Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Georg-August Universität Göttingen
August 2017
The Future of the European Union:
Integration, Differentiation and Disintegration through a
Core-Periphery Approach
Submitted by: Erik Houwing 2246813 11603969 Phone: 0031-643817026 E-mail: erik_houwing@hotmail.com Göttingen Dr. Senka Neuman-Stanivukovic Prof. Dr. Tobias LenzGöttingen, 01-08-2017
1 MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Erik Houwing hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “The Future of the European Union: Integration, Differentiation and Disintegration through a Core-Periphery Approach”,
submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
2
Index
Introduction ... 3
Research outline ... 10
Chapter 1: Europe as an Empire and European disintegration ... 12
Chapter 1.1: Europe as an Empire ... 12
Chapter 1.2: European teleology ... 18
Chapter 1.3: Integration and Disintegration ... 24
Chapter 2: Brexit as disintegration within the EU ... 32
Chapter 2.1: Historical background: Reluctant Britain ... 32
Chapter 2.2: Brexit and disintegration: an assessment of a process ... 35
Chapter 2.3: Brexit and disintegration: an assessment of impact ... 38
Chapter 3: The Schengen Acquis crisis ... 43
Chapter 3.1: Historical and Institutional Background ... 43
Chapter 3.2: Schengen Crisis and Disintegration: an assessment of a process ... 46
Chapter 3.3: Schengen and disintegration: an assessment of impact ... 49
Conclusion ... 54
3
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been haunted by the spectre of crises for almost over a decade. Amongst these are the economic and financial crisis, the prospect of Greece leaving the Economic Monetary Union, the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, the migration and Schengen border crisis, geopolitical challenges on the eastern border of the EU, in North-Africa and the Middle-East. All of these crises threaten to undermine the stability, prosperity and levels of solidarity within and between EU member states. Forbes published an article in March 2017
warning investors to ‘prepare their portfolio’s for a possible collapse of the EU’.1
This article by Forbes is just one of the many examples within the public debate, which is dominated by blogs and op-eds about the possible collapse and relaunch or rejuvenation of the EU. Often though, these views are contradictory. Politico interviewed seven European politicians on their view of how to relaunch or rejuvenate the EU. The answers ranged from more European elections; doing more with less; or contradictory to that, stop making exceptions
for certain member states.2 A guest commentary in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argues
that the EU should focus on practical solutions, and if necessary, throw out some of the ‘Träumereien’ if there is not enough public support, or if the proposals are to contentious.3
And if Marine Le Pen would have won the French elections, the European Union will be
condemned to collapse.4
High levels of anti-European sentiment also creates counter forces, which accumulates in for example the Pulse of Europe movement. This grassroots movement is aimed at showing support and solidarity with the European Union and its founding ideals by rallying every week. These clashing views make it difficult to assess the scale and impact of European disintegration on the future of the EU. The question is here whether the EU is facing disintegration and if so, where, how and why. The European Commission has touched upon this issue.
Recognising the complex situation the EU finds itself in for the last decennia, cascading from crisis to crisis, the European Commission presented in March 2017 a White Paper on the
1 Olivier Garret, “An Investor’s Guide to the Collapse of the European Union,” Forbes, last modified on
01-03-2017. Accessed on 13-05-2017: https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/03/01/an-investors-guide-to-the-collapse-of-the-european-union/#7a027ebef805.
2 “Symposium: How to relaunch the EU,” Politico, last modified on 04-04-2017. Accessed on 03-05-2017:
http://www.politico.eu/article/how-to-relaunch-the-european-union-future-brexit/.
3 Udo di Fabio, “Kopf Hoch,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, last modified on 07-07-2016. Accessed on
25-05-2017: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/brexit/zukunft-der-europaeischen-union-kopf-hoch-14327446.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2.
4 Paul Taylor, “As France goes, so goes the EU,” Politico, last modified on 10-04-2017. Accessed on
4 Future of Europe. This reflection paper is meant to provide scenarios for the remaining 27
member states on the state of Europe in 2025. Outlining the problems the EU is facing and the possible consequences this can have for the future of the EU, the Commission presents five possible scenarios. These five are the carrying on scenario; nothing but the Single Market scenario; those who want more do more scenario; doing less more efficiently scenario; and the doing much more together scenario.5 By outlining these five possible future scenarios, the Commission recognizes that integration is not the sole pathway anymore.
Even though European disintegration has dominated the European public and political
discourse for a while, attempts at theorizing European disintegration are scarce.6 This means
that there are few academic and useable definitions of disintegration and explanations of possible disintegration processes. History however, is full of states, empires, federations, regional organisations and currency areas that disintegrated. The narrative within scholarship on European integration has predominantly been a progressive interpretation of Europe’s contemporary history, rather than a protean one which leaves room for a variety of
interpretations.7 Many scholars explain the interplay and dynamics between inter-governmental
and supranational governance, and the increasing centralization of European decision-making processes, without looking at the possibilities different narratives.8 Because of the focus on integration, the area of disintegration has been neglected.
The past decade has, according to Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, witnessed the opening of what they call ‘a yawning chasm’ between scholarly attempts to theorise the EU, and the political realities of the EU in crisis. Mainstream EU scholarship had broadly accepted the premise that the EU is a neoliberal, state-like political system and that Europeanisation is a
one-way process.9 The premise of identifying the EU as a state-like political system makes it
hard or maybe even impossible to explain disintegration. The study of the EU would therefore benefit from adapting more combinatorial approaches and a greater use of interdisciplinary approaches.
But before we delve deeper, we must look into what disintegration means within the context of the EU. Theories on integration outline and explain the conditions and mechanisms
5 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025
(European Commission: Brussels, 2017): 15-25.
6 Hans Vollaard, “Explaining European Disintegration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 5 (2014): 2. 7 Mark Gilbert, “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no.3 (2008): 642.
8 Christian Kreuder-Sonnon, “Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti-)Constitutional Dimension of European
Crisis Governance,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no.6 (2016): 1350-1351.
5 under which competences and boundaries shift between levels and agents on the European
multilevel governance system.10 Disintegration must means a shift of competences and
boundaries towards an opposite direction. Douglas Webber defines European disintegration as a decline on three levels. Firstly, a decline in the range of common or joint policies adopted and implemented in the EU; Secondly, the number of EU member states; and thirdly, the formal treaty-based and actual capacity of EU organs to make and implement decisions if necessary
against the will of individual members.11 This definition suits my thesis because it touches on
different levels of disintegration and thus allows me to assess different cases of disintegration, which will bring a broader understanding to disintegration processes.
Problematic is that current integration theories have difficulty explaining crises and disintegration processes. Whereas neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are able to explain the euro crisis, they are not able to fully explain the suspension of the Schengen
zone.12 The suspension of the Schengen acquis by several member states with the intend to slow
or stop cross-border migratory movements, or to prevent terrorists from crossing borders, led to a debate on the future of the EU. Though these suspensions were allowed under EU law, they were a prelude of the possible disintegration of the EU. The range of common EU policies experienced stress and could even diminish. Migration commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos even warned in late 2016 that "If Schengen collapses, it will be the beginning of the end of the
European project".13 The collapse of Schengen would mean disintegration within the range of
common or joint policies adopted and implemented in the EU. However, member states agreed to support the Schengen zone and came with different mechanisms to stop migratory movements, such as the creation of a European border guard. Disintegration of an EU policy was close, but in the end was prevented. How can we explain a turn like this?
Postfunctionalism, emphasizing the role of politicization and identity, is able to explain through constraining dissensus the reluctant position of national governments in regards to the
Schengen crisis, but not to the euro crisis.14 The economic and financial crises put pressure on
10 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Integration Theory,” in Research Agendas in EU Studies. Stalking the Elephant,
edited by Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent and William E. Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 37-38.
11 Douglas Webber, “How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate? A critical analysis of competing
theoretical perspectives,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no.2 (2014): 342.
12 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories,
politicization, and identity politics,” Journal of European Public Policy (2017): 2.
13 “Refugee crisis: "If Schengen collapses, it'll be start of end European project,” European Parliament, last
modified on 14-01-2016. Accessed on 25-05-2017:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160114STO09818/refugee-crisis-if-schengen-collapses-it'll-be-start-of-end-european-project - accessed 13-04-2017.
6 the capacity and ability of integration theories to explain integration processes and outcomes. According to Sabine Saurugger, this does not call for the need to replace existing conceptual frameworks on European integration with others. It merely introduces a puzzle in all theoretical
frameworks that explain the EU.15 But what this puzzle is and how it relates to disintegration is
something that Saurugger leaves untouched. Webber on the other hand, concludes that, when turning integration theories on its head, liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist theories of European integration cannot or can hardly explain disintegration of the EU. These theories postulate that cooperation between EU member states is so highly institutionalized and that the ties of economic interdependence that bind them are so strong that disintegration is no viable alternative.16
However, this argument is challenged with the exit of the United Kingdom (UK) out of the EU, or in other words, Brexit. The citizens of the UK voted with a small majority during a referendum on June 23, 2016 in favour of leaving the EU, an outcome which heralds a new era within the Union. For the first time since the founding of the European Community for Steel and Coal in 1951, the European community sees a member state leave. This is legally possible since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, which contains a clause that enables member states to leave the Union through the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty of the European
Union. The triggering of Article 50 by the UK happened on March 29, 2017. Consequently, the
British government seems bent on making this happen. As prime-minister Theresa May of the
UK said, ‘Brexit means Brexit’.17 Existing economic and financial interdependence are
apparently not always capable of keeping the Union together. Here we have a clear example of disintegration within the context of the EU. How do we explain an event like this?
Within this thesis, I will look at European integration from a different angle, while simultaneously proposing a new research agenda. The focus here will be on explaining European disintegration processes instead of solely on integration processes. The aim of this thesis is to explain when and why disintegration takes place and when it does not. To do so, I will look define the EU as an empire with a core and a periphery. This allows me to move away from the mainstream theories who look at the EU as a state-like entity or a regional organisation.
15 Sabine Saurugger, “Politicisation and integration through law: whither integration theory?,” West European Politics 39, no.5 (2016): 933-934.
16 Webber, “How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate?” 358.
17 Ashley Cowburn, “Theresa May says 'Brexit means Brexit' and there will be no attempt to remain inside EU,” The Independent, last modified on11-07-2016. Accessed on 10-12-2016:
7 I will argue that if disintegration takes place within the core of the EU, member states will act to prevent this. If disintegration is about to take place within the periphery of the EU, member states are less inclined to prevent disintegration, or might even be the cause of it. Disintegration taking place within the periphery will be allowed to take place because it does not undermine the core structures of the European Union. This approach thus allows me to identify who or what kind of processes drives disintegration.
This approach will allow me to explain why disintegration is happening in some cases, but not in others. I have discussed the Brexit and the suspension of the Schengen acquis above. Brexit is a clear case of disintegration, whereas the suspension of the Schengen zone is not. Making use of the distinction between core and periphery will help me explain why the Schengen zone did not disintegrate, but it will explain why the UK is able to leave the EU. In both cases I will make use of a comparison. I will compare Brexit with a Greek exit, which did not take place. Greece, being part of the Economic Monetary Union, is therefore part of the core of the EU. The UK, having opted out of many core EU policies, is part of the periphery of the EU. Its departure does not undermine the future of the EU, whereas the Greek exit or Grexit would have.
Simultaneously, a collapse of the Schengen zone would have undermined the future and stability of the EU. I will compare the suspension of the Schengen zone against another case of disintegration, the controversies surrounding the CETA trade negotiations. The challenge of the member states to turn this EU-only agreement into a mixed agreement is a form of disintegration of the capacity of EU organs to make and implement decisions even if it is against the will of individual member states. This challenge, though it is a form of disintegration, does not threaten the future of the EU, and is therefore allowed by the member states to take place.
To use the concept of Europe as an empire allows us to see integration and disintegration processes through a different light, and add something to our understanding of the EU. Jan Zielonka shows us that the concepts of state, great power or hegemony have difficulties when being applied to the EU. These concepts are often contested and limited in their explanatory
capacity.18 The study of empires requires a focus on the scope and structure of governance, the
nature of borders, centre-periphery relations and its civilising missions. Studies of empire might find it easier to cope with explaining economic interdependence, fuzzy borders and informal
hierarchies.19 This is applicable to the EU as a polity and it allows me to go beyond a
8 focus. If integration theories have difficulties explaining disintegration movements, as shown above, then looking through a difference perspective might help us understand for example Brexit.
To be able to build on important aspects such as the scope and structure of governments, the nature of borders and centre-periphery relations, I will make use of a definition of empire proposed by Magali Gravier. He defined empire as a hub-like polity that comprises a core and peripheries, experiences territorial instability due to the succession of phases of expansion and shrinkage, and existing off a two-level identity policy made of a mission of civilization at the top level and of a more or less tolerant attitude vis-à-vis at the local level.20 As written above, I use Webber’s definition of disintegration. He defines possible disintegration as the decline on the number of member states, the range of common or joint policies adopted, and the formal
treaty-based and actual capacity of EU institutions to make and implement decisions.21 I will
not make use of the traditional economic or colonial relations as definitions of core and periphery. I assume that the core of the EU is the parts that have integrated most, such as the Economic Monetary Zone or the Schengen zone. The periphery of the EU are the member states and the surrounding countries of the EU who are not part of these policies.
Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, told the European Parliament in his 2016 State of the Union address that he never had before seen so little common ground and so much fragmentation amongst members. This is contradicting with what the EU is supposed to be. Juncker is of the opinion that, ‘above all, Europe means peace. It is no coincidence that the longest period of peace in written history in Europe started with the
formation of the European Communities’.22 Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand argue that,
regardless of whether it is a successful narrative, the narrative of ‘Europe born out of the War’ and Europe as a harbinger of peace has played an important role in the debates about the
European Union, and has been used to define a perceptually ‘loose political identity’.23 This
peace, Juncker implies, is threatened by possible disintegration of the EU.
The reason of the existence of the EU plays an important role with regards to disintegration. I will therefore dedicate a part of the thesis to the teleology of the EU and why
20 Magali Gravier, “Empire vs federation: which path for Europe?” Journal of Political Power 4, no.3 (2011):
418.
21 Webber, “How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate?” 342.
22 Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects,
empowers and defends,” European Commission, last modified on 14-09-2016. Accessed on 10-12-2016: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm.
23 Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory and Identity (New York: Cambridge
9 it exists. The impact of disintegration and discontinuity might endanger the future of the EU. The idea or purpose of empires is to connect the idea of an equitable order seeking to federate peoples on the basis of a concrete political organization. Continuity might facilitate the transition from a multi-national, imperial entity to a multi-national state and ultimately towards a nation state.24 If disintegration is a threat to this continuity, is it also a threat to the whole empire, and therefore to the EU? This is what I will assess in my paper.
Within the ‘Declaration on the Celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome’ a future was outlined by the European institutions and agreed to by the European member states. It reads that ‘We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the
Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later’.25 Member states decided
to opt for multispeed integration or differentiated integration for future integration steps. Differentiated integration could change the face of European integration. It might mean accelerated integration for some; outright disintegration for others; and greater differentiation
in commitments to policies and institutions for all.26 Therefore it plays an important role within
this thesis. The UK was one of the most differentiated member states of the EU. How does differentiation relate to Brexit and thus integration?
To approach disintegration within the EU through theories on imperial collapse is not feasible. More than 200 reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire have been given. A theory of
empire that predicts the fall of an empire is, according to Marks, a theory of almost everything.27
Therefore I will make use of my own approach. To do this, I will turn integration theories on their head. I will look at why and under which conditions member states are willing to prevent, or on the other hand, allow disintegration to take place. This approach is similar to questions on why countries seek to join a regional organisation and why current member states are willing to accept these countries within their organisation. Events like these change the structure, goals, and identity of a regional organisation like the EU.
Assessing disintegration will make us able to better understand these processes and its consequences and will shine a different light on European integration. European integration has
24 Henk Spruyt, “Empires, Past and Present. The Relevance of Empire as an Analytic Concept,” in Empire and International Order, edited by Noel Parker (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013), 27.
25 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/.
26 Benjamin Leruth and Christopher Lord, “Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, a
process, a system or a theory?,” Journal of European Public Policy 22, no.6 (2015): 756.
10 often been interpreted and presented as a progressive story towards a positive or teleological
outcome.28 Marks et al argued in 2006 that ‘instead of being explicitly challenged, states in the
EU are being melded gently into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of
numerous sub-national and supranational actors’.29
But we realise that this does not have to be the case. If we remember the empty chair crisis of the 1960’s. During the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle, president of France, pushed for a more intergovernmentalist structure of the European Economic Community, instead of a more supranationalist one in which the Commission played a bigger role. As a consequence of this power struggle, French delegations no longer participated in Community activities, bringing the Community’s institutions to a dangerous standstill for a period of six months.
The empty chair crisis shaped the European communities and propelled it towards a more intergovernmental institution. According to N. Piers Ludlow, the empty chair crisis served the purpose of compelling the six member states ‘to assess what sort of European system they
wanted and to reject more clearly than before what they did not wish to see’.30 Mark Gilbert is
of the opinion that the European Union as it exists in its current form owes just as much to De Gaulle, as it does to drivers of European integration such as Jean Monnet or Jacques Delors. Yet much of the historiography of the EU presents Charles de Gaulle as an aberration or as an
anomaly.31 Periods of crises are thus as important to European integration as periods of growth
and prosperity. Narratives on crises and disintegration are often found within the public discourse, but as I have argued above, little assessed little. My thesis will try to fill that gap.
Research outline
I will need to outline several steps within my thesis before I am able to successfully answer what disintegration looks like and why it takes place within the context of the EU. The first chapter will be my theoretical chapter. Firstly, I will discuss Europe as an Empire. Doing so will allow me to make a distinction between the core and periphery of the EU. Through this, I will be able to distinguish between different cases of disintegration and why they are allowed to take place. Secondly, I will assess the teleology or end-goal of the EU. Why does the Union
28 N. Piers Ludlow, “History Aplenty: But still too Isolated,” in Research Agendas in EU Studies. Stalking the Elephant, edited by Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent and William E. Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010), 23.
29 G. Marks, L. Hooghe and K. Blank, “European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric versus Multi-Level
Government,” in Debates on European Integration: A Reader, edited by M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 375.
11 exist and what is it supposed to look like? This will again allow me to assess the consequences and impact of disintegration. Through this I can attribute the value and impact of disintegration on the structure of the EU. Differentiated integration will play an important role here. Thirdly, I will look at definitions and processes of disintegration. In order to outline the processes of disintegration, I will borrow from integration theories.
In the second and third chapter I will analyse disintegration in the cases of Brexit and the suspension of the Schengen zone. After first outlining the historical and institutional background of the case studies, I will put the emphasis on assessing and explaining the disintegration processes taking place, hereby paying attention towards the actors that are the drivers of the disintegration processes. In the third part of the second chapter I will outline why disintegration took place in the case of United Kingdom, but not in the case of Greece. I will do take a similar approach in the third chapter regarding the suspension of the Schengen zone. Why was disintegration of the whole zone prevented, and why were member states willing to charge the EU on other policy areas, like the CETA agreement? I will focus on bringing understanding of disintegration tendencies within the European Union. I will make use of integration and disintegration theories, as outlined above, and make use of EU documents, member state documents, academic articles and news articles.
This thesis is about explaining ‘possible’ and existing disintegration processes. The case studies will show us how disintegration of the EU can take place, and why disintegration takes place in some fields, but not in others. Of importance is the position that a policy or member states has within the EU’s structure. By making a clear distinction between core and periphery, we can make an assessment of the impact and relevance of said disintegration process. This means that this research goes beyond looking at existing integration theories, who are unable to explain certain disintegration processes. It also means that I try to go beyond a definition of European disintegration. The focus is on the underlying relationship between core-periphery, differentiated integration, and disintegration.
Through the case studies, I will show why the UK’s exit is not necessarily a bad thing for the future of the EU, but disintegration within the Schengen Acquis, one of the core policies of the EU, is. Being a core part of the EU, member states were reluctant but willing to go through great lengths to maintain the system, even though the public debate was highly politicized. The cut off point for my research and data is the ‘Declaration on the Celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome’ which was signed in March 2017. Within this
12
Chapter 1: Europe as an Empire and European disintegration
In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical background to lay the foundation of my analysis. I will first discuss the nature of the European Union (EU) as an empire, which will allow me to explain disintegration through a core-periphery approach. I will pay explicit attention towards the teleology of European integration. Afterwards I will assess and outline European disintegration processes. What is European disintegration, and what drives it. Important is the attention for European integration. Is disintegration integration in reverse, or is it something more?
Chapter 1.1: Europe as an Empire
Before I start to theorize on disintegration I will theorize on the nature of the European Union. The nature of the EU has been studied often, but its definition depends on how one approaches the EU. Is the EU a federation; a regulatory state; an international organisation like any other; something reminiscent of a state; or a sui generis entity? Jose Barroso, former European Commission president, has once remarked in 2007 during a press conference that ‘The EU is not just any old international organisation, nor is it a superstate, but it might just be an ‘empire”’. The difference between empires of old and the EU as empire, is that according to Barroso, the
EU is a non-imperial empire. Countries voluntarily pool their sovereignty. 32
Scholars too have argued that the EU is something like an empire. Though the terms ‘EU’ and ‘empire’ seem foreign to each other at first glance and therefore difficult to align, it is certainly possible. Comparative studies of Imperial Europe has limits, according to Hans Vollaard. The formal equality of member states contradicts with the principle of asymmetric relationships within previous instances of empire. On the other hand, Vollaard also concedes that it may offer valuable insights into processes and factors of disintegration of a complex and
multi-layered political entity or construct.33 I however, think that a clear distinction can be made
here between a core and periphery, as I will show down below.
Comparisons between the EU and empires have been made before. Gary Marks analysed and compared five European polities with each other. These are the polities of Rome, the Franks, Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and the European Union. Marks argues that these polities
32 “Barroso: European Union is an ‘empire’,” EURACTIV, last modified on 10-07-2007. Accessed on
24-06-2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2Ralocq9uE; Honor Mahony, “Barroso says EU is an ‘empire’,”
13
‘…may be conceived as empires in the Roman sense of exerting imperium (power, authority) over a great territory containing diverse communities. Each of them subordinates formerly independent units in a composite polity. Each combines direct and indirect rule. And each uses pre-existing structures and local elites to do so’.34
Marks analyses these five entities on the premises that these five polities are forms of empires,
without requiring that they have a redistributive, exploitative and coercive centre.35 Zielonka
argues that ‘The EU does what all historical empires have always done, namely it exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations or various forms of informal
domination’.36 Russell Foster argues that, when analysing European maps made by the
Publication Office of the European Union, the EU presents itself as imperialistic. He argues that imperial imaginations are reflected within the maps published by the EU:
‘The most significant feature connecting all categories is that the EU’s maps serve less as geographical tools and more as political icons, objects largely devoid of scientific cartographic elements and instead emphasising territorial reach and collectively’.37
The biggest benefit in defining the EU as an empire is that it allows us to make the dichotomy between core and periphery, and therefore differentiate between the impact of disintegration processes on the EU, as I will show later. It may not be an exact fit, no one definition ticks all the boxes on the ‘imperial definition list’, but is certainly moving into that direction. The goal is to understand the tensions and processes that large polities like the EU face when dealing with questions regarding integration and disintegration. The EU for example does not have its own army, but the public debate about a European Defence Union is still alive. In September 2016, France and Germany announced plans to deepen their cooperation. Germany’s minister of Defense, Ursala von der Leyen, said that ‘It's time to move forward to a European defence
union, which is basically a 'Schengen of defence’.38
Important here is the definition and connotation of empire. The term empire is often used without nuance and without recognizing the differences in material and ideational grounding. Throughout the ages, many different types of empires existed, formal and informal
34 Marks, “Europe and Its Empires. From Rome to the European Union,” 1. 35 Ibidem, 2.
36 Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s new civilizing missions: the EU’s normative power discourse,” Journal of Political Ideologies 18, no.1 (2013): 36.
37 Russell Foster, “Tabula Imperii Europae: A Cartographic Approach to the Current Debate on the European
Union as Empire,” Geopolitics 18, no.2 (2013): 393.
38 Andrew Rettman, “France and Germany propose EU 'defence union',” EUobserver, last modified on
14 ones. I will use the term empire to be able to differentiate between core and periphery. Gravier defines the concept of empire as a hub-like polity comprising a core and peripheries, experiencing territorial instability due to the succession of phases of expansion and shrinkage, and using a two-level identity policy made of a mission of civilization at the top level and of a more or less tolerant attitude vis-à-vis at the local level.39 This is a very useful definition. Within the academic literature, most authors assume that empire is about control of various peripheral actors through formal annexation or through forms of economic and political domination. But
that is where the consensus ends.40 Empires share certain characteristics, but are never identical.
To look closer at the characteristics, I will lean on Henk Spruyt.
Spruyt denotes the empire as ‘a specific mode of organising the internal relations of a
composite entity, as well as a particular mode of organizing external interactions’.41 Internally,
empires constitute a single, hierarchical governance structure. Spruyt identifies several features of formal empires. The first is that an empire is composed of differentiated parts. Secondly, imperial rule is an asymmetrical exercise of power. The empire rests on coercion of the subject polity by the dominant power, the imperial metropole. Whereas nation-states also restrict certain actions of their citizens, terms such as ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are meaningless in the context of nation-states, but essential to the understanding of empires. Thirdly, not only is power exercised asymmetrically, but the dominant core exercises its power heterogeneously. The subjected parts, the periphery, only interact sparsely with the core. The lines of communication and transport in the empire are constructed to serve the metropole’s reach in
the periphery, while at the same time denying such means to the peripheral entities.42
One of the key characteristics here is that an empire exists of differentiated parts. Differentiated integration theory is not foreign to European studies. Differentiated integration in legal terms means the divergence of the validity of EU law across the member states. Differentiation can vary with respect to time, territory and content. States can negotiate opt-outs of EU integration schemes permanently, or temporally. Some EU laws are only applicable to a certain number of member states and not to all. Sometimes, member states decide to accept entire policies, or only selected legal acts. In political terms, it means moving away from uniform integration patterns for all member states within a single political entity. The aim of differentiated integration is to deal with the heterogeneity of states’ preferences and abilities,
39 Gravier, “Empire vs federation: which path for Europe? 418. 40 Zielonka, “Empires and the Modern International System,” 507.
15
as well as to avoid political impasse.43 If we would look down from polity to policy, European
integration is probably more differentiated than before the Treaty on European Union was
signed in 1992, even though the EU is more integrated.44
Currently, four states have major opt-outs. Ireland and the UK in regards to the Schengen Agreement; Denmark and the United Kingdom in regards to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Denmark on Defence; Poland and the United Kingdom on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; and lastly, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in
regards to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.45 Additionally to this, not all member
states meet the requirements to either join the Schengen Agreement or the EMU, creating an involuntary differentiated polity. Having said that on the current situation, the member states have opted to take differentiated integration as the main road forward for European integration.
The statement released at the ‘60 Anniversary Declaration of the Treaty of Rome’ in March 2017 outlines the future of European integration. The Declaration reads that ‘We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later’.46 Member states decided to opt for multispeed integration,
enhancing the already existing differentiated integration process. How one assesses this importance, depends on the significance one allocates towards the whole European integration process, and the reason of existence for the European Union. Differentiated integration could change the face of European integration. It might mean accelerated integration for some; outright disintegration for others; and greater differentiation in commitments to policies and institutions for all.47
Coming back to Spruyt, the EU has, just like an empire, an identifiable core and periphery. At the first glance several cores can be identified, either within the EU, or by juxtaposing the EU against non-EU member states in its vicinity. To start with the latter, the EU deals with these states through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The ENP ‘translates the EU's wish to build upon common interests with partner countries of the East and South and commitment to work jointly in key priority areas,
43 A.K. Cianciara, “Does EU Differentiation Lead to Disintegration. Insights from Theories of European
Integration and Comparative Regionalism,“ Yearbook of Polish European Studies 15 (2015): 40-41.
44 Leruth and Lord, “Differentiated integration in the European Union,” 755. 45 “Opting Out,” Eur-lex, last modified unknown. Accessed 06-05-2017:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/opting_out.html.
46 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/.
16 including in the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion’.48 The goal is ‘strengthening the state and societal resilience of the EU's partners
[which] is a key priority in the face of threats and pressures they are experiencing, including
the challenges associated with migration and mobility’.49 The EU tries to create a buffer zone
between the EU and unstable countries. Instead of using hard power to protect its core, the EU makes use of soft power to promote and project a normative or ideological narrative. Whereas neighbouring states are free to decide on the desirability and intensity of their ties with the EU,
the rules and practises of co-operation are non-negotiable.50
Here we can identify the link between Spruyt his third characteristic of empire, namely that power is almost heterogeneously exercised. The EU makes individual agreements with third countries, regardless of whether they are for example part of the European Free Trade Agreement or not. Switzerland has decided not to join the EEA, and the EU has signed an independent trade agreement.
Similarly, through the EEA, the EU exercises its power on 3 non-EU member states. These are Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. These three countries are not part of the EU, and neither are they susceptible to all EU law. These countries however, adopt a lot of EU law, pay into the EU budget, and are obliged to accept the free movement of people from both the EU and EEA countries. Norway contributes on a yearly basis €340 million to the EU budget
example, more than some of the smaller and poorer EU member states.51 In 2014, 627 EU laws
were accepted by Norway.52 If extraterritorial rule is a characteristic of an empire, then the EU’s
ENP and EEA policies are clear examples of this.
I will add one important element that Spruyt does not touch upon when he outlines his three characteristics of empires. This is the cycle of growth, collapse and revival. We can make several links in regards to Europe as an empire and disintegration processes. Empires tend to expand, but they can also collapse and experience revival. To be an empire, a polity must have known the full cycle of expansion, collapse and re-expansion.53 A synonym for collapse is
48 “European Neighbourhood Policy,” European External Action Service, last modified on 21-12-2016. Accessed
06-05-2017: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en.
49 Ibidem.
50 Raffaella A. Del Satro, “Normative Empire Europe. The European Union, its Borderlands, and the ‘Arab
Spring’,” Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no.2 (2016): 221.
51 Roland Rudd, “No power, no influence and we would still have to pay the bill,” The Guardian, last modified on 16-12-2012. Accessed on 15-05-2017: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/16/britain-would-be-diminished-by-leaving-eu.
52 “5.1 EEA JCDs - Overview of adopted JCDs,” European Free Trade Agreement (2016). Accessed on
15-06-2017: http://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/images/news/list-of-adopted-JCDs-5-feb-2016.pdf.
17 disintegration. While full-scale collapse of the EU did not take place yet, the Brexit is a form of disintegration. If the EU expands again, something which is highly likely in regards to associate member states on the Balkans, the EU will continue the cycle of expansion. Journalist Paul Taylor describes the future of the EU in terms of disintegration and revival. The latter
depends on German-Franco cooperation in strengthening the Eurozone.54 If the future of the
EU depends on German-Franco cooperation, say in for example the deepening of military cooperation, then what is the core and the periphery of the EU?
The core-periphery dichotomy can be politically, economically and socially identified. Depending on the size of economies and population of the member states, and depending on the amount of influence and power member states exercise on EU policy making, a core within and amongst the member states can be identified. This could possibly mean that the core is somewhere between Germany, France and the UK, and the periphery somewhere amongst the poorest countries, such as Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. A good illustration of this divide is European Commission President Juncker giving France more leeway on budget and fiscal rules,
just ‘because it is France’.55 Politico, when reporting on a meeting of the six founding countries,
identified these six as the ‘core Europe’, who were committed to more European integration.56
But historically, the core of an empire does not have to be a state: it can be a city, as in the
Roman or Byzantine empires.57 This means that within the EU context, the core can also be
several states, or integrated policy parts of the EU.
I will take the core of the EU as the part of the EU which has integrated most. For now, anno 2017, this means the Schengen Area and the Eurozone. This configuration can change in the future depending on further integration, in for example in area’s such as a defense or social union. The other EU member states who did not integrate to the furthest degree possible, voluntary or not, can be identified as the outer core. The states being part of the European Economic Area, candidate member states and the states being targeted by the European Neighbourhood Policy, can be identified as the periphery. However, nation states on the European continent which are part of the EEA, or the targets of European enlargement policies, are also the targets of assimilation processes and can maybe in the future ascend to the Union.
54 Paul Taylor, “Disintegration or Revival? Europe after Brexit and with Trump,” Eurozine, last modified on
31-01-2017. Accessed 18-05-2017: http://www.eurozine.com/disintegration-or-revival/.
55 Francesco Guarascio, “EU gives budget leeway to France 'because it is France' – Juncker,” Reuters, last
modified on 31-05-2016. Accessed on 22-06-2017: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-deficit-france-idUKKCN0YM1N0.
56 Paul Dallison, “‘Core’ Europe committed to more Europe,” Politico, last modified on 18-05-2017. Accessed
on 29-05-2017: http://www.politico.eu/article/core-europe-committed-to-more-europe/.
18 The choice for this approach is arbitrary, but allows me to apply the notion of empire and align it with disintegration. It means I will not use the traditional definitions of core-periphery in economic or colonial relations. The interdependence between member states which was created through integration means that disintegration within the core would harm all the other member states as well.
Consequence of this approach is that, as I will show in chapter 2 and 3, Brexit as disintegration is not harmful to the EU, because it is not part of the core of the EU, regardless of the size of its economy and population. A possible collapse or disintegration of the Schengen zone however, has different and further reaching consequences. Schengen is of one of the core EU policies, and covers most of the EU member states. It makes the freedom of movement possible. The EMU, another core element of European integration, was regarded as too important to be allowed to collapse, and therefore member states supported eaach other through the crisis. If the EU is an empire, what consequences does this have for its teleology?
Chapter 1.2: European teleology
To be able to assess the consequences and impact of disintegration on the European Union, we must look into the reason of the existence of the EU. This comes down to assessing its telos or teleology. As written in the Introduction, ‘Europe born out of the War’ and Europe as a harbinger of peace has played an important role in the debates about the EU, and has been used
to define a perceptually loose political identity within the EU.58 Similarly, Juncker sad during
his 2015 State of the Union address that, ‘above all, Europe means peace. It is no coincidence that the longest period of peace in written history in Europe started with the formation of the
European Communities’.59 This trope reverberates through many EU narratives. The use of
myths has been important for the development of European integration,60 and still is when looking at the Rome Declaration of 2017. Narratives, myths and also memory are what shapes and unifies a community. They constitute social relations in which everyone can partake and share. Within these narratives, legitimacy and historical meaning are sought by emphasizing
specific values or characteristics, giving identity to a community.61 However, there are more
dimensions to the existence of the EU. Assessing the perhaps multiple and shifting teleologies
58 Bottici and Challand, Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory and Identity, 63. 59 Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the Union Address 2016.”
60 Jan Ifversen, “Myth in the Writing of European History,” In Nationalizing the past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe, edited by Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010), 459-463.
19 of the EU and European integration can help clarify what is at stake during moments of crises and disintegration processes.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘teleology is the explanation of phenomena by the
purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes’.62 The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy
defines teleology as ‘the study of purposes, goals, ends and functions’.63 Teleology is derived
from the Greek words telos (end, goal, purpose) and logos (reason, explanation). Teleology is a reason or explanation for something in relation to its end, purpose or goal. In a historiographical sense, teleology is a form of historical enquiry which attempts to construct a narrative view of history as a progressive movement in one direction. This direction is often a predefined and inevitable end point. Questions evolving teleology try to explain the ‘why’, not the ‘how’ or ‘what’. Why does European integration take place, instead of how integration takes place, or what it looks like. The idea of ‘Europe’ is according to Etienne Balibar ‘by definition ideological’, or otherwise ‘it is a teleological discourse, which performs epistemological and
political functions at the same time’.64
We can identity several important dimensions or characteristics within the teleology of the EU. These are the teleology’s based on content, space and time. EU institutions, especially the Commission as a stronghold of supporters of integration, cling on two things when it comes to content. Firstly, the element of peace, security and prosperity on the European continent forged through European integration, as identified above. Secondly, for who integration is so important, namely for the ‘peoples of Europe’. The presented teleology or the legitimization for the EU to exist is that through European integration and cooperation, war will be prevented, and prosperity and security will be guaranteed in Europe. This argument is used to justify the existence of the EU, and to further legitimize or justify integration. This reoccurring theme can be identified within EU documents, treaties and narratives. An important example is to be found within the Preamble of the Treaty on the European Union. It reads that ‘Recalling the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe… Have decided to establish a European
Union…’.65 This reference to the past and the division of the European continent is a way to
62 “Teleology,” Oxford Dictionary, last modified unknown. Accessed on 01-06-2017:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/teleology.
63 Andrew Woodfield, “Teleology,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified unknown. Accessed
on 01-06-2017: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/teleology/v-1.
64 Etienne Balibar, “The Rise and Fall of the European Union: Temporalities and Telelogies,” Constellations 21,
no.2 (2014): 202.
20 acknowledge that an alternative pathway to competition between nation-states, war and oppression exists, focused on keeping ‘the peoples of Europe’ safe and secure.
However, this does not necessarily mean that it is the EU who should bring Europe peace. Other institutions or types of cooperation between nation-states could theoretically also lead to peace and prosperity on the European continent. However, the EU also clings to another dimension, namely to get there ‘together’. As declared in the Rome Declaration of 2017, ‘European unity started as the dream of a few, it became the hope of the many. Then Europe
became one again… We have united for the better. Europe is our common future’.66 Europe is,
in other words, united in diversity. Would disintegration spell the doom for the European continent, or will disintegration transform the Union, and thus the continent?
These dimensions on the founding principles and a narrative around the EU’s raison
d’être, are presented to the European public en masse. Within the European Commission’s White Paper on the Future of the Europe, a certain teleology can be identified. Though a
reflection paper, the White Paper depicts how the vision for a united and peaceful Europe took off with Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, two Italian political prisoners who wrote the famous
Il Manifesto di Ventotene during the Second World War. Named after the isle that housed their
prison, their manifesto paints a picture in which old adversaries would come together to make sure that the horrors and absurdities of a warring and competing Europe would never return. The White Paper continues that inspired by a dream of a peaceful and shared future, the EU’s
founding members ‘embarked on a unique and ambitious journey of European integration’.67
This narrative was reiterated in 2017. The Rome Anniversary Declaration reads that ‘we [the
member states] have united for the better. Europe is our common future’.68
The second dimension is that of the spatial dimension. The Union is presented as the ‘Area of freedom, security and justice’. Through this process, the Union is being juxtaposed against the rest of the world, which is seemingly different. Dichotomies like these attempt to highlight and emphasize the unique position the European continent find itself in thanks to European integration. The EU and its domestic and foreign policy are similarly based on values
which have been interwoven in European Union law, EU’s interactions vis-à-vis its member
states, other states and international organizations. The EU vis-à-vis the rest of the world tries
66 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/.
67 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, 6.
68 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
21 to work towards a world order as written within the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
Article 3(5):
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”.69
The EU presents her own narrative as that of being an answer to war and nationalism, not only on the European continent, but also outside of it. The EU is willing to spread its ideals elsewhere, for example through its European Neighbourhood Policy, but also through other means. Additionally to that, the EU is also willing to accept more countries as member states in the future. The Rome Declaration of 2017 reemphasises this. It writes that ‘We [the member states] will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open
to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible’.70
Here we can find a link with the European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like the EU, empires had to be justified as somehow reconcilable with moral sentiments, which was done under the rubric of civilisation.71 Examples are the ‘civilizing mission’ for the British, a ‘new ethical imperial policy’ for the Dutch, while the French spoke
of their mission civilsatrice.72 ‘The white man’s burden’ became an ethical responsibility of
home countries to improve the living standards in colonies. If certain prerequisites were met and if colonies were deemed fit for independence, the mother country or imperial core would not stand in the way.73
The EU also has its own civilizing mission as outlined above, but with different dynamics. The governments of western European states had committed themselves towards idealist principles of ‘the peoples of Europe’ and an ever closer union, based on the founding myth of Europe as an alternative to war, and therefore could not oppose the enlargement of
69 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union [2007] OJ C326, Article 3(5).
70 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/. Emphasis mine.
71 Spruyt, “Empires, Past and Present. The Relevance of Empire as an Analytic Concept,” 26. 72 Ibidem, 26.
22 2004. Central and Eastern European states successfully appealed to the idea of a ‘return to Europe’, and managed to mobilize institutionalized identity to make enlargement an issue of
credibility.74 The 10 countries that joined the EU had a combined gross domestic product (GDP)
off less than 5 percent of 15 EU countries in 2004. Because of its small economic size, there was little economic interdependence to integrate ‘poor’ countries into the EU.75 After the
Western-European countries had committed themselves to admitting countries that share its liberal values in earlier stages, they could not defer on this. Economic and geopolitical interests cannot account for the EU’s decision to embark on ambitious and costly enlargement projects. Whereas the EU too works outside its territory to spread its mission, the goal is different. Instead of independence, applicant member states seek to join the EU. To do so, many standards of plurality, democracy and the rule of law have to be met. The range of member states are confined to the countries on the European continent. Morocco, who applied to join the European Communities in 1987, was rejected as Morocco was not regarded as a European country. This means that the spatial dimension is linked to the ‘why’ dimension. The main focus is on bringing peace and prosperity on the European continent. Pacifying the surrounding non-European nation-states is a means to an end in itself.
The final form of the EU is unclear. The Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 by the six founding members reads that the founding members are ‘Determined to lay the foundations
of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’.76 It has never been defined what this
notion of ever closer union is, but over the years it has gotten more shape through integration, and also more content and meaning. When it is finished remains impossible to tell, but consecutive phases of integration ought to have moved the Union ever closer. The EMU reforms after the European debt crisis are, for example, characterized by Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot as major steps of integration towards an ‘ever closer union’, even though this
was just one step out of many.77 Terms as ‘advance’ and ‘progress’ are reoccurring themes.
Moments of relative inactivity are described as ‘stagnation’, with the process of integration always being ‘re-launched’ or ‘revived’ after moments of difficulty. Assessing whether European integration is successful or not is measured through the degree of transferred authority
74 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The community trap. Liberal norms, rhetorical action and the eastern enlargement of
the European Union,” in The Politics of European Union Enlargement. Theoretical Approaches, edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 158-159.
75 Andrew Moravscik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Preferences, power and equilibrium. The causes and
consequences of EU enlargement,” in: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, editors, The Politics of
European Union Enlargement. Theoretical Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2005), 204. 76 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, preamble, 2.
23 to supranational institutions within the Community. The Dutch and French referenda outcomes
on the European Constitution of 2005 are regarded as a failure or as a catastrophe.78
With the teleology of the EU being defined timewise as an integrative move towards an ‘ever closer union’, and spatially comprised of all countries on the European continent, how is it affected by disintegration? If the signatories of the European treaties agreed to lay the foundations of an ‘ever closer union’ among the peoples of Europe, than disintegration processes are the processes that prevent this, or move away from it. The term of ‘ever closer union’ does not outline the degree of integration, merely the continuous and perhaps autopoietic move towards this undefined Union. However, with the growth of the European communities, so grew this Union. From an economic union towards a political union towards a fiscal union. As written above, the future and final form of the EU is unknown. The high number of
crises put the idea of an ever closer union on hold.79 As said above, member states have agreed
to opt for more differentiated integration. Whereas differentiated integration so far has been a more ad hoc process, it might be the model of future European integration. To repeat, The
Declaration reads that ‘We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary,
while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and
keeping the door open to those who want to join later’.80 The different pace introduced here is
important. It is a prelude to a change in the approach of member states to further integrate the EU. The Financial Times calls this ‘a halt to some pan-European policies [which] departs from the principle of an ever closer union’.81
Here we can identify a change in teleology. Though there are many clear exceptions through opt-outs which existed prior to this Declaration, the EU tried to move towards an ever closer union in the same pace. The new declaration is now making way for differentiated integration and a multi-speed Europe. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig ask that though the observable time span may still be too short, it would also be interesting to learn more about the effects of differentiated integration on the EU as a whole: does it put the EU on a slippery slope toward a permanent core-periphery structure or dissolution, or does it create a fresh impetus for
further deepening?82
78 Gilbert, “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” 645.
79 Jorge Valero, “EU puts 'ever closer union’ on hold,” EURACTIV, last modified on 11-10-2016. Accessed on
27-07-2017: http://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/eu-puts-ever-closer-union-on-hold/.
80 “The Rome Declaration,” European Council, last modified on 25-03-2017. Accessed on 17-04-2017:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/.
81 Arthur Beesley, “Juncker edges away from principle of ever closer union,” Financial Times, last modified on 01-03-2017. Accessed on 26-07-2017: https://www.ft.com/content/630c5b6c-fe87-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30.
82 Katherina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Many
24 Though these reforms are reactionary, the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Economic Community in 1957, opens with the notion that the signatories of the Treaty are ‘determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples
of Europe’.83 The focus here is ‘the peoples of Europe’, not the preservation of the European
nation states. So what then would European disintegration mean for this peace and the future of the EU? Having classified the EU as an empire is one thing. As I have written above, more than 200 reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire have been given. A theory of empire that predicts the fall is therefore a theory of almost everything, and therefore we cannot really draw
from it.84 So what then is European disintegration?
Chapter 1.3: Integration and Disintegration
Before I start with outlining disintegration theories applied to the European Union, I want to outline what European integration is, and what drives the integration process. To be able to differentiate between different theories on European integration allows me to later on differentiate between theories and perspectives on disintegration and identify what drives disintegration. Theories on European integration outline and explain the conditions and mechanisms under which competences and boundaries shift between levels and agents of the European multilevel governance system. These shifts, occurring in three dimensions, are sectoral integration, vertical integration, and horizontal integration. Sectoral integration, or ‘broadening’, refers to the process through which policy areas or sectors become regulated by the EU. These policy areas or sectors were previously governed on the national level. Vertical integration, or ‘deepening’, refers to the distribution of competences between EU institutions in integrated policy sectors. An increase in vertical integration occurs when national competences shared across EU member states, are conferred or delegated to EU institutions. Whereas broadening means that new policy areas are transferred to the supranational level, deepening is the process through which more competences within a policy area are transferred to the supranational level. Horizontal integration, or ‘widening’, refers to the territorial extension of a given state of sectoral and vertical integration. Schimmelfennig here distinguishes between enlargement of the EU, and the adoption of EU policies (such as
Schengen) by non-EU member states.85
83 Treaty of Rome, 1957, p2.
84 Marks, “Europe and Its Empires. From Rome to the European Union,” 15.
85 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Integration Theory,” in Research Agendas in EU Studies. Stalking the Elephant,
