FRAMING MH17

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FRAMING MH17

A comparison of Russian and Dutch

news broadcasts

Picture source: www.independent.co.uk

MASTER THESIS / MA MEDIASTUDIES (JOURNALISM NL)

Iris de Graaf | S1989995

Supervisor | dr. Berber Hagedoorn Second reader | dr. Tamara Witschge Hand-in date | 30-04-2017

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ABSTRACT

Television remains the main source for international news. Most people get their perspective on things that happen in the world through their television. That gives television the power to influence what we think and talk about. How we perceive a certain news event can differ completely, depending on the country a person lives in.

This study contributes to the area of television studies by showing cross-national differences and equalities in framing a disaster media event in Russia and the Netherlands. This is done by analyzing how framing influences news broadcasts in a specific case: the MH17 crash, one of the deadliest aviation incidents since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

A comparative quantitative content analysis combined with a qualitative textual analysis is conducted on the content of Russia’s Channel One and the Netherlands’ NOS public broadcasters. This research tries to find out how dominant frames, sources and televisual codes work together to frame the crash according to the ongoing ideology in the society. Also, the influence of the crash being a disaster media event will be explored. Results reveal that a free-press broadcaster in the Netherlands frames and manipulates the news just as much as a Russian state-controlled broadcaster.

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PREFACE

When I started my master Journalism studies in Groningen, I already knew what the topic for my master thesis would be. The MH17 crash has fascinated me since the moment it happened, because it was the first time I decided to follow a news event from both the Dutch as from the Russian perspective. I noticed that while the Russian state-controlled news left out many details of the crash in the news, our Dutch free-press broadcaster also left out parts of the story that I saw on the Russian news. This fascinated me.

As a journalist working for the NOS, I am taking in account the results of this study in my daily work life. It helps me to be more aware of the multiple perspectives surrounding news events.

Moreover, I feel personally connected to the MH17 crash. Last year I interviewed Mara, who lost her boyfriend Darryl in the crash. It was emotional and beautiful. I feel proud to be part of the historical legacy we leave behind to honor the victims of the crash. I hope my research can somehow contribute to that legacy. We will never forget the victims.

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1. INTRODUCTION

On 17 July 2014, a Malaysian airliner en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur over eastern Ukraine was shot down by a missile, killing all 298 people on board. On the Independence Square in Kyiv, flowers, messages of condolence and teddy bears – in memory of the many children that died on the plane – piled up at the Dutch embassy, placed by weeping Ukrainians (Newstatesman, 2014: 15). The crash of Flight MH17 near the village of Hrabove is “the deadliest aviation incident since the terrorist attacks of 9/11” (Ibidem). Two-third of the passengers killed were Dutch. Since the plane was shot down over rebel-held territory, the Kyiv government blamed the pro-Russian separatists that are operating in that area. But the Russian president refused to accept any responsibility for what happened (Ibidem).

According to Patrikarakos, the MH17 disaster is unquestionably a turning point in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict (in Newstatesman: 16). As stated in the New York Times, the moment the MH17 crashed, the “month-long proxy war between East and West took a devastating turn, one that would shift the ground geopolitically amid the charred wreckage and broken bodies in a Ukrainian wheat field” (Niemöller, 2014: 39). According to Niemöller, those bodies in the wheat fields became the symbol of a renewed Cold War. The separation between Russia and the west got even bigger because of this incident. Two worlds, both with their own tunnel vision about what must have happened with flight MH17 (Ibidem).

Manipulative powers create a story

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bite-sized chunks of opinionated news that are soaked in by the people. These news broadcasts in the immediate aftermath of such an event are highly influenced by existing stereotypes and enemy images (Idem: 47). In the Netherlands that enemy is Putin. In Russia, the enemies are the US and the EU, both seen as huge treats. These first days the news coverage is full of quotes, images, conspiracies, facts and revelations. “That’s how blame game starts” (Idem: 48). This study, however, does not aim to find out who did it, who is right, or who is broadcasting about the crash ‘rightly’ or ‘objectively’. This study is interested in detecting the differences in the framing of such a disaster in the news by comparing the broadcasters of two emotionally involved countries, East vs West, free-press versus state-controlled broadcasters.

Interpreting the news

To find out if and how much the Dutch and Russian broadcasts differ in framing the crash, this paper uses framing theory. It is quite a task to define ‘framing’. According to Entman, one of the key authors of framing theory, framing is defined as: “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them to promote a certain interpretation, evaluation, and/ or solution” (Entman, 2004: 5). This means that some parts of the reality are selected and given more attention than others, so that a certain view or problem gets more attention in the news. And when a view on a problem is salient in the news, people will be more likely to think about the problem with the intended perspective.

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selected aspects of “reality” only, often leaving out those that contradict the regime narrative (Hansen, 2015: 153).

Perspectives

Niemöller argues that we, people in the west, feel that we live in the ‘free world’ and that we base our personal opinions on objective facts. He states that we are convinced that the Russians are not capable of doing so, since there is only one opinion possible in Russia: pro-Putin (Niemöller, 2014: 42). But we should be self-reflexive about our western perspective. Journalist Karel van Wolferen for example emphasizes that our Dutch mindset is completely influenced by the American one, and is convinced that people are too judgmental about Russia (in Niemöller, Ibidem). According to van Wolferen, we must realize that even in the west our opinion is not so free and objective as we wish to believe (Ibidem). As Willis describes in his work The Human Journalist, objectivity is just an extreme that can never be realized when telling any story, since the reporter talks about the object. And when a human comes in, then subjectivity enters in as well (Willis, 2003: 45). And with subjectivity comes a selection of the ‘reality’. Hawpe states in this work by Willis that “there is only one reality out there, and many ways to frame it for readers and viewers” (Idem: 54).

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among all age groups (De Nieuwe Reporter). Since television is so important in our daily lives, it’s important to contribute to the awareness of how this medium can influence what we see and how we think about certain issues. To get a better insight in how the reality surrounding the MH17 crash is framed is the main aim of this study.

Comparing the framing of the MH17 disaster as broadcasted by the Russian, state-controlled broadcasters with the Dutch, free-press broadcasters can be useful because it adds to a fuller understanding of how foreign news is covered in two completely different countries with two completely different media systems, that are both highly emotionally involved in one of the greatest aviation disasters in history. When watching broadcasts about an event that takes place in such a complex political and emotional context, it’s important to realize that there are potential ways the news operates to convince us of a certain perspective. The main research question of this study will therefore be:

RQ: How do public broadcasters frame the MH17 crash during the immediate

aftermath in Russia and the Netherlands?

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Hierarchy

Since this research question is a comparative one, this paper elaborates on the different phenomena that will be compared. The first chapter outlines the context in which the crash took place, namely the Ukrainian Crisis, and will explain the relevance of the MH17 crash for this study. The choice to place the contextual chapter before the theoretical framework is made, since it is important to be aware of the already ongoing ‘blame game’ and influences of ongoing debates on the framing of the crash. Following the context regarding the crash, the chapter elaborates on the impact of television and everyday life, and describes the (historical) differences between Dutch and Russian broadcasters. Furthermore, the concept of media systems will be used and applied to both countries to be able to compare two completely different broadcasters in two very different media systems. This is necessary to construct a framework in which this research can be conducted. The theoretical framework chapter starts by defining media disasters and their influence on broadcasts in the immediate aftermath of an event. Furthermore, it elaborates on framing theory that will be used for this research and the importance of sources in relation to framing. The concept of televisual codes, introduced to find out how framing works on a deeper level, will be explained and adjusted for this research.

The method section describes how to operationalize this research by using a deductive content analysis and a shot-by-shot qualitative textual analysis. Variables for the content analysis will be outlined, such as different kind of sources, pre-defined frames and examples of televisual codes of television. The choice for combining two methods will be elaborated upon as well.

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theories that are used throughout this research, the following sub-questions were drafted to guide this research:

SQ1: what are the most dominant frames? SQ2: what are the most dominant sources? SQ3: which codes of television are applied?

SQ4: how do frames, sources and codes of television work together to frame the MH17 crash?

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2. BACKGROUND

2.1 CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

This chapter outlines the context in which the crash took place and provides some insight in the ongoing ‘blame game’ and feelings towards ‘who did it’ in the Netherlands and in Russia. Moreover, it places both broadcasters in the historical context of television in both Russia and the Netherlands. Also, the concept of media systems is introduced. This is done to be able to compare two countries that are not immediately comparable because of their differences in history, culture and societies. It’s important to be aware of all these ongoing contextual differences before conducting the actual analysis, since these factors might already influence the framing just by existing. Some of the guiding questions for this chapter are: What is the (political) context surrounding the crash? Does the ongoing ‘blame game’ influence the framing of the crash? ‘How does television influence our lives?’, ‘What are the differences between Dutch and Russian broadcasters?’, ‘How to define Dutch and Russian media systems’ and ‘How to compare the two completely different media systems?

The conflict

The year 2014 was a year of many new worldwide conflicts. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the declaration of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq were main events in the mass media that year, events of which we still feel the aftermath today. An event with huge impact on the media landscape was the MH17 crash. Especially on Dutch television the crash, where all 298 passengers (193 of them were Dutch) died, gained a lot of attention (Niemöller, 2014: 9).

To obtain a better understanding of the tensions and emotions already surrounding the MH17 crash, the event should be placed in a wider context: the Ukrainian crisis. This

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Yanukovych suspended all the preparations for the implementation of an association

agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in mass protests by a huge group of opponents, that wants Ukraine to be part of the European Union, known as the

‘Euromaidan’. But the word goes that this crisis had already started way back, on 19 February 1945, when the Preasdium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decreed the

administrative transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Since Russia and Ukraine were both part of the Soviet Union, the transfer was mostly a symbolic act with very few implications (Service in Hansen, 2015: 143). But this all changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when all former Soviet republics called for sovereignty. Ever since Russia ‘gave’ Crimea to Ukraine, the then parliament (the Russian Supreme Soviet) felt the need to talk to their Ukrainian colleagues about the issue of Crimea. It was clear that Russia always regretted the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine (Ibidem).

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The blame game

What happened on July 17th? Was it an accident? Or was it an attack? If so, who is guilty for ‘killing’ all those innocent passengers? Priminister Rutte from the Netherlands said one day after the crash: “we will spare no effort to find out what happened” (in Niemöller, 2014: 13). Even though this research does not aim to find the answer to these questions, they are part of the ongoing blame game surrounding the MH17 crash.

Niemöller describes how the media in the West present an image that the pro-Russian separatists are responsible for shooting down the plane with a missile. But everything the Dutch people have is based on rumors and pictures provided by the Ukrainian secret service. “The other story, from Russian perspective, is completely ignored in Western media. People in the West have no idea that Russia has provided objective sources such as radar images and satellite pictures to contribute to the investigation” (Ibidem). On the other hand, people in the west are also unaware of the fact that the government in Kiev openly blames the pro-Russian separatists, the ‘terrorists’ as they call them, for shooting down the airplane on purpose. According to them, Russia has set up this scenario to create a reason to start a war with the west. But we in the West, according to Niemöller, “don’t even think for a second that perhaps it was the Ukraine people that accidentally shot down the airplane” (Idem: 16).

This study does not intent to find out ‘who did it’, but to remind us of the fact how different perspectives of a certain country can influence the framing of an event. It’s interesting to see how much the news is framed regarding the ongoing ‘blame game’

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in comparison with Russian news? These are some of the guiding questions to keep in mind while conducting the actual analysis.

2.2 THE CASE: MH17

The conflict between Russia and the West seems like a conflict between two worlds, with two completely different stories, as the Dutch journalist Weird Duk explains on the website The

Post Online. Duk, a Russia correspondent, says that the western interpretation of what

happened is completely different from the Russian interpretation. The widening gap of

misunderstanding between Russia and the west is demonstrated by the Ukrainian conflict with the annexation of Crimea, and especially the MH17 crash (in Niemöller, 2014: 31-32).

Therefore, the MH17 crash is a very relevant case to study the impact of framing, as an example of a big disaster event with emotionally involved countries and ongoing political tensions surrounding the event.

2.3 TELEVISION

As mentioned in the introduction, television remains the most influential medium for people to consume their news (Thussu, 2007: 2). In addition, research from Van Cauwenberge showed that the traditional media, and especially public service newscasts, were still the “main reference points” for news consumption under young people of the age between 17 and 31 (Van Cauwenberge, 2013: 382). Despite the rise of Internet and other new ways to

consume news, television newscasts are still highly consumed by people from every age in society and show the social relevance of television in this research. This chapter outlines the influence of television on our lives and explores the history of Dutch and Russian

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Since Russia and the Netherlands are two completely different countries with different broadcasters, we can’t simply compare them without providing some nuances. To

contextualize the different frames that will be analyzed in this study, and to find differences in how these countries frame their content, it is important to give an overview of the history of Dutch and Russian broadcasters, the main characteristics, the cultural and societal situations they exist in and, to compare them with each other, which typology of media systems they are part of. It is especially difficult to define the Russian media system, so an effort is made to contribute to this field as well.

Television and everyday life

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11). But even though we are aware of this mediation, we are not really taking this in account every time we watch the news on television.

Ellis argues that television isn’t ‘good or bad’. According to him, television can be good, bad or even indifferent depending on the decisions the broadcasters make to frame their content. In our modern society, in which television plays such an important and changing role, we should understand the importance of television through the stories that are brought to us (Idem: 4). And to understand the stories, we need to look at the frames that exist within these stories. That is exactly the aim of this study. To better understand the decisions made by the broadcasters on how to frame their content is related with the socio-cultural and historical environment they exist in. So, let’s move on to the history of broadcasting in respectively the Netherlands and in Russia.

Broadcasting in the Netherlands

The recent history of press and broadcasting in the Netherlands is closely intertwined with ‘pillarization’ of which the remains are still to be found today (Brants In Kelly, Mazzoleni & McQuail, 2004: 145). Brants describes how from the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1960s, Dutch society was a good example of so-called ‘segmented pluralism’. The whole social system was organized vertically along the lines of religious and ideological cleavages (Ibidem).

The origin of Dutch broadcasting lies in the 1920s. Here, radio amateurs and the telecommunication people came together. Representatives of the pillars quickly moved in. Towards the 1960s this polarized structure came to an end with the loosening of religious and ideological ties. Press and broadcasters were ‘depillarized’ (Idem: 146). Press and

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uncertainty due to the dramatic political elections of 2002, which resulted in a new socio-political landscape (Ibidem).

Economically, the media in the Netherlands are in a state of competition between press and broadcasting, and between public and private broadcasters. Private ownership of

television and cable has become predominantly foreign (Ibidem). Brants describes that it was only at the end of the 1980s that private commercial television changed the pillarized

structure. But in 1969 a Broadcasting Act came into effect, which enabled a system of co-operation and mixed financing. A Dutch Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) was set up to provide co-ordination and technical services, but also to broadcast news and sport. But this system turned out to be more focused on entertainment then on culture, information and education (Idem: 148). In 1988, the Media Act set a trend in motion that could not hold back commercial television. This soon became a dual broadcasting system, in which the traditional public channels gained less and less audience (Idem: 149). Eight member-based broadcasting organizations such as VARA, KRO, AVRO and some twenty small (religious, humanist,

educational) non-member organizations and government information programs share the three national public channels Nederland 1, 2 and 3 (Ibidem).

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Broadcasting in Russia

Russia is a parliamentary democracy. There are more than 150 political parties, but only some of them have strong positions in the Russian electorate, such as the Communist Party and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (Vartanova in Kelly, Mazzoleni & McQuail, 2004: 192). In 1703, the first newspaper was set up by tsar Peter the Great and was controlled by the political elite. Until the nineteenth century Russian journalism developed unevenly. As Vartanova outlines, the progress of the press was hindered by censorship. Only in the twentieth century, after the first Russian revolution in 1917, press freedom was legally introduced (Ibidem). But in the Soviet period the media were mostly used to promote the communist ideology. Vartanova describes how the structure of the Soviet media is a pyramid hierarchy on top of all levels of print and broadcast media. The Communist Party and the State owned this pyramid (Ibidem). On top of that, Glavlit, a special agency of Soviet censorship, supervised all the media content. This led to a general self-censorship in the Soviet Union, of which the professional norms still affect the activity of Russian media professionals today (Ibidem).

Russian television takes the central place in the Russian media system. 94 percent of Russians watch television every day, for three and a half hours per day, which makes it the most powerful medium for news consumption in the country (Idem: 195). Vartanova outlines how the core of national television in Russia consists of nine channels. They include three national federal channels, two with a mixed structure of state and private shareholders ORT (Channel One since 2002) & RTR (Russia-1 since 2002) and the private NTV, four federal television networks and two regional channels (Ibidem).

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guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of expression and abolished censorship completely (Ibidem). This law lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the parliamentary (1999) and presidential (2000) elections the role of government bodies in media policy was strengthened. But there were two situations. On the one hand, people spoke about the complete withdrawal of the state from the media industry, to secure fair and honest competition in the media market. On the other hand, the government was putting a lot of effort in determining the media more efficiently, including restrictions on the Internet, “under the flagship of protecting the ‘national interests’” (Vartanova in Kelly, Mazzoleni & McQuail, 2004: 200-201). Vartanova states that “the dichotomy between etatism and the market-driven economy is undoubtedly a distinct feature of Russian media policy” (Ibidem). This media policy contributes to the difficultness of comparing the Dutch and Russian broadcasters.

Another difficulty is the fact that general basic principles of journalism are well known by journalists in Russia, but not used, as for example in the Netherlands. These principles, in the form of the code of practice adopted by the Union of Journalists and the codes of professional associations, are often neglected or ignored. Mostly because journalists tend to accept concealed advertising to make some extra money on top of their low salaries (Ibidem).

The state remains the main actor in the Russian broadcasters. Even though control over programming policies exists, the state cannot completely control or finance the activities of Channel One and Russia-1. The channels have a strong position in the advertising market as well (Idem: 196). Nowadays, new online media is challenging the ‘state control’ in Russian media landscape. According to Vartanova, new and popular online sources in Russia such as

Gazeta.ru, “have no analogues in the traditional media and, owing to constant updating of

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media” (Ibidem). Some form of ‘objective’ and ‘free’ media seems to arise in Russia and challenges the system of state-controlled news.

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2.4 MEDIA SYSTEMS

A difficult feature of television is that it is relatively easy for outsiders to look at national characteristics of any television system or ‘ecology’. But for the people who live in that ecology, these characteristics seem to be natural, part of their everyday life (Ellis, 2002: 130). According to Ellis, each television system or broadcaster operates within a well-known system, and these broadcasters try to find their balance between the different television genres such as news, documentary, talk show, soap etc. (Idem: 131). For this paper only the news genre will be discussed. News, according to Ellis, has two criteria: immediacy and

importance. And the relative importance of an event depends on the criteria of power and distance (Idem: 104). “The more an event affects the structures of power in a particular society, the more prominence it may gain. The closer the event is to that society, the more coverage it may get” (Ibidem). This is also important to keep in mind when analyzing the MH17 crash, which was very close to both Dutch and Russian society.

Defining the Dutch media system

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This Democratic Corporatist model is characterized by “early development of press freedom . . . [a] very high newspaper circulation . . . [and] a history of strong party

newspapers and other media connected to organized social groups” (Idem: 74). Also, a high level of political parallelism and a history of journalism that is emphasizing on neutral professionalism and is information-oriented characterize this model. In these countries, press freedom works together with support for and regulation of media by the state (Ibidem). In these countries, a strong welfare state exists. According to Hallin and Mancini, the countries belonging to this model are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands (Idem: 75). Following this outline of Hallin and Mancini, it seems easy to define the Dutch media system using the typology of the Democratic

Corporatist model. But how can we define the Russian media system? Does Russia fit the traditional definitions of Hallin & Mancini so that we can compare both broadcasters through a framework of media systems?

Defining the Russian media system

To define the current Russian media system appears to be more difficult. The Soviet Union had a clear and distinct media model, the ‘communist or Soviet model’. According to De Smaele, this media system was characterized by state ownership, censorship, centralization, and partisan journalism (de Smaele in in Karol Jakubowicz, in Dobek-Ostrowska, 2010: 41). De Smaele outlines how the post-communist Russian model combines private ownership with state control; a ban on censorship with pressure on journalists to write about certain things and decentralization with highly centralized state television (Ibidem). How can we label the Russian media system within the typology of media systems proposed by Hallin and Mancini to be able to conduct a solid and well defined comparative analysis on two completely

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De Smaele tried to do so by looking at characteristics of the Russian media system by using the four major dimensions of Hallin and Mancini: 1) the development of media markets, 2) political parallelism, 3) the development of journalistic professionalism and 4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system (Ibidem).

Many media labels try to compare a country to a Western model and are goal-oriented. But, according to De Smaele, “all attempts to classify the Russian post-communist media model under the general Western model have been unsatisfactory” (Ibidem). De Smaele states that some crucial aspects of a European media model that are absent in the Russia media system are the notion of citizen and the notion of public service (Idem: 44).

Hallin and Mancini believe that the Polarized Pluralist model is the best option to describe Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union media systems. Russia is also seen as a “late democracy”, and the political history is marked by conflicts and polarization (Idem: 45). Hallin and Mancini understand The Polarized Pluralist model as a system with an

elite-oriented press with a small circulation (2004: 73). In this Polarized Pluralist model, there is a strong focus on political life, and public broadcasting systems are, according to Hallin and Mancini, “politics over broadcasting” systems (2004: 106). In the history of Russia, there has always been a lack of autonomy of mass media, which were used as a tool. In the Soviet Union, “freedom of speech was made instrumental to social goals”: people were allowed freedom of speech, but only “in accordance with the interest of the people and to strengthen and develop the socialist system” (De Smaele in Karol Jakubowicz, in Dobek-Ostrowska, 2010: 50). And according to De Smaele, this is exactly what is still happening in Russia today (Idem: 51). But one difference between communist and post-communist Russia is, according to De Smaele, the fact that nowadays not all journalists are instruments of the same

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powers. Alexei Pankin describes this unique result as “genuinely pluralistic unfree media” (in De Smaele in Dobek-Ostrowska, Idem), a term that seems to apply perfectly to the Russian media system.

When it comes to levels of ‘professionalism’, Russia again joins the Polarized Pluralist model according to De Smaele. Russian journalism is “an extension of the worlds of literature and politics, rather than an autonomous institution” (Idem: 52). In post-communist Russia, this instrumental use of journalism remains strong (Ibidem). In Polarized Pluralist systems “the state plays a large role as an owner, regulator, and funder of media, though its capacity to regulate effectively is often limited (Hallin and Mancini in De Smaele, in Dobek-Ostrowska 2010: 53). And this is again highly applicable to Russia.

But it’s not only about how the state controls the information, it’s also about how aware the people who receive that information are about the fact that their news is influenced by the state. Although this paper does not look at audience perceptions, it’s important to note a nuance in the Russian media sphere. Ellen Mickiewicz unveils in her research the profound mismatch about the idea that the Russian audience will absorb the messages of the Russian political figures trough television. According to Mickiewicz, Russian viewers have very different skills in ‘reading’ news broadcasts than for example people in the west. This is the case because in the Soviet Union, the people had to squeeze out information that might affect or even safe their lives. Russian viewers are very aware of the fact that news stories might be bought to support a certain regime (Mickiewicz, 2008: 33).

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Russians have their own understanding of objectivity. Objectivity in the journalistic profession is a dilemma, everywhere and all the times, because it is impossible to reach completely. Mickiewicz calls that Russian objectivity ‘functional objectivity’, because it is achieved under difficult circumstances and demands considerable effort from the viewers (Idem: 37), way more than in the Netherlands. According to Mickiewicz, “the Russian viewer comes equipped with a larger tool box of instruments for processing news than would [for example] the American viewer . . . It is an essential part of living defensively and squeezing out from limited information something they can call ‘objective’” (Ibidem). On top of that, according to Hutchings and Rulyova, Russian television now operates in a global info sphere, therefore we can’t say that a return to the totalitarianism of the Soviet media has occurred. They say that the combination of this global info sphere combined with the low cultural status of television ensures that Putin’s control remains remote and not so effective (Hutchings & Rulyova, 2009: 3). This is important to realize when we analyze the Russian state-controlled news, since it contributes to the previous theory that state-controlled broadcasting does not always mean full propaganda that is not even worth researching or that it is impossible to compare to ‘free-press’ broadcasting.

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and Mancini by defining the Netherlands as having a Democratic Corporist media system versus Russia with a Polarized Pluralist media system, it is possible to compare these broadcasters and find cross-national differences in the framing of the MH17 crash.

Overview

This chapter describes the ongoing political ‘blame game’ surrounding the MH17 crash. Basically, Russia blames Ukraine and denies any responsibility. The Netherlands suspect and blame Russia. We should keep this in mind when analyzing the most dominant frames since the fact that this ‘blame game’ exists, might already influence the framing.

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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As outlined in the introduction, an influential way for the media to shape public opinion is by framing events and issues in certain ways. To determine how the MH17 crash was framed cross-nationally, this paper will make use of framing theory. This chapter will discuss and specific the theory for this study. When conducting a cross-national analysis, it’s important to outline what framing means for this study and how it will be used.

Other concepts that are related to framing such as media disasters, a ‘scenario’ that by itself contributes to a certain way of ‘framing’, and the sources that have access to the

coverage will be explored throughout this chapter. Also, theory on televisual codes will be explained and elaborated upon.

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3.1 MEDIA AND DISASTERS Disasters

We live in an age that is increasingly defined by disasters in the media. In recent years, television news was filled with series of enormous disasters, such as tsunamis, devastating earthquakes and nuclear meltdowns, as described by Pantti et al. (Pantti et al., 2012: viii). When a disaster happens, the news is shared immediately. People “put down whatever they are doing and turn their attention to those who are suffering” (Deppa, 1993: 2). Especially in this global world, we all experience tragedy live, at the exact moment it happens. As outlined by Pantti et al., we all respond to disaster through the images and discourses in the media that are all emotionally charged (Pantti et al., 2012: 2). Whether it’s intentional or not, all the images that appear in the media at the immediate aftermath of a disaster, are emotionally charged. When people need a story as quick as possible, it’s easy to forget which side of a story is shown, which voices are granted access, in other words: how the story is framed. Since this paper is investigating the framing of the MH17 crash, it’s useful to see the MH17 crash in the context of a disaster, to be aware of the possible influence this has on framing, being a framed event itself.

Media disasters as events

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political action and lead to collective struggle against injustice” (in Pantti et al., Idem). Frames, in this context, are instruments that arise in mediated disasters to enlarge the impact of existing emotions surrounding the event which can be used for political goals and to create collective sentiments in the society. It’s interesting to find out which frames and which emotions can be distracted surrounding the MH17 crash for political goals or collective sentiments.

According to some researchers, disasters are media events. Dayan & Katz for example define classic media events as “interruptions of routine: they monopolize media communication across different channels and programs, and are broadcast live, pre-planned and organized outside the media” (in Couldry, 2009: 2). Critique for this definition could be that disasters are never pre-planned, so they are not ‘pure’ media events. But Cottle has tried to extend this concept of disasters as media events into a more general approach of disasters as “mediatized rituals”. His definition is that media rituals “are those exceptional and performative media phenomena that serve to sustain and/or mobilize collective sentiments and solidarities based on the basis on symbolization . . . to what should or ought to be” (in Couldry, 2009: 7). Other research, like for example research by Tamar Liebes on ‘disaster marathons’ share a lot of characteristics of the classic concept of media events, but she argues for a broader understanding that reflects disasters as a certain genre of a media event instead of a pre-planned event (in Couldry, Ibidem). Couldry concludes with a broader definition of media events in a global age: “Media events are certain situated, thickened, centering

performances of mediated communication that are focused on a specific thematic core, cross different media products and reach a wide and diverse multiplicity of audiences and

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emotions involved need a framework of interpretation to obtain a collective struggle against injustice or support for political actions (in Pantti et al., Idem).

According to Dayan & Katz, news stories can indeed be considered as media events, but only when they become ‘breaking news’. And for this to happen, an event must be “exceptional, extraordinary, and of a high significance of the past and future. Thus, it might be negative, scary or destructive . . . [and] should be perceived as relevant and meaningful to the majority of a society (or societies) . . . or to a large number of people” (in Couldry et al, 2009: 208). This seems to perfectly apply to the MH17 crash, given the exceptional,

extraordinary happening that is meaningful to most societies; given the worldwide tensions this crash took place in.

Furthermore, the MH17 crash is an interruption of routine, a performative media phenomenon that mobilizes collective sentiments on the basis on symbolization, an event infused with emotion and drama, and a centering performance that is focused on a specific thematic core or “situation”. These characteristics combined, I argue that the MH17 can be considered a ‘disaster event’: a combination of a disaster and media events as outlined above.

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3.2 FRAMING

There are many previous studies on framing of certain events in the news, but very few on the framing of Russian news, and especially on Russian television news. Some studies that have been conducted made efforts to compare broadcasters within Russia, such as the study on Russian Elections and TV News from Oates & Roselle (2000), or general studies on Russian framing on certain events such as the study of Hansen on the framing of Crimea in Russia (Hansen, 2015).

This study tries to fill up a gap by comparing frames cross-nationally between Russia and the Netherlands, two different countries with different media systems and to learn about cross-national differences in frames. But to do this, the concept ‘framing’ must be defined in the right context for this study.

Framing is, according to De Vreese, an increasingly popular concept in media analysis. But at the same time there is an increase in inconsistency of its application (De Vreese, 2005: 51). It seems quite challenging to define ‘framing’. According to Entman, one of the key authors of framing theory, framing is defined as: “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman, 2004: 5). With this, he means that some parts of the reality are selected and given more attention than others, so that a certain view or problem gains more attention in the news. And when a certain view on a problem is salient in the news, people will be more likely to think about the problem with the intended perspective.

Framing the news

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states that in short, a frame is an “emphasis in salience of different aspects of a topic” (Idem: 53). And according to Norris, framing theory suggests that journalists work with news frames to “simplify, prioritize and structure the narrative flow of events” (Norris, 1995: 358). All these definitions seem relevant and do not seem to be mutually exclusive.

For this study, a deductive approach to finding frames will be conducted, that means that the frames are defined and operationalized prior to the analysis. This will be further elaborated upon in the method section. To be able to define the frames for this study, it’s necessary to understand which components of a news story constitute a frame. This study follows the definitions of Entman and Gamson and Modigliani. Entman describes how “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” identify frames in the news (Entman, 1993: 52). Norris agrees that frames

represent stereotypes, which place certain events into familiar interpretative categories (Norris 1995: 358). Gamson and Modigliani are building upon this concept and add that looking at the ‘framing devices’ that give information of an issue can identify frames. They identify metaphors, exemplars, catch phrases, depictions and visual images as framing devices (in De Vreese, 2005: 54). This implies that by looking at certain elements in the content, such as words, phrases, stereotyped images, sources or metaphors, we can identify frames and specifically look for them. This concept will be used in the method section to identify and draft the main frames for the content analysis.

Generic frames

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suitable for this study, since this paper compares two different broadcasters in different countries and different media systems. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identified five news frames; ‘conflict’, ‘human interest’, ‘attribution of responsibility’, ‘morality’, and ‘economic consequences’. These frames will be used in this study and the choice for these frames will be further elaborated upon in the method section. These frames are generic news frames, which are related to journalistic conventions and are suitable for different kind of topics, and therefore also suitable for this study. De Vreese conducted a research on these generic news frames by Semetko and Valkenburg to a ‘cross-nationally comparative setting’ by looking at the use of conflict and economic frames in television news in Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands to establish the generality beyond national boundaries (De Vreese, 2005: 57). Unravel generality beyond national boundaries is what this study also aims to contribute to, because it helps to understand cross-national differences in television news coverage between Russia and the Netherlands. All this theory can help answer the first sub-question, as

introduced before:

SQ1: What are the most dominant frames for both the NOS and Channel One?

De Vreese only looked at two generic frames; this study will investigate more frames. Based on these concepts and definitions of frames for this study, five frames were created.

Frames for the quantitative content analysis

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Entman says that the words and images that make up any kind of frame can be distinguished, because they have the capacity to stimulate support or opposition to different sides in any conflict. These are for example terms referring to stereotypes, historical events, nationalism, or other terms that are emotionally loaded and stored in a group’s consciousness. When these words and images in a frame are prominent, and repeated, then Entman speaks about magnitude (2004: 5). Smith Dahmen agrees that the most important factor for a successful frame is magnitude. The content of a frame has no impact without magnitude (in Smith Dahmen, 2008: 9). In other words, frames only exist because of the emotionally loaded words and images used and the repetition of these words and images. The frames are selected based on their relevancy for the MH17 crash. Definitions and rules for each frame can be found in the codebook (see appendix).

Future Threat / Fear frame

According to Powell, news stories featuring the future treat frame are characterized by the speculation of the possibility of more strikes from the attacker, which keeps any feature threat salient (2011: 102). She adds that when any motivation is unclear, it feels impossible to know how to stop the ‘attacker’ and this contributes to the fear of any feature threat, since not knowing why anyone is motivated to attack heightens the feeling of fear (Ibidem). This seems very applicable to the discourse surrounding the MH17 crash, since immediately after the crash it was not clear whether the crash was an attack or an accident and there was no

motivation why this happened or by who. The uncertainty surrounding the MH17 creates the expectation that this future threat frame will be used frequently, especially in the Dutch coverage, the country that felt most attacked.

Emotional frame

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to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem (2000: 95). Semetko & Valkenburg state that this frame works with personalization of the news, dramatizing an event, or “emotionalizing” the news to create more impact of the story (Idem: 96). To add some more indicators for what makes a story ‘emotional’, a theory by Goffman will be added to this frame for this study. He states that not frames themselves but so-called “frame breaks” are what heighten the emotions in a news story (in Couldry et al., 2009: 147). These are the “accidental moments when the ‘real’ intentions of performers come to light and the veils of deception can be peered through” (Ibidem). Examples are hidden backstage images, off-stage performances and behind-the-scenes insights (Idem: 144). He states that frame breaks are themselves framed and orchestrated to create a more emotional image in a news story in “negative events” (Idem: 148). These elements will be added to the definition of this frame in the codebook. Since the crash was so devastating and so many bodies were involved, the emotional frame is also expected to be highly dominant in the coverage of both broadcasters to create more impact of the story. But the main expectation is that the NOS, with Dutch people being highly involved as victims of the crash, will make most use of the emotional frame.

Conflict / War frame

This frame, according to Semetko & Valkenburg, “emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions” (2000: 95). Stepinska speaks about a ‘frame of war’ when talking about a conflict between ‘us and them’ in her research on perpetrators and the U.S.

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conflict and perhaps even warfare while framing the crash and how these references differ in both countries.

Blame / Responsibility frame

In a large content analysis of press and television news stories, Semetko & Valkenburg found that the most frequent used frame in the news was the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame, together with the ‘conflict’ frame. On top of that, Pantti et al. describe how responsibility attributions are always present in disaster reporting (2012: 164), which also applies to the MH17 crash. Tamar Liebes wrote that: “stories of disaster invite a hermeneutic search for the culprit, someone to whom to assign the blame. The less possible it is to point to the actual villain, the less the chance of satisfactory resolution, and the more powerful the role of television in providing the frame” (in Pantti et al., 2012: 165). Stepinska describes how after 9/11, no one claimed responsibility for the acts right after the event. Therefore, the

responsibility was not claimed but attributed (in Couldry et al., 2009: 212). The same can be said for the MH17 crash, where no one claimed responsibility for the crash and countries were blaming one another. This makes it relevant to look at how the attribution of responsibility is framed and how often this happens in the news coverage in both countries. And moreover, how the attribution of responsibility differs between the countries and what that says about the framing of our news and therefore our perspective on what happened.

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most use of the responsibility / blame frame. In the first place to claim ‘no responsibility’ for itself and to blame Ukraine for being the one ‘who did it’.

Religious / Morality frame

This frame explores how much references are made to religion or moral judgments regarding the MH17 crash. References to prayer are a way to emphasize that everything is in God’s hands, and that nobody takes the blame. I expect that especially in Russia, victims are associated with spirituality or religion and that this frame will often be used to contribute to the blame game by ‘showing’ that Russia is not guilty. According to Powell, this frame has an underlying theme of good versus evil. ‘Terrorists’, or in this case the ‘attackers’, are portrayed negatively while the “victims are portrayed as good, honorable, and innocent” . . . where “the fear and animosity toward the terrorist becomes the focus, rather than what may have led to a terrorist event” (2011: 105). This can be applied to the crash as well, especially from a Dutch perspective, and might as well give some insights in the framing of the ongoing ‘blame game’. In addition, this theme is build up by the definition of Semetko & Valkenburg who state that this frame “puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions” (2000: 96). These elements will define the frame (see codebook in appendix).

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3.3 SOURCES

Not only the choice of words or images contribute to the framing of news. The choice of voices that are included in the news coverage can also be considered a way to frame the news. As Strömbäck et al. state, “who gets to speak in the news, ultimately decides what audiences may hear from the news” (Strömbäck et al., 2013: 33). Journalists rely on sources for

interpretation and its argued that the frames in news coverage are influenced by the sources selected (Kim & Weaver in Coleman et al, 2011: 1). Indeed, frames may influence media frames. As Strömbäck et al. conclude, framing the media is a “coproduction of news sources and journalists” (Strömbäck et al., 2013: 34). To gain more insight in differences in framing the MH17 crash it is therefore important to consider sources as a form of framing.

Sources as a form of framing

For this study, sources will be treated as an essential part of framing. They will be analyzed to get a complete understanding of how the MH17 crash is framed. According to Stepinska, it’s very important to include looking at sources when you try to research how a certain event is framed: “Since public memories are subjective, selective and often contested and shaped by ideological systems that serve particular interests, the question of the source of the frames used to define the situation should be raised” (in Couldry et al., 2009: 211). She emphasizes how big events like 9/11 did greatly impact our global collective memory, because of the framing and sources used when broadcasting about it (Ibidem). This is applicable for the MH17 crash as well, an event that also left a great impact on our global collective memory.

News informs us, and journalists gather their information from various sources (Ibidem). According to Schneider, journalists frame and interpret certain subjects by the sources that they use, which lead to a selection of perspectives available to the viewers

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this way, sourcing is an essential part of the complete picture of ‘framing’ a certain news story.

Fiske contributes to this theory. He says that voices are selectively accessed and controlled by the way they appear into the news narrative: “Even though the dialogue ‘belongs’ to the characters that speak it, it is produced by the author. In television news, the same principle holds. Whatever an individual character may say, its meaning will be

determined not by his or her intentions or situation, but by the placing of the interview in the overall context of the story” (Fiske, 2010: 109-110). So according to Fiske, characters are only ‘allowed’ to speak after the narrative has constructed this voice in a certain way, for example as the enemy or villain in the story or news fragment (2010: 294). This contributes to the theory of seeing sources as part of framing, by looking at which voices are allowed to speak, for how long and how they collaborate with the dominant frame. More elaboration on the operationalization of the sources for the analysis can be found in the method section.

Dimitrova and Strömbäck argue that there is a lack of comparative research on how sources are used in certain events across countries (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2009: 75). According to Strömbäck et al., most studies on the impact of sources are single-country studies and they tend to assume that there are very few cross-national differences. In fact, they argue, there is too limited cross-national research in general to make such statements

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SQ2: What are the most dominant sources used by the NOS and Channel One?

Sourcing categories for the quantitative content analysis

Suggesting that sourcing is an essential part of the complete picture of ‘framing’ a certain news story, I will also look at the most dominant sources used in the news fragments, next to looking at the most dominant frame. Combined, it will give country-specific insights in how the crash is framed.

Official sources

The first tendency in news reporting is, according to Dimitrova and Strömbäck, the reliance on official sources, which is common all over the world (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2009: 77). The differences between countries in the amount of citations by official sources may be a result of the differences in the political and media systems and the different understanding of ‘objectivity’, according to Donsbach and Patterson (In Dimitrova and Strömbäck: Ibidem). The problem, according to Dimitrova and Strömbäck, exists in the two-way relationship between news media and their sources: “on the one hand, the media need to rely on authoritative voices to . . . fulfill the goal of balanced reporting. On the other hand,

government officials may use the media to influence framing of events” (Ibidem). Using these sources might seem inevitable, but is the news really ‘balanced’? To what extent do both countries use official voices in their coverage? And which official voices are allowed to speak?

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Russian politicians and officials on the other hand depend almost completely on the news media. Since the state remains the main actor in the Russian broadcasters, and control over programming policies still exists today, I expect that news in Russia is more depending on political and high-ranking official sources than the Netherlands.

Citizen sources

Continuing this matter, it’s also interesting to see how often ordinary citizens are used as sources. Since the Netherlands is such a small country, the distance between citizens and journalist is way smaller than in Russia. Furthermore, Dimitrova and Strömbäck argue that ordinary citizens are used often to provide eyewitness accounts, but mostly to give the event a human face (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2009: 80). Based upon this, and on the theory that the Netherlands is expected to make most use of the emotional frame it is expected that Dutch broadcasters make more use of ordinary citizens used as sources in comparison with the Russian broadcasters.

Academic experts

Regarding sourcing theory, a last category of sources is added, namely the use of academic experts. According to Dimitrova and Strömbäck, academic experts are commonly used in many different countries to elaborate on campaigning, war and strategies, religion and other subjects (Ibidem). They state that academic sources give credibility to the news fragment (Ibidem). There is no rationale for predicting if the use of academic experts is more common in the Netherlands or in Russia. But based on the expectation that a state-controlled

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3.4 CODES OF TELEVISION

Fiske describes television as a medium that is a “provoker and circulator of meanings”. He states that programs, broadcasted on television such as news, are filled with potential meaning that work together with a dominant ideology in a society (2010: 1). Together with the sources and frames that are prevailing in the content, other variables also influence how meaning is put into the coverage: these variables are often described as televisual codes or codes of television. Fiske outlines his codes of television; codes that television uses to create meaning.

According to Fiske, a code is a “rule-governed system of signs, whose rules and conventions are shared amongst members of a culture, and which is used to generate and circulate meaning in and for that culture . . . [and are] links between producers, texts, and audiences” (2010: 3). Fiske states that our reality is already encoded, or: framed. And

according to him, the only way we can make sense of reality is by our cultural codes: “If this piece of encoded reality is televised, the technical codes and representational conventions of the medium are brought to bear upon it as to make it (a) transmittable technologically and (b) an appropriate cultural text for its audiences” (2010: 5). By looking at frames in the content, but also at the televisual codes of television in a textual analysis, we can say something about the cultural codes of a country (in this case the Netherlands or Russia) and thus gain a fuller understanding of the cross-national differences in framing. Therefore, this theory also contributes to this study.

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representational level and the ideological level will be analyzed by conducting the qualitative textual analysis. Based on this part of the theoretical framework, the following sub-question that will guide the analysis is drafted:

SQ3: Which codes of television are applied in both Russian and Dutch newscasts?

By looking at frames and sources in the content, but also at the televisual codes of television, we can say something about the cultural codes of a country (in this case the Netherlands or Russia) and thus gain a fuller understanding of the cross-national differences in framing. To answer the third sub-question, variables to specify these codes of television were drafted.

Codes of television for the quantitative content analysis and textual analysis

Camerawork

Fiske says: “the camera is used through angle and deep focus to give us a perfect view of a scene, and thus a complete understanding of it” (2010: 6). He outlines that the normal camera distance in television is a mid-shot to close-up, and that by camera distance we (the audience) feel sympathy towards the hero’s and away from the villains (Ibidem). When people are shot in extreme close-ups (ECU’s), it represents villainy. ECU’s are also used in news and current affair programs, to emphasize tensions felt by people interviewed. Viewers may then

associate this tension as the person lying or feeling guilty (Idem: 7). Fiske describes how ECU’s replicate our “social code of interpersonal distance: 60 cm of us is encoded as private [and] anyone entering it is either hostile (when uninvited) or intimate (when invited)”

(Ibidem). The meaning of the camera distance depends on the context and the ideological codes they work in, but Creeber attached some meaning to the variables in camerawork.

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a feeling of power over the actions, whilst low-angle shots create a sense of intimidation or inferiority. I will look at specifically these variables (see codebook in appendix) and count how often the different shots are used within the fragment. The most dominant used camera angle will be counted as ‘dominant’ in the fragment.

Editing

Fiske found in his small sample study that “the heroes are given more time (72 seconds) than the villains (49) and more shots (10 against 7), though both have an average shot length of 7 seconds” (2010: 7). He concludes that it is remarkable how consistent these results in editing are for all kind of forms of television, and that it became a conventional characteristic of television news. The variables for the influence of editing will therefore be the time given to certain subjects, the amount of shots and a variable created by Creeber: chronological editing versus montage, where live coverage shows harsh realism and several scenes quickly edited together create a sense of dramatic action (2006b: 43) (see codebook in appendix). I will count the amount of different editing forms used in the fragment and determine the most dominant one.

Sound bites

A third variable for looking at the codes of television will be the use of sound & music in the news fragments. Creeber describes how television heavily relies on sound, because it is a domestic medium and broadcasts while we are doing other things (eating, talking reading and so on) (Creeber, 2006: 41). Theme tunes, announcements, newsreaders, voice-over

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seems to be creating a realistic scene, and non-diegetic music is added for drama and emotion in the scene (Idem: 42). He also describes how ‘no sound’ can be notable for capturing a greater sense of documentary realism (Ibidem). Therefore, I will also count the sound bites in the news fragments and determine the most dominant use of sound.

Ideological codes

The televisual codes such as camerawork, editing work and the use of sound and music are deeply embedded in the ideological codes of a society, of which they are also the bearers themselves, according to Fiske (2010: 11). According to him, the level of representation consists of technological codes such as camera, lighting, editing, music and sound, as analyzed in the content analysis. He says that these codes “transmit the conventional representational codes, which shape the representations of for example: narrative, conflict, character, action dialogue, setting, casting etc.” (Fiske: 2010: 4). He says that “in making sense of the program . . . we are indulging in an ideological practice ourselves, we are maintaining and legitimating the dominant ideology, and our reward for this is the easy pleasure of the recognition of the familiar and of its adequacy” (Fiske, 2010:11).

By realizing that the televisual codes that this research analyses are embedded in ideological codes we should specify these ideological codes. Fiske talks about a level of ideology, which “are organized into coherence and social acceptability by the ideological codes such as those of: individualism, patriarchy, race, class, materialism, capitalism etc.” (Fiske, 2010: 4).

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society. Fiske argues that if the things we feel in our everyday life conform easily to the dominant ideology on television, we will find little problem in adopting the position that television constructs for us (Ibidem). This can never be totally successful, because people have the power to resist the workings of ideology (Ibidem). Fiske puts it this way: “In making sense of the program we are indulging in an ideological practice ourselves, we are

maintaining and legitimating the dominant ideology, and our reward for this is the easy pleasure of the recognition of the familiar of its adequacy” (2010: 10). It’s interesting to see how television constructs a position we should ‘accept’, by using skills and techniques that are based on dominant ideologies. Hence the introduction of this theory for this study.

Overview

In this chapter, questions were raised and hypotheses were formulated. Starting with the MH17 crash considered being a disaster event based upon the theory on media events, we should keep in mind that the MH17 crash, being a performative media phenomenon that mobilizes collective sentiments, is an event infused with emotion and drama. It is expected that this will influence the framing of the MH17 crash. The first hypothesis formulated is therefore:

H1: The MH17 crash, considered a disaster event, will influence the framing of the news.

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main frames were drafted for this research: the future threat / fear frame, the emotional frame, the conflict / war frame, the blame / responsibility frame and the religious / moral frame. Based on the theory, five corresponding hypotheses were created:

H2: The future threat / fear frame will be frequently used in Dutch newscasts H3: The emotional frame will be the most dominant frame in Dutch newscasts H4: Both broadcasters will make the same use of the conflict / war frame

H5: The blame / responsibility frame will be the most dominant frame in Russian newscasts

H6: Russian newscasts will make more use of the religious frame than the Dutch newscasts

Based upon these frame expectations and upon sourcing theory as outlined in the following section, the expectations for the use of sources in framing the MH17 crash were drawn:

H7: Russian news makes most use of official sources

H8: Dutch news makes most use of ordinary citizen sources

H9: Academic sources are featured more often in Russian news than in Dutch news

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research tries to figure out how television newscasts use techniques for us to recognize the dominant ideology ongoing in the society. In other words, which technical codes does television use to manipulate how we think about certain events? All this combined lead us to the fourth sub-question that guides this research:

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4. METHOD

The main goal of this analysis is to find out how the MH17 crash is framed in the immediate aftermath of the event on Dutch and Russian television, by looking at certain aspects of framing such as frames, sources and televisual codes. And specifically, to uncover country-specific patterns in framing that occur during a media disaster with the MH17 as a relevant case to investigate these topics.

Because this study involves both quantitative and qualitative research questions, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is appropriate. The choice for a

combination consists of a quantitative content analysis and a qualitative textual analysis and will be elaborated upon in this chapter.

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4.1 SAMPLE NOS news

The NOS news channel is selected for the Netherlands, since it is one of the most important news programs in the Netherlands. For decades, the NOS was the only television news program in the Netherlands (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000: 97). According to Semetko & Valkenburg, the NOS is the Dutch equivalent to Britain’s BBC (Ibidem). The NOS is therefore considered a good representation of the Dutch national television newscasts in the country.

Channel One news

For Russia, this study includes Russia’s Previn Kanal or Channel One news. Channel One is selected because among the many Russian television channels, Channel One, controlled by the Kremlin through a state majority ownership, has the largest share of viewers and thus possibly the largest impact (Hansen, 2015: 142). Channel One is therefore a good representor of the Russian national television newscasts in the country.

Systematic sampling

This paper applies a systematic sampling of the material. The sample is collected using the issue-based sampling method, since this paper examines the coverage of an (media) event: the MH17 crash. The choice for systematic sampling is made because in this case random

FRAMING MH17

FRAMING MH17

A comparison of Russian and Dutch

news broadcasts

ABSTRACT

PREFACE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. BACKGROUND

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4. METHOD