Knowledge is Power: Investigating China’s ICT Power to reshape Global Internet Governance

(1)

Knowledge is Power: Investigating China’s ICT Power to reshape

Global Internet Governance

Frederic Augustin S2569310 f.augustin@hum.leidenuniv.nl 03 July 2020 MA Thesis Global Political Economy (5184VGP01Y) Word Count (incl. bibliography): 14848 Supervisor:

(2)

1. Chapter: Introduction

The rising power of the Chinese state is almost a truism in modern-day public debate. In 2018, the Vice President of the United States, Mike Pence declared China’s rising power as one of the main threats to the United States of America (US)1. Goldman Sachs and the Economist have both predicted that China will surpass the US economically by 20252. Furthermore, the narrative of “China buying the world”, has become extremely popular in western media, especially with regards to the Information and Communications Technology (‘ICT’) sector3_. Fittingly, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping has outlined that China’s international policy goal should be to reshape international institutions towards Chinese values and priorities4. However, a growing body of international relations and Area Studies literature on China have empirically questioned China’s ability to influence the global political economy5_{. This conundrum begs the question as to whether Chinese economic} capabilities, whatever they may be, necessarily translate into actual power. What kind of power allows an actor to reshape global structures and how can economic capabilities influence it?

One of the sectors in which such questions may find answers is global internet governance. The internet and its governance structures have only recently emerged in the modern world. On an institutional level it is therefore highly susceptible to influence—as the emergence of new global governing institutions between 2016 and 2017 has emphasized6_. Beijing also sees an enormous potential in internet governance as well as the ICT sector. Through national ICT strategies like the Digital Silk Road and Internet Plus, it seeks to accelerate the “promotion of China’s global discourse power and rule-making in cyberspace", with the goal of becoming a cyber superpower (wangluo qiangguo)7. Therefore, this paper investigates whether China’s use of its ICT capabilities has allowed it to reshape the configuration of global internet governance in pursuance of its overarching national goal of reshaping the global political economy.

Present academic literature on the matter so far has discussed this question to a limited extent and application. While authorities on the matter like Adam Segal and Nigel Inkster, have

1_{Pence, 2018}

2_{Nuruzzaman, 2016, 193} 3_{Shen, 2017, 4}

4_{Huang et. al, E.d.}

5_{Ferchen, 2016a; Ferchen, 2016b; Ferchen, 2018; Goh, 2015; Scobell and Nathan, 2014; Chung, 2018; Goh,}

2014; Fitriani, 2018; Friedberg, 2018; Oh, 2018

6_{Soesanto & D'Incau, 2017; Robinson, 2016} 7_{Kania, Sacks, Triolo & Webster, 2017}

(4)

outlined their respective definitions of cyber power and the degree to which China possesses it, they restrict themself to a simply descriptive historical analysis of ICT capabilities and China’s internet governance approach as opposed to a causative one8. A similar picture has also been presented in the broader literature on China’s rise and influence in the global political economy. Although the implications and evidence for China’s rise find considerable academic attention9, there is little empirical evidence in these discussions that may suggest that the Chinese rise has any actual effect on Beijing’s power. This paper therefore adds necessary empirical insights to a growing body of literature that operates at the academic forefront of understanding China in international relations.

In order to the answer the research question at hand, Chapter 2 firstly provides a historical background reflecting on China’s ICT capabilities. Chapter 3 then introduces the theory of knowledge structures by Blayne Haggart to offer insight into the concept of power in international relations that theorises both capabilities and influence10. The theory is translated into three sub-questions establishing the link between China’s ICT capabilities and their influence on its ability to reshape global internet governance. The sub-questions cover China’s ability to reshape what is firstly regarded as important in cyberspace governance, secondly, how the global internet is regulated, and thirdly, whether China benefits from the outcomes of the structures of global cyberspace. Finally, Chapter 4 offers an empirical analysis of the causal effect between Chinese ICT capabilities and China’s ability to reshape global internet governance by conducting a content and discourse analysis of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—which is to say, global internet-governing institutions that recently went through a transition phase.

8_{Segal, 2017, Inkster, 2015}

9_{Breslin, 2008; Blackwill & Harris, 2016; Cardenal & Araujo, 2013; Jacques, 2012; Subramanian, 2012} 10_{See Haggart, 2017, and Haggart, 2019}

(5)

2. Chapter: Background: China’s Emerging ICT Capabilities

Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) broadly include companies that produce and sell computers, communication equipment, consumer electronics and other electronic equipment. Some of the most prominent examples of ICT companies include the US-American GAFA companies (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon)11 and the Chinese equivalent BATX (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi). As in any other sector, the global economic strength of the Chinese ICT sector can be measured by standard benchmarks such as foreign direct investments (FDI), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and its research and development (R&D) capabilities. Advancements in new technology, which in this case include ventures such as artificial intelligence (AI), fifth generation technology standards for cellular networks (5G), and the Internet of Things (IoT), are further indicators for the emerging strength and capabilities of the sector. This chapter provides insights into China’s international ranking in the above mentioned benchmarks, allowing for an analytical estimate as to whether Chinese ICT capabilities should even be considered important enough for a study of their potential impacts on global structures.

Since the ‘going out strategy’ in the early 2000s, China’s ICT sector has grown from one competitor among many to a dominating global presence. Along with the United States, China today hosts the largest number of web users and competitive technology companies12_. In terms of e-commerce capabilities, China has increased its share of global transactions from 0.6% in 2005 to 42% in 2016, making its market greater than that of the US, Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined. While American mobile payments accounted for $112 billion US-Dollars (USD) in 2016, China has been transitioning towards a cashless economy for the past decade, leading up to $9 trillion USD in transactions13. Moreover, with the value of ICT goods exported by China reaching $500bn USD in 2015—making up for 55% of total ICT exports—China has emerged as the leading ICT exporter14. This is in line with the 2015 World Investment Report, indicating a stark rise in outward FDI stock from 2000 to 2014—surging from $27 billion to $729 billion USD15. This has ranked China’s overall outward FDI in 2014 to be the third largest in the world after the US and Japan16. In terms of

11_{Sometimes also referred to as FANG, i.e. Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google} 12_{Segal, 2017, 40}

13_{IISS, 2018} 14_{OECD, 2017a} 15_{UNCTAD, 2015, A8} 16_Ibid

(6)

trend prediction, the report also estimated that China would shift from overall net FDI recipient to net FDI supplier over the next few years17_{. Nevertheless, China still experiences large} dependencies on foreign technology. ICT imports in value terms from China have increased by 60% from 2008 to 2015, while overall OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) imports remained relatively stable18. The danger in such an exponential rise lies in unexpected cut offs and disruptions from imports—as has already happened in the cases of ZTE or Huawei. When the access to chips or other high-tech ICT components from abroad suddenly experiences a cut, China’s ICT companies struggle to maintain their production levels19.

Chinese ICT companies are also in the spotlight for their advances in Western states. The European Commission, out of fear that Chinese ICT companies might acquire too many strategically relevant European companies, have undercut Chinese investments into region as well as abroad20. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) finds that due to this increased scrutiny, there has been a clear trend towards an overall decrease in Chinese investments since 201621. Despite this decline, Chinese ICT in Europe maintained itself as the top investment sector as of 2019, in terms of single transactions—constituting 20% of all transactions—placing second in terms of investment volume at an evaluation of €2.4 billion Euros22. This persistence of ICT as a top target for Chinese investment shows the Chinese firms’ continued interest in European technology companies and know-how.

Hong Shen finds that ICT plays a similarly important role in the United States. More than half of China’s FDI to the US in 2014 was poured into the ICT sector23_{. Large-scale} Chinese overseas acquisitions through ICT firms have become more frequent with companies like Tencent, Alibaba or Baidu investing hundreds of millions into acquisitions24. Uber, one of the largest multinational ride-hailing companies, for example, received a $600 million USD investment from Baidu in 2014—a sum not easily spent, even for technology companies25. These continued investments show not only a commitment for expansion, but also that Chinese ICT companies, as they have accumulated large amounts of capital, seek profitable outlets for reinvestment outside of China.

17_{UNCTAD, 2014, 47.} 18_{OECD, 2017a, 57}

19_{See Davies, 2019, 39; and Mengting & Lee, 2019} 20_{The Economist, 2018; The Economist, 2020} 21_{Hanemann, Huotari, & Kratz, 2020, 3} 22_{Ibid, 13}

23_{Shen, 2017, 131} 24_{Shen, 2017, 26} 25_Ibid

(7)

This is also why China has shown interest in developing markets that host large consumer bases and newly developing structures. The ASEAN Investment Report in 2018 shows China ranking third in ICT Greenfield FDIs—investments into new environments without pre-existing systems—between the years of 2013 and 2017, with especially competitive investments into mobile phone manufacturing operations26. Notable Chinese investments in ASEAN ICT firms include a $1.1 billion USD investment by Alibaba in the Indonesian online marketplace Tokopedia, as well as its purchase of the controlling stake in Southeast Asia’s largest e-commerce operator Lazada27_{. In several African countries ‘Made in} China’ technology from Huawei, ZTE and China Telecom serve as the backbone of local network infrastructure28. ZTE and Huawei, for example, secured a $1.6 billion USD deal with Ethiopia in 2013 to expand mobile phone infrastructure, introducing a high-speed 4G broadband network in its capital Addis Ababa and rolling out a 3G service across the rest of the country29. As a young and growing consumer base the targeted early investment is predicted to make the African market as a whole one of the most dynamic ones in the decades to come30, with Chinese ownership of over half of Africa’s smartphone market providing a competitive advantage to Chinese ICT companies31.

On top of its investment efforts, China consistently works towards becoming the world’s key ICT innovator. It is the world’s most specialized economy for ICT products, with ICT-related goods accounting for over 60% of its patent portfolio32_{. In the field of artificial} intelligence, China is the second largest producer of scientific documents on machine learning behind the United States33. A recent 2020 study by Macro Polo suggests that Chinese AI talent, although mostly working in the United States, makes up for the second largest talent pool in the world.34 Chinese AI capabilities are therefore well positioned to make a difference not only in AI labs at Google or Stanford University, but also in the Chinese market. Moreover, Daniel Nepelski and Giuditta De Prato find that “Chinese [ICT] companies frequently seek R&D opportunities overseas”, placing China 5th_{globally in terms of interlinkages between national} innovation networks35.

26_{ASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD, 2018} 27_{Shen, 2017, 177} 28_{Chimbelu, May 3, 2015} 29_{Olander, January 20, 2019} 30_{The Economist, 2015} 31_{Telecomlead, 2020} 32_{OECD, 2017b} 33_{OEDC, 2017a, 20} 34_{Macro Polo, E.d., a}

(8)

China’s drive for innovation may have also led the country to dominate in 5G and IoT technology. Spearheaded by Huawei, which launched its commercial services in 2019, Chinese companies hold “one-third of the worldwide 5G-related Standard Essential Patents”36_, engaging in 80 telecommunications projects worldwide37. This is also why Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman argue that the United States, challenged in its dominance of global communications networks, banned Huawei from selling 5G equipment to US technology companies38. As China also accounts for 44% of worldwide machine-to-machine (M2M) sim card subscriptions—three times the share of the United States—it is furthermore put at an advantage for emerging IoT technology39. IoT development and international cross-sector partnerships are generally seen as much more feasible in China, leading to many observers to conclude it will enable China to engage much faster in the mass commercialization of IoT technology through reaching scale. The experience of catering to the world’s largest domestic market for IoT-enabled services therefore works in an effective combination with a uniquely favorable policy environment for ICT growth. The question now is, do these apparent capabilities translate into power?

36_{IPlytics, 2019; McGregor, 2019, also see Kim, Lee & Kwak, 2020, 1} 37_{Adee, 2019}

38_{Farrell & Newman, 2019} 39_{OECD, 2017a, 19}

(9)

3. Chapter: Methodology

3.1. Analytical framework: Knowledge Structures

Before exploring a suitable theory that can lead us to an empirical understanding of China’s actual power through its ICT capabilities, we must look at the concept of power itself. In international relations power is often seen as the ability of one actor to modify another actor’s behaviour despite their opposition40. Although power is often treated as an exclusively realist concept41, international relations thinkers have recognized the need to conceptualize different forms of power. This includes the Gramscian notion of military power, economic power42, soft power43, as well as normative power, often connected to the European Union44. As this array of definitions, however, only describe aspects, types, or tools of power—the United States, for example might have both normative and military power—they, however, do not provide an answer to what some international relations scholars have termed the ‘paradoxes of power’45_.

This idea suggests that capabilities such as the number of tanks, diplomatic or cultural institutions are often falsely assumed to be synonymous to power. Capabilities, no matter their nature, must be employed in the form of influence with an actual effect on the actor’s behavior to truly qualify as power. Influence, not capabilities, counts as power.

The essence of what provides actors with power in international relations have furthermore shifted. Since the millennium, the control over information has moved to the forefront of states’ ambitions to increase their power. “’Unprecedented transnational communication capacities’”46, driven by the exponential growth in collection, processing, and storage of digitized information47, point towards a trend in shifting global priorities to the possession of data as a strategic resource48. Other than oil or cheap labour, intellectual property (IP) and consumer data function outside the laws of comparative advantage. The collection of IPs comes at minimum cost to overall market power. That is why technology companies like

40_{Building on Weber and Cox et. al,}₁₉₇₃ 41_{Carr, 1964, in Barnett & Duvall, 2004, 40} 42_{Hill, 2016}

43_{Ikenberry & Nye, 2004} 44_{Manners, 2002}

45_{Baldwin, 1989; Maoz, 1990} 46_{Comor, 1996, 1}

47_{See Valenduc & Vendramin, 2017, 124 for the effects Big Data and Cloud Computing had on the production}

and possession of data,

48_{Valenduc & Vendramin, 2017, 122-124; also see Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2015; Cardon, 2015; Escande and}

(10)

Uber can afford to run at an overall loss—they bet to win a near monopoly position in their market by building business models around network effects and acquiring strategic consumer data49. This is also why international trade agreements since the 1990s focus strongly on intellectual property goods like copyrights, patents, and trademarks50. The more strategic data or information a company or country possesses, the better—there is no upper limit.

In light of these structural changes through new technologies, several International Political Economy (IPE) scholars have argued for new ways to theorize international relations incorporating a more structural, constructivist angle to the study of power in international relations51. Moreover, unlike other definitions of power, structural power also offers a direct link between capabilities and outcomes, as it means controlling sources, mediums, or institutions that allow any actor to hold power to begin with. Structural power means defining the rulebook by which everyone else plays and thus having influence—or power—over the system itself.

This paper, therefore, uses Haggart’s (2019) adapted version of Susan Strange’s definition of power over knowledge structures. Under this definition, power means holding the key to what information is collected, communicated, used, and accepted as true. It allows its holder to perpetuate, (in-) formally institutionalize, and legitimize asymmetries of power in the global political economy52. Through its focus on the structurally underlying dynamics, power over knowledge structures therefore precedes and pre-determines all other sources of power and should be given ontological primacy53_{. From a policy perspective, it is also highly suitable} as a similar idea of ‘discourse power’ (huayuquan) is commonly used in the Chinese foreign policy lingua. For the CCP “enhancing its discourse power internationally” means elevating China’s ability to influence global governance and values54_.

The power over knowledge structures allow an actor to structurally control knowledge through the legitimation and regulation of knowledge55. On the one hand, the knowledge-legitimation aspect governs which truths are accepted as known56. What counts as legitimate and acceptable knowledge shapes how we interact with the world around us. It shapes who and what is prone to have advantages and disadvantages in any given structural relationship, 49_{Cardon and Casilli, 2015; Huws, 2013}

50_{Halbert, 2016; Halbert, 2017; Haggart & Jablonski, 2017} 51_{Constantinou, Richmond & Watson, 2008, 7; Haggart, 2017}

52_{Holzscheiter, 2013, 150, essentializing one tenet of}_{Foucaultian thought on power, for further reference see}

Foucault, 1970, 1972, and 1990

53_{Langley, 2009, 131} 54_{Kania, 2018} 55_{Haggart, 2019, 26} 56_Ibid

(11)

because it shapes reality according to whoever determines what counts and does not count as accepted truth57_{. Traces of this aspect are found in actors’ expressions of priorities, norms, and} moral benchmarks that they intend to achieve with their actions. If their comprehension of truth is found legitimate by other actors, these traces may also express a relationship of influence.

On the other hand, the regulatory aspect governs how, to whom, and on what terms knowledge is created, communicated, and used58. As there are many different beliefs and ideas that could potentially develop into accepted knowledge, there is a constant ontological and epistemological contestation between them59. Regulating or governing knowledge, therefore, means having the power to decide these contestations. Naturally, the regulatory aspect of knowledge structures often expresses itself in the setup and acceptance of (in-)formal rules. Laws, regulations, and (in-)formal networks that are linked to the creation, dissemination or use of knowledge, can thus be measurable traces of the power over knowledge structures.

Underlying the idea of knowledge structures is furthermore the concept of knowledge. While there is considerable philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge60, this paper defines it as a socially constructed “approximation of an underlying reality—or phenomena— that we can think of as information”61. As this information must always be collected, communicated, or used by social actors, it can never be fully objective—or in other words, “’raw data is an oxymoron’: it is knowledge, not information”62_{. This nature of knowledge} itself not only explains the underlying link between power and knowledge, but it also indicates another important consideration for an effective research framework of power over knowledge structures. It suggests that any research conducted around knowledge structures will always be to some extent interpretive in nature. Therefore, research applying knowledge structures must recognize that we live in a ‘world of our making’63_{, always constrained by the} double-hermeneutics of social science research64. Only through acceptance of this reality, future research may be able to build on this research’s findings without falling for its (hopefully minimal) interpretive biases.

Lastly, as Haggart definition builds on Susan Strange’s theory, the relation between knowledge structures and other structural powers requires definition. While Strange regards

57_Ibid 58_{Ibid, 32}

59_{See Strange, 2016}

60_{One of questions that remain unresolved is the Gettier problem challenging the notion of knowledge as}

justified true belief, see for example Turri, 2012

61_{Haggart, 2019, 27}

62_{Gitelman and Jackson, 2013} 63_{Onuf, 1989}

(12)

knowledge structures as one of four sources of structural power—with the others including finance, production, and security structures—Haggart shows how the power over knowledge structures fundamentally determines the strength of all other structural powers. The power over production structures, for example, encapsulates the idea that power is gained through controlling “what is produced, by whom, for whom and on what terms”65_{. Whoever defines} what is accepted as valuable to produce, however, also controls what is ultimately produced. Transitionally the same logic applies to the power over security and finance structures. Therefore, all structural sources of power as outlined by Strange are necessarily dependent on knowledge structures.

Tying all these aspects of knowledge structures together, three observable implications showcasing power can be measured66. If China has used its ICT capabilities to reshape the configuration of global internet governance, we would see that China:

1. ... defines what knowledge is important in global internet governance—despite facing considerable definitional contestation. (knowledge-legitimation aspect); 2. ... has (in-)formally institutionalized power over the creation, communication, and

use of knowledge in global internet governance. (regulatory aspect); and

3. ... asymmetrically benefits from these rules and definitions in global internet governance.

3.2 Empirical Strategy: Content & Discourse Analysis

In order to offer a suitable method for both the nature of the research question and the theoretical framework of power, this paper principally combines conventional content analysis with document analysis. As knowledge is often expressed through language, ideas, and framing of the world, tracing it requires a flexible and interpretive, yet precise approach to measuring it. As content analysis combines inductive categorization to the discursive comprehension of power expressed through linguistic means, the tandem of these two methods is highly suitable to operationalize an answer to this paper’s research question.

As the overarching research goal is to measure the effect of Chinese ICT capabilities on China’s ability to reshape global internet governance, the empirical chapter firstly provides

65_{May, 1996, 179}

(13)

a content analysis of China’s internet governance priorities and national ICT strategies. Thereby an analytical base line of categories such as the employed framing and set policy priorities is established. As China has one of the most extensive governance regimes for cyberspace and ICT, emphasis is put on the Cybersecurity Law (CSL) which functions as the corner stones of Chinese cyber space jurisdiction67. For a holistic picture of China’s ICT strategy, the paper analyzes Made in China 2025, Internet Plus, Digital Silk Road, the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization, and the 2017 State Council’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. To allow for a conclusive, triangulated picture, the findings are then cross-referenced with area studies specific secondary literature on the history and culture around Chinese internet governance.

Content analysis, following Hsieh and Shannon’s definition, principally relies on an inductive approach68. “Translation device[s]” such as ideas, expressions, framings, and concepts are directly derived from the data to codify them into categories69. These build relational center points for consecutive information, antecedents, and concurrences. Content analysis therefore goes beyond simple categorization strategies of counting words, but explicitly considers inferred communication to gain a contextual understanding of the analyzed material70_{. This type of analysis is especially useful in fields where existing research is limited} and many, potentially messy data points are available. Due to its relatively recent emergence and the therefore limited existing research available, an inductive approach to Chinese influence on global internet governance is therefore highly suitable. Moreover, it prevents preconceived notions and biases to interfere with research outcomes. Through a process of breaking data points down into smaller, comprehendible categories based on apparent patterns, it ultimately allows for the consideration of findings in a more holistic manner, also including data points that might otherwise be overlooked71.

After establishing the analytical baseline, a discourse analysis of the effect of Chinese ICT capabilities on the three aspects of power over knowledge structures is conducted. Firstly, to measure the knowledge-legitimation aspect, the paper compares the analytical base line to the norms and preferences of states in two separate time periods—pre-2017 and post-2017. This separation is due to the 2017 collapse of the governing body of the global internet since

67_{Sacks, E.d.}

68_{Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 1279; see also Kondracki & Wellman, 2002} 69_{Poole & Folger, 1981, in Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 1285}

70_{Hsieh & Shannon, 2005} 71_Ibid

(14)

2004, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (UNGGE)72_. Although it was re-established in 2018, it now runs in parallel to a second body, the Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International Security (OEWG). The difference between the two institutions is twofold. Firstly, the UNGGE only allows for 25 selected experts, the OEWG includes all UN member states. Secondly, the OEWG looks to be broader in scope, looking into “existing and potential threats; international law; rules, norms and principles; regular institutional dialogue; confidence building measures; and capacity building”73.

The pre-2017 documents are accessed through the Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index (CCNI), which offers a collection of all UNGGE and all related multilateral documents between 2007 and 201774. The post-2017 documents are accessed through the United Nations Library and the OEWG website75. They include a total number of 12 documents from the UNGGE, OWEG, and the UN General Assembly76. All findings are consistently cross-referenced with the Digital Deciders Data (DDD) by New America and secondary area studies specific literature to allow for a more conclusive and holistic understanding of the results77. The DDD, in particular, offers additional empirical insights into individual states’ position on global cyber norms beyond multilateral forums. The consultation of this additional literature and data therefore allows for an effective triangulation of the findings on three levels of governance, i.e. on a global, inter-state, and state level.

The paper’s choice for a discourse analysis is justified in that it allows the research to engage with "intersubjective meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed"78. This interpretive method "broadly understood as 'meaning in use'79 or 'talk and text in context'80 is particularly useful to comprehend power expressed through linguistic means because it uncovers the context in which language finds social meaning. For discourse to become dominant, Hajer describes two different stages it needs to attain, the discourse structuration stage and discourse institutionalization stage81.

72_{Osula, Rõigas 2016, 13; Soesanto & D'Incau, 2017} 73_{DWO, E.d.}

74_{CNNI, E.d.} 75_{OEWG, E.d.}

76_{It is important to note however, that the OEWG’s mandate only began in 2019 with results being expected at}

the end of 2020. Analyzed OEWG documents will thus only include drafts and are not final

77_{Morgus, Woolbright, & Sherman, 2018} 78_{Holzscheiter, 2013, 144}

79_{Wiener, 2009}

80_{van Dijk, 1997, 3; Holzscheiter, 2013, 143} 81_{Hajer, 1993; Hajer, 2006}

(15)

Discourse structuration entails the idea that important actors begin to accept the discourse in question and use it for the conceptualization of the world around them. The more important actors rely on the same discourse, the more meaningful and thus powerful it becomes. Discourse institutionalization occurs when the discourse in question is actively used in the policy process. If a certain idea, image, or framing is apparent within policy documents or even statues and institutional trainings, it may therefore constitute as powerful, dominant discourse82.

Secondly, to measure the knowledge regulation aspect, the paper conducts a discourse analysis of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) transition process. Founded in 1998, ICANN has since overseen the root zone of the internet (IANA) and the Domain Name System (DNS) that allows for a globally connected internet83. The United States government announced in 2014 that IANA and ICANN at large should be transformed. Many states had issued their concerns over ICANN’s relations to the US department of Commerce, to which it was technically accountable84. One of the states strongly advocating for an overhaul towards a more state-centric institution was China. Officials in Beijing saw too much power in the hands of the United States and even left the institution out of protest in 2001, only joining again in 200985.

Following Haggart’s definition of the regulatory aspect of knowledge, the structural importance of ICANN as a network governing the root administrative system of the global internet is not to be understated. It governs the system that allows for the global internet to function—for example, it administrates the Internet Protocol address spaces (IP addresses) and the allocation of addresses to regional internet registries. Whoever controls ICANN, regulates the technical root core of the internet, and can perpetuate their conception of how the internet is supposed to run on a foundational level. The ICANN transition process between 2014 to 2016 is therefore an ideal proxy for an analysis of the relation between Chinese ICT capabilities and China’s ability to shape knowledge regulation in global internet governance.

The data analyzed comes from three different sources: official ICANN transition documents and Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) meetings between 2014 to 2016. The first allows for a discursive look into the outcomes of the transition, while the later gives insights into the language used throughout the transition process. The GAC, while only giving non-binding advice to the ICANN board86, is the only body in ICANN’s structure that is

82_{Ibid, 71} 83_{Liu, 2012, 47}

84_{Ibid; Robinson, 2016, 198, 201} 85_{Creemers, 2020, Liu, 2012, 51} 86_{ICANN, E.d.}

(16)

intergovernmental. Therefore it was also the forum in which states would state their interests about the transition process most openly. In total, three IANA transition documents and a dozen GAC documents from nine international ICANN events have been accessed—all through the ICANN website, which makes all its meeting notes and results openly available87. Additionally, as in the sections beforehand, secondary literature offering further insights through interviews and area specific expertise is consulted to allow for a more conclusive picture of the power realities throughout ICANN’s transition process.

Lastly, to finish the empirical chapter, the paper analytically weighs whether China benefits from the outcomes of knowledge structures in global internet governance. Power over knowledge-legitimation and knowledge regulation are to an extent only useful if they produce outcomes that are beneficial for the actor that controls them. In reverse, actors do not necessarily need to have direct influence over structures if the outcomes from those structures benefit them. Therefore, if actors gain from the outcomes of knowledge structures, they do not need to actively change them, giving them a third alley of power over knowledge structures. The last part of the analytical chapter thus offers insights into the outcomes of global internet governance norms and the ICANN transition process and whether they benefit China. As the paper follows an inductive analytical approach, the results are taken from preceding chapters and triangulated with secondary literature evaluating if China benefits from knowledge structures in global internet governance.

(17)

4. Chapter: Empirical Analysis

4.1. Analytical Baseline: Chinese Cyber Norms & ICT strategy

4.1.1. Normative Priorities

China governs cyber space through six regulations, of which the Cyber Security Law (CSL) lays out the core normative foundation88. Several institutions utilise these legislative documents in order to function as regulatory bodies. Three are particularly relevant: The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)—the central institution for internet governance—; the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), which has significant partaking in the elaboration of ICT strategies89; as well as the Central Commission for cybersecurity and Informatization which is chaired by Xi Jinping himself90.

Conducting a content analysis of the CSL as well as cross-referencing the material with secondary academic sources, a clear normative emphasis on public security and sovereignty in cyber space can be detected. When the CSL addresses data protection, for example, it emphasises the importance of public security over other ideas such as personal privacy91_{. This} is meant to foster consumer trust in the digital economy while ensuring central governmental control of cyber space92. Secondary literature suggests that this is due to the idea of privacy having taken significantly longer to develop in China than in “the West”. Local communities and the adherence to “strict moral and behavioral social norms” have created an unfavorable environment for privacy protection to emerge93. While Western societies democratized after World War II by balancing power-dynamics between states and individuals, political circumstances in China hindered such developments. Data protection only became relevant when a vast problem of online fraud lead to a public outcry in 201694. Nevertheless, Chinese

88_{Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017}_;_{Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018} 89_{Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017}

90_{Creemers, 2020}

91_{Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018, Art. 8, 14, 28;}_{Wang Han & Munir, 2018, 535; Sacks, 2018} 92_{Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018, Art. 16}_{; Sacks, 2018; 11, 34-35}

93_{Pernot-Leplay, 2020, 65}

94_{After a college student died in 2016 as a consequence of being a victim to online fraud, the Chinese public}

vocally expressed their anger about the rampant problem. Chinese consumers were at the time estimated to have lost 1.5 billion USD in the timespan between 2011 and 2014 from online fraud already; on this also see Inkster, 2015, 42; Pernot-Leplay, 2020, 110; Wang Han & Munir, 2018, 535

(18)

data protection laws are built around norms of public security, reinforcing traditional Chinese policy priorities95_.

A second idea that is prevalent in the CSL is that of cyber sovereignty (wangluo zhuquan). Mentioned in Art. 1, cyber sovereignty is understood as the application of the classical 1648 Peace of Westphalia idea of sovereignty to cyber space96. Although the document leaves definitional room for interpretation, it suggests that states, as much as they have exclusive authority within their territory, also have such rights within their cyber territory. In the words of Xi Jinping, states should therefore refrain from “interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, and engaging in, tolerating or supporting online activities harming the national security of other countries”97_{. Rogier Creemers finds that reference to the term first appeared} in a 2010 national White Paper98, then in 2011 and 2015 in the United Nations99, at the 2012 Budapest Conference on Cyberspace100, at China’s World Internet Conference in 2014101, as well as in China’s international cyber strategy102_{. This wide use of the term highlights its central} importance in China’s priorities for cyber governance.

Although Chinese regulatory documents make no direct reference to the reasons underlying the employment of this term, Chinese lingua suggests a defensive purpose, referred to as information security. Since the historic imperialist invasion of the China in the 18th century, Chinese officials have long feared foreign interference and have thus been inclined to securitize cyber space103_{. Rogier Creemers underlines this idea, suggesting that China employs} cyber sovereignty as a defensive mechanism against US cyber hegemony (wangluo baquan)104_. When the Snowden revelations (lengjingmen) and the United States’ ban of Huawei and ZTE revealed vulnerability towards US technology, cyber sovereignty became a normative tool to advocate for national security in cyber space105. Despite this framing, it is also often regarded as a way for Beijing to justify a controlling government censoring domestic and international

95_{Pernot-Leplay, 2020}

96_{Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017} 97_{Xi, 2015} 98_{SCIO, 2010} 99_{UN, 2011; UN, 2015} 100_{Creemers, 2020} 101_Ibid 102_Ibid

103_{Schell and Delury, 2014}

104_{Harold, Libicki & Cevallos, 2016, 8-9}

(19)

cyber content. Through the Great Firewall of China, for example, “internet architecture, content, and data flows” in China are systematically isolated from international cyberspace106_.

4.1.2. National ICT Strategy

Five national ICT strategies lay the foundation for China’s approach towards becoming a cyber superpower. The Made in China 2025 strategy seeks to engineer a shift for China from being a low-end manufacturer to becoming a high-end producer of goods107. The goal is to tap into its increasingly wealthy domestic consumer base as well as the value-added global sourcing segment. This requires a transitioning of the country’s existing manufacturing infrastructure and labour market towards producing more specialized output—with targeted investments in research and development and an emphasis on technological innovation. Among its various goals, the program seeks to raise the domestic content of core components and materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025. The plan explicitly refers to how much of China’s technology market should be controlled by Chinese companies and how many component parts in different products need to be ‘Made in China’. These goals could be summarized as fostering indigenous production without foreign interference and promoting investments abroad.

The former is also present in the Internet Plus initiative108_{. In July 2015, the State} Council released the ‘Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the Internet Plus Action Plan’, strongly advocating for Chinese Internet firms to join traditional industries, such as manufacturing and finance, in their overseas expansion109_{. It also encouraged those firms to} build globally competitive application platforms to offer Internet service such as cloud computing and big data analysis, to both Chinese and global businesses. Moreover, Hong Shen explains that a growing and complex alliance has been formed between the state and its homegrown Internet companies in building a Digital Silk Road. It has the multifaceted aim to mitigate industrial overcapacity, facilitate corporate China’s global expansion, support the internationalization of the renminbi, construct a China-centred transnational network infrastructure, and promote an Internet-enabled inclusive globalization110. In combination with targeted ICT investments, for example, in internet infrastructure in Africa, the Digital Silk

106_{The Great Firewall is a reference to the Great Wall of China and effectively stops foreign online traffic to}

Chinese cyberspace; see Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018

107_{Zenglein & Holzmann, 2019} 108_{Xinhua News Agency, 2015}

109_{Shen, 2017, 129; State Council, 2015} 110_{Shen, 2018}

(20)

Road has therefore allowed for a framework in which Chinese companies have had an easy time flourishing and expanding to new countries111_.

In 2016, the Chinese State Council published the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization, devoting a specific section to the construction of an ‘Online Silk Road’ and encouraging the full participation of Chinese Internet companies112. In the plan the Chinese government explains the importance of the internet in chapter 6 which is called “Broaden the Internet’s economic space”113_{. It states that the overall goal is to “constantly have a firm grip} on the developments within the change of IT; realize the strategy of becoming a strong internet power; speed up the instalment of Digital China; further push the fusion of IT and economic and social development; and speed up the push for robust IT economic development”114_{. The} chapter further recognizes four key areas of attention, being: Establishing an extensive network of high-efficiency IT, developing a modern internet industrial system, implementing a national big data strategy, and strengthening assurance of cyber sovereignty as well as information security. Given the wording, this strategy is the closest and most explicit about Chinese cyber norms, thus showing how the growth of ICT capabilities and the achievement of norms like cyber sovereignty are seen as part of the same overarching strategy.

Lastly, in the 2017 State Council’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, the CCP formulated its intention to turn China into “the world’s primary AI innovation centre” by 2030115_{. While Macro Polo points out the lack of a clear roadmap towards the} achievement of this goal, they also highlight the signalling function that statements like these often have for Chinese domestic politics. It functions as a “high-profile signal to local government officials—mayors, university presidents, and provincial transportation chiefs— that they would be rewarded for promoting AI in their jurisdiction”116_{. Similar to other} strategies, there is thus a dual goal with China’s AI strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to foster indigenous growth by creating strong economic and structural incentives. On the other hand, it employs the growing ICT capabilities to expand abroad.

Taken all strategies together, two analytical reference points can be drawn. Firstly, and most importantly, as China ties its ICT strategies closely to its cyber norms, any reference of norms such as (cyber) sovereignty, national security, public security or public order, and

111_Ibid

112_{State Council, 2016} 113_Ibid

114_{State Council, 2016} 115_{Macro Polo, E.d., b} 116_{Macro Polo, E.d. a}

(21)

information security should be considered as potential traces of China’s influence. Secondly, China ties its norm promotion to economic incentives at large. Access to digital infrastructure and new technologies like cloud computing are specifically promoted and offered as an incentive for other states to consider. China also emphasises indigenous growth, which necessarily includes the exclusion of foreign interference in its national markets. Therefore, if other actors’ reference any of these economic reasons for their choices, this paper regards them as an indicators for potential influence of Chinese ICT capabilities.

4.2. Knowledge-Legitimation: China & Norms in Global Internet Governance

4.2.1. Norms in Global Cyberspace up until 2017

The discursive analysis of Carnegie’s Cyber Norm Index (2007-2017) indicates an international divide along the spectrum of two opposing fronts on norms for cyberspace. On the one hand, China and Russia can be categorized as advocates for an internet that balances the rights of individuals with the sovereignty of states as well as the need of states to be able to defend themselves against the US in cyber space. Firstly, on the idea of balance, Chinese and Russian documents frame the idea of national security as one fundamentally is trade-off to the adherence to human rights117_{. They officially agree to the importance of human rights in} general but state that they must be in accordance with a states’ national law, as well as their means to protect them and national security. Secondly, on the defensive needs with regards to US power in cyber space, China and Russia reference the Snowden revelations and emphasise the threat of mass surveillance through cyber space118. However, there is no further reference by other states or international bodies to these norms. This indicates an unsuccessful discourse structuration.

On the other hand, states closely associated with the EU, the US and “the West” advocate for human rights norms. They structure their framing around the universality of human rights and the obligatory nature of international resolutions that make human rights an international norm. Firstly, on the universality of human rights, the EU-US Cyber Dialogues, conducted annually between 2014 and 2016, put repeating emphasis on human rights norms. In nearly the exact same wording they conclude after each dialogue that the “same rights people

117_{CEI, 2017i; CEI, 2017f; CEI, 2017j; CEI, 2017k; CEI, 2017h} 118_{CEI, 2017g; CEI, 2017a}

(22)

have offline must also be protected online”119_{. This framing also appears nearly word-for-word} in the Group of Seven (G7) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), indicating the emergence of discourse structuration120.

Secondly, on the obligatory nature of international resolutions, the EU-US Cyber Dialogue references the freedom of expression online as well as individual privacy rights as agreed upon norms for international cyber space. They uphold the Human Rights Council resolutions in particular. Other states again show signs of discourse structuration, by repeating this codification of norms into their official statements. As human rights norms are already noted as obligatory under international resolutions as well as accepted by other states, there is even indication for an institutionalization of the discourse around human rights norms. While human rights might not be fully acted upon, they can therefore be regarded as legitimate knowledge, that is accepted as truth in global internet governance. This also indicates that the EU and the US—the core advocates for these norms—are at an advantage when it comes to internet governance. Any other actor can be hold to these standards, giving the EU and the US power over knowledge structures—at least up until 2017.

Cross-referencing these findings with the Digital Deciders Data by New America, a similar picture emerges, although with the additional emergence of a third group. The DDD’s Internet Value Score categorises states on a scale from authoritarian to free and open in attitude towards internet governance. Results match the CCNI in that China, Russia, and states like Egypt and Turkey categorize as authoritarian, while Western countries, including the EU and the US are found on the free and open side of the spectrum121. However, the data also indicates that approximately 50 states—including states like India and Brazil—are undecided, siding somewhere in between the two extremes. This group is coined the digital deciders. Following the DDD’s semantic emphasis, it is this group that is the most important for the future of global internet governance.

4.2.2. Norms in Global Cyberspace after 2017

The discursive analysis of the UN OEWG and General Assembly (GA) indicate that human rights norms are still institutionalized, but that Chinese norms of information security and cyber sovereignty have become more prominent. Firstly, regarding the human rights norm, all three

119_{CEI, 2017b; CEI, 2017c; CEI, 2017d} 120_{CEI, 2017e; CEI, 2017a; CEI, 2017f}

(23)

officially published drafts of the OEWG show a clear “commitment to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”122_{. The GA further reaffirms this by employing the} same framing around offline-online rights that the EU and the US had used before 2017123. As this discourse was already institutionalized before 2017 and continues to be prevalent in the documents published by all UN member states, one can conclude that this norm remains institutionalized.

Secondly, regarding Chinese norms for cyber space, there is greater mention of the norms by actors other than China, Russia, and their associated allies. The OEWG has a separate agenda point on information security124. The pre-draft further outlines the importance of preserving states ability to act as sovereigns, however, also emphasizing the need to uphold fundamental human rights (point 23, 27)125. This dual stance is underlined in the second pre-draft and in some of the comments by states commonly associated as digital deciders such as Ecuador126. In terms of the General Assembly, particularly the documents A/73/505 and A/73/505 stand out127. They emphasis the need to “continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security”128_. However, closer inspection of the context in which it is used indicate that while states begin to see information security as relevant, they do not conclude national measures are necessarily the best way to ensure it. To protect critical infrastructure, countries like India or Canada see international cooperation as a better choice instead129_{. Therefore, states generally call for more} action to ensure and study measures for information security130_{, but refrain from following} Chinese norms. France even explicitly states that as an advocate for freedom of expression online, it “first [wishes] to reiterate that it does not use the term ‘information security’’, preferring other terms instead131. Information security is thus moving up the agenda, but not fully according to the Chinese definition.

The clearest trace of Chinese norms however can be found in a 2018 Chinese and Russian-led GA resolution on Countering the Use of Information and Communication

122_{OEWG, 2020c, 1; OEWG, 2020b, OEWG, 2020a}

123_{GA, 2019c, 3, a similar commitment can be found in GA, 2019d} 124_{GA, 2019b}

125_{OEWG, 2020c} 126_{GA, 2017}

127_{GA, 2019c; GA, 2019e} 128_{GA, 2019c}

129_{OEWG, 2020b, 4; GA, 2018c} 130_{GA, 2019a, 2}

(24)

Technologies for Criminal Purposes132_{. It highlights both the right of states to be the sovereign} of their cyberspace and the public security norm. While this emphasis is most often present in Chinese and Russian resolutions, this time, the resolution found additional support and was eventually adopted. Some of the digital deciders—for example, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and states in China’s neighborhood—backed the resolution. In total half of the digital deciders votes yes133.

Secondary literature also suggests that sovereignty finds more frequent mention in the EU’s regulatory context of data protection regulation. Internet governance conferences, as well as policy proposals, and even speeches of EU country leaders refer to the need to regain sovereignty as states in cyberspace134. Since the formulation of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), stronger restrictions on the free flow of data have been imposed in Europe. They de facto operate through a localization requirement, usually associated with controlled and sovereign norms for cyberspace135. Occasionally, European officials even mention the need to protect against US power in cyberspace136. However, the term employed in the European context is not cyber sovereignty, but digital sovereignty, which describes the ability for both individuals and states to stay self-determined in cyberspace137. France’s answer to the report of the UN Secretary General working on cybersecurity highlights this in particular. Although the country states that “sovereignty applies to cyberspace”, it does not refer to cyber sovereignty, but specifically differentiates it as digital sovereignty138_. Following Hajer’s definition for dominant discourse, this indicates that Chinese discourse around sovereignty and national security has reached the discourse structuration phase but has yet to institutionalize its position. Important actors, such as the digital deciders and European states, traditionally opposed to Chinese norms, are more prone to use China’s discourse, but they are yet to reach its full acceptance.

Finally, when it comes to the second indicator showing influence of Chinese ICT’s economic incentives, states generally tend to be vaguely responsive. India, the Netherlands, Germany, Argentina, Columbia the United Kingdom all recognize that critical infrastructure is connected to reaping the economic benefits from information and communications

132_{Sherman & Morgus, 2018} 133_{see GA, 2018a, and GA, 2018b}

134_{IGF, 2019a; IGF, 2019b; IGF, 2019c; IGF, 2019d; EIT, 2020; Creemers, 2020} 135_{Daskal, & Sherman, 2020, 3}

136_{Segal, 2017, 21-22} 137_{IGF, 2019a} 138_{GA, 2019a}

(25)

technologies139_{. Infrastructure should therefore be protected, in particular from cybercrimes} and malicious intent. The UK even states that national security is necessarily linked to economic prosperity. However, there is never a direct reference to any particular ICT technology or the need to indigenize ICT production. Moreover, all countries state their explicit unwillingness to compromise on individual freedoms. Sometimes they state this in the same sentence in which they refer to economic benefits, other times, as in the case of France, they explicitly state that it is part of a broader goal in which protectionism is not an option—there has to be a balance between security, economic growth, and individual freedoms140. Adding these findings to the results on cyber norms, ICT capabilities can only be considered partially impactful for China’s power over knowledge-legitimation. While norms like information security and sovereignty have in part reached the discourse structuration stage, economic incentives do not leave any empirical traces. China thus only partially or even minimally defines what knowledge is important in global internet governance.

4.3. Knowledge Regulation: China & Institutionalized Power over Knowledge in Global Internet Governance

As in the previous section, Chinese norms for cyberspace and expressed economic incentives are traced throughout a variety of documents from the ICANN transition process. Adding to the framings established in the content analysis in section 4.1., the inductive research of Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index has shown that Chinese officials also employ the notions of balance as well as the need to defend against an hegemonic US power in cyber space. Moreover, it introduced the notions of a free and open internet adhering to human rights as a framing employed by states that sided with “the West” on internet governance.

Against this backdrop, the IANA and GAC documents suggest moderate to low influence of Chinese ICT capabilities on China’s ability to shape the ICANN transition process. Although secondary literature highlights Chinese officials openly advocating for a more state-centric, sovereign version of ICANN under UN oversight since 2003, there is limited trace of this affecting other states141. Firstly, considering the linguistic representation of Chinese norms for cyberspace, only few norms find relevant mention. Although, national security is one of the

139_{Ibid, 2-11, GA, 2017, 12, 18, 25} 140_{GA, 2019a}

(26)

most important concepts in the Chinese understanding of global cyberspace142_{, there is no} direct mention of the term. Public order and information security are also left unmentioned. The only reference point that indicates direct concern about these norms can be found in a GAC High Level Governmental Meeting in Marrakech (2016). Russia, a close ally to China, as the research into Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index has shown, issued its doubts over whether the United States was truthful in its promises to aid the transition process away from ICANN’s relation to the US government. For evidence, they pointed towards a letter by Ted Cruz, a US Senator, warning of giving away the internet to the Chinese143.

Another important Chinese norm often promoted through Chinese officials and ICT companies is the idea of (cyber) sovereignty. Although, the Chinese government again showed the intention to make it an absolute priority in the ICANN transition process, it only finds direct mention in one of the GAC meetings and in none of the IANA documents. After the Chinese official mentions the issue at the beginning of the meeting, Iran, a Chinese ally in cyberspace governance, as well as Peru and representatives of .AFRICA, an independent non-governmental regional organization speaking on behalf of the interest of African internet consumers, voiced their desire to have sovereignty be regarded in the ICANN transition process144. While this does indicate that sovereignty plays an important part in the discourse employed by the actors involved in the transition process, the single mention of the issue also shows that the notion did not persist throughout the entire transition process. Moreover, the fact that other states only mentioned it once it was raised by a Chinese official in the same meeting first, indicates that ICT capabilities probably played less of a role in the behavior of other states. Instead, they are likely to have been more concerned about immediate reference points raised in the meeting.

Economic incentives also play a marginal role in the considerations of states in the GAC and the final IANA documents. There is no mention of the economic role in the IANA final documents and only two countries mention economic incentives in the GAC meeting in Marrakech in 2016. While Canada refers to the economic benefits a multi-stakeholder model would hold, Indonesia highlights that the development of the internet should be connected to a beneficial environment for internet-related technologies145. The latter is a linguistic trace that one might expect if there was any influence of Chinese ICT capabilities. However, Indonesia is the only country to mention these intentions this explicitly and it formulates them vaguely

142_{Creemers, 2020, Liu, 2012} 143_{GAC, 2016, 34-35}

144_{GAC, 2016, 86, 95, 106, 143, 167} 145_{Ibid, 19, 100}

(27)

around the term of international cooperation leading to the development of local internet-related technology146_{. Therefore, the language used in the analyzed documents suggests that} economic incentives paly a marginal role in other states’ considerations.

The notions that do stand out consistently in all documents, however, are the notions of balance as well as the “western” notion of a free and open internet. The IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal—notably just the initial proposal and under heavy international scrutiny147—already stated the need “to find the right balance across the stakeholder equities and operational requirements”148_{. In fact, the same proposal made direct reference to the need} to limit the power of the United States outlining that no single interested should be able to capture IANA stewardship149. Several states participating in the GAC forum made similar claims. Sometimes such balance is seen as a balance between the power of developed and developing states, sometimes it is referenced as checks and balances that are fair for every actor involved. Overall, the notion of balance appears to be an important notion throughout the transition process, mentioned from actors on the entire spectrum from allies to China, to allies to “the West”, and even the CEO of ICANN himself150_.

Norms promoting a free and open internet structure are explicitly present in the IANA transition documents. The IANA transition proposal, that outlines the United States’ idea as to how the transition was supposed to function, states that “the transition proposal should contribute to an open and interoperable internet”151_{. This clear promotion of the free and open} norms for cyberspace can also be traced in the IANA transition assessment report. There it specifically refers to the new model being one representing a “neutral and judgement-free administration of the technical DNS and IANA functions”, which will lead to a technical structure that does not limit “free expression or the free flow of information”152_{. According to} the report, this is also in large parts due to the Obama Administration committing to the preservation of a free and open global internet153. Given these open expressions of support through a US administrative body, it is therefore likely that not China but in fact the United States were able to influence the transition process to their liking. Following Hajer’s

146_Ibid

147_{Robinson, 2016, 203} 148_{ICG, 2016a, 30} 149_{Ibid, 25}

150_{GAC, 2016, 15, 32, 91; GAC, 2015, 19, GAC, 2014, 45} 151_{ICG, 2016a, 87}

152_{ICG, 2016b, 7} 153_{Ibid, 25-26}

(28)

conceptualization, this does therefore indicate institutionalized discourse, thus leading to a dominant discourse in cyberspace along the free and open internet norms.

Taking all documents into consideration, China’s ICT capabilities can therefore be identified as far from the discourse institutionalization that is required to qualify Chinese discourse as dominant discourse. Moreover, they do not reach the discourse structuration level either, indicating the lack of influence of Chinese ICT capabilities altogether. In fact, considering the extent to which documents mention Chinese norms in comparison for China’s vocal advocacy of the same norms in the early 2000s, there appears to be a gradual decline in Chinese advocacy efforts. Two non-mutually exclusive explanations for this development appear likely. Firstly, China accepted its low likelihood of success within the international discourse that was already strongly influenced by the free and open idea of internet governance for ICANN. Secondly, Chinese officials realized that the multi-stakeholder model without direct US control over ICANN would achieve its goals of limiting US power without the necessity for strong Chinese advocacy. Despite initial opposition to the multi-stakeholder model in the early 2000s154, Gianluigi Negro finds that Chinese officials began to familiarize themselves with the benefits of the multi-stakeholder model throughout the transition process155_{. This ultimately led to their acceptance of the model and the consequent halt to its} advocacy efforts. Combining these alternative explanations with the discursive findings, Chinese ICT capabilities can thus be considered non-influential towards China’s ability to shape knowledge regulation in global internet governance. China does not possess (in-)formally institutionalized power over the creation, communication, and use of knowledge in global internet governance.

4.4. China & Benefits from Rules and Definitions in Global Internet Governance

Although the previous two sections have shown China to have limited power over the knowledge-legitimation and knowledge regulation aspects of the power over knowledge structures, the outcomes from knowledge structures in global internet governance show a trend that is overall beneficial to China. In light of the analysis already provided in this chapter, two aspects stand out specifically. Firstly, protectionism and national sovereignty is shifting towards center stage in the discussion around how to govern global cyberspace. In particular

154_{Creemers, 2020, also see ICANN, 2014, for access to Lu Wei’s speech} 155_Ibid

Knowledge is Power: Investigating China’s ICT Power to reshape Global Internet Governance