A Russian World?
On the inner workings of Russian cultural-linguistic institutes and their
effectiveness as vehicles of soft power
MA Thesis East European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
University of Amsterdam
Author: Sjoerd Oostra, 11050845
Main Supervisor: dr. Christian Noack
Second Supervisor: dr. Alfrid Bustanov
Table of Contents
Abstract...3
Acknowledgements...4
A Note on Translation and Transliteration...5
Introduction...6
Chapter 1: Discourse Analysis and Methodology...8
Chapter 2: The State of Affairs in Foreign Affairs...13
2.1 The Conception of Public Diplomacy and Institutes...13
2.2 The Demands of Policy...19
2.3 Conclusion...23
Chapter 3: Structures and Methods...24
Introduction...24
3.1 The Russkii Mir Foundation...25
3.2 The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute...29
3.3 Rossotrudnichestvo...33
3.4 Conclusion...36
Chapter 4: Depictions of Russia...38
Introduction...38
4.1 The Russkii Mir Foundation...39
4.2 The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute...47
4.3 Conclusion...52
Chapter 5: Implications and Considerations...54
Bibliography...58
Primary Sources...58
Oral Sources...59
Secondary Sources...60
Appendix...63
List of Questions – Russkii Mir...63
Abstract
This MA thesis is primarily centered around the use of Russian culture-language institutes as instruments of soft power. During the research project, this matter has been approached from an interdisciplinary angle; with elements of historical and anthropological research methods mixed in it. The institutes that have been subject to research are the Russkii Mir Foundation, the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, and Rossotrudnichestvo. The main goal of this thesis is not to assess the institutes direct effects on the people with whom they are connected, but rather their ability to translate policy directives into effective methods that promote Russian soft power, especially in the near abroad. Before researching the inner workings of each institute the general state of affairs pertaining to the relation of these institutes with policy, and their role in foreign affairs have been examined. The subsequent chapters deal with the inner workings of the three institutes: their methodology, structure, didactics, activities etc. A final supplementary chapter deals with the implications of this research project’s findings, and how they might be interpreted when put together.
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors. I owe a debt of gratitude to dr. Christian Noack in particular for taking the time to help me prepare for this research project. My eyes were opened to the possibilities of conducting field work in Russia during our discussions, something which has turned out to be the backbone of this entire project.
Secondly, I want to extend my gratitude to the employees of the Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg for their help in accommodating my activities in Russia. Special thanks go to Katja Vekshina, who has helped me approach numerous organizations, and who was of great assistance in setting up the interviews.
Thirdly, I am very grateful to my friends and family for their enduring love and support. Being able to send drafts and have them ‘peer-reviewed’ by the ones closest to me has proved invaluable to my confidence in pursuing this research project.
A Note on Translation and Transliteration
All translations from Russian to English are my own, unless otherwise indicated. They are based on the conventions established in the ALA-LC Romanization for Russian. In transliteration and spelling this convention has been given preference over other methods, though diverging transliterations used in titles by other authors (for example: About Russkiy Mir Foundation instead of About Russkii Mir Foundation) have been respected, as can be seen in the footnotes and bibliography.
Introduction
Soft power. It is one of the more fickle concepts of the academic discipline of International Relations. Despite being a staple in this academic field, the concept is still often used in the same way it was at the time of its conception in 1990. Some pioneering authors have since expanded the concept beyond the confines of its original interpretation, but the field of International Relations is still dominated by descriptions of intent, rather than process or outcome.
This is especially true for Russia, which has, some would say, invented a new form of statesmanship altogether in the past few years. Like any (aspiring) contemporary great power, Russia has invested greatly in expanding its soft power arsenal. It has been theorized a number of times in the field of International Relations that one of the areas where Russia’s soft power is most prevalent is that of international education, specifically concerning the fields language and culture. Some authors have looked at the intent behind this endeavor, and few have tried to assess its effects on people who are on the receiving end of Russian soft power. But so far, very little research has been conducted on the practical execution of Russian soft power. It is this gap that I have attempted to explore with this thesis.
I have attempted to do this by doing field research in Russia. For two months, I have
conducted interviews and examined materials from three prominent institutes that I hypothesized were in some way connected to the execution of cultural-linguistic soft power policy. These institutes were the following: the Russkii Mir Foundation, the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, and the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation Rossotrudnichestvo. I have conducted interviews with eight ranking figures at these institutes, as well as three people that were formerly associated with the institutes. Through examination of policy papers I have found that they were indeed intended to function as vehicles of Russian soft power, after which I started my field research. The way in which
this thesis is constructed follows the pattern of my journey, and working process. The main question I have asked myself during the course of this research project is the following: to what degree is
Russian cultural-linguistic soft power policy effectively executed through cultural-linguistic institutes? To provide structure for this main question, this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is used to analyze the existing discourse on (Russian) soft power, to explain the methodology of this research project, and offer some explanation on the types of sources that were used. The second chapter offers a brief historical/historiographical overview of cultural-linguistic policy to create a frame of reference upon which the subsequent chapters can be built. The chapter is also used to show how the institutes can be connected directly to policy papers. The third chapter revolves around the structure, approach and methodology of Russian culture-language institutes to assess whether or not the policy directives have resulted in a ‘united front.’ This logically flows into the fourth chapter, which is used to examine the didactics and depictions of Russia in textbooks and other lesson materials, and determine whether or not there is a clearly different approach to non-native speakers and compatriots respectively. The fifth and final chapter is then used to reflect on the relative
effectiveness of the aforementioned policies, and determine who is intended to be at the receiving end of them (diaspora or non-nationals).
Chapter 1: Discourse Analysis and Methodology
No research project making use of the concept of ‘Soft Power’ would be complete without the inclusion of the author who originally came up with the concept: Joseph Nye. This author coined the term in 1990, and has since seen it grow out to become one of the core concepts of contemporary international relations, both in theory and practice. Since the concept of soft power plays such a vital role in this thesis, it makes sense to include a thorough reading of Soft power: The means to success in world politics. In this book, and numerous subsequent articles and interviews, Nye has explained the way in which soft power is used by governments as a geopolitical tool.1 In Nye’s view, soft powerserves modern governments as a tool to achieve things that hard power can not. Among hard power resources Nye has listed things such as an army, capital resources, coercion etc.2 Soft power instead
serves to influence and to attract, preferably without the recipient being aware.3 A good example
encompassing both these aspects would be the Marshall Plan. This plan was, as is well known, an economic aid-package to help European governments rebuild their shattered countries. This gave the United States an unprecedented amount of hard power over European states, as they became both literally and figuratively indebted to their benefactor. However, with the package an equally unprecedented amount of American goods and values also entered Western-Europe. Products like Coca-Cola, and the increasing presence of American thought in education, served to further reinforce the United States’ positive image. These things were not visibly part of some government program, but did help the United States to build a lasting presence in Western-Europe. The United States therefore became more attractive without being too overt, it seemed as if it was just there, which exemplifies soft power in a nutshell.
At this moment, the scholarly debate on soft power does not seem to be revolving around the definition and different interpretations of the concept, this discussion was more relevant during the 1990s and early 2000s, but rather the way in which it can be used. The scholarly debate on this subject
1 Joseph Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics, (New York 2004). 2 Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power,’ Foreign Policy (1990), Vol. 80, pp. 153-171, p. 155-159. 3 Nye, ‘Soft Power’, pp. 153-171, p. 166-171.
has not yet expanded very much beyond the mere ‘intent’ of politicians, and remains even less concerned about the outcome of policies under that label. In international relations, states are commonly seen as actors, but more recent ventures expanding the scope of analysis in contemporary international relations, like for example Gerard Toal’s critical geopolitics, have shown that while this approach is fruitful, it does not entirely cover contemporary interstate discourse anymore.4 Any
modern state consists of many (invisible) actors that maintain and progress the apparatus, however much it may seem that a country is being controlled by a single person. Furthermore, modern states tend to make use of a multitude of means to get a certain message across (such as TV, radio, social media, hard action, soft action etc.), which makes it harder to see an institution like for example the Kremlin as a unified actor.
Only few authors have expanded the concept of soft power beyond the origins of its discipline. Ammon Cheskin, Valentina Feklyunina and Michal Kozdra have all tried to look beyond the intent of (Russian) soft power policy and examined the effect of such policy on ordinary people. This
exploration of Russian soft power is fairly novel, as all three of them have published their works on the subject only in 2017 and 2018. Of the three, Cheskin has made this point most clearly, as his entire article revolves around the creation of a structural approach to Russian soft power.5 In other words, he
intended to find a way past the agent of power and address the issue of subjects of power directly. Compared to Nye’s original conception, it is a bottom-up interpretation of the subject. Feklyunina has assumed a similar position, but ended up with very meaningful examination of the nature of soft power in this particular context. She has adopted a social constructivist approach to analyze the influence of soft power on identity empirically, thus ‘zooming out’ a bit beyond Cheskin’s
interpretation, which has resulted in tremendously useful data. Feklyunina has therefore effectively shown that soft power goes beyond the sparring of geopolitical cultures, but also directly affects peoples’ minds and hearts, resulting in alterations of identity (collective or otherwise).6 Kozdra has
4 Gerard Toal & John O’loughlin, ‘Why Did MH17 Crash?: Blame Attribution, Television News and Public Opinion in Southeastern Ukraine, Crimea and the De Facto States of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transnistria’, Geopolitics, 23(4) (2018), pp. 882–916.
5 Ammon Cheskin, ‘Russian soft power in Ukraine: A structural perspective’, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 50 (2017), pp. 277-287.
6 Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’’, European Journal
also opened up new possibilities for this scholarly field, as he has researched specifically the russkii mir concept in Russian online media. This too has opened new doors regarding the concepts of cultural identity and soft power. While his approach differs little from traditional source analysis, the changeability of digital sources and the multi-agentic dynamic they expose, have opened up yet another dimension in the debate. Among his list of sources both government media, sponsored media and social media can be found. He has therefore effectively connected both the aforementioned perspectives with a source study that befits discourse on identity in the modern world.7
This brings me to the more specific literature on the implementation of Russian language policies abroad. Similar to the previous debate, this discussion seems to largely concentrate on the intents behind policy, and not so much their effects on the target groups. One has to look into sponsored research, like that of the OECD (Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and
Development) to really see the effects of the Russian language in the near abroad.8 This is especially
true for the field of education. Even Sirke Mäkinen, who has published an insightful article on the subject of Russian educational diplomacy quite recently (in 2016), has viewed this research problem as a matter of foreign policy, and neglected its effects on ordinary people.9
The academic discourse on the subject of soft power is therefore expansive. While the bottom-up study of soft power inside and outside of Russia is now clearly emerging as an insightful
subcategory of study, it is not nearly broad enough to compete with the established traditional perspective of public diplomacy. It is important to make a distinction here between soft power and public diplomacy, as many aspects of both concepts overlap and tend to be used interchangeably. Whereas soft power is often used as a concept to explain certain effects, like (covert) attraction, in international relations, public diplomacy is the public and conscious use of soft power by a government. As such, Russia’s creation of platforms for interaction with compatriots abroad is an example of public diplomacy because it is an overt declaration of intent, not a subversive infiltration to attract behind the scenes. However Russia does use public diplomacy to increase soft power in certain
7 Michal Kozdra, ‘The Boundaries of Russian Identity Analysis of the Concept of Russkiy Mir in Contemporary Russian Online Media,’ Lingua Cultura (2018), Vol. 12(1), pp. 61-66.
8 Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development; OECD (Corporate Author), Reviews of National
Policies for Education: Higher Education in Kazakhstan (2017).
9 Sirke Mäkinen, ‘In Search of the Status of an Educational Great Power? Analysis of Russia’s Educational Diplomacy Discourse,’ Problems of Post-Communism (2016), Vol. 63(3), pp. 183-196.
regions, the difference is therefore in the level of overtness and the known need of the country to attract people. Again, both concepts are often used in academic literature to illustrate the intent of politicians, and sometimes to describe their effects on people. The real gap lies in the implementation of policy, as there is hardly any literature available on this subject. Literature that focusses on the relative effectiveness of policy-implementation in depth simply does not exist as far as contemporary Russia is concerned. I have therefore devoted this thesis to the ‘middle level’ of soft power and public diplomacy. How are the Kremlin’s soft power policies implemented? To what degree can they be considered effective? How does Russia represent itself in educational materials abroad?
I have attempted to answer these questions by conducting interviews with (former) employees and examining the materials used at the Russkii Mir Foundation, the Federal Agency for the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (from here on out: Rossotrudnichestvo), and the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute. Keeping in mind the unique nature of each institute, a somewhat different approach has been used for each one. There are of course some basic questions about the inner workings of an institute that shows inherent similarities to one another, as the institutes have been founded with a similar goal in mind. But especially along the lines of method and didactics my interlocutors have been asked different questions with regards to the activities of the respective institute they work for. Questions have been included in the appendix, and are accordingly referred to in the main body of the thesis. My interlocutors have been approached by me both through official channels (formal emails, requests for phone calls etc.), and by employing a network of actors that are in some way either connected to the NISPB (Nederlands Instituut in Sint Petersburg – Dutch Institute in Saint Petersburg) or comparable institutions, or from my personal circle of acquaintances.
The materials that were examined for this thesis have been approached with a different frame of mind. I use ‘materials’ as a fairly broadly defined term, as it refers to all kinds of things; ranging from a textbook to the program of a cultural forum. In this sense, anything an institute deploys to teach people something about Russia was a suitable source for researching, but I have narrowed it down to the most relevant examples. I have refrained from pondering too much on the ‘teachability’ of these materials, as this task would be more suited to a didactics-expert or a pedagogue. Instead, I have
reflected on the materials’ supposed ability to implement policy directives. The questions that I had in mind when researching these materials therefore mostly revolved around the concept of soft power, and the materials’ relative usefulness as mediums of influence.
Chapter 2: The State of Affairs in Foreign Affairs
2.1 The Conception of Public Diplomacy and Institutes
There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.10
On 10 February, 2007, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave his memorable ‘turnaround’ speech. It was an important moment in contemporary history, as it not only showed Russia’s fundamentally altered attitude towards the rest of the world, but also cemented the prophecy of an uncertain and unstable future. The president made it abundantly clear that Russia would become more assertive in its pursuit of foreign policy.11 The quote above is very telling in that regard, as it very directly lays out a
clear agenda for Russian foreign relations in the years to come. The new centers of global economic growth are the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and those countries in the Eurasian sphere that directly profit from (and facilitate) this growth. This economic, non-military, power will be converted into political influence; a clear hint at the leverage countries like Russia will be having over its respective spheres of influence. The multipolarity Putin mentioned refers to the positive images of Russia abroad as a result of this political influence. This is a quintessential example of soft power in the ‘traditional sense’, in the way in which Joseph Nye initially defined it in 1990.12 The concept has
since evolved to encompass much more, and it is very telling that Russia only adopted the ‘traditional’ stance seventeen years after its conception. Nevertheless, an attempt at soft power it is, a new venture in the pursuit of public diplomacy. And if recent events have shown anything, it would be that Russia has truly attempted to become an influential player on the international level.
10 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security
Policy (10 February 2007, Munich Security Conference),
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034, last consulted on 15-04-2019. 11 Idem.
This chapter will be dedicated to the following question: which institutions have been created as a result of Russia’s shifting attitude in foreign relations, and how are they connected to the new policy directions? Section 2.1 will be devoted especially to the founding principles of Russkii Mir, Rossotrudnichestvo and the Pushkin Institute, whereas section 2.2 will look more specifically at the relation between these institutes and Russian foreign policy.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the institutions that are the subject of this thesis have all either been founded or fundamentally altered shortly after the (in)famous Munich speech. Take Russkii Mir for example: the need for such a cultural-linguistic institution was revealed by the president himself during an address to the Federal Assembly in April 2007, barely two months after the Munich
Conference.13 The following statement by the president figures prominently on Russkii Mir’s website:
The Russian language not only preserves an entire layer of truly global achievements but is also the living space for the many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself. As the common heritage of many peoples, the Russian language will never become the language of hatred or enmity, xenophobia or isolationism.14
This line of thinking summarizes the basic principles of the Russkii Mir concept. This concept is the idea that Russia has a special place within the Eurasian sphere, and that it has certain responsibilities to uphold with regards to the unity of this community.15 The concept of Russkii Mir suggests that there
is an international Russian community in Eurasia, bound by culture and language.16 Reminiscent of the
tsarist ‘Third Rome ideology’, the Russkii Mir concept is centered around Russia as a defender of Russians’ rights. The concept is therefore partly an ideology in its own rights, one that explains the Russian government’s rather vocal claims to defend the rights of Russians abroad. It should not come as a surprise then that another two months later, in June 2007, Putin signed a decree establishing the Russkii Mir Foundation which was supposed to cooperate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education to achieve this.17 Keeping in mind the timespan and the message propagated,
13 About Russkiy Mir Foundation, https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php, last consulted on 16-04-2019. 14 Idem.
15 Mikhail Suslov, ‘Russian World Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of Spheres of Influence’, Geopolitics (2018), Vol. 23(2), pp. 330-353, p. 330-334.
16 Suslov, ‘Russian World Concept’, pp. 330-353, p. 330-334. 17 Idem.
even a layman would see that the shifting attitudes displayed in Munich and the attitude displayed in the quote above are thoroughly intertwined. Russia has definitely shown to be more assertive in foreign affairs, making use of both hard and soft power. Russkii Mir is a suited vehicle to ferment this assertiveness as it enables Russia to become present in the near abroad in ways it previously could not. The suitability of Russkii Mir is enhanced by the fact that it is a cultural-linguistic foundation, which means that public opposition to it would appear to be needlessly problematic, as it does not inherently harm the national interests of host countries. As a result, the foundation is able to operate largely unopposed. The quote points to a tangible number of targets of future public diplomacy. This potentially includes the Russian diasporas in the near abroad, as they too make use of the Russian language, even if not exclusively so. Putin has also alluded to the use of Russian as a lingua franca among the peoples of the former Soviet Union. This creates the impression that Russkii Mir’s mission statement is geared towards the preservation of Russian culture and language among ‘displaced’ Russian communities, as well as of is function linking the non-Russian peoples in the former Soviet space.
In a similar vein, Rossotrudnichestvo has been founded by presidential decree in 2008.18 This
institution’s founding principles also correlate with the messages displayed in Munich. When looking into its activities as a center of public diplomacy, I was pleasantly surprised to discover that in the policy statement it is explicitly stated that Rossotrudnichestvo is intended to function as a catalyst of Russian soft power.19 This is especially interesting, as it is quite a move away from Nye’s original
rationalist approach to soft power. It is supposed to be an instrument of attraction, without appearing to be an instrument at all.20 Instead, people should be convinced that it is just there, while it
subconsciously influences their modes of thought and behavior.21 Such an explicit statement would
therefore be counterproductive, at least from Nye’s point of view. This blatant disregard for the subtleties of soft power has not gone unnoticed by other scholars, as Yulia Kiseleva has also found Nye’s rationalist approach wanting with regards to Russia. Instead, she has opted for an interpretive
18 About Rossotrudnichestvo, http://rs.gov.ru/en/about, last consulted on 16-04-2019. 19 Idem.
20 Joseph Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science (2008), Vol. 616(1), pp. 94-109.
approach, keeping in mind the goal and rationale that drove Russia to adopt soft power in the first place.22 She has argued that soft power, to Russian policymakers, is equal to hegemony.23 This
effectively means that soft power is viewed as a means to establishing a sphere of influence in the near abroad, most likely by making use of the diasporas that live there. She too has mentioned
Rossotrudnichestvo, which uses soft power as a medium to promote hegemony as a positive
contribution by Russia to Eurasia.24 This sentiment is echoed on Rossotrudnichestvo’s own website,
where the organization’s statement on public diplomacy includes a section which emphasizes the use of soft power to strengthen Eurasian integration.25 If anything, this unequivocally proves that Russia is
investing in soft power, especially on the Eurasian level. This suggests that Rossotrudnichestvo is especially interested in the near abroad, where many Russian-speakers live as a cultural minority. This suggestion is further reinforced by the fact that one of the organization’s key activities is the
supporting of compatriots abroad.26
The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute serves as the exception that proves the rule. The institute, founded in 1966 as part of the Moscow State University, has been a proud and
well-established promulgator of Russian as a philological discipline for many years. Since its separation from the Moscow State University in 1999, the institute has grown in importance, as it is now sanctioned to not only teach, but also test the Russian linguistic prowess of immigrants. Thus, the institute serves a dual role: it specializes in teaching foreign students who want to learn Russian, but also provides courses and tests of citizenship for immigrants. In many ways this institute’s activities seem to be of a fairly ‘normal’ nature, comparable in structure to its German counterpart; the Goethe Institute, and not related to the concept of soft power in a similar way to the other two institutes. However, it is precisely the connection to the other institutes that initially caused me to add the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute to the list of possible soft power vehicles. The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute is linked to both Russkii Mir and Rossotrudnichestvo, and has several
22 Yulia Kiseleva, ‘Russia’s Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status and the Attraction of Power’, Politics (2015), Vol. 35 (3-4), pp. 316-329.
23 Kiseleva, ‘Russia’s Soft Power Discourse’, pp. 316-329, p. 317-320. 24 Ibid., pp. 316-329, p. 321-322.
25 Public Diplomacy, http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities/4, last consulted on 19-04-2019.
other partners and branches in the near abroad.27 Similar to Rossotrudnichestvo, here too the list of
partners is for a large part comprised of institutions in the near abroad.
Furthermore, during my stay in Saint Petersburg, I managed to get in touch with some former employees of the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, as well as some who were previously associated with this institute. During the interviews my interlocutors revealed that they apparently had a falling out with the institute some ten years ago. This was around the period of the ‘assertive turn’ the government made with regards to foreign policy which was previously discussed. They stated that much of their disagreements had to do with methodology and target audience, but not so much a noticeable ‘regime change.’ Whereas the institute had previously gained a reputation for being able to teach the Russian language to foreigners and native speakers alike and achieve comparable results, much of the effort was now being focused on quantity rather than quality. One interlocutor remarked that instead of teaching Russian children (though to be fair, he referred to young adults as well) to speak like adults, foreign adults were now being taught how to speak like Russian children.28 These
former employees and associates therefore disagreed with the institute’s growing emphasis on non-native speakers, while simultaneously ‘dumbing down’ the academic aspects of the Russian language. Most of these interlocutors readily admitted that the institute has since recovered quite well
academically from this ‘outward turn’, but they were reluctant to agree with the institute’s policies overall even today. The fact that nearly all of these people now work in state universities, or are in some way connected to them, suggests that their disagreements were indeed methodological in nature. One professor at the State University of Saint Petersburg even remarked that the ‘good people’ (meaning the most academically sound employees) never returned to the institute.29 This struck me as
odd, since the institute has since regained much of its former splendor. When asked about this, he stated that jobs at state universities were much more rewarding, as students there learn to study in a truly Russian environment where they are constantly challenged instead of a more accommodating, ‘foreigner-friendly’ learning environment.
27 Partn’ory Instituta, https://www.pushkin.institute/partnership/partnery_instituta.php, last consulted on 22-04-2019.
28 Anonymous male, interview with university professor by author, 24 April 2019, transcript in author’s possession.
2.2 The Demands of Policy
On 30 November 2016 Vladimir Putin approved a renewed Foreign Policy Concept which would serve as a guideline for officials in the pursuit of government goals. This document is especially interesting for this thesis, as it very clearly shows the guidelines that Russkii Mir and
Roostrudnichestvo also must adhere to. They are, after all, respectively connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a partner organization and a department of the ministry itself. Therefore, an examination of this document, accompanied by secondary literature, should precede any delving into the inner workings of the institutes who actually have to execute parts of it. This policy concept has been realized in light of Russia’s more recent ambitions in foreign policy, and is still the guideline for policymakers and other officials today.
Examining the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2016 suggests that the relative importance of public diplomacy (i.e. soft power) for Russian foreign policy has considerably increased in the past few years. Article 3 of the General Provisions lists all the main objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from that point on. Subsections F to K of this article are all in some way concerned with efforts of public diplomacy.30 These include, but are not limited to: the pursuit of
friendly relations with neighboring states, funding of cultural forums, protection of Russian citizens’ rights in neighboring countries, consolidation of the Russian language in the near abroad and
improving the standing of Russian media.31 Note that subsection H refers specifically to ‘ensuring the
protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad.’32
This does not come as a surprise, but it is important to keep in mind when looking at the activities of the three institutes under scrutiny here, as this is apparently an important part of policy for their main sponsor.
Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like Rossotrudnichestvo, made no secret in the document of its desire to explicitly implement soft power elements in international relations in
30 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (1 December 2016), I. General Provisions, Art. 3 F-K,
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/254224 8, last consulted on 23-04-2019.
31 Ibid., I. General Provisions, Art. 3F-K. 32 Ibid., I. General Provisions, Art. 3H.
response to an ever changing world order. These methods of soft power should supposedly be implemented by means involving ‘civil society.’33 Further explanation is not offered in this section.
The means to the end become clearer a bit further down in the document. Article 45 of III. Priorities of the Russian Federation in Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair and Sustainable World Order (D to M) is almost entirely devoted to the issues of concrete goals and comprehensive
implementation.34 Subsections D to F are primarily concerned with the protection of compatriots living
abroad in a more specific sense, as these sections mention that their contribution to Russian culture and the Russian language is as significant as it is important to preserve.35 Subsection F mentions the
consolidation between Russia as a homeland and the Russian diasporas by stating that their historical ties should be emphasized, and measures should be taken to ensure that the diasporas are able to preserve their identity as Russians.36 The next subsection (G) goes into more detail about how
precisely this should be realized. Supposedly, a network of international Russian educational institutions should be promoted and maintained.37 Evidently, the Russian language should become a
valued means of international and inter-ethnic communication on a global level.38 It is no coincidence
that the issues of compatriots living abroad and the spreading of the Russian language and culture are listed so closely together. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may even consider them the same thing, seeing as they are both listed under the same article, and not one subsection apart.
To enhance the effectiveness of foreign policy, the ministry has partnered with civil and educational institutions.39 There can be no doubt that this refers directly to the three institutes that are
the subject of this thesis. This is further affirmed at the end of the document, where it is stated that preparation and execution of foreign policy with regards to these areas are conducted in cooperation with the Russian academic community and cultural organizations (among others).40
33 Ibid., II. Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Art. 9.
34 Ibid., III. Priorities of the Russian Federation in Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair and Sustainable World Order, Art. 45D-M.
35 Ibid., III. Priorities of the Russian Federation in Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair and Sustainable World Order, Art. 45D-F.
36 Idem.
37 Ibid., III. Priorities of the Russian Federation in Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair and Sustainable World Order, Art. 45G.
38 Idem.
39 Ibid., III. Priorities of the Russian Federation in Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair and Sustainable World Order, Art. 45J.
Rossotrudnichestvo is mentioned explicitly in this regard as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.41 This means that, as it appears from Rossotrudnichestvo’s mission statement, the organization
has been given the task of expanding Russian soft power in the near abroad. I initially hypothesized that the Russian government most definitely intends to use cultural-linguistic institutes as conduits for the increasing of Russian soft power abroad. The examined policy papers confirm this hypothesis. Moreover, the policy documents seem to suggest that much of this cultural-linguistic effort is geared towards Russian diasporas abroad, and the emphasis seems to lie more on the preservation of the Russian community than its expansion on a global level. Hence one may conclude from the primary sources that the intent behind public diplomacy and government sponsored cultural-linguistic institutions is at least partially politically motivated.
The existing secondary literature on this subject seems to largely concur with this assessment. Sirke Mäkinen, for example, stated that the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept already called for a
strengthening of Russia’s soft power arsenal.42 Furthermore, according to Mäkinen’s research,
Rossotrudnichestvo had at that point already been used as an instrument for formulating a comprehensive soft power strategy.43 Mäkinen has focused her research mainly on education and
students, and should be regarded as an authoritative figure regarding these subjects. In her articleIn Search of the Status of an Educational Great Power? Analysis of Russia’s Educational Diplomacy Discourse she has thoroughly examined the rhetoric of officials and the official line of argumentation forwarded by the government. She has argued that the state views foreign students as potential ‘diplomats’ who could propagate Russia’s positive image. Students that visit Russia, or come into educational contact with Russia abroad are therefore potential instruments of Russian soft power themselves.44
A similar position has been taken by Tuomas Forsberg and Hanna Smith, who have argued that Russian soft power (which they refer to as ‘cultural statecraft’) indeed defies Nye’s original interpretation of the concept in its implementation.45 They regard Russian soft power as a very
41 Ibid., V. Russia's Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation, Art. 105. 42 Mäkinen, ‘Educational Great Power’, pp. 183-196, p. 183
43 Idem.
44 Ibid., pp. 183-196, p. 183-185.
45 Tuomas Forsberg, Hanna Smith, ‘Russian Cultural Statecraft in the Eurasian Space’, Problems of
distinctly top-down concept, which further reinforces the assessment that the government is very proactively forwarding measures to ensure a smooth implementation of policy.46 Valentina Feklyunina
has also stated that the last ten to fifteen years have seen a substantial increase in Russian efforts to promote soft power in the near abroad (her case study revolves around Ukraine).47 She has argued that
there has been a noticeable shift in Moscow’s thinking when comparing to periods like the early 2000’s.48 This is what is often referred to as the culturally and linguistically defined ‘Russian World’
or Russkii Mir concept which I described earlier.
46 Forsberg, Smith, ‘Russian Cultural Statecraft’, pp. 129-134, p. 129-131.
47 Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’’, European Journal
of International Relations (2016), Vol. 22(4), pp. 773-796, p. 773-774.
2.3 Conclusion
So far, a number of points have become clear. We now know for certain from both primary and secondary literature that there has been a noticeable shift in the attitude of Russian foreign policy during the last ten to fifteen years. I have argued that it was around the time of the 2007 Munich Conference that significant changes in the government’s conduct in foreign policy became noticeably internationally. This has led to the creation of new institutions, most notably Russkii Mir and
Rossotrudnichestvo, which are conceived as instruments for the implementation of soft power by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of Russkii Mir this assessment is implicit, as it is not mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept explicitly, but the organization’s mission statement
correlates completely with the leading provisions of that document. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also the biggest partner of the foundation, which further reinforces the assessment that its influence over Russkii Mir is very real. The assessment is more explicit in the case of Rossotrudnichestvo, as this is a government organization which has been founded with the very thought of soft power in mind. An examination of policy documents then revealed that there has indeed been a considerable amount of investment by the Russian government in the concept of soft power. The examination of the Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, the leading document for policymakers in that ministry, revealed that the organizations that are subject to this research are indeed being regarded as instruments of soft power by the Russian government. This raises questions with regards to the degree to which the three institutes indeed implement these policies, what methods they use, and how effective they are in fulfilling the requirements set out by policymakers. This will be assessed in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: Structures and Methods
Introduction
It is of paramount importance to assess the ‘how’ of a policy when gauging its relative effectiveness. Merely talking about a vision will achieve very little in terms of insight into a complicated matter like soft power. This applies to both scholars and policymakers. Having visited several institutes and after conducting interviews there, I have gained some insight in the inner workings of these cultural-linguistic organizations. After completing this phase of the research project, I have found that The Russkii Mir Foundation, Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, and Rossotrudnichestvo employed entirely different methods to achieve the goals set out in the policy papers that were examined in the previous chapter. Yet they had some aspects in common as well. I therefore decided to discuss each one of them separately in this chapter to highlight their specific methods, and to show their respective degrees of autonomy.
As stated in chapter 1, the methods of these institutes have rarely been examined up close, if at all. This chapter will therefore revolve around the following questions: How do cultural-linguistic institutes approach their task methodologically? And: to what degree does this correspond with the demands of policy? Due to the lack of secondary reference material, I had to rely mostly on primary and oral sources. In some cases I referred to policy papers or websites related to the institutes, as not all of them were willing to send a representative to give an interview. This was the case with
Rossotrudnichestvo, which (even after several appeals from the Netherlands Institute in Saint
Petersburg) tied my requests up in bureaucratic procedures, making it impossible to approach anyone. I have however obtained some documents detailing Rossotrudnichestvo’s activities in the sphere of educational diplomacy, which made up for some of the lost interview-opportunities.
3.1
The Russkii Mir Foundation
The Russkii Mir Foundation was gracious enough to offer interviews, as well as materials which helped me immensely in pursuing this research project. I have also approached some people who are (or have been) affiliated with Russkii Mir in some way during my stay in Saint Petersburg. I have even been given the opportunity to talk with Russkii Mir’s director of the Western Branch, for which I am very grateful. These oral sources, as well as some information from the foundation’s website and documents, have revealed a great deal about the methodological approach of Russkii Mir abroad.
Structurally, Russkii Mir is divided into several branches that oversee activities in a certain region. The Western Branch for example, which I visited, is located in Saint Petersburg. This office is responsible for the foundation’s activities in the Baltic States and, albeit more sporadically, in
Western-Europe as well. From this office, a small number of dedicated employees oversee and coordinate the numerous activities of Russian Centers in their region. I was told by the employees there that this kind of structure is very common in Russkii Mir, other branches also tend to be
controlled from a very small office. Russkii Mir is a fairly large organization, present in almost every European and Asian country.49 The fact that an entire branch was coordinated by a mere handful of
people therefore came as a surprise to me, to the delight of the present employees. This made me very curious about the organizational structure further down the ladder: how could activities by such a large organization be coordinated centrally by such a small amount of people? Simply put, they were not. The director explained to me that Russkii Mir functioned more as a sponsor of already existing
structures, rather than a sponsor of completely new ones.50 Many of the institutes that are now Russian
Centers owned by Russkii Mir were already owned by other cultural-linguistic organizations in some shape or form. In most cases, these organizations were universities that were struggling with funding for the smaller linguistic faculties. According to the director, Russkii Mir approached these
organizations and offered funding in exchange for what he called ‘branding.’51 This explains a number
49 For an overview of Russian Centers around the world, consult the interactive map in this link:
https://russkiymir.ru/rucenter/, last consulted on 09-06-2019.
50 Anonymous male, interview with director by author, 15 May 2019, transcript in author’s possession. 51 Idem.
of things. Firstly, it shows how Russkii Mir has been able to expand so rapidly in so little time. In a little over ten years, the foundation has made ample use of its funding by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to build up a significant presence all over the world. In fact, the director even remarked that after a few years into this process, organizations would invite Russkii Mir into their country as ‘’their reputation was quite good, and their money even better.’’52 Secondly, it implies that Russian Centers
have some degree of autonomy in determining their own agenda. When asked if this implication had some truth to it, the director explained to me that Russkii Mir’s main concern was with funding and supplying a space in which the Russian language can be learned properly.53
During my stay, I was lucky enough to encounter Jeroen van Koningsbrugge, director of The Centre for Russian Studies, situated in the University of Groningen, during a lecture he gave at the Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg. The center is an initiative of van Koningsbrugge himself, one which he founded to improve cultural ties between the Netherlands and Russia. He told me that his center, too, was struggling with funding, until Russkii Mir approached him with an offer.54 Their
agreement correlated with what the director of the Western Branch claimed; The Centre for Russian Studies would receive a steady stream of funding for research and the organization of seminars in exchange for becoming one of Russkii Mir’s Russian Centers on paper. In practice, van
Koningsbrugge has experienced very little interference on the part of Russkii Mir during the years of their cooperation. He explained that he is free to determine for himself what kind of material he offers to students and other participants, books published by Russkii Mir itself are not obligatory.55
In contrast, the Russian Centers in Tallinn and Riga were expected to follow some guidelines. These centers could still be considered relatively autonomous. They were staffed by local teachers who were already working part-time in other schools or universities. The staff was also able to
determine its own teaching agenda for the most part, but some materials produced by Russkii Mir itself were present in their libraries and courses. They were also subject to some inspections and had to maintain fairly frequent contact with the employees at the Western Branch in Saint Petersburg.56 The
52 Idem. 53 Idem.
54 Jeroen van Koningsbrugge, phone conversation with author, 18 April 2019. 55 Idem.
difference between the Russian Centers in the Baltic States and the one in the Netherlands are minimal, but if the activities of the Western Branch are as representative of the rest of Russkii Mir as its employees claim the implications are quite substantial. This suggests that Russian Centers in the near abroad do experience some degree of centralization, while those in countries with no significant Russian minority are almost completely autonomous.
During my interview with the director of Russkii Mir’s Western Branch I also took the opportunity to ask him about any methodological differences the foundation employed with regards to non-nationals and compatriots respectively. He pointed out that, in his branch, there was always the issue of a significant Russian minority in host countries.57 However, it is also his branch that often
attracts some of the greatest numbers of non-nationals who want to learn the Russian language. Some degree of methodological differentiation was therefore an absolute necessity, otherwise the local teachers in the Russian Centers would have too much difficulty in fulfilling their assigned tasks. To this end, Russian Centers tend to teach Russian in separate classes for non-nationals and compatriots whenever possible. He reminded me however, that this decision was always delegated to the
respective centers, as they were generally better able to determine their teaching capacity than Russkii Mir itself.58 Mixed classes therefore do exist. Whether or not this resulted in different teaching
methods in the entirety of the organization the director could not say with certainty, but he did point out that Russian Centers tended to have teaching materials that differentiate between non-nationals and native speakers.59 Non-nationals are generally treated as a separate category in Russian education,
as they usually are unfamiliar with the Cyrillic alphabet and Slavic pronunciations. As such, the director explained, they have to be taught ‘’like children’’, while compatriots are always more proficient (even if both are considered to speak Russian at an intermediate level).60 I then asked if
compatriots were treated any differently than Russians living in Russia by either their teachers or in teaching materials. His response said much about the mindset I had previously encountered when researching documents of Russkii Mir: ‘’Compatriots are Russians too, no matter where they live. As such, they are not treated any differently by our organization than those living on Russian soil. It is
57 Anonymous male, interview with director by author, 15 May 2019, transcript in author’s possession. 58 Idem.
59 Idem. 60 Idem.
very important to us that they feel connected to Russia, and we facilitate this by treating them as they should be treated; as Russians.’’61
There are therefore no materials specially designed for compatriots present in Russkii Mir’s Russian Centers. There does seem to be some degree of differentiation ‘on the ground’ by teachers, but as with the issue of relative autonomy, this is very difficult to confirm. What these interviews have confirmed however, is that Russkii Mir is an organization that is typically led with some centralization in the higher levels, but a large degree of autonomy down below. It has also shown how Russkii Mir was able to expand so rapidly, and why its footing in numerous countries across the globe is quite solid and sustainable. The high degree of autonomy and apparent policy of limited interference offer ideal conditions for expanding Russian soft power capacity in host countries, as Russkii Mir’s
presence is almost never seen as an annoyance by educational institutions, but rather a financial boon. Keeping in mind the conditions in which Russkii Mir expanded, I would argue that the organization has been quite effective in building an organizational structure that supports the expansion of soft power. There is still much the organization could do to increase its capacity methodologically however, for example by gradually enforcing more favorable curricula (i.e. more Russocentric) in relevant Russian Centers. I have not seen any evidence that something like this has happened as of yet, nor does it seem likely that Russkii Mir is planning to increase its efforts very much in that direction. Overall Russkii Mir does seem to be structured in a way that contributes to the propagation of a positive image of Russia abroad, which corresponds with the demands of policy.
3.2 The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute
Out of the three institutes under scrutiny in this thesis, The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute is the most unambiguous by far, and easily the most transparent. This makes sense, as the institute is also the one with the least direct connections to government institutions and programs. Research of teaching materials has shown that these programs’ influence is definitely present in the Pushkin Institute, as is shown in chapter 4, but structurally the institute has fewer connections with ministries than for example Russkii Mir. As such, I had to rely much on interviews with (former) employees to determine to what degree the institute’s structure fitted the demands of policy. The institute’s methods are, in contrast, quite candidly available in public domains run by the institute, though here too the interviews were most helpful in constructing an image of the institute’s activities. Upon establishing contact with the institute’s press service, I was offered a number of interviews with experts online. Sadly, not all of the planned interviews came to fruition because of scheduling issues. I mostly spoke with didactics experts, but not directors. Much of the following information is therefore derived from the institute’s public domains.
The Pushkin Institute is divided into three main departments: the Philological Department, the Department of Teaching Russian as a Foreign Language, and the Center for Continuing Education.62
The second department immediately drew my attention, as this was a subject that the Pushkin Institute has been known for since Soviet times. The institute has a reputation of being the leading center of experts on teaching the Russian language to foreigners. Sirke Mäkinen for example, claimed that institutes like the Pushkin Institute are used to turn visiting foreign students into ‘foreign diplomats.’63
This suggests that there is some degree of indoctrination present, or at least that Russia is viewed more favorably after enjoying education there. The Pushkin Institute has certainly tried to accommodate this. The department provides courses not only in the realm of language, but also dedicated courses on
62 Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, https://www.pushkin.institute/en/about/, last consulted on 14-06-2019.
Russian culture.64 During one of my interviews with one of the institute’s didactics experts I asked
about the nature of these courses and how foreign students are taught about Russian culture. She told me that the contents of the courses depend on the student’s grasp of the Russian language and
familiarity with Russian culture.65 The courses usually start with some rudimentary knowledge of day
to day life in Russia. This is also meant to accommodate students who only just recently arrived in the country and still have to get used to living there. Only when the students have shown that they control these ‘superficial cultural aspects’, as my interlocutor called it, can they register for courses that deal with Russian history, and more abstract aspects of culture.66 When I asked whether or not these
courses should contribute to a positive image of Russia in the minds of students she responded that ‘they certainly should.’ Upon being asked why, my interlocutor explained that many foreign students (especially those from ‘the west’) tend to arrive in Russia with many prejudices already firmly implanted in their thought process. This is why students first need to show that they have at least some rudimentary understanding of Russian culture in day to day life, which they have to experience, before they can come to a better understanding of ‘the real facts of Russian culture.’67
The institute also offers an international summer school which explores much of the
aforementioned aspects. Students partake in courses that are specially designed for non-nationals and attend cultural trips to famous Russian heritage sites.68 Teachers that organize classes for this
department are all trained in the Pushkin Institute’s own methodology of teaching the Russian language to non-nationals. I asked one of my interlocutors whether or not these types of courses were also attended by compatriots and other bilinguals. She told me that the Pushkin Institute does attract a lot of compatriots overall, but that specially organized activities like the summer school are usually attended by non-nationals.69 From personal experience she did tell me that the interest in Russian
culture and the Russian language is quite omnipresent in both groups, and more students attend the
64 Pushkin State Russian Language Institute, https://www.pushkin.institute/en/about/, last consulted on 14-06-2019.
65 Anonymous female, Skype interview with a didactics expert by author, 21 May 2019, transcript in author’s possession.
66 Idem. 67 Idem.
68 International Russian Language Summer Courses,
https://www.pushkin.institute/en/russian_language_courses/summer_courses/, last consulted on 14-06-2019. 69 Anonymous female, Skype interview with a didactics expert by author, 23 May 2019, transcript in author’s possession.
institute’s courses every year.70
To support this, the Pushkin Institute has also created an significant digital learning
environment, in which over a million students have enrolled. Another interlocutor of mine told me that this learning environment is not only frequently used in courses in the institute itself, but that it is also a popular (if not the most popular) platform for education about all kinds of subjects in the Russian language. This means that the Pushkin Institute’s potential reach for propagating Russian soft power is huge. Whether or not this is reflected in the courses is discussed in chapter 4. The digital learning environment does offer room for other organizations to upload courses and tests. During an interview I asked if organizations like Russkii Mir and Rossotrudnichestvo also uploaded courses. My interlocutor did not know if Russkii Mir was involved in their online network, as they could technically be
considered a competitor, but he did point out that Rossotrudnichestvo may have sponsored some courses at some point.71
The way in which the Pushkin Institute is structured suggests that it has potential for the spreading of educational soft power. However, it differs from Russkii Mir on one crucial point: location. Russkii Mir settles in host countries, often close by big Russian communities. The Pushkin Institute is present only in Moscow and Paris. The institute does cooperate with other international organizations, but most of its activities take place in the heart of Russia. This means that students who could potentially be influenced by soft power from the Pushkin Institute would have to travel there, which could withhold a lot of students from doing so.
On the other hand, the Pushkin Institute has its digital learning environment to counteract this potential ‘speed bump.’ The enormous amount of students that both the physical institute and the digital learning environment attract suggests that the Pushkin Institute indeed succeeded in meeting the demands that policy imposed on civil institutions in the Foreign Policy Concept. By sheer
popularity, the Pushkin Institute must contribute to a positive message of Russia abroad. I am skeptical whether or not students that attend an institute like this convert into foreign diplomats as some have claimed, but it would be very interesting to determine if this is true in practice. One suggestion for
70 Idem.
further research I would therefore like to make here is an anthropological series of interviews with these students before and after they attend courses at the institute. This would contribute greatly to the ‘bottom-up’ sphere of soft power literature.
3.3 Rossotrudnichestvo
As stated in this chapter’s introduction, Rossotrudnichestvo was not willing to give an interview. During my stay in Russia, the employees of the Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg and I petitioned Rossotrudnichestvo many times, sadly to no avail. We also contacted a number of employees of Rossotrudnichestvo independently, but none of them were willing to meet with me either. One person we reached out to did point me to a document which detailed many of
Rossotrudnichestvo’s activities in the sphere of educational soft power in the last few years.
Throughout the remainder of this chapter I will use this document, the Concept of Russian Language 2016-2020, to describe as accurately as possible the methodology of Rossotrudnichestvo. This description will be supplemented by information from the organization’s public domains. The
documents available to me are quite rich in information, but the conclusions derived from them might appear to be a bit more superficial, as I did not get the invaluable ‘look on the inside’ that I had with Russkii Mir and the Pushkin Institute. Out of the three institutes, Rossotrudnichestvo’s public information is the least transparent, which leaves some analytical gaps in places that may have otherwise been more easily filled in.
Similar to Russkii Mir, Rossotrudnichestvo also invested in a number of Russian schools abroad.72 Keeping in mind the organization’s mission statement, which was examined in chapter 2,
Rossotrudnichestvo’s activities are mainly geared at the near abroad. One reason cited for this in the Concept of Russian Language 2016-2020 is that the Russian language is already dominant or present in most countries that are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.73 Within these states
Rossotrudnichestvo has used its funding for this program to prevent the number of Russian schools diminishing in countries like Kazakhstan.74 In this way the brand of Rossotrudnichestvo expanded
quite drastically, albeit less noticeably than Russkii Mir, which is fairly explicit about its sponsoring. From the available documents it would appear that Rossotrudnichestvo concerns itself only with
72 Education and Science, http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities/10, last consulted on 15-06-2019. 73 Concept of Russian Language 2016-2020, 20 December 2014, p. 4.
funding, and not so much with the practices of education like the Pushkin Institute and Russkii Mir, though I do not have the word of a ranking official to confirm this.
The document also shows that Rossotrudnichestvo has been active in the funding of teaching materials, though it is not specified which ones. For example, it is stated in the document that Rossotrudnichestvo has sponsored the development of 53 textbooks on literature and culture, 44 manuals on grammar and 17 textbooks for teaching Russian to compatriots’ children.75 Nowhere in the
document is stated which titles these are precisely or on the print runs, nor is this information available on the organization’s public domains. This makes it nearly impossible to track down which books have been sponsored, and therefore possibly influenced, by Rossotrudnichestvo. These teaching materials (150.000 copies) have been spread through the near abroad in cooperation with Russkii Mir.76 This suggests that at least a number of these copies must be present in Russian Centers owned
by Russkii Mir as well. Seeing as both Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkii Mir are respectively controlled and sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is very likely that not only the distribution but also the development of these materials was a joint venture by both organizations, though I have no way of confirming this.
Rossotrudnichestvo has also been active in the area of event-organization. According to the Concept of Russian Language 2016-2020, Rossotrudnichestvo has been involved in the organization of 130 cultural and educational events in the near abroad from 2011 to 2015.77 Most of these events are
aimed at the promotion of open education in Russian. As such, the document stated that these events must be intensified to expand public knowledge about open Russian education in the near abroad as much as possible.78 The Pushkin Institute is named as one of the ‘brands’ that Rossotrudnichestvo
cooperates with to make this possible.79 This implicitly suggests that the Pushkin Institute’s digital
learning environment has been sponsored in part by Rossotrudnichestvo, but again, the document does not mention this explicitly.
Overall, Rossotrudnichestvo seems to function as a funnel that the Russian government uses to
75 Ibid., p. 9. 76 Ibid., p. 10. 77 Idem.
78 Ibid., p. 10-12. 79 Ibid., p. 17.
sponsor activities by other organizations. Rossotrudnichestvo is often party to the development of teaching materials, or one of the organizers of some cultural event, but it never publicly takes charge of these developments. The organization excels in singling out developments and events that could potentially increase Russia’s soft power in certain areas, and rather than initiating processes it intervenes in ongoing developments to alter the course in the most favorable direction. Contrary to how it presents itself, this government institution’s methodology is far more reactive than proactive. Rossotrudnichestvo sports impressive statistic results, but here the nature of Russian government institutions must be kept in mind. Statistics could have been manipulated to curry favor with the upper layers of the government, and to justify and ensure the organization’s continued existence. For
example, it is not unthinkable that Rossotrudnichestvo let Russkii Mir do most of the practical work in the distribution of lesson materials, while it merely provided funding for that project. My interlocutors at the other institute also stated that they rarely ever saw ‘boots on the ground’ from
Rossotrudnichestvo, which makes me skeptical about the organization’s involvement on a practical level. Nevertheless, Rossotrudnichestvo does fulfill the demands of policy, at least on paper. Its organizational structure and methodology do suit the expansion of soft power, as they mostly remain in the background, thus preventing the exposure of their intent (though this is somewhat ambiguous, as the organization’s mission statement is displayed on its website). Yet this also hampers the
organization’s capabilities in anticipating trends and leading developments in a favorable direction. Rossotrudnichestvo therefore seems to be capable, but it could be far more competent.
3.4 Conclusion
It has become clear in this chapter that each institute has a different interpretation of policy directives. Each institute executes policy in a different way, to put it very bluntly: Russkii Mir delegates, the Pushkin Institute teaches, and Rossotrudnichestvo sponsors. Russkii Mir used its funding to build up a presence in a great number of countries all over the globe. The foundation bought influence in
numerous already existing Russian language schools and gradually turned them into Russian Centers. In these centers, there is a great deal of autonomy. Teachers are generally able to determine their own curricula in most cases, and centralization only occurs in some cases in the near abroad, where there is a significant Russian-speaking minority. Russkii Mir’s methodology supports soft power, because the foundation is often perceived in a positive way, and its organizational structure allows room for a gradual increase of influence.
The Pushkin Institute is perhaps the most efficiently organized to spread a positive image of Russia. Unlike Russkii Mir, the institute does not really spend much effort in promoting its own ‘brand’, as this is already well established (this is further emphasized by Rossotrudnichestvo’s
attempts to ‘heist’ the institute’s reputation for its purposes). Instead, the Pushkin Institute focusses on quality education in a Russian cultural setting, which depoliticizes the cultural issue for many
attendees. Furthermore, the institute has created a digital learning environment which has proven to be capable of reaching an enormous audience, which further increases this institute’s potential for spreading soft power from a structural-methodological standpoint.
Rossotrudnichestvo also claims optimistic results, but the degree to which the organization was truly involved in the achievement of these results is disputable. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, the (‘Putinized’) nature of government institutions in Russia increases the likelihood of tampering with results, because their continued existence is only ensured by their ability to tangibly increase government influence in certain areas. In other words: they tend to tilt towards pleasing the leadership to ensure that they keep their jobs. Secondly, Rossotrudnichestvo is mainly concerned with sponsoring events and developments that are being made proactively by other organizations. This
