EU Enlargements during and after the Cold War

University of Groningen

EU Enlargements

during and after the

Cold War

Thijs Noordzij

2

T

ABLE OF

C

ONTENTS

1. Introduction...4

2. Western Europe during the Cold War...7

2.1. Overcoming a common enemy ...8

2.2. New initiatives for cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War...9

2.2.2. Military cooperation...10

2.2.3. Social and cultural cooperation...10

2.2.4. Economic cooperation...11

2.3. For Peace and Prosperity, the beginning of European Union...12

2.3.1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS)...12

2.3.2 The European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM...13

2.3.3 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)...14

2.3.4 Possible enlargement blocked by France and other developments in the 1960s...15

2.4. Cold War enlargements of the European Union...17

2.4.1 New Leaders, new possibilities. The developments in the 1970s ...17

2.4.2 The north-western enlargement...19

2.4.3 The 1980s: Single European Act ...20

2.4.4 The southern enlargement...21

2.5. Conclusion...23

The players and their motives ...23

Motives of the members of the European Communities...24

Motives of the accessing states...26

Motives of the others involved ...26

3. The influence of Communism on Eastern Europe ...28

3.1. The Soviet Union’s grip on Eastern Europe ...28

3.2. Reform repressed...29

3.3. Unnoticed change ...30

3.4. Growing resistance ...31

3.5. The Fall of Communism...33

3.6. Conclusion...35

3

4.1 German unity ...38

4.2 The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), an institutional reform to ensure Western values 39 4.3 The neutral states...41

4.4 Help from outside of the European Union...41

4.5 PHARE ...42

4.6 Europe Agreements...42

4.7 Copenhagen Criteria ...43

4.8 Agenda 2000 ...44

4.9 Turkey ...45

4.10 More institutional reform: Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice ...46

4.11 Negotiating the enlargement...47

4.12 Conclusions...50

Motives of the EU...50

Motives of the accessing states...51

Motives of the others involved ...52

5. Conclusions...54

4

1.

I

NTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the European Union, it has only been growing. This process of growing has been twofold. First, after the start of the cooperation in the 1950s, it became more and more intense and led to the emergence of supranational institutions whose strength kept growing. Second, from the 1970s onward the territory of the EU steadily expanded. The latest enlargements, in the first decade of the 21st

century, almost doubled the size of the EU. The question whether the latest enlargements of the EU have been wise has been widely discussed, with a wide variety of conclusions. The question of this thesis is whether the eastward enlargement was different from the previous enlargements. My hypothesis is that it is.

The latest enlargements of the EU raised many questions about who’s in and who’s out of the European project, and why. At one hand are the people that claim that the EU was reckless with its last enlargement, for several reasons. The economies of Eastern Europe are too different from those of Western Europe to form a single internal market, the corruption in Bulgaria and Romania is supposed to be a problem too big to handle and the enormous increase of people and countries added to the EU makes it too difficult to govern. Also, the differences in culture between the ‘old’ Western European member states and the new Eastern countries are thought to be too big. At the very least internal reforms of the EU seem to be necessary to be able to govern this ‘union’ of European states. Some countries who wish to become members seem to be excluded from the EU by matter of principle. Many citizens of the EU think that Turkey can never be a member of the EU. The Balkan countries have to fight against their reputation of inherent savageness. Not only were their economies backward, underdeveloped and inward-oriented, some even went so far as to state that people in the Balkans are primitive and uncivilized.

5 just another wave in the continually enlarging EU, which is not fundamentally different from the earlier enlargements.

To support the hypothesis that the eastward enlargement is different from the previous ones, the motives of the member states of the EU at the time, the accessing states, and other involved actors will be studied. The ‘old’ member states had good reason not to agree with the eastward enlargement. There were huge differences between the EU and the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The East was very poor compared to the West and the structure of the economy had been fundamentally different for decades. There had been previous enlargement that included economically less fortunate countries, but never an enlargement of the enormous size the eastward enlargement. The EU also had to deal with uncertainty with regard to stability. After the Second World War the states of Eastern Europe had been held together by force, suppressing the nationalistic sentiments for decades. They were re-emerging after the end of the Cold War. Although breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993 had been ‘velvet’, the Balkan wars of the 1990s were also still fresh in memory. Nationalistic or racial tensions involving for example the Hungarians living in Romania or the Roma living throughout most of Central and Eastern Europe could easily emerge. The re-emerging power of Russia was also to be considered. Would they accept an

enlargement of the EU? Many of these considerations had not been involved in the earlier enlargements. It is obvious that the accessing states wanted to join the EU, but the motives to join were not always as evident as you would expect. It is obvious that the less wealthy people wanted to join the rich West. To a certain extend this is comparable with the earlier enlargements of the EU with Spain, Portugal, and Greece. It must have been disappointing that it took until 2004, fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to finally join the EU. Moreover, the EU was not as generous to the new members as they might have expected at earlier stages. Another thing to consider is the leadership of the ex-communist states in Europe. Many leaders had been part of underground movements during communism. They generally had little experience governing a country and the bureaucracy had been serving the communist regimes for decades. Although many had hated the communist regimes, there had been many who had been part of the regime or actively supported it. And were people really ready to give up the (social) benefits that communism had offered? Finally, why join the EU that would dictate an important part your policies so shortly after you regained your independence?

One party not directly involved could have had great influence on the enlargement process, if they

6 when, and if they would oppose the enlargement of the EU. The other influential player was obviously the United States. Having ‘won’ the Cold War, the necessity of help for Europe from the other side of the Atlantic was not as evident anymore. The US might have asked the EU to taken the role of successor of NATO in Europe and take care of security. It was not to be however. The only remaining superpower reinvented its role in the world and NATO’s with it. The US took the initiative and enlarged NATO eastward before the EU did.

To give structure to the analysis of the motives of the involved parties, three broad categories of motives will be used: security, economy, and culture. The first chapter following the introduction will handle the foundation of the EU and the enlargements during the Cold war. In this chapter will describe the context of the start of the EU and the enlargements during the Cold War. This will be useful to examine the question whether the three categories of motives are chosen correctly. Were motives of security, economy, and culture indeed relevant for the development of the EU? Another question to answer about the Cold War enlargements is if the motives during these first enlargements were similar to each other. The following chapter is an intermezzo from the developments in the EU. In this chapter the developments in Eastern Europe will be described to be able to understand the particular situation the ex-communist countries were in after the Fall of Communism. The question to answer here is if almost half a century of

7

2.

W

ESTERN

E

UROPE DURING THE

C

OLD

W

AR

This thesis will try to answer the question whether the post-Cold War enlargements of the European Union are different from the pre-Cold War enlargements. This will be done by investigating the motives to enlarge the EU, or to hinder any enlargement. The motives of the internal parties and the external parties will be studied. The internal ones are the member states and the institutions of the EU, the external ones the accessing states and other involved parties. As mentioned in the introduction, three broad categories of motives will be used to give structure to the analysis of the motives of the involved parties: security, economy, and culture. This chapter will answer the question if these motives chosen correctly. Are indeed security, economy, and culture relevant for the development of the EU?

This chapter will describe the developments in Western Europe during the Cold War. The first two paragraphs will describe the events that shaped Europe during the Cold War. The first short paragraph will deal with the outside influences shortly after the Second World War, specifically the United States and the Soviet Union who strongly influenced the events in Europe during the Cold War. The second

paragraph describes the development of different forms of cooperation in Western Europe, because the start of the EU is not the only relevant initiative. Many organisations which were formed in Europe shortly after the Second World War have influenced the development of the EU in the Cold War decades and some of them are still active.

8 To support the hypothesis of this thesis that the eastward enlargement was different from the

enlargements before that, the question to answer in this chapter is if security, economy, and culture are useful motives to study. In the fifth and final paragraph an analysis of the Cold War enlargements of the EU will answer this question. The other question that will be answered is if similar motives were relevant during the Cold War enlargements, so they can be compared with the eastward EU-enlargement after the Cold War.

2.1.

O

VERCOMING A COMMON ENEMY

When the Second World War was nearing its end, Europe was divided in two influence spheres, East and West, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The Soviet Union’s position for negotiations during the Yalta conference had been strong. The Red Army was closing

in on Berlin, while the armies of the western Allies still had to cross the Rhine. Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union used this position to his advantage. The eastern part of Poland was to become Soviet territory. Poland was compensated with the eastern part of Germany, so Poland effectively moved westward. Germany had to pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union and Germany’s territory –including the capital, Berlin– was to be divided into a section for each of the Big Three: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. A French section was added later. Poland (and the other Eastern European countries) would have free elections, but as Churchill declared ‘they must honestly follow in harmony with their allies, a policy friendly to Russia.’ Stalin promised to declare war on Japan within three month after

Germany was defeated. These conclusions of the Yalta conference laid the foundation of the division of Europe during the Cold War (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006, p. 991). After the Second World War many political leaders sought a way to prevent an all-out war in Europe from happening again. At the same time the two most important victors of the Second World War with their different ideologies and conflicting economical systems –the United States representing democracy and market economy, the Soviet Union representing communism and planned economy– were trying to consolidate their influence in Europe. When the Second World War was over, the relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other quickly cooled. The new president of the United States, Harry Truman, demanded free elections in Eastern Europe, but Stalin bluntly refused. After working

9 together with the capitalist West to defeat fascism in the Second World War, the communist parties resumed their pre-war ‘ideological struggle against capitalism and imperialism’. Not long after that, Churchill declared that an iron curtain had fallen across the European continent. The Western European countries sought protection by signing a military alliance with the United States and Canada –NATO– to which the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries responded by signing the Warsaw Pact. The Belgian statesman Paul-Henri Spaak, who was involved in European integration from the early start, held a famous speech directed at the Soviet delegates on 28 September 1948 in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which is the best summary of the mind-set of the West: Messieurs, nous avons peur, Sirs, we are afraid (Spaak, 1948).

The traditionally quibbling nation-states of Europe had been at the start of both World Wars. The Second World War had seriously weakened the European countries, but the tensions in Europe started rising once again. This time the conflicts of interest between the nation-states were not the cause of the tension. The most important reason for this was the collision of the sphere of influences the West with the Eastern one, the border between them running right through Europe. This made Europe an important frontier in the Cold War. Without using military force against each other –at least in Europe– both the West and the East tried to gain an edge over the other. The threat of total destruction forced the West to find itself a new common identity. Europe, as part of the West, based their identity on cooperation against a common enemy. New forms of cooperation emerged on a wide variety of terrains, not only economic, political, and military cooperation, but also on the field of culture and human rights new initiatives were undertaken. Gerard Delanty (1995, pp. 124-125) considers the whole “Idea of Europe”, which led to the European Union in its present form, a product of the Cold War. One of the forms of cooperation between the countries on the European continent has lead to the European Union as it is today. It helped to overcome their internal differences and face up to the challenges of the Cold War.

10 at economic growth. The welfare state became a popular model for most Western democracies (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006, pp. 995, 1041).

2.2.2.

M

ILITARY COOPERATION

After the Second World War military cooperation in Western Europe started with the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947. France and the United Kingdom pledged to help each other if either was attacked in Europe. The empires that both countries still had were not included in the treaty. A customs union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Benelux) came into force early in 1948. A military alliance between the Benelux countries, Britain and France soon followed: these five states signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948. Beside mutual defence, the Brussels Treaty also promoted economic, cultural, and social

collaboration. After Italy and West Germany joined in 1954, the Brussels Treaty Organization became the Western European Union (WEU).

The best known and most influential military alliance however is the NATO. Although the traditionally isolationist forces in the United States congress were initially opposed to any 'entangling alliances', the threat of communism led to a shift in attitude. In April 1949 the United States and Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty with the five Brussels powers and Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. On 18 February 1952 Greece and Turkey also joined. These parties agreed to come to each other's aid in the case either of them was attacked in North America or Europe. Just like the Treaty of Dunkirk, the

remaining empires of the parties were not included in the treaty.1 _{The signing of the treaty was followed}

by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the establishment of an integrated military command (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 5-6). When West Germany joined the WEU in 1954 and NATO in 1955, the Soviet-Union and their Eastern European satellites responded by erecting their own defence treaty: the Warsaw Pact (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006, p. 992).

2.2.3.

S

OCIAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

Although the Brussels Treaty Organisation officially was more than a mutual defence agreement, the focus was on military cooperation. A call for deeper integration came at the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948. Representatives of twenty-six countries including academics, journalists, trade union leaders, and

1 _{As stated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of}

11 prominent resistance veterans, concluded that a European Assembly should serve a constituent body for a united Europe: to prevent war from erupting again, the countries of Europe should hand over (part of) their sovereignty over to a federal state with its own parliament. Early 1949 an intergovernmental conference was organized in London to discuss the pros and contras of a federal Europe. The five countries of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden

participated in this conference. A fundamental difference in opinion between Britain and Scandinavia on one side and ‘continental’ Europe on the other side surfaced. Britain and the Scandinavian countries wanted an intergovernmental approach to a united Europe, in which the national governments would maintain a decisive vote. The other, ‘continental’, participants were fervent promoters of a supranational organization, which would have the power to make decisions which national governments had to follow. Both approaches to European cooperation would remain influential in the debates for the coming decades. In May 1949 the participants of the conference compromised by erecting an organisation with both a Ministerial Committee and a Consultative Assembly: the Council of Europe was born. The organization functioned mainly on an intergovernmental basis, which made its power very limited. The work done by the Consultative Assembly however did convince many parliamentarians of the value of closer European cooperation (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 5).

In the decades following the Council of Europe mainly focussed on human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 1950 the European Convention on Human Rights was adopted, following a report by their Parliamentary Assembly. The Convention set the rules for the members of the Council of Europe and created the European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, p. 8). States, individuals, or other parties can bring cases to this Court if they believe that a member country has violated their fundamental rights. Any decision of this Court is binding on the member states.

2.2.4.

E

CONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation in Europe was mainly based on two initiatives. The first was the Marshall Plan initiated by the United States, the second was the integration of the economies of Western Europe which led to the European Union. In June 1947 United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed an aid program to get the war-torn Europe back on its feet and stabilize the political situation. Stabilizing the economy was the most important instrument to achieve that. In exchange for monetary aid, the Europeans had to come with a plan, designed as a joined effort rather than as individual national requests. Because the conditions to apply for aid were based on market-oriented principles, the Marshall Plan was an

12 isolationist course, binding the Eastern European states to them even more (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 3-4). The emerging Communist Block started their version of European cooperation in January 1949: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, more commonly known as Comecon). The sixteen (western) European states that participated in the Marshall plan founded the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to administer the Marshall aid in April 1948. The United States provided a total of $12.4 billion (the equivalent of over $70 billion in 1999 prices) between 1948 and 1951 with the Marshall Plan. Membership of the OEEC was later extended to non-European states. In 1961 the OEEC was reformed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its mandate broadened to promoting economic and social welfare in all

developed countries (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 3, 8).

2.3.

F

OR

P

EACE AND

P

ROSPERITY

,

THE BEGINNING OF

E

UROPEAN

U

NION

The second initiative for economic cooperation was a European initiative. It was based on the ideas of two

Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Their efforts helped to lay the foundations of what is known as the

European Union today. What started out as a French-German initiative to pool their coal and steel markets, grew to a much deeper economical integration with many more countries.

2.3.1

T

HE

E

UROPEAN

C

OAL AND

S

TEEL

C

OMMUNITY

(ESCS)

In 1950 Jean Monnet started promoting his ideas to leading politicians in Europe. Monnet’s groundbreaking idea was to pool the vital resources for war in those days, coal and steel. His ideas were adopted by several politicians in ‘continental’ Europe. Monnet proposed that the resources needed for war should become a shared responsibility. Starting a war, and thereby separating the coal and steel markets, would cost more than in would gain. The benefits of peace would outweigh those of war. Not only would this prevent a new war, it would also provide a larger common market, which in turn would help economic growth. What made Monnet’s plan

F

OUNDING

F

ATHERS

Jean Monnet (1888-1979) is known as the “father of Europe.” He had traveled around the world as a French Cognac trader before he gained experience with international diplomacy during the First World War, when he was working in a French-British committee that managed shipping in the war against Germany. In the Second World War he was again involved in logistics of war, this time as senior official of the British government (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 9; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 8, 9).

Robert Schuman (1886-1963) was born in Luxembourg of French

13 revolutionary was not only the pooling of the coal and steel markets, but to install a joint authority to manage this. National governments had to hand over national sovereignty for this specific purpose over to new supranational institutions. Robert Schuman, the French minister of foreign affairs at the time, was convinced of the advantages Monnet’s plan. He explained what the objectives of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would be in his famous declaration on 9 May 1950:

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible (Schuman, 1950).

Konrad Adenauer, the West-German chancellor welcomed the Schuman Declaration. The Benelux

countries and Italy also showed interest in joining the community-to-be-founded. As with the conference in London were the Council of Europe was established, Britain and Scandinavia were not in favour of this kind of European cooperation. They were especially opposed to a federal approach to European

cooperation, as was expressed in the Schuman Declaration words “a first step in the federation of Europe.” Because Monnet and likeminded political leaders didn’t want to wait or delude their innovative initiative to come forward to the intergovernmental wishes of Britain, the Treaty was signed in 1951 in Paris by France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, thereby establishing the ECSC (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, p. 9).

With the founding of the ECSC, the first European supranational institutions with extensive legal and administrative powers were created. The ECSC had four institutions: the High Authority for daily management of the ECSC, the Council of Ministers as intergovernmental decision making institute, the Common Assembly as representation of the people, and the Court of Justice rule over any difference in interpretation of the Treaty.

2.3.2

T

HE

E

UROPEAN

E

CONOMIC

C

OMMUNITY

(EEC)

AND

EURATOM

14 power and to pool radioactive fuels. A more political objective of EURATOM was the establishment of new shared institutions to intensify European integration, which Monnet strongly promoted.

The EEC on the other hand was different in nature from the ECSC and EURATOM. The EEC had a much broader and long-term objective of establishing a common market. To do this, not only goods, but also persons, services, and capital should be allowed to move freely within the borders of the community. The removal of national barriers to ensure what became known as the ‘four freedoms’, was clearly a long-term process. Next to a customs union the EEC also established common external tariffs and a common

commercial policy for other matters related to external trade.

The same basic institutional framework as the ECSC was used for the Treaty of Rome. The institution that was called the High Authority in the ECSC, his counterpart in EURATOM and the EEC was called the Commission. The Commission was the sole initiator of Community legislation. A Council of Minister would vote on their proposals. The members agreed that the three communities would share the same Common Assembly (the present-day European Parliament) and Court

of Justice.

2.3.3

T

HE

C

OMMON

A

GRICULTURAL

P

OLICY

(CAP)

Not only the industry was included in the European project, agriculture as well. To protect the farmers, the common market for agricultural products was not created by breaking down national barriers to trade however, but by the

establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The agricultural sector was economically vulnerable in the 1950s and all Member States had their own programs to support and protect their farmers. Agriculture was the main source of income of a much larger part of the population then it is today. This made including agriculture in the common market with its rather ruthless market principles politically

unthinkable. The common market meant an important advantage for the German industry, which had always been strong. France was initially hesitant to compete directly with these strong industries. On the other hand, France had a strongly developed agricultural sector, which could use the

15 German market to outlet her products. In negotiating the Treaty of Rome, the formulation of the objectives of the CAP was important for France to agree to the creation of a common market (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 148-153).

The details of the CAP were not part of the Treaty of Rome, but developed soon after the Treaty was signed. The CAP was formed by legislation passed by the Council of Ministers on proposals of the European Commission. The basic principles were (and still are) threefold. One: unity of the market. Similar to the common market, the internal barriers to trade were eliminated, so the prices of agricultural products became similar in all Member States. Two: community preference. Member States should import agricultural product from each other first, before attempting to import it from outside the Community. Three: financial solidarity. The costs for maintaining the CAP were shared by all Member States. To achieve this, the European Commission sets the prices for agricultural products. To protect the agricultural sector from cheaper import products, levies were put in place. Because this caused the internal prices of agricultural products to be above world market prices, export subsidies were also installed.

In later years, the CAP has been drastically adjusted, to reduce the enormous costs and lessen the

(international) political pressure. Its basic objectives to protect farmers and ensure reasonable prices for food are still considered important. The basic mechanism of the CAP, keeping prices above world market prices, still stands. This gives the CAP has a high economic price, because it stimulates overproduction. The overproduction makes it necessary to store the products and install costly export subsidies to be able to ´dump´ the product on the world market. Because of this, it also has a high political price. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in general, and the food exporting regions in North America and Australia more specific, repeatedly put pressure on the European Union to change their agricultural policy. Another reason for the revision of the CAP policies lies in the enlargement that is the focus of this thesis. As will become clear in later chapters, the CAP policy provided quite a barrier against accession to the EU for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. After the Cold War, the economies of these countries were still very dependent on their agriculture. Giving the same subsidies to these potential new members would be impossible to fit into the budget.

2.3.4

P

OSSIBLE ENLARGEMENT BLOCKED BY

F

RANCE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

16 In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Treaty of Rome was

implemented. In this period, no major treaty revisions took place. The developments of the Communities were dominated by France in this period. President De Gaulle did not favour of the supranational nature of the Community and preferred a stronger intergovernmental focus in the European cooperation. In 1965 the Commission put a proposal forward which would strengthen the position of the Commission and diminish the power of the Member States in the Council of Ministers: the European Community would raise its own taxes, and for certain issues unanimity in the Council of Ministers would be replaced by qualified majority voting. De Gaulle was furious and claimed the proposal was an attack on the sovereignty of France. For months France boycotted the meetings of the Council of Ministers, so the activities of the Communities virtually

stopped. The crisis was resolved by what became known as the Luxembourg Compromise: the Member States agreed to disagree, if decisions were made on issues which were very important for one or more states, the Council would try to reach a unanimous decision. Point of view France (had to be reached by unanimity) was noted, the other Member States

disagreed. The Commission withdrew its proposal and business resumed as usual. The ‘empty chair policy’ of De Gaulle underlined the point of view of the intergovernmentalist school of thought, that all major decisions are made by the Member States of the European Communities (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 6-7, 13-14; Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 24-25, 38-40).

The only Treaty that was signed during the years that De Gaulle was in power in France was the Merger Treaty. This treaty was mostly practical of nature: the institutes of the three communities were merged, establishing a single Council of Ministers and a single Commission of the European Communities’, forming the European Commission and a common Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and Court of Justice had been shared from the moment EURATOM and the EEC were erected to function next to the ECSC. (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 30, 165)

In these years the integration process was strengthened by the European Court of Justice, who supported the role of the European Commission as keeper of the treaties (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 96-102). The most prominent example of the important influence of the European Court of Justice in this period of

I

NTERGOVERNMENTALISM

During the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, ‘continental’ Europe opposed the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries when they pressed for a supranational organization of Europe. In the 1970s, when the supranational parts of the European Communities seemed to lose their influence, ideas opposed to

17 European integration is the case of Van Gend en Loos. The logistical company Van Gend en Loos was taxed by the Dutch government when it imported goods from West Germany to the Netherlands. Van Gend en Loos argued that this was not compatible with the Treaty of Rome. The European Court of Justice ruled in favour of Van Gend en Loos, stating that the European law had direct effect in the national courts (Van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming) v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 179-180, 182-188). The doctrine of direct effect was further developed in the early 1960s and utilized in the 1970s. The ruling of the European Court of Justice in the case of Costa versus ENEL for instance went further. In this case the European Court of Justice ruled that the Community law is an autonomous legal system, which cannot be overruled by national law. This makes Community law different from other international law, which can be ignored by national

lawmakers and courts. In effect, Member States of the European Communities had given op some of their sovereignty in favour of the European Communities (Costa (Flaminio) v. ENEL, 1964; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 16, 186).

2.4.

C

OLD

W

AR ENLARGEMENTS OF THE

E

UROPEAN

U

NION

2.4.1

N

EW

L

EADERS

,

NEW POSSIBILITIES

.

T

HE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

1970

S

The political situation changed at the turn of the decade, giving enlargement of the EU a new chance. In 1969 De Gaulle was followed up by Georges Pompidou in France and Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of West Germany. With these two new leaders, the process of European integration gathered momentum again. Pompidou was not as distrusting towards the United Kingdom and was interested in bringing it in the European Communities to counterweight the rising power of West Germany. Brandt, former mayor of West Berlin, could use the backing of a stronger European Economic Community with his negotiations with the communist regimes. While improving the relations with Eastern Europe, he also wanted to anchor West Germany deeper in European Community. In December 1969 the new initiatives to widen and deepen the European cooperation were launched at the Hague Summit. The decision was taken to start enlargement negotiations with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. To strengthen the economic development of the European Economic Community the Member States agreed to the gradual formation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). To strengthen the political power of the European Communities the Member States started to investigate how to cooperate more on foreign policy matters (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, p. 18).

18 transfer sovereignty to the Community, which made the cooperation rather ineffective. The EPC did make it possible to represent the European Community in other international organizations and was helpful to response to the changes in Eastern Europe, but on many other issues the reactions of the Member States were very different regardless of the EPC (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 40-45; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 14-15).

The intergovernmental character of the European Communities was further strengthened in 1974 by establishing the European Council, an informal summit at which the heads of government or state and the President of the European Commission come together twice every year, or more often if required. It was agreed that the European Commission would be present as observer and doesn’t have a vote. The European Council didn’t have a legal basis in the Treaties of the European Community until the Single European Act of 1982, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. Its informal influence on the other hand became considerable. Following the Luxembourg Compromise all participants strived to reach unanimity, which had the effect that the European Commission would only put forward proposal of which the support of the national representatives was carefully verified in advance at the meetings of the

European Council.

The supranational elements of the European Community were strengthened as well. In 1969 agreement was reached that the European Community could collect its own resources, so it would no longer be as dependent on the contributions of the Member States. The Commission would tax agriculture, receive custom duties on imports in the European Communities, and up to 1% of VAT. If De Gaulle would still be president of France, this probably wouldn’t have been possible. Another supranational measure was that the European Parliament would adopt the budget of the European Community, which was done by the Council in the past. In addition, the European Parliament was directly elected for the first time in 1979. Although this didn´t immediately increased their formal powers, it gave this supranational institute the legitimacy to push for increased powers in the following decades (Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 43-45; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 14-15, 18). In the 1970s the European Court of Justice continued to have a strong influence on the European integration, especially by strengthening its supranational character. In the case of Simmenthal in 1978 for example the European Court of Justice declared that all judges must apply Community law even in favour of the national constitutions (Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978; Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 524-525, 527).

19 to a central unit: the European Currency Unit (ECU). The ERM proved to be quite successful and remained effective until the early 1990s (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 17-19, 685; Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 45). At that time the plans for the EMU were fully revived, which resulted in the introduction of a single currency for (most) Member States, based on the ECU: the Euro (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 685-691).

2.4.2

T

HE NORTH

-

WESTERN ENLARGEMENT

In these first years after De Gaulle, when the European Union was still the ‘EC of six’ (European

Communities with France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg), the focus had been on deepening the cooperation between the member states and strengthening the supranational character of the European Union. As mentioned before, this movement was lead by Germany, who used it to anchor Germany deeper in the European Communities and have a stronger position toward the communist East. The first period of enlargement of the European Communities was the joining of Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Although these countries had initially opposed to the supranational approach of the EC, the early successes of the common market appealed to them. To benefit from the increased trade in (western) Europe, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had been established on Britain initiative in 1960. Portugal, the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Switzerland participated. These countries established this intergovernmental organization, and with it a free trade zone for industrial goods, but no common customs or (external) tariffs (Van Oudenaren, 2005).

20 After De Gaulle had passed on, negotiations were quickly resumed. In 1973 Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC. Norway did not join, because the electorate voted against accession to the EC in a national referendum.

2.4.3

T

HE

1980

S

:

S

INGLE

E

UROPEAN

A

CT

1980s had a slow start for European integration. With the second oil crisis in 1979, Europe encountered economic difficulties. There also was a political change of the guard in many countries. The Christian democrat ideal of the welfare state, which had been successful in the 1950s and 60s, was not able to solve the economic problems that many countries were facing. The most notable politician in this period, from a European point of view, was Margaret Thatcher. Whereas De Gaulle had been a difficult partner in the 1960s, Thatcher was a formidable opponent of the supporters of deeper European integration in the 1980s. Her main reasons to oppose were the supranational character of the European cooperation and the large net sum that the United Kingdom paid every year to finance the CAP. On the other hand, Thatcher did favour the economic cooperation on a common market. This made it possible to take a step forward in the European integration.

Opposite to the initial ‘eurosclerotic’ sound from the United Kingdom, others saw the European

Communities as a solution for the economic malaise. The foreign ministers of Italy and Germany proposed a far going plan to reform the structure of the European Communities in 1981. The European Parliament symbolically adopted a ‘Draft Treaty establishing the European Union’ in 1984. Both initiatives did not found much support, but they illustrate the growing sense of realisation that a restructuring of economic project of the common market and a streamlining of political process of the European Communities could be a solution for many of the economic problems that persisted in these years. In 1984 the Council

decided to explore the possibilities. At the same meeting the European leaders also neutralized Thatcher’s opposition in advance by lowering the contribution of the United Kingdom to the Community’s budget, the so-called UK rebate (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p. 47).

21 Compromise, those in favour of the Intergovernmental Conference pushed on. After extensive

negotiations between the Commission and the Member States in the Council, the Single European Act was signed in 1986. The Single European Act included some relatively small institutional changes. The

European Parliament had to be consulted on more topics and got the right to veto on the accession of new member states. To assist the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance was installed. The Council could delegate powers for certain areas (mainly concerning the finalizing of the internal market) to the Commission. Other changes that the Single European Act brought include the introduction of qualified majority voting on more topics in the Council of Ministers and the adding of more policy area’s to the competence of the European Communities. The Single European Act also formalized the European Political Cooperation as an instrument to coordinate the foreign policy. It was kept out of the institutions of the Communities however, and remained a matter of intergovernmental cooperation (Craig & De Búrca, 2003, pp. 19-21; Van Oudenaren, 2005, pp. 47-50).

The interpretations of the impact of the Single European Act differ greatly. Some state that the changes were very limited and many changes only affirmed practices that were already in use and broadly accepted. A former judge of the European Court of Justice even claimed that the Single European Act was deceptive because it denied the Community’s achievements by implying that not enough was done since the start of the common market in 1957 (Pescatore, 1987, p. 11). Others were more enthusiastic,

reviewing the results of the Single European Act some years later. With the implementation of the Single European Act the European Commission got to play a more political role, as was originally intended by the Treaty of Rome. The Commission got to set the agenda and was in a better position to function as a power broker in the deepening, but also the widening of European Communities (Weiler, 1991, p. 2454).

2.4.4

T

HE SOUTHERN ENLARGEMENT

22 European Communities. Making accession possible was considered a good instrument to support the democratic powers in Greece. Especially for Britain and the United States, getting Greece into the

European Communities was a way to ensure a stable government and ensured economic growth, which in turn would lessen the necessary contribution of NATO. Greece started the Association Agreement with the European Communities in 1961, with the goal to become a full member (Hatzivassiliou, 1995, p. 196). However, as soon as the Greek military seized control of the government in 1967, the EC suspended the negotiations. After disastrous Greek losses in the war with Turkey over Cyprus, the democratic

government was restored in 1974. Negotiations with the EC were resumed and Greece joined the EC in 1981.

In Spain and Portugal respectively Franco and Salazar ruled as authoritarian dictators. With Franco’s death in 1975 in Spain and the almost bloodless Carnation Revolution in 1974 in Portugal, both countries soon installed democratic governments. In 1977 Spain and Portugal became members of the Council of Europe. They also applied for membership of the EC to help to consolidate their new democratic systems and to improve their economic situation. Both had been members of the OEEC for some time, but better access to the European market of the ECC would be a boost for their agricultural sector. France and Italy, the Mediterranean states that had been members of the European Communities longer, had good reason not to be enthusiastic about this southern enlargement for exactly that reason. The ECC and CAP provides the Mediterranean member states better access to the Western European market for their agricultural products (mainly olive related products) then non-members. The members states of the EC had doubts about the stability of the post-dictatorship governments and its dedication to democracy. Early in the 1980s all European Mediterranean countries had socialist or social-democrat governments. A ‘socialist summit’ held in 1983 with the premiers of France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal (McAllister, 2010, p. 110) only strengthened concerns in northern Europe. To prevent the possibility of communism getting a foothold on the Iberian peninsula, it would be safer to include Spain and Portugal into the EC. The economies of both ‘old’ member states had become much less dependent on agriculture in the decades before, so in the end the prospect of stable democratic neighbours to trade with outweighed the

disadvantage of competitors of agricultural products. Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986, the year the Single European Act was signed.

23 ‘permanently neutral’. In the situation of the Cold War, this meant neither associating with the East nor the West, so accession to the EC was out of the question.

2.5.

C

ONCLUSION

In this chapter the circumstances of enlargements during the Cold War have been examined. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the eastward enlargement was different from the enlargements before that. To support that idea, the involved parties’ motives of security, economy, and culture have been studied. First the question whether these motives were relevant will be answered, followed by an answer on the question if similar motives were relevant during the Cold War enlargements.

T

HE PLAYERS AND THEIR MOTIVES

The institutions of the EC are not considered active players in this chapter yet. The activities of the European Court of Justice shows that this institute is an important exception to this rule. Throughout the history of the EU the institutions grew stronger however, and became more dominant players.

To improve security in Europe the instrument of pooling of resources needed for war was a revolutionary idea. This instrument has been utilized and by doing so the European Communities were formed. It improved relations between former adversaries and ensured having strong allies. For the southern enlargements, the building of a stable democracy was an argument for both the EC and the democratic forces in these countries to enlarge. To develop a strong (market)economy, the effect of scale is important, as is the system of free trade. Lower trade barriers and a larger group of potential customers have

improved the growth of the European economy tremendously. Culture is also a force to be reckoned with. At the early stages, it was probably working against the European Communities, rather than promoting it. Supranational cooperation, that is the voluntary handing over sovereignty to new institutions, was something completely new. Making one’s own nation stronger and expanding its influence had been the common way to go for a long time. Supranationalism didn’t fit in any political culture of that time and made the Britain and the Scandinavian countries decide against joining the ECSC at first. It is clear that motives of security, economy, and culture were relevant for the development of the EU. It is also clear that at least one of these categories of motives have been relevant for the start of the EU and all enlargements. The question whether all these categories of motives were important for all enlargements, and if the motives were similar with all enlargements, remains.

At the end of this chapter we can conclude that the development of the European Union has not been gradual, but came in shocks. Deepening of integration was succeeded by enlargements, which in turn was followed by deeper integration. Based on how the northern enlargement came to be, we can even

24 Ostpolitik, to extend Germany’s influence in the communist East. Germany did not however give the impression that it searched for a dominant position in Europe again, so it sought for deeper integration in the EC. This re-emergence of German self conscience made France look for another strong partner in the EC to counter the German power. Britain was applying for membership and after De Gaulle it was possible to enlarge.

The original intentions of the founders of the European project were to – in time – create a federal European state, as is clear from the Schuman declaration. The role of the supranational, and potentially federal, institutions of the European Communities has not always developed in that direction. In the early years the responsibilities of the Commission increased. Two new communities were added to the

European project: EURATOM and the EEC. Another core activity was added with the CAP. But after the Luxembourg compromise, the influence of the European Commission decreased considerably. Following the enlargements, a deepening of the integration came. Although the Commission had been reduced to an observer who was guided by the Council of Minister, with the formation of the European Council the Commission’s role grew stronger again. Formally the Commission retained the right to initiate new legislation, but in practice this would never be done without conformed support from the Council. The position of the Commission changed again with the Single European Act of 1986 (the same year as the southern enlargement), when the European Parliament got the right to veto accession. The Commission regained much of the political role that they were intended to have by the Treaty of Rome. The role of the European Commission was not settled however. The European Communities would continue to evolve. Fact is that the process of European integration got back the momentum it had lost in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The firm deadline to finalize the internal market in 1992 to which the Commission and all member states had committed themselves, worked to accelerate the pace in which the decisions were made. This is not only true for the decision-making in relation to the internal market, the renewed

enthusiasm for the European project also for many made it possible to make advancements in other policy areas. It also helped to bring about the second period of enlargements. In chapter 4 the role of the

supranational institutions in the enlargement process will be more important.

M

OTIVES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE

E

UROPEAN

C

OMMUNITIES

25 countries. The prevention of war by pooling the main resources needed for war was the core of the

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). But because it was also very successful economically, other sectors of the economy followed soon: EURATOM for the pooling of nuclear fuel and the European Economic Community (EEC) for the creation of a common market were created, based on the same principles as the ECSC. As mentioned above, the cultural motives involved were against the start of the European project. The old nationalistic habits were slowly replaced by a new political culture that made it possible to transfer sovereignty to the supranational institutes of the EC.

The first attempts to enlarge the EC failed, mainly because of the French president De Gaulle. De Gaulle was not only against a supranational Europe, his mistrust of the United States and Britain made it impossible for Britain and the other countries that tried to become a member of the European

Communities when they applied in 1961. In 1967 De Gaulle blocked the accession of Britain and the other interested countries to the Communities again. It is certain that De Gaulle played a major part in this, but his motivations – beyond distrust against supranational institutions and Anglo-Saxons – are not clear. Almost the opposite is true, because when the British joined the EC, they would pay disproportionally much to the CAP budget, of which France benefitted most. The most important motivations of the member states for the northern enlargement were twofold. Security was an issue for France. Britain could provide a vital counterweight against the recovering and more self-assured Germany. Germany also sought a stronger European Community to give extra leverage while trying to improve relations with the

communist East. Economic motivations were also involved. An increased size of the common market was welcome, just as the contribution of Britain to finance the CAP.

26 enlargements, motives of security and the positive effects of a larger market prevailed over the economic motives of the ‘old’ member states in southern Europe that feared the competition however.

M

OTIVES OF THE ACCESSING STATES

The lack of enlargements in the 1960s was mainly caused by one leader, President De Gaulle of France. His distrust of the United Kingdom, and its transatlantic ally the United States, was the biggest obstacle. The countries that eventually joined in the 1970s were interested to join because of the economic advantages they expected. Having seen the economic successes of the EU, the governments of Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway decided that it was better to join the EU than to continue competing with it. Their security concerns were already covered by NATO. There were cultural obstacles to overcome however: already from the early years of European cooperation these countries protested against the supranational character of the European Communities, because it simply didn’t match with their existing political cultures. The sum of the pros and cons nevertheless made the governments of the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway start accession negotiations.

The motives of the existing member states during the southern enlargements partly coincided with those of the accessing countries. Stable democratic states in the south of Europe were preferred to the return of authoritarian regimes. After the revolutions against their authoritarian regimes in these countries, the new leaders turned to the EC. By joining the EC the democratic forces in these countries would be supported. For Greece another security issue was relevant, which matched the interest of the other Western countries: keeping a strong border against the communist neighbours north of Greece. Greece, Portugal, and Spain also had obvious economic interests to join the EC. The large accessible market to place their – mainly agricultural – products was always welcome.

M

OTIVES OF THE OTHERS INVOLVED

27 which gave the United States an economic motive to press for Greece’s membership of the EC. The security motives of the United states overlaps with that of the member states: keep communism out of Europe as much as possible.

Summarizing, different motives were involved at the beginning of the European Union and the two Cold War enlargements. Security motives were not always involved, but if they were, they were always opposed to the communist East. The economic motives of the advantage of a bigger common market run throughout the first decades of the EU. The side effects of enlarging the common market with less developed economies posed challenges however. The cultural motives, if involved, were negative. Old habits needed to be replaced to ensure a brighter future.

28

3.

T

HE INFLUENCE OF

C

OMMUNISM ON

E

ASTERN

E

UROPE

To answer the question whether the motives for the latest enlargements of the European Union were similar to those of the earlier enlargements, the enlargements before the end of the Cold War were studied in the previous chapter. The countries of Western Europe started to work together for peace and prosperity in a way that hadn’t been done before. With the military protection of the United States

through NATO, the Western European countries could focus on rebuilding their economies and preventing conflict between former adversaries. The cooperation first started with a common coal and steel market, but led to deeper economical integration. To make sure that the common goals of the participating countries were met, the countries had handed over part of their sovereignty to a supranational community.

Meanwhile in Eastern Europe events went in a different direction. This chapter will focus on these developments in the period from the end of the Second World War to the Fall of Communism. To be able to comprehend the determination of Eastern European countries showed in their quest to enter the EU after the Fall of Communism, and to understand the specific problems that these countries faced with the entry to the European Union, this chapter with its relatively extensive history of Eastern Europe during the Cold War is necessary. Because of the lack of a democratic government for decades and the relatively poor economic situation, the southern enlargements bear some resemblance to the eastern enlargements after end of the Cold War. The question of this chapter is if almost half a century of Communism left behind a specific situation in the Eastern European countries, which could influence their accession to the EU, and how if that makes their situation different from the countries that became members earlier.

3.1.

T

HE

S

OVIET

U

NION

’

S GRIP ON

E

ASTERN

E

UROPE

During the Cold War, Western and Eastern Europe developed very differently. In Eastern Europe communist parties loyal to Moscow and Stalin’s regime were in power everywhere by 1948. Yugoslavia was the only exception; Josip Broz Tito was able to establish an independent communist state, primarily because there was no Russian army in Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War. Stalin’s

29 After Stalin died in 1953 and Khrushchev started leading the Soviet Union things began to change. Within certain limitations, change was allowed in Eastern Europe by Khrushchev: The government still should be in the hands of a single Party (the communist party) and the lead of the Soviet Union should be followed, but the Stalinist repression was greatly reduced and the standard of living began to improve. This didn’t mean that the Soviet Union lost her grip on her satellite states in Eastern Europe. Riots in Poland in 1956 led to a more autonomous government under the leadership of Władysław Gomułka. Gomułka spoke of the working class, which had been deceived by the leadership of the Party, and the evils of Stalin’s dictatorship. Reforms in agriculture and industry were announced. Freedom of criticism was postulated, as long as it was within the framework that the Party lay down. Gomułka also stated that the people should be thankful for the help of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union however, for helping to stop the evil that existed in the past. Poland should maintain its friendship with the Soviet Union (Gomułka, 1985). With the communist party in power and loyalty to Moscow assured, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accepted this course of action and thereby ended the crisis.

3.2.

R

EFORM REPRESSED

Khrushchev’s reaction was very different however when revolutionaries in Hungary under leadership of Imre Nagy announced the New Course and declared that Hungary intended to become independent of the Warsaw pact. Nagy proposed agricultural reforms similar to the reforms in Poland. Cooperation should be voluntary and farmers should be allowed to leave the Kolkhozes. Nagy also proposed more possibilities for (not state-regulated) trade, and wanted to stimulate private initiatives and enterprises (Nagy, 1985). When he announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, Moscow intervened. The revolution in Hungary was bloodily subdued and a new pro-Moscow government established. Nagy was executed on charges of treason not long thereafter.

While Khrushchev’s policy regarding the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states was quite coherent, his foreign policy was more inconsistent. At the one hand, Khrushchev claimed ‘peaceful coexistence’ with capitalist states was possible and he agreed to the neutrality of Austria, which for 10 years had been divided in four different zones of control for each of the Big Three and France. He also tried to build good relations with the decolonized countries in Asia and Africa. On the other hand he ordered the western Allies to leave Berlin in 1958, which only strengthened the Western commitment to support West-Berlin. In response, Khrushchev ordered the Berlin Wall to be built in 1961. When

30 Brezhnev stopped the liberalization that Khrushchev had started. The way Brezhnev handled the Prague Spring is the best example of how he controlled the reforms in Eastern Europe. In January 1968 the liberal communist Dubček was elected as the new leader of the Party in Czechoslovakia. Dubček repeatedly proclaimed that he wanted Czechoslovakia to remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact and Brezhnev’s leadership and he wished to maintain the rule of the communist party in Czechoslovakia. Dubček did however want to reform communism in Czechoslovakia to ‘socialism with a human face’. He wanted less censorship and less bureaucratic planning by the Party and more power to trade unions and consumers. His policies were very popular in Czechoslovakia, but it made the leaders in the Soviet Union nervous. In June 1968 a much discussed article called “2000 words” was published in several Czech media. The article was written by Ludvík Vaculík and signed by some seventy public figures. The article was very critical toward the communist party and the effect it had had on the society as a whole: Although they claimed to rule according to the will of the workers, in fact the Party had become the new ‘ruling class’. The Party had gathered all power and controlled all parts of society. The people outside the party had no political power. Vaculík wanted to support the progressive wings of the communist organizations, not to overthrow the government led by Dubček. In his article Vaculík already states that the humanization of the regime is being threatened and that they should be aware of the possibility of ‘revenge of the old forces’ (Vaculík, 1968). The publication of the article can be seen as a sign of relaxation of the censorship and revival of the civil society which was the most important part of the Prague Spring.

Socialism with a human face and the Prague Spring did not go by unnoticed by the other communist countries of the Warsaw Pact. In August 1968 the ‘revenge of the old forces’ which Vaculík had feared became reality. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies quite suddenly invaded Czechoslovakia. Although the invasion met no military resistance, the passive political resistance was significant. The Soviets seemed to have difficulties finding suitable and willing people to replace the reformist political leaders and heads of the mass-media. While it had been possible to claim that the invasion in Hungary had been on request of the threatened (conservative) wing of the Party, the reforms in Czechoslovakia seemed to be broadly supported throughout the society and the Party. No one in the government or the

communist party of Czechoslovakia had asked the Warsaw allies to intervene in their domestic affairs, nor supported it (Suda, 1969). This posed a political problem for Brezhnev. To solve the issue the Brezhnev doctrine was soon proclaimed: the Warsaw Pact allies had the right to intervene in any socialist country whenever that socialist country developed towards capitalism.

3.3.

U

NNOTICED CHANGE

31 conservative during the Brezhnev years, there were significant changes in the communist society. The urbanization which had started early in the 20th _{century accelerated and people became more and more}

educated. The increasingly complicated society needed more specialized scientists and managers. This growing group of specialists got more freedom, although generally only within their specialization. With the increase of freedom, the confidence also grew and people cautiously began to let their opinions be heard in the communist societies. These changes were gradual and unintended, but the revolutionary changes that Mikhail Gorbachev started when he came to power in 1985 wouldn’t be possible without them (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006, p. 1028).

With his Ostpolitik the West-German chancellor Willy Brandt took the lead in an effort to relax the tensions caused by the Cold War in the 1970s, backed up by the European Communities and the United States. The policy of détente, as it was called, reached its highest point with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in the summer of 1975. All Eastern European countries (except Albania), Western European countries, and the United States and Canada signed this covenant, in which all parties agreed on the existing political frontiers and made guaranties for the political freedoms and human rights of their citizens. By signing, West Germany formally agreed to the loss of territory after the Second World War and the communist countries agreed to improve the human rights situation (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006, p. 1017). Although initially this had little effect in Eastern Europe, the impact of signing the Helsinki Final Act was of great importance.

3.4.

G

ROWING RESISTANCE

The agreement on human rights and political freedom made in the Helsinki Final Act were not respected in the Eastern European countries, but they were noticed nonetheless. In the face of oppression, some intellectuals opposed the regimes and wanted serious reforms still saw chance to publish their work in the underground press, commonly known as samizdat. One of the best known works that was published in this fashion is Charter 77. It was written by several intellectuals and published on 1st _{of January 1977,}

hence its name. The Charter points out that the Czechoslovakian government had signed several

32 subjected to reprisal (they sometimes spent more time in jail than outside of it), they were not executed as was more common in Stalin´s years.

In 1970 the working class rose up against the communistic regime in Poland. Although Gomułka had been able to have a relatively autonomous government, he was replaced by a new leader who promised highly needed economical reforms: Edward Gierek. Because of West Germany’s Ostpolitik Gierek was able to obtain both credit and Western technology. During Gierek’s time in power cardinal Karol Wojtyła,

archbishop of Cracow, was elected as the new pope. Wojtyła took the name John Paul II. Pope John Paul II travelled back to Poland in 1979 where he challenged communism repression be speaking of ‘man’s unalienable rights’, or human rights. This fuelled the already

existing discontent. Together with the appalling economic situation which Gierek hadn’t been able to improve due to the worldwide oil crises, the economic recession in Europe, and mismanagement of the Party in Poland, caused unrest to mount. This resulted in major strikes throughout the country, starting with a strike at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk. The strikers were led by Lech Wałęsa, a charismatic electrician at the shipyard. He was able to ensure their demands for free trade unions, freedom of speech, release of political prisoners, and economical reforms to be heard (Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), 1984). With permission of the Party the trade union Solidarity was erected, with Wałęsa as leader (The Gdansk Agreements, 1982). Solidarity became very popular, operating with almost 10 million members and 40.000 staff in a short period. Remembering the repressed revolution in Hungary in 1956 and the Soviet interference in the Prague Spring in 1968, Solidarity willingly limited its

influence and didn’t challenge the power of the communist party as sole party in the government (Kuroń, 1982). The Party in Poland nevertheless feared Soviet involvement. They feared that the Brezhnev doctrine would cause a bloody Soviet intrusion in Poland and decided to replace Gierek. In 1981 general Wojciech Jaruzelski came to power. He immediately imposed martial law and outlawed the Solidarity movement. Many of their leaders were put in prison, including Lech Wałęsa. Due to Solidarity’s popularity, the movement saw ways to live on as a strong underground movement (Łopiński, Moskit, & Wilk, 1990). The survival of Solidarity under years of martial law can be seen as the first clear sign that communism was losing its grip on Eastern Europe (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 2006).

U

NALIENABLE RIGHTS

Pope John Paul II’s reference to unalienable rights was controversial for more than one reason. First of all, it refers to the Declaration of

Independence of the United States of America, the ultimate opponent of Communism. The Unalienable Rights of Independence that Thomas