To what extent have the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015
shaped the debate and reality of EU intelligence cooperation?
The Impact of Focusing Events on Policymaker Rhetoric and Action
Anne Konrad
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
MSc Crisis and Security Management
Master Thesis
To what extent have the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 shaped
the debate and reality of EU intelligence cooperation?
The Impact of Focusing Events on Policymaker Rhetoric and Action
Author:
Anne Konrad
Supervisor:
Dr Constant Hijzen
Second Reader:
Dr Jelle van Buuren
Submission Date:
11 August 2016
Abstract
Borderless travel across the European Union, long perceived as a facilitator of free movement of goods and people across the continent, is becoming increasingly problematic in light of the transnational threat of jihadi terrorism and returning foreign fighters. Although counter-terrorism has emerged as a top priority not just of national intelligence services but also police authorities, multilateral collaboration of respective agencies across Member States in this field remains scarce. Large-scale terrorist attacks of the past and present, often introducing unprecedented modus operandi as seen in the suicide blasts in November 2015 in Paris, have thus repeatedly triggered a strong rhetoric by national and EU policymakers, calling for a more coordinated response and better cooperation to face a common threat. Europol as the designated agency and platform for multilateral information sharing has experienced increased attention by media, politics and the public alike, but it remains unclear how rhetoric has been translated into action. Through the lens of focusing events and regime theory, this thesis sheds a light on whether the tragic events that characterised the past year have spurred EU countries to accept terrorism as a common concern rather than a matter of national security, leading to an increase in information exchange in the field of counterterrorism.
Table of Contents
i. Abstract
iv. List of Acronyms
iii. List of Figures and Tables iv. List of Referenced Persons
1. Introduction: Global Threats, National Responses 1
1.1. Context 1
1.1.1. Security Context within the European Union 1 1.1.2. General Overview of the EU Intelligence Environment 2
1.2. Research Subject 3
1.2.1. Research Question 4
1.2.2. Academic and Societal Relevance 4
1.2.3. Subquestions 5
1.2.4. Empirical Component 5
2. State of the Art: Theories and Concepts 6
2.1. Theoretical Framework: Regime Theory 6
2.1.1. Intelligence Regimes 8
2.1.2. Obstacles to Cooperation 10
2.2. Analytical Concept: Focusing Events 14
2.2.1. Terrorist Attacks as Focusing Events 15
2.2.2. Wake-Up Calls for Intelligence 15
2.2.3. Prelude: Madrid 2004 16 3. Research Design 19 3.1. Operationalisation 19 3.2. Methodology 22 3.2.1. Desktop Research 22 3.2.2. Quantitative Analysis 25 3.2.3. Expert Interviews 26 3.3. Case Selection 27 3.3.1. Case Justification 27
3.3.2. Reliability and Validity 30
4. Analysis : The Impact of Focusing Events on Rhetoric and Action 34
4.1. Reactions to the 2015 Paris attacks 34
4.1.1. Charlie Hebdo shootings 34
4.1.2. Paris November Attacks 35
4.2. Changes in Security Measures and Information Exchange 39
4.2.1. Passenger Name Record Directive 40
4.2.2. European Counterterrorism Centre 41
4.2.3. Europol Information Exchange 44
4.2.3.1. European Information System 46
4.2.3.2. SIENA Counterterrorism Configuration 48
5. Conclusion 50
5.1. Summary of Research Findings 50
5.2. Discussion 52
5.3. Future Research 55
6. Bibliography 56
List of Acronyms
AIVD
Allgemeine Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst
[Dutch Domestic Intelligence Service]
BKA
BND
Bundeskriminalamt [German Federal Criminal Police Office]
Bundesnachrichtendienst [German Foreign Intelligence Service]
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
COSI
Committee on Internal Security
CT
Counterterrorism
CTC
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
CTG
Counter-Terrorism Group
ECTC
European Counter-Terrorism Centre
EIS
European Information System
EU
European Union
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FP
Focal Point
FTF
Foreign Terrorist Fighter
IntCen
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
PNR
Passenger Name Record
SIENA
Secure Information Exchange Network Application
List of Figures and Tables
Table I: Operationalisation of Concepts……… 21
Figure I: News Volume on terrorist attacks……… 23
Figure II: News Volume on intelligence cooperation ………... 23
Table II: Major religiously inspired terrorist attacks in the EU……… 29
Figure III: Case Study Visualisation………... 30
Figure IV: Logging of FTFs in EIS by Member States………... 47
1. Introduction : Global Threats, National Responses
“Globalisation has created a borderless world in which states move clumsily but where their many illicit
opponents move elegantly.” - R. Aldrich
11.1. Context
1.1.1. Security Context within the European Union
The European Union is unique in its formation of nations that have eliminated national borders to enable the free movement of goods, people and capital. The gradual expansion of the Schengen area to include nearly every Member States has enabled EU citizens to live and businesses to operate in an effectively borderless region.2 Since the end of World War II, trade has been considered a prime facilitator of peace in
Europe. While the creation of a common market has been a major achievement, allowing Member States to act as one single entity and thus remaining competitive on a global scale, the political stability that has characterised the continent for the past decades can arguably be seen as the most significant achievements of the European Union. At the same time, the globalisation of the legal economy and our everyday lives has coincided with a globalisation of crime. Despite the fact that criminal groups have long been operating on an international scale, their illicit activities are becoming ever more adaptive, decentralised and fluid in their structures, specialising in cross-border movement and highly proficient in the use of modern technologies.3 The abandonment of internal borders within the EU for economic and travel purposes thus
simultaneously created opportunities for criminal groups to exploit loosened restrictions for illicit activities. For example, drugs successfully trafficked into a European port from overseas can be sent on to other EU destinations without further custom checks, while mobile criminal groups can easily move from one country to another to avoid detection.4 Although the positive economic impact of a single market far outweighs the
negative implications and risks related to criminals gaining access, it is true that the creation of a borderless European Union has failed to coincide with a true merging of security policy and intelligence sharing to counter cross-border crime, not least because national security remains a sovereign matter.
In light of the rising prominence of transboundary issues such as illegal migration and terrorism in the media and political debate, the lack of a collaborative response is bringing national policymakers under pressure. Critics of Schengen have been able to draw on major events such as the refugee crisis and recent terrorist attacks to point out that a borderless Europe creates more risks than benefits, as for instance seen during the heavily polarised Brexit campaign in spring 2016.5 Following the Paris attacks in November
2015, former Interpol chief Ronald Noble said Schengen “is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to
1 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence’, Review of International Studies, [online] 35(4), (October 2009): 890. 2 ‘The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders’, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 239 (22 September 2000).
3 Aldrich, citing M. Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Highjacking the Global Economy (London: William Heinemann, 2005): 4. 4 European Police Office, SOCTA 2013 EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2013).
Europe, [who] have been accepting the invitation”6. At the opposite end of the debate spectrum, advocates
of an ever-closer security union have taken advantage of the increasingly popular concern with public security to demand the creation of a supranational EU intelligence agency, in order to better manage the multifaceted threats that Member States are facing.7 This comes as national domestic intelligence and law
enforcement services have been heavily criticised for their apparent failure to connect the dots leading up to the attacks in Paris, which could seemingly have been prevented if more information relating to individual suspects had been shared among relevant partner agencies in other countries.8
1.1.2. General Overview of EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
In the 2010 Internal Security Strategy, the European Union committed to tackling cross-border crime and to improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States in order to adapt to the “challenges of the dynamic and global twenty-first century”.9 Over the past decades, the EU has made a conscious effort to
foster cooperation in the field of counterterrorism among Member States. As some policymakers fiercely reject the proposal of a common EU intelligence agency, it is often neglected that the European Union already counts with a range of institutions and tools to facilitate collaboration among national authorities in charge of counter-terrorism. Nonetheless, due to the predominantly clandestine nature of their operations, the public is often unaware of the extent to which Member States exchange information relating to counterterrorism on a European level.
Although the true extent of multilateral collaboration of intelligence agencies is unknown, informal meeting groups such as the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) provide a forum for national agencies to exchange information. At the same time, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen), based at the European External Action Service, functions as the intelligence body of the European Union, although it does not count with any operational mandate and is limited to making threat assessments. Most notably, the European Police Office (Europol) was established within the context of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, with the aim to enhance “police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism […] in connection with the organisation of a Union-wide system for exchanging information”10. As detailed in the Council Decision of 2009, Europol’s principal task is to
“collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and intelligence [and] provide intelligence and analytical support to Member States in connection with major international events”11. Although the agency
remains predominantly responsible for facilitating collaboration among law-enforcement agencies,
6 Ronald K. Noble, “Europe’s Welcome Sign to Terrorists”, New York Times, [online] 19 November 2015. 7 Maia De La Baume and Giulia Paravicini, ‘Europe’s intelligence black hole’, Politico, [online] 12 August 2015.
8 John Irish, Robert-Jan Bartunek and Orhan Coskun, ‘Authorities missed many 'red flags' before Paris shootings’, Reuters News, [online] 22 November 2015.
9 Council of the European Union, Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European Security Model”, 7120/10 (Brussels, 8 March 2010).
10 Council of the European Communities, Treaty on the European Union (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992): Article K1(9).
11 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol)’, Official Journal of the European Union, L121/37 (15 May 2009)
following 9/11 its responsibilities were enhanced to support all competent authorities, including the intelligence services12. As the agency has increasingly drawn media and political attention as the focal point
of formal European counter-terrorism collaboration, this paper will assess in how far major security-related events have impacted its evolvement.
1.2. Research Subject
As theory on multilateral security regimes shows, states do recognise the benefit of collaborating on issues of common interest, but ultimately choose to prioritise national sovereignty. Building on theoretical explanations by Krasner13, Jervis14, and other key authors of regime theory, we will establish the benefits
and downsides of multilateral intelligence cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Drawing on Birkland’s analytical concept of focusing events, this thesis will provide insights on whether major international events that directly relate to security policy within a given area, like the terrorist attacks we have witnessed in Western Europe over the past year, can alter the behaviour of policymakers and practitioners alike. An in-depth review of current directives and institutions linked to information exchange, combined with a statistical analysis of the use of platforms for counter-terrorism intelligence, will help us to understand the state of cooperation at EU level. Interviews with experts in counter-terrorism collaboration will supplement our research.
The terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 revealed that the reluctance for sharing information on EU-level between national intelligence and law enforcement agencies can bear a severe obstacle in anticipating and effectively countering current cross-border security threats.Just like other major terrorist attacks in the previous decade, such as Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the events triggered a strong rhetoric by national political leaders and EU officials, urging to step up information exchange or even create a “European CIA” to tackle the challenge of terrorism in Europe.15 This thesis set out to
investigate whether the attacks have proven to be a true game changer in the debate and to what extent they have led national intelligence agencies to share more information with European counterparts on a multilateral. Due to the confidentiality under which the operations of domestic intelligence services are carried out, it is difficult to assess the degree of cooperation between them, which takes place in a secret and informal manner. However, as counter-terrorism collaboration is increasingly moving into the realm of formal EU structures, specifically through the law enforcement agency Europol, data on information exchange is becoming more accessible. Based on criticism that previous terrorist attacks did not bring the
12 Oldrich Bureš, ‘Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU: lessons learned from Europol’, European View, [e-journal] 15(1), (2016): 62.
13 Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, International Organisation, [e-journal] 36(2), pp. 185-205 (Spring 1982).
14 Robert Jervis, ‘Security regimes’, International Organisation, [online] 36(3), pp. 357-378 (Spring 1982). Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, International Organisation, [e-journal] 36(2), pp. 185-205 (Spring 1982).
15 See Jacopo Barigazzi and James Panichi, ‘Terror bites, followed by EU Pavlov’s bark’, Politico, [online] 24 March 2016, or Jim Brunsden, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Sam Jones, ‘Europe’s failure to share intelligence hampers terror fight’, Financial Times, [online] 4 April 2016.
change in cooperation policymakers had advocated, this thesis will assess whether the Paris attacks have altered the state of information sharing at EU level more visibly than in the past.
1.2.1. Research Question
To what extent have the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 shaped
the debate and reality of EU information exchange?
1.2.2. Academic and Societal Relevance
Focusing events are a popular concept applied in academia in order to analyse policy-making within the field of Crisis and Security Management, while Regime theory is one of the key International Relations theories concerned with multilateral cooperation. The present thesis combines these two theoretical and analytical frameworks to explore recent events and policy changes. We will test regime theory in the domain of terrorism and intelligence, while applying focusing events to security-related policiesthat are currently a matter of great concern and public debate within the European Union. Despite the tragedy and devastation of terrorist attacks, they can contribute - positively or negatively - to a major policy change or trigger measures taken by a state or individual that would not have been possible otherwise.
While agencies such as Europol have been praised for their advances in cooperation on matters relating to serious organised crime, collaboration in the field of counter-terrorism has been less explored. Only recently, the issue of information exchange at EU level has received increasing media attention, fuelled by the widespread perception of terrorism as a major threat to the internal security of the European Union and its citizens. Due to the clandestine nature of intelligence agencies, academic scholars are unable to truly measure the degree and efficiency of cooperation among relevant national entities, and lament the lack of an adequate performance evaluation baseline16. Nonetheless, in light of the transnational issues Europe is
currently faced with, coupled with repeated calls for better cross-border collaboration, it is becoming increasingly important to be able to assess the evolvement of information exchange. With Europol having emerged as the formal hub for Member States to share counter-terrorism intelligence, the qualitative and quantitative methods used in this thesis are an attempt to shed light on how information exchange plays out in practice.
1.2.3. Subquestions
The following sub-questions will be addressed throughout the chapters of this thesis in order to build up towards the final research question:
Chapter II:
How does regime theory help us to explain the likelihood for states to pool intelligence resources?
In how far do terrorist attacks serve as agenda-setting focusing events for policymakers?
How have past terrorist attacks impacted multilateral information exchange at EU level?
Chapter III:
How do we define terrorism and intelligence?
Why are we focusing on Europol as a unit of analysis?
How can we assess the level of counter-terrorism collaboration among EU Member States?
Chapter IV:
What rhetoric did the 2015 Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks trigger among policymakers?
How did such rhetoric translate into action; can we observe an impact on existing policy proposals and platforms for information exchange?
How do experts perceive the debate surrounding EU information exchange?
1.2.4. Empirical Component
This thesis will consist of two empirical components. A desk study of press statements, EU directives and committee reports will allow us to assess the impact of terrorist attacks on policymakers’ rhetoric and action in their immediate aftermath, leading us to establish whether policy proposals and the degree of information exchange were influenced by the events. A quantitative analysis of statistics will make evident how the contribution of information exchange per Member State to various terrorism-related databases and platforms changed before and after terrorist attacks in question. Expert interviews will allow for detailed insights into the everyday practicalities and obstacles of information sharing at EU level. The reasoning behind our research methods will be outlined in detail in the methodology chapter.
2. State of the Art : Literature Review
“No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own” – European Security Strategy 2003
17Our research will combine a theoretical framework and analytical concept: While regime theory enables us to explain why states may choose to collaborate in the field of counterterrorism, the concept of focusing events provides us with the necessary tools to understand to what extent perceptions towards information exchange may change in light of terrorist attacks.
2.1.
Theoretical Framework: Security Regimes
Theory in Social Sciences is meant to help explain phenomena and describe realities. Within the discipline of International Relations, security is one of the key concepts debated: while Realists believe states need to maximise security in order to ensure survival in an anarchic world, Liberals advocate that security concerns between states can be overcome by forging a system of interdependence and institutionalism. In this regard, the formation of the European Union has been explained by theory as a liberal experiment to create peace and stability through economic interdependence, cultural exchange and multilateral cooperation. However, security continues to be a heavily contested policy area, not least because, as stated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”18. Although common
security principles have been outlined on many occasions, most notably in the European Security Strategy of 2003, the memory of historical conflicts, discrepancies in military strength and capabilities, and diverging foreign and domestic security agendas all loom too large to allow Member States to cease national sovereignty in favour of supranational governance. Nonetheless, EU countries have recognised the advantage of managing individual security issues that affect each state in a similar manner through a united response. In light of the unprecedented influx of refugees at EU external borders, a common stance on migration and resettlement became a priority on the security agendas of EU political leaders. In a similar manner, the demand for a more sustained multilateral counter-terrorism policy has reoccurring continuously after every major terrorist attack since 9/11. The potential for states to cooperate in a particular security domain, as well as the advantages and obstacles associated with it, can be best explained through regime theory.
Regime theory is accepted by both Liberals and Realists, as it describes the rational behaviour of states in a context of anarchy within the international system19. Stephen Krasner, who coined the concept,
defines regimes as “decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area”, with a function to “coordinate state behaviour to achieve desired outcomes in particular
17 European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe In a Better World (Brussels, 12 December 2003): 1.
18 Council of the European Communities, Treaty on the European Union (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992): Article K1(9). 19 Richard Little, ‘International Regimes.’ In: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens eds. The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, 4th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 302.
areas”20. According to Stein, states may choose to cooperate in situations when “individualistic calculation
leads them to prefer joint decision-making because independent self-interested behaviour can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes”21. Such situations are characterised by ‘dilemmas of common
interests’ and ‘dilemmas of common aversions’, motivating states to join forces to pursue an agenda that holds potential for all involved, or jointly fight against an issue that could otherwise affect everyone in an equally harmful manner. Although regimes thus constitute a promising tool to pursue positive outcomes together, they are much more likely to be used to maximise states’ own ambitions and predict the behaviour of others. Krasner emphasizes that “the prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic self-interest”22. In this sense, although nations tend to prefer unilateral action, they may find
themselves engaged in cooperation with the mere intention of avoiding potential risks or negative consequences.
While some authors have focused on environmental or trade regimes23, Robert Jervis has
specifically concentrated on security regimes, which imply norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation beyond short-run self-interest24. He argues that incentives and obstacles to establishing a
regime are far greater in the security domain due to the ‘security dilemma’, meaning that the increase of security by one state causes others to be less secure25. The fear of others violating the common agreement
makes states reluctant to form a regime and resort to unilateral action. Jervis is convinced this dilemma affects security more than non-security domains, because the clash of interests and convictions tends to be more deeply entrenched, stakes are higher due to national security being a prerequisite for other policy areas, and uncertainty about the other states’ behaviour is greater26.
We can also draw on Jervis to establish the conditions that underlie the formation of security regimes. He cites the willingness of major powers to establish a regulated environment rather than sticking to individualist behaviour as a primary factor. Secondly, actors must be convinced they share the same values regarding mutual security and cooperation; a sense of trust and loyalty amongst each other must be present27. Thirdly, states will have to accept that security is not enhanced through expansion, and exercise
restraint in maximising their own power in relation to others. Lastly, the individual pursuit of security must be seen as negative in comparison to a cooperative approach. Security regimes are unlikely to succeed if states continue to see more benefits in unilateral over multilateral behaviour. Overall then, “the costs and risk of individualistic security policies [must be] great enough to provide status quo powers with incentives to seek security through cooperative means”28. If these conditions are met, states will be prepared to make
sacrifices and accept short-term risks in return for long-term gains in the future.
20 Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences’: 186, 191.
21 Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, International Organization, [e-journal] 36(2), (1982): 302. 22 Op cit.: 195.
23 For example: Oran Young and Gail Osherenko, Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes (London, Cornell University Press 1993). 24 Robert Jervis, ‘Security regimes’: 357.
25 Ibid.: 358. 26 Ibid: 359. 27 Ibid.:360. 28 Ibid: 362.
2.1.1. Intelligence Regimes
Despite growing frustration and demands for reform, cooperation in various key policy areas have made the European Union a credible and powerful actor on a global stage, thus confirming the potential that regime theory holds. In light of the mutual solidarity and concerns emanated by Member States in relation to the fight against terrorism,29 the need for a common internal security and intelligence framework has
become evident. Regime theory can thus also be applied to the domains of intelligence and counter-terrorism, helping us to understand the likelihood for states to pool resources in search for more security against terrorist threats.
Although the danger of U.S.-Soviet direct military confrontation and proxy conflicts of the Cold War era have largely disappeared off the international security stage, more abstract global threats posed by non-state actors have been quick to fill the vacuum. The European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) asserts that although threats such as terrorism, proliferation and organised crime are not new phenomena, they have undergone a qualitative change. Western societies are increasingly vulnerable to antagonists that are growing ever larger in scale and sophisticated in the use of modern technology. Rather than the traditional state-level approach to security, these new challenges demand a more comprehensive, cooperative and cohesive response from European policymakers.30 Since intelligence plays a vital role in identifying and addressing
threats, enhancing cooperation among law-enforcement and intelligence agencies on a European level becomes all the more important. If each national agency only takes into consideration those activities of an adversary that fall within its own geographical and functional remit, it will be impossible to apprehend the full magnitude of the potential international scope of action and diverse fields of activity.31 Sharing information helps to unify
perspectives and thus gain a comprehensive picture of a threat.
Richard Aldrich, a key researcher on intelligence and security communities, identifies four major changes in modern intelligence debited to globalisation: He finds that intelligence agencies have grown in scale and size, have become more interventionist, and increasingly involve private entities. Most importantly though, both domestic and foreign agencies “have been forced to accelerate their co-operation, often with improbable partners”32. According to Aldrich, the main issue lies in the paradox that governments have charged
national intelligence agencies with the fight against transnational opponents, without giving thought to how these agencies need to be adapted and restructured in order to effectively deal with “networked threats that are simultaneously diffuse yet interconnected”. He identifies cooperation as the greatest challenge to intelligence services, especially given their inherent lacking collaborative instinct. 33
29 BBC News, ‘Paris attacks: Millions rally for unity in France’, [online] 11 January 2015.
30 Björn Müller-Wille, ‘For Our Eyes Only? Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU’, Occasional Papers No.50 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, January 2004): 11.
31 Ibid: 12.
32 Richard Aldrich, ‘Globalisation and Hesitation? International Intelligence Co-operation in Practice’, paper presented at the Conference on the Accountability of International Intelligence Co-operation (17 October 2008): 6.
Investigations into 9/11 revealed that if U.S. national agencies had shared more individually collected information with each other, a more comprehensive threat assessment would have been made, which could have allowed intelligence analysts to “connect the dots” and anticipate the attack.34 This deficit in
information sharing among security authorities within one state is replicable to the inter-state European level. As terrorist groups operate across borders, planning attacks in one country while carrying it out in another, the lack of coordination among the responsible agencies of Member States can lead to a similar failure to see the big picture and anticipate threats that can target all countries involved. Within this context, even smaller states can be the source country for transnational criminal activity or breeding ground for dangerous individuals, which makes it all the more important to connect domestic security services across borders.35 According to Gruszczak, intelligence cooperation was not problematised in European reactions
to 9/11 due to a reluctance by EU institutions and a majority of Member States to endorse the ‘war on terror’36. Terrorism within Europe was widely considered to be a national security issue linked to domestic
separatist movements such as the ETA in Spain or IRA in Northern Ireland.
However, the subway bombings and mass casualties of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 put Islamist terrorism on European security agendas and incited debate on a common counter-terrorism approach.37 A lack of intelligence sharing and data exchange among EU Member States was identified, and
calls for more cooperation between Europol and national law-enforcement and intelligence services became louder38. The conditions for a multilateral regime to enhance security and fight against the threat of
terrorism thus seemed to be in place following the terrorist attacks of the early 2000s, as states recognised the need to overcome individualist reservations and instead pool resources to effectively counter a common adversary.
Both Aldrich and Fägersten agree that both formal and informal EU intelligence cooperation in the field of counterterrorism has improved over the past decade.39 Nonetheless, no responsibilities have
been formally transferred from the national level to Europol or any other agency. Europol thus merely represents an additional service for Member States, who can decide whether or not to share relevant information on the various platforms provided by the organisation.40 Although Europol monitors the
performance of national units in an effort to scrutinise participation, Member States are not obliged by law to submit intelligence. Countries retain full responsibility for their national security, and thus retain accountability for the anticipation or detection of threats such as terrorist attacks. However, as Aldrich points out, hesitant national agencies have come under pressure to engage more cooperatively, as in the
34 Richard A. Best, ‘Intelligence information: need-to-Know vs. Need-to-Share.’ CRS Report for Congress (Washington, Congressional Research Service, 6 June 2011): 1.
35 Aldrich, International Intelligence Co-operation in Practice: 20.
36 Artur Gruszczak, ‘EU Intelligence-Led Policing: The Case of Counter-Terrorism Cooperation’, in Maria O'Neill, Ken Swinton, Aaron Winter eds.: New Challenges for the EU Internal Security Strategy (Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013): 27.
37 Katie Friesen, ‚The Effects of the Madrid and London Subway Bombings On Europe’s View of Terrorism’, Review Digest: Human Rights and The War on Terror (2007): 10.
38 Op cit.
39 Björn Fägersten, ‘Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, European Policy Analysis, [online], (Swedish Institute for Policy Studies, 2008).
wake of terrorist attacks, public scrutiny awaits those who turn out to have refrained from sharing actionable intelligence.41 This is one of the motivations a truly collaborative regime for information sharing could hold:
if counter-terrorism intelligence analysis was fully shifted towards a supranational level, responsibility for a failure to detect a threat would be shared, and national authorities would no longer be held accountable individually.
2.1.2. Obstacles to Cooperation
Within the context of the Brexit debate, the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, described Member States cooperating through Europol as “leaky ships” and European intelligence agencies as “colanders” riddled with holes, strongly arguing in favour of British agencies to refrain from future cooperation. His accusations were dismissed by the current director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, who himself worked for the MI5 for years.42 Whether unfounded or not, the allegations reflect the scepticism many national
authorities feel concerning the trustworthiness of other countries’ agencies.
In a publication released shortly before the Madrid bombings in 2004, Müller-Wille discussed the dilemmas associated with EU intelligence cooperation,43 thus providing a valuable insight on perceptions
and realities prior to the terrorist attacks that pushed the issue of information exchange on top of European political agendas for decades to come. Since the essence of intelligence agencies lies in the concealment of the identity of their sources and method of collecting information44, sharing intelligence with other agencies
inevitably presents a delicate matter. While one actor may be ready to share information with a second party, it risks losing control over access as it cannot ensure whether the latter actor will pass this information on to a third party. Lack of trust remains a crucial obstacle to intelligence regimes, as their inherently secretive character makes it difficult for agencies to engage in any sort of collaborative framework. Intelligence cooperation is thus much more likely to occur at a bilateral level between agencies that have established an informal culture of exchange, rather than through formal multilateral structures.45 While the degree of
institutionalised EU regimes concerning counter-terrorism collaboration continues to be openly debated by policymakers, we can speculate that national intelligence services opt for more informal regimes of intelligence sharing, as seen through the Club de Berne and the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG). Here, cooperation takes place on a voluntary basis, outside EU institutional structures and without directives and regulations governing information exchange.
Another problem associated with distrust is free-riding, which is also one of the major obstacles cited in regime theory. States who feel they contribute more than others towards a common framework, be it through financing or actual sharing of information, will be sceptical of those who take more than they
41 Aldrich, ‘Globalisation and Hesitation’: 12.
42 Rowena Mason, ‘Europol Chief: Brexit would be a mistake for UK security’, The Guardian, [online], 24 March 2016. 43 Müller-Wille, ‘For Our Eyes Only?’
44 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation’, International Affairs, [online] 80(4), (June 2004): 734. 45 Aldrich, ‘Globalisation and Hesitation’: 8.
give.46 Countries that are perceived as the most powerful actors on the European political stage, such as
France, Germany, and the UK, count with much more elaborated intelligence structures due to their long historic evolvement. Hence able to gather and analyse intelligence on an extensive scale, the added benefit of sharing crucial classified information at a European level has little appeal. However, given the great variations in geographical and population size, as well as economic strengths of Member States, coupled with this discrepancy in their national intelligence services, it is not possible for all countries to contribute in an equal manner. Excluding Member States would thus reflect a lack of confidence and solidarity.
Müller-Wille mentions the EU’s intelligence relationship with the United States as a further obstacle. Traditionally, Western Europe has relied on the immense scale and expertise of U.S. intelligence gathering, although such transatlantic cooperation arguably suffered from the Snowden revelations which uncovered massive spying of U.S. agencies on European government bodies. Notwithstanding this fact, U.S. intelligence authorities may be inclined to share less information with an EU Member State if they feel that information will not be treated with sufficient secrecy. European states will consequently be hesitant to jeopardise their access to U.S. intelligence and refrain from setting up an obligatory cooperative framework. Müller-Wille thus asserts that EU intelligence cooperation needs to be able to produce information that is of interest to U.S. agencies and thereby adds value from a U.S. perspective.47
At the same time, scepticism towards EU intelligence cooperation also depends on national perceptions surrounding the privacy-security debate. Aldrich points out that Western states differ in their notions on privacy, which may cause them to resist large-scale data sharing.48 While in Anglophone culture,
public life has been heavily securitized, as evident by the high number of CCTV cameras in the U.S. and UK, other countries such as Germany are much more sceptical of trading in individual privacy rights to allow for extensive data collection and monitoring of public spaces. The resistance of German political parties to enhance the authority of its intelligence services has been attributed to the nation’s still vivid memory of excessive state surveillance carried out by the Stasi secret police in East Germany.49
Bures identifies the overlap between police and intelligence authorities in the realm of counterterrorism as an additional hindrance to information sharing at EU level.50 While police are more
interested in specific criminal intelligence that will aid investigations and lead to an arrest, intelligence agencies are eager to gather more general information on suspicious individuals. However, as terrorist suspects often turn out to have been engaged in criminal activities prior to committing an attack, the agendas and responsibilities of the two entities are becoming increasingly blurred, with both police and intelligence services having a stake in counter-terrorism operations. The UK made a conscious effort to overcome rivalries and confusions over responsibility within their law-enforcement and intelligence agencies after the London bombings in 2005. The difficulty of cultural approaches between national
46 Müller-Wille, ‘For Our Eyes Only?’: 15. 47 Ibid.
48 Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation’: 734.
49 Michael Birnbaum, ‘In Germany, legacy of Stasi puts different perspective on NSA spying’, Washington Post, [online] 18 November 2013. 50 Bures, ‘Intelligence Sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU’: 61.
agencies is echoed by the European Union Committee of the UK House of Lords, which finds that such discrepancies are only magnified and international level.51 Müller-Wille agrees, stating that ‘the ambition to
put Europol at the centre of the fight against terrorism, repeated after every terrorist attack on European soil, has been seriously obstructed by the fact that national security and intelligence agencies have been unwilling to strengthen their cooperation with a police body.”52
The reluctance for inter-agency cooperation at national level has been evident in many Member States, most notably in Belgium, where ‘parallel structures were created to cater for different language groups’ debited to the Wallonian and Flemish divide of the country.53 This also links to the various practical
issues that complicate the process of intelligence sharing among the EU, which is characterized by the cultural and linguistic diversity of 28 Member States54. The translation of information or direct production
in an accessible language constitutes a time-consuming and costly effort for national agencies. Interoperability has long been lamented as a major problem, as information and communication systems are not always compatible, thus making it all the more difficult for national officers to enter information into relevant databases.55
Stefan Heumann, who has researched Western intelligence agencies since the Snowden revelations, underlines that international cooperation between European intelligence agencies is currently not governed by any legal framework. Although parliamentary committees are in charge of monitoring national intelligence agencies for compliance with privacy and human rights, no control mechanism for information sharing on a multilateral level is in place.56 When international agreements to exchange information are concluded, a third
party rule excluding any other institution or agency gaining access is invoked, which effectively excludes parliamentary committees from supervising these multilateral exchanges. Following the Snowden revelations, it became evident that national governments had been unaware that European agencies were giving data to the NSA and CIA.57 If the European Union was to launch its own supranational intelligence agency, this would
have to be accompanied by the introduction of corresponding legal framework and supervisory bodies. Although the EU established the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), its function is to evaluate the status and efficiency of EU intelligence cooperation, rather than scrutinising it over privacy and data protection concerns.58
According to Bures, a major hindrance for law enforcement and intelligence officers to accept institutions like Europol as a valuable tool to pool information is the fact that it was formed through a top-down decision made by European political bodies, as opposed to being set up by professionals themselves.59
51 House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘After Madrid: the EU’s response to terrorism. Report with Evidence’, 5th Report of Session 2004-05 (March 2005): 12.
52 Müller-Wille, ‘For Our Eyes Only?’: 3.
53 Tim King, ‘Belgium is a failed state’, Politico, [online] 12 February 2015. 54 Bures, ‘Intelligence Sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU’: 61. 55 Müller-Wille, ‘For Our Eyes Only?’: 16.
56 Stefan Heumann, ‚Nachrichtendienst unter Kontrolle?‘ Interviewed by Falk Steiner on Deutschlandfunk, 4 April 2016. 57 Ibid.
58 See ‘Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)’: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/standing-committee-operational-cooperation-internal-security/
This assertion links back to the idea of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ put forward by Michael Lipsky60, who
argues that policies imposed from above always play out differently in practice as public officials need to adapt the rules in order to effectively manage their day-to-day duties and routines. The lack of incentives for Member State authorities to feed information into Europol presents the greatest obstacle. As national agencies retain the responsibility to produce intelligence assessments required for national security, they cannot blame failures on a malfunctioning EU-level agency.61 Law enforcement and intelligence officers
thus still have to make their own intelligence assessments at national level, which may cause them to be reluctant to go through the extra effort of sharing information with Europol in addition to their own workload. Without input from Member States, however, the agency cannot compile a multilateral, comprehensive intelligence picture that could in fact be valuable to participating national authorities, thereby reinforcing the impression that the work of the agency has no added value for EU countries. Ultimately, the absence of mutual trust and shared expectation of positive outcomes, which Bures lists as crucial prerequisites to form intelligence regimes, causes Member States to refrain from sharing information. This may however be altered by focusing events, which can act as a game changer by revealing the cross-border dimension of terrorism and the need for a common framework to adequately respond to the threat.
60 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (Russel Sage Foundation, New York 1980). 61 Müller-Wille, , ‘For Our Eyes Only?’:: 35.
2.2.
Analytical Concept: Focusing Events
Birkland defines focusing events as sudden, relatively uncommon events that cause harms concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest, and are known to policymakers and the public simultaneously62. He has predominantly explained the dynamics of focusing events in relation to natural
disasters and industrial accidents, such as earthquakes, hurricanes or oil spills, although he later also used 9/11 as a case study. Birkland argues that focusing events gain attention more rapidly than pervasive issues such as crime and disease, and can thus serve as a powerful tool for groups seeking policy change63.
However, the harms caused by the event need to be obvious, such as natural disasters “illustrated in compelling images of destroyed buildings”64. If this is the case, focusing events can cause governments,
policy advocates, news media and the public to pay more attention to previously existing yet dormant issues. Items that have long been advocated by certain lobby groups or political parties may thus be pushed towards the forefront of policy agendas, as the moment to demand and create change appears imminent. Birkland claims that pro-change groups will mobilise based on the need to react to the event and the failed or inadequate policies that allowed it to happen65. Nonetheless, group efforts to promote an issue is not always
necessary as media propagation already creates images and symbols associated with the problem.
In Chapter 3.1, we will show how this has been true in relation to linking terrorist attacks to demands for better and increased information exchange at EU level. Public discourse in the aftermath of focusing events can thus be characterised by changes in the dominant topic of discussion and attitudes towards policy66. We will try to make evident how in light of terrorist attacks, actors have changed their
stance towards intelligence cooperation and information exchange. Birkland emphasizes that focusing events are only important if policy communities are well organised and capable of dramatizing the need for change. As will be explained in later chapters, Europol was well established and equipped before the focusing events in question, and advocates of the agency were able to capitalise on the terrorist attacks to promote an enhancement of its capabilities. If no ‘advocacy coalition’67, as Birkland calls them, takes
advantage and uses a focusing event in its rhetoric to call for change, it may pass without generating major attention, especially when public interest in the issue is low. Furthermore, it is important to note that the effect of a focusing event does not last long as attention paid to consequences and potential change may be short-lived68. Linking back to our research question, we will consider whether the anticipated increase
in information exchange only occurs shortly after the event or emerges as a long-term trend.
2.2.1. Terrorist Attacks as Focusing Events
62 Thomas A. Birkland, “Focusing Events, Mobilization, Agenda Setting”, Journal of Public Policy, [e-journal] 18(1), (1998): 54. 63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.: 55. 65 Ibid: 57. 66 Ibid: 64. 67 Ibid: 72.
68 Erik J. Dahl, ‘Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance’, Intelligence and National Security, [e-journal] 25(6), (December 2010): 781.
The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, which caused the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers, has been described as “the ultimate focusing event”69. Birkland goes as far as to call 9/11 the “most
consequential event of the 21st century”70, and applies his theory of agenda-setting and focusing events to
establish to what extent policy changes were implemented as a result of the attacks71. He concluded that
policy proposals at the time were largely based on pre-existing ideas, with 9/11 providing a window of opportunity for policymakers to push long-planned items to the top of the security agenda. In the realm of foreign policy, the attacks infamously enabled then U.S. President George W. Bush to push through the Patriot Act and launch the ‘war on terror’, which saw the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in subsequent years. Subsequently, the attacks generated a lasting impact on the aviation industry, as security measures were tightened in response to the tactics the perpetrators had employed to hijack the airplanes.
While 9/11 has exhaustively been used as a case study by researchers, the concept of focusing events has not been applied as extensively to terrorist attacks in the European Union. In a recent study, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) analysed the Charlie Hebdo killings in January 2015 to test its impact on EU counter-terrorism policy responses, finding that a majority of the proposals outlined in policymaker reactions predated the shootings, but had until this point proven too contentious to be implemented into action.72 Within this context, CEPS scholars warn that terrorist attacks enable the rapid
adoption of contested measures, which raises questions as to the legitimacy, efficacy and lawfulness73.
2.2.2. Wake-Up Calls in Intelligence
Dahl describes focusing events as crises that ‘can help organisations and policymakers learn’74. He
investigates how intelligence processes and organisations have been shaped by prior failures and disasters, and coins the idea of a ‘wake-up call’, the positive effect of a focusing event on the evolvement of intelligence. He cites Pearl Harbour and 9/11 as two key events in shaping the reorganisation of U.S. intelligence communities, but laments that scholars have taken a generally pessimistic approach, concentrating on how disasters uncovered intelligence failures75. Instead, he proposes for the positive
outcome of crises to be researched, considering how failures can inspire effective change and future success of intelligence performance. In his opinion, major events involving threats already present on the intelligence and security agenda have the power to inspire improved performance, if the two key players – intelligence communities and policymakers – are woken up by the magnitude and repercussions generated by the event. Dahl asserts that “an intelligence failure is most effective in improving intelligence
69 Dahl, ‘Missing the Wake-up Call’: 782.
70 Thomas A. Birkland and Megan K. Warnement, Focusing Events, Risk, and Regulation (April 2014): 2.
71 Thomas A. Birkland, ‘The World Changed Today: Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, Review of Policy Research, [e-journal] 21(2), (2004).
72 Didier Bigo, Evelien Brouwer, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, Julien Jeandesboz, Francesco Ragazzi and Amandine Scherrer, “The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, [online] No. 81 (February 2015): 1.
73 Ibid: 15.
74 Dahl, ‘Missing the Wake-up Call’: 779. 75 Ibid.: 783.
performance if it directs new attention at sources of intelligence that had already been identified”76. Bearing
this assertion in mind, we will consider whether the Paris terrorist attacks proved significant enough to draw attention to the lack of information sharing despite existing cooperative frameworks at Europol, causing Member State authorities to overcome their reluctance and step up information exchange. In a similar manner, focusing events are more likely to generate policy change if they highlight an issue that has previously been on the agenda of relevant decision makers77. As the potential threat of foreign fighters
returning to Europe as terrorists was long feared by government leaders, but not fully anticipated until the November Paris attacks, it will be interesting to see whether Dahl’s notion proves true in our case.
2.3.
Prelude: Madrid 2004
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States also incited a major political and public debate on the need for better intelligence cooperation in Europe. The European Council declared that “terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe” and decided that “the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union”. 78 Among others, the introduced plan of action foresaw
‘improved cooperation and exchange of information between all intelligence services’, requested that “Member States will share with Europol, systematically and without delay, all useful data regarding terrorism”, and stipulated that a ‘specialist anti-terrorist team’ be set up.79
Shortly after the Madrid bombings in 2004, which constituted the first major terrorist attack on European soil, the German news magazine Der Spiegel wrote that the decisions taken at EU level after the shock of 9/11 had never been translated into concrete actions. Three and half years after the worst terrorist attack in the Western hemisphere, which revealed the implication of terrorists who had been living and plotting the attack in Europe for years, Europol as the dedicated EU institution to fight terrorism lacked a clear mandate and thus effectively had no function.80 Decisions to introduce a European arrest warrant had been delayed by Member States, and hardly any country was logging information in Europol databases, which is why the organisation had been unable to really investigate cross-border cases in relation to terrorism. Der Spiegel proclaimed that “law-enforcement officers from Berlin to Madrid [could] only dream of a centralised counter-terrorism database”.
With the attacks in Madrid, Islamist terrorism reached European soil. On 11 March 2004, four separate bombs went off on commuter trains in the Spanish capital, killing 201 people and wounding thousands.81
Although the Spanish government initially blamed the Basque separatist group ETA for the bombings,
76 Ibid.: 794. 77 Ibid.: 781.
78 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting, SN140/01, 21 September 2001. 79 Ibid.: 2.
80 Matthias Gebauer, ‘Antiterrorkampf in der EU: Gelähmt durch Kleinstaaterei‘, Spiegel, [online] 18 March 2004. 81 CNN, ‘Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts’, [online], updated 4 March 2016.
Qaeda soon claimed responsibility for the attack, threatening further terrorist attacks if Spain would not withdraw its troops from Iraq.82 As investigations into the attackers revealed, some of the suspects had
previously been noted by authorities in France, Spain, Germany, Italy and Norway, but had never caused sufficient concern by either country to be arrested.83 Furthermore, Morocco had issued arrest warrants for
two of the terrorists for a series of café bombings in Casablanca, yet the suspects were living openly in Madrid. Aldrich asserts that ‘each country seemed to have a few pieces of the puzzle’84.
According to the BBC, the Madrid bombings “led to attempts to galvanise Europe’s response to terrorism”85. German Minister of the Interior Otto Schily organised an EU summit to revise anti-terror
measures of Member States as Islamic extremism was viewed a “growing and wider threat to European Union nations”86. Poor intelligence sharing and data exchange among EU Member States due to an acute
lack of mutual trust were identified as a factor that had hindered the anticipation of the Madrid bombings.87
The European Commission as well as the European Council thus urged to improve mechanisms for the exchange of information and collaboration among national intelligence agencies in order to overcome the shortcomings of existing EU anti-terrorist policy. In their Declaration on Combating Terrorism88, released
on 25 March 2004, Member States outlined commitment to more joint counter-terrorism efforts. Although terrorism had previously been identified as a key threat to EU interests, no concrete measures had been implemented prior to Madrid, which the European Council now believed to be “a matter of urgency”89.
Law enforcement agencies, including security services, were requested to “cooperate with each other and exchange all information relevant to combating terrorism as extensively as possible” and provide Europol “with all relevant criminal intelligence related to terrorism as soon as it is available”90. The European
Council also vowed to develop the relationship between Europol and intelligence services.91 This underlines
how Europol’s role as the relevant institution to collect counter-terrorism intelligence was reasserted following the Madrid attacks.
Austria and Belgium proposed the creation of a EU intelligence service, which was rejected by the governments of France, Germany and the UK.92 Instead, Member States agreed to establish the position
of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), who was to present policy recommendations based on IntCen and Europol reports and maintain an overview of instruments at EU disposal. Dutch former Minister of Interior Gijs de Vries became the first to occupy the post. Although the appointment of the CTC has been noted as one of the most visible initiatives adopted after Madrid, the position never became fully functional and operational due to persistent concerns with national sovereignty that Member States had only
82 The crisis management of the ruling party in Spain in the wake of the Madrid bombings, including falsely attributing the terrorist attacks to ETA, caused widespread public discontent and led to the opposition party to win national elections the week after the attacks.
83 Raphael Bossong, The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European Security Policy after 9/11 (London, Routledge 2012): 84. 84 Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation’: 734.
85 BBC News, ‘The Legacy of the Madrid bombings, [online] 15 February 2007. 86 Deutsche Welle, ‘Security Discussions Rage across Europe’, [online] 17 March 2004. 87 Gruszczak, ‘EU Intelligence-led policing’: 28.
88 European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism (Brussels, 25 March 2004). 89 Ibid: 2.
90 Ibid: 5/6. 91 Ibid: 10.
temporarily or rhetorically sidelined in the aftermath of the Madrid attacks.93 The frustration relating to the
lack of actual powers was made evident by the resignation of de Vries in 2007.94 Two years later, the new
CTC Gilles Kerchove lamented a certain “counter-terrorism fatigue” caused by other major international events with more immediate impact on peoples' lives, and warned of complacency amid dwindling public support for counter-terrorism measures.95
The Madrid attacks serve as a preliminary example of a focusing event that triggered demands for better information exchange to fight terrorism in Europe. Although a detailed analysis of EU-counterterrorism policies implemented in light of the Madrid bombings is possible and has been widely conducted by researchers96, such policy changes and adoptions do not truly reflect whether or not real
information sharing was increased. As the data available to the researcher was not statistically documented at the time, the impact of the 2004 incidents could not be adequately compared to the events in 2015, and are thus excluded from the analysis. We can conclude that the Madrid attacks made EU Member States more aware of the European dimension of terrorism and the cross-border movement of terrorist suspects, yet ultimately, the proclaimed urgency for closer cooperation was not followed up properly.
93 Bossong, The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European Security Policy after 9/11: 83.
94 Frédéric Simon, ‘From 9/11 to Charlie Hebdo: The EU’s response to terrorism’, EurActiv, [online] 14 January 2015.
95 For example: Ben Hayes and Chris Jones, ‘Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures Adopted since 11 September 2001’, Securing Europe through Counter-Terrorism: Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness (2013).
3. Research Design
3.1.
Operationalisation
Before delving into our analysis, we first need to set out the concepts used in this research, and their associated definitions and indicators. The chart below provides a compact overview to this end, but the two broader underlying concepts; terrorism and intelligence, deserve closer attention as they will be continuously referred to in the course this thesis, and it is therefore important they be understood as intended by the researcher.
The European Union has defined terrorism as offences committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”97. In Europol’s
annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)98, terrorism is grouped into five major categories: 1.
ethno-nationalist and separatist, 2. left-wing and anarchist, 3. right-wing extremist, 4. single-issue (e.g. animal rights) and 5. jihadist. The latter category has proven contentious: initially denominated ‘Islamist’ in previous TE-SAT reports, it was replaced by the term ‘religiously inspired’ in 2012 after a general decision taken at EU level to avoid the wrongful association of the criminal actions of a small group of extremists with the religion of Islam in general. As this classification in its turn appeared too general to accurately describe the threat faced by the European Union, the term ‘jihadist terrorism’ is now used.99 Compared to
this type of terrorism, incidents motivated by one of the first three categories mentioned above have caused significantly more economic damage and human casualties in Europe over the past decades. While violent left-wing or separatists groups, such as the RAF in Germany, ETA in Spain or the IRA in Northern Ireland, are either no longer active or less hostile towards national governments than in the past, right-wing attacks against pro-immigration groups or individuals continue to pose a considerable threat to EU internal security. This was made evident by the far-right terrorist Breivik who killed 69 members of a left wing youth party in Norway in 2011, numerous arson attacks on refugee reception centres across Europe in the past years, or the fatal stabbing of a British Labour politician in 2016.
Nonetheless, this thesis concentrates solely on the policy implications of rare, yet high-impact terrorist attacks attributed to Islamist extremism, which, justifiable or not, have generated arguably more attention from policymakers, media and the public. Jihadist terrorism is thus the only classification of terrorism that will be taken into consideration in this analysis. According to Europol, its definition
97 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism’, Official Journal of the European Union, L164/3, 22 June 2002.
98 See EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016. As stated on p. 52 of the report, the T-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. The choice of categories used reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as groups may display a mixture of motivating ideologies.
