The silence in a field of chaos
A study on fragmentation phenomena to collaboration processes during terrorist attacks.
Masterthesis Crisis and Security Management Written by: Manouk Zwartkruis
Supervisor: Dr. J. J. Wolbers
Second reader: Dr. L. D. Cabane
July 20, 2019
Leiden University Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
Additional information
Studentnumber: S2099802 Date of admission: July 20, 2019 Word count: 15.086
Email: manoukzwartkruis@hotmail.com
Preface
In front of you the thesis: The silence in a field of chaos is presented. This thesis was written as a final test to fulfill the requirements of the Master Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University. In this thesis I have had the opportunity to combine the knowledge I have gained during both my Bachelor and Master programmes.
I would like to thank a few people that made the finalization of this thesis possible. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Mr. Wolbers for always replying quickly to my emails, for supporting me and providing helpful feedback that has given this study structure and guidance. Furthermore, I would like to thank my mom in particular for the necessary motivational support. Many phone calls and motivational support cards have helped to achieve my final study goal. Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends for all the support when I was in need of some relaxing. This process has been a rollercoaster with ups and downs. I hope that I can call myself a Master of Science in the end.
I hope you will enjoy reading as much as I enjoyed working on it. Kind regards,
Abstract
During the Paris attacks in 2015 and the Brussels bombings in 2016 first responders had to deal with a large scope of the crisis operation. In order to mitigate the impact fast-response organisations had to align collaboration processes. This study aims to discover how fast-response organisations have aligned collaboration processes from a fragmentation perspective. Fragmentation is a phenomenon that can emerge under excessive circumstances of which first responders have to cope with. It can mark collaboration and sensemaking processes of a crisis in a positive or negative way. Due to multiple factors fragmentation phenomena have complicated crisis operations. The communication defaults, increasing time pressure, lack of resources and unstructured shifts from centralised to decentralised units and vice versa; have contributed to the rising of fragmentation. Therefore, in the future communication technology and resources should be up to date to innovations and government authorities should reconsider the level and structure of decision-making authorities during a terrorist attack.
Table of contents
Preface ………. P. 3 Summary ………. P. 4 List of abbreviations ……… P. 6 1. Introduction ………. P. 7 2. Theoretical Framework ……….. P. 11 §2.1 Inter-organisational collaboration ………. P. 11 §2.2 Inter-organisational sensemaking ……… P. 17 3. Methodology ……… P. 19 §3.1 Design ……… P. 19 §3.2 Datacollection ……… P. 20 §3.3 Data analysis ………. P. 21 §3.4 Validity ……….……… P. 22 4. Analysis ……… P. 24 §4.1 Brussels bombings……… ……….. P. 24§4.1.1 Overview of attacks context ……….. P. 24
§4.1.2 Analysis ………... P. 26
§4.1.3 Subconclusion ……….. P. 29
§4.2 Paris attacks ………. P. 29
§4.2.1 Overview of attacks context ……… P. 29
§4.2.2 Analysis ……….. P. 31
§4.2.3 Subconclusion ………. P. 33
§4.3 Comparison between cases ……… P. 34
§4.3.1 Communication ………. P. 34
§4.3.2 Late arrival of services / time pressure ………….. P. 37 §4.3.3 Lack of resources and training ……… P. 39
5. Discussion ……… P. 42
6. Conclusion ……… P. 46
7. Bibliography ……… P. 48
Appendix: A ……… P. 51
List of abbreviations
APHP Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris (academic hospitals)
A.S.T.R.I.D. All-round Semi-cellular Trunking Radio communication system with Integrated Dispatching
B.R.I-BAC Research and Intervention Brigade – Brigade Anticommando (Parisian specialised forces, one of the 15 units throughout France).
CCOT Center for Coordination of Operations and Transmissions
CP-OPS Commandpost Operational Services
DAO Decentralized Autonomous Organisation
DIR MED Director Medical Assistance
FGI Federal Health Inspector
FiST Fire fighter Stress Team
Maxi-MIP Maximum- Medical Intervention Plan
MEDA Medical Center Brussels Zaventem
MHKA Military Hospital Queen Astrid
MIVB Community for Intercommunal Traffic in Brussels
Chapter 1: Introduction
“On the morning of Friday, November 13, fire fighters and emergency medical workers in Paris simulated how they might respond to a mass shooting event. They had no idea that they would be putting their skills into practice that same night”. This is the first sentence of a news article by STATnews (Boodman, 2015). It illustrates how unexpected and suddenly the Paris attacks occurred in November 2015. The surprise effect contributed to the fact that the situation was difficult to manage. Due to this unexpectedness, services were not prepared to respond adequately. Wolbers et al. (2018) claim that recent studies, to the Paris attacks in 2015 and the Oslo bombings in 2011, show that these situations are hard to manage due to the rapid increase of ambiguity in such situations. Bechky & Okhuysen (2011) also found in a study to preparations and responses of emergency services that it was difficult for these services to respond adequately. The context of a crisis demonstrates how difficult it is for emergency services to manage unexpected events as terrorist attacks. During a crisis, fast-response organisations as fire fighters, law enforcement and medical services, have to quickly adapt to new and unexpected events. Fast-response organisations are able to develop structures and risk-mitigation processes to perform under excessive circumstances (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). By shaping risk-mitigation structures fast-response organisations are able to show resilience to unexpected changes and developments during a crisis situation (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011). The management of a terrorist attack as occurred in Paris, requires a structured process and division of responsibilities in order for fast-response organisations to be able to adapt to new situations within an event. However, if one composes a structured and standardised process, it has to take into account that the organisations involved do not have a coherent organisational culture. Martin (1992) describes organisational culture as the way patterns of norms, formal and informal rules and procedures are interpreted and can only be understood by insiders. Every organisation develops its own norms, values and workethics. Especially these factors can lead to conflict during crisis response operations if divergent norms, values and procedures do not coalesce and a common approach to the problem will not be accomplished.
Furthermore, Wolbers et al. (2018) explain that unexpected changes decrease the level of effective integrated action due to uncertainties. As a result of uncertainties and ambiguity that emerge during an operation the risk of issues with collaboration and sensemaking increases. The result is that fragmentation is likely to emerge. Wolbers et al. (2018) describe that fragmentation emerges due to the breakdown of collaborative action and sensemaking.
Hanrieder (2015) describes fragmentation as a phenomenon that “generates a path dependent
organisational dynamic whereby it is locked in and reinforced over rounds of reform” (p. 3).
Moreover, Martin (1992) explains fragementation as: “A multiplicity of interpretations that
seldom, if ever, coalesce into a stable consensus” (p. 130). Fragmentation is thus
characterised by ambiguity and complexity of relationships and interpretations (Martin, 1992, p. 130). If one takes all definitions into consideration, it is plausible that the outcome as Hanrieder (2015) describes, is similar to the breakdown of collaborative action and sensemaking as Wolbers et al. (2018) describe and the lack of coalescence of interpretations into consensus as Martin (1992) describes.
Hanrieder (2015) emphasizes in this description the coexistence of powerful subunits in a crisis whereby each subunit is in dispose of autonomy. This quasi autonomy “is blamed
for jeopardizing policy coherence and implementation” (p. 7). The power of subunits “is usually seen as being diffused more broadly in the environment and among individual organizational members” (Martin, 1992, p. 159). The coexistence of autonomy and powerful
subunits could influence the fragmentation process in terms of the breakdown of collaborative action, since it is plausible that subunits will try to exert power and veto decisionmaking processes during a crisis. Formal collaboration processes that are not applicable to the situation at hand cause fragmentation. For instance, because prescribed procedures are not applicable to the situation and therefore lack effectiveness.
The previous definitions may create the impression that fragmentation is a negative phenomenon. However, the negative nature of the definition does not necessarily mean that fragmentation has a negative impact on all situations. The breakdown of collaborative action and sensemaking during a crisis situation can be positive as well. For instance, if fast-response organisations deal with time pressure it might be useful to undertake direct action instead of following the chain of command, since this could be time consuming. Fragmentation is not a process itself, but a phenomenon that emerges during processes of collaboration and sensemaking. However, it remains difficult to predict the impact of fragmentation on first response organisations during terrorist attacks. Therefore, this study aims to provide more insight into the impact of fragmentation on the collaboration processes. Particularly focusing on collaboration processes between fast-response organisations and how these organisations cope with the emerging of fragmentation. This leads to the following research question: How have fast-response organisations aligned collaboration processes and
coped with fragmentation during the terrorist attacks in Paris, November 2015 and in Brussels, March 2016?
This study will focus on the cases of the Paris attacks in 2015 and the Brussels bombings in 2016. The Paris attacks and Brussels bombings have been selected, because the cases are similar in terms of collaboration processes, fragmentation phenomena, types and scope of the attacks. In Brussels and Paris were fast-response organisations obliged to collaborate. Since the scope of attacks was rather similar, the type of involved fast-response organisations matched as well. It will be easier to draw conclusions, make recommendations and show implications for fast-response organisations in practice by comparing similar cases. However, regarding a terrorist attack one has to take into account that every situation is unique and every country holds its own response system. Furthermore, this study will conduct a within-case comparison, since this study is concerned with causal mechanisms and processes. A study to causal processes is focused on “A sequence of intervening factors that
elucidate step by step how the cause brings about the outcome” (Rohlfing, 2012, p.12). It is
remarkable to mention the difference in response systems, which makes it simultaneously interesting to compare these cases.
Furthermore, both attacks were committed on multiple locations by multiple attackers within a short period of time. This was determinative for response services, since crisis services were preoccupied with the management of the first crisis when another major crisis incident emerged. Therefore, it is plausible that the level of fragmentation increased. Since the attacks emerged within a short time frame it was challenging for fast-response organisations to respond adequately. This causes the breakdown of a clear overview of the situation whereby it will be challenging to validate certain impressions and interpretations. This could lead to the breakdown of collaborative sensemaking.
Societal and academical relevance
There has been a reported lack of systematic reports and scientific evaluations of rescue missions during terror attacks (Wurmb et al. 2018). It is important to publish these academic articles, because “systematic reports will allow for the description, assessment and
comparison of civil emergency rescue operations during terrorist attacks and they may serve as a very important basis in order to define and communicate the lessons learned” (Wurmb et
al. 2018, p. 2). In order to improve the collaboration processes of emergency response services to sudden onset crisis, these reports are important to determine the lessons learned of previous and similar incidents.
Moreover, it is necessary to clarify more on the phenomenon of fragmentation in crisis response operations due to its ambiguous nature. This study can be valuable for first
responders that cope with sudden onset crises to create coherence in a field of chaos. During these sudden events it is plausible that fragmentation easily emerges under the circumstances of timepressure and chaos. Therefore, this study provides more insights on the effects of fragmentation during these events, whereby first responders will be aware of the emerging of this phenomenon and are able to adapt accordingly.
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
The research question of this study entails several concepts that will be further explained in this chapter. First, the importance of the concept of collaboration will be discussed. Whereafter, the concept of sensemaking will be elaborated.
§2.1 Inter-organisational collaboration
In crises situation such as terrorist attacks multiple organisations are asked to solve a sudden onset event. The event is rather unpredictable in contrast to the predictable nature of a natural disaster as a hurricane, which one can predict through the use of weather systems and analysis. A crisis results in the allocation of time, attention and resources (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Therefore, in a short amount of time different voluntary, governmental and private organisations are facing a shared problem.
The only way to effectively resolve a shared problem is to establish collaboration between organisations. Collaboration can be defined as:
“A cooperative, interactive process in which participants from different organizations, relying neither on markets nor legal hierarchy mechanisms, develop shared rules, norms, and structures to act and decide on issues related to a shared problem” (Beck and
Plowman, 2014, p. 1235).
Prezelj (2014) defines inter-organisational collaboration as:
“An effort from at least two organisations to coordinate their activities or share their
sources for the purpose of creating results that a single agency would be unable to achieve” (p. 325).
If one considers the previous definitions, it can be concluded that collaboration consists of important elements as: different organisations, common goal and actions. Taking all the definitions into account the definition of Beck and Plowman (2014) seems the most complete in relation to a crisis setting and will be used as basis for this study. Not only does this definition address the most important elements of collaboration, it also addresses the development of shared rules, norms and structures. Collaboration is a process that develops over time, whereby the integration of different workprocesses between organisations has proven its additional value. The definition of Prezelj (2014) lacks profoundness in terms that it remains rather unprecise. Characteristic for fast-response organisations in crises is the development of swift trust. Swift trust arises, compared to conventional trust, in temporary
relationships as a means to manage the vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk inherent in collaborative situations (Beck & Plowman, 2014, p. 1242). Mutual trust determines to what extent collaboration processes, coordination methods and communication activities can be optimalised. The integration of rules, norms and values into the organisational culture and structure is called institutionalism. Especially crisis situations are characterised for instant institutionalism. However, the level of institutionalism depends largely on the level in which swift trust is created.
One can determine that sharing the burden and benefits between organisations to achieve a common goal is key in terms of collaboration. Collaboration passes beyond mutual sharing and having a common goal. It also implies the development of shared rules, norms, values and structures. This is a difficult process, particularly between different crisis organisations. The difficulty exists in the element that fast-response organisations are suddenly alarmed when a crisis evolves. Therefore, these organisations are asked to collaborate: “When a task, which
was formerly small enough to be handled, amenably grows to an unmanageable size, resources may be increased to handle the larger problem, or parts of it may be passed on to other organisations, so that the task becomes an interorganisational one” (Turner, 1976, p.
379).
One of the key challenges during a crisis is to establish effective collaboration within a short timeframe. Beck & Plowman (2014) and Faraj & Xiao (2006) both emphasize that emergent collaboration develops under excessive circumstances where a contribution of interdependent organisations is demanded. Therefore, it is important to develop a common management structure to create one team by uniting all fast-response organisations involved. Drabek (1985) claims that the level of proper emergency management and possibility of interdependent organisations is determined by a lack or non-lack of standardisation. The lack of standardisation is caused by the diversity of organisations that are involved that do not have a common approach in managing the situation. If one considers the scope of the attacks of Brussels and Paris, it is assumable that fragmentation during collaboration activities can emerge due to the amount and type of organisations involved that are required to collaborate simultaneously.
In order to establish collaboration it is important to have a common understanding of the problem and a common approach to solve this problem. Beck and Plowman (2014) indicate that it is essential to first identify relevant stakeholders, create relationships, trust and a collective identity among these stakeholders and appoint a leader in order for inter-organisational collaboration to become effective. Prezelj (2014) holds a similar perspective
and claims that trust creates the basis for inter-organisational collaboration. In these situations, organisations are interdependent of each other, whereby trust accelerates the collaboration process since it is based on correctness, frankness and honesty (Prezelj, 2014, p. 331). Inter-organisational partnerships with a lack of trust will hardly be able to resolve or mitigate a crisis due to the insufficient quality of information exchange. The exchange of information occurs through communication between organisations.
Communication is one of the key components in crisis management (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Crisis communication is: “The collection, processing, and dissemination of
information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs & Holladay, 2010, p. 20). How
fast-response organisations react to a crisis has a significant impact on the outcome. In this study operational communication will be the central factor that determines the rising of the fragmentation phenomena. Considering a large crisis as the attacks in Brussels and Paris, different organisations are located all over the scene. Therefore, these organisations need to be able to communicate, amongst others, to follow commands, exchange information and monitor activities. An important factor within crisis communication is tactical advice. This advice consists of three elements: be quick, accurate and consistent (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). By doing so, the level of credibility increases and the level of uncertainty decreases. With an increasing level of credibility also comes an increase to the level of trust. A higher level of trust contributes to effective collaboration, because organisations become interdependent.
While communication patterns vary greatly by responder, it is often difficult to predict who will wind up being central in a crisis (Butts et al., 2007, p. 143). In other words, which person or organisation will be responsible for giving commands? Olsson (2014) claims that it is important to distinguish communication activities of public and private organisations. Especially public organisations, as fast-response organisations, are obliged to manage large-scale crises. Well-structured communication flows can improve resilience and sensemaking. Olsson (2014) distinguishes two dimensions that create four ideal types of crisis communication. This study will focus on the operational resilience-oriented approach which entails: “Operational information that relates to direct and event-oriented information, which
aims at providing people with information that can enhance their ability to cope with the situation at hand” (Olsson, 2014, p. 114). The resilience dimension is more of a process
instead of an outcome and can be understood as: “A process linking a set of adaptive
capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaption after a disturbance” (Olsson,
collective identity and providing emotional support (Olsson, 2014). Morgan et al. (2002) argue that it is important to inform those who are the most affected by the situation and need to make a considered decision. In contrast, strategic information is often pre-planned to achieve a long-term goal (Olsson, 2014). However, fast-response organisations are characterised by a sudden and temporal organisational structure, which do not pursue a long-term goal. Nevertheless, there exist pre-planned crisis plans that delong-termine, for instance, the division of responsibilities. Over time, these plans can be adapted and optimalised in order to increase effective crisis communication. Thus, within these existing crisis plans it seems possible to set and pursue long-term goals. The best method to establish effective communication during a crisis is to create a central system in order to monitor all flows of communication between organisations (Olsson, 2014).
Furthermore, as briefly presented in the introduction, the organisations involved during a crisis response operation mostly differ in terms of organisational culture. “An ongoing effort
to establish an emphasis on culture can add notably to the effectiveness of the message”
(Littlefield, 2015, p. 5). Organisational culture consists of two main elements, which are the method of approach to a crisis situation and the organisational philosophy through which the identity develops (Martin, 1992). These two elements determine the level to which extensive collaboration can be achieved. For instance, if the method of approach of fast-response organisations already coalesces, it becomes easier to integrate different workprocesses. However, the question remains if integration of these elements is necessary to establish effective collaboration. Beck and Plowman (2014) claim that this is necessary and emphasize the importance of shaping a collective identity between organisations. A collective identity is the shared understanding of the larger collective of participating agencies, what it means to be part of that collective identity and to act accordingly (Beck & Plowman, 2014). However, according to Martin (1992), from a fragmentation perspective it seems that there is no coherent culture between organisations. It is argued that organisations consist of diverse and ambiguous cultures that do not seem to merge. This is mainly caused by differences in for instance, perceptions, memories, beliefs, experiences and values. The diverse and ambiguous cultures comply with the inter-organisational collaboration processes between fast-response organisations. Every organisation has its own organisational culture. Therefore, it is challenging to establish a collective identity and merge all the organisational cultures of involved stakeholders together within the short timeframe. Moynihan (2009) supports this:
“Responders need a central coordinating mechanism to direct resources and resolve conflict in a timely fashion” (p. 898).
The ambiguous, discontinuous and uncertain nature of crisis events cause difficulties and increase the risk of failure. An important challenge is the shift between a centralised and decentralised approach and vice versa. During a terrorist attack it is required to first re-centralise in order to be able to shift from a dere-centralised to a re-centralised approach again.“While decentralization in emergencies is the key modus operandi, deeply rooted in
organizational systems and the professional ethos of the officers, some situations may require a form of re-centralization that proved to be a particular challenge during the handling of the terror attack” (Bye et al., 2019, p. 69). This form of re-centralization proved to be
challenging, because it is extremely difficult to centralize and align the separate pockets of command during collaboration processes in the crisis operation. Ambiguity, uncertainty and time pressure causes this challange. If these inter-organisational problems continue to exist, ineffective collaboration or even competition between organisations will arise.
Prezelj (2014) discusses the role of inter-organisational competition to evolve during a crisis and limits effective collaboration processes. It is plausible to say that competition during crisis situations will break down the collaborative action, cause fragmentation and obstructs the integration of organisational culture and workmethods. Prezelj (2014) further clarifies that the reason ‘competitive collaboration’ emerges is because: “Especially a crisis
period just after terrorist attacks can be perceived as an opportunity for some organizations to attain more power, influence, reputation, money, fame and prestige” (p. 330). This does
not foster the inter-organisational collaboration process. Since, organisations will focus on personal benefits instead of the common result. In the end this will only result in winners and losers instead of a relationship in which one is willing to sacrifice personal advantages for the common good.
Another important element of collaboration is the method of approach, in other words, the coordination process. At first sight coordination and collaboration seem rather similar. Therefore the concept of coordination will be explained. Whereafter, the specific role of coordination within collaboration processes becomes visible. Faraj & Xiao (2006) define coordination during a crisis as a: “Temporally unfolding and contextualized process of input
regulation and interaction articulation to realize a collective performance” (p. 1157). The
term ‘temporally unfolding’ is important for fast-response organisations to provide a swift answer to the emergent situation. Wolbers et al. (2018) explain that coordination is the process of uniting different activities of different organisations into one specific plan of action. Whereby Prezelj (2014) defines inter-organisational coordination as: “The process
among two or more organizations (interlocking or connecting for mutual effect)” (p. 327).
The overall descriptions of the concept coordination match on the basis of creating one common method of approach. This is manifested in terms as: ‘collective performance’, ‘uniting activities’ and ‘harmonic organisation’.
However, if one analyses both definitions of coordination and collaboration it can be determined that coordination mainly refers to the method of approach of collaboration processes. The difference between collaboration and coordination is the level of intensity of working processes. Coordination processes consist more of temporarily aligning methods of working activities. Collaboration processes take it one step further and aim to align different methods of approach and organisational identities into one common method of approach and a collective identity. A collective identity can simplify the integration and differentiation of coordination processes between different organisations. Differentiation distinguishes large tasks into smaller tasks (Wolbers et al., 2018). What follows is integrating these smaller tasks into one common cohesive task. In which the first steps towards a common organisational culture among fast-response organisations are taken. Prezelj (2014) provides clarification on the integration of smaller tasks into one cohesive task by addressing the division of responsibilities of stakeholders. The approach consists of a horizontal and vertical division of responsibilities of different stakeholders. The horizontal and vertical division of responsibilities “means that centralization must be balanced by decentralization and vice
versa” (Prezelj, 2014, p. 330). Bye et al. (2019) emphasize this point as well: “How organisations relying on strong centralization to maintain reliability in normal operations switch to a decentralized mode of organizing when they encounter particularly demanding situations” (p. 69). Differentiating large tasks into smaller tasks to create one common
cohesive task will be valuable to structure switches between centralised and decentralised modes of organising.
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that external factors as time pressure and uncertainty, will arise during a crisis. These factors will limit the feasibility of differentiation and integration. The processes of differentiation and integration take time and cannot be established within a few hours. Therefore, fast-response organisations should make agreements in advance of a crisis. Littlefield (2015) supports this: “During the pre-crisis
stage, however, relationships can and should be developed and put in place so that when a crisis occurs, the infrastructure and knowledge is available to be able to communicate effectively” (p. 5). Or else, it is plausible that fragmentation will emerge.
to ambiguity and discontinuity in operating procedures (Wolbers et al. 2018). Ambiguity and discontinuity are caused by factors as time pressure and the diversity of stakeholders operating in the field. This affects the collaboration process, since it is challenging to integrate and determine different expertises and methods of organising of different stakeholders under the circumstances of acute time pressure. If ambiguity and discontinuity dominate during the coordination process it might be plausible that fragmentation emerges and influences the collaboration processes. Bye et al. (2019) support this: “The breakdown in coordination and
decision-making at this stage of the police response is a product of the sudden increase in uncertainty that occurs when information about a second attack at another location starts to reach the operations officers” (p. 74). However these complications can barely be resolved
and have to be accepted as unavoidable. Nevertheless, in order to provide overview and insight in the different processes that can emerge within the dynamics of a crisis operation; Wolbers et al. (2018) composed a model of coordination practices during emergency response operations.
§2.2 Inter-organisational sensemaking
One of the factors that determine the level of fragmentation in collaboration practices is joint sensemaking (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). A common understanding of the situation at hand is crucial in managing a terrorist attack. Since there are multiple emergency services involved in the managing of a crisis situation and at the same time attacks take place simultaneously. This requires a clear and common understanding of all roles and responsibilities of the services involved whereafter common goals can be determined. “The basic idea of sensemaking is that
reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from effort to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (Weick, 1993, p. 635). Besides, people make sense of a
situation by relying on past experiences and to make things rationally accountable. This is also emphasized by Moynihan (2009):“Past crises allow for the accumulation of experience,
which enable individuals to use useful cognitive skills even under stress, such as framing the problem, developing mental models, and engaging in sensemaking” (p. 193). Based on these
elements people ultimately make a decision.
However, by over-rationalising ideas and expectations a crisis sometimes does not make sense anymore (Weick, 1993, p. 635). Whereby different impressions of different people within different organisations cannot be validated. Therefore, in order to understand the crisis situation it is important to create situational awareness. This entails the “perception
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). It
is key for these organisations to make common sense of the situation and analyse what is occurring. Therefore, “during joint sensemaking significant negotiation of meaning takes
place” (Faraj & Xiao, 2006, p. 1165). One can imagine that during a crisis long-term
negotiations and analysis are impossible. A key component in a crisis is timepressure and the level of uncertainty under which people are operating. These factors can influence the collapse of sensemaking. This conflicts with elements whereof sensemaking exists:
“Sensemaking is built out of vague questions, muddy answers and negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce confusion” (Weick, 1993, p. 636). If sensemaking breaks down, the level of
confusion will not reduce but increase. In this way organisations will hardly be able to make a rational decision. Whereby it is imaginable that a crisis becomes even more chaotic, than it already is, without the existence of a common approach and rational decisionmaking.
However, the involvement of multiple organisations can either mitigate or aggravate the level of sensemaking. On the one hand the crisis can be mitigated involving several organisations that can help to achieve a higher level of sensemaking. Since, one is able to make sense of the situation together. On the other hand the situation can be aggravated if other organisations let emotions control their decisionmaking as well and the level of sensemaking completely breaks down. Wolbers & Schakel (2017) state that sensemaking also contributes to decision-making practices. Decision-making processes are, amongst others, based on impressions, experiences and knowledge. Particularly fast-response organisations experience much timepressure and therefore need to make some decisions within a split second. If one is not able to make sense of the situation, it will complicate profound decision-making processes as well. However, the process of actual sensedecision-making occurs in the post-crisis phase, when response operations are evaluated. “Organizational learning occurs during
the post-crisis phase as those affected by the crisis make sense of the crisis and its effects”
(Littlefield, 2015, p. 1). When a crisis is occurring there is no time for organisations to self-reflect on the situation. Therefore, when a crisis has finished there is time for organisations to evaluate the response operation in the post-crisis phase and determine lessons learned.
Chapter 3: Methodology
In this section the methodology of this study will be explained. First, a clarification on the design of the study will be given. Whereafter the methods of data collection will be explained. Finally, the chapter will be closed with an explanation on the method of data analysis. This chapter will also provide clarification on the reliability and validity level.
§3.1 Design
This study makes use of an inductive approach. The selected cases will first be analysed after which a conclusion can be drawn. A comparative casestudy will be conducted to compare the terrorist attacks of Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016. The aim of this study is to see how first responders have aligned collaboration processes and have dealt with fragmentation phenomena during the Paris attacks in 2015 and the Brussels bombings in 2016. The cases of Paris and Brussels will be compared to determine how collaboration processes have developed and how fast-response organisations have coped with fragmentation. To study this a comparative casestudy is used to fill in the gap of academic research on crisis response operations during terrorist attacks. Yin (2013) states that a case study “Investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). Therefore, to analyse the
process of fragmentation in first response operations a comparative case study will be valuable, because this method will take the specific contextual conditions and circumstances into account. Besides it also shows how fast-response organisations deal with similar dilemmas under comparable circumstances, yet in a different context. The contextual conditions apply to the dynamic nature of fast-response operations.
A comparative case study is chosen, because of the dynamic nature of processes during a crisis response operation. In this way multiple techniques of data gathering can be used that contribute to an in-depth analysis of the cases. A comparative case study will reveal patterns and mechanisms in crisis operations during a terrorist attack. Furthermore, a comparative case study takes the importance of real-life circumstances of fast-response organisations into account that have to deal with time pressure in an uncertain and unclear situation. To study the impact of fragmentation on collaboration processes of fast-response organisations, it is eligible to compare cases that are similar in terms of scale, timeframe and impact. These features are important in this study, because this influences the effectiveness of
the crisis response operation. The size of the crisis operation will impact the level of effective collaboration and sensemaking. Small crisis situations are clearer in terms of who is in charge and what actions need to be taken compared to large crisis situations. In large crisis situations fragmentation is more likely to develop in terms of complex collaboration processes.
§3.2 Data collection
This study will collect data through process tracing. The theory of process tracing explains how a process shifts from one strategy to a second strategy (Mohr, 1982). A combination of events, activities and decisions during the process causes this shift. This data will be collected through the analysis of reports on collaboration and sensemaking processes in crisis response operations during the Paris attacks and Brussels bombings. Reports and documentaries will be analysed to detect the emerging of fragmentation. Several valuable reports on both cases have been found. On the Paris attacks the HSAC & PPSD Report (2016) The attacks on Paris:
lessons learned focuses mainly on intelligence failures but nonetheless provides a clear
chronology of the events occurring during the attack and how the incident command system performed. Second, a report by the National Assembly (2016) will be evaluated, which is an extensive report of the French Government on several levels of decision-making and amongst others the response of first responders to the attacks. The first two sources are selected in terms of reliability. Both sources represent a governments’ perspective, which is relevant to include in the analysis. Third, a special report on the remote damage control during the attacks on Paris: Lessons learned by the Paris Fire Brigade and evolutions in the rescue system (2017) will be analysed. This report focuses on the Parisian rescue system response and also how it has developed after the Paris attacks. Fourth, an article to the medical response during the Paris attacks will be looked into. This article presents insights into the medical response of first responders during the Paris attacks. The last two sources are selected based on the specific information. The articles look respectively into the performance of the fire brigade and medical services. By looking into different reports and articles on medical response, police response and response by fire fighters different processes can become visible and even so the possible collapse of collaboration and sensemaking which causes fragmentation. As additional source a small documentary series, ‘13 Novembre, Fluctuat Nec Mergitur’, will be analysed. This documentary provides a clear and visual overview of events that night, including interviews with key actors. The documentary shows real footage of the crisis situation, whereby collaboration processes between fast-response organisations are visible.
The Brussels bombings will be analysed through the reports of: The House of Representatives (2018) and the International Institute for Counterterrorism (2016). These reports will show the similarities and differences in response systems and may show signs of the breakdown of collaboration and sensemaking, which may have caused fragmentation. Besides, there is a report available of Parliamentary interrogations (2016), on behalf of a special investigation committee, in which all hearings of people involved are captured. §3.3 Data analysis
After data is collected, it needs to be captured in a structured way. Therefore, it is important to elaborate on the reporting of data. One can consider several methods to have a structured overview. There are several methods of process tracing one can use. This study will make use of visual mapping and temporal bracketing. Langley (1999) explains the benefits of a visual mapping approach: “Visual graphical respresentations are particularly attractive for the
analysis of process data, because they allow the simultaneous representation of a large number of dimensions, and they can easily be used to show precedence, parallel processes, and the passage of time” (p. 700). This method is valuable to present a visual overview of
processes in the crisis response operation that could have caused fragmentation. By mapping these processes, it becomes easier to analyse data thoroughly in order to see if and when fragmentation emerged. Regarding the cases of the Paris and Brussels attacks it is useful to visually map the actions and decisionmaking processes that are described within a timeframe. In this way the process can be structured in terms of time, events, key actors, collaboration, sensemaking and results. In this way, the processes are visually structured and the two cases can be compared in terms of certain decisions, the level of command, the level of collaboration, and sensemaking of the crisis situation.
In addition, the method of temporal bracketing will be used to distinguish the operation into different phases to analyse the different processes within this operation. These phases can be determined on the basis of time or certain actions or events that emerge in both processes. In this way a comparative unit of analysis can be composed which is valuable when a comparative case study is conducted. The cases were selected in a way that temporal bracketing is applicable and with the expectation that conclusions can be drawn. As discussed previously in theory, centralisation and decentralisation alternates throughout a crisis response operation. In order to have a clear overview when, where, how and why this occurs temporal bracketing will be applied. In this way the response operation will be distinguished into smaller parts to see if this shift between levels of command influences the level in which
fragmentation emerges. To be able to compare both cases, six events within both cases have been selected that mark a certain phase in the crisis operation. This enables the author to analyse and compare these phases. The methods of visual mapping and temporal bracketing can easily be combined and create a solid basis for report analysis. The result of temporal bracketing is shown in figure 2 and 3 on page 26 and 31.
Finally, an excel sheet has been used to structure data. After dividing data into subcategories, these subcategories can be merged in one overarching category. These main categories will create the foundation of the structure for the data analysis. Especially concercing the analysis of Parliamentary Interrogations it was valuable to structure data into codes and colourcodes, to have a clear overview. For instance, there have been multiple communication errors. Therefore, useful data that addressed these communication errors was collected and got a colourcode, orange, to have an overview at a glance. Figure 1 shows an example of this datacollection, division of subcategories into overarching categories and colourcodes.
Figure 1: example selection of overview of codes
§3.4 Validity
The internal validity of this study is sufficient to draw conclusions. In the Brussels case reliable data on parliamentary interrogations is collected. This contributes to a more profound analysis of data and how different fast-response organisations experienced and managed the crisis. Sufficient sources have been found to make a profound analysis in order to draw conclusions. The concepts that have been operationalised are inter-organisational collaboration and inter-organisational sensemaking. Inter-organisational collaboration is defined in this study as: “A cooperative, interactive process in which participants from
different organizations, relying neither on markets nor legal hierarchy mechanisms, develop shared rules, norms, and structures to act and decide on issues related to a shared problem”
as “The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges
from effort to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (Weick, 1993, p.
635). These two concepts create the foundation of the main concept fragmentation. The analysis has selected important subconcepts that influence collaboration and sensemaking processes. The subconcepts that have been discovered for these processes are, communication, division of responsibilities, resources, shift centralisation to decentralisation and vice versa, unit of command and decision-making. After analysing the interviews with responders present on-site, the method of temporal bracketing was applied. Both events have been distinguished in phases where certain events have stimulated the rising of fragmentation.
Chapter 4: Analysis
In this chapter the analysis of the study will be presented. This consists of a structured analysis of collected data retrieved from documents and important reports on the cases of Brussels and Paris. This analysis will determine how fragmentation has emerged and for Brussels it might even be possible to determine how responders have coped with this phenomenon. The data is retrieved from different resources in order to present a profound analysis on the crisis response operation of fast-response organisations during the terrorist attacks. First, a chronological narrative of facts of the Brussels bombings and Paris attacks will be presented, that show signs of fragmentation in the crisis response operation. Whereafter the method of temporal bracketing will be used to divide both cases into phases, which contributes to a structured analysis. Finally a comparison between both cases and a connection to theory will be made to analyse how fragmentation has emerged.
§4.1 Brussels bombings
§ 4.1.1 Overview of attacks context
On the morning of March 22, 2016, two attacks shocked Brussels. At 7:58 AM the first bomb detonated at Brussels Airport Zaventem. A few minutes earlier at 7:45 AM the Northern barracks at Brussels Airport received a call due to a fire in warehouse eight (Respondent 4, Parliamentary Interrogations, 2016, p. 61). Therefore, the fire department of the Northern barracks at Brussels Airport was already on the move towards the fire. At 8:02 AM the Brussels aviation police commissioner entered the departure hall and started to help people (Respondent 3, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 56).
At the same time, the fire department of district Halle-Vilvoorde and the military hospital, Military Hospital Queen Astrid (MHKA), were alarmed. At 8:05 AM the first fire services of the Northern barracks at Brussels Airport arrived in the departure hall. At 8:09 AM the provincial governor of Vlaams Brabant, who was the responsible person at the 112-center, warned the provincial emergency plan officer (Respondent 2, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 11). Whereafter the responsible parties at Brussels Airport decided to close the Airport. At 8:11 AM the provincial governor of Vlaams Brabant informed the Federal Health Inspector (FGI) whereafter three Mobile Urgency Groups (MUG’s) and five ambulances were sent to Brussels Airport Zaventem (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 33).
At 8:14 AM the first ambulances arrived at the departure hall of Brussels Airport. At 8:16 AM six MUG’s and ten ambulances had arrived. The FGI activated five additional ambulances of the Red Cross in order to have an eligible number of ambulances. At 8:17 AM the first medical chef of the MUG’s entered the departure hall to provide help to the wounded. At 8:24 AM the fire commander of Brussels’ Capital Service requested to activate the provincial disaster plan due to a lack of ambulances. At 8:27 AM the Maximum- Medical Intervention Plan (Maxi-MIP) started. This is a medical intervention plan that enables medical services to request more resources (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 35). At 8:29 AM the provincial governor of Vlaams-Brabant proclaimed the provincial emergency phase (Respondent 2, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 22).
At 8:42 AM the 112-crisis center agreed with 112-crisis center Brussels to allocate a few Maxi-MIP ambulances on the flyover. The Brussels Capital Service commander was told at 8:45 AM that the 112-crisis center Leuven waited for a call from the Director Medical Assistance (Dir-Med) to scale up (Respondent 5, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 394). At 9:07 AM the first communication problems started to rise. The Decentralized Autonomous Organisation (DAO) emailed the head of the railway police on the wrong email address with important information that all underground stations needed to be closed till 12:00 PM until further notice.
At 9:11 AM the second bomb detonated in the city center of the underground of Brussels Maalbeek. At 9:14 AM, a refocus of the entire organisation of victims occured. It was decided that all victims from Brussels Airport Zaventem were transported to hospitals outside Brussels, so that hospitals in Brussels remained available for victims of Maalbeek. At 9:27 AM the Community for Intercommunal Traffic in Brussels (MIVB) shut down the complete underground network of Brussels. At 9:28 AM the 112-crisis center in Brussels requested to return five ambulances in order to start the medical intervention plan (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 35). However, three minutes later at 9:31 AM the entire airport was evacuated, because of a suspicious vehicle that could be a third bomb. At 9:35 AM the Brussels Capital Service Commander took the operations lead as Director Commandpost Operational Services CP-OPS. 1
At 9:38 AM the All-round Semi-cellular Trunking Radio communication system with Integrated Dispatching (A.S.T.R.I.D.) and cell phone networks collapsed. Therefore, at 9:42 AM the crisis management team decided to make the mobile relay station operational in order
to restart communication processes. At 9:51 AM all underground stations in Brussels were evacuated and at 10:01 AM all underground stations were closed. At 11:04 AM the Dir-Med communicates that it was in dispose of sufficient capacity to treat the victims in the Center for Coordination of Operations and Transmissions (CCOT) (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 36). At 11:11 AM the FGI requested support for the Northern fire department with the evacuation of victims out of the departure hall. At 11:15 AM the MHKA had insufficient capacity and requested additional personnel to support the treatment of the slightly injured victims. At 12:42 PM the Vilvoorde hospital reports that it was able to receive and treat more victims (Respondent 9, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 298). At 13:07 PM the Red Cross made seven more ambulances available and reported this to the crisis center in Brussels. At 13:38 PM the Dir-Med reported that the three ambulances of the federal police, two ambulances of the Medical Center Brussels Zaventem (MEDA), one ambulance of the Military Hospital, one ambulance of Zaventem and four ambulances of the Red Cross, so a total of eleven ambulances, were sufficient (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 36).
§4.1.2 Analysis
Figure 2: Phasing fragmentation process Brussels bombings
The temporal bracketing of the Brussels bombings is divided in six phases. The six phases as displayed in figure 1, are chronologically ordered in order to get a clear and structured overview of fragmentation causes. The first phase, in which the rising of fragmentation is considered to be present, starts with the breakdown of sensemaking. The Northern Barracks of the fire department of Brussels airport received an initial call with the reporting of a fire in
warehouse eight. The fire department was prepared and drove towards warehouse eight. However, on the way, the fire department received new information on alarming activities in the departure hall. This caused confusion and a certain level of unpreparedness in terms that extinguishing a fire required a different preparation than saving people from a bomb. This unpreparedness could have caused fragmentation in terms of decreasing collaboration processes since different resources might be activated. At the same time, 112 Leuven called 112 Brussels to report that an airplane was in trouble. 112 Leuven had received this code through the information system at Brussels Airport, since there existed no code to report an attack and it was necessary to put resources into place. This is one of the reasons why only the fire department was sent on site in the first place. “When 112 Leuven calls the 112 of Brussels
at 08:06, he calls it for the reason "plane in difficulty". That is probably what may explain why we only sent fire fighters because, at this stage, as you said in your opening remarks, there were still no victims” (Respondent 8, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 24; p. 351).
Secondly, after the first bomb had detonated, the collaboration processes between fire department of Brussels Airport, the Brussels’ aviation police and federal health services started. These collaboration processes continued until the crisis was mitigated and resolved. The collaboration between the fire department of Brussels Airport, the Brussels’ aviation police and federal health services was challenging. “Our care provider quota is so diverse
that there is not just one approach. We have a very root quota from the fire brigade, from the fire fighters; they have the Fire fighter Stress Team (FiST). A part comes from the hospitals, both in terms of ambulances and MUG services” (Respondent 9, parliamentary
interrogations, 2016, p. 293). Therefore, the second phase was not one seperate phase but is an important overall phase that influences collaboration processes and stimulates the emerging of fragmentation.
Moreover, the third phase in which fragmentation is likely to emerge, entailed the allocation of additional ambulances retrieved from the Maxi-MIP on the fly over. At 8:42 AM the 112-crisis center agreed with 112-crisis center Brussels to allocate a few Maxi-MIP ambulances on the flyover. “At that moment the fly over is our point of reference” (Respondent 1, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 35). However, this was not clear to every organisation present on-site. For instance, the fire officer was located in front of the departure hall and did not notice any ambulances. Therefore, the fire officer assumed no ambulances had been sent. “I can perfectly imagine that the fire officer stood in front of the
Sheraton and said: I do not have any ambulances over here. The man had experienced his moment and he was right: he did not see any” (Respondent 9, parliamentary interrogations,
2016, p 291). In this situation fragmentation can emerge, because of insufficient resources and a lack of clear communication about plans that have been composed by commanders. First responders are better able to collaborate when commanders communicate plans in advance.
Furthermore, the fourth phase considers the rising of communication problems as a cause of fragmentation. As described previously, at 9:07 AM the first communication problems started to rise and at 9:38 AM the first responders’ communication network A.S.T.R.I.D. collapsed. A.S.T.R.I.D. is the umbrella to connect all communications between organisations and therefore fulfills an important role during the crisis response operation. For instance, the police department has its own network. It switches to the A.S.T.R.I.D. network in case communication between other fast-response organisations is needed. “On a certain
moment I had several radios, because I had to communicate with the command and with my own people” (Respondent 3, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 58). Effective
collaboration can be influenced if one does not switch to the correct radio. Besides, an overloaded network caused the defaults in A.S.T.R.I.D. The overload was amongst others caused by individuals making personal calls instead of using the group network. “It has been
agreed that first responders are not allowed to make individual calls during a crisis, because this can contribute to the collapse and overload of the network” (Respondent 11,
Parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 181). The capacity of the A.S.T.R.I.D. network was not resistant to this amount of communication flows.
Besides, the fifth phase concerns the refocus of the organisation of victims to hospitals. At 9:11 AM a second bomb detonated in the underground near Maalbeek station. This led to the decision of the FGI that victims from Brussels Airport Zaventem were transported to hospitals outside Brussels and victims from Maalbeek were transported to hospitals in the center of Brussels. In this way the flux of wounded was controlled and spread to different locations. However, this medical plan led to obstacles in the capacity of hospitals. While the MHKA had insufficient capacity to treat all the wounded, the Vilvoorde hospital reported that it was in dispose of sufficient capacity and was able to handle another flux of wounded people. This phase connects the communication problems to the fifth phase. The hospitals need to be informed with the activation of medical plans in order to respond adequately and deliver qualitative care.
Finally, it was found that the evacuation of the departure hall, because of a suspicious vehicle and possible third bomb, contributed to the emerging of fragmentation. At 9:31 AM was decided to immediately evacuate the airport, because of the possibility of a third bomb. What follows was a chaotic situation in which all first responders had to withdraw from
helping activities and leave the scene. Outside the departure hall organisations had to reorganise and wait for a sign that the area was safe again. This also affects the collaboration processes in terms that each team has its own structure and methods of approach to reorganise. It was unclear who was in charge to structure this reorganisation. It is plausible that this would be the responsibility of the CP-OPS. However, it turned out that there existed no CP-OPS. “I also only learned afterwards that there existed no CP-OPS. There should
have been a CP-OPS” (Respondent 9, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 292). This did
not have a direct impact on the medical intervention plan but mainly on the (medical) reorganisation after evacuation. “At a number of times the airport needed to be evacuated.
This had an impact, because our medical teams also had to leave patients behind”
(Respondent 9, parliamentary interrogations, 2016, p. 292).
4.1.3 Subconclusion
During the Brussels bombings there exited confusion in the initial phase of the attack, due to the use of different emergency codes in the emergency system. These codes caused the activation of emergency plans with scarce resources. The federal emergency plan is able to activate more resources. However, this did not immediately happen. After the federal emergency plan was activated there occurred miscommunication in the allocation of ambulances to Brussels Airport. The ambulances were located on a fly over as agreed in one of the emergency plans and not near the departure hall where the fire officer needed the ambulances. This led to confusion, miscommunication and the breakdown of sensemaking and collaboration processes. These processes broke even more down when the communication network A.S.T.R.I.D. collapsed and it was not possible to communicate between fast-response organisations on-site. This caused delays and complicated the crisis response operation since commanders were unable to provide orders. However, this inability was also caused by not activating a CP-OPS. After a reorganisation of victims to hospitals and the detonation of the third bomb it became clear that there was no operational commander who structured the whole collaboration process between services.
§4.2 Paris attacks
§ 4.1.2 Overview of attacks context
At November 13, 2015 Paris was shocked by multiple attacks. At 20:50 PM the security guard of the Stade de France declined a suspected person entrance into the stadium. After being denied access, at 21:20 PM a suicide bomber detonated its vest outside Stade de France
near gate D. At 21:25 PM terrorists opened fire on the terraces of Le Carillon Bar and Le Petit Cambodge in the city center of Paris (HSAC, 2016, p. 17). At 21:26 PM fire fighters were, due to a previous call, in the neighbourhood and activated the Red Plan. The Red Plan coordinates emergency teams and resources in order to get fast medical treatment to the victims.2 At 21:30 PM a second suicide bomber detonated its vest at Stade de France, near gate H (HSAC, 2016, p.17). The commander of the Parisian fire fighters was present in the stadium and rushed outside to observe the situation. At 21:31 PM it became clear in the 112-crisis center that attacks were occuring, on several locations.
At 21:32 PM terrorists opened fire at Café Bonne Biere and Casa Nostra (HSAC, 2016, p. 17). At 21:33 PM the commander of the Parisian fire fighters drove from the Stade de France to the headquarters. At 21:36 PM gunmen opened fire on the terrace of La Belle Equipe. At 21:38 PM the call center received increasingly more addresses of locations fire fighters were dealing with. At 21:40 PM a suicide bomber detonated its vest in Le Comptoir Voltaire (HSAC, 2016, p. 17). At 21:43 PM fire fighters were heading to the scene. On the way the team is briefed by the chief of the parmentier barracks. Around 21:48 PM the fire medic set up an advanced medical post in which victims were categorised in absolute and relative emergencies.
At 21:50 PM three gunmen entered the Bataclan and started a twenty-minute shooting spree inside the venue (HSAC, 2016, p. 17). At 21:53 PM a third suicide bomber detonated its vest at Stade de France. At 21:55 PM the emergency call center received calls on the situation in the Bataclan, however the situation remained unclear. Therefore, the first Parisian fire fighters left to the Bataclan. A few minutes later when the trucks arrived fire fighters had to wait outside for backup from the police. At 22:02 PM the two patrolmen entered the Bataclan without knowing the situation inside. At 22:15 PM the Research and Intervention Brigade – Brigade Anticommando (BRI-BAC) team arrived, half an hour into the assault at the Bataclan when the intial shooting had already finished (Nossiter, 2015)3. BRI-BAC, when activated, is a specialised intervention force to resolve crises as hostage takings and terrorist attacks. At 22:18 PM the BRI-BAC connected with local police forces whereafter it took some time to prepare the entering of the Bataclan.
At 22:30 PM the BRI-BAC entered the Bataclan with fifteen people. At 22:34 PM the Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris Director General (APHP, academic hospitals)
2https://redditblog.com/2015/11/13/whats-frances-plan-rouge/
3 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/world/europe/response-to-paris-attacks-points-to-weaknesses-in-french-police-structure.html
activated the White Plan, which concerns the mobilizing of hospitals, recalling of staff and releasing beds to cope with the large influx of wounded people. At 22:35 PM the first wounded people left the Bataclan for treatment. At 23:00 PM BRI-BAC requested back up in the Bataclan to make sure the stairs on both sides of the concerthall were covered. Once upstairs, the hostages were taken behind a steel door. At 23:10 PM the BRI faced difficulties in communicating to the hostages due to the steel door and bulletproof helmets. In the mean time at 23:15 PM police forces provided information to the crisis center head quarters to discuss the possibilities and actions to end the hostage taking. At 23:16 PM the Commissioner agreed with a breach and delegated decision-making authority to the Chief of the BRI. At 00:18 AM the assault started and lasted for one minute and six seconds. At 00:21 AM dozens of ambulances had arrived to take the severly wounded of the Bataclan to the hospitals.
§4.2.2 Analysis
Figure 3: Phasing fragmentation process Paris attacks.
The temporal bracketing of the Paris attacks is distinguished in six phases. These phases have likely contributed to fragmentation processes in the emergency response operation. In the first phase the Parisian fire department received an initial call about a robbery in a supermarket across the street of cafes Le Carillon Bar and Le Petit Cambodge. A few minutes after the Parisian fire services had arrived gunmen started to fire on both cafes at 21:25 PM. The fire services were sitting inside the fire vehicle and waited until the shooting had stopped. After which the fire fighters alight from the truck and could not make sense of the situation at hand.
