Hardline bargaining strategy in the
intercultural context
An analysis of the influence of communicational context cultures on intercultural negotiations.
Marco Janmaat 10207600 Juli 2014
Bachelor opleiding Economie en Bedrijfskunde Begeleid door:
Specialisatie Bedrijfskunde. Daphne Koolmees
Abstract
This research explores the influence of cultural dissimilarity in intercultural negotiation. Due to increased global trade, the importance of intercultural negotiations has grown. Negotiators use different negotiation strategies to get the best economic outcome of the negotiations. This study examines the influence of cultural dissimilarity, operationalized in communication context culture background, on the relationship between hardline bargaining strategy and economic outcome. Thereby it tries to explore if hardline bargaining strategy makes a better fit with the low communication context culture.
An intercultural negotiation simulation was build using an online questionnaire. In total 171 people participated, divided among 4 surveys. Strong support was found for the fit between hardline bargaining strategy and low communication context culture. No significant prove was found for the moderating effect of cultural dissimilarity on the relationship between hardline bargaining strategy and economic outcome. The non-significant result does not dismiss cultural dissimilarity as an important variable in intercultural negotiations, but instead provides directions for future research. For future research a laboratory experiment building up on the negotiation simulation design used in this study is suggested.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
4
3. Theoretical framework
6
3.1 Intercultural negotiations
6
3.2 Negotiation style
7
3.3 Communication context
9
3.4 Hardline bargaining
10
3.5 Adaptation
11
4. Methodology
13
4.1 Method
13
4.2 Process
14
5. Results
16
5.1 Economic outcome
16
5.2 Last offer taken
18
5.3 Agreement reached
20
5.4 Age
20
6. Discussion
21
7. Limitations & future research
23
8. Conclusion & managerial implication
25
9. References
27
10. Appendix1
29
Introduction
The fading of trade barriers in big parts of the world has led to increased international
competition and trade which has significantly changed the market environment. Organizations nowadays are not only concerned with the domestic environment they operate in, but have to take in account a whole range of international factors that influence their environment (Speece & Chaisrakeo, 2004). This freedom to buy and sell products and services all around the world not only brings forward a huge amount of possibilities, but also adds a inter cultural
dimension to the transactions.
Especially transactions in B2B markets are influenced by cultural differences between the buyer and seller because the transactions in B2B markets in most cases rely on negotiations between both parties (Wilken, Jacob, & Prime, 2013). These intercultural negotiations are influenced by the context of the communication (Adler & Graham, 1989). The context of communication could be seen as a continuum ranging from high to low which influences the negotiator in his/her basic perceptions of the communication during the negotiations. A negotiator from a low culture context country is more focused on formal communication and assigns less value to informal communication. A high context culture assigns less value to formal communication and focuses more on informal communication (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2000).
This high versus low context of communication influences the choice and interpretation of negotiation styles (Adler & Graham, 1989). Current literature proposes two different approaches to negotiations, which are based on two contradicting theories of how to maximize negotiations outcomes. The hardline bargaining style is based on the level of
aspiration theory, which argues that a low first offer in combination with minimal concessions leads to the most favorable outcome. The contradicting bargaining style, soft line bargaining, is based on the tension reduction model which proposes that creating a cooperative
environment by doing unilateral concessions leads to the most favorable outcome (Huffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014).
A lot of research has been done on the different economic outcomes hardline versus soft line bargaining have with different demographic variables, or different situational factors. For example hardline bargaining style leads to a more favorable economic outcome if visual contact among negotiators is possible (Huffmeier et al., 2014). Research has also been done about the moderating effect of cultural communication context on the influence from gender, educational level and experience on soft line bargaining strategies(Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2000). Current research has not yet explored the moderating effect of culture
dissimilarity of high versus low context of communication culture on the relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcomes. Exploring this research gap can gain valuable insight in the negotiations process between negotiators from high and low context cultures. This can influence negotiations in trade relationships between western countries, which are characterized by low context cultures, and high context cultures like Japan, Thailand and China(Adair & Brett, 2005).
According to Adair, Brett,& Okumura (2001) cultural adaptation of one of the negotiators increases the chances of a positive outcome. The research of Mintu-Wimsatta &
Gassenheimer (2000) proves that negotiators from a high context culture are more likely to choose a soft line bargaining style because it makes a better fit with the communicational context. Researching if using hardline bargaining strategy in intercultural negotiations lead to a less favorable economic outcome, if the negotiation partner is from a different cultural context, an answer can be given to the question if adopting the bargaining style that fits the cultural context is gainful. Thereby this research aims to explore the influence of culture communication context as a determinant of preferable negotiation styles.
Out of the theoretical gap found in the existing literature the following research question is defined: What is the influence of cultural communication context similarity between negotiators on the relationship of hardline bargaining strategy and economic outcome? This research tries to provide a theoretical basis for negotiators whether they should train themselves in soft line bargaining, as well as hardline bargaining, or specialize themselves in the hardline bargaining style in case it fits them best. For example if the research proves that negotiators who use a hardline bargaining style and are from a low context culture have less favorable economic outcomes when they encounter a partner from high context culture, then negotiators can gain better results from negotiations if they train themself in soft line
bargaining. If the research does not prove significant favorable economic outcomes, negotiators should spend their effort on improving their hardline bargaining style.
First this paper will explore the current literature and define the concepts that are necessary to provide a theoretical framework. Secondly out of the theoretical framework the conceptual model is build and hypotheses are defined. Thirdly the conceptual model is tested with a self-administrated survey and quantitative analysis. Finally results are discussed and conclusions are drawn from the results.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework will begin with exploring intercultural negotiations in the current literature and shortly introduce the used constructs. Secondly different negotiations styles will be discussed. Thirdly the concept of communicational context will be researched. Finally out of theories about adaptation or conceptual model will be drawn.
Intercultural negotiations
A negotiation is a process which includes at least two parties with perceived different goals who engage in social interaction to come to an agreement (Carnevale & Prui, 1992; Brett 2000). Negotiators depend on each other to reach the wanted outcome, but at the same time want to maximize their own individual outcomes. This brings forward the negotiators dilemma, at one hand negotiators need to cooperate to make an agreement possible, on the other hand negotiators need to compete with each other to maximize their own outcomes (Huffmeier et al., 2014). To deal with this negotiators dilemma and reach optimal individual outcome two negotiations strategies are proposed in literature: Hardline bargaining strategy and soft line bargaining strategy (Ibid.).
There is a general consensus that the outcomes of intercultural negotiations are less favorable then the outcome of intracultural negotiations (Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965). Negotiators tend to feel less satisfied after intercultural meetings than after intracultural meetings, negotiations tend to take longer and are more frequently broken off due to communication problems (Ibid.). Intercultural negotiations are influenced by significantly different processes then intracultural negotiations (Cai, Drake, & Wilson, 2000). In intercultural negotiations,
negotiators have different cultural backgrounds; the negotiations are thereby influenced by the cultural context negotiators come from. The negotiators are individuals who are socialized with the values, beliefs and norm perceptions of their culture (Tinsley, Curhan, & Kwak, 1999). Many researches argue that individual differences in value, norms and beliefs are the product of national culture and held not by a single individual (Markus, Hazel, & Heiman, 1994 as cited in Tinsley et al.,1999). This research will thereby tend to focus on differences at cultural level rather than differences at individual level. One important aspect of cultural context is explored: The communicational context culture. The communicational context culture of negotiators is crucial in intercultural negotiations, after all negotiation consist of social interaction by communicating (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2000). Different communication context cultures of the negotiators in intercultural negotiations lead to communication problems which influence the negotiations outcome and behavior in an unfavorable manner (Graham, 1985). Francis (1991) argues that intercultural communication
problems arise from two sources of communication problems. First, there is a different norm of acceptable behavior among different cultures. Some behavior may be seen as acceptable in a culture, while the same behavior is not accepted in other cultures. The second source of communication problems arises from the misinterpretation of communication.
Communication problems may not be caused by what is said, but by how it is interpreted by the opposite party (Adler & Graham, 1989). Hall (1976) points out that the communication roblems between negotiators can be explained by the different communicational context culture negotiators come from. This communicational context is a continuum ranging from high to low in which negotiators interpret and prioritize communication.
The definition and implications of intercultural negotiation have been explored and
communicational context as key factor of cultural influence has been introduced as well as the two broad categories of negotiation styles, which will be further explored.
Negotiation styles
The literature about negotiation has defined two broad categories of negotiation styles that can be used during negotiations: Hardline bargaining, also known as the competitive approach and soft line bargaining, also known as integrative bargaining or the problem solving approach (Mintu-Wimsatta, & Gassenheimer, 2000). Soft line bargaining is defined as making unilateral concessions during the negotiations to encourage the other party to also make concessions. By making their own concessions, negotiators try to create a cooperative environment where understanding for the other party is demonstrated (Allen, Donohue, & Stewart, 1990). Negotiators that use this style try to adapt their behavior to the other party. They look for informal and formal signals of the other party to find out their needs and preferences (Mintu-Wimsatta, & Gassenheimer, 2000). In the context of intercultural negotiations this soft line bargaining strategy may include trying to understand the other cultures informal policies and behaviors to be able to find out their needs. A renowned example of the use of soft line bargaining strategy in the intercultural context is the negotiation tactic former Sovjet leader Michael Gorbatsjov, used in the negotiations with former U.S president Ronald Reagan about the disarmament of nuclear weapons. Gorbatsjov was the first in making a unilateral concession to decrease the tension between both countries (Matlock, 2004). The soft line bargaining strategy is based on the tension reduction model developed by Osgood (1962). Osgood advocates a graduated reciprocation policy; by doing one-sided concession, an environment of ‘give-and-take’ is created under the negotiators. According to Osgood, negotiators should make sure that the concessions are not interpreted as
weaknesses to create such an environment. By establishing this environment of ‘give-and-take’, trust among both parties is created and competitive bargaining where every concession is seen as a loss is avoided. The negotiations will transform into a cooperative situation where both negotiating parties work together towards a solution and the risk of zero-sum bargaining is reduced.
Contradictory to the tension reduction model is the level of aspiration theory developed by Siegel & Fouraker (1960), which is the theoretical basis for using a hardline bargaining strategy. According to the level of aspiration theory, negotiators enter the negotiations with a level of aspiration. This level of aspiration can be based on a number of factors, for example the market price of a certain product. The level of aspirations is adjusted during the
negotiations, when negotiators experience the feeling of success or failure. Starting the negotiations with an aggressive first offer will lead to the experience of failure by the other party. The level of aspiration theory expects that the other party will adjust his level of aspiration because of this experience. The other party will adjust his level of aspiration to make sure an agreement is possible. Using a hardline bargaining strategy consists of using aggressive first offers and doing minimal concessions during the negotiations (Huffmeier et al., 2014) to make the other party adjust his level of aspiration. The level of aspiration theory argues that if substantial and frequent concessions are made, the opposite party has the perception that the limit of concessions is not yet reached and more concessions could be possible. The level of aspiration theory does not recommend doing no concessions at all. Negotiators have to make small concessions to show their positive intentions, otherwise there is the risk of an impasse (Huffmeier et al., 2014). The hardline bargaining style in the
intercultural context will be the main point of this research. First of all hardline bargaining is expected to have more optimal economic outcomes because of the aggressive first offers and minimal concessions, while soft line bargaining uses unilateral concessions to come to successful negotiations (Huffmeier et al., 2014). Researching if the relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome is influenced by communicational context can thereby secure optimal economic outcome for intercultural negotiations. Secondly a lot of research has been done on soft line bargaining in the intercultural context while little research has been done on hardline bargaining in the intercultural context (Mintu-Wimsatta &
Gassenheimer, 2000). Thirdly among low communication context cultures, the soft line bargaining approach is less common then among high communication context cultures (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2000). Negotiators from a low culture context are generally more experienced and better in using hardline bargaining strategies because it
makes a better fit with their communicational context culture (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001). This research tries to provide a basis for negotiators from low communication context cultures to use their normative negotiation style or to change their negotiation style to soft line bargaining, if negotiators from high communication context are encountered. Thereby it could avoid spending money and time on training in both bargaining styles for intercultural
negotiations. The concept of communicational context shall now be further explored.
Communicational context
Hall (1976) developed a continuum ranging from low to high communication context in which cultures can be ranked. It shows the extent to which context of the communication is seen as important in a certain culture. This gives an interpretation of how people in a culture interpret communication (Kim, Pan & Park, 1998). In high context cultures information is for a big part drawn from the context of the communication instead of the message itself. The receiver of the communication interprets the message not directly from the message itself but from the context in combination with its own previous knowledge (Brett, 2000). Negotiators from high context cultures tend to be less strict and systematic during negotiations (Gulbro & Herbig, 1996 as cited in Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2000). Low context cultures are characterized by plain messages without any nuance or underlying meaning. The context of communication has little to no influence on the message (Brett, 2000). Negotiators from low context cultures quickly try to reach a formal agreement and work highly systematic (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer, 2013). From the research of Cai & Wilson (2000) the theoretical basis for the proposed model with communication context as a moderator of the relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome can be derived (see figure 1). Cai & Wilson (2000) argue that communication behavior of individuals is mainly determined by the cultural context. In case of conflict, regardless of the context of the situation, people will interpret communication according to their context culture and act according to their context culture. In negotiations practice this means that the interpretation of negotiation strategy maybe differently. For example if a negotiator from a low culture context start with an
aggressive first offer according to its hardline bargaining style this might be misinterpreted by its counter partner from high cultural context. The negotiators goal from the low context culture is to diminish the level of aspiration of the other negotiator according to the level of aspiration theory. Instead the negotiator of the high context culture may interpret this
aggressive first offer as an insult and bad intentions because in the context of the negotiations the other party begins with a negative attitude. This is because high context cultures assign
more value to the context of the communication compared to low context cultures (Brett, 2000). This implies that the negotiator from an high context culture will not just interpret the first offer as a plain message, but as showing the intentions for the whole negotiations.
Hardline bargaining and economic outcome
Hardline bargaining is expected to have a more optimal economic outcome compared to soft line bargaining because the soft line bargaining strategy tries to establish an environment of cooperation by initiating own concessions. These own concession diminish the economic outcome of the negotiations (Huffmeier et al., 2014). In comparison, soft line bargaining will not be expected to get more or bigger concessions then it uses itself, because its negotiation strategy is based on a cooperative environment where win and loss are shared. Hardline bargaining will only use minimal concessions and is expected to provoke bigger or more frequent concessions then its own from the opposite party (Ibid.). The research of Graham (1994) showed that the soft line bargaining approach is significantly more used in high context cultures compared to low context cultures. High context cultures are typified as less individualistic and more cooperative and thereby make a better fit with the cooperating problem solving approach (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer , 2000). Hardline bargaining better fits the low communication context culture because it supports the western rationality of negotiation. In the western logic the negotiations are systematically done, and negotiations end when a formal agreement is reached, and preferably written down (Ibid.). Hardline bargaining fits this western rationality because it starts off with clear intentions, and makes minimal concessions to these intentions. Because hardline bargaining makes an better fit with the low communicational context culture, hardline bargaining is expected to gain a more optimal economic outcome, which is formulated in the first hypotheses:
H1: The amount of hardline bargaining used by the negotiator will have a positive effect on economic outcome of the negotiations if done in a low context communication culture
Adaptation
Researching the moderating effect of communication context culture has it theoretical foundation in adaptation theories. Changing communication style and adjusting norms and behavioral norms to the other party’s culture is defined as adaptation (Ellingsworth, 1983 as cited in Francis, 1991). The use of adaptation by intercultural negotiations is defined as using negotiation strategies that are seen as normative in the culture of the receiver (Adair et al., 2001). Adair et al. (2001) and Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer (2000) pointed out that hardline bargaining style better fits the low communication context culture then the high communication context culture.
Attraction paradigm
Many researches advocate at least a form of adaptation to the cultural norms, values and behavior of the foreign counterparty. This advice is based on two main assumptions; first the assumption is made that the more similar people are behavioral the more people will like each other. Secondly, adapting to the foreign culture should lead to the avoidance of inappropriate behavior and/or misinterpretations (Francis, 1991). The theoretical foundation for these assumptions can be found in attraction paradigm developed by Bryne (1971). The attraction paradigm is based on the ‘Law of attraction’ which states that the more similar people are, the more attracted they feel towards each other (Leonard, 1976). Research has shown that
attraction can be seen as a linear function of similarity attitude versus dissimilar attitudes. The more similar attitudes relative to dissimilar attitudes, the higher the attraction to the opposite party (Wetzel & Insko, 1980). The more similar and attracted people are in a buyer seller relationship, like negotiations, the higher the expected outcome and changes of agreement (Francis, 1991). Attraction in this case is the mediator between similarity and more favorable outcomes. In the context of hardline bargaining in intercultural negotiations we thereby derive the following hypotheses.
H2: The relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome is positively moderated by cultural dissimilarity of the negotiation partner.
As mentioned hardline bargaining style better fits the low communication context culture then the high communication context culture (Adair et al., 2001; Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer , 2000). Theoretically derived from the attraction paradigm developed by Bryne (1971), negotiators from high context cultures who use hardline bargaining strategy make a better fit with the communicational context of counter partners from low context cultures and thereby act more similar which results in higher economic outcomes then when the normative soft line bargaining strategy is used.
Social identity theory
Opposed to the attractiveness paradigm, the social identity theory argues that increased similarity does not lead to more attraction among people (Francis, 1991). The social identity theory points out that we use all sorts of behavior to show our ‘group’ identity; we show solidarity to other group members and discriminate against non-group members. The goal of this behavior is self-esteem and self-enhancement. A group is defined as members who evaluate and interpret themselves and their surrounding with shared attributes and beliefs that distinguish them from other (Hogg, 2006). Intercultural negotiations differ from intracultural negotiations in the fact that both representatives are from distinctive cultural groups. The outcome of the negotiation is influenced by the perceived differences between the cultural groups (Francis, 1991). One of the processes that motivate the social identity is
distinctiveness. Individuals attempt by social comparison to create similarity within the group and distinctiveness between their own and other groups. People follow strategies to create intergroup distinctiveness, which is seen as positive, and when intergroup distinctiveness is threatened they will react negatively (Hogg, 2006). In the case of intercultural negotiations, adaptation by the other party will not lead to the presumed benefits as argued by the attraction paradigm, instead adaptation will lead to the threatening of group distinctiveness. Increased similarity thereby will have a negative influence on attraction which mediates between similarity and economic outcome (Francis, 1991). Based on the social identity theory and the implications for intercultural negotiations the following hypothesis is drawn
H3: The relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome is negatively moderated by cultural dissimilarity of the negotiation partner.
Negotiators from high context cultures pursuing hardline bargaining strategy to make a better fit with the low context culture of their negotiation party will according to the social identity theory experience negative reaction of their negotiation party. The negotiation party, from the
low context culture will try to distinct themselves and be less attracted, which lead to less economic outcome then when the normative soft line bargaining is used.
Methodology
Method
This research will try to test the stated hypotheses and related variables through quantitative research. The quantitative method provides the benefits of greater generalization and the collection of sufficient data from a large group of people (Saunders, Lewis, & Thomhill, 2009). In total 4 surveys were created in online survey software Qualtrics. These surveys were randomly distributed among Dutch people. The surveys were built as small negotiation
simulations. Participants actively had to engage in intercultural negotiations through the surveys. The negotiation simulation intended to simulate the processes of intercultural negotiations. The study uses two independent variables: Bargaining strategy & culture similarity. The depended variable is economic outcome of the negotiation in all four surveys. In the simulation participants are confronted with one of the two different negotiation styles: Hardline bargaining or soft line bargaining. To be able to test hypotheses 2 & 3, the
independent variable cultural dissimilarity was incorporated in the simulations where hardline bargaining strategy was used. In total three of the surveys included hardline bargaining strategy, but differed among each other by cultural background of the presented negotiator. The first survey included a hardline bargaining strategy with a negotiator with a Dutch cultural background. The second survey included a hardline bargaining strategy with a negotiator with a Chinese cultural background. The third survey hardline bargaining strategy was used with a negotiator with a mixed cultural background, Dutch and Chinese. In the fourth survey soft line bargaining strategy was simulated and the negotiator was introduced as coming from an Dutch cultural background. All the participants were randomly divided among the different simulations.
Process
The experimental design of the negotiation simulation is based on the experimental design developed by Hamner (1974). Every participant engaging in the research was explained they would randomly be selected to be the buyer or seller, but in reality would always be assigned to be the seller. The participant would then be showed an instruction paper and a payoff table. The instructions explain that they are engaging in intercultural negotiations and that they have to exchange offers about the wholesale price of product called product Xonan. Their goal is to maximize outcome for the organization they are working for called organization Yanmaat, but
they are not obligated to reach an agreement. Organization Yanmaat exports product Xonan and sells it to foreign countries, product Xonan is important for organization Yanmaat but they do also sell other products. They participants are explained that reaching no deal will not harm the organization, but a good deal would benefit the organization. After the organization and context is introduced, the process of the negotiations is explained.
The negotiation is started by an offer of the buyer. Every offer is accompanied with a sentence written by the buyer. The participant can respond to this offer in three ways, the first option is to accept the offer, this would end the negotiations by reaching an agreement. The second option is to refuse the offer and do a counter offer. The third option is to refuse the offer and break off the negotiations, this would end the negotiations without reaching an agreement. In case option two is chosen, the buyer makes a counter offer. The counter offer can be any amount at the interval of €0,10 cents, as explained to the participants in the instruction form. The negotiations are done in good faith, once an offer is made, the next offer cannot be less. The negotiators are not obligated to raise their offer, compared to their last offer, if they do a counter offer. After the negotiation process is explained the pay-off table is introduced. At the end of the instruction form, the participants had to fill in their age and nationality before the negotiation would start.
The pay-off table explains the participant what profit he has at a certain price. The product has a retail price of €13,30. The possible price range will be visible in the pay-off schedule. The bottom price is €5,00 euro while the upper price is €13,30, the interval is €0,10. The subject was explained that every gain he made would be a loss for the other negotiator; thereby a high profit for the participant would lead to a low profit for the buyer and vice versa. . The payoff table starts at -2,00 euro and ends at €6,30. If 5 euro is bid by the buyer, the seller would have a pay-off of -2,00 euro, because no seller or buyer is going to accept a negative pay-off and the pay-off tables are symmetrical, the true pay off ranges from 0 until €4,30. The buyer is programmed to follow the hardline bargaining strategy or the soft line bargaining strategy. The operationalization of the strategies is based on the book of Rahim, M. A. (1990).
Following the hardline bargaining strategy the buyer will start with an opening bid of €7,00, which implies that he will make €4,40 profit (the payoff table is symmetrical) while the seller will make no profit. The buyer will incrementally increase its offer with €0,10 cents after approximately 3 trails. To overcome the perception that the negotiator will keep continuing to offer €0,10 cents more every 3 trails this is done with different intervals and amounts. The negotiations can maximally take up 36 trails, after 36 trails the simulation will break off if no
deal has been reached. Following the hardline bargaining strategy the negotiation takes longer to reach the same potential economic outcome compared to soft line bargaining strategy.
The soft line bargaining strategy will start with an opening bid of €8,00, which means that the seller will have a profit of €1,00 while the buyer will have a profit of €3,40. In the third trail the buyer will make a concession of €0,50 cents to try and establish a cooperative
environment. After the first concession the buyer will make one more big concession and then slowly reduce the amount of its concession. After the 4th big concession, there will be no concession done for a period to make sure that the negotiation strategy is not seen as a
weakness. The negotiations can maximally take up 20 trails, after 20 trails the simulation will break off if no deal has been reached.
Incorporating the communication context
Before the negotiations start the buyer is introduced to the participant on the instruction form. There are three types of buyer used in the simulations where hardline bargaining strategy is simulated, the first buyer is coming from a low communication context culture (Dutch). The second buyer is coming from a high communication context culture (Chinese). The third buyer has a mixed context culture background (Dutch & Chinese). All use exactly the same negotiation strategy. The research of Wurtz (2006) provides an overview how people from low communication context communicate different from people from high communication context. First, people from a low communication context speak in a more direct, explicit and aggressive way. The seller from a low communication context culture will thereby be
introduced as very direct. At every offer the seller will be explicit in telling why he did the offer and what he thinks of the participants offer. The seller from a high communication context background will speak more indirect, at every offer the seller will be very polite and not explicitly telling what he thinks of the offer. Secondly, people from low context cultures believe in rationality and objective truth, this is translated in their communications by being explicit about information, and moving the conversation to information that is not yet given. This is translated into the negotiations by explicitly telling what the seller thinks of the offer and asking why the buyer thinks differently. People from high context cultures will be less detailed and explicated and will be reparative in their communication (Wurtz, 2006). This is incorporated in the negotiations by vaguely telling what the seller thinks of the offer and saying sentences repetitive. The buyer from mixed cultural background will be introduced as coming from a Chinese cultural background, but would in reality act like a buyer coming from an Dutch cultural background. In the negotiations where soft line bargaining is used, the
buyer will be introduced as coming from an Dutch cultural background, this will be in the exact same way as the buyer coming from an Dutch cultural background that uses the hardline bargaining strategy
The communicational context background of the negotiator is shown in two ways: First, the seller is introduced on the instruction form. Secondly every bid of the negotiator is
accompanied with a sentence. The next paragraph shows the instructions provided about the negotiator on the instruction form.
Low communicational context
The negotiator you are encountering is Hans Paal, Hans works for a Dutch company and is a typical Dutch guy, and he is very direct and explicit in his way of communicating. He doesn’t like to discuss things repetitively and has a clear idea what he wants. Hans likes to close the deal but will tell you if he thinks the price is wrong.
High communicational context
The negotiator you are encountering is Wan Xiao, Wan works for a Chinese company and is a typical Chinese person, he is very polite and will never tell you directly if he thinks you are wrong. He always tries to solve the problem for both parties, and thinks in a cooperative way. Wan likes to make a deal and wants to negotiate with you in a good way to get the right price.
The whole negotiation simulation can be found in Apendix 1.
Results
In total 171 (N) people participated in the research, divided among 4 surveys. After deleting not fully completed surveys or surveys with invalid answers, a total of 123 (N) surveys were used to analyse.
Economic outcome
To test for H1 a between groups independent sample T-test was conducted. In total 49 (N) participants participated in the hardline bargaining survey, ten filled in surveys were not fully completed and were not used for analysis. Seven surveys were not incorporated in the analysis due to invalid answers. Finally 32 (N) were usable for analysis. In the soft line bargaining 37 (N) participants were registered. Four surveys were not fully completed and not used for analysis, two surveys showed invalid answers. In total 31 (N) were used for analysis. To test
H1, the surveys where no agreement was reached about the price where not used in the analysis because no economic outcome was reached. In the hardline bargaining strategy survey, 7 surveys were excluded from analysis. In the soft line bargaining strategy survey, 14 surveys were excluded. The T test showed a significant difference between the hardline and soft line strategy (T=7.036, P=0.000). The mean of the economic outcome in the negotiations where hardline bargaining (M =7.964, SD = .628) was used thereby is significantly better than the mean of the economic outcome where soft line bargaining was used (M =9.229, SD = .477). H1 is therefore supported.
Low communication context culture – economic outcome
Bargaining strategy N Mean Std. Deviation Soft line bargaining strategy 17 9,2294 ,47666 Hardline bargaining strategy 25 7,9640 ,62775
*T=7.036, P=0.000
The influence of culture dissimilarity as stated in H2 and H3 are tested with an one sided ANOVA in combination with Scheffe’s post hoc test. Three groups that all used the hardline bargaining strategy were compared. In the first group, the negotiator has an low
communication context culture background. The negotiator from the second group comes from an high communication context culture. The third group is the control group, where the communication context background is mixed. In total 49(N) people participated in the hardline bargaining strategy with an negotiator of a low communication context culture. 10 surveys were not fully completed and were not used for analysis. Seven surveys were
excluded from analysis due to invalid answers. 32 (N) surveys were useable for analyzing. To test for the difference in economic outcome, the negotiations were no agreement about the price was reached were excluded. 7 surveys were therefore excluded which left 25 (N)
suitable for testing. In group 2, 45(N) participants were registered. Ten surveys were not fully completed and thereby not used for analysis. Five surveys were excluded due to invalid answers. 30 (N) surveys were correctly filled in. In 6 cases the negotiations did not lead to an agreement, they were excluded from the analysis. In total 24 (N) cases were suitable for testing. In group 3, 40 (N) people participated in the survey. 5 surveys were not used for analysis due to incompletion and 5 surveys showed invalid answers. This leaves 30 (N) suitable for testing. In three negotiations no deal was made. In total therefore 27 (N) surveys were used for analysis. The one way ANOVA test showed that there are no significant differences between the groups (F (2, 73) =0.562, p=0.573). The means of group 1 (M=7.964 SD=0.628), group 2 (M=8.163, SD=0.718) and group 3 (M=8.115, SD=0.715) only have little
non-significant differences. Hypotheses 2 and hypotheses 3 are not supported based on the results of the one sided ANOVA test.
Hardline bargaining strategy – economic outcome
Context culture N Mean Std. Deviation Low communication context 25 7,9640 ,62775 High communication context 24 8,1625 ,71798 Mixed communication context 27 8,1148 ,71452 Total 76 8,0803 ,68430 Anova df F Sig. Between Groups 2 ,562 ,573 Within Groups 73 Total 75
Last offer taken
In the hardline bargaining strategy the negotiator leaves the negotiations after 36 trails, in the soft line bargaining strategy the negotiator leaves the negotiations after 20 trails. If the assumption that the buyer will leave the negotiations without reaching an agreement is harmed, the effect has to be researched on economic outcome of the negotiations if the buyer leaves the negotiations with accepting the last offer that the seller makes. Note that the last offer the seller makes can exceed the last bid of the buyer of €9,60.
To research the difference between hardline and soft line bargaining, an independent sample T-test was performed. The soft line bargaining survey registered 37 (N) participants, after checking for invalid answers and uncompleted surveys, 31(N) surveys were suitable for analysis. The hardline bargaining survey registered 49 (N) participants, 17 surveys were not suitable for analysis due to invalid answers or incompletion, this left 32(N) suitable for
analysis. The T test showed a significant difference between the hardline and soft line strategy (T=-2.238, P=0.023) at a significance level of P<0.05. The mean of the economic outcome in the negotiations where hardline bargaining (M =9.0781, SD = 2.565) was used thereby is significantly better than the mean of the economic outcome where soft line bargaining was used (M =10.453, SD = 2.090). This strengthens the conclusion that H1 is supported, even when the last offer is accepted the hardline bargaining strategy has significantly better economic outcome compared to when soft line bargaining strategy is used.
Low communication context culture – last offer accepted – economic outcome
Bargaining strategy N Mean Std. Deviation Hardline strategy 32 9,0781 2,56487 Softline strategy 31 10,4532 2,09025
*T=-2.238, P=0,023
To test the difference between the high, low and mixed communication context background when hardline bargaining is assumed a one sided ANOVA test is performed. Surveys with invalid answers or not fully completed were withdrawn from analysis. In Group 1, where the negotiator has a low context culture background, 32 (N) surveys were usable for analysis. In group 2, where the negotiator has a high context culture background, 30(N) surveys were used for analysis. Group 3, where the negotiator has a mixed context culture background, 30 (N) surveys were correctly filled in. The one way ANOVA test showed that there are no
significant differences between the groups (F (2, 89) =1,301, p=0.277). It must be noted that assumption of homogeneity of variance is not met (Levene statistic=5.168, P=0,008), but sample sizes are near equal so there can be stated that the one way ANOVA is robust against the violation. The means of group 1 (M=9.078 SD=0.256), group 2 (M=8.823, SD=1.568) and group 3 (M=8.333, SD=0.951) are different, but the difference is non-significant. This
supports or first conclusion that the hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported.
Hardline bargaining strategy – last offer accepted – economic outcome
Anova
df Mean Square F Sig. Between Groups 2 4,407 1,301 ,277 Within Groups 89 3,387
Total 91
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 5,168 2 89 ,008
Context culture N Mean Std. Deviation Low communication context 32 9,0781 2,56487 High communication context 30 8,8233 1,56815 Mixed communication context 30 8,3333 ,95098 Total 92 8,7522 1,84656
Agreement reached
To get a deeper understanding of the economic outcome of the negotiations, the different negotiations are tested for a significant difference on the depended variable agreement or no agreement with a chi square test. Two chi square tests are performed, the first chi square test is performed on the groups with different communicational context background of the
negotiator. The second chi square tests the difference in agreement and no agreement between the hardline and soft line strategy. No significant difference was found between the low, high and mixed group (
2 (2, N = 92) = 1.731, p = .421), this is in accordance with not supporting hypotheses 2 and 3. The second chi square test performed shows a significant difference between hardline versus soft line strategies (
2 (1, N = 63) = 6.522, p = .011) at asignificance level of P <0.05. After the chi square test, a Phi test was conducted to determine the strength of the effect. The Phi test showed a small to moderate effect (Φ=-0.322). This supports the acceptance of H1, soft line bargaining has a small to moderate negative effect on reaching an agreement.
Agreement Reached
Age
As noted in sample & method, the participants were drawn among many different sources. Participants were randomly divided among the 4 negotiations survey. Participants with
different ages thereby participated in the same negotiation survey. To test for the influence of
Regression model age – economic outcome
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 8,406 ,248 33,876 ,000 Age ,009 ,010 ,079 ,870 ,386
* a. Dependent Variable: Negotiation_outcome ** Predictors: (constant), Age
*** F(1,122)=0.756, P=0.386
age on negotiation outcome a linear regression was performed. The linear regression included al 123 (N) participants. The linear regression showed an very small adjusted R²=-0.002 that is non-significant (F(1,122)=0.756, P=0.386). The non-significant beta that was reported (β =0.079 t(123) = 0.87, p > .05) showed that age was not a significant predictor of economic outcome.
Discussion
The goal of this study is to contribute to the knowledge about intercultural negotiation. The relevance of intercultural negotiation for organizations has increased due to enlarged volume of international trade, which affects many organizations (Speece & Chaisrakeo, 2004). In detail the effect of two bargaining strategies as tested, as well as the moderating effect of cultural dissimilarity on the economic outcome of the negotiations. Throughout this research negotiation outcome has been operationalized as economic outcome. The experimental design used was based on the research of Hamnler (1974).
Hypotheses 1 focused on the match between bargaining strategy and cultural context. The aim of soft line bargaining strategy to create an cooperative environment at the cost of its own concessions was expected not to match with low communication context cultures where the western logic of negotiation is applicable (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer , 2000). The hypotheses was strongly supported, the economic outcome was significantly lower for the buyer using soft line bargaining strategy compared to hardline bargaining strategy , P < 0.001. The soft line bargaining strategy also performed significantly less than the hardline bargaining strategy when the last offer was accepted P <0.05. In the light of the level of aspiration
developed by Siegel & Fouraker (1960), which forms the theoretical basis for the hardline bargaining strategy, the level of aspiration of participants that participated in the soft line
bargaining simulation seems significantly higher than participants who negotiated in the hardline bargaining simulation. The tension-reduction model developed by Osgood (1962) predicted that starting with a reasonable offer and making significant concession would create a cooperative environment. Instead the soft line bargaining raised the aspiration level of the participants. This is strengthened by the significant difference, between agreements and no agreements, between the hardline bargaining and soft line bargaining simulation. The chi square test showed that soft line bargaining had significantly more no agreements then hardline bargaining (
2= 6.522, p < 0.05). The results are in agreement with the theory that argues that soft line bargaining does not make a good fit with low communication context cultures (Mintu-Wimsatta & Gassenheimer , 2000).Hypotheses 2 incorporated the influence of cultural similarity based on the attraction
paradigm of Bryne (1971). Cultural dissimilarity was expected to be a positive moderator, in intercultural negotiations, on the relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome. This research did not support cultural dissimilarity as a moderator. The one sided ANOVA test showed non-significant differences P>0.05. The one sided ANOVA conducted when the last offer was accepted. also showed a significant difference P>0.05. This non-significant result provides the field of research with an important theoretical insight. The research of Cai & Wilson (2000) provided the theoretical basis for the different interpretations of communication based on the communication context culture people originate from. This research does not reject the theory of Cai & Wilson (2000), but instead provides an new view where culture dissimilarity operationalized through different communication context culture backgrounds is revised. This research suggests that cultural dissimilarity operationalized in communication context culture, is not an influence on negotiation behavior during the intercultural negotiation. This provides two possible insights. First, the construct of cultural dissimilarity may not be rebuild with the use of different communication, to create cultural dissimilarity more dimensions should be added. Secondly the law of attraction developed by Leonard (1976) may not be applicable to integrative negotiations, in negotiations both negotiators pursue opposite goals, this might diminish the effect of attraction.
Hypotheses 3 provided a different view of cultural dissimilarity in intercultural negotiations. Based on the social identity theory developed by Francis (1991), cultural dissimilarity was expected to be a negative moderator, in intercultural negotiations, on the relationship between hardline bargaining and economic outcome. As stated before the one sided ANOVA test did not show any significant difference between the two groups and the control group. The social identity theory may not be suitable for negotiation practice because a bargaining strategy may
not be addressed as belonging to a certain culture. Participants from the low communication context may not have interpreted the hardline bargaining strategy pursued by the negotiator from high context culture as a way to match the cultural norms and values of the participant. The participants then have no need to distinct themselves and show their ‘group identity’, and will act the same as when a negotiator from the same cultural context is encountered.
Limitations and future research.
With the use of surveys, this research tried to gain insights in the process of intercultural negotiations. For future research three improvements to the methodology of this research are proposed. First the sample size of N (123) should be increased to strengthen validity and generalizability. Secondly, the between group methodology of this research creates room for individual variability to become a factor, especially because surveys were distributed among a wide range of people varying in a range of demographic factors. For future research using a within subject design, this individual variability could be reduced. Thirdly participants were used with no experience in the context of intercultural negotiations or negotiations itself. Using participants with experience in negotiations or intercultural negotiations can increase the external validity of the research.
This research tried to simulate the process of intercultural negotiation through surveys, based on the research design of Hamner (1974). The environment of intercultural negotiation was tried to be recreated with the use of written text. This is an important limitation; the written text does not cover all the dimensions of intercultural negotiations. Cai, Drake, & Wilson (2000) argued that intercultural negotiations have significantly different processes then intracultural negotiations. The intercultural negotiation simulation might have not captured the essence of these differences through written text. Therefore, participants might have experienced the intercultural negotiations as normal intracultural negotiations. For future research therefore is suggested to change the design of the research in to a laboratory
experiment, where the simulation of intercultural negotiation can be improved through face to face experience.
The operationalization of communication context culture of the negotiator was based on the research of Wurtz (2006). To be able to incorporate the communication context culture in to the negotiation simulation some adjustments were made. One of the aspects named by Wurtz (2006), in which high communication context cultures significantly differs from low
communication context cultures, is non-verbal communication. According to Wurtz (2006) face to face communication in high communication context cultures highly relies on
verbal communication. Low context communication cultures focus more on the content of the conversation, non-verbal communication is of less importance. The experimental design used in this research did not allow incorporating the use of non-verbal communication into the negotiation simulation. The recreation of a communication context culture background by following preset rules may harm the validity of this research. For future research the construct of communication context culture background in intercultural negotiations should be explored further to create higher internal validity of the research.
According to Allen, Donohue, & Stewart, (1990) the goal of the soft line bargaining strategy is creating a cooperative environment. In this research the soft line bargaining strategy used two ways to create a cooperative environment. First, unilateral concessions were made in the beginning of the negotiations. Second, through written text a friendly atmosphere was tried to establish. These two methods did not fully cover the dimensions of soft line bargaining. As Mintu-Wimsatta, & Gassenheimer (2000) pointed out, negotiators following the soft line bargaining strategy try to find out the preferences and needs of the opposite party. They are sensitive to the other parties’ behavior, and adjust their own behavior according to it, and so create a cooperative environment. Because the bargaining strategies used in the negotiation simulation were pre-set strategies, there was no room for adaptation to the behavior of the opposite party. For future research, operationalizing the dimensions of soft line bargaining should be extended to create higher validity.
This research provided a first direction of exploring the construct of cultural dissimilarity in intercultural negotiations. With the finding of non-significant results, it does not dismiss the influence of cultural dissimilarity in intercultural negotiations. Instead the construct cultural dissimilarity should be further explored. This research suggests that the construct of cultural dissimilarity through showing a different communication context culture background is not sufficient. The different dimensions of cultural dissimilarity should be researched to provide deeper insights of the effect of cultural dissimilarity on intercultural negotiations.
Secondly, this research provides a basis for the deeper exploration of bargaining strategy and communication context culture fit. The significant different results between the amount of hardline bargaining strategy in low communication context culture suggest that adaptation could be proven valuable. For future research, exploring if learning a new bargaining style by a negotiator from high communication context culture to adapt to the low communication context culture background of the opposite party, could provide valuable insights. This could provide important managerial implications for manager’s engaging in intercultural
negotiations.
Thirdly, this research has focused on economic outcome of the negotiations. For future research the outcome of the negotiations should be extended to more dimension then
economic outcome. Soft line bargaining is proven to create more fundamental basis for long term relationships (Mintu-Wimsatta, & Gassenheimer, 2000). Satisfaction after the
negotiation is highly important for a long term relationship and should be taken in to account in future research.
Conclusion
This study tried to get a deeper understanding of the influence of culture on intercultural negotiation practice. It explored the influence of the constructs of culture dissimilarity in intercultural negotiation. Based on previous literature, different communication context cultures were defined and used as a way to show cultural dissimilarity.
The results of this study support the fit between hardline bargaining strategy and low communication context culture. In the low communication context culture the level of aspiration theory, as contradictory to the tension reduction model, is proven to be the most applicable. Contradictory to the social identity theory as well as the attraction paradigm, no influence of the different communication context culture background of the negotiator was found. The non-significant results between the negotiators with different communication context culture backgrounds did not discharge cultural dissimilarity as a variable of
importance in intercultural negotiations. Instead this research provides directions for further exploring the construct of cultural dissimilarity in intercultural negotiations.
This research also provides directions for the further development of simulating negotiations. The incorporation of communication context culture in to negotiation simulations should be further explored to be able to recreate the intercultural negotiations.
Managerial implication
This study provided an important implication for managers from low communication context cultures. Hardline bargaining led to significant better economic outcome as compared to soft line bargaining in low communication context cultures and thereby it provides a basis for managers from low context communication context cultures to follow the hardline bargaining strategy if an party from the same context culture is encountered. Secondly, managers from high context cultures who are native to the hardline bargaining strategy might benefit from using this strategy if negotiators from low context cultures are encountered. There must be noted that this research focused on economic outcome of the negotiation. The effects of using
hard or soft line bargaining strategy when a long term relationship is attempted is not yet clarified.
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Appendix 1
Instruction form showed to participants negotiation with negotiator from high context culture. The highlighted parts differ among the different negotiators
Dear participant,
By receiving this form you are engaging in intercultural negotiations. You have been selected to be the seller in the intercultural negations. You are representing a company called
Company Yanmaat, a wholesale company. Yanmaat produces products in the Netherlands and exports them all over the world, which are then sold to consumers. Yanmaat has multiple products and one of these products is called product Xonan.
You are one of the sales managers of the company and your job is to sell products of the product portfolio of Yanmaat to possible clients. The prices of Yanmaat are not fixed but differ per client and are established through negotiations, as a sales manager it is important you sell the products, but not against any price. It’s up to you to get the best deal you think is possible, our if you think the deal is not fair to refuse the deal. No deal will not harm the company, but a good deal will benefit the company.
The company has sent you to a possible customer, they have tested the product and are interested in buying the company if the price is right. It is your job to negotiate with the customer and to make a deal if you think the price is right, our refuse the deal. Before you go the company has given you some additional information about the possible customer:
The negotiator you are encountering is Hans Paal, Hans works for a Dutch company and is a typical Dutch guy, and he is very direct and explicit in his way of
communicating. He doesn’t like to discuss things repetitively and has a clear idea what he wants. Hans likes to close the deal but will tell you if he thinks the price is wrong.
The negotiations will start by a bid of the buyer. At every bid the seller has 3 options:
1. To accept the bid, then the negotiations are ended by reaching an agreement
2. To refuse the offer and do a counter offer. (It is important to notice that when doing a counter offer that you do not have to raise your offer compared to the last offer)
3. To refuse the bid and break off the negotiations without reaching an agreement.
The negotiations are done in good faith, this means that your counter offer can never be lower than your previous offer. You are allowed to offer the same amount as your previous
offer. You should keep in mind that Hans may leave the table if he thinks your offers are not good enough. He has exactly the same options as you have.
To help you the company has provide you with a payoff table of product Xonan. The product retails approximately for €13, 30 to the consumers. The negotiations are done at an interval of €0, 10 cents. A high profit for the company will lead to a low profit for Hans Paal, and vice versa. In the payoff table you can see that for a negotiated price of €7, 00 the company will make no profit. At a price of €13, 30 the company will make the most profit, but Hans Paal wil make no profit because the retail price is approximately €13,30.
The highlighted part that is showed on the instruction form when negotiator from low context culture is encounterd.
The negotiator you are encountering is Wan Xiao, Wan works for a Chinese company and is a typical Chinese person, he is very polite and will never tell you directly if he thinks you are wrong . He always tries to solve the problem for both parties, and thinks in a cooperative way. Wan likes to make a deal and wants to negotiate with you in a good way to get the right price.
The payoff table showed to the participants
The hardline and soft line bargaining strategy
Hardline bargaining style Softline bargainng style
trail negotiation price raised number of admittance trail negotiation price raised number of admittance
1 7 opening 1 8 opening 2 7 0 2 8 0 3 7 0 3 8,5 0,5 1 4 7,2 0,2 1 4 8,5 0 5 7,2 0 5 8,9 0,4 2 6 7,5 0,3 2 6 8,9 0 7 7,5 0 7 9,2 0,3 3 8 7,5 0 8 9,2 0 9 7,5 0 9 9,2 0 10 7,5 0 10 9,4 0,2 4 11 7,8 0,3 3 11 9,4 0 12 7,8 0 12 9,4 0 13 7,8 0 13 9,4 0 14 8 0,2 4 14 9,5 0,1 5 15 8 0 15 9,5 0 16 8 0 16 9,5 0 17 8 0 17 9,6 0,1 6 18 8,2 0,2 5 18 9,6 0 19 8,2 0 19 9,6 0 20 8,2 0 20 9,6 0 21 8,4 0,2 6 22 8,4 0 23 8,4 0 24 8,4 0 25 8,6 0,2 7 26 8,6 0 27 8,6 0 28 8,9 0,3 8 29 8,9 0 30 9,1 0,2 9 31 9,1 0 32 9,3 0,2 10 33 9,3 0 34 9,3 0 35 9,6 0,3 11 36 9,6 0 31
Sentences used in hardline bargaining simulation with negotiator from high context culture & low context culture. The sentences who are highlighted red are used by the negotiator from low context culture
Offer 1: That is enough, i think this is a fairly good offer, i need to earn some money to"
Offer 1: “With all that is in my power, I have tried to comprehend the product Xonan in this price, do you feel that €7,00 matches your idea of the price?”
Offer 2 : “I have clearly stated what I am offering you, your offer is way to high”
Offer 2: “With the highest regard for your abilities, I regret to inform you that I am not fully satisfied with your offer, would you mind to please reconsider €7,00?”
Offer 3: “I don’t know how you came up with that price, but I can’t work with that, €7,00 euro is an good offer”
Offer 3:“With all respect, I do not fully understand your position about €7,00. The price of Xonan has some difficult implications for our profit making, €7,00 euro would be the start of something new”
Offer 4: “Oke I am willing to pay you a bit more, but you should really consider your prices.”
Offer 4: “After re-examining your point of view, I am happy to inform you we are able to make a concession of €0,20. Would you please re-examine your prices now?”
Offer 5: “The offer is good, I already raised it once, I think we can become good partners if you accept the offer”
Offer 5: “I would like to point out the possibilities of our future relationships, in the light of cooperation €7,20 seems like a legit price.”
Offer 6: “Oke I will pay you 0,30 cents more per product, It is an premium price for Xonan, but for this price I expect you to be a reliable partner
Offer 6: “ I am happy to inform you that within our possibilities I have found an option to raise the price with €0,30 cents. The light of our future relationship I see you as a reliable partner!”
Offer 7: “ No I raised my offer twice already, it is too much”
Offer 7: “With all due respect, with in our possibilities we have increased our offer for the product Xonan, our possibilities are thereby stretched. “
Offer 8: “We won’t reach an agreement like this, your price is too high”
Offer 8: “With the highest regard of your negotiation skills, the gap between our prices is significantly, I must ask you to help me close the gap to secure our future relationship” Offer 9: “The negotiations will take really long like this, your offer is unfair and I will make no profit like this”
