television by the world, including Arctic states such as the US, Norway, Denmark and Canada and was remarked by the former Canadian Foreign Minister Peter Mackay as: “This isn't the fifteenth century. You cannot go around the world and just plant flags and say, ‘we are claiming this territory.’ There is no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic… we are not at all concerned about this mission – basically, it is just a show by Russia” (Reuters staff, 2007). Klaus Dodds (2010, 63) explains in his work that this ‘show’ is typical for a new geopolitical region that has become a theatre for realist performances by interested states. There has arisen a new neo-realist vision on international politics in the Arctic region. What states are now doing is something that scholars such as Dodds (2010) call ‘claiming their continental shelf’. The continental shelf is a part of a state’s coast that is submerged under an area of shallow water. The Lomonosov Ridge is directly connected to Russia’s continental shelf (by its own claims).

These shelf areas in the Arctic are now claimed as national territory by the Arctic States that believe they have a geographical and scientific claim to the perceived area and the belonging resources and possessions (Weber, 2009; Dodds, 2010).

The situation is even more urgent because the Arctic region does not have any overall governance or economic structures, according to Borgerson (2008, 71). However, that is disputable. Officially, the main overarching institution is the Arctic Council (AC) that brings a complex structure of governance with a combination of the eight Arctic states, six organisations of indigenous peoples, thirteen non-Arctic states, twelve non-governmental

(15)

institutions and fourteen intergovernmental organisations (De Roo et al. 2008; Raspotnik and Østhagen, 2019).

It is important to think about what ‘the Arctic’ exactly means and implies. The answer to that question is in no account simple. The Arctic is not just a notion of space as a geographical construct, but there is also a historical and identical understanding needed for comprehending what the Arctic entails (Archer, 2010, 2-3). The Arctic has various different regions with different populations, geographies and climates. For the purpose of this study however, we will limit ourselves to regarding ‘the Arctic’ as one global and geopolitical region. In map 2, one can see the exact regional limitation of the Arctic. It covers the area within this circle. It is not so much a terrestrial but rather a maritime region. This means, for example, that northern Finland lies within the Arctic region as well. It entails areas of eight Arctic states: The US, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Russia. ‘The Arctic Eight’ as they call themselves. Kobza (2015, 9) explains he views this group of states as a ‘concert of powers’ and that these are “unitary state actors with articulated national interests, who follow, at least in that part of the globe, the traditional sovereign state-to-state approach (absolute territorial integrity, opposition towards sub-state or inter-state networks taking over parts of national decision- making powers, and limited trust in international regimes, even those traditionally established through multilateral legal instruments)” (Kobza, 2015, 9). For some states, it seems much more self-evident to claim certain Arctic territories than others. Whereas Russia’s territory entails a wide range of ‘Arctic

(16)

space’, the US for example, only covers its ground via the state of Alaska. But, even states that have no direct claim to the region, such as China and the EU, desire to partake in this Arctic endeavour that is essentially predominantly about resources and possessions (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019, 6). China and the EU are, however, official observers at the Arctic Council, but have no official competencies. Be that as it may, the EU remains an ad hoc observer due to some conflicts with Arctic states. However, an EU Arctic policy expert of a European research centre that was interviewed for this study, commented on the data information the EU has and provides for the Arctic council in exchange for some influence.

But, the EU’s role in the Arctic council is something that has known some problems on the way that will be discussed later.

This brings us to the question of who the most critical players in the Arctic are. The Arctic region consists of an exclusive network of these A-8 member states of the council and are quite structured and formalised in their practices (Kobza 2015, 9). As Dodds (2012, 12) explains the Arctic Council as an organisation: “The Arctic Council as an organisation is to acknowledge its role as a major producer of discourse and materials, and its capacity to act as a geopolitical agent.” In which its goals are security and peace, sustainable development and promoting polar science. The AC is exclusive in the sense that it does only perceive actors as legitimate when they have a geographical claim to the perceived arctic territories (Dodds, 2012, 22). As the aforementioned states, China and the EU do not really maintain these claims; they are essentially excluded as an Arctic actor by the eight Arctic states. In this investigation, I will focus on one of these actors, which has not really made its mark on the Arctic yet, which is the EU.

3. The EU’s Arctic policy and the Arctic as a geopolitical region and construct

“The EU’s Arctic involvement holds out the possibility of a fascinating case study of the EU’s broader role as an international actor with a steadily evolving geopolitical identity”

(Raspotnik, 2019, 2).

There is an ever-growing interest in the geopolitical relevance of the Arctic for the EU. Over the last decade, it has increasingly tried to engage with its Northern neighbourhood. As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, over the last decades, the EU has evolved as a global geopolitical actor with its integral concepts as the rule of law and governance to its direct neighbourhood. Various studies have examined the arctic involvement of the EU between 2008 and 2020 such as (Kristine Offerdal, 2011; Njord Wegge, 2012; Andreas Raspotnik, 2016; Andreas Osthagen, 2017, 2018; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Wegge and Merticaru, 2019; Wegge and Keil, 2018) and (Raspotnik and Stepien, 2020). A number

(17)

of these scholars are part of the Arctic institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, which is an independent think tank that focuses on Arctic policy issues with a wide network of researchers across the globe that engage with Arctic and EU Arctic affairs.

The EU has always traditionally focused on the more controversial neighbourhoods the East and the South with its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This means the East and South were more often perceived as regions with a higher degree of geopolitical instability than the North (Arctic) was. The northern neighbourhood has always been perceived as peripheral for the ENP to intervene (Joenniemi, 2007, 152). But, with the 1995 enlargement of Sweden and Finland, the EU had received a new northern dimension that subsequently needed a new EU policy (Osthagen, 2019). What followed was the initiation of the Northern Dimension initiative (NDI) in 1997, which sought to give institutional structure in EU policy and aimed to help realise the EU had now received a vast new geographical space and a large new border with Russia of ca. 1300 kilometres (Aalto, Dalby, and Harle 2003, 7; Lipponen 1997; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019). Later on, the NDI changed to the ND and was formed by the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland which mainly focused on the region of the Baltic Sea and the relationship with Russia (which was the most important actor of the ND). This made the ND more of an eastern rather than a northern neighbourhood initiative (Moisio, 2003, 95-96).

But then, as the growing alertness of the Arctic from 2007 began with the aforementioned complexities of the low temperatures in the region and Russia’s flag-planting, the EU launched its first joint Arctic policy document via the High Representative (HR) and the Commission (EC) in march 2008, which is also one of the policy documents that will be analysing in this study. An important statement in the policy document concerned the rapid melting of ice caps: “The rapid melting of the polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geostrategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests.” (HR, 2008, 8) The EU has since then established various policy documents on the Arctic, see table 1.

Table 1: The EU’s arctic policy milestones, 2008–21. (Source: Website of the European Union) __________________________________________________________________

2008 HR and the Commission Paper on Climate Change and International Security EP Resolution on Arctic governance

Commission Communication on The European Union and the Arctic region 2009 Council Conclusions on Arctic issues

2011 EP Resolution on A sustainable EU policy for the High North

2012 The Commission and HR Joint Communication on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps

(18)

2014 EP Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic

Council Conclusions on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region

2016 Commission and HR Joint Communication on An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic Council Conclusions on the Arctic

2017 EP Resolution on An integrated EU policy for the Arctic 2020 A Balanced Arctic Policy for the EU (2020)

2021 Summary of the results of the public consultation on the EU Arctic policy __________________________________________________________________

However, the EU’s desire to manifest itself as a relevant actor in the Arctic as an AC observer has failed. This is mainly because of the lack of an Arctic narrative and ideas, according to Stępień and Raspotnik (2015, 432–33). But Osthagen (2019, 15-16) identifies three distinct factors that have obstructed the EU’s attempts to become involved in the Arctic. These are the somewhat paternal position the EU takes in acting as the ‘great solution’ to the Arctic’s problems, the lack of direct geographical connection with the Arctic ocean and the volatile participation with all its different actors and interest groups such as economic or climate change campaigns. Do not forget the 2009 sealban and the 2014 economic sanctions for Russia that both resulted in tensions between Canada and Russia with the EU, which will be discussed later.

Current discourse in Brussels seems to be divided between those who desire a sensitive approach to the A8 and indigenous peoples and those who want the Arctic to use as a representation of the fight against climate change in which the EU will take a leading role (Osthagen, 2019, 16). All these difficulties have not been observed well by some Arctic states such as Canada, Russia and the US, and some have even explicitly spoken out against the EU’s Arctic entanglement.

However, with the EU’s geographical link and Arctic policy over the last years, there exists a growing interest in the region. With the (2012) Joint Communication on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps of the Commission and the HR and the (2016) Joint Communication on An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic Council Conclusions on the Arctic of the Commission and the HR, the EU’s Arctic policy has been developed towards a more concrete and modulated approach that takes the complexities and regional distinctions into consideration (Osthagen, 2019, 16-17). Through various participation with organisations such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, the Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council, but also with indigenous organisations and regional authorities, the EU will be and should be able to partake in the region.

A new Arctic policy is expected to be presented in the autumn of 2021. As the 2020 A Balanced Arctic Policy for the EU states: “The EU is currently working towards updating its

(19)

Arctic policy. It needs to respond to two major changes that affect the region and pose challenges to the role of the EU in the Arctic; accelerated climate change and increased geo-economic and geopolitical competition.”(2020) The most recent policy document (which was a public consultation on how to go forward with EU arctic policy) came out in January of 2021, including new main objectives such as tackling climate change and the impacts and protecting the environment and promoting sustainable development for indigenous people (2021).

The EU’s role for security for the Arctic, however, remains confined. Both Raspotnik and Osthagen explain that the EU is able to assist discourse through the ASFR (Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and through military operations, but this is mostly regulated via NATO. The Arctic states mainly depend on international agreements with the US and member states of the EU in order to create a counterbalance against an ever-growing presence of Russia that’s expanding its campaigns along the borders of other Arctic states.

An example Osthagen (2019, 16-17) gives is the joint military Zapad operation of 2017 of Russia and Belarus, where Norway’s reaction was to immediately expand with military actions through NATO.

All in all, the EU’s role for the Arctic remains complex but should be augmented. As Osthagen (2019, 17) explains: “Given that the north constitutes one of three essential regional neighbourhoods of direct geopolitical relevance to the EU—the other two being the southern and eastern neighbourhoods—grasping its dynamics and complexities should obviously be a priority.” The EU has yet to get used to a neighbouring region that is rather not simple to influence in a way such as the neighbouring regions of the South and the East.

The EU is tied to various interests of other powerful (western) states that operate intergovernmental and support regional structures and inclusiveness in the Arctic (Raspotnik, 2019, 11; Aalto 2013, 117; Kobza 2015, 22-23). It is thus difficult for the EU to become a relevant and fully accepted player in the exclusive Arctic network of actors without a concrete developed plan and idea of what it wants to achieve in the region. The question remains what the coming decades will entail for the EU and its role in its northern neighbourhood.

4. Theoretical framework - (Critical) geopolitics

Classic and feminist geopolitics

The theoretical foundation for this thesis will be based on the theory of critical geopolitics.

Before outlining it, the theory of classical geopolitics and other approaches will be explained in order to get a clear overview of the concept of critical geopolitics and geopolitics in general.

(20)

The definitions that are known regarding geopolitics are not quite transpicuous. What is geopolitics exactly? It is a discipline that arose in the late 1800s, made a dark turn in the 1930s and returned to life in recent decades. According to Gerard O’Tuathail (1999, 107), geopolitics “can be described as a problem-solving theory for the conceptualisation and practice of statecraft.” Because it considers the global power balance and the future of strategic progress in an anarchic world as essential, it is similar to the international relations theory of realism, but distinguishes itself in placing geography as an essential element in international relations policy and practice. It views the world as a geographically measured community in which cultural and political perspectives shape the narrative of the truth of that world. In this way, geopolitics can be a reassuring explanation for a complex and uncertain world. Reassuring in the sense of creating an ‘illusion’ of understanding and predicting the world (Tuathail, 1999; Flint, 2016, 1).

Now, we must discuss the diversity of geopolitics in which scholars position three distinct approaches. Classical, feminist and critical. Classical geopolitics is the original approach to geopolitics that originated at the end of the 19thcentury. It should not be viewed as historic and dispensable since it still can be used for understanding and explaining the world. (Flint, 2016, 4). As mentioned, geopolitics can provide reassuring understandings of the world’s complex international relations and affairs. The foundations for these (classical) geopolitics arose at the turn of the century and the desire to interrelate ‘civilised’ Europe and the ‘uncivilised’ rest of the world. Geopolitics viewed the world theatre as a matter of power and competition between states and therefore something that can be controlled (Agnew, 2003; Flint, 2016, 4). This understanding of the world went hand in hand with European imperialism and colonization. The most important colonizing actor and European empire in this time at the end of the nineteenth century was the British empire, but its world dominance was challenged by upcoming new imperial powers such as Germany, Japan and the US. It was in these times that the first founders of geopolitics introduced the concept such as Sir Halford Mackinder, General Karl Haushofer and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The former is likely to be the most famed and influential thinker of geopolitics. Mackinder (1861-1947), who was a British geographer, is primarily known for his Heartland theory and his concern for the

‘decline’ of British world supremacy. His objective was to preserve Britain’s power both geopolitically and domestically as the rise of the working classes paved the way for new social changes through upholding imperial and aristocratic social structures (Flint, 2016, 8).

He theorised about the rising importance of land power and concluded that the centre of Eurasia, which he called the pivot area, was to become the most important geopolitical area on which he said his famous words: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, Who rules the World-Island commands the World.” Mackinder constructed an intellectual foundation for strategists in the Cold War and

(21)

provided useful theoretical elements for the Cold war policy of the West (Tuathail, 1992;

Flint, 2016, 8-9).

Map 3: The Pivot Area of Sir Halford Mackinder, 1904. Source: (Mackinder, 1904, 435)

An interesting overview of the features of classical geopolitics is given by Flint (2016, 5) in which he outlines the eurocentric and obsolete aspects of classical geopolitics. As he explains: “Classical geopolitics is a way of thinking that claims to take an objective and global perspective, but in reality has been the endeavour of elite white males in predominantly, but not exclusively, Western countries with an eye to promoting a particular political agenda. Classical geopolitics has put the ideas of geographers in the service of the state, usually willingly.” These features of classical geopolitics were eventually considered obsolete and for a long period, it was regarded as a redundant discipline that was very much tainted by European imperialist thinking and eventually with nazism via Karl Haushofer. But some decades later, geopolitics experienced a revival, which eventually arose as the thinking we now call critical geopolitics: a necessary critique on classical geopolitics that critically looked at how we think and how we are told the world works.

Table 2: The features of classic geopolitics Source: (Flint, 2016, 17)

Privileged position of author White, male, elite and Western situated knowledge

Masculine perspective ‘All seeing and ‘all knowing’

Labelling/classification Territories are given value and meaning A call to ‘objective’ theory or history Universal ‘truths’ used to justify foreign policy

(22)

Simplification A catchphrase to foster public support

State-centric Politics of territorial state sovereignty

Before moving on to critical geopolitics, I will first outline another approach to geopolitics: feminist geopolitics, which arose somewhat later than critical geopolitics.

Scholars such as (Hyndman 2004; Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004) have been pioneers in creating visibility and importance of feminist geopolitics at the beginning of the 2000s. However, as scholars explain (Massaro and Williams, 2013, 569

;Flint, 2016, 6), it is not just a simplistic desire to create more attention for contributions and roles for women, but rather a kind of thinking that focuses on the counteraction of simplistic classifications that is the structure of classical geopolitics. It goes beyond a sole focus on reducing gender inequalities in geopolitical work, and builds on this to look at the roles of positionality and the situatedness of geopolitical knowledge. A key contribution the feminist approach makes is identifying the complexities between people and their positions and the interrelatedness between space and people, instead of claiming explicit boundaries between (political) spaces (Flint, 2016, 6). The other important contribution that feminist geopolitics provides is the theory that the world does not work in a top-down manner of classical geopolitics (or by simply critiquing classical geopolitics as done by critical geopoliticians:

“What is required, is an embodied perspective; it is essential to understand what it means to be a particular individual in a particular context to understand the way politics operates.” An empirical imperative of speaking to real people is of importance in feminist geopolitics. (Flint, 2016, 6)

Critical geopolitics

As mentioned before, critical geopolitics originated in the 1990s and arose as a reaction to the old classical geopolitics that had become tainted by the association of Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s. Various scholars have unpacked geopolitical thinking in the 1990s, such as (Dodds, 1993; Dalby, 1991; Tuathail, 1992, 1993). Geopolitical scholars - especially revisionists - have argued that the historical context of geopolitics should be reviewed and may be reassessed for new geopolitical thinking in Europe and the Americas (Hepple, 1986;

Kearns, 1984; Kelly, 1984; Paterson, 1987). With all this context, a critical approach to geopolitics arose, where geopolitical scholars believe geographical thought can be revisited and used as a contribution to new issues of knowledge and (geopolitical) power.

The most important influence on critical geopolitics has been Foucault’s stance that the connection between power and knowledge in the discourse of geopolitics should be

(23)

explored. “Forms of power and knowledge operate geopolitically” (Dodds and Sidaway, 1995, 516). This is something that is inherent to Foucault’s thoughts on power, politics and geography in which an important nexus emerges which is power/knowledge in discourse.

Foucault suggests forms of this power/knowledge function geopolitically and that the concepts of geopolitics, power and knowledge are interrelated. Scholars call this ‘a certain spatialisation of knowledge’ and a demarcation of a field of knowledge’ (Dodds and Sidaway, 1995, 516). Various geopolitical scholars have quoted Foucault’s comment on this: "The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge needs to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power.

Tactics and strategies deployed through the implementations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisation of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods...Geography must lie at the heart of my concerns" (Foucault, 1980, 77). This is also something that comes out of the work of Tuathail and Agnew, (1992, 198) who argue, geography is a social and historical construction and always inherent to questions of ideology and politics. Thus, “Geography is a form of power and knowledge itself.”(Dodds and Sidaway, 1995, 516).

Like Foucault’s (post-)structuralism, Dodds and Sidaway explain that Edward Saïd’s postcolonialism (translated in his famous work (Orientalism, 1978), influenced critical geopolitics greatly. Said provided a generic framework for critical geopolitics by creating the concept of ‘imaginary geographies’ of the Orient and illustrated the significance of the representational actions utilised to describe international relations by dominant political elites (Dodds and Sidaway, 1995, 516-517; O’Tuathail, 1992). Said argued that geopolitical thinking (from 1904 with Mackinder onwards) has solely consisted of a eurocentric and Anglo-American perspective on the ‘West’ and the ‘dangerous East’. But even much later in the Cold War, popular depictions of the Soviet Union as an orientalist power remained dominant, which has been analysed by (O’Tuathail and Agnew, 1992).

In essence, scholars of critical geopolitics have tried to reveal how political elites of states have spatialised global politics. As Dalby (1990, 173) explains: "Geopolitics is about that ideological process of constructing spatial, political and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the threatening other". It is not about power, it is power, (O’tuathail, 1999, 108) and critical geopolitics has aimed at deconstructing this concept. In short, critical geopolitics is a necessary critique on several forms of geopolitics that made us realise we must maintain critical of how we are told the world is and works. As O’tuathail (1999, 122-123) explains, no national state or security has the sole right to rationality and to explain the world. This power/knowledge relations together with the concept of imagined geographies form the two aspects of critical geopolitics that we have

(24)

identified in this literature and which are relevant and useful for this analysis of critical discourse analysis on policy frameworks.

5. Conclusion of literature review

In this literature review, I have tried to outline the most essential aspects of the Arctic as a geopolitical region and the EU as a geopolitical actor in the Arctic. Next to this, a short overview is made on geopolitics and specifically on critical geopolitics, which provides an important theoretical framework for investigating discourse in EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic. At the beginning of the EU’s existence, the EU needed to focus on internal issues such as European integration. But since the EU has integrated extensively, it has slowly become an important global geopolitical actor and has gradually developed a policy in recent years for its northern neighbourhood. However, it remains difficult for the EU to become a relevant actor in the exclusive network of eight Arctic states. It finds it difficult to participate in a region where it only has links via its member states Sweden and Denmark (and members of the EEA, Iceland and Norway). It has however, slowly but steadily made its way from 2008 and onwards via various policies and practices in a new geopolitical area where the entire world watches every step there is made. In this literature review, I have identified two important aspects of critical geopolitics which are imagined geographies and power/knowledge relations and which will be useful for analysing geopolitical discourse of the EU in the Arctic region. Questions such as how the EU has constructed its policy on this relatively new geopolitical region arise. How is ‘the Arctic’ constructed as a geopolitical region in EU foreign policy discourses? An extensive Critical Discourse Analysis of various EU policy documents on the Arctic is needed to provide answers to these current questions.

It will focus on important concepts such as governance, the EU’s relation to Russia, borders and indigenous peoples of the Arctic within these EU policy discourses.

(25)

III. Methodology

This paper includes a critical discourse analysis supported by a number of interviews of Arctic and EU policy. I will first outline a theoretical framework for discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to have a good understanding of its use and what is done in this investigation. This chapter also outlines how and what exactly is analysed and studied. Ultimately the performed interviews are described as well.

1. Discourse analysis in general

The research question of this study is rather complex. Therefore, in order to understand the (geopolitical) discourse and how the Arctic is constructed as a geopolitical region in these EU foreign policy documents, carefully reading and analysing what is outlined in the texts is needed. As mentioned, the methodology for this research is a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as defined in the works of (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: Hewitt, 2009; Hidding, Needham and Wisserhof 2000) and with support by similar works of discourse analysis by (Mawdsley and Rigg, 2002; Carta and Morin, 2016). Through these works, I will outline the potential of Critical Discourse Analysis for EU foreign policy documents, but will also set out possible (theoretical) challenges CDA possesses.

Aydın-Düzgit (2014) provides a substantial argumentation for this potential use of Critical Discourse Analysis for EU foreign policy. The objective of this analysis is not to explain EU foreign policy, but rather to show how it is textually constructed. Foreign policy documents may contain various “linguistic mechanisms through which one can have an improved understanding of the means used in discourse to create subject identities, as well as a more in-depth view of the types of subject identities constructed” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014, 356). The example Aydin-Düzgit gives is the analysis of ‘who speaks’ and who ‘we’ is. This also applies to figures of speech, similes, euphemisms and personifications. These can provide aims for creating subject identities. But next to outlining the valuable use of these linguistic tools to analyse these subject identities, Aydın-Düzgit (2014, 356) also argues that these tools can help contest ‘normalised’ notions of reality. The analysis of EU policy discourse in this study tends to search for these notions. When the documents state the ‘EU’

is or aims for something, who is speaking? This analysis also looks for these mentioned euphemisms and personifications to get an answer to these kinds of questions.

“Critical linguistics can also prove helpful in enhancing our understanding of the play of practice in discourses, especially in demonstrating the means through which certain representations of the world are deemed ‘natural’ and ‘uncontested’. Aydin-Düzgit gives examples such as the use of numbers in certain ways or the reliance on implicit assumptions and explains these are just a few among numerous argumentative ways to create a notion of

(26)

‘normal’ in discourse. This investigation will also search for these implications as well as certain kinds of representations of the world and the Arctic in these policy discourses.

2. Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

Now that we have outlined these critical linguistics, we can focus on the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis which is also set out by scholars such as (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014;

Carta and Morin 2013; 2016). CDA has been significantly influenced by the Frankfurt School and by Habermas in the way that self-reflection is essential for (critical-)science. It focuses on the role of language in identity construction, relations of power and moves of inequality and exclusion. It critically views discourse in the social world. It is important to remember that CDA makes a distinction between the non-discursive and discursive within the social world. Poststructuralism does not make such a distinction. Because of this, CDA manifests itself close to social constructivism and rather diverges from poststructuralist notions of discourse (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014, 357). However, CDA shares ground with poststructuralist discourse analysis in the sense that they both deny that (social) scientific work can be entirely unbiased and is always subject to its language. Hansen (2006, 213) explains that there is not a place outside of language and that there is always a political attachment.

The article of Aydin-Düzgit provides a different and broader methodological view on CDA than Carta and Morin (2013; 2016). Carta and Morin look at discourse analysis through the lens of International Relations (IR) and explain that EU foreign policy is inherently pluralistic and that “Discourse analysis can be of great use in illuminating the ways in which social discursive practices convey meaning to foreign policy discourses”. This can be done both through communicative action and contestation (Carta and Morin, 2016, 23). The authors investigate in which ways EU actors convey discourses to articulate an international position.

When discussing CDA, Carta and Morin (2016, 34-35) explicitly state that the approach is focused on criticising and reshaping society rather than just explaining it. CDA is very clear in its adherence to linguistic analysis. Wodak and Meyer( 2009,2) explain here that CDA analyses the broader social phenomena and does not intrinsically investigate the linguistic unit. Scholars outline seven fundamental concepts in CDA here (Carta and Morin, 2016, 35; Wodak, 2008). These are encapsulated in: 1) an interest in the language in use (as opposed to abstract language); 2) a focus on texts, discourses, conversations, acts of speech or events as units of analysis; 3) an extension of linguistics beyond isolated sentences; 4) the inclusion of non-verbal elements in the analysis; 5) a focus on dynamic interactional moves and strategies; 6) a focus on the contexts in which language is used and its functions; and 7) linguistic attention to text grammar and language use. This investigation has tried to use these seven concepts of CDA for our policy discourse analysis.

(27)

In this study, the theory of Critical geopolitics and Critical discourse analysis is used that both are concerned with the geographical suppositions and selections that are underlined in the making of (world)politics and in this case EU geopolitics for the Arctic region. The aim is to enlighten and explain how the EU as a singular geopolitical actor is spatialising its (international) politics and representation of the Arctic region as a geopolitical construct in the world.

3. Method

This investigation focuses on twelve EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic as a new geopolitical construct and the EU as a geopolitical player in this region. These documents have been selected by their relevance on EU foreign policy on the Arctic. A substantive critical discourse analysis is made on these policy documents and supported by other works from scholars such as (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Stępień and Raspotnik, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Keil and Raspotnik 2014; Østhagen 2011, 2013, 2017; Raspotnik 2018;

Østhagen and Raspotnik, 2018; Raspotnik and Stępień 2017). As these studies have studied the Arctic and geopolitical dimensions of the Arctic, this study focuses on the idea of the Arctic as a region and the construct of it as a geopolitical region. A different approach is provided here by analysing policy discourse of the EU on four distinct concepts. These are 1) governance, which is an important geopolitical conception of the Arctic in which various political actors are involved. 2) The EU’s (geopolitical) relation to Russia, which is almost inherent to the EU and its relation to the Arctic. 3) Indigenous peoples of the Arctic in EU policy documents. This is an essential aspect for this analysis as well because people and where they are is immanent to geography and geopolitics. And 4) Borders. The Arctic borders and the EU’s perspective on these borders is important for our analysis as well. How does the EU construct these concepts within its foreign policy discourse for the Arctic?

In order to do this, this paper sets out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the underlying assumptions and agendas that could exist within the writing of these policy documents.

These documents have been picked out carefully by their discourse and language in policy on the Arctic. This paper therefore aims to examine the language of various policy documents for their political connotation as for both their form and their content. To reveal certain patterns and invisible rules of how language is used to create certain narratives. A kind of examination of the communication of policymakers to gain new understandings of their policy and the patterns within these frameworks. “Truth is constructed within a discourse and, therefore, is relational to the knowledge and practices of that discourse”

(Hewitt, 2009, 3). Discourse analysis necessitates the researcher gaining a view of the problem from the ‘outside’ in order to recognise the hidden assumptions and practices that

(28)

form the rules of discourse formation, as (Hidding, Needham and Wisserhof, 2000; Hewitt, 2009, 3) have described it. Various scholars such as (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014; Wæver, 2009, 167), suggest that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can provide a worthy approach that combines macro and micro analyses of EU foreign policy documents by employing refined language tools. An example is looking at the context or the attempt to objectively look at what is said. As in acting as an ‘outsider’ and asking oneself: what would someone think is abnormal here who has not any knowledge about the subjects? The language in these policy documents is therefore worth investigating on these four concepts of governance, the EU’s relationship with Russia, indigenous peoples and borders. As one of the interviewees of an Arctic think tank noted: “It is rather something of a balanced foreign policy approach by these EU policymakers within these documents.” The EU does not necessarily hide its intentions and interests, but wants to make clear it is both trying to ‘support’ and ‘achieve’ certain ideas in the region.

The policy documents have been carefully picked out by me personally and by scholars such as (Stępień and Raspotnik 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Keil and Raspotnik 2014; Østhagen 2011, 2013, 2017; Raspotnik 2018; Raspotnik and Østhagen 2018; Raspotnik and Stępień 2017), who have done similar research on these fields. These range from the year 2003 until 2021 and have been picked by their mentions of the Arctic. The manner of which I analysed these documents was by reading them multiple times and by carefully creating descriptive codes based on common themes in the documents which linked to the four geopolitical concepts of governance, Russia, the northern dimension (ND), borders, indigenous peoples and other relevant references to geopolitical matters on the Arctic. In table 3, a list of these twelve EU foreign policy documents is provided.

Table 3: A list of EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic that are analysed in this study.

European Council. 2003. A secure Europe in a better World: European security strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Commission of the European Communities. 2007. An integrated maritime policy for the European Union (COM(2007) 575 Final), Brussels, 10. 10.2007.

Communication of the Commission on the EU and the Arctic Region, adopted 20 November 2008.

European Parliament. 2008. Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance (P6_TA (008)0474).

European Commission. 2012. Developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic Region. Progress since 2008 and next steps: joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council

(29)

Council of the European Union. 2014. European Union maritime security strategy (11205/

14), Brussels, 24 June 2014.

European Commission & High Representative, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN(2016) 21 final, Brussels, 27 April 2016.

High Representative. 2016. Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and security policy. http://europa.eu/globalstrat egy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf

European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. 2017. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission

European Commission. 2018. European Union, trade in goods with Russia. On April 16, 2018.

European Parliament. 2020. A Balanced Arctic Policy for the EU.

Joint Communication to the EP, the European Council and the Council. 2021. On EU-Russia relations - Push back, constrain and engage.

4. Interviews

For this research, numerous experts on EU affairs and EU Arctic policy have been interviewed in order to support and confirm (or perhaps disconfirm) the analysis and findings of this study. The aim with these interviews is to provide detailed insights into the political contexts and debates which inform EU Arctic discourses. Various scholars such as Potter (1998, 15) explain that interviews can help support discourse analyses and are extensively used because they are relatively good for identifying and exploring different interpretations on certain matters. As Potter explains: “An interview can be a particularly effective way of getting at the range of interpretative repertoires that a participant has available as well as some of the uses to which those repertoires are put” (1998, 15).

In this regard, there were a total of six interviews performed. The dialogue with these experts on EU foreign policy will support the research on the discourse within these policy documents. All six interviews have been conducted, recorded and transcribed between April and July 2021 and were all organised via online meetings with platforms such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams. The people interviewed vary from various different European institutions that are more or less engaged with European Arctic affairs. These individuals are mainly Arctic experts and academy fellows of European think tanks and polar and Arctic institutes.

(30)

But policymakers of institutions of the EU have been interviewed as well. They have been sampled by their academic work and contribution to the academic discourse on the Arctic and the EU as a geopolitical region. It also occurred that some interviewees were not Arctic policy experts, but nevertheless turned out to be very much helpful in providing information for the process of this research. About the same questions were asked each time. Although sometimes, due to the course of the conversation, some specific questions may not have been answered, this ultimately caused no difficulties and can simply be considered as part of the nature of an interview and conversation. Sometimes different questions were asked that were more personal or seemed more appropriate at the time. For a copy of the interview protocol and consent form, see the Appendix of this paper on page 59. The general questions that were asked can be viewed in the Appendix as well. These questions were all useful to get a better understanding of Arctic policy and the region as a geopolitical construct. It resulted in interesting conversations about the challenges for the region and for the EU itself. It has provided an adequate underpinning for the policy discourse analysis that is performed in this study. Especially the concepts regarding the Arctic as a geopolitical region and the EU as a geopolitical actor are important. As well as the more specific questions about climate issues regarding the Arctic and whether the indigenous peoples’

rights are considered well enough in EU Arctic policy. Discussions about the contribution of the EU to the Arctic as a region and as a potential governance stabiliser and enhancer in EU foreign policy documents were supportive and helpful for this investigation as well. These interviews and debates were all very constructive for this analysis and are sporadically used and implemented in the next chapter.

(31)

IV. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic

In this section, four distinct subjects will be investigated and analysed by a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as described in the previous part. These are 1. The EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer. 2. The EU’s geopolitical relation to Russia. 3. Indigenous peoples and organisations of the Arctic. And 4. Borders. The analysis of these four areas in the EU foreign policy documents all contribute to the essential question for this study, which is how the Arctic as a geopolitical region is constructed in these twelve EU foreign policy documents (See p. 23-24).

1. The EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer

Before moving on to the analysis of aspects of EU governance in these policy frameworks, a short but clear overview is outlined of what ‘governance’ exactly entails. Although there exist numerous complex types of governance, this study will keep to the general concept of governance for this analysis. Mark Bevir in his Governance: a very short introduction, defines governance as the process of governing over social systems through power, laws, norms and language. This can be a government, a family, a tribe or any organisation such as the EU (Bevir, 2012, 1). It is different from ‘government’ because it rather focuses on social practices and affairs. In our analysis, the EU as an organisation is portrayed that governs through power and laws over its member states. This chapter focuses on the EU as a governance stabiliser and enhancer in an ‘external’ region (the Arctic), where it has no real

‘governance power’, but has some influences. How is this constructed in EU policy discourses?

Geopolitical ideas of the EU have always been focused on the EU being a supporter and promoter of shared and explicit principles (Bialasiewicz, 2008, 76). In recent decades, this is increasingly expressed in EU foreign policy frameworks and is set out in a number of policy documents. European geopolitical ideas for the Arctic (in the twelve policy documents this investigation has analysed) all come down to ideas such as responsibility, helping through dialogue and security issues. There are five key geopolitical ideas that scholars such as Raspotnik and Osthagen identify in these documents: “The EU as the leader to tackle climate change; as a sustainability manager; as governance stabiliser and enhancer; as a promoter of the rights of indigenous peoples; and as guardian of animal welfare” (Raspotnik 2018, 133–140; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019) These are all very altruistic ideas for the

(32)

Arctic that seem to contain no self-interest at first. The moralistic language in these policy documents regularly contain words such as ‘protect’, ‘preserve’ and ‘responsibility’ (High Representative, 2008). One could question whether it is the EU’s responsibility to ‘protect’

this region. In any case, some EU officials view it this way. An official at a 2012 European Parliament-Arctic meeting in Brussels remarked that the EU is the best actor to tackle the climate issues in the Arctic. The EU thus, regards itself as a past, present and future regional actor to solve the issues in the Arctic region (Raspotnik 2018, 172–73).

In order to reach these objectives, the EU has initiated an official Arctic policy since 2008. It is rather a ‘policy’ and not an ‘initiative’ or a ‘partnership’, while the EU is not working

‘with’ the region, but rather ‘for’ the region (Kobza, 2015, 4-6). As Kobza explains the concept of an (EU) policy: “An ‘EU policy’ to be worth its name must fulfil at least three criteria: establish a new course of EU action concerning a given issue, with identifiable goals, be indefinite in time (thus no seasonal actions) and normally also have its own financing” (Kobza, 2015, 5). But what kind of EU policy belongs to the Arctic then? Is it foreign policy? Kobza (2015, 6) believes it is everything and derives from the policy documents an ‘umbrella character’ - as he calls it - and mentions security, defence, environmental issues, energy, fishing, climate issues, research and development, maritime and (social-) dialogue. A similar note was given by an interviewee from an Arctic think tank related to a European University, who mentions this notion of ‘cross-cutting’ in which all these various topics intersect with each other. As Stepien and Kobza argue and Raspotnik explains as well: “For the EU, the Arctic region is not simply a matter of foreign policy, it is an unconventional policy mix of internal, cross-border and external policies” (Raspotnik, 2019, 14).

And what kind of policy does the EU implement for the region? Usually, scholars distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power operated by actors. Positioning military operations is typically a form of hard power policy. The EU predominantly operates via its soft power practices (this is mentioned in the previous chapter as well). For the Arctic region, the EU has implemented a ‘soft external policy’ approach. Scholars identify the main objective of the EU for the Arctic (Kobza, 2015; Raspotnik, 2019), which is to become an international geopolitical player in the region and to increase its influence. The EU does not force its objectives via ‘hard’ policy and legislation. Kobza (2015, 7) identifies two reasons why the EU maintains this soft approach. The EU wants to maintain its ‘good’ example for the world as a democratic actor for other players. Second, the EU could operate independently within almost every area of Arctic policy, but is limited by the European Economic Area (EEA) and EU relations. As Kobza explains: “In the Arctic, the European Union’s offer must, so to say, be judged on its own merit: because the EU cannot influence the Arctic partners by the above-mentioned tactics, it must convince them that its proposals

(33)

can be valuable and useful for them” (Kobza, 2015, 7). Some important elements of this soft policy approach are the financial subsidies of the EU to Arctic regional development and to circumpolar research in order to create an image of the EU as an ‘equal partner’, which Raspotnik (2018, 80-81) calls an unus inter pares.

However, there seem to be some EU-arctic divisions. Multiple interviewees mention the exasperations felt by members of the Arctic Council and especially by Norway and Canada because of the EU’s interventions and its “self-perception as an epitome of what is right and safe” (Raspotnik, 2019, 13). As the interviewee from an Arctic think tank in Europe noted:

“The people living in the northern regions of Norway do not even like Oslo as an ‘external’

governmental actor”. Let alone an external institute as the EU, in which Norway is not even a member of. Here we see the clear aversions some regional areas in the Arctic have against outside governmental intentions. But then there exist other divisions between Arctic states and the EU. The most important example of the division between the EU and the most important Arctic states is the ban on seal products (Sellheim, 2015). An expert on EU affairs from a European think tank who was interviewed for this research confirmed this as well.

The ban on seal products is a perfect example of problematic legal incompatibilities between the EU and certain Arctic states. The EU finds difficulties in working with states (Norway and Canada) that practice illegalities for the EU. The ban on seal products was implemented in 2010 for animal welfare in the Arctic (one of the key Arctic ideas of the EU that scholars mention).

When reading and analysing the policy frameworks, there seems to be a tendency in these policy documents of depicting the EU as a coherent and joint player/actor (HR, 2008;

EP, 2008; 2014; GS, 2016; HR, 2016). However, scholars such as (Stepien, 2015; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2014) (and some interviewees) call for a necessary distinction between all the different EU institutions, actors and voices that have various different interests. Not to forget all the different member states (-27). There exists a general neglect of this complex and diverse range of different voices. As some interviewees explain as well, it is necessary to recognise that some people working in the, e.g. commission, parliament or European Union External Action Service (EEAS), may have different opinions and plans for certain Arctic issues.

Prior to the ‘Arctic hype’ in 2007-2008, as some scholars call it, there exist few mentions of the Arctic and certainly no strategic and geopolitical mentions for this region in EU foreign policy documents. In the (2003) European security strategy, there is not even one mention of the Arctic. Then, with the (2007) An integrated maritime policy for the European Union, the Arctic is mentioned carefully and only twice. The document mentions the important oceans

The Arctic as a geopolitical region: A Critical Discourse Analysis of how the Arctic region is constructed in EU Foreign Policy frameworks Source: Maritimecyprus.com