Political and Expert Involvement in Poverty Reduction Policies in Venezuela

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Political and Expert Involvement in Poverty

Reduction Policies in Venezuela

by

Gabriela E. Hernandez Contreras S2131323

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science in Public Administration

Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Institute of Public Administration

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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Johan Christensen, for challenging myself into completing this thesis, as well as for having all the patience in the world to guide me throughout the research writing process.

I am also grateful to my parents and grandparents for giving me the opportunity to pursue my Master’s degree, for inspiring me, supporting, and encouraging me along the way. My gratitude extends to my friends for their support throughout this process.

Lastly, I would like to thank the participants of the interviews conducted in the research –in special, to Fernando Spiritto and Ricardo Hausmann, for giving me the opportunity to learn from their scientific knowledge and immense skills.

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1. Introduction and Research Question

1.1. Introduction

The formulation of public policies is a complex process, in which generally a number of different actors are involved – both political figures and experts in the subject to be considered. An important part of the literature concerning the formulation of public policies in Venezuela, estimates that politicians are primarily the individuals who carry out the process (Spiritto, 2013). These politicians are in charge of defining the scope of policies, negotiating with the different actors associated with the problem, and establishing who are the winners or losers in the process (Kingdon, 1985, as seen in Lodge et al., 2015); Albrow and Easton, 1966). Nevertheless, the politician, due to the nature of his work, is not capable of addressing all the details of the formulation of policies; a reason why it would be appropriate to grant discretion to the experts, who can adequately act by defining the policies’ scope (Millett et al., 1948).

It is necessary to make clear that, for purposes of this work, bureacurats will be regarded as the experts in the public service. Bureaucratic experts in this context, are individuals who have acquired specialized knowledge in a particular area of work, and as explained by Liu et al. (2016), possess “detailed information and empirical data regarding a specific policy issue that is often tied to an agency’s mission and operation” (p. 706). In this sense, the growing specialization of State interventions, guided by criteria and demands of efficiency, effectiveness, opportunity, and quality, may outlined a favorable scenario for the integration of experts into decision-making spaces.

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Poverty has been one of the main topics present in the Venezuelan political sphere over the last decades. Venezuela’s oil condition adds a differentiating element with respect to other Latin American nations: the country has the largest oil reserves in the world (Graeber, 2018). However, poverty in Venezuela has been persistent in the face of periods of high growth and the different oil revenues distribution strategies that governments have implemented. This research seeks to look into the policymakers behind the formulation of a range of social programs in Venezuela, with the purpose of evaluating the reasons that may explain the extent to which bureaucrats and politicians exercise a fundamental role in the formulation of poverty reduction policies in Venezuela; moreover, this research will delve into what may drive and define the relationship between the two set of actors involved in the process. Therefore, this study will deal with the following research question: what

explains the relative involvement of politicians and experts in the formulation of poverty

reduction policies in Venezuela?

This research will examine the aforementioned research question through an observational research design; moreover, it will follow a single-case study, concerning the involvement of politicians and experts in policy-making. Similarly, this research will analyze data concerning the relationship between the actors involved in poverty reduction policies in Venezuela, gathered through a range of primary and secondary sources. The time frame that will be covered in this research ranges from 1989 to 2014. This time frame will be divided in two periods, precisely: a) 1989-1998 and b) 1999-2014; each period represents different characteristics of the economic, political, and social structures of the country that will allow for a more comprehensive analysis. It is imperative to clarify that social programs will be analyzed until 2014, as the last official poverty figures are from that year;

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as for that moment, the social description of poverty has relied on independent studies carried out by several universities in the country (España et al., 2016).

1.2. Goal of the Research

During the last decades, the poverty line in Venezuela has not been stable; the figures are similar to a roller coaster with its constant ups and downs. There are numerous works that analyze and explain how poverty has evolved in the country over time (Spiritto, 2013). Along these lines, a large number of authors propose ideas and mechanisms to follow in order to overcome poverty and increase the level of development of the country (España, 2015; Spiritto, 2018). These possible solutions are usually proposed by taking into account the economic structure of the country (España et al., 2016), the relationship between the private sector and the public sector in the policy-making process (Hausmann, 2008), and regional comparisons of how other Latin American countries have managed to favorably reduce its poverty ratios (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2012).

In Venezuela, there have been numerous and distinct social programs put forward by the respective governments in office, each created with the intended purpose of covering the basic needs of the population. However, at present time, there is no research study in the country that takes into account and focuses on analyzing the main actors responsible for formulating and carrying out such social programs. This is an essential aspect in the process of achieving poverty reduction in a country, as it requires highly trained people in the field to propose ideas and programs that benefit society in a definite and effective way. Perticará (2016) highlights the importance of recovery in the technical and education sectors of society –thus in human capital– in Latin America, in order to reduce poverty rates and

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increase development indicators in the region; although they emphasize the importance and essentiality of an ‘expert’ sector within societies, they do not make reference to how the relationship between these experts and politicians would be in practice, when formulating such social policies. Furthermore, Portes et al. (2011) analyze institutional change in five Latin American countries, through the use of the sociological theory; nevertheless, the study does not consider the decision-making process, nor does it take into account any decision-makers involved.

Along these lines, Spiritto (2016; 2018) focuses on studying the process of political decision-making in Venezuela during the Hugo Chavez administration; in order to do so, the author identifies a series of factors that determine how certain problems are taken into account by policy makers, why certain policies are approved and others are not, and the reason behind policy success or failure. However, the author does not delve into the study and analysis of the actors in charge of such policy processes, and omits the relationship between the administrative capacity of a government –the bureaucracy –and its political actors. In this context, it is necessary to cover the lack of existing information about the decision-making process of social policies –in specific, policies formulated with the aim to reduce poverty levels– and to compensate for the deficiency of data regarding the relationship between the main parties that carry out the formulation of said policies –the bureaucratic and political sectors. Additionally, the need to compare two opposite and contrasting periods in the Venezuelan political, economic, and social history is made imperative, in order to be able to distinguish the existence of challenges or changes in such relationship.

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This thesis aims to fill in the existing gap in the literature, by providing valuable information to the scientific community to inform and make known who exactly drives poverty reduction policies in Venezuela, to what extent the use of expert knowledge in the country is valued, how is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats when creating policies, and to what magnitude both set of actors participate in the process. Moreover, in order to provide new information in favor of society, this research aims to look into the level of transparency behind the creation of social programs; this is to say, were the actors in charge really knowledgeable about the matter they were dealing with? Did the individuals behind the programs act in accordance to the established policy goals? In answering these questions, this research will attempt to highlight the importance of expertise in both the Venezuelan bureaucracy and political arena, and to portray how the roles and relationships between the two actors may impact the outcome of the policy –and in this case, the social programs.

1.3. Administrative Context

Venezuela has been governed by two different constitutions during the period of time to be examined in this thesis; therefore, it becomes useful to analyze the historical and administrative contexts of the country governed by the 1961 constitution and by the constitution introduced in 1999, in order to learn about any changes that were made to the written law and better understand the participation and behavior of the bureaucratic and political figures.

According to the 1961 constitution, Venezuela is a presidential republic with 23 federal entities and a capital district (La Vanguardia, 2018). The national government is structured

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in three levels, which are the ‘Poder Público Nacional’ (National Public Power), constituted by all the institutions of the government with competence at the national level (Organization of American States, Article 157); the ‘Poder Público Estadal’ (State Public Power), in which states are established as autonomous and equal political entities (Organization of American States, Article 159); and the ‘Poder Público Municipal’ (Municipal Public Power), in where it is established that “municipalities constitute the primary political unit of the national organization” (Organization of American States, Article 168). Similarly, the government is divided into three branches; the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial, and these are “regulated in accordance with the separation of powers” (Organization of American States, p. 1). The Legislative Branch is composed of a chamber in the National Congress; on the other hand, the President of the Republic, the Executive Vice President, and the Ministers exercise the Executive Power (Organization of American States, Article 242). Lastly, the Judicial Branch is in charge of overseeing justice for citizens and is conferred by the authority of the law, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Public Ministry, and the Public Defender (Organization of America States, Article 253).

A new constitution was adopted in 1999, which serves as the code that governs the country until today (Gutierrez, 2013); it establishes that Venezuela is a “democratic and social state of law and justice” (Organization of American States, p.1) with a decentralized system of government. The new constitution included two additional branches of power to the existing ones (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial); these are the Citizens’ and Electoral branches. The ‘Republican Moral Council’, comprised of the Ombudsman, the Attorney General of the Republic, and the Comptroller General of the Republic, composes the ‘Citizen Power’; its function is to prevent, investigate, and sanction the violations against

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public moral and administrative ethics (Tablante, 2006). On the other hand, the ‘National Electoral Council’ -serving as the governing body- the ‘National Electoral Board’, and the ‘Commission for Political Participation and Financing’, -acting as subordinate bodies- exercise the ‘Electoral Power’ (Tablante, 2006).

Most of the articles found in the constitution of 1961 remained the same in the charter introduced in 1999. The most striking difference between the two constitutions is the introduction of the notion of a ‘participatory democracy’; understood as having the right to express opinions and decide on the political and economic programs that will be put forward in the country (Ayala and Casal, 2008, p. 444). This is opposite to what was in place before, a ‘representative democracy’; even though citizens were able to exercise their voting rights, only parliamentarians had the right to decide on aspects relating to public policies and laws in general (Ayala and Casal, 2008, p. 441). There are two other changes that are important to highlight; first, the establishment of what the government of Hugo Chavez called ‘the fifth republic’, by changing the country’s name from ‘Republic of Venezuela’ to ‘Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’ (Ayala and Casal, 2008, p. 445). Lastly, the presidential periods were changed to last six years instead of five (Ayala and Casal, 2008, p. 441).

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two is composed of the theoretical framework, introducing the Public Service Bargain theory, as well as numerous theoretical approaches of policy-making in Latin America, which will be later applied in the analysis. Similarly, this chapter will cover the range of concepts that would be used throughout the research, as well as the expectations that will help in answering the research question. Chapter three

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will consist on the explanation of the research design of the thesis, in where the methods and mechanisms to be used for data collection and analysis will be expressed; moreover, this chapter will operationalized and measure the variables of study. Chapter four will introduce to the reader the case study of this thesis, along with the data collected regarding the key actors involved in poverty reduction policies in Venezuela. The fifth chapter will cover the discussion of the research results, by applying the findings to the theoretical elements discussed in chapter two. This thesis will end with a conclusion, where an answer to the research question will be presented, as well as research implications, recommendations, limits, and weaknesses.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Political and Bureaucratic Relationships

Numerous authors have written about the relationship between politicians and the decisions they take in the public sector field (Hollibaugh, et al, 2014; Kopecky et al., 2016; Peters and Pierre, 2004); most of their work is based on analyses of arguments on the literature of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson. Although taking different stances, Weber and Wilson both emphasize that the work of politicians and bureaucrats should not be mixed and both should work individually, without interfering with one another. When this does not happen, the transparency of the actions and decisions of politicians can be hindered and bring as consequences bad practices, unfavorable results for the society, and corruption activities in the government (Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2017).

In this context, Bach and Wegrich (2018) highlight the fact that during the last years, the selection process of top bureaucrat officials carried out by political executives has been thoroughly researched. The typology used for the selection process includes characteristics such as professionalism, political affiliation, and the level of personal loyalty (Kopecky et al., 2016). Along these lines, according to Stein et al. (2008) the policy-making process constitutes a series of deals and bargains carried out by different actors involved; in turn, the role of such actors may vary across settings. Starting from this premise, this thesis will consider the works by Hood and Lodge (2006) and will use their Public Service Bargain framework as a starting point in the analysis of the gains and losses behind the administrative-political relationship that exists in any government.

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The Public Service Bargain (PSB) framework entails a relationship of mutual political-administrative exchange, where individuals belonging to such relationship renounce to certain things, but at the same time, gain other equally (Hood and Lodge, 2006). As in any human relationship, it requires two or more parties to establish a link, a dialogue, or a bargain. Therefore, it is imperative that the needs and motivations of both parties involved in the PSB be taken into account; this is a relationship that relies on the opinions and preferences of both bureaucrats and politicians. In this sense, politicians delegate to bureaucrats because they have something to offer, at the same time that bureaucrats gain confidence and permanence within the system (Hood and Lodge, 2006). Along with the gain of certain benefits, both parties must renounce to certain amenities equally. In this view, bureaucrats renounce to their possibilities of communicating any form of dissatisfaction with the government of the day; meanwhile, politicians abandon the ability to personally and voluntarily take charge of the process of bringing in bureaucrats, terminating their contracts, and to financially remunerate them (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 7).

The authors highlight the existence of two types of PSBs, the ‘trustee-type’ and the ‘agency-type’ (Hood and Lodge, 2006). By referring to a ‘trustee-type’ bargain, the authors explore a relationship between bureaucrats and politicians with agreed-upon similarities (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 25). The bureaucrats exercise certain level of independence from the politicians, as they do not directly have to express loyalty to the politician for whom they work; but rather, bureaucrats serve the administrative system at large and the country in its totality. Similarly, their capabilities and benefits are not adjusted to please certain political figures (Hood and Lodge, 2006). It should be noted that politicians often

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have a preference towards this type of bargain, in order to avoid being blamed for any type of mistake committed on the part of the bureaucrat (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 33). Furthermore, ‘trustee-type’ bargains can be divided into ‘representational’ and ‘tutelary’ forms (Hood and Lodge, 2006). On the one hand, ‘representational’ forms have to do with the idea that bureaucrats must symbolize the citizens of the country for which they work; this, in the sense that all the languages, religions, and ethnic groups that exist in a country’s society should be represented in the public service at large (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 34). On the other hand, ‘tutelary’ forms consist on the notion that the public service should be made up by bureaucrats selected on a merit-based condition, and should not be focused on having a bureaucracy that is socially represented in all forms (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 38).

The second type of PSB identified by Hood and Lodge (2006) is the ‘agency-type’ bargain; it derives from the rational theory of principal-agent links (p. 42). The bargain posits that, within the context of principal-agent relationships, the ‘principal’ would be the politician and the ‘agent’ would be the bureaucrat. There may be three possible forms of relationships within the bargain, linking “politicians as agents of electors, top public servants as agents of the elected politicians, and front line public servants as agents of the top public servants” (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 43). The central idea behind the arrangement is that bureaucrats consent to act according to the orders of the politician or ‘principal’ in charge; this may include maintaining relationship ties with other actors with which the politician is involved with or works for. Additionally, the agreement often includes the need to keep a clear communication channel between the bureaucrats and the politicians, in order to avoid any misunderstandings; bureaucrats know what to expect from the politicians and the

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politicians know what to demand from their bureaucrats. This type of bargain is most often done in exchange of a trade-off that could benefit or outstrip the bureaucrat, expressed in forms of the level of given autonomy, shown allegiance, accountability for policy results, among others (Hood and Lodge, 2006).

The two types of bargains ‘trustee-type’ and ‘agency-type’ vary from country to country, and at the same time, can be victims of changes or cheating on the part of the people involved in the political-administrative relationship (Hood and Lodge, 2006). According to Hood and Lodge (2006), PSBs may change due to short or long-term movements, such as a change of government, political or military unrest, the level of income of a country, or even depending on corruption indicators (p. 153). Short-term movements, referred to as “sudden habitat changes” by Hood and Lodge (2006), take place when there are occurrences within the state apparatus, which agitate and break its functioning; hence, this damage the relationships within the political-administrative system, as well as the way in which the process of conducting business is carried out (p. 154). Likewise, changes within the organization of a state system may happen in the long run, and may begin with general symptoms of discontent; Hood and Lodge (2006) call these slow shifts “longer-term habitat changes” (p. 156). In this sense, changes may occur because one or more of the members of the political-administrative relationship seek to change the way in which things work, because the topics or problems of the moment are no longer of interest to the politician in turn, or because of evolutionary factors, as the way of working may not be convenient for some of the parties involved.

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Similarly, the authors identify several ways in which dishonesty can occur in the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Some cases can be exemplified in situations where politicians do not respect the level of autonomy designated to the bureaucrat; when bureaucrats do not follow the rules of the politicians and decide to take the course that best suits them or that best fits their own ideals; or, when both politicians and bureaucrats are found to disrespect the established operating norms that were already agreed upon (Hood and Lodge, 2006). A common practice present in many politico-administrative relations –and highly discussed by Hood and Lodge (2006) –is the action of cheating in the PSB by either the part of the bureaucrat, the politician, or by the both of them (pp. 157-158). The authors compare the action of cheating with the famous 'Prisoner's Dilemma', given that in the realm of doing politics –and in any realm that requires and depends on relations of discussion and dialogue –the possibility of deception is always present (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 158). The table below explains the possible situations that may arise in the event that both parties deliver, if they cheat, or if one takes the decision to cheat and leave the other in the position of being 'the least clever' one.

Table 1: Public service bargains: cheat or deliver?

Politicians Public servants Deliver Cheat Deliver ‘Cooperative equilibrium’: high trust public service

arrangements

Public servants fatalistic, but resigned or apathetic

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Cheat

Politicians distrust public servants, but

feel unable to alter system

Low trust and unstable public service arrangements

Source: Adapted from Hood, 2001, p. 20, as seen in Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 158

Along these lines, Gerald Mars (1982) (as seen in Hood and Lodge, 2006, pp. 158-159) emphasized the existence of two forms of cheating: ‘individualized cheating’ and ‘collective cheating’. The former refers to the engagement of bureaucrats or politicians in any sort of behavior or action that may be considered as cheating, and that may serve the purpose of benefiting oneself. The latter, has to do with practices carried out by groups of people –whether it be bureaucrats or politicians –in which agreements are disrupted and new modes of compliance are performed and informally accepted. This behavior entails very serious consequences, as there is a risk of not being able to identify when collecting cheating is carried out, to which in reality is the natural and previously agreed form of the accustomed governmental approaches (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 159). In the world of political processes, the concept of cheating is a bit ambiguous, as on many occasions what is determined as cheating –or not –may be subject to people's interpretation (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 159). That is to say, some will see an option as a trap, without rebuttal, and others will see the same option as a practice to which the applications of norms can be diverted, without necessarily being counted as cheating. In this sense, it helps to distinguish if it is cheating or not, to know if the customs of the political processes and of the political-administrative system are usually transmitted from generation to generation, and if they are

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applied and adopted informally; or if on the contrary, governmental approaches are conducted to the letter, as stated in the rules of the administration (Hood and Lodge, 2006).

If the two types of PSBs previously identified by Hood and Lodge (2006) are taken into account, it will be possible to evidence situations of cheating in different scenarios. In the case of ‘trustee bargains’, civil servants will fall into a dishonest behavior whenever they decide to prioritize and put themselves before the decisions of their superiors (Hood and Lodge, 2006, pp. 161-162). Likewise, politicians will be participating in dishonest actions as long as they do not comply with giving the bureaucrats their promised space of autonomy in decision-making arenas (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 162). As for the 'agency bargain' type, cheating is conducted whenever some of the parties involved make the decision to disobey their superior or to go against their subordinate (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 164). A common example in different spheres of government power is when politicians blame those in less powerful positions or their employees for the negative outcomes of their projects, rather than accepting responsibility for the matter.

In order to continue with the research and to be able to proceed with its empirical analysis, it is necessary to define the concepts of the key words used in the aforementioned research question. First, a definition for the term 'politicians' is required. By taking a simple dictionary definition, one can gather an understanding of the concept to be "a person experienced in the art or science of government, especially, one actively engaged in conducting the business of government” (Merriam-Webster). Moreover, if the meaning behind the action of ‘making politics’ is taken into account, one can distinguish it, as the action or actions that the human being performs for the benefit of society (Alcántara Sáez,

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2008). Aristotle already recorded the action in his work entitled 'Politica', in which he recognized this task as a government action that has, as its intention, the attainment of the objectives of a certain group. Furthermore, one can determine that politicians are individuals who have defined ideas that serve to address the problems that affect a country and therefore, its citizens and at the same time, shape the institutional structure for which they work (Alcántara Sáez, 2008).

Moreover, in order to engage in public policy-making, two types of key actors are needed: political executives and policy bureaucracies (Bach and Wegrich, 2018). Political executives can be identified as those individuals who have been elected or appointed to public offices, such as presidents and ministers, among others. On the other hand, ministries, departments, or central agencies comprise bureaucracies, sharing the responsibility of formulating public policies (Page and Jenkins, 2005). The consequences of the decisions taken by the rulers are fundamental for the legitimacy of political systems and for the well being of citizens. This is where it becomes essential to define what the term 'public policies' entails. Public policies are coordinated decisions based on collective objectives, and the public organizations are responsible for implementing them (Spiritto, 2017, p. 34). Therefore, it can be said that the bureaucracy is present in every space, in which the life of the citizens unfolds. Similarly, one can identify a politician as having a responsible figure in deciding on the content and application procedures of a public policy; based on his or her power, exercised through society and by his or her capacity of making administrative decisions, in the sense of possessing resources and authority to accomplish certain social goals (Spiritto, 2017).

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Overall, policy-making processes require the engagement of a set of actors, in order to carry them out in the most effective and efficient ways possible. These actors are usually linked to the structures of government and the existing institutions within it; however, it is possible to encounter a variety of actors outside the realm of the political sphere, such as business groups, academics, or experts specialized in certain fields (Stein et al., 2008; Markoff and Montecinos, 1994).

2.2. Government and Public Policy-Making in Latin America

Public policies in Latin America emerge from the need to seek solutions to visible problems of economic and social natures, and overall, to improve citizens’ living and performance standards. Nevertheless, Stein et al. (2008) focus on clarifying that, as a matter of fact, public policies arise as a result of policy-making process, which are in turn characterized by the involvement of a broad set of political actors, who move in different arenas –political or non political (p. 2). These actors are usually comprised of career politicians (presidents, governors), public officials (bureaucrats, judges), or business group’s representatives, the civil society, and even news outlets (Stein et al., 2008, p. 13). This section will introduce the main actors present in the Latin American policy-making sphere.

2.2.1.1. The President

Latin American countries have adopted the use of an executive power of government characterized by a presidential system. According to Stein et al. (2008), these government systems tend to be more abrupt than parliamentary systems, as it is common to witness important and considerable changes in the government structures every time a new

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president is elected; especially if they are from different political parties. In this context, it is clear that the president plays an important role in the policy-making process because the policy determinants will not only be shaped by their political ideologies, education, or values, but also by the “rules of the game” put forward by the country’s institutions (Stein et al., 2008, p. 32).

Starting from the premise that the power conceded to a president is ample, most frequently, head of states are granted specific presidential powers that "contribute to frame the relationship between the executive and the legislative” (Stein et al., 2008, p. 33). In this regard, Stein et al. (2008) present three characteristics in which a president’s power may be divided when it comes to Latin American politics: constitutional powers, legislative powers, and non-legislative powers (p. 33). The greater a president’s constitutional power is, the more liberty he or she will possess to introduce any policies, apply changes to existing ones, or divert the rules of the game. Meanwhile, a president’s legislative power may determine the extent to which policies will be governed by his or her preference; this entails the ability to emit any rules or to refuse permission of any kind to the parliament (national assembly), among others (Stein et al., 2008, p. 33). Lastly, non-legislative powers grant presidents the ability to designate and remove bureaucrats or any other individual representing the country’s administration (Stein et al., 2008, p. 34).

In this sense, a president is capable of taking decisions that have a direct effect on policies and that can either be addressed for the common good of the population, or for their own benefit. Another aspect to consider surrounding the figure and capabilities of the president has to do with the established electoral norms of the country. This is reflected in practice, as

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the decisions regarding public policies that a president is able to take, will be affected by the number of years of his or her mandate and reelection possibilities (Stein et al., 2008, p. 36).

2.2.1.2. The Cabinet

Cabinets in Latin American governments are usually comprised of ministers, who integrate the different specialized sections a government is divided in; hence, the cabinet plays a crucial role when it comes to policy-making processes, as they are actually those who dictate and guide the actual application capacities of public policies (Stein et al., 2008, p. 37). A fundamental characteristic of the cabinet –which has an impact on the policies to be adopted –is its tendency to form alliances, which in turn is governed by the electoral characteristics and political parties that rule a country (Stein et al., 2008, p. 37).

Furthermore, Martinez Gallardo (2005) (as seen in Stein et al., 2008, p. 37) affirms that there are two distinctive features of a cabinet’s role in Latin American policy-making processes, which are a cabinet’s method of composition and its overall cohesion. The way a cabinet is composed will have a direct influence on ministers’ loyalty towards the president. If the rules of a country dictate certain conditions on party representation in the cabinet – such as cases where the number of ministers must represent the number of political parties – this would influence the president’s power to gather support to enact policies or plans (Stein et al., 2008, p. 38). On the other hand, when cabinet composition does not possess any regulation, cases of alliances are rarely seen; this is most common in cabinets that are composed by members of the same political party as the president (Stein et al., 2008, p. 37).

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The restructuring of the existing ministries, and therefore, of their ministers in charged, is a frequent practice for most Latin American countries that may have an impact in policy-making processes; likewise, presidents usually add and remove with ease different ministries and regularly change their established functions. (Stein et al., 2008, p. 37). These practices of frequent changes and rotations make it difficult to maintain cohesion regarding the ideas and purposes of public policies. Additionally, having a low cohesion may alter the level of expertise used and may directly affect the members of the bureaucracies, as "ministers have no time and incentives to accumulate expertise" (Stein et al., 2008, p. 37).

2.2.1.3. The Political Parties

Political parties are understood as “organizations that seek influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government by ‘aggregating’ interests in the society” (Ware, 1996, as seen in Stein et al., 2008, p. 61).

In Latin America, political party systems tend to play an important role in policy-making processes. In this sense, Stein et al. (2008) identify two types of political parties: ‘programmatic’ parties and ‘clientelistic’ parties (p. 62). The former puts emphasis on reaching the masses through achievements and objectives fulfilled by their representatives in the government, and the ideals and values that the political party represents (Stein et al., 2008, p. 62). The latter, are characterized by providing tangible materials to gain support, in which the party "lures" possible supporters with a range of inducements, be it job opportunities, financial rewards, or the compensation of a certain need, and wins the support of the people once these promises have been fulfilled (Kitschelt, 2000, as seen in Stein et al., 2008, p. 62).

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2.2.1.4. The Bureaucracy and The Experts

The bureaucracy can be defined as a system of management and administration, rationalized, and of technical quality, characterized by its hierarchical and sometimes authoritarian organization, the delimitation of functions, and its arrangement according to impersonal norms, among other aspects (García-Pelayo, 1974, pp. 15-16). It may also be understood, in another sense, as a political system managed and directed by officials, whose members are recruited from the political sphere and who exercise the privileges of political decision-making and administrative implementation (García-Pelayo, 1974, pp. 20-21). Along these lines, the bureaucracy has important functions to fulfill for the Latin American community for two specific reasons. First, the bureaucracy exercises the capacity to offer expert advice in the design of government programs, in order for those in charge of making decisions (the elected politicians) to adopt the most appropriate tools (Jiménez, 2010, p. 2). Second, bureaucracies have the task of integrating and putting into work the programs that were previously designed and decided for, once approved (Jiménez, 2010, p. 2). Furthermore, bureaucracies may offer an element of stability in governments, while at the same time they introduce a certain degree of rationality in its operations (Jiménez, 2010, p. 3).

As previously stated, bureaucracies play a crucial role in government and therefore in public policy-making, but the way in which they are composed will probably have a weight in the nature of the policies. Stein et al. (2008) identify two attributes to catalogue bureaucracies in Latin America: the level of autonomy a bureaucracy possesses and the technical resources available to them (p. 64). In this context, the level of autonomy refers to the extent to which the expert capabilities of the public server are respected and are

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safeguarded against any forms of politicization; on the other hand, technical capacities eludes to the notion of having "salary compensation and evaluation systems" in place that are available to the bureaucracy (Stein et al., 2008, p. 64). Moreover, Centeno and Wolfson (1997) highlight the idea expressed by French author Jean Meynaud, regarding the power that prevails on the bureaucrats’ hands -as they can be regarded as experts- as through their specialized knowledge they are able to determine which options are “on the table” during policy-making processes; however, one must recognize that the last word, and therefore, the absolute decision-making power rests on the shoulders of their superiors, the elected politicians (pp. 218-219).

These experts stand out for their pertinence and the accumulation of knowledge or experience they may posses in a specific area (Fazey et al., 2006). In this regard, it is possible to see a variety of actors within the state apparatus that would influence, in different ways, the formulation of policies. On the one hand, and based on scientific and technical expertise, the literature distinguishes between two types of actors, technocrats (Putnam, 1977) and techno-politicians (Dominguez, 1997). Technocrats are defined as actors in power by virtue of their academic merits or expertise (Centeno and Maxfield, 1992). They are characterized for having studied in traditional education institutions and for carrying out postgraduate studies, to later integrate at the upper-middle levels of the state apparatus. Gunnel (1982) defines technocracy as “the government (or control) of scientists, technicians, or engineers –or at least the exercise of political authority by virtue of technical competence and expertise in the application of knowledge” (p. 392). Moreover, Schneider (2004) links technocrats with professionals related to business, law, and administration,

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while another group of authors relate them specifically to the profession of an economist (Markoff and Montecinos, 1994).

On the other hand, techno-politicians can be differentiated from technocrats for they have an important political capital, although they share with technocrats the characteristic of a high technical experience (Dominguez, 1997). This means that, along with having an outstanding technical training, they have a political career occupying positions of popular representation, or within political parties or movements. The misinterpretation of the use of technical criteria and the imposition on decisions of a political nature may leave in the background the link between the democratically elected authorities and the needs and demands of citizens. This is precisely how technocrats and techno-politicians could get to occupy important spaces in instances such as presidential advisory councils and think tanks.

In Latin America, technocrats have been widely associated with neoliberal trends, as a disarray of beliefs exists between two different inclinations –technocracy and the tendency towards a free-market approach (Centeno and Wolfson, 1997, p. 229). According to the authors, there is no link between the two suspected inclinations –other than the fact that Keynesian politics and the development practices that bolstered the industrialization of the region by import substitution gave importance and power to experts (Centeno and Wolfson, 1997, pp. 229-230). Similarly, Centeno and Silva (1998) discuss the idea behind the rise to popularity of technocrats in Latin America, suggesting that one could speak of a wave of change in the region. Technocracy already existed in the hemisphere –dating back to the 18th century –but it was around the 1970’s that its practice became more noticeable and emerged with more force than before, as the result of experts joining public arenas to

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discuss political and social issues (Centeno and Silva, 1998, p. 5). In this sense, experts replace the strong military and political figures that previously controlled the independence of experts, therefore having as a result a greater input on behalf of experts to determine the policy decisions of the region’s countries (Centeno and Silva, 1998).

Furthermore, Markoff and Montecinos (1994) highlight the existence of experts who act as advisers to the presidents of Latin American countries and other ‘Third World’ countries. Within the scope of experts to which they refer, the authors highlight the presence of economists within the bureaucracies, who, moreover, have taken control of the teams in charge of offering recommendations to the ministers of most of the region (Markoff and Montecinos, 1994, p. 4). This practice of the incorporation of economists in advisory systems or power within the government may be linked to the "need to give effective management to complex problems" (Nelson, 1987, Kaysen, 1968, Pechman, 1975 and 1989, as seen in Markoff and Montecinos, 1994, p. 6).

Experts' communication abilities also play a big role and add an additional element that gives them importance within the positions of power in government. Economists usually maintain extensive communications in different environments such as political sectors, the market, and the academic world, which allows them to have contact with other intellectuals from other countries and regions (Markoff and Montecinos, 1994, p. 15). Similarly, Markoff and Montecinos (1994) give as an example the economic problems experienced in Latin America more than thirty years ago; for a government to approach institutions or international organizations to ask for support in terms of aid and economic recovery plans,

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they need to have the necessary knowledge, language, logics, and assurances to seem credible and reliable (p. 10).

Additionally, Markoff and Montecinos (1994) present arguments that contradict Max Weber’s (1946) point of view, in relation to the role of experts in the modern political system. Taking into account Weber's argument, one could say that experts should be under the control of their superiors and would be asked only to apply their specialized knowledge to generate policies, of which they are not accounted for (Weber, 1946, p. 95, as seen in Markoff and Montecinos, 1994, p.13). On the other hand, Markoff and Montecinos (1994) express their opposite view on the matter, indicating that in the realities of the governments of the Latin American region, there are no clear boundaries between the roles of experts and their superiors, because the same knowledge that could give a bit of domain or exclusivity to the expert is actually changing, falling into the threat that experts could become "generalists" (pp. 13-14).

2.3. Expectations and Causal Mechanisms

The main expectations to be tested in the investigation are:

E1: Sudden habitat changes in Latin America have led to the increase use of experts in

government for poverty reduction policies.

This expectation is based on the premise that sudden and abrupt changes in a government – such as political, military, economic, or social crises –can in turn cause unexpected changes in a country’s political-administrative system (Hood and Lodge, 2006). This alteration makes the restructuration of the system of government necessary, and therefore, of the

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actors that integrate it. This may bring as a result, the need to rely on individuals with certain level of expertise that may contribute with their capabilities and knowledge to solve the problem or challenge that a country may be going through.

E2: The authority of the president’s figure in Latin America has led to the control of

politicians over experts regarding poverty reduction policies.

Unlike countries that have adopted the use of a parliamentary system of government, Latin American countries have chosen to integrate the use of presidential systems. A characteristic of presidential systems of government is the tendency towards a greater concentration of power in the figure of the president. As explained by Stein et al. (2008), presidents in the region usually enjoy constitutional, legislative, and non-legislative powers, which could in turn facilitate political favoritism when dealing with policy-making processes. In this sense, presidents may show certain preference or degree of manipulation in forming their cabinet or influencing legislators to propose, approve or reject certain policies.

E3: A disproportionate influence of the governing political party over policy-making

processes in Latin America has lead to the dominance of politicians over experts in poverty reduction policies.

When political parties have a high degree of influence in a country, this can have an impact on the country’s system of government. In this regard, when policy-makers are members of major political parties -such as the governing party- they must be accountable to them for

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their results, which can in turn lead to a greater dominance of politicians over experts, as politicians must meet the expectations of the political parties and may be subject to their pressure; while not all experts are members of political parties, must politicians are part of one.

E4: Technocratic led governments in Latin America have led to a greater contribution with

international financial institutions in dealing with poverty reduction policies.

This expectation is based on the notion that the more experts -or technocrats- are at the upper levels of government, the greater the working relationship with international financial institutions will be. Politicians may not be as connected to pundit thinkers as experts could be, and they may have other preferred resources to go to other than international institutions. This may be explained in Markoff and Montecinos’ (1994) statement regarding the tendency of technocrats to interact with other experts in diverse intellectual domains. In turn, as technocrats relate to other experts and maintain a constant connection, this will result in greater cooperation mechanisms with international financial institutions, to jointly seek better results for the challenge faced.

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3. Research Design

This research will be based on the case study of Venezuela, as it is a country with a long history of prosperity and development phases, as well as times of dictatorship and collapse. In this context, in the research process prior to the start of this work, the researcher came across important publications on the topic of governance, expertise, and technocracy, such as Babb’s work on Mexico (2001). Her work discusses the rise to power of economists -educated and trained in the United States- who now hold the highest positions within the Mexican government. In this sense, the researcher was inspired by an existing gap in the literature that needed to explore the subject of study in Venezuela.

Additionally, this research will focus on poverty reduction policies in specific, for three main reasons that will be listed as follow. First, poverty reduction is a central issue for Venezuela, because despite having the largest oil reserves in the world -which in theory would translate to having elevated economic resources, as Venezuela’s economy is an oil-dependent one- there have always been high poverty rates in the country; this fact makes the topic interesting and leads to the rise of a number of questions, the most important being, who exactly is in charge of formulating and implementing the policies that aim at reducing the poverty levels in the country? This leads the researcher to inquire about the second reason that explains the interest in the chosen issue. In Venezuela, there is only one published work that takes the task of looking into the subject of expertise in policy-making; however, this work (Gonzalez Oquendo, 2006) focuses solely on the country’s oil sector, leaving out the complex situation as well as the wide variety of actors that integrates Venezuela’s social policy system. Lastly, this research focuses on poverty reduction

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policies as throughout the years, numerous ministries have been created and removed, along with their specific functions and objectives (Official Gazette N° 6189, 2003; Official Gazette N° 38731, 2006; Ministry of Planning, 2010). But the ministries in charge of social issues in Venezuela have remained and still are fundamental for its functioning and mission; moreover, the core of many social programs have remained intact throughout the years, with others being reinvented (Political Database of the Americas, 2011).

The type of research that will be used for this study is an observational research design, as it seeks to deduce opinions and interpret information based on theory and qualitative generated data. Furthermore, this research will follow a single-case study design, as it will analyze numerous data sources and information about one specific case; therefore, a within-case study will be carried out. More specifically, data containing the information of the key actors involved in policy-making processes aimed at reducing poverty rates in Venezuela will be analyzed; this will enable the researcher to explore the backgrounds of the main players and establish a clarification on the factors that explains the involvement of certain figures in the policy-making process. Moreover, this research is of a retrospective nature, as the time frame that will be covered ranges from 1989 to 2014. Additionally, this within-case study, based over a long period of time, will allow the researcher to examine changes over time in the involvement of politicians and experts, and in the factors that may explain these changes.

The dependent variables of the research are “political and expert involvement”; political involvement is operationalized as political figures that have been voted in or appointed, and expert involvement is operationalized as individuals with advanced knowledge or

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experience in a specific domain. The dependent variables were identified, as they are the central point of study of this research, and therefore, they are not changeable; furthermore, this research focuses on explaining why politicians and experts are involved in public policies aimed at reducing poverty, and not any other additional factor. Additionally, the dependent variables identified above may rely upon certain alterations of the independent variables to be presented; that is to say, if any of the independent variables do not occur, it may not be possible to discover what explains the involvement of politicians and experts, what that involvement entails, and why there might be changes in such involvement.

Meanwhile, the independent variables are the set of factors that could potentially explain such an involvement, which to be explicit are: short-term movements in Latin American governments, which is operationally defined as sudden economic, social, or political crises that may affect a country; the authority the presidential figure may have in the region, operationalized as the control of a president to hold constitutional, legislative, and non-legislative powers; influence of political parties, operationalized as the degree of power and pressure exerted on the top level government officials, whom at the same time may be accountable to the party; and the reliance of Latin American countries on international financial institutions, operationally defined as the possible relationships experts or politicians may have with institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and IDB. The independent variables were identified as these are the criterion this research will be examining to see the extent and implication of the involvement of experts and politicians; these variables are changeable and therefore they may be modified if required. Moreover, these are the components that the theory of this research indicates may lead to an appropriate explanation to the question that is being examined in this research. The

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relationship between the variables is expressed in the aspiration to discover the extent to which either political or expert knowledge is used in poverty reduction policies in Venezuela, through analyses of the country’s main actors involved in the policy-making process.

Table 2: Operationalization of Variables

Category Variable Operationalization Measurement

Dependent variable Political involvement Political figures voted in or appointed Measured through complete lists of actors involved in social policy making, obtained through Georgetown University’s database and the

Universidad Catolica Andres Bello’s database

Dependent variable Expert involvement

Individuals with advanced knowledge and experience in a Measured through biographical information

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specific domain Independent variable Short term movements in Latin American governments Sudden economic, social, or political

crises that may affect a country

Measured through data obtained from

primary and secondary sources, such as interviews, books, and official

documents

Independent variable

Authority the presidential figure

may have in the region Control of a president to hold constitutional, legislative, and non-legislative powers Measured through data obtained from

primary and secondary sources,

such as interviews and articles from the Constitution of Venezuela Independent variable Influence of political parties Degree of power and pressure exerted on the top

level government officials, whom at the same time may

be accountable to

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the party Independent variable Reliance of Latin American countries on international financial institutions Possible relationships experts or politicians may have with institutions such as

the IMF, World Bank, and IDB

documents

Source: table created by researcher

Table 2 summarizes the operationalized variables of this research. It is important to mention that the variables were previously conceptualized in chapter 2 (theoretical framework) so the complete concepts have already been defined.

Furthermore, the identified variables will be measured through the use of qualitative data, that will be collected through primary and secondary sources; some which include the use of document analysis, such as public record documents –including but not limited to the annual plans of the nation, which specify the policies to be implemented, the problems to be dealt with, how to deal with them, and the expectations the government has on the development of the country. In addition, sources include documents such as research papers from universities, annual reports from private institutions, advisory bodies, online tools such as Leiden University’s Catalogue, JSTOR, Wiley Online Library, as well as

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government institutions and policy documents that will serve useful in identifying the key actors involved in the formulation of policies.

Moreover, biographical information on key actors involved in social policies -such as ministers- and experts in the different periods will be examined. The selection process of the information was selected randomly from two documents containing a list of relevant actors who took part in social policy-making; these were obtained through the databases of

Universidad Catolica Andres Bello and Political Database of the Americas (2011). Once

the random selection process took place, each chosen individual was thoroughly researched based on two categories: (1) professional trajectory within the Venezuelan public sector and within their area of expertise, and (2) educational background. The categories were selected, as they would allow determining if the individuals had a relevant trajectory concerning their area of study, or if they had acquired their expertise through technical experience.

There will also be a number of interviews with relevant political and expert figures involved in the formulation of poverty reduction policies and social programs in the country. This thesis will use a semi-structure interview technique to generate information that will help in answering the research question. This technique is the most appropriate for this study, as it will have already defined questions that the interviewees will then answer to, through their own perspective and opinions. The content of the interviews was adapted according to the type of actor that they constitute in relation to their position in the management of expert knowledge within the field of public policies (see annex).

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As there are interviewees that had a policy-making role in different government periods, this technique will provide valuable insight information on how the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was framed through the established time period of research. It is important to highlight, that the data gathered through the interviews will serve as secondary sources for this thesis, and will be conducted with the aim of filling in the blanks that the document material is not able to provide. In this context, interviews will help in analyzing the influence expertise or political involvement has played in the country’s social policies, as well as the role played by each actor.

Additionally, the information obtained was analyzed by taking into account responses with similar or repetitive patterns related to the variables studied. Interviews were carried through online platforms, such as Skype and Google Hangouts; they had an average duration of 30 minutes to 1 hour. Informed consent was addressed by asking the respondent if they agree or not to being recorded, for the sole purpose of using the data for the thesis; all interviewees agreed to having their names included in the empirical analysis and discussion. It is important to point out that interviews were conducted in Spanish, as this is the native language of all the participants; they were later translated into English by the researcher. However, it should be noted that several of the interviewees often switched from Spanish to English, referring to key words or concepts in that language.

Table 3: Experts and politicians that will participate in the interview process

Participant Title

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Director of the Centre for International Development of Harvard University; and

Venezuelan representative to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Ada Raffalli Councilwoman of Maracaibo, Venezuela

Miguel Rodriguez

Former director of CORDIPLAN (Central Office of Coordination and Planning) for the

period of 1989-1992

Fernando Spiritto

Public policy researcher and consultant; postgraduate director of the Faculty of

Economic and Social Studies at the

Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB)

Gisela Velasco Bureaucrat

Table created by researcher with the information provided by the interviewees

Table 3 portrays the individuals who participated in the interview process, and includes their professional trajectory related to the topic of study.

3.1. Time Frame for Data Collection

The time frames that will be used for this research are as follow:

• 1989 to 1998: this decade encompasses the end of the so called “lost decade”, characterized by the impossibility of paying external debt and the devaluation of the

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Venezuelan currency. Moreover, during this time span, the government turned to multilateral organizations to finance social programs, as a consequence of the economic crisis held during the 1980s. The social programs of presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and Rafael Caldera will by considered.

• 1999 to 2014: this time frame covers different political, social, and economic movements in the country. Among them, a coup d'état in 2002, followed by an oil strike, and an economic recession. From the middle of this period, the situation of the country is stabilized. This period is also marked by the economic and social instability of the country. 2010 begins with a strong economic recession; the same situation is encountered within the social area, with new projects launched by the government because of the economic crisis. The death of Hugo Chavez and the election of Nicolas Maduro as president mark the end of the period; therefore, the social missions of both presidents will be considered.

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4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. Historical Overview

During the 1980s, Venezuela was submerged in what has been called the ‘lost decade’, characterized by an international fall in oil prices and therefore, the decline of resources in the hands of the State (Tablante, 2006). Added to this situation, is the growing external debt the country experienced; the payment of the debt involved compromising a substantial part of the country’s external resources, which resulted in the depletion of distribution possibilities among the different sectors of society (Tablante, 2006). By the end of February 1989, a social outbreak took place in Caracas, known as the “Caracazo”; the uprising was the result of the socio-economic tensions suffered by the Venezuelan society due to a macroeconomic restructuration put forward by president Carlos Andrés Pérez, which affected the quality of life of the middle and lower social strata (Tablante, 2006). The “Caracazo” is also considered to be the first symptom of exhaustion of the Venezuelan bipartisan system, which had governed the country since 1959.

The bipartisanship was the political manifestation of the so-called “Punto Fijo Pact”, an agreement signed between the Social Democratic Party of Democratic Action (AD), the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organization (COPEI), and the Democratic Republican Union (URD); the agreement did not include the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) (Tablante, 2006). This arrangement involved the establishment of a government of national unity, in which each of the signing parties would have equal representation in the Executive Cabinet. Due to the success gained by the AD and COPEI parties in creating massive and active supporters, the agreement gave way to the

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composition of a logic of alternating power between the two parties, and reduced the prominence and importance of the remaining political parties (Tablante, 2006). In this regard, the political and administrative errors carried out by the various governments contributed to fueling popular discontent against the “Punto Fijo Pact” and its leadership style; especially, as the economy could no longer ensure an environment of citizen harmony.

The support to the bipartisanship was broken down in 1993, when Rafael Caldera was elected president; this came with the support of a new political party known as “Convergencia”, formed by diverse political movements (Tablante, 2006). Caldera’s government went through one of the biggest political, economic, and social crisis; the public services deteriorated, the living standard of the population decreased significantly, violence in the country was generalized, and an overall dissatisfaction against the established democratic system itself grew considerably (Tablante, 2006).

In December 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected president with the promise that Venezuela would greatly reduce its poverty rates and increase the living standard of the population by relying, even more than before, on its natural energy resources and wealth (Desjardins, 2017). However, in April 2002, Chavez was deposed from power by a coup d’état, and Pedro Carmona assumed the presidency of the transitional government; nevertheless, Carmona only lasted two days in power, as Hugo Chávez was reinstated into power by military loyalists (Gutiérrez, 2013). Once ratified in the presidency, Chávez continued to preach his commitment to fight against poverty through the use of a socialist model, known as “21st Century Socialism”; this ideal opposed the notions of capitalism and the

Political and Expert Involvement in Poverty Reduction Policies in Venezuela