Indigenous peoples and organisations of the Arctic

When exploring the Arctic, we have discussed a lot about its geography, its most important states and their interests. However, there exists another important and diverse actor of the region that we will ventilate here: the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Since ‘people’ and where they are located are inherently linked to geography and therefore geopolitics, it is essential to stipulate the construction of how the indigenous peoples and organisations of the Arctic are (re-)presented in the EU foreign policy documents that we have discussed in this study. Before we will focus on how these twelve EU foreign policy documents mention indigenous peoples and organisations in the Arctic, a short outline of the wide variety of all indigenous Arctic peoples, groups and organisations is needed.

Approximately 4 million people are living in the Arctic, of which a third are indigenous (also called Circumpolar peoples). That makes about 1.33 million indigenous people who are particularly vulnerable to the increasing pressures of globalisation and climate change.

These peoples are secured via the European Community Law, which is a protocol of the accession of Finland and Sweden in 1995. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, these peoples are represented by six organisations within the Arctic Council and all have a permanent participant status in the council. These six organisations are then organised in the ‘Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Secretariat’ (IPS), which is their secretariat in the council (Fondahl et al., 2015, 8-10). One of the interviewees noted that their status within the council is so great, they have similar competences and the same status as the other Arctic states. “There is no other international organisation that provides a role like this for indigenous peoples”. However, the problem is, of course, that they are rather weak in terms of organisation, as noted by one of the interviewees.

Their website arcticpeoples.com conveys a good and clear representation of these six organisations, which are portrayed in table 4. Of course, these organisations consist of a wide variety of dozens of indigenous ethnolinguistic groups such as the Inuit, Saami, Dolgans, Yakuts, Yupik and Chukchi to name a few. This study will not focus on these groups specifically, but rather on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic as a whole.

Table 4: Indigenous organisations of the Arctic (Source: Arcticpeoples.com) Aleut International Association (AIA)

Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) Gwich’in Council International (GCI)

Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)

Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) The Saami Council (SC)

As a number of interviewees for this research have noted, the indigenous peoples’ rights and organisations are substantially considered by the Arctic Council, the Arctic states and also:

by the EU. We see this clearly in the policy frameworks in which indigenous peoples and their organisations are mentioned regularly. Words such as ‘protecting’ and ‘preserving’ often pass here. This is even impillared in the three main policy objectives of the first Arctic policy of (2008, 3) which is: protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population. Now,

‘population’ could mean multiple things. Does the EU mean its indigenous peoples or simply people that are living in that region? This reference to the ‘population’ of the Arctic does not change in later policy frameworks such as the (2012, 2) communication in which the EU states it wants to benefit both the ‘local Arctic population’ and the EU. Again, we see here this twofold approach of the EU where it both wants to support the Arctic (in this case its inhabitants) and the EU (itself).

It is important however, to always remember some context in these regards. There exists even some specific support for indigenous peoples via the EU. As one of the interviewees explained: before the (2008) communication, the ilulissat declaration was launched during the Arctic ocean conference in Ilulissat, Greenland. In this meeting, important topics such as climate change, the Arctic ocean, the protection of marine environment and marine safety and new shipping routes were discussed. Involved parties were just the five coastal states and not the Arctic Council. This was deliberately done and excluded the non-coastal states Sweden, Finland and Iceland. But this excluded indigenous peoples as well. One of the interviewees however noted that policymakers of the EU created their own meeting in order to involve indigenous peoples and organisations. Everyone was invited here to exclude noone. “Before anything is produced in the EU, it comes from long discussions with member states and involved actors (and in this case the indigenous peoples of the Arctic)”.

Another important point one of the interviewees made regarding indigenous peoples in the Arctic, is that some of them are located within EU borders, thus making Indigenous peoples essentially EU citizens and also the EU’s responsibility for their well-being. The interviewee was specifically referring to the Saami peoples that live in northern Scandinavia and even partly in Russia. However, the Saami peoples living in Russia are obviously not EU citizens.

It is noteworthy that indigenous peoples are mentioned often in these early policy frameworks. It possibly shows that even from the start, the EU has considered these groups rather well and has been (quite early) aware of the high influence these peoples and their organisations have in the Arctic Council and other regional bodies. Although mentioning something multiple times is not necessarily a sign of significance. In the (2008, 4) an extensive part is dedicated to the support of indigenous peoples and local population. Here we see what looks like a distinction between indigenous peoples and the local population.

The document specifically refers, however, to the 1.33 million indigenous peoples that are living in the Arctic. It mentions these ‘cross-border programmes’ a number of times for supporting organisations and activities of the Saami peoples or indigenous peoples in general. The EU regularly mentions the word ‘dialogue’ with indigenous peoples in these documents where it specifically e.g. wants to help with reindeer husbandry, self-driven development, regulation of whaling operations (2008, 4). The most important remark in this framework is that a key principle of EU development policy is the: “full participation and free, informed consent of indigenous peoples...rights of indigenous peoples are a thematic priority under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights.” Indigneous peoples rights are thus considered well in this policy document.

In the following Arctic policy document of (2012) we even see an increase of references concerning indigenous peoples, organisations and their rights. ‘Indigenous’ is mentioned 26 times. Again, often in the context of ‘dialogue’: “The Commission and High Representative will moreover engage in a broad dialogue and consultation process with Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other relevant stakeholders” (2012, 5). It is interesting here that this time not the EU as a singular actor is mentioned in order to engage in dialogue with indigenous peoples, but specifically the Commission and the HR of the CFSP. However, obviously this document was launched by these two EU actors. But in other policy documents the EU as one single actor is mentioned regarding the four topics we discuss in this analysis.

There exists however, a complication between certain indigenous peoples and the EU which has been mentioned in this study a few times, which concerns the hunting of marine mammals. In the (2008, 4) communication the EU states: “Hunting marine mammals has been crucial for the subsistence of Arctic populations since prehistoric times and the right to maintain their traditional livelihood is clearly recognised. However, modern human activities have put certain of these species in danger and there is growing concern in the EU about animal welfare. EU policies should continue to take all factors into account, seeking an open dialogue with the communities concerned”. In the (2008, 5) the EU again mentions

conducting ‘dialogue’ between indigenous and local communities that are involved with sea-hunting.

But the complication occurred somewhat later. Two years after the first Arctic policy, the EU implemented a ban on seal products (2010) for animal welfare. One of the key pillars of Arctic objectives for the EU. This especially affected the Inuit peoples and their traditions, who are the most maritime indigenous peoples. This ban resulted in a conflict between Canada and Norway and the EU. Two Arctic states with a substantive number of indigenous peoples that are engaged in seal hunting. Bad relations between these two states and the EU was the result and was the first reason for the EU not acquiring an official observer status in the Arctic Council. As mentioned earlier, an interviewee that was part of EU arctic policy making believed this was extremely unjust for the EU.

In foreign policy documents concerning maritime and strategic matters, indigenous peoples are seldom discussed. Only in the (2016) global strategy there is one mention of indigenous peoples and that the EU will promote cooperation with indigenous peoples.

Something that has continuously been present in these policy frameworks. The most important references to indigenous peoples remain within the specific Arctic Policy documents. In the latest Arctic policy (2016) indigenous peoples are mentioned regularly and considered well. There seems to exist an increasing urge for fighting climate change and the direct consequences it may have for the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. As the (Communication, 2016, 5) states: “Delicate Arctic ecosystems are under threat and the livelihoods of indigenous peoples are being directly affected by climate change.” This shows the EU is willing to help maintain the means of living for these peoples and protect them. The document regularly mentions the importance of ‘cooperation’ with these peoples in order to realise this. It also mentions that this ‘cooperation framework’ can have an ‘impact’ on the lives of indigenous peoples.

Another important section of this document regarding indigenous peoples is concerned with ‘dialogue’ and what exists in earlier documents as well: “The EU will continue to engage with Arctic indigenous peoples to ensure that their views and rights are respected and promoted in the ongoing development of EU policies affecting the Arctic. The European Commission hosts an annual dialogue meeting with representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples to exchange views and agree on areas for further cooperation, particularly in relation to business and human rights. The EU should continue to work on advancing consistency between the EU’s internal and external policy towards indigenous peoples”

(2016, 15). This is also confirmed by several interviewees. This answers our interviewee/research question whether indigenous peoples’ rights are considered well enough in EU foreign policy documents. In any case, it is substantially stated in the (2016) communication. This was also found in similar works by Raspotnik and Osthagen (2019,

11-12) and what we have identified as one of the five key Arctic ideas of the EU: As a promoter of indigenous peoples’ rights.

However, there are also scholars who do not believe the EU considers indigenous peoples’ rights well enough. Some even argue for an EU permanent Forum on Indigenous issues. Federica Scarpa (2014, 3-6) for example states that Arctic states and scholars think the EU is disrespectful for the culture and lifestyle of Indigenous peoples. This is translated into a ‘poor’ and ‘inconsistent’ implementation of adjustments and needs for these peoples.

However, when speaking to various interviewees for this analysis and reading and analysing the EU foreign frameworks, I conclude that there is nothing that indicates such beliefs.

4. Borders

Before moving on to the analysis of borders for these policy documents, it is important to clarify the complex meaning of ‘borders’ and how borders are constructed within Europe.

According to Klaus Eder: “Borders in a pre-institutional sense are boundaries that define a unity that we call a collective identity” (Eder, 2006, 256). Borders are a social construction of boundaries that defines a kind of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Other scholars look at the idea of Europe as a set of borders as well. This is portrayed in various works by Joep Leerssen (1993, 7). As he explains that we see Europe as a modular system of well-defined and discriminated blocks. This is logical for constitutional and legal reasons, but this does not count for the wide cultural diversity Europe possesses. He explains: “But by the same token we run the risk of arranging our awareness of cultural diversity according to the same pattern, and to see Europe’s cultural diversity in the old, inherited, comfortable but distortive national schema” (Leerssen, 1993, 7). Another important work related to this and relevant for this analysis is on the constitution of EU territory by Bialasiwicz and Elder (2005). In their work, they argue that there is a profound ambivalence between the senses of European territory (they refer to the 2004 Europe’s constitution draft) and notions of European territory such as the idea of the nation-state. Bialiasiwicz and Elder explain in their work that Europe has many spatialities. These are area, regionalization, urbanization, rescaling of the state, a networked Europe, the blurring of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of Europe and last, ‘territory’

(Bialasiweicz and Elder, 2005, 333-335). Territory is the most important concept of spatiality within Europe here and relevant for this analysis as well. EU Territory is laid out in two senses: “..‘hard’ territory is organized through border controls, jurisdictional limits and a concern with territorial integrity and sovereign rights.” The other is more open and aspirational and relates to Europe as a putative space of values and area of solidarity; it evokes the ideal of territorial cohesion” (Białasiewicz and Elder, 2005, 335). For indigenous peoples in Europe, these nation-borders are not relevant. They do not perceive themselves as part of a nation and subject to these socially constructed borders. As for the EU, it perceives the Arctic partly as European because it is situated within its own constructed borders.

It is clear the EU has gradually become an important geopolitical player in the region.

However, an essential question remains whether how the EU as this geopolitical actor will manifest itself and its vision over its borders. The EU being a somewhat diffuse collective of various different institutions and actors, a coherent comprehension of its geopolitical vision over its borders is needed. This section explores this vision and the EU’s notion of borders that are portrayed in the foreign policy documents of the EU.

There exists a lack of a lucid notion of Arctic space as some scholars argue (Osthagen, 2017). In the last decade, EU policymakers have not been concerned with ‘delineating’ this Arctic space as scholars such as Raspotnik and Osthagen (2019, 14) call it. In these years the Arctic as a geographical region has been regarded as predominantly circumpolar and the only two policy fields relevant for the region were external and maritime policy. Of course, the Arctic region is much more than that, as outlined in this study before. Currently, there exists a large cross-cutting (and cross-border) variety of policies for the region (Kobza, 2015, 4). This cross-border cooperation for the Arctic is often mentioned in policy frameworks as well such as the (2008, Communication, 11) and the (2012, Communication). It remains, however, sometimes a bit unclear what these documents exactly mean with ‘cross-border’ in certain contexts. For example, the (2008) communication mentions ‘cross-border programmes’ several times that are meant to support organisations and activities of the Saami peoples, (an indigenous peoples that encompasses the northern regions of Scandinavia as well as the Murmansk Oblast in Russia). Does it mean that the EU will simply engage in practices across its borders and in this case to support indigenous peoples? As mentioned before, cross-border programmes are often used in the context of indigenous peoples. Mentions of cross-border cooperation also exist in later policy documents such as the (2012) and (2016) Joint communications and are most often mentioned in these contexts of supporting energy and indigenous peoples.

We can identify four physical lineations for the EU’s vision for action in the Arctic in these policy frameworks (2008; 2012; 2014; 2016; 2016) These are 1. A European region, with the Northern areas of EU member states Finland and Sweden. 2. An EEA region, with EEA members Norway and Iceland. 3. An international region, with the EU having an (ad hoc) observer role in the Arctic Council. And 4. Cooperation in the European spheres of the Arctic with Denmark’s Greenland, Russia and the ND (Koivurova, Paula and Stepien, 2014, 76).

These four dimensions show a geographical issue the EU has with being a significant Arctic partner (as a substantial funder and economic power) and ‘being stuck between a (maritime) circumpolar and (terrestrial) European Arctic’, as (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019, 14) call it.

Since 2007, the EU has been stuck between on the one hand: an EU that is geographically focused on the Arctic, and on the other hand an EU as an international player that is concerned with fighting climate change and with environmental protection.

The EU as this geopolitical player in the Arctic with a gradually evolving geopolitical identity becomes clear in some Arctic policy frameworks that have been concerned with regional matters. Examples are the northern part of EU members Finland and Sweden in the (HR, 2016, 8-13). Policymakers of the (HR, 2016, 9) describe: “The European part of the Arctic also has significant potential to support growth in the rest of Europe. However, as the

EU does not currently have a complete north-south traffic connection, it could explore the merits of strengthening links to the Arctic through trans-European networks, for example from Finland to Norway, providing access to the Arctic Ocean.” It can shape and be a significant influence in the coming developments for the region through financial and infrastructural support. It is notable that the EU refers in this quote to ‘the European part of the Arctic’. This shows the EU views the Arctic as partially European. Thus, ‘cross-border’

Arctic claims are in this sense not crossing borders since this part of the Arctic is, at least from the EU’s perspective, still Europe.

Another approach of regional concerns by EU foreign policymaking is expressed in the (EP, 2008), with an Arctic Treaty, which is more of a top-down method of engagement..

An Arctic Treaty is something that has been a controversial idea since 2008 and would radically change the regional governance and decision-making in the Arctic. This has, however, been denied by most Arctic coastal states (Rahbnek-Clemmensen, 2019, 116).

The (Communication, 2008, 9) mentions some aspects of Arctic borders. It states that there is no specific treaty that results in a state having sovereignty over the Arctic region. It almost appears like the policymakers in this first Arctic policy document are not aware of the variety of stakeholders in the region. As mentioned before, this debated ignorance is both confirmed and disconfirmed by a number of interviewees. However, the document mentions the Arctic states and the Arctic Council multiple times, so it might just refer to the Arctic as a region that is not ruled by one regime. It states there is ‘no group of countries that have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean’. But one could argue that that is the Arctic Council together with indigenous organisations. It is unclear whether the EU is aware of the governmental (and thus borders) situations of the Arctic at that point in time. As mentioned in previous parts of the analysis, opinions seem to differ on

The (Communication, 2008, 9) mentions some aspects of Arctic borders. It states that there is no specific treaty that results in a state having sovereignty over the Arctic region. It almost appears like the policymakers in this first Arctic policy document are not aware of the variety of stakeholders in the region. As mentioned before, this debated ignorance is both confirmed and disconfirmed by a number of interviewees. However, the document mentions the Arctic states and the Arctic Council multiple times, so it might just refer to the Arctic as a region that is not ruled by one regime. It states there is ‘no group of countries that have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean’. But one could argue that that is the Arctic Council together with indigenous organisations. It is unclear whether the EU is aware of the governmental (and thus borders) situations of the Arctic at that point in time. As mentioned in previous parts of the analysis, opinions seem to differ on