An EU-CIA? : exploring intelligence cooperation in the European Union

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Student: Marieke Lomans Supervisor: Dr. P. van Hooft Second reader: Prof.Dr.B.Burgoon 26-06-2015

Master Political Science Specialization:

International Relations

“An EU-CIA?”

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Thesis Research Project “Grand Strategy in the 21

st

century”

Supervisor: Dr. P. van Hooft Second reader: Prof.Dr.B.Burgoon

Student Marieke Lomans marieke.lomans@gmail.com

26-06-2015 Word count:19.439

Master Political Science Specialization: International Relations

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List of abbreviations

ADIV………...Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid AIVD……….Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst CIA………..…………..Central Intelligence Agency CIC………...……...Civil Intelligence Committee CSDP………..……..Common Security and Defense Policy CTG………..Counter Terrorist Group DI………Defense Intelligence EEAS……….European External Action Service EIS………... European Intelligence Service EU-CIA………...European Central Intelligence Agency Europol………European Police Office EUSC………European Union Satellite Centre IntCen………..Intelligence Analysis Centre INTDIV………Intelligence Division of the European Union Military Staff GCHQ………..Government Communications Headquarters MEP………..Member of the European Parliament MI5………...Military Intelligence, Section 5 MI6………...Military Intelligence, Section 6 MIC………Military Intelligence Committee MIVD………..Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst NATO………..North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSA……….. National Security Agency NSS………..National Security Strategy SitCen………..Situation Centre SDSR………..Strategic Defense and Security Review VvS………...Veiligheid van Staat

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In the light of current events, such as the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, and the growing concerns about Islamic extremism in Europe, there seems to be renewed interest in European security issues, the fortification of European security structures and cooperation mechanisms. Intelligence cooperation might be one of the next steps in the development of an European security network.

The discussion on the integration and intensification of cooperation on the matter of intelligence was spurred following the Charlie Hebdo attacks on the 7th of January 2015. After these attacks, several politicians and members of the Europarliament rooted for the re-initiation of the process of intelligence cooperation and integration within the EU’s own intelligence organization “EU-IntCen” (EUbusiness,2015). In recent years, the EU has developed its ad hoc established counterterrorist situation center (SitCen) to a formal European intelligence center (IntCen) (Hurst,2014). IntCen is part of the European external action service (EEAS), the European diplomatic and foreign affairs department of the EU (EEAS,2015), and the agency provides the EU with intelligence analysis, early warnings and situational awareness. However, IntCen does not, collect analysis itself (EEAS,2015). Therefore the institution is very dependent on the input of the member states and is not able to carry out much work by itself. It is because of this that there are some calls from EU commissioner (Viviane Reding), members of the EU parliament (Guy Verhofstadt), and European member states (Austria, Italy and Belgium) for the further development of IntCen and/or the creation of an “European CIA” (Müller-Wille,2008;Nielsen,2015).

After the previous attacks in Madrid, London, and now Paris, intelligence and security agencies in the EU and beyond have become more aware that, there is a need for closer cooperation if the EU wants to respond to the threat of international terrorism (Muller-Wille,2008: 49). On top of that, it can easily be argued that the latest threats of international terrorism should have brought European intelligence agencies closer together.

Leaders of those services agree that there is a need to join and combine forces, because fighting this terrorism unilaterally can hardly be truly effective (Muller-Wille,2008:54).

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9 However, on the 6th of February 2015, one month after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, a proposal for a new mandate for IntCen, making the institution more independent and stronger, was dismissed by the EU with the statement of an EU official saying that it was not a priority right now (Nielsen,2015). This provides us with a puzzle. On the one hand does intelligence cooperation sounds a very reasonable next step in the development of European security, the CSDP and the fight against jihadism. On the other hand it seems like no concrete ideas are being implemented or even explored.

Intelligence structures in the EU

Since the Second World War, the main pillar of stability on the European continent was the process of integration of European states into a European framework of cooperation (Waever,2006:250). At present day, the integration process is still in development as now, after a successful integration of European markets into an Economic Union, integration very slowly moves to new terrains, such as the political and juridical domain. In relative terms, integration on the terrain of the military and security services of the EU is absolutely premature (Börzel in Calsnaes, Risse & Simmons, 2013:504). Nevertheless, there is much debate at the EU level on the integration of armies, security frameworks, and the creation of military institutions. On the 8th of march 2015, German newspaper “Die Welt” published an interview about the future of European security with Jean-Claude Juncker, the current president of the European Commission (DieWelt,2015). In this interview, Juncker proposed for the formation of an European army, making the EU capable to face up Russia and other current threats, such as the ones coming from jihadism. "With its own army, Europe could

react more credibly to the threat to peace in a member state or in a neighboring state, (BBCNews,2015)" he argued.

Cooperation, in the direction, collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, within the EU can be regarded as a new form of European multilateral security cooperation. After the Nice and Amsterdam treaty’s, the EU pursued the establishment of an Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). With this initiative, investments were being made in the creation of a military staff, response force, and an independent intelligence framework (Wetzling,2010). But it must be underlined that cooperation and intelligence are more or less an oxymoron (Lander,2004). Intelligence is secret by nature and cooperation requires sharing and openness. So there is a tension between “the need to maintain the secret” and “the will to share the secret”.

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10 Real multilateral intelligence sharing is therefore rare (Alderich,2010) and it is because of this that despite the fact that the EU now has established an intelligence institution of its own (IntCen), we still observe that much of the cooperation is still taking place outside of the EU frameworks (Muller-Wille,2008:49).

Nevertheless, within the EU there are now four institutions that are involved in the intelligence business: Europol, the Intelligence Division of the European Union Military Staff (INTDIV), European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) and IntCen (Wetzling,2010). The EU Military Staff (INTDIV) provides support and expertise to the EEAS and CSDP. It provides warnings and crisis management based on amongst others intelligence and surveillance. Europol is the EU’s police transnational agency. It collects intelligence for law-enforcing means. The EUSC collects satellite images and forwards this information to the Commission’s databases. IntCen is the only EU body whose main task is to collect and analyze intelligence, especially for counterterrorist purposes (Blom & Vanhoonacker,2014). IntCen is thus an intelligence analysis unit and an institutionalization of the former EU Situation Center (SitCen). SitCen was a group of 20 analysts that supported former High Representative of the EU, Mr Solana, and the EU terrorism workgroups. Established in the wake of the Balkan war, the SitCen later came into use as a counterterrorist intelligence analysis center. In 2012, SitCen was renamed IntCen, and its scope and tasks have changed. According to the official EU factsheet, “EU INTCEN's mission is to provide intelligence

analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms Federica Mogherini and to the European External Action Service (EEAS)”. According to its current president, Ilka Salmi, the

focus of IntCen lies on counterterrorism, although the need for operational support is gradually growing. This is because IntCen has to provide increasingly more information for diplomatic and operational purposes. However, IntCen states itself that it is not an operational agency and has no capacity or intent to collect intelligence on its own. IntCen only deals with strategic analysis (EEAS,2015). This task description of IntCen basically means that the EU member states are still the main collectors and producers of the intelligence.

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An EU-CIA?

As mentioned above, some EU senior officials and experts argued for the establishment of an EU-CIA. This would be most likely be more powerful and autonomous institution with its own intelligence production capabilities that are superior to IntCen’s capabilities. Concrete plans have never been brought out, but the concept has lived a life of its own during the last few years. Whether the establishment of an EU-CIA is feasible, is heavily debated by both politicians and academics. Proponents of the idea state that such an institution could effectively contain and eliminate enemies through a joint effort and recognition of shared interests, alliances and mutual strategies and action. However, there are also multiple concerns about joint intelligence projects. Member states consider their secret intelligence functions as a part of their sovereignty and they are therefore not very open to letting their guards down by cooperating and sharing with others. On top of that, EU member states are in some cases likely to be afraid of spoiling their relationships with allies oversees, namely the US. This thesis will try to examine these factors by investigating three European member state’s incentives for intelligence cooperation in the European Union and argues that member states with different starting points in this field hold different opinions on intelligence cooperation. These starting points differ in the sense of the national intelligence capabilities that state has and the relationships with intelligence allies, with a special emphasis on the US.

1.2 The study of intelligence cooperation

In this study it is regarded plausible that some of these member states are hesitant towards European intelligence cooperation while others are more optimistic. It will be argued that a state’s willingness depends on an individual cost-benefit assessments of engaging in cooperation frameworks and a state’s respective ties or alliances within the intelligence field, of which the most prominent one is the US. This thesis examines these factors in three case studies, The UK, Belgium and The Netherlands, and will subsequently collect their opinions on the current IntCen and responses to the proposals for and EU-CIA. But why IntCen? IntCen is the only EU intelligence institution whose sole purpose is to gather and process intelligence, contrary to Europol which is mere a law-enforcement policing body, and the military staff which provides support in crisis management. IntCen is a key institution in counterterrorist intelligence as its initial purpose was to function as an situation room that monitors threats on a 24/7 base.

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12 Counterterrorism is currently thus the only topic on which semi-institutionalized cooperation takes place and in the wake of recent threats form jihadism, IntCen has regained some interest. It is for this reason that this study focusses on the attitudes towards IntCen, instead of the other previously mentioned EU institutions that have intelligence units.

By doing collecting the attitudes towards this institution, this study attempts to carefully speculate about the prospects of European institutionalized intelligence cooperation. Through an estimation of the national capabilities of the three respective states and a brief review of the known ties that exist with the US the different starting points of the three states in the intelligence field are being identified. It is expected that the UK, because it is in a very close intelligence sharing relationship with the US that is being called “an intelligence liaison” or the ‘Anglo-American Special Relationship’, and has relatively large national capabilities, is the most hesitant towards intelligence cooperation. The Netherlands is expected to stand on middle ground on this subject matter and Belgium, who has very limited national capabilities and a less well developed intelligence relationship with the US, is expected to be a proponent of intelligence cooperation.

The main question that will be answered is as follows:

“How do individual cost-benefit analysis of EU member states and their intelligence ties with the US shape attitudes towards European intelligence cooperation?”

Assessing incentives for intelligence cooperation intelligence field is complex. One must bear in mind that most information and data about intelligence is just as secret as the intelligence content itself. Little is officially known about real intelligence capabilities and the existence of only very few intelligence liaisons is officially confirmed. Therefore the study has its limitations. Both open source data and scholarly work on intelligence theory is scarce and little studies on intelligence cooperation have never been conducted. This means that in this study, no absolute conclusions will be drawn and this thesis should be regarded as an

informed speculation about European intelligence cooperation.

In the following chapter, this study will attempt to bring intelligence cooperation into theory. As noted before, within the study of IR, theory on intelligence and intelligence cooperation is underdeveloped which entails that only little literature is available on the subject matter. Nevertheless does this study attempt to shed a theoretical light on intelligence cooperation from a strategic and rationalist angle, drawing from IR theories.

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13 The third chapter will lay out the methods that will be used throughout this study and a case selection will take place, followed by the deriving of hypotheses. In the fourth chapter an analysis of the costs versus benefits and intelligence relationships for the three cases will take place, followed by an chapter on the attitudes of the three states towards IntCen and an EU-CIA. In a sixth and final chapter, this thesis will be concluded.

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Chapter 2 Conceptual and Theoretical framework

Intelligence is an important component of a states’ security. Intelligence entails all kinds of processes of information gathering about internal and external threats and is a crucial topic in the study of security and strategy. It is the basis on which policies and strategic decisions are being formed. There is even consensus that intelligence is essential in the actions against terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation (Aldrich,2010). About 30 years ago, Andrew and Dilks already pointed out that “intelligence” has always been a missing dimension to the study of international relations. While the general public was for a long time not aware of the existence of intelligence- and security agencies, the tide has now turned. People now start to understand the connection between foreign policy, decision making and intelligence and intelligence has become a key aspect of political, economic, military and financial decision making processes (De Graaff,2012). Intelligence is a crucial component to international relations and can be connected to some of the most crucial world events, such as 9/11, which is generally regarded as one of the most dramatic cases of intelligence failure (Frontline,2015;National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,2015; CNN,2004;Svendsen,2008). Apart from that is intelligence essential to the chances of success in peacekeeping operations and conflict analysis (De Graaff,2012).

Yet it is a relatively understudied area. As UK intelligence scholar, Michael S. Goodman, argues in Svendsens work: ‘the academic study of intelligence is a new phenomenon

(Svendsen,2009).’ Within IR, intelligence theory is regarded as underdeveloped

(Andrew,2004) and ‘the least understood and most ‘‘undertheorized’’ area of international

relations’(Scott and Jackson,2004:141). This is very striking in the light of an increase in the

interest of EU and international security studies. This thesis therefore also attempts to shed more light on the matter of intelligence studies within the IR discipline. It will attempt to apply grand IR theory to recent developments in the intelligence community with a special focus on intelligence cooperation. First, intelligence cooperation will be briefly conceptualized. Second, Realist theory will be reviewed in the light of security and intelligence cooperation in general, and more specific on the influence of the US in European intelligence cooperation. Third, neo-institutionalist theory will be explored in order to understand a state’s motivations for intelligence cooperation and, moreover, it provides us with tools that can be used in the analysis of a state’s cost-benefit calculation.

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2.1 Conceptualizing intelligence cooperation

Current literature on intelligence lacks a unified understanding of the concept of intelligence (Blom & Vanhoonacker,2014). Since the aim of this thesis not to study intelligence itself, this paragraph will first only briefly elaborate on about how intelligence should be defined and which types of intelligence exist. Understanding the various dimensions of intelligence is important to comprehend on which intelligence types cooperation take place in the EU. Defining what intelligence exactly means proves to be quite difficult as the concept of intelligence can be interpreted in different ways. Many scholars vary in their conceptualization of intelligence and define the construct differently. Treverton et al. prosed at a conference of the “National Security Research Division“ that in common usage, a definition of intelligence often encompasses two different views: one that intelligence entails

“information for decision makers”, and one that poses that intelligence is “a state activity which is designed to understand and analyze the influence of foreign entities, and is involved with a lot of secrecy” (Treverton et al,2006:2). The purpose of intelligence is to gain an

advantage over another state. The mechanism that underlies this is that states organize covert and non-covert activities that provide an information advantage which serves for better decision-making by either enlarging the insecurity of another party, or reducing the uncertainty about oneself (De Graaff,2012).

When we take the conceptualization of into further detail, we have to take into account the various dimensions in which intelligence can be conceptualized. It is important to briefly go through the dimensions of intelligence, especially when trying to set up a research into the field of intelligence cooperation (Rathmell,2004). Rathmell adds to the above that intelligence includes a variety of activities, such as researching (the process), organizing (the profession) and estimating (the politics) (Rathmell,2004:89). The “process”, which is what is often referred to as the ‘cycle of intelligence’(CIA,2007) which is an analytical instrument that can be used as a tool to map the different stages of intelligence production and the different variations of intelligence. The study of intelligence cooperation can benefit from this as the cycle shows how the means of cooperation and levels of coordination can vary between the different stages of the cycle. This cycle, which Müller-Wille translated in his work into a cube (see below), works in three dimensions: a tactical to strategic dimension, a direction dimension (from raw data analysis to the publication of results), and an intelligence type dimension (military, foreign, security, criminal, counterterrorist) (Müller-Wille,2008:53).

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16 This cube proves that intelligence cooperation should not be considered as a homogenous block, but instead has great variation. There many options when it comes to picking a focus in the study of a cooperation framework and this cube brings many of them together. In this study, the intelligence type that will be studied in the light of cooperation will be “counterterrorist”, as the institutions of study, IntCen, and the proposed EU-CIA, are primarily concerned with counterterrorist intelligence production.

2.2 Realism

Most of the scarce theoretical work that has been done on intelligence within the field of IR draws from Realist theory (De Graaff,2012; Wethered,2014). However, according to De Graaff, multilateral intelligence cooperation goes against the Realist paradigm of international relations. In the Realist perspective, the state system is being portrayed as an anarchy in which even friends are not trustworthy (De Graaff,2012). However, when exploring the schools of Realist thought, one can find that especially defense Realism, as a sub dimension of classical Realism, does present us with clear expectations on security cooperation in general. The main conceptions of Realism are that states are selfish, pursue self-interest, regard the international environment as anarchic, and put an emphasis on the importance of sovereignty (Mearsheimer,1994). In this light one can easily imagine that explaining security and intelligence cooperation provides Realists with a puzzle. Nevertheless, the few IR scholars who study intelligence and intelligence cooperation often start and end with the exploration of Realist theories.

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17 Classical Realism and the concept of intelligence seem a good fit at glance as knowledge is power, and states pursue power over others in order to remain secure in the anarchic international environment. States minimally seek to preserve national security and maximally seek to have dominance over other states (Munton,2009). As pointed out in the previous paragraph, intelligence production and collection is a mechanism that is being used to gain advantages over other states. As Jennifer Sims notes in the work of Munton, is the international system based on self-help and anarchy, and these conditions are the drivers of the process of intelligence collection and analysis. On top of that, intelligence can be regarded as a part of a struggle between two countries, comparable to a real combat, but in this case with persuasion, obtaining, and denying information (Sims, Shulsky and Schmitt in Munton,2009). So how does this match with the phenomena of intelligence cooperation and international intelligence liaison? As noted before, Realism would in general argue in first stance that such things are unlikely to occur since states pursue their own survival. This is the principle of "self-help". It stands in contrast with the idea that state X has to rely on state Y for its survival. States should maximize their own chance at survival and not be dependent on others. Security cooperation is thus not feasible. A state’s freedom to act and its ability to maximize its military power, will be limited and constrained by security cooperation, according to these Realists (Müller, 2014:608). Security cooperation is even further minimized by the problem of ‘relative gains’, because of the fact that the distribution of capabilities can change, leading to a new structure of the system, current ‘friends’ can become ‘rivals’ in the blink of an eye. It must therefore be ensured that the distribution of the gains from cooperation can be asymmetrical, making it likely that a state gets disadvantaged in comparison to the other states. Because it is very hard to create a completely symmetric distribution of capabilities within an alliance, Realists generally regard the chances of successful cooperation as limited (Müller,2013:609). This is especially true for the intelligence community where trust is an important factor. Since intelligence is a large contributor to a state’s national security, states want to minimize the risk that friends become rivals and that their sensitive information is being shared with partners that one day may turn against them. However, defensive Realists argue that security cooperation is a tool that can secure a state’s survival. They regard long-term security cooperation as possible and sometimes very feasible. In their eyes, security cooperation can in fact be regarded as a form of self-help when the risk of cooperation is lower than the risk of non-cooperation (Glaser,1994:78). The ultimate goal of a state is to avoid conflicts as it is highly costly and full of risks. It can do so by cooperating with other like-minded states.

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18 Through this cooperation, a state can learn about another state's intention and can secure itself by the creation of a web in which defection is costly (Tang,2010:113). However, in line with the more classical Realist thinking, this cooperation is most likely to occur through alliances. In an alliance, international intelligence cooperation could augment power if one is able not to weaken its own position in the cooperation process (Munton,2009). The creation of alliances is a form of ‘balancing’ behavior. The composition of an alliance, which is a coalition of states that coordinate their actions in order to achieve a goal, has an influence on international power relations (Layne,2006). In the intelligence field there are some, be it very few, intelligence liaisons and alliances.

Atlanticism

According to Munton an “ongoing international liaison is an intelligence or information alliance” (Munton,2009: 128). However, only the existence of very few information alliances are officially confirmed. The UKUSA agreement, which is often being referred to as the “US-UK liaison” is the most well-known, dominant and well developed information alliance (Svendsen,2008;2009). This particular liaison is an example of US influence in the European security domain and intelligence field and can be connected to the broader concept of ‘Atlanticism’. Atlanticism describes the bond between the US and the EU and influence of the US in European defense, politics and economy (Croci,2008). US influence on European defense is especially present through EU involvement in the Atlantic Alliance, better known as the NATO (Howorth,2000). Up to the establishment of the CSDP, the EU and its member states security frameworks were heavily influenced by the standards of the NATO. At present day, member states take still in regard the frameworks and norms set by the NATO when designing their defense strategies, even though, some authors argue that this Atlantic orientation is in decreasing (Daalder,2003). Following the creation of the CSDP, the EU gained some capacity for the autonomous development of European security frameworks. However, it is still being argued that partially because of NATO and US influence, no significant institutional arrangements are being made. The US is ambivalent on the matter of European security cooperation in the sense that it does want the EU to become more independent, but at the same time does not circumvent the NATO by developing its own institutions (Kamp,2015). If the EU member states would become too ‘Europeanized’ in its defense, and circumvent the NATO, their acts might be perceived as counter balancing the US.

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19 From the perspective of structural Realists, a continued and intensified cooperation in the field of security between EU member states, can be regarded as an European attempt to balance against the US and cooperate outside the NATO alliance. According to Posen, this means that intensified cooperation and integration in the security field by the EU can complicate U.S and EU relations, because it makes the EU a less pliable and a more independently acting ally (Posen,2006: pp. 185-186). For this reason countries who are close allies with the US can be hesitant towards intelligence cooperation, because they do not want to spoil their relations. The concept of an Atlantic orientation might therefore have an influence on the willingness of states to engage in European intelligence cooperation.

2.3 Neo-Institutionalism

Neo-institutionalism starts with the same assumptions as Realist by emphasizing on the self-interested nature of states in an anarchic international environment. Neo-institutionalists differ from Realists in the sense that they put less emphasis on the “survival imperative” and argue that a state’s preferences are not solely fixated on relative gains, but also compile of absolute gains, such as enhancing welfare and making gains in security (Muller,2013:611). In the study of security cooperation, neo institutionalists make a few general arguments why security cooperation is possible and likely in the anarchic system. The first argument is that the actors are able to communicate freely about cooperation, as long as the information exchange is not being hindered by prohibitive costs. When two actors talk about security cooperation, they both try to approach a Pareto-optimum that serves the interests of both respective states in the field of security. However, the process of giving and absorbing information and interests about one’s security interest might be dangerous. Intentions can be true or false, or portrayed differently (Muller,2013:614). One example of this is that a state pretends to be stronger or weaker than it actually is, luring or forcing the future cooperation partner into a partnership. This argument explains the gap between the real motivation for security cooperation and the actual cooperation agreement (Muller,2013:615). States must therefore be very aware of the fact that they make themselves slightly vulnerable. Secondly, when security institutions are being created, transaction costs between countries are reduced and information channels are opened. In the process of cooperation, various ‘rounds’ are completed wherein states know what they have to give as input, and what they will receive from their partners.

The more cooperation rounds take place, the more likely trust will grow and states dare to put more risk into the game.

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20 At the same time, the institution provides a norm standard and a platform for enforcement of the agreements that are being made. This, in combination with the reduction of transaction costs and the provision of information are good incentives for a state to cooperate (Muller,2013:616). In addition to this, it is important to note that Neo-institutionalism is a rationalist theory. This entails that it expects states to show strategic behavior. States and actors have specific sets of preferences and try to maximize to fulfill these preferences. The basis for this lies in self-interest and optimization. Institutions are important in these processes as they constrain an actor’s behavior by the structure they provide and also presents opportunities. Actors can use this structural context in order to pursue their strategies (Nolin,2013).

Costs and benefits

When the neo institutionalist reasoning is being applied to the subfield of intelligence cooperation, it is possible to develop some predictions about a state’s behavior in the intelligence cooperation field. Fägersten is one of the few scholars who has extensively worked on theorizing European intelligence cooperation. According to him, a trade-off of achieving intelligence and policy gains versus costs lies at the base of intelligence cooperation analysis. He argues that states base their decision to cooperate or establish intelligence cooperation frameworks by assessing four interests: intelligence gains, policy gains, sovereignty costs, and risks. As discussed above, the reason that institutions are established and continued is because they fulfill utility-maximizing functions that are important to self-interested states. The vital state intelligence interests determine the eventual functionality of the institution (Fägersten,2009:11). Intelligence gains, is the first interest. Any state that enters into the stage of intelligence cooperation does that because it wants its own intelligence capacity, either in the light of projecting its power abroad, or in order to enhance domestic security (Fägersten,2009). This interest thus primarily entails intelligence enhancement. This also applies to the sharing of interests between states. In his studies, Walsh has found that in the cases “in which mutual interests are strong and the value of sharing intelligence is high, states have little need for a highly structured relationship.”(Webb,2009). He thus adds that if the intelligence interests are mutual, interstate cooperation has more chances. Second, states are often interested in policy gains. Apart from the direct enhancement of intelligence capacity, states can be interested in the means it can obtain from the act of cooperation, the so called ‘ byproducts’ of the cooperation process.

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21 These byproducts are boosts of political or military alliances, or other gains from the cooperation process that do not directly involve the intelligence itself. A good example of this is the possible installment of an anti-terrorist coordinator that serves the EU more credibility while it does not necessarily is a decisive role player in EU anti-terrorist activities (Fägersten,2007:14). In this sense intelligence cooperation serves as a tool to enhance its own credibility. Third, states have the interest of safeguarding their sovereignty. When extending intelligence cooperation to the level of a new, authoritarian institution, they might encounter sovereignty costs (Fägersten,2007:16). A state would thus want to minimize these costs as put constrains on their intelligence liberty. Fourth, states have a primary interest in avoiding risks. Intelligence cooperation is a risky business as it walks the line between secrecy and openness and deals with classified files and important data about the security of civilians. A high risk for a state is when intelligence would leak out and when this disclosure would have serious consequences. This risk increases when intelligence information is disseminated wider and wider. Another considerable risk is that the information, that is being shared through cooperation from one actor to another, ends up with a third party, against the will of the sharer. On top of that, when cooperation partners become more and more involved with each other, they learn more about each other’s strengths and weaknesses, possibly affecting their national strategy. A sense of trust between the cooperation partners can increase their willingness to take risks, but this doesn’t mean that all risks are being minimized. Technical failures, dramatic events and misunderstandings cannot be mitigated (Fägersten,2007:2010). Walsh has also identified some factors that can constrain intelligence cooperation. First he names the problems with the secret nature of intelligence in the practice of intelligence sharing or cooperation. According to Walsh can the providers of intelligence not be sure about whether the receiver is careful and is concerned about protecting the received goods. The receiver, on the other hand, cannot be completely certain that what is being received is true. You therefore never know whether you are being double-crossed by your intelligence partner (Webb,2009).

But there are even more barriers to intelligence sharing according to Walsh. Governments also fear dependency on another state for intelligence, especially when it comes to terms such as using the intelligence relationship to force the other state into making concessions on other issues. Another barrier would be the rejection regular sharing with a state that has very little valuable intelligence to return. Nevertheless, issues with trust prevail. The providing party may violate the receiver’s trust by lying or fabricating intelligence in order to influence the

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22 receiver and his policy choices. A provider could also withhold essential intelligence when he intends to manipulate the receiver or exaggerate the accuracy of his reporting and sources. The receiver, on the other hand, can damage the trust of the provider by deliberately or inadvertently sharing with third party actors. Additionally, concerns about civil and political rights might influence one state’s willingness to cooperate with others. These concerns might be about data protection laws and procedures or privacy related issues. International intelligence cooperation is thus subjected to various barriers: cooperation is risky, sometimes dangerous and expensive. Because governments are well aware of the dangers, they are often hesitant to engaging in intelligence cooperation. These barriers are part of the calculation of costs and benefits of cooperation (Fägersten,2010).

When taking these interests into account, we can see a trade-off between the intelligence and policy gains, and the (sovereignty) costs and risks. With the enhancement of cooperation states hope to make these gains, but also face these costs. According to Fägersten, in the most historical cases, the costs have outweighed the benefits, making it a status quo or non-cooperation. Change in this status quo is caused by a shift in the cost-benefit balance.

Drivers of cooperation

Two factors are said to be the determinants in the generation of demand for cooperation in the EU (Fägersten in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014). The first one is the increase in the threat perception of Islamist terrorism and Jihadism. This increased threat perception has caused a rise in demand for both intelligence and policy gains: intelligence gains relate to the greater awareness of terrorist movements, policy gains relate to the new emerging institutional arrangements that show commitment to counterterrorism to the general public. However, it must be remarked that the increase in the threat level will only generate increases in the need for more cooperation when the threats supposedly challenge the individual intelligence capacities and capabilities of states. This means that if a state possesses enough capabilities to tackle a threat on its own, it will do so. If multiple states share or experience the same threat, multilateral cooperation has a chance (Fägersten in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014). The second factor of an increased demand for cooperation was the process of European integration. This was a strong driver of intelligence cooperation in the light of the CSDP. There are signs that spillover effects, which is a concept of neo-functionalist thinking, have led to the establishment of IntCen, as political support in favor of European intelligence supposedly has grown ( Fägersten 2007; Fägersten in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014).

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23 There are some critics of the neo-institutional approach. According to Van Buuren, the application of this neo-institutionalist framework to the matter of security cooperation presents us with a rather state-centric approach (Van Buuren in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014). It is therefore not a perfect approach to intelligence cooperation, but for this study, which has a grand strategy focus, it is a theoretical framework that presents the good possibilities for empirical research. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the study of European intelligence cooperation could benefit from a de-institutionalized approach. There are many other factors that can jeopardize cooperation, or put impediments on cooperation processes. As Färgesten has argued in his article by using a case study of Europol, there are some bureaucratic cultural wars that prevent states from getting what they want (Fägersten,2010;Van Buuren in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014). Apart from the bureaucratic perspective scholars should also approach the subject from a juridical perspective, by investigating the coming into being of EU treaties and diplomatic negotiations (Van Buuren in Duyvesteyn, De Jong, Van Reijn,2014).

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Chapter 3 Operationalization

3.1 Methods and data

This study tries to explore some of the member state’s attitudes towards intelligence cooperation, and more specifically the current IntCen and the prospect of enhancement of cooperation in the form of an EU-CIA. However, as argued before, empirical study on intelligence issues is very difficult. If this study would seek to do a content-analysis of intelligence output and products, hardly any data would be available as the large majority of intelligence products are ‘classified’ and parts of the intelligence production is clandestine. The empirical study of intelligence cooperation, intelligence structures, a state’s true contribution to an intelligence organization such, as IntCen, or the IntCen institutional arrangements, is thus almost impossible to accomplish. Second, little is known about true cooperation processes and much of the information remains, just as the intelligence itself, classified. On top of that, there is very few information about IntCen itself available. This study therefore will not explore the intelligence content, but focuses more on discourse an open source reports. Despite the fact that it could be very interesting to work with requested and semi-classified data, would it entail that the publication and open debate with fellow students of IR about the findings of the study would not be possible. It is therefore wiser to work around the classified and hard to obtain material and work in creative ways around the wall of secrecy.

This study tries to avoid classified data by analyzing political discourse of three selected case studies on the subject of intelligence cooperation. The selected cases are The UK, The Netherlands, and Belgium. The next paragraph will go into detail about the motivation for these cases and what is exactly expected in each case on intelligence cooperation.

As identified in the theoretical framework, two sets of variables are expected to have an influence on a state’s willingness to cooperate in the intelligence field: Färgesten’s cost-benefit calculation, and ties with the US. By applying the crucial factors that Färgesten has identified as influential in intelligence cooperation, an estimated “Threats-Gains-Cost-Risk-Trust” analysis of each of these three cases is being made. This “TGCRT” analysis provides understanding of the possible rationing of the three selected states.

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25 Then, an assessment of the current known intelligence cooperation ties is being added to the analysis which attempts to map the known cooperation liaisons each country has. The next step in the analysis is the investigation of what is known and what has been said about the current IntCen and, more importantly, how the three selected states think about and engage in IntCen. Finally, with an examination of the responses to proposals for an EU-CIA, the analysis is concluded with an brief examination of the attitudes towards the concept of institutionalized cooperation.

The data that is being used in the analysis is provided by defense strategies, national security strategies, annual reports of intelligence organizations and newspaper articles. However, the availability of such documents differs for each case. The UK is significantly less open about intelligence subjects and rarely comments in the parliament of these matters. Therefore data less is drawn from the parliamentary debates, and more data is provided by the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and security review, of which a comparable equivalent in neither Belgium nor the Netherlands exists. Nevertheless, for each country the parliamentary databases are thoroughly being examined. For all three cases, annual reports from the Intelligence and Security Committee of the Parliaments, annual reports of the intelligence agencies, expert papers and newspaper articles will be examined as well. Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite the availability of these documents and data resources, still relatively little information on the core of intelligence cooperation for these three cases can be found. It is because of this that it must be emphasized that the analysis will be more an “informed speculation” and no bold empirical claims will be made.

3.2 Case selection

It is known that the predecessor of IntCen, SitCen, had France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK as its main contributors (Jones,2013). IntCen now states that it receives products and information from several EU member states, but does not specify which ones and how much each member state contributes. An exploration of all the suspected IntCen contributors would be too ambitious for this study. It is because of this that only three cases, The UK, The Netherlands and Belgium, have been selected. However, this selection is not coincidental. For each of these three countries, there are different expectation in terms of their attitudes towards intelligence cooperation and willingness to sharing, based on their expected differences in cost-benefit calculations and ties with the US.

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26 The UK is a special case in the sense that it is a powerful European member state with a well-established intelligence culture and a special relationship, or liaison, with the US in the field of intelligence. It is being argued that this liaison with the US is an important factor that hinders multilateral intelligence cooperation in the EU (Treverton,2009). The Netherlands is a much smaller member state, with intelligence organizations, be it on a smaller scale, and has, as a founding father of the first hour, always been a proponent of European cooperation. The Netherlands is also in an intelligence alliance with the US, but this relationship is estimated to be less significant than the UK-US relation. Belgium is also a small member state, but has very limited intelligence capacity of its own. It is also in an intelligence coalition with the US, but this is a relationship that probably stands lower in the hierarchy than the Dutch-US relationship. The following section will go into further detail about how these estimations have come into being.

Variation in intelligence capabilities

The Netherlands, Belgium and the UK all have a different starting position in the field of intelligence production. This has to do with their own intelligence capabilities. It takes only logical, rational reasoning that a country with poor national capabilities is likely to be more interested in cooperating with others than a country who as reasonable national capabilities and is thereby able to provide enough security for itself. It is hard to concretize the exact capabilities of the intelligence structures of the three respective countries. This has, again, to do with the secrecy that is involved with the business.

The expenditures of the military intelligence units, who mainly collect intelligence on foreign enemies, are always kept a secret as they are often incorporated into the ministry of defense, and are not being specified on the transcripts of the military budgets. The non-military intelligence institutions, who collect intelligence on domestic threats, are more open and receive their own government funding. By looking at defense budgets and the budgets of the non-military intelligence organization, and reflect on how these budgets can be put into the perspective of the national GDP, it is possible to make a tentative comparison of the national intelligence capabilities in material terms. It is impossible to make a qualitative evaluation of the intelligence capabilities of the three respective countries as most of the output of the intelligence sector is classified and it is very difficult to classify intelligence production as “successful” or “unsuccessful”.

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27 The UK has in relative terms the largest amount of national intelligence capabilities. The British intelligence field consists of four main institutions: the secret intelligence service (SIS/MI6), the security service (MI5), the government communications headquarters (GSHQ), and the defense intelligence service (DIS) which is part of the ministry of defense. MI6, MI5 and the GSHQ share a “Single Intelligence Account”, which provides the three as a collective with a budget of 2,6 billion euro in 2015 (MI5,2015). The Single Intelligence Account budget had been subjected to financial cuts a several times in the past few years, but has now witnessed an increase (Kirkup & Dominiczak,2013). The military intelligence body of the UK, the Defense Intelligence service (DI) is incorporated within the ministry of defense and does therefore not have separate funding. The full defense budget of the UK for 2015 is set on 55,61 billion euro, but the true expenses of the DIS remain unknown as they are subjected to military secrecy.

The Netherlands have one non-military and one military intelligence institution. With regard to the military intelligence unit, the same principle applies as to the UK’s DIS. The Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) is incorporated into the ministry of defense and does not have its own budget (Tweede Kamer,2013c). As a component of the ministry of defense, the MIVD has probably been subjected to large budget cuts as the ministry of defense experienced a historical drop in military expenditures as a whole in 2011-2012 (Schramade,2013). The Dutch military budget for 2015 has been set on 7,3 billion euro, which shows a small increase in expenditures (Prodef,2015;Rijksoverheid,2014a; Rijksoverheid,2014b). Again, it is not known about how much the military intelligence unit receives.

The budgets of the non-military intelligence institution, the Algemene Inlichtingen- en

Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), are not being kept secret. The AIVD’s budget has grown from 50

to 200 million euro between the years 2002 and 2012. In these years the budget was enlarged in the wake of various international terrorist attacks and activities (Trouw,2005). However, in the year 2012, the government introduced budget cuts that were characterized as “draconic” as the total AIVD budget was slimmed down by one third of its original budget (68 million euro) (AD,2015;Rekenkamer,2015). Two years later, the budget suddenly was raised because of an increase in threats coming from Russia and Jihadism (AD,2015) The Dutch Court of Audit recently published a report in which they criticized the AIVD’s budget. They argued that the decisions on the budgets have caused a destructive dynamic. The agency first had to shrink and cut on staff, and had to recover, rebuild and expand the year after. Because of this

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28 the long term operational capability has inevitably been damaged (Rekenkamer,2015). For the year 2015, the AIVD’s budget has been set on 213 million, and the future prospect is that it will get an additional 25 million per year for the next couple of years until 2018 when new cuts will take place (Radio1,2013).

The Belgian equivalent of the AIVD, the Dienst voor de Veiligheid van de Staat (DVS) has also experienced severe budget cuts. The agency receives now 41,7 million in 2015, but is, together with its military equivalent the Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid (ADIV) in desperate need of more funding. According to military officials and the heads of the two agencies, both intelligence organizations are working in “survival mode” this year as there are not enough means in order maintain the current capacity (DeMorgen,2015;Clerix,2015). The exact budget of the ADIV is again unknown as it is part of the Belgian ministry of defense. This ministry receives 2,3 billion euro in 2015 (Matthijs,2015).

If one takes all these numbers on the budgets of the respective agencies of the UK, Netherlands and Belgium, and compares them to the latest statistics on the national GDP’s of the tree countries, the following percentages can be derived.

National Budgets

Non-military intelligence Military intelligence (part of the defense budget) United

Kingdom

(GSHQ,MI5,MI6)

0,11% of national GDP

(DIS)

Total defense budget

2,5% of GDP Netherlands (AIVD)

(MIVD)

1,01% of GDP Belgium (Veiligheid van Staat)

(AVID)

0,5% of GDP Source

GDP’s

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29 These calculations show that there is a substantial difference in terms of the intelligence budgets of the three respective countries. The UK, has by far the largest budget, followed by the Netherlands, and Belgium has the least amount of resources. Combined with the observations about the national intelligence agencies’ budgets that have been made in the section above, these numbers present indications that there might be a hierarchy in national intelligence capabilities. In this hierarchy the UK represents the top, the Netherlands the middle, and Belgium the bottom.

Variation in Atlantic ties

Unfortunately, it is unknown which true bilateral intelligence relations, or liaisons, between European member states exist outside of the IntCen institution. About the relationships of EU member states with the outside world, little is known as well. However, thanks to the revelations made by Edward Snowden, there is more known about the liaisons between the European countries and the US in the intelligence field.

The UK-US intelligence liaison is based on the UKUSA agreement which stems from the WW2 period. This agreement provided a platform for exchange of foreign signal intelligence, and officialized an intelligence relationship between the Anglo-Saxon countries: The UK, USA, Canada, New-Zealand and Australia (NSA,2015). These countries, the so-called “5-Eyes” share raw intelligence, funding, technical systems and personnel (MacAskill & Ball,2013). Apart from this coalition, there is proof on the existence of a “9-eyes” and “14-eyes” coalition. The 9-eyes consist of the 5-eyes plus Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway, the eyes adds Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden. All of the, 9- and 14-eyes, except for the original 5-14-eyes, are regarded as third party states (MacAskill & Ball,2013). This means that they all have a formalized agreement with the American NSA. However, the third part members exchange raw data, but do not receive substantial support of finished products, such as valuable intelligence reports. On top of that, every third party member is being assigned a Special Liaison Officer (Electrospaces,2013).

The most important thing to note about these networks is that there seems to be a substantial difference between a seat in the 5-, 9-,and 14-eyes. First of all, being a member of the 5-eyes means that one is in an elite position and receives high quality, classified information. 5-eyes members supposedly do not spy on each other, as they tend to do with their third party members in the 9- and 14- eyes (Poitras, Rosenback, Stark,2013). What makes up the exact benefits of being in the 9-eyes as opposed to be assigned a seat in the 14-eyes is not clear.

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30 However, there must be a significant advantage as Germany has expressed its discontent with its seat in the 14-eyes. According to the NSA, Germany was not quite amused that they were not invited to the 9-eyes, and would even be interested in an upgrade to the 5-eyes (Sanger Mazzetti,2013). This seems to indicate that some sort of hierarchy between the three circles of intelligence sharing.

Now, it is hard to make real arguments about these calculations and observations. Nevertheless, the comparison of national spending on the intelligence apparatus in relative terms gives an idea of the differences in intelligence capabilities. More budget means more money available for personnel and technology, and budget cuts imply a shrinkage of the agencies capabilities. The table and budgetary descriptions clearly suggest that the UK has in relative (and absolute terms) the largest budget for non-military intelligence, and also possibly for military intelligence. The Netherlands come second and Belgium seems to have very limited capabilities which causes their intelligence agencies to work in a ‘survival mode’ for at least the year 2015. Apart from that, drawing on the information about the 5-,9-, and 14-eyes that was made available through the revelations made by Snowden, there seems to be a difference in the Atlantic relationship of the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium with the USA, and more specifically, the NSA. The UK is clearly in a tight, exclusive liaison that already lasts for several decades. The Netherlands is a third party state, but seem to be higher in the hierarchy than the Belgians with their 9-eyes coalition. However, it must be noted that despite the claims of Edward Snowden, the participation of the Netherlands in the 9-eyes is not officially confirmed by the Dutch government (Tweede Kamer,2013a). These calculations and observations lead to expectations about the willingness of the three respective countries in the case of European intelligence cooperation and the development of IntCen. In the next paragraph, hypotheses on this will be formed.

3.3 Hypotheses

When theory and the estimations that have been presented in the paragraph above are being combined, we can derive three hypotheses: one for each case. When taking in regard that the UK is in a very tight and exclusive intelligence relationship with the US, and seems in that sense to have an Atlantic orientation, it can be assumed that the UK is not very likely to be interested in European cooperation. Apart from that, the UK might fear that European cooperation spoils the relation with the US. However, it does not mean that the UK is not

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31 interested in intelligence cooperation at all. But when we add the observation that the UK has a large intelligence budget and many well developed intelligence institutions of its own, the interest in institutionalized European intelligence cooperation is expected to be rather low because the absolute gains the UK could make from intelligence cooperation should be relatively low compared to the other cases. On top of that, since it seems that the UK can rely on its own, sovereignty costs might hold them back from supporting a stronger IntCen or EU-CIA. This means that it is expected that:

H1 The UK is not unwilling to cooperate in the field of intelligence, but at the same time is not interested in further intelligence cooperation or integration at the EU since it is already in a liaison with the US and has a well-developed intelligence sector. The UK is therefore not expected to be in favor of an EU-CIA or extensive cooperation through IntCen.

The Netherlands are by far not as tight with the US as the UK. This is very unlikely due to its placement in the 9-eyes and absence from the UKUSA agreement. They are therefore maybe less concerned about the US relationship than the UK and more interested in making intelligence gains as their national intelligence budgets have been cut in recent years. They are therefore expected to be more in favor of European intelligence cooperation than the UK, but are not expected to be either n favor or against an expanded IntCen or EU-CIA. This means that it is expected that:

H2 Because the Netherlands do share a bond with the US, but are not in the inner circle and have some reasonable national intelligence capabilities, is expected that the Netherlands will be more positive about cooperating in the intelligence field than the UK, but will not be in favor of a stronger IntCen or a real EU-CIA, nor opposing it.

Since Belgium is at an absolute minimum with regard to their national intelligence resources, it is expected that they are most in favor of European intelligence cooperation as this would provide them with relatively large intelligence gains. Since Belgium is not being named as a liaison partner or 9-eyes coalition partner to the US, it is assumed that Belgium has the least Atlantic orientation with regard to intelligence cooperation. This means that it is expected that:

H3 Since Belgium has very limited national capabilities, and is probably in the other circle of the US’s intelligence network, it is expected that Belgium is in favor of intelligence cooperation and will be most in favor of an EU-CIA and cooperation through IntCen.

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Chapter 4 Costs, benefits and partners

In this chapter, the “Threats-Gains-Cost-Risk-Trust” analysis will be conducted. This analysis will be followed by an examination of the intelligence relations and/or liaisons of The UK, The Netherlands and Belgium. By analyzing these elements, this chapter attempts to report observations that will be connected, together with the observations that will be made in the fifth chapter, to the hypotheses. In the final chapter of this study, some conclusions about the hypotheses will be made.

4.1 Threats

The threat from Jihadism affects many western European countries, including Belgium, The UK and The Netherlands. When their common interest lies in countering these threats, intelligence gains could be made when national intelligence agencies would cooperate together and share information of suspected terror cells or extremists. Terrorism is a perfect example of a transnational security issue. It is a borderless threat with cells that are often hard to identify. Especially in such transnational cases, where multiple member states share a common interest in combatting the threat, intelligence gains could be made. In the three sections below we see if and how renewed terrorist threats influence the intelligence sectors of the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The UK

The UK speaks about “the age of uncertainty” in its latest national security strategy (NSS) and strategic defense and security review (SDSR). They regard Britain more secure as ever from a historical perspective, but also underline the emergence of new threats form the “open network society”, such as terrorism. Al Qaeda remains the most important terrorist threat to the UK with a threat level that has been scaled up to “severe”. According to the NSS, its intelligence services uncover terrorists plots against the UK on a regular basis, making it an important defensive tool (HMGovernment,2010:14). In order to counter these terrorist threats, the UK wants to gear up to face against terrorism with a new strategy for its defense system (HMGovernment,2010:4). The blueprints for the defense system are laid out in the UK’s “Strategic Defense and Security Review” of which the most recent version stems from 2010. In that review the UK lays down that it needs strategic intelligence on potential threats, intelligence assets for the support of the military and domestic security, counterterrorist intelligence capabilities. The tasks for the production of intelligence will be handed to the

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33 Security Service, which will be leading investigations in the UK, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) that can use its global network to provide insights into terrorist activity overseas, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) which can bring its technical and analytical capabilities to bear, MI5 which provides military intelligence, and the Defense Intelligence (DI), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) which can contribute to the intelligence collection in each specific expertise (HMGovernment,2010:42).

The attacks on Charlie Hebdo have cause a renewed awareness of the presence of the terrorist threat to the UK. It was also an opportunity for the UK’s intelligence sector to emphasis its importance and present future plans to counter terrorism. However, in his speech, MI5 president Parker, showed no intentions to extend intelligence cooperation, but hinted at more domestic control and UK presence on the borders of interest, such as in France (MacAskill ,2015). The UK’s intelligence community had offered help to France following the attacks, but there is no evidence of any further commitments to the extension of intelligence cooperation in the wake of these attacks. Most of the UK’s intelligence discourse following the attacks focusses on the interests in enhancing domestic security (BBC,2015). Nevertheless, the UK’s interior minister decided to take part in a joint statement of the EU’s interior ministers following the Charlie Hebdo attacks. This statement encompassed a commitment to the sharing of intelligence on the threats from foreign terrorists (Ambafrance-UK,2015). However, the statement lacked concrete ideas and strategies and the statement did not resonate into the British parliament. It is therefore not possible to state or conclude that the increase in threat to the UK after Charlie Hebdo leads the UK’s intelligence sector to upscale intelligence cooperation.

The Netherlands

According to Dutch minister Opstelten, who was also present when the joint statement was composed, the attacks on Charlie Hebdo definitely had an impact on the European intelligence community. He came back to the Netherlands with a more promising message, stating that there is consensus in Europe that cooperation and intelligence production, especially on fighting Jihadism, should be up scaled. (Tweede Kamer,2015c). Nevertheless, he neither had any concrete ideas about how the Netherlands would accommodate this. The Dutch parliament hinted that the answer would lay in an expansion of the liaison network of the Netherlands in the upcoming years. But two years before, in 2013, according to the edition