Now that we have outlined these critical linguistics, we can focus on the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis which is also set out by scholars such as (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014;
Carta and Morin 2013; 2016). CDA has been significantly influenced by the Frankfurt School and by Habermas in the way that self-reflection is essential for (critical-)science. It focuses on the role of language in identity construction, relations of power and moves of inequality and exclusion. It critically views discourse in the social world. It is important to remember that CDA makes a distinction between the non-discursive and discursive within the social world. Poststructuralism does not make such a distinction. Because of this, CDA manifests itself close to social constructivism and rather diverges from poststructuralist notions of discourse (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014, 357). However, CDA shares ground with poststructuralist discourse analysis in the sense that they both deny that (social) scientific work can be entirely unbiased and is always subject to its language. Hansen (2006, 213) explains that there is not a place outside of language and that there is always a political attachment.
The article of Aydin-Düzgit provides a different and broader methodological view on CDA than Carta and Morin (2013; 2016). Carta and Morin look at discourse analysis through the lens of International Relations (IR) and explain that EU foreign policy is inherently pluralistic and that “Discourse analysis can be of great use in illuminating the ways in which social discursive practices convey meaning to foreign policy discourses”. This can be done both through communicative action and contestation (Carta and Morin, 2016, 23). The authors investigate in which ways EU actors convey discourses to articulate an international position.
When discussing CDA, Carta and Morin (2016, 34-35) explicitly state that the approach is focused on criticising and reshaping society rather than just explaining it. CDA is very clear in its adherence to linguistic analysis. Wodak and Meyer( 2009,2) explain here that CDA analyses the broader social phenomena and does not intrinsically investigate the linguistic unit. Scholars outline seven fundamental concepts in CDA here (Carta and Morin, 2016, 35; Wodak, 2008). These are encapsulated in: 1) an interest in the language in use (as opposed to abstract language); 2) a focus on texts, discourses, conversations, acts of speech or events as units of analysis; 3) an extension of linguistics beyond isolated sentences; 4) the inclusion of non-verbal elements in the analysis; 5) a focus on dynamic interactional moves and strategies; 6) a focus on the contexts in which language is used and its functions; and 7) linguistic attention to text grammar and language use. This investigation has tried to use these seven concepts of CDA for our policy discourse analysis.
In this study, the theory of Critical geopolitics and Critical discourse analysis is used that both are concerned with the geographical suppositions and selections that are underlined in the making of (world)politics and in this case EU geopolitics for the Arctic region. The aim is to enlighten and explain how the EU as a singular geopolitical actor is spatialising its (international) politics and representation of the Arctic region as a geopolitical construct in the world.
3. Method
This investigation focuses on twelve EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic as a new geopolitical construct and the EU as a geopolitical player in this region. These documents have been selected by their relevance on EU foreign policy on the Arctic. A substantive critical discourse analysis is made on these policy documents and supported by other works from scholars such as (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Stępień and Raspotnik, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Keil and Raspotnik 2014; Østhagen 2011, 2013, 2017; Raspotnik 2018;
Østhagen and Raspotnik, 2018; Raspotnik and Stępień 2017). As these studies have studied the Arctic and geopolitical dimensions of the Arctic, this study focuses on the idea of the Arctic as a region and the construct of it as a geopolitical region. A different approach is provided here by analysing policy discourse of the EU on four distinct concepts. These are 1) governance, which is an important geopolitical conception of the Arctic in which various political actors are involved. 2) The EU’s (geopolitical) relation to Russia, which is almost inherent to the EU and its relation to the Arctic. 3) Indigenous peoples of the Arctic in EU policy documents. This is an essential aspect for this analysis as well because people and where they are is immanent to geography and geopolitics. And 4) Borders. The Arctic borders and the EU’s perspective on these borders is important for our analysis as well. How does the EU construct these concepts within its foreign policy discourse for the Arctic?
In order to do this, this paper sets out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the underlying assumptions and agendas that could exist within the writing of these policy documents.
These documents have been picked out carefully by their discourse and language in policy on the Arctic. This paper therefore aims to examine the language of various policy documents for their political connotation as for both their form and their content. To reveal certain patterns and invisible rules of how language is used to create certain narratives. A kind of examination of the communication of policymakers to gain new understandings of their policy and the patterns within these frameworks. “Truth is constructed within a discourse and, therefore, is relational to the knowledge and practices of that discourse”
(Hewitt, 2009, 3). Discourse analysis necessitates the researcher gaining a view of the problem from the ‘outside’ in order to recognise the hidden assumptions and practices that
form the rules of discourse formation, as (Hidding, Needham and Wisserhof, 2000; Hewitt, 2009, 3) have described it. Various scholars such as (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014; Wæver, 2009, 167), suggest that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can provide a worthy approach that combines macro and micro analyses of EU foreign policy documents by employing refined language tools. An example is looking at the context or the attempt to objectively look at what is said. As in acting as an ‘outsider’ and asking oneself: what would someone think is abnormal here who has not any knowledge about the subjects? The language in these policy documents is therefore worth investigating on these four concepts of governance, the EU’s relationship with Russia, indigenous peoples and borders. As one of the interviewees of an Arctic think tank noted: “It is rather something of a balanced foreign policy approach by these EU policymakers within these documents.” The EU does not necessarily hide its intentions and interests, but wants to make clear it is both trying to ‘support’ and ‘achieve’ certain ideas in the region.
The policy documents have been carefully picked out by me personally and by scholars such as (Stępień and Raspotnik 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019; Keil and Raspotnik 2014; Østhagen 2011, 2013, 2017; Raspotnik 2018; Raspotnik and Østhagen 2018; Raspotnik and Stępień 2017), who have done similar research on these fields. These range from the year 2003 until 2021 and have been picked by their mentions of the Arctic. The manner of which I analysed these documents was by reading them multiple times and by carefully creating descriptive codes based on common themes in the documents which linked to the four geopolitical concepts of governance, Russia, the northern dimension (ND), borders, indigenous peoples and other relevant references to geopolitical matters on the Arctic. In table 3, a list of these twelve EU foreign policy documents is provided.
Table 3: A list of EU foreign policy documents on the Arctic that are analysed in this study.
European Council. 2003. A secure Europe in a better World: European security strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
Commission of the European Communities. 2007. An integrated maritime policy for the European Union (COM(2007) 575 Final), Brussels, 10. 10.2007.
Communication of the Commission on the EU and the Arctic Region, adopted 20 November 2008.
European Parliament. 2008. Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance (P6_TA (008)0474).
European Commission. 2012. Developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic Region. Progress since 2008 and next steps: joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council
Council of the European Union. 2014. European Union maritime security strategy (11205/
14), Brussels, 24 June 2014.
European Commission & High Representative, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN(2016) 21 final, Brussels, 27 April 2016.
High Representative. 2016. Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and security policy. http://europa.eu/globalstrat egy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf
European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. 2017. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission
European Commission. 2018. European Union, trade in goods with Russia. On April 16, 2018.
European Parliament. 2020. A Balanced Arctic Policy for the EU.
Joint Communication to the EP, the European Council and the Council. 2021. On EU-Russia relations - Push back, constrain and engage.
4. Interviews
For this research, numerous experts on EU affairs and EU Arctic policy have been interviewed in order to support and confirm (or perhaps disconfirm) the analysis and findings of this study. The aim with these interviews is to provide detailed insights into the political contexts and debates which inform EU Arctic discourses. Various scholars such as Potter (1998, 15) explain that interviews can help support discourse analyses and are extensively used because they are relatively good for identifying and exploring different interpretations on certain matters. As Potter explains: “An interview can be a particularly effective way of getting at the range of interpretative repertoires that a participant has available as well as some of the uses to which those repertoires are put” (1998, 15).
In this regard, there were a total of six interviews performed. The dialogue with these experts on EU foreign policy will support the research on the discourse within these policy documents. All six interviews have been conducted, recorded and transcribed between April and July 2021 and were all organised via online meetings with platforms such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams. The people interviewed vary from various different European institutions that are more or less engaged with European Arctic affairs. These individuals are mainly Arctic experts and academy fellows of European think tanks and polar and Arctic institutes.
But policymakers of institutions of the EU have been interviewed as well. They have been sampled by their academic work and contribution to the academic discourse on the Arctic and the EU as a geopolitical region. It also occurred that some interviewees were not Arctic policy experts, but nevertheless turned out to be very much helpful in providing information for the process of this research. About the same questions were asked each time. Although sometimes, due to the course of the conversation, some specific questions may not have been answered, this ultimately caused no difficulties and can simply be considered as part of the nature of an interview and conversation. Sometimes different questions were asked that were more personal or seemed more appropriate at the time. For a copy of the interview protocol and consent form, see the Appendix of this paper on page 59. The general questions that were asked can be viewed in the Appendix as well. These questions were all useful to get a better understanding of Arctic policy and the region as a geopolitical construct. It resulted in interesting conversations about the challenges for the region and for the EU itself. It has provided an adequate underpinning for the policy discourse analysis that is performed in this study. Especially the concepts regarding the Arctic as a geopolitical region and the EU as a geopolitical actor are important. As well as the more specific questions about climate issues regarding the Arctic and whether the indigenous peoples’
rights are considered well enough in EU Arctic policy. Discussions about the contribution of the EU to the Arctic as a region and as a potential governance stabiliser and enhancer in EU foreign policy documents were supportive and helpful for this investigation as well. These interviews and debates were all very constructive for this analysis and are sporadically used and implemented in the next chapter.