THE FINAL OPERATIONS ON 18 SEPTEMBER AND THE FLICHTS OF 18-19 SEPTEMBER AND 21-22 SEPTEMBER 1944

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CHAPTER 9 THE FINAL OPERATIONS ON 18 SEPTEMBER AND THE FLICHTS OF 18-19 SEPTEMBER AND 21-22 SEPTEMBER 1944

9.1 INTRODUCTION

By september 1944, the soviet Union's attitude was changing , partly due to the fact that the United states and Britain were constantly requesting Stalin to support the partisans in warsaw. Stalin was reminded time after time that the soviet Union could possibly be condemned after the war for her lack of interest in the fate of Poland. The soviet Union could also be accused of openly allowing the extermination of the partisans because they were anti- communist.1

At this stage, it was obvious that only a major mission from bases in Britain would be able to attain the necessary success in providing the partisans with sufficient supplies. In order to launch such an operation , Russian co-operation had to be obtained first, so that the operation could be planned in conjunction with them , as the aircraft had to refuel for the return flight at Russian controlled airfields.2

supplementary information was sent to the soviet High command by the us Military Mission in Moscow as well as the British Military Mission. They proposed an urgent meeting of representatives of the General Staff, to co-ordinate plans for dropping supplies on warsaw. several vital bombing targets were identified: Fort Bema, the Bielany and Haecie airfi elds, the block of the Institute of Physical Cu lture at Biant, all motorised columns on roads leading to and from warsaw, as well as the Citadel on the west bank of the Vistula, and Gyansk station. They pointed out these targets as suitable for attack by soviet forces .3

1 G.L. Weinberg, A world at Arms, p.733; R.C. Lucas, "The Big three and the warsaw uprising", Military Affairs, p.132.

2 National Achives, washington DC, Military Branch Suitland, subject file Frantic 7, APO 552.

3 National Archives, washington DC, Box 22, RG334: Memorandum, cable from British Military Mission in Moscow, p.C12.

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They also supplied information on supplies already dropped by the Allied Air Forces and gave intelligence assessments of the most urgent needs: portable antitank weapons, automatic weapons with ammunition, grenades, explosives and engineering materials for demolition and the construction of roads, bombs, medical supplies and foodstuffs <dehydrated and concentrated>, including condensed milk and vitamins. They also estimated the Polish secret Army at between 25 ooo and 30 ooo, with the morale reportedly fairly high in spite of German brutality.4

Stalin eventually gave permission to the United States for a major operation, now named "Frantic 7", to take place. on 15 september, the us 8th Air Force departed in broad daylight from England with 108 Fortress Bomber aircraft, but had to return because of extremely poor weather conditions.s Rough weather delayed this operation, as well as attempts to fly from Italy, until 18 September.

9.2 SUPPLY FLICHT BY 8TH UNITED STATES AIR FORCE <FRANTIC 7l By 26 August, 334 Wing had improvised and successfully tested a delay fuse which permitted dropping of supplies from as high as 3 500 metres, facilitating accurate dropping from a safer height. The Air Ministry ordered production of 500 of these, as the highest priority.s

on 18 September, three American combat wings7 of the 8th USAF consisting of three groups totalling 110 B-17 long-range Fortress bombers flew from England to drop supplies on warsaw. Each group was given a specific designation. 95 A

4 National Archives, washington DC, Box 22, RG334: Memorandum, cable from British Military Mission in Moscow, p. C13.

5 National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch suitland, Subject file Frantic 7, APO 549.

6 British Ministry of Defence, London, Air Historical Branch, File 13: Air supply for warsaw, n.d.

7 A wing was a tactical unit of the United states Army Air Force under the direction of a

wing commander. A wing consists of several groups.

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Groups was the Lead group, the 95 8 the H igh Group, and 95 c the Low Group.

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They were escorted by 64 P-51 fighter aircraft.1o

95 A Group formation ,11 flying as Lead group, took off at 06:07 - 06:14 and assembled over the base at 1 200 metres. 95 8 High Group took off at 05:56 - 06:06 and formed at 1 500 metres over the base and joined with 95 A Lead Group circling until 06:45, during which time the 95 c Low Group completed its assembly at 900 metres and joined wing formation .12

The aircraft started to climb earlier than scheduled, in order to avoid interference from low clouds over England.13 The Wing proceeded on a briefed course over the North sea towards southern Denmark, passing close to the Northern German shore. They crossed the Danish peninsula and continued south of 8ornholm. They reached Northern Poland and then continued on their way to warsaw over Torun, Plock and Plonsk.14 The identification point at warsaw was crossed at 12:35 and containers and canisters were then dropped by different groups. 95 A Lead Group dropped at 12:41 from an altitude of 4 300 metres; 95 B High Group dropped at 12:45 from-an altitude of 4 570 metres and 95 c Low Group dropped at 12:43 from an altitude of 4 400 metres.1s

Flak over the target area was moderate and inaccurate. The Wing formation resumed without difficulty at the rally point, in as much as the groups were not strung out on the bomb run. The remainder of the flight was flown as

8 In the united states Army Air Force a tactical unit that comprises two or more squadrons of one type of aircraft would form a group.

9 National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch suitland, Subject file Frantic 7, H R M NR. 35 P.

10 These aircraft gave fighter support to the B-17 bombers, which carried the supplies.

They also protected them against enemy aircraft.

11 A formation of aircraft of one type, consisting of two or three flights operating as a unit.

14 J. Garlinski, Poland, SOE and the Allies, pp.200,201; National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch Suitland, Subject file Frantic 7, APO 559.

15 National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch suitland, subject file Frantic 7, APO 559.

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briefed and the formation arrived at Poltava in the soviet Union at 16:19 <17:00 British time>.1

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A and B combat Wings experienced no attacks by enemy aircraft although 13 B reported sightings of both 109's and FW 190's high to level and out of range. 13 c reported 8 ME-109's attacking the lead squadron at about 12:37 on the bomb run . one aircraft, B-17 175, was lost. 13 c high squadron was attacked by six enemy aircraft, two FW 190's and four ME-109's. These attacks came between 12:37 and 12:42. 13 c also reported attacks on the low squadron by 8 ME-109's in the same location as the high squadron.17

The aircraft had to refuel at Poltava before returning to England.1

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The fuel tanks of the heavy American bombers were much smaller than those of the Liberators and Halifaxes that flew from Italy. It was also beyond the range of the P-51 fighter aircraft, which escorted the Flying Fortresses, to fly from Britain to warsaw and back on one tank of fuel. Therefore the aircraft had to land at Poltava.

The three American combat wings dropped over 126 100 kilogram of supplies and ammunition during this operation. The supplies were in both canisters and containers. The canisters contained 16 070 plastic explosives, 7 120 incendiaries, ten antitank mines, 7 070 hand grenades, 2 987 Sten sub-machine guns, 390 Bren light machine guns, 545 pistols, 882 050 rounds of small arms ammunition, 102 Piat antitank guns, 2 040 Piat bombs, 30 290 food canisters, weighing 38 800 kilogram , and 2 420 items of medical supplies.19 In addition, 89 containers of plastic explosives and demolitions, 109 containers of mixture grenades, sten guns, ammunition and small-arms, 101 boxes of small arms ammunition, 417 containers of Bren guns and ammunition, 102 Piat antitank guns and grenades, 184 standard food containers, 64 special food containers, 3 containers of grenades and 11 containers of medical supplies made up the cargo. Two

16 National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch Suitland, subject file Frantic 7, APO 559.

17 National Archives, washington DC, Military Branch suitland, subject file Frantic 7, APO 559.

18 N.D. orpen, Airlift to warsaw: The Rising of 1944, p.159.

19 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, supplies and ammunition, n.d.

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hundred containers were also prepared by the Poles - making for a total of 1 280 containers.2o

The crews claimed most of the results of the drops were unobserved. Reports from warsaw indicated at first that about SO% of the containers were received. Later reports confirmed that the partisans received only 288 containers. It was assumed that another 100 containers were also collected by the partisans. Some landed in the city of warsaw, some were dropped near Plock and the balance was unobserved.21 The Task Force Commander asserted that dropping areas were definitely identified. Accuracy could have been increased by reducing the dropping altitude, but this was not recommended under the prevailing circumstances.22

Although only a mediocre success was achieved, the drop represented a giant boost for the Polish partisans. In a subsequent cable, senior Polish officials confirmed the supplies dropped on 18 september had meant the difference between survival and defeat for the Poles in warsaw.23 Messages received were exaggerated and falsely indicated that most of the supplies had been collected.

General Bor commented from Warsaw:

The American expedition raised a terrific enthusiasm among the Polish population. The morale and the feelings of our people improved immensely, especially in the northern part of the city, where we managed to collect nearly the whole lot of the supplies dropped by planes. 24

20 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, supplies and ammunition, n.d.

21 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, cable USSTAF 18009, n.d.

22 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, Reduction of dropping altitude, n.d.

23 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, Report on Frantic 7, LMG 74, p.35; Military Branch suitland, Subject file Frantic 7, HRM Nr. 3P.

24 National Archives, washington DC, sox 67, RG334: Memorandum, General Bor on supply effort, n.d.

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A message to the command of the us Strategic Tactical Air Force <USSTAF> from a member of the RAF, who had been in warsaw at the time, described the reactions of the populace in warsaw. He witnessed a large formation flew over warsaw and dropped many containers with arms, ammunition and food . Unfortunately a part fell outside the Polish lines and into enemy hands. Most important, he explained, was the fact that this first direct aid from the Americans drew enormous enthusiasm from the civil population and the armed forces; people disregarded shrapnel bursts and ran out into the streets and countryside for their first daylight view of Allied aircraft.zs

A Polish member of the Home Army command who also described the event claims that only a few people knew that a great American fleet was approaching; the civilian population and the soldiers on the barricades had no idea what was afoot. suddenly their straining ears caught a sound different from that of the artillery bombardment, the roar of mortars and the rattle of machine-guns. A dull, monotonous throbbing, ever more powerful, could be heard from the north-west. Every single person who was not at that moment covered by enemy fire ran out into the street or climbed on to a roof-top and stared at the sky. Nothing could vet be seen, but the heavy throbbing grew louder every moment. There could be no doubt that it came from hundreds of powerful engines. A few minutes later, tiny parches of different colours could be seen high in the sky. As they drifted down and grew larger the crowd began to shout: "It's the paratroopers".26

This assessment was naturally a mistake. The partisans could not see the containers from that distance, but the few survivors of the city were clinging to the hope of some impossible change of fate, or a miracle. If it had been parachuters that were gently f loating downwards, the soldiers and other onlookers would have witnessed a fearful massacre because the bullets of chattering machine-gun fire that were directed at the swaying parachutes as they came closer to the ground, would have killed these defenceless

parachuters.

Many of the coloured canopies caught fire or were struck by heavy flak. The containers fell far and wide, and many into German controlled zones. But, the

25 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, Report, "Frantic 7", LMG 74, p.35.

26 J. Garlinski, Poland, SOE and the Allies, p201

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mere fact that the Americans had rendered help was perhaps even more precious to the exhausted defenders than the supplies.

These daylight operations depended on close co-operation between the united states and Russian Air Force Chiefs, but after the first attempt, the soviet union was not in favour of a repetition of such missions.27 consequently the flights from Italy were once more the partisans' only chance of survival.

As a matter of fact, four Liberators of 34 Squadron had already reached the Yugoslavian coast on their way to warsaw on 18 september when they were called back.2s In the light of the reports received on the success achieved by the big flight of the USAF, their mission was now regarded as unnecessary, notwithstanding the distance they had already travelled.

on the night of 18-19 September, seven Halifaxes of 148 Squadron RAF were airborne on operations. Five of these sorties were detailed to Poland. Only one aircraft was successful in dropping containers of supplies on warsaw. Most of the failures were due to the difficulty of obtaining pinpoints.2s The route adopted this time took the aircraft behind the Russian lines. No opposition was encountered.3o

on 19 September, Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, sent a letter to Molotov, People's commissar for Foreign Affairs, stating that he had been instructed by his Government to communicate to the soviet Government the text of an appeal received by the Polish Government from the council of National Unity in warsaw. The appeal was addressed to Marshall stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. It had been telegraphed to canada for Roosevelt and Churchill and read as follows:

on the 45th day of the struggle of the people of warsaw for the freedom of the capital and of Poland, the Council of National Unity affirms that the effective assistance in the form of air

27 National Achives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334, B/TCO/PG, p.31; R.C. Lucas, "The Big Three and the warsaw Rising", Military Affairs, october 1975, p.133.

28 H.J. Martin & N.D. orpen, Eagles Victorious, p.261.

29 Public Record Office, London, Air 27, Piece 996, p.4.

30 British Ministry of Defence, London, Air Historical Branch, file 13: Air supply for warsaw, n.d.

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cover and of the dropping of arms and food which has now begun, has brought great relief to warsaw. The council of National Unity stresses the inflexible will of the people of warsaw and of Poland to fight the Germans unto the end for the freedom and independence of Poland. To carry on this fight it is indispensable to supply the soldiers of the Home Army. The council of National Unity therefore fervently appeals for the continuous dropping of arms, ammunition and food, for permanent air cover to be organised, and for bombing of German concentrations and military objectives. The enemy is attacking the city with continuously reinforced formations. Lack of quick and effective succour may cause a catastrophe.31

Major-General L.F. Anderson asserted again that operation "Frantic 7" had met with mediocre success and the practicability of further operations had to be weighed against the results of the dropping operations of 18 September.

Apart from the fact that 110 B-17's and 64 P-51's had been away from UK bases for five days, two bombers and two fighters had been lost, while 21 bombers and 15 fighters remained on bases along the route, out of commission.

According to him the dividends of the operation had been exceedingly smaiJ.32 Anderson added that the Russians had commenced air-supply operations to warsaw on 13 september. confirmed information was received that food and some ammunition was dropped on warsaw for six days until 18 september.

Then supplies ceased. Anderson's assessment was that the soviet supply operation had satisfied the Polish needs for food.33 The Americans flew at such high altitudes that a great percentage fell into enemy hands.

The costs of the operations as well as possible losses compelled the American war Department to advise against continuing efforts to drop supplies .

31 National Archives, washington DC, Box 22, RG334: Memorandum, Letter from British Embassy, p.C18.

32 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334, B/TCO/PG, p.34.

33 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334, BITCO/PG, p.33.

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Anderson therefore suggested that these operations be discouraged in the highest government circles.34

Another factor counting against further operations, utilising Russian bases, was the evacuation of great numbers of American personnel from these bases, since no further bombing missions would be run from them that year.

Anderson also pointed out the possibility of being stuck with more American personnel in the soviet Union than could be properly cared for once the cold weather set in. He maintained the missions forced the Americans to make a damaging diversion of bombing efforts, with no hope of appreciable return for their efforts.3s

The Polish premier opposed Anderson's view, providing important and pressing reasons for a second daylight expedition by us air forces to warsaw.

Although the Russians were supplying food and weapons, they conducted operations on a limited scale and at irregular intervals. The food situation had become extremely critical, after eight weeks of siege.36 Famine was a real threat to all in warsaw. Since 6 september, there had been no regular issue of food.3

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Polish forces still needed arms, and especially ammunition, which would enable them to continue fighting until relief arrived. The large-scale American operation carried out on 18 September had relieved a very tense situation.3s The number of stores collected had been larger than all the stores dropped on warsaw in night operations during the first seven weeks of the fighting.39 Anderson was also informed that for the next operation it would be possible to use delayed action parachute devices, which would reduce the time of

36 The Times, 14 september 1944: No bread for 10 days, p.3.

37 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, Prime Minister Poland, p.44.

38 Daily Mail, 19 september 1944: Forts fly aid to Patriot Army, p.4; Daily Telegraph, 19 september 1944: Arms dropped in warsaw, p.S; Daily Herald, 19 september 1944: Forts from England fly to warsaw, P.1.

39 The Times, 19 september 1944: supplies dropped to warsaw patriots, p.4; Manchester Guardian, 19 September 1944: supplies for warsaw, p.s.

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dropping of containers from 7-10 minutes to not more than two and a half minutes. It was obvious that the accuracy of the dropping was bound to improve, and the number of containers collected would certainly exceed

SO%

of the stores dropped. In their night operations from Italy, better results had never been achieved. Mikolajzcyk again also stressed the big morale value of a daylight operation.4o

9.3 THE FLIGHTS OF 21·22 SEPTEMBER 9.3.1 INTRODUCTION

on the night of 21 september, 205 Group and 334 Wing once again despatched supplies from Italy. Two Liberators of 31 Squadron, three Liberators of 34 squadrons and five Halifaxes of 148 Squadron took part in these flights on 21·

22 september. Of the ten aircraft participating in the sorties, seven reached the target area and three failed.41 All the aircraft returned safely, despite storms over the carpathians.42 The supplies had to be dropped over demarcation zones that were supposed to be identified with lights. on their arrival over the woods, numerous signals and lights awaited them , causing so much confusion that only two Liberators of 31 Squadron and one Liberator of 34 squadron were able to identify the correct drop-zones and to successfully deliver their supplies.43 The crew also found that the use of white flare strips was unsatisfactory when viewed from an altitude of 3 400 metres. The Polish division 's flashlights at the supply zones also did not shine brightly because they were afraid that the German units, concealed in the woods, would easily locate them.44

40 National Archives, washington DC, Box 67, RG334: Memorandum, Prime Minister Poland, p.44.

41 see chapter 10, Table 19.

42 J.H. Martin & N.D.Orpen, Eagles Victorious, p.261.

43 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, union war History, container 140, pp.5576- 5581. 44 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, container 44, File 1, p.53998.

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A total of

45

containers were dropped.45 Fortunately no losses were suffered during the sorties of 21-22 September and all aircraft returned to their home bases.46

9.3.2 DETAILS OF THE INDIVIDUAL FLICHTS

liberator

KG874 J

of 31 Squadron, left on its first flight to warsaw. weather conditions during the flight were fairly poor. Dense 10/10 cloud formations were encountered at an altitude of 4 500 metres, especially over the mountains in the vicinity of the Danube. over the carpathian Mountains, the density of the clouds started breaking up and only scattered cloud formations were experienced. An oscillating searchlight was noticed 75 kilometres south of warsaw. on their arrival at warsaw, good weather conditions prevailed and several lights, as well as two fires bur ning in the northern and western parts of the city, were observed. Lights in the shape of a long stemmed fork and flashing lights in the shape of the letter

"T",

were identified in the vicinity of the target area.47

All 12 metal containers were dropped over very poorly lit drop zones.

containers were dropped at intervals to obtain distances of

4 - 45

metres between the containers. Lieutenant C.P. Nel and his crew could not establish where the supplies had landed. No anti-aircraft flak was encountered over the city, but light anti-aircraft flak was seen north of the city. During their return flight, a row of lights moving slowly in an easterly direction, as well as a searchlight were observed. The small town of Belgrade was brightly illuminated and could be seen from afar.4s

Liberator

KG967

a of 31 Squadron was piloted by Flight Officer T.M. Bad ham. At first poor weather prevailed with dense cloud formations that reached from the coastal areas up to the Dan ube. Further north,· the cloud formations started clearing and scattered clouds were encountered over the carpathian

45 see chapter 10, Table 18.

46 J.H. Martin & N.D.Orpen, Eagles Victorious, p.261.

47 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, container 44, File 1, p.54418.

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Mountains. on their way to Warsaw, ground rockets were observed as well as fighters with red lights that were continually switched on and off. Evasive action was taken in order to avoid any contact. Later, an unidentified aircraft with a red light in its nose was observed. once more, evasive action was taken to avoid any contact with the enemy aircraft. At one stage, the Liberator was followed by an unidentified fighter, most probably a Russian fighter, for approximately 25 minutes. Nearly 90 kilometres south of warsaw, an aircraft was identified in the area where three gr ound beacons as well as a circling aircraft had been observed. The pilot then tuned into Warsaw's radio frequency and headed directly for the target area. Good weather conditions prevailed over the city. several burnt-out fires were spotted next to the Vistula. At the target area, very bright lights displayed the letters "OM" and "T".

A row of lights was also visible in the vicinity of the target area. All 12 metal containers were dropped with intervals between the drops to obtain distances of approximately 4,5 metres between the containers. The crew could not determine where the supplies had landed. Light anti-aircraft fire from the city was spo radically encountered. A photograph was taken with an F8 camera while flying over the burning city. over t he carpathian Mountains they were followed by an unidentified aircraft for nearly ten m inutes, but no contact was made.

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Poor weather conditions prevailed and thunderstorms were experienced over Hungary and Yugoslavia by Lieutenant E.A. van Zyl and his crew of Liberator KG155 a. The weather conditions and visibility over the target area, however, were good. On their arrival, the crew could not spot the identification lights of the drop-zones because a variety of small lights were visible in the area. They circled over the estimated target area for 13 minutes but were still unable to

identify the drop- zones. After they had completed two full circling

movements, the pilot decided to return without dropping the supplies. They saw a German fighter flying over the target area at great speed.so Fires and anti-aircraft fire were visible everywhere in warsaw. During the return flight, green flares were fired from the ground and a rotating beacon w a s observed.

49 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, Container 44, File 1, p.54419.

so

D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, container 45, File 1, p.S4879.

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A fighter was seen firing at another aircraft, after which an air-to-air fire exchange took place.s1

Liberator EW207 K of 34 Squadron, commanded by Lieutenant P.N. Maas, maintained an altitude of nearly 3 800 metres on its flight to Warsaw. At first, dense clouds banks were encountered, but in the vicinity of the Danube, the dense clouds started clearing and over the carpathian Mountains only scattered clouds were found. Flares, a flare-strip, and an aircraft taking off were seen in the Danube area. The crew then tuned their radio to the warsaw frequency and headed directly for the target area. The weather conditions and visibility over the target area were good, but due to a large number of lights and flares there, the drop-zone could not be identified. The wooded areas were clearly identified, but no lights indicating a supply zone could be seen. In any case, it was very difficult for the members of the crew to identify an ordinary white light from an altitude of 3 400 metres. After they had circled over the area for 30 minutes without making positive identification, Maas decided to turn back without delivering the supplies. searchlights were observed throughout their return flight. An unidentified fighter was seen, but no contact was made. In the vicinity of the Danube, they were caught in the beams of a searchlight for several minutes, but succeeded in escaping without any incident.s2

The pilot, Lieutenant J.N. Smith, and the crew of Liberator EW192 G of 34 squadron, could identifY warsaw by the many fires, as well as by the Vistula.

The lights in the woods were clearly identified . Nine containers were dropped after circling widely over the target area. According to calculations, all the metal containers landed on the identified supply zone. Three other metal containers, however, were snagged by the hatches of the aircraft and could not be dropped. A flashlight, which displayed the letters "TU" and

"T"

was observed nearly 37 kilometres south of the woods. Approximately so

searchlights that were widely dispersed, were noticed along the Russian front.s3

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9.4 CONCLUSION

The attempt of the us 8th Air Force raised a terrific enthusiasm among the Polish population and improved the morale of the people. This flight by the Americans was seen as a renewed effort by the Allies to assist the partisans in their struggle. The fact is that by now this was the partisans' only chance of survival.

Although initial messages indicated that most of the supplies were collected, it was later realised that a lot of the supplies fell outside the Polish lines and into enemy hands. The fact that the Russians were also not in favour of a repetition of such missions reduced this effort by the Americans to nothing more than window dressing.

Due to adverse weather conditions because of the onset of winter, the last flights of september were mostly unsuccessful. No information concerning the operations was received from the partisans in Warsaw. The only information available about the sortie of 31 Squadron was that both Liberators succeeded in reaching the target area and in dropping their supplies.s4 At the time, it could not be determined whether supplies landed in the target area or whether they were received by the partisans. The three Liberators of 34 Squadron also succeeded in reaching the target area, but only one Liberator could drop nine of its 12 metal containers over the supply zone.ss Five Halifaxes of 148 squadron RAF participated in the sorties on 21-22 september, but only two aircraft reached warsaw. one crew dropped their supplies on the wrong signals but the other was successful in dropping its supplies on the identified areas.s6

54 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, container 44, File 1, pp.54418-54419.

55 D DOCs, Pretoria, SAAF, war Diary, container 45, File 1, p.S4881.

56 British Ministry of Defence, London, Air Historical Branch, File 13: Air supply for warsaw, n.d.