The EU’s geopolitical relation to Russia

The (2008, 1) Resolution states: “The geopolitical and strategic importance of the Arctic region is growing, as symbolised by the planting of a Russian flag on the sea bed below the North Pole in August 2007.” Geoeconomic and geopolitical competition have since then increased significantly in the last decade. With the (2020) precursor A Balanced Arctic Policy for the EU that is to be expected in the autumn of 2021, the document also starts with expressing the increased geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges for the EU.

Prior to the first official Arctic policy in 2008, the ND was the first partial EU policy that had an Arctic perspective. The Northern Dimension started in the late 1990s with the accession of Sweden and Finland and was a new policy that focused on the Baltic and the Barents region. According to an interviewee, it was a very project oriented policy and in which Russia was only benefiting and not contributing until 2007. In this year the ND transformed into a joint policy between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia. The interviewee notes it is a very successful policy since then, but the problem is ofcourse the 2014 Crimea situation.

Compared to the Arctic Council, which is circumpolar and sea oriented, the ND is very much a land type of policy. The Arctic policy from 2008 and the ND are the two distinct EU Arctic policies and both inherently linked to Russia.

When the first communication (2008) policy on the Arctic was launched, where the EU believed the Northern dimension was not enough, it was believed the EU needed a proper Arctic policy in line with the three Arctic states of the EU, but also in line with other EU strategic policies. It was initially assumed that the geographical Arctic space was rather empty. As multiple interviewees noted, the start of the EU’s Arctic endeavour was characterised by a somewhat naive perception of the region and the assumed idea that it was still very much undefined and unclaimed. As one of the interviewees of an Arctic institute explained that in his view, the first EU Arctic policy was not really well informed and therefore not well received by the Arctic Council. “In the beginning, the EU had a completely wrong understanding of what the Arctic is. They treated the Arctic a bit like the Antarctic.

They were suggesting that it was a protected area like the Antarctic that is protected by the Antarctic treaty and the Madrid protocol. The EU was suggesting that something like that should also happen for the Arctic.” The interviewee, just like other Arctic experts, notes that this is completely unrealistic as there are eight Arctic states who have an interest in developing their Arctic territories and moreover, unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic has a substantive diversity of indigenous inhabitants. There is an interesting orientalist aspect to this that Dodds and Nuttal (2016, 6) mention in their chapter ‘Opening up the Poles’ and in

which this notion of Polar orientalism as this ‘imaginative geography’ comes forward. The authors explain that eurocentric ideas of late nineteenth century and early 20th century scholars of geopolitics (see literature review, p. 17-20) in combination with ignorance of important historical and geographic facts have resulted in this eurocentric polar orientalism.

Even today, polar debaters are sceptical of Antarctica endeavours from Asian countries in which Dodds and Nuttal (2016, 6) mention India, China and South Korea. This imaginative geography is especially interesting as it is one of the two aspects of critical geopolitics that we have identified, which is relevant for our analysis. Experts expect the new Arctic policy in 2021 will be more comprehensive and better fit the needs of the Arctic.

However, people who constructed the first policy (2008) and who were interviewed for this study disagree with this notion. One of the interviewees related to the EP noted that the EU and its Arctic policy-makers were very much informed about the Arctic and all its regional complexities. This was simply a negative campaign by mainly the Harper-administration in Canada and indigenous organisations who were very anti-EU in the Arctic Council. This had mainly to do with the conflict over the EU seal ban in 2009. Interviewees note that this anti-EU sentiment in the Arctic Council is very unjust. The EU merely wants to support the region and is not there to seek any conflict with Arctic states nor the indigenous peoples.

During the same time of launching the first policy (2008), this was also the reason the first EU application to become an observer was refused. However, the EU is now an ad hoc observer in the Council. As the official website of the Council states: “At the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in 2013, the Arctic Council “receive[d] the application of the EU for Observer status affirmatively”, but deferred a final decision. Until such time as Ministers of the Arctic States may reach a final decision, the EU may observe Council proceedings.”

These negative receptions by the EU, have all resulted in quite a negative view on the EU in the Arctic by other Arctic states (such as Canada and Russia) that can measure the EU in geopolitical outreach. Until now, the EU remains an observer in the Arctic Council.

This ad hoc observer status of the EU in the Council has also to do with the tensions with Russia, which particularly increased from the 2014 Crimea annexation. The EU sanctions on Russia have resulted in a block by Russia for a potential seat for the EU in the Council.

When analysing the foreign policy documents as regards to Russia, we see that in the (2003) Global Strategy, Russia is merely mentioned in an international cooperation or trade context. The year 2003 is a time when Russia was only a decade out of the Soviet regime and a new time for neoliberal and capitalist global thinking was dominant. The document states that Russia is negotiating to join the WTO and that a conducive and strong relationship with Russia is important: “We should continue to work for closer relations with

Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.” There was no indication of any diplomatic problems in these early foreign policy documents yet.

In the following years, this did not change significantly. In the (2007) maritime policy, Russia is only mentioned one time. This concerns Russia as one of the most important EU’s partners in building an integrated maritime approach. However, there are some parts that indirectly and partly focus on Russia. The EU states that it wants to promote Europe’s leadership in international maritime affairs and will share responsibility with its close neighbours (such as Russia). The document particularly mentions a proposal for the increased co-operation for the management of the Black Sea and the co-operation within the Northern Dimension, which is an important joint policy between the EU and Russia.

References to Russia regularly exist in the Arctic policy documents. The first Arctic policy (2008) mentions Russia as a ‘strategic’ partner for the EU. The proposal for action regarding Russia is set out as follows: “Work to strengthen the foundations for long-term cooperation, particularly with Norway and the Russian Federation, facilitating the sustainable and environmentally friendly exploration, extraction and transportation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources” (2008, 7). This is in line with the agreement within the ND, where European Arctic areas are mentioned to be a priority in the document.

The subsequent policy on the Arctic (2012, 2) keeps referring to the Arctic as an area of (growing) strategic importance and where international cooperation will contribute to security and peace within the region. The maritime delimitation and cooperation on the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean between Norway and Russia is an example of this international cooperation. The (2012) joint communication portrays and views Russia as a strategic partner in various aspects. Next to international cooperation, the EU looks to build a strong and long-term partnership with Russia through trade, pursuit of raw materials and promotion of sustainable development. The document mentions that the sustainable management of resources could provide an important contribution to social-economic development in for example, the Barents Region (2012, 2).

The document mentions numerous times to keep up the ‘bilateral dialogues’ with its Arctic partners, including Russia. The word ‘dialogue’ with Russia is mentioned multiple times. Various other co-operations between European institutes and Russia are mentioned as well. For example, the Kolarctic programme. An interviewee explained that between the European scientific institutes and Russia, scientific research cooperation has been going extremely well over the last 25 years or so. The interviewee noted that this has been the case since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and remains to be the case. Scientific cooperation in the Arctic between the EU and Russia seems to be an anomaly within

EU-Russia relations. As mentioned earlier, this overall bad relationship especially worsened after the 2014 Crimea annexation of Russia.

The (2016) joint communication was launched after this annexation. It is vital to remember this historical context in which these documents were written. It is notable that the EU however, in the (2016) keeps referring to Russia as a ‘partner’, and more specifically as an ‘Arctic partner’. The document does not refer to Russia specifically, but mentions Russia in every specific field in matters of cooperation such as bilateral cooperation, scientific research and development and funding programmes for indigenous peoples. It is notable that the document states that the programme ‘is open to participation for Russia’. The EU seems to invite Russia and wants it to join and participate. There is no sign of anti-Russian sentiment within these documents yet.

Sceptical positions towards Russia are more prominent in the (2016) EU Global Strategy, which mentions Russia’s violations of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine (2016, 33). The document states that although managing the relationship with Russia is a ‘key strategic challenge’ (2016, 33), the EU shall not accept Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine and the illegal Crimea annexation. It is interesting that the EU calls itself and Russia ‘interdependent’ and that cooperation and keeping up dialogue is therefore important. Thus, the EU still wants to stay partners with one of its most important partners in the Arctic, but has clearly changed its tone in its foreign policy.

Russia is by far the largest Arctic state and is an important Arctic partner for the EU.

Scholars mention the Arctic relationship between the EU and Russia as an exception in an overall poor bilateral relationship (Aalto, 2013, 101). This has predominantly to do with the aforementioned Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine (and Georgia) in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and other international violations committed by Putin. This is particularly visible in the 2016 Global Strategy where the Arctic is constructed as a possible case for positive relations between Russia and the EU, but where overall the two seem to be in a strained partnership (HR, 2016, 33).

While this paper is being written, the newest foreign policy document (Joint communication, 2021) on EU-Russia relations has been launched with the subheading:

“Push back, constrain and engage”. This again seems like a twofold approach to Russia: We completely disagree with the course of your actions, but our doors keep open. However, the language in this framework becomes even more harsh: “The European Council...condemned the illegal, provocative and disruptive Russian activities against the EU, its Member States and beyond (2021, 1). It is an extensive document explaining the whole political situation, economic relations, energy, the Belarus situation and strengthened partnership with EU’s eastern partners and neighbours. It is noteworthy however, that the EU still regards Russia as a strategic partner as it states in the communication (2021, 3): ”Despite these

fundamental differences, the EU and Russia have a fundamental common responsibility for peace and security on the European continent. We face common global challenges and are interlinked in some specific economic fields.” The EU is here adopting an open stance towards Russia, encouraging further cooperation.

Another point arises when reading and analysing the documents, which is about territory and access to the Arctic Ocean. In the policy documents this is frequently mentioned as ‘Arctic sovereignty’ (2008; 2012). Other scholars have found this as well. (Raspotnik and Østhagen, 2019, 14) identify that the EU acknowledges the regional rights of the Arctic states (specifically Russia and Canada which both blocked EU observer status), but misconceives the regional sovereignty of these states in EU foreign policy documents. Even though the EU evidently recognized the region’s existing regional complexities and governance, it has, at the same time, disputed their effect and that it could only be improved by EU’s support. This has a very moralistic and normative discourse (Raspotnik, 2018, 150,151), which exists in various policy frameworks (2008; 2012; 2016). A somewhat paternalistic language of

‘supporting’, ‘helping’, ‘promoting’ every aspect of the Arctic region.

In general, what the Arctic means for the EU has gradually changed over the last decade and is intertwined with the complex relationship with Russia. As the Arctic has predominantly been dominated by the EU’s eastern neighbour, it remains a rather exclusive regional governance region. The strained relationship with Russia is not helping and the northern initiative of EU Arctic policy has slowly become more geopolitical. However, the EU still is seeking partnership with every regional Arctic actor, including Russia.