Depoliticizing the Greek Central Government: Has the 2016 public management reform (4369/2016, Transparency and Meritocracy in Public Administration) resulted in the depoliticization of the central government in the field of HRM?

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Depoliticizing

the

Greek

Central

Government.

2018

Has the 2016 public management reform (4369/2016, Transparency and Meritocracy in Public Administration) resulted in the depoliticization of the central government in the field of HRM?

CHRISTOS MANTOUDIS ID: S1758799

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Introduction

Southern European countries are characterized by high levels of bureaucratic politicization at both senior and low levels of the civil service and Greece is not the exception to the rule (Kickert, 2012). Since the outburst of the economic crisis, public management reform has been a priority for domestic political leaders, but also for the so-called Troika (IMF, ECB and European Commission). Special emphasis was given to counter the extended practices of bureaucratic politicization at the highest administrative levels, however most of these efforts never managed to produce successful policy outcomes (Vyrzigiannakis, 2016). For many experts, bureaucratic politicization in Greece has major negative consequences in the effectiveness and efficiency of the Greek public sector as a whole, considering the immense involvement of the government in the economy (Sotiropoulos; 1998, Papas; 2014, Spanou and Sotiropoulos; 2012). Bureaucratic politicization is also one of the reasons why Greece scores so low in citizen trust against the government among its European counterparts (Eurobarometer, 2016). Of course low citizen trust in government is widespread throughout the Western democracies (Kampen and De Walle, 2006) and it would be misleading to assume that bureaucratic politicization is the only variable responsible for this phenomenon. Nevertheless, several studies have proven that impartial, professional and depoliticized bureaucracies are more likely to raise public support towards a government (Dalberg and Homberg, 2013; Kampen and De Walle; 2006, Bouckaert; 2006).

According to Ladi (2015), the economic crisis has put Greece into a critical juncture in which public management reform is a necessary precondition for the country to remain in the Eurozone. Nevertheless, despite the initial enthusiasm for a depoliticized and meritocratic public sector, policy actors never managed to put the discourse into practice, for political and practical reasons (Manitakits, 2015). Bureaucratic politicization is a phenomenon deeply rooted in the Greek administrative culture. Throughout the period after the democratic consolidation of 1973, every government would proclaim depoliticization as a strategic goal. However, reforms were rarely implemented according to the legal statutes (Sotiropoulos, 2006). Since 2010, the PASOK and Nea Dimokratia (ND) coalition government had been trying to depoliticize the civil service especially at the highest ranks, responding to external pressures by Troika. The most ambitious reform was implemented in 2010 by the PASOK government (central-left socialist party), introducing meritocratic recruitments and promotions for senior civil servants (Siskos, 2016).

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Despite the initial enthusiasm, the reform was quickly replaced by a more flexible and adaptable institutional framework in 2013. For many analysts, the 2013 depoliticization attempt could effectively address several politicization problems, such as the lack of meritocracy in executive positions (Vyzigiannakis; 2016). For the first time, Human Resource Management was unprecedentedly dealt with modern public management means, implementing measures of managerialism and contractualism, meant to reduce political influence over senior level bureaucrats (ibid). Even though the government was under the strict supervision of the Troika institutions, scandals of malpractice and legal manipulation quickly arose accusing the ministers of finance and public management reform for bypassing the legal procedures in order to install their preferred public officials in ministerial executive positions (Enikos;2013, Kathimerini; 2014, Xlepas, 2015). Hence, in 2016 the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government, implemented a revised policy reform, (4269/2016 Transparency and Meritocracy in Public Administration) promising to establish a meritocratic recruitment and promotion system that would restrain political interference in matters of Human Resource Management.

My research question is: has the 2016 public management reform resulted in the depoliticization of the central government in the field of HRM? The reform (4369/2016, Transparency and Meritocracy in Public Administration) is the independent variable, while the dependent variable is senior level bureaucratic depoliticization. Considering the different dimensions depoliticization implies, I have divided the overarching research question into two sub-questions, one focusing on discourse and the latter one on practice. On the one hand, I will be investigating whether the current reform holds the promise of depoliticization (i.e. discourse); in other words, is the new reform compatible with what a depoliticized HRM should involve? On the other hand, my focus lies on the implementation phase of the policy (i.e. practice), hence the second research question is: to what extent has the policy reform been successfully implemented?

If one were to look into the reforms surrounding the phenomenon of politicization into the Greek public sector, he/she would find plenty of theoretically well-grounded legal statutes promising to cope with patronage relations once and for all (as in 1996, 2010), however at the same time he/she would see implementation efforts failing for various reasons such as political unwillingness, bureaucratic incompetence and lack of resources (Featherstone and Papadimitriou; 2008, Sotiripoulos; 2015). As plenty of scholars have noted, the existence of a policy should by

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no means imply that its statutes are indeed aiming to solve a real-life problem, in fact they could aggravate it. Furthermore, very often policies are never put into practice as they face implementation problems caused by macro-meso and micro factors (OECD; 2012, Matland; 1995). Investigating the status of bureaucratic politicization in the Greek central government would provide answers regarding the government’s ability to deal with an ever-lasting problem of both the Greek public sector as well as the society as a whole. By paying a closer look at the discourse of the reform, my thesis intends to find out more about the government’s willingness to structure a policy framework compatible with modern theories of depoliticization. Furthermore, an analysis of the implementation phase would divulge the extent to which the government is effective in delivering its promises by successfully implementing policies.

Despite its ambitious character there has been no systematic effort to investigate the impact of the current reform on the extent of senior level executive politicization in the central government. Secondly, very little research has been done to effectively address the extent to which the policy measures of the reform are compatible with the wording of the statute. Hence, a deep and thorough policy assessment of an important policy is missing. Perhaps scientists and experts are hesitant to look deeper into the topic, since the Greek public sector has been characterized by short-term reforms, rarely implemented successfully (Diamantouros; 2001, Sotiropoulos, 2012). Therefore, a more systematic approach is imperative in order to ascertain the extent to which the reform itself is indeed compatible with what a depoliticized HR should look like and secondly assess the state of its implementation.

My assumptions regarding the former research question indicates that the new reform is compatible with policy tools of a depoliticized civil service. The reason why I assume this is because most major reforms which are part of the MoU between Greece and the international creditors are assisted by experts from the EC and the IMF. In other words, organizations with technocratic aspirations and devotion to modern depoliticized public management practices are more likely to produce a reform in line with their ideology. However, the implementation of these measures could be problematic, considering the country’s history in implementing similar reforms. My thesis is a qualitative explanatory case study of the Greek central government, elaborating on the ministries of administrative reform and finance. Hence it will be a Small-N research involving primary and secondary data collected throughout 2013-2017. The reason I put the central

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government under the microscope is because it has diachronically exhibited increased numbers of senior civil servant politicization (Sotiropoulos, 1998, 2012).

Any findings indicating a theoretically valid policy reform able to deal with executive level politicization in the central government would add new theoretical knowledge to our understanding of the Greek public sector and the evolution of the Napoleonic tradition regarding the (de)politicization phenomenon. In addition, my thesis adds to our understanding of the Greek central government HRM status in the post-crisis period. Furthermore, throughout the crisis Greece has been a laboratory of change indicated by ambitious public management reforms. Accordingly, it would be valuable to learn more about the dynamics of these changes, as some of them including the reform studied in this thesis, could have the potential to change the country’s characteristics for the better. Moreover, by observing the implementation process as a whole my thesis could be important for assumptions regarding the working of the Greek government in fulfilling its responsibilities towards the EU and the IMF. Known for its implementation failures, Greece has been blamed by its creditors for the inability of the governments to implement cutting-edge reforms in the public sector (Dinas, 2015). It would be useful to find out if the current government is making a difference in that regard or plainly follows the same old path of ineffectiveness. Societally, my research is highly relevant because it can be seen as an assessment of the current government and its actions to reduce politicization and make the public sector fairer and more meritocratic as extended bureaucratic politicization had always been a reason of popular dissatisfaction against the governments (Ladi, 2014).

The first section of my thesis will provide a literature review in order to situate my topic’s background and the key theoretical debates related to my research question. In addition, theoretical gaps in the literature surrounding my topic will be addressed, followed by a critical reflection of the already existing academic work. Moreover, in that section I will explain the rationale of my thesis and my standpoint concerning the core theoretical concepts. The next section will elaborate deeper into the conceptual framework of the thesis. Section three will focus on the research design, by presenting the variables and their operationalization. It will also exhibit the method used to tackle the research question and the evidence, also the data collection strategy will be systematically justified. My analysis develops in section four, proceeding as follows: the first part will be a discursive analysis of the reform by using state-of-the-art academic work on

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depoliticization which will effectively allow me to answer the question regarding the compatibility of the legal framework with depoliticization theories. Part two deals with the implementation phase, looking deeper into the extent to which the discourse was put into practice. Moreover, the findings will be complemented by a discussion. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main findings and present the limitations of my thesis.

2. Literature review

This section will provide a critical discussion of the state of the art literature surrounding my thesis. I will begin by introducing the central theoretical concept, namely bureaucratic politicization and presenting a brief but elaborate overview of the phenomenon. The next sub-section defines administrative tradition and the following delves deeper into the Napoleonic tradition in which Greece belongs to. It is important to note that the Napoleonic tradition here will not be analysed as a different independent variable but rather as the framework surrounding the Greek public sector. Part three introduces the concept of New Public Management as it is essential to comprehend the philosophy behind the direction of the current legal framework. Lastly part four is devoted to core elements of policy implementation aiming to familiarize the reader with the second research question.

2.1 Reviewing Politicization

Public administration has shifted radically since the early 20th_{century when Max Weber was}

envisioning the structure of a well-functioning bureaucracy (Hood and Lodge, 2006). Western modern democracies are characterized by an increasing complexity in policy making which makes it hard for politicians to respond given that quite often they are amateurs of their policy field. Naturally, senior level bureaucrats engage actively in the policy making process by being responsible for providing advice to the politicians, assuming political competencies (Neuhold, Vanhoonacker and Verhey, 2013). This new status quo disturbs the traditional idea of separation between the executive and the legislative branch of the government. In order for politicians to ensure effective policy implementation and prevent ideological leaks in the policy formulation phases, they intervene in the recruitment and promotion of senior level bureaucrats (Mair, Kopecky and Spirova, 2012). Therefore, “the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the

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selection, retention, promotion and disciplining of members of the public service” is defined by Peters (2004) as politicization.

Generally speaking, bureaucratic politicization is widespread across the Western democracies and we can find traces of it in every administrative tradition (Peters and Pierre; 2002, Peters; 2004, 2008, 2013, Neuhold, Vanhoonacker and Verhey; 2013; Kickert; 2011). Weberian, Neo-Weberian, even New Public Management (NPM) countries exhibit politicization at all administrative levels (Pollitt and Bouckaert; 2011). There is very little agreement among the scientific community as to what extent politicization is beneficial or threatening for the well-functioning of a country’s administration. The retort most researchers give is “it depends on what exactly we are looking at”. For example, Peters (2004) agrees that even though politicization substitutes merit over political criteria in recruitments, promotions and retentions, there is indeed some use to it, especially when it comes to policy implementation effectiveness. According to him many researchers fail to see the administration as a living organism, whose interactions with the political elites shapes public policy significantly. Instead, they consider it to be a static entity, responsible of blindly implementing public policies and following political orders. For Pierre and Peters (2004), the administration has, now more than ever, an active role in policy implementation, consequently, politicization is an effective tool for politicians to secure that their wishes will translate into actual policies.

The more idealist view sees politicization as a curse rather than a necessary evil, arguing that it threatens founding principles of democracy which have to do with fairness and transparency (Venrardakis; 2014, Spanou; 2008, Sotiropoulos; 2011). Moreover, for them politicization has negative consequences in citizen trust towards the government. As depicted in their research, bureaucratic professionalism, impartiality and effectiveness are necessary for citizens to trust their government (Dalberg and Holmberg, 2014). In the absence of government trust, citizens hinder reforms; therefore politicization here functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, politicizing the civil service politicians can rely on bureaucrats for effective policy implementation, but on the other hand citizens expect the administration to be effective, impartial and professional in order for them to trust the government and support policy changes (ibid). However, even though they provide some guidelines as for what it means to have a professional and impartial bureaucracy (mainly by emphasizing on merit and professional ethics) they have

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little to say about how to ensure effectiveness. And this is precisely the point Peters and Pierre raise when they refer to politicization as necessary evil. Dalberg and Holmberg (2014) seem to provide a rather poor operationalization of effectiveness, since they measure it as “the capacity of the civil service to implement sound policies…independent from political pressures” (p.12).

Often as Rouban (2008) stressed, civil servant ideology interferes with policy implementation, hindering policy implementation while in systems where civil servants have more active role in the actual policy formation civil servants are able to disturb the principal agent relation with the politicians. Consequently, many scientists agree that some politicization is necessary, however, very little has been written about the extent of politicization and how much this “some” they all refer to actually is (Peters and Pierre, 2005). Indeed, most researchers agree that there needs to be a tradeoff between bureaucratic impartiality and politicization but little research has been done to investigate which layers of the administration could potentially be politicized for the better, how to control political arbitrariness regarding HRM issues, under which procedures should political appointments occur and if politicization actually works in practice (Rouban, 2008). In general, within the scientific community, there is consensus respecting the ethical and practical negative effects of bureaucratic politicization at both high and low administrative levels.

2.2 Administrative traditions

It is often claimed by many researchers that administrative systems throughout the world are essentially identical (Palier; 2005, Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Bezes and Lodge, 2007). Administrative models such as NPM and other types of reform frameworks (especially business-like models) treat public bureaucracies in the same way assuming that their agenda is a one-size-fits-all solution for public management improvement. Moreover, global agencies and consulting bodies tend to mistakenly think that there is a common ideology of what constitutes public management reform around the globe. The EU itself in collaboration with the OECD have developed several public administration structural and performance indicators with which member states should align (Verhey, 2013). Despite the evident similarities among public bureaucracies across the globe and especially among the Western democracies, there are equally many ways in which bureaucracies differ. As Painter and Peters (2010) point out, there are families of nations with close cultural and consequently administrative ties. Although there is indeed a global trend

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for convergence to more business-like doctrines of public management, administrative traditions play an important role in both the content and context of reform (Van der Meer and Dijkstra 2000, Brunsson and Olsen; 1993; Christensen, 2004, March and Olsen; 1989; Olsen and Peters 1996). For instance, according to Yeliskagit (2008), until very recently students of European integration thought that EU member states would eventually converge towards a common model of public management in the long term, however this has proven to be wrong due to the persistence of administrative traditions to external shocks.

Yeliskagit (2010) sees administrative traditions as a twofold phenomenon because they determine structural elements of the state, such as the way public institutions work. In addition, they function as an ideology or a cognitive map for reformers and civil servants when performing their duties. Regarding the structural dimension of administrative traditions, their elements can be traced not only in the way public organizations and institutions work, but also in the regulatory framework in which they operate. Traditions can be operationalized as governance structures, as they are anchored in the past but still evident in the present. Institutional settings of the present are in line with arrangements created at a previous point in time, exhibiting a path dependency according to the theories of historical institutionalism. Despite the strict criticism made by many comparative institutional studies, stressing the deterministic conceptualization of traditions more research has shown that the past has a large impact on how institutions work and will hereafter (Streek and Thelen, 2005).

The second dimension of administrative traditions emerges as a cognitive code that determines the actions and preferences of politicians and civil servants. For Yesilkagit (2010) these codes function as some sort of unwritten, far from the rational choice model. Instead, they are inherited models of governance received during the socialization process by the individuals. In addition to governing structures, administrative traditions carry various ethical codes especially regarding the role of the government in the society. As will be analyzed later, governmental philosophies between traditions vary significantly (Bevir et al, 2003). In contrast to the first dimension of administrative traditions, its second (the more cognitive) aspect demonstrates the role of agency in public management reforms (ibid). Policy actors are indeed driven by their goals, ambitions and interests, therefore in this sense they act rationally. Nonetheless, these motives are largely inspired by inherited values and principles of the wider group they are embedded, their

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ideas about the state of their world and their subjective choices (Peters, 2004). Essentially the political culture in which traditions are embedded is what forms them and traditions in turn determine the governmental philosophy. And this is why despite the severe criticisms historical institutionalism is relevant to explaining the concept of bureaucratic traditions. The past affects how politicians and bureaucrats perform their tasks and organize their memory. Socialization and the values that come with it determine what is considered ethical, efficient, good or bad when it comes to making political choices. Moreover, these actions largely form the way institutions work, hence traditions continue evolving both in their practical and cognitive dimensions (Yesilkagit, 2008).

2.3 Politicization and the Napoleonic Tradition

Politicization in the Napoleonic tradition is highly visible both at the top and the bottom of the administration (Kickert; 2012, Peters; 2004, Sotiropoulos; 2012, Spanou; 2008, Rouban; 2008). For Spanou (2008), the reason why Napoleonic states are highly politicized is because the state has a central role in integrating society. The state is seen as an organic entity responsible of ensuring public good values, hence political elites follow the same interventionist philosophy in every policy area as well as the administration. Unfortunately, there have been very few attempts by scientists to systematically investigate the Napoleonic administrative tradition and its philosophy. Ongaro’s work (2009) is perhaps the most systematic analysis of the Southern European tradition, integrating earlier theories of Peters (2004) who was among the first to operationalize the notion of the Napoleonic system. Peters (2004) defined four operating tools to identify the Napoleonic tradition characteristics, namely the relationship between state and society, the dichotomy between law and management, the administration’s accountability and finally the separation between politics and administration. In his study he managed to collect dispersed conceptual knowledge from different scholars and unify these theories to come up with a coherent structure of what constitutes the Napoleonic tradition. The following paragraphs will briefly highlight the main features of the Napoleonic tradition through the lens of the four operating tools.

2.3a. State and society: the Napoleonic state is structured according to the organic conception of

the state. In contrast to the contractarian model, inspired by Hobbes and Locke, the organic state exists as a natural entity while the society is largely shaped by it. In Napoleonic countries the state

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is responsible for integrating society through a continuous interventionism in both cultural and economic aspects of governance. As Painter and Peters argue “the state is the architect of what constitutes the public good by shaping collective identities and creating ethical codes” (2010, p7). On the contrary, traditions such as the Anglo-American and the Germanic have a more contractarian state conception where human action shapes what state institutions look like. Moreover, the state functions as a mediator of individual interests. Consequently, in Napoleonic states bottom up public management reforms are hampered by the dominant governance structures of the state centric model (Ongaro, 2009).

2.3.b. Law vs Management: there are two rival conceptions of law evident across traditions. On

the one hand the managerial perspective sees civil servants and especially senior executives as people who will get things done by focusing on performance and not so much on doing everything by the book. In this sense the law is important but not binding for the acts of bureaucrats as performance of the organization is the ultimate goal. The Napoleonic states have a more legalistic perception of law inspired by the Weberian administrative model. In this case, the civil servant is responsible of implementing the law, following it blindly in order to achieve the public interest. This perception however (especially in the highest administrative layers where policy complexity is the case) makes the civil service often inflexible, ineffective and terribly static. Reforms are usually obstructed by legal complexities which are most of the times impossible to be solved.

2.3.c. Administration and politics: basically this relation describes the extent to which civil

servants are expected to act autonomously or under the influence of elected officials. In hierarchical systems such as the Napoleonic, senior level executives exhibit a politically active behavior. On the contrary, traditions such as the Anglo-American or the continental are highly professional and senior executives are impartial and apolitical. In particular, the Napoleonic system is characterized by few barriers between the political and the administrative officials (Spanou, 1998). Politicians are highly active on determining who works at the upper echelons of the government. In addition to the senior level direct appointment, ministerial cabinets composed of political appointments often function as a parallel bureaucratic system since politicians prefer to consult their own experts rather than senior level executives (Bouckaert, 2006). Hence, senior level politicization in Napoleonic states is a dual phenomenon, as on the one hand it serves as accommodation of party affiliations through patronage, and, on the other hand it serves as a

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guarantee of reliable political advice (Husted and Salmonsen, 2014). In other words, senior level bureaucratic politicization is the case in Napoleonic countries partly due to the legalistic nature of the administrative system which makes policy implementation complex and inflexible. Essentially politicization is a product of the administrative culture itself (Sotiropoulos, 2006).

2.3.d Accountability: in contrast to more managerial traditions, the Napoleonic model of

bureaucratic accountability is again formal and legalistic. Despite the existence of external accountability mechanisms such as the parliament and special monitoring agencies, accountability is being exercised internally. In this formalistic structure bureaucrats need to gain approval from their superiors before they act in order to be held accountable at a later stage. Even though this model guarantees legality it makes the administration less effective and its actions more time consuming (Ongaro, 2009).

2.4 Policy Implementation

Policy implementation research can be traced at the crossroad of several academic disciplines namely public administration/management, organizational studies and political science (Schofield and Sausman, 2004). Notwithstanding the rich literature on policy change, the process of implementation itself was largely neglected until politicians and social scientists realized that policy change cannot be understood without realizing what determines implementation success or failure (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). It is important to note that policy implementation is a twofold term. One the one hand, it describes the process through which a policy gets implemented, exposing variables crucial for its success or failure. On the other hand, policy implementation can be seen from an outcome perspective, that strictly examines what constitutes implementation success or failure. Of course both dimensions are interlinked and often overlap, however, for my thesis it is essential to differentiate between them as my second research question attempts to evaluate whether the current legal framework has been successfully implemented by looking into the outcome side of the implementation. Still, a good understanding of the implementation process will be crucial to explaining why certain policy measures were, perhaps, more successfully implemented than others, yet it will not have a central role in my thesis. The policy implementation literature review will start with the implementation outcome dimension (what is considered success or failure of a policy) followed by a brief attribution to the process of policy implementation.

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Successful implementation had always been a subject of debate between two opposing scientific groups, the bottom-up and top-down thinkers (Matland, 1995). Overall policy success is determined by one’s perspective of legitimacy and value superiority (Ingram and Schneider, 1990). Grounded on democratic theory the top-down approach sees policy makers as the only legitimate political actors responsible for formulating policies and monitoring bureaucratic action to secure its success. As Matland (1995) puts it “the statutory designers' values have a superior value” and implementers should not have any discretion in affecting political outcomes (p.154). Therefore, policies are successfully implemented only when they apply the wishes of elected officials in real life. Top-downers are divided into the proponents of the strong statute approach (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981) who see successfully implemented policies only when implementers apply the legal statutes as prescribed. The Wilsonian perspective recognises the effect implementers have on determining success and gives larger discretionary capacities to the bureaucrats. Hence, implementers on the one hand should implement policies according to the wording of the statute, but the means, the resources and the tools are chosen by them (Lowi, 1979). Bureaucratic accountability is of central importance for the Wilsonians, as it guarantees compliance with the statutory objectives (Goggins, 1987). Top-down perspectives fail to address the problem of goal clarity, as policy makers often cannot predict and anticipate potential problems that could arise throughout the implementation. Therefore, bureaucrats need to be able to modify the statutory goals in order to make them more applicable to the real world (O’Toole, 2000).

The bottom-up approach envisions a completely different perspective of implementation success, seeing bureaucrats and citizens as the sole legitimate actors in producing political outcomes (Hill and Hupe, 2002). Divided into the grass root and support building proponents, bottom-up thinkers deem policies successful when “positive societal outcomes” are produced through the interaction of bureaucrats and social actors. Legal statutes exist in order to provide guidelines and should in no case be implemented by word if the prescribed legal documents violate the interest of social actors. Being a more progressive ideology, bottom-up thinkers assume that all citizens and bureaucrats are capable of coming together and participating in a policy process that produces substantial political outcomes (Suggest, 2011; OECD; 2013). However, they seem to ignore the fact that not all social groups have the same abilities to participate in democratic procedures, therefore a mediator (such as state institutions) is always necessary to guarantee the

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inclusion of these groups in policy making (Matland, 1995). As stated earlier, successful political outcomes are determined by one’s conception of democracy and value of superiority.

The academic debate of the past decades which started from the US in the 1970s to cope with the increasing problem of policy ineffectiveness, has indicated two rival schools of thought aiming to explain the process that leads to implementation success or failure, the top-down, bottom-up approaches. In the mid 90’s a third school of thought evolved synthesizing bottom-up and top-down elements (O’Toole, 2000). Top-down academics (Van Meter and Van Horn; 1975, Nakamura and Smallwood; 1980, Mazmanian and Sabatier; 1983), explain implementation success as a process determined by the actions of policy-makers exclusively. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) were those who evolved the top-down thinking by introducing three factors for successful implementation: tractability of the problem, ability of the statute to structure implementation and non-statutory variables such as technology and financial resources.

First, policy objectives need to be clear and precise providing bureaucrats with adequate legal resources to implement the law. Second, policies should be justified by convincing causal theories situating social problems and pointing out solutions. Third, legal measures must be taken in order to ensure bureaucratic and target group compliance. Regarding the non-statutory variables, Sabatier (1984) claims that civil servants should be skilful and committed, interest groups must support implementations and socio-economic conditions need to be rather predictable in order to prevent unexpected policy drifts.

Even though top-downers saw politicians as the central actors in the implementation process, they were cautious about the context in which bureaucrats function, hence they suggested that implementation should be handled by agencies which are not hostile to the policy. Moreover, they were aware that when many veto points exist in a policy sector implementation gets tougher, therefore discipline, hierarchy and monitoring were essential elements of success (Suggest, 2011). Nevertheless, top-down approaches were criticized as ineffective since they were ignoring how powerful bureaucrats can be when implementing the law and especially how easily politicians could be manipulated by bureaucrats due to their lack of expertise in the policy field (Matland, 1995).

Bottom-up theorists have criticized top-downers for being one-dimensional by seeing policy implementation as a process controlled by elected officials (Hjern and Hull; 1982, Barrett

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and Fudge; 1981, Elmore; 1979. Policy implementation for bottom-uppers, depends on the actions of bureaucrats who have to deal with societal actors when applying policies. Hence, variables, such as communication, networking, participation, inclusion and co-production are crucial for a successful implementation process (Sabatier, 2005). Hjern (1982) was the first to stress the need for scholars to conceive policy implementation as a multi-actor and inter-organizational process in which networks and social interaction shape public policies. For him the identification of these social networks was crucial to understanding and predicting the direction implementation should follow. Both citizens and bureaucrats act rationally in their effort to maximize their personal interest and it is precisely the outcome of this bargaining that determines successful implementation (Hjern and Porter, 1981). Bottom-uppers have been criticized for their perception of democracy. The normative critique suggests that bureaucratic flexibility and autonomy undermine the actions and legitimacy of elected officials as it limits their capability of exercising their power. Methodologically, this approach has been criticized for the increased emphasis it gives to bureaucrats in handling public policy, ignoring the power politicians possess to sanction and/or persuade civil servants to implement policies as prescribed (Sabatier, 1993).

Third-generation research attempts to bridge the gap between the two schools of thought by incorporating elements of both camps into their theories. This generation is characterized as the most scientific so far as it formulates and operationalizes clear hypotheses from which it deduces observations (O’Toole; 2000). More specifically these scholars (Elmore; 1985, Fullan; 2007, Goggin et al.; 1990, Matland; 1995, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith; 1999) approach implementation as a process emerging from the interactions between politicians, bureaucrats and the society as well as more static variables such as socio/economic conditions and administrative cultures. Combining top-down and bottom-up approaches provides researchers with a holistic picture of the environment in which implementation takes place, allowing for more detailed conceptualization of the variables that could be crucial for the success or failure of a policy (Suggest, 2011; OECD; 2013).

In their effort to get the best of both worlds many researchers such as Elmore (1985), Sabatier (1986) and Gogging et al. (1990) attempted to merge the two approaches and explain implementation as a process that takes place both at the political and social level. Elmore’s work (1985) of forward/backward mapping was the first to express this generation of thinkers,

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envisioning policy makers as the actors responsible for providing implementers with all the necessary resources and instruments to implement the policy (forward mapping), but at the same time try to anticipate as precisely as possible (and this includes the assistance of bureaucrats in all implementation phases) the preferences of target populations and interest groups (backward mapping). Matland (1995) was the one who advanced the hybrid theoretical models, developing a framework that introduced two explanatory tools: policy conflict and policy ambiguity. It is exactly the ability of elected officials to trace the extend of policy conflict and ambiguity regarding a specific policy and adapt their implementation strategy accordingly. In an environment where conflict between politicians and social actors, including the bureaucracy, is high, then it is better for politicians to draft an ambiguous policy statue, in order to guide the process step by step according to the reactions of the actors. If conflict is low, then it is better for politicians to adopt a less ambiguous strategy since it is in nobody’s best interest to impede the policy implementation. Studies of European integration have adopted Matland’s operationalization and discovered that factors such as politico/administrative traditions and socioeconomic conditions are crucial for successful policy implementation.

Despite the absence of a common theoretical framework for policy implementation evaluation, hybrid theories suggest that policy implementations be a process determined by macro variables such as cultural elements, socioeconomic and politico-administrative conditions, policy sector related factors as well as agency related issues (Suggest, 2011). Nevertheless, as O’Toole (2000) has noted, there are literally hundreds of variables one could possibly observe when studying policy implementation. There is no “one-size-fits-all” recipe for researchers to apply and still very much depends on the researcher’s ability to link possible explanatory variables with the context of the policy (Fullan, 2007).

2.5 NPM Inspired Reform

The last theoretical concept analyzed in this section is New Public Management, a business like set of doctrines for improving the performance of the public sector. NPM has been widely diffused the past decades across Western democracies, mainly due to the necessity of a more or less assimilated philosophy of public management (OECD; 2012, Word Bank; 2011). Pollitt and Bouckaert, (2011) illustrate the influence of NPM in public management reform in Southern Europe claiming that indeed there is a convergence towards NPM doctrines as a side-effect of

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Europeanization. Siskos; (2016), Spanou; (2012), European Commission; (2014), Kickert; (2012) stress the importance of NPM in reforming the public sector of the Napoleonic countries during the Eurocrisis as a way to counter increasing public debts. Several European Commission reports (2010, 2014) as well as OECD country specific studies (1996, 2013), have stressed the need for Greece to implement NPM oriented reforms not only to deal with the unsustainable public debt, but also modernize and depoliticize its public sector. The depoliticization reform analyzed in my thesis is very much inspired by NPM doctrines as the Memorandum of understanding between Greece and its international creditors pinpoints, more business like models will be implemented to minimize senior level bureaucratic politicization in the Greek public sector (Makredemetres, 2014). This is why NPM is an important theoretical concept for this thesis.

In particular, NPM embraces private sector values such as competitiveness, customer oriented services, quality improvement and strategic planning (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2010). The citizen is seen as a customer with an active say on the form and quality of services provided by the public/private organizations. Public enterprises are being privatized or contracted out in order to release the government from unnecessary expenses, while at the same time these public services are being provided cheaper and more efficient to the customers. NPM gives great emphasis on a more managerial mentality, which is cultivating innovation and employee creativity in contrast to the traditional Weberian hierarchical notion of public management (Hood, 1994).

3. Conceptual framework

This section of my thesis outlines the conceptualization of the independent and dependent variables. It begins by presenting an in-depth discussion of the depoliticization phenomenon according to modern theories of public management. Next, I will explore the concept of New Public Management, which even though is not a separate variable, it is important for a better understanding of the 2015 depoliticization reform as its measures were largely inspired by NPM. Lastly, I will conclude the conceptual framework with an elaborate examination of policy implementation literature. The conceptual framework is developed in such a way to address both research questions in a natural order. The first two sub-sections aim at making the reader familiar with what a depoliticized civil service should look like, according to the ideas which the legal

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framework was built on, in order to effectively investigate the extent to which the current legal framework is in line with theories of depoliticization. Sub-section three, is concerned with research question two (to what extent has the reform been successfully implemented) and therefore presents what constitutes policy implementation a success.

3.1 Depoliticization

Modern theories of depoliticization integrate ideas from both the Weberian classical administrative philosophy as well as from new public management theories such as NPM (Aucoin, 2012). In both classical public administration as well as in NMP, impartiality is of fundamental importance, as it establishes mechanisms of interest separation between politicians and civil servants. In particular, an impartial bureaucracy functions in a way that distinguishes political from administrative authority, as political parties respect bureaucratic autonomy and civil servants act within their legal competences (Evans and Rauch, 2000). More specifically, the bureaucracy cannot be seen as a partisan tool for awarding employment to political supporters, exercising patronage practices. Any public service positions should be filled by applicants who exhibit both merit and competence, and not political sympathy towards the governing party/parties (Hood and Lodge, 2006). As for public administrators, they are required to act professionally, offering advice to politicians and implementing public policies driven by their duties and not their political ideologies (Pollitt and Bouckaert; 2011, Dahlber and Holmber; 2014, Dahlstrom; 2012). According to Silberman (1993) impartiality and professionalism are practically operationalized as meritocratic recruitments in public services positions, describing a depoliticized bureaucracy which promotes and recruits its civil servants according to skills, competences and qualifications, instead of political criteria. Rauch and Evans (1995) pointed out that meritocratic recruitments/promotions are of vital importance for the separation between politicians and civil servants in Western democracies. For the authors, recruitments and promotions are meritocratic only when: “the applicant’s skills and merits decide who gets the job” and “there is absence of political recruitment” (p53). Impartiality and professionalism are closely linked to meritocratic recruitments since the latter are fundamental requirements for securing impartiality (Dahlström et al.; 2012a, Rothstein and Teorell; 2008). Such principles are particularly evident in the theory of NPM, practiced almost everywhere across the Western democracies although with some variations (Christensen, 2014).

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The traditional Weberian meritocratic HRM model underpins centrally organized and managed competitive examinations when it comes to recruiting/promoting civil servants of all ranks. Especially in upper level positions absolute rigidity is necessary to assess the most qualified applicant for the job. Independent public entities are responsible for recruiting, promoting, assessing or dismissing employees taking the privilege of direct appointment by politicians (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2010). Even though NPM adheres to the principles of meritocracy and depoliticization, the need for increased efficiency, speed and precision over personnel selection introduced new practices of HRM borrowed from the public sector (Fullan, 2007). Furthermore, it is argued that competition over public service positions is not meritocratic because all applicants are being tested on the same subjects and not exclusively on themes regarding the job itself. The private sector recruitment logic, which NPM adheres to, leaves greater discretion to the senior executives of public sector organizations to choose the most qualified candidate according to the job requirements. Flexibility, responsiveness and competence are the intended outcomes of this process. Accordingly, promotions are being handled internally. Additionally, the contractual philosophy of NPM replaces life-long contracts for higher public officials with short term contracts 3-6 or 4-8 years (depending on the country) enforcing flexibility at the civil service, promoting merit over seniority (Hood and Lodge, 2006). By giving line managers of public organizations the competence to handle HRM issues, NPM was promising to further divide the line between politicians and civil servants (thus depoliticize the civil service) and improve organizational performance by selecting the most qualified employees internally bypassing the slow old fashioned centralized recruitment methods (Aucoin, 2012). Managerial reform (devolution) was meant to practically consolidate the need for more technocratic rather than political restructuring of the civil service by “letting the managers manage” (Hood, 1991).

However, in practice the increased autonomy of line managers and public organizations made the administration less responsive and adaptive to political orders. The new administrative actors were not as loyal as their traditional predecessors, assuming competences beyond their confined boundaries. Moreover, they were less concerned about values such as public interest, accountability and ethics and more with the performance of the organization itself (Christensen and Laegreid; 2001, p.304 in Pollitt and Bouckaert; 2011, p.165). Consequently, in their need to regain control of the bureaucracy, politicians were often bypassing the meritocratic recruitment methods by appointing their own preferred applicants in executive positions. In the US for

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instance, increased managerialism complemented by decentralized recruitment methods was responsible for establishing the spoils system, leading to extended patronage especially in the highest ranks of the civil service (Ongaro, 2009). Hence, countries applying NPM practices have taken many steps back regarding managerialism and recruitment decentralization, introducing a blend of both centralized and decentralized methods, bringing NPM closer to the traditional Weberian model (Aucoin, 2012).

Another fundamental principle of NPM, this time totally different from the classical Weberian administrative model, is the principle of transparency and open government (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The rapid development and spread of IT technologies during the 20th_century

has changed the way public sector works. NPM states chose to embrace IT technologies, in order to make public service provision more effective, cost-efficient and most of all visible to the citizens (Vyzigiannakis, 2016). Although the term transparency is largely associated with visibility of public finances it has extended to the use of IT technologies, making public organizations subject to public scrutiny. With the increased application of technology across the public sector, NPM has managed to make governments more accountable to their citizens since information that was once considered to be classified (under the Weberian “closed bureaucracy”) now is accessible to anyone including personnel issues (Pollitt and Hupe, 2011). Inspired by private sector practices NPM uses IT technologies (e-recruitments) as a tool to distance politicians from personally appointing their preferred candidates in public organizations (Roberts, 2006). By making all recruitment procedures public, governments ensure the apolitical stuffing of public enterprises, promoting meritocracy, fairness and equal access to opportunities and information to their citizens. For Roberts (2006) open governance is a principle in which all modern democratic states should adhere to. To sum up, the devotion to principles of professionalism, meritocracy and adaptability to new technologies can be translated into several mechanisms through which they can be achieved.

3.2 (De)centralized Independent Staffing Agencies

In order to safeguard principles such as meritocracy, professionalism and impartiality which are all underpinnings of a depoliticized bureaucracy (Aucoin, 2012) recruitments, promotions and dismissals need to be conducted by centralized independent organizations. For Rauch and Evans (2000) centralized HRM for public organizations effectively diminishes political appointments and eliminates partisan abuse of the bureaucracy. Secondly, centralized independent organizations

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focus on merit and qualifications rather than political criteria. Third, the fact that politicians have no influence over executive positions allows civil servants to perform their duties in an impartial manner, unconfined and protected from political demands that jeopardize their neutrality. As already noted in the theoretical section, many NPM countries across the Westminster systems use centralized staffing methods particularly at the highest bureaucratic ranks, to decrease political influences over HRM (Lavigna and Hays, 2004). Sundell (2014) stresses the need to consider the effect of political patronage before decentralizing staffing methods, by clearly referring to the Napoleonic states as examples where decentralization would not be the optimal solution if policy makers wanted to depoliticize the bureaucracy. More specifically, systems with high levels of patronage in the public sector are unable to make the public sector more meritocratic, because politicians will have the discretion to politicize the civil service even further. In order for recruitment de-centralization to work, some variables such as bureaucratic autonomy, low levels of patronage and emphasis on merit, need to be already in place. In an administrative system, as the Napoleonic, where politics prevails over merit when selecting senior level executives, it is best if recruitments and promotions are being handled by independent centralized agencies (Izvorski and Kahkonen; 2008, Roberts; 2006).

3.3. Merit Over Seniority

3.3.a. Competitive examinations and interviews

In politicized bureaucracy the standard recruitment/promotion procedure at the highest ranks of the civil service is achievedby emphasizing on seniority over actual competence and performance indicators. This is unfortunate as according to Kickert (2011) today’s civil service needs to be able to attract the most qualified employees. In many NPM countries the decentralized studding methods described in the previous paragraph were accompanied by a denial towards the traditional competitive examination procedures as they were seen as time-consuming, expensive and inadequate for choosing the right candidate. However, another strand of literature is leaning towards the more traditional competitive staffing procedures, especially when it comes to applying them in countries with extensive political patronage (Sundell; 2014, Ongaro; 2010, Evans and Rauch; 2000, Lavigna and Hays; 2004, Vyzigiannakis; 2016, Hollyer; 2011, Aucoin; 2012). To get a more complete overview of the candidate’s qualities, oral interviews are widespread across many Western democracies when it comes to choosing senior level executives. As Hollyer (2011)

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points out, policy makers often have to choose between a flexible and adaptable civil service by avoiding the practice of competitive examinations risking political patronage, or implement a more time-consuming and expensive staffing procedure based on knowledge assessment to eliminate bureaucratic politicization. Therefore, the traditional competitive examination procedures accompanied by oral interviews are effective tools to choose the most qualified applicants in systems with a history of bureaucratic politicization (Evans and Rauch, 2000).

3.3.b. Performance Measurement

Another tool for reinforcing meritocracy over recruitments and promotions of bureaucrats in all ranks is the implementation of performance indicators (PI). In order to avoid the classical promotion/recruitment method of working time experience, NPM introduced performance oriented selection tools. According to many analysts across the Napoleonic states, perhaps with the exception of Italy (Ongaro, 2009), the legal framework of recruitments and promotions in senior level positions largely disregards the actual performance of the civil servants. Instead it promotes and rewards working experience in order to accommodate the legacies of civil servants appointed during their previous term in office (Petters and Pierre, 2005). Countries such as the UK, Ireland, New Zeeland and Slovakia in their effort to increase the efficiency, transparency and professionalism of public organizations as well as to depoliticize the upper levels of their bureaucracies, implemented performance indicators as basic tool for selecting both senior and low tier civil servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert; 2011, Roberts, 2006). Izvorski and Kahkonen (2008) suggest that in countries with high political involvement in the staffing of senior level positions, performance measurement should be assisted by independent public agencies. When public servant performance is measured, then agencies have a complete overview of the candidate’s qualifications (Vanhoonacker, 2013). To sum up, evaluation schemes empower meritocracy by rewarding skills and qualifications instead of (just) working experience, thus making it hard for politicians to reward their preferred applicants unless they have the skills to be recruited/promoted. Furthermore, performance PI make public service positions more attractive to highly qualified applicants since they have the opportunity for fast track career development and accelerated promotions through performance based rewards (ibid). Consequently, competitiveness increases making it harder for politicians to directly appoint their political supporters, especially when

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centralized staffing agencies monitor the whole evaluation and recruitment/promotion process (Siskos, 2016).

3.3.c. Contractualism

Life-long contracts serving as mechanisms for governments to build up legacies of civil servants loyal to the party are being replaced by short-term contracts of 3-8 years in NPM countries (Dahlstrom 2011). According to many analysts (Vyzigiannakis; 2016, Kickert; 2011, Spanou; 2008, Sotiropoulos; 2012, Ongaro; 2010) in politicized systems parties tend to create a core of loyal civil servants by appointing them in public organizations and rewarding them when they assume office. By hiring party loyalists with life-long contracts, appointees are able to gain the necessary working time experience and then be eligible for executive positions, as in most Napoleonic countries tenure is the most vital criterion for recruitment/promotion. In countries applying the contractual logic, phenomena of tenured careers, as by-products of patronage relations between politicians and civil servants, are inconceivable (Dahlstrom, 2011). Senior lever bureaucrats are being recruited and promoted for a short time period, in a competitive environment. Whether or not they will move up the hierarchical ladder or not depends on their professional skills which are continuously monitored and assessed (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In the UK for instance, senior level executives are required to re-apply for their jobs after 5 years (Ongaro, 2010). The NPM contractual philosophy, combined with explicit performance indicators monitored by independent agencies prevents politicians from creating and sustaining party loyalists in the civil service. It promotes merit, individual performance and gives the administration a sense of continuity, since executives work under contracts, making it harder for politicians to replace them with their personal appointees (which is a common phenomenon after every re-election even outside the Napoleonic system) (Sundell 2014).

3.4 Transparency and e-recruitments

3.4.a E-recruitments

The use of information technology across the OECD countries is widespread. The diffusion of NPM as a global scheme of public management reform has contributed to the application of e-governance and e-recruitments in the public sector to increase transparency, fairness and diminish

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political involvement in the staffing of public organizations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The European Commission has made the use of online recruitment platforms mandatory for member states in its effort to help countries of the Balkans and Central Europe modernize their HR methods, but more importantly to make personnel selection procedures transparent for the public (Vyzigiannakis, 2016). In systems such as the Napoleonic, politicians were often manipulating recruitment procedures to benefit those who offered them political support. This way politicians would conceal information from both the applicants and the public, selecting their own preferred candidate without exhibiting any of his/her qualifications. Moreover, applicant interview data was never published, thus no one could possibly know what was said during the procedure (Sotiropoulos, 2006). E-recruitment procedures make staffing of public organizations transparent to the citizens as well as to the applicants (Lavigna and Hays, 2004).

3.4.b. Executive Member Online Records

Another tool used across many Western Democracies to increase transparency, accountability and public trust by minimizing political interference in executive member staffing procedures is the Online Executive Member Record. More specifically, countries like England and New Zealand make use of national civil servant records to prevent politicians from recruiting and promoting employees with questionable abilities in executive positions (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). This record displays academic qualifications, working experience and skills and serves as a database for the preliminary selection of candidates (ibid). In order to avoid arbitrary political appointments and promotions, all highly qualified civil servants need to be part of the record and publicly display their qualifications (ibid). The members’ qualifications are subject to scrutiny in order to confirm their validity in order to prevent the free riders who submit fake data (Giannaras, 2014). Furthermore, interview data, assessment scores and performance measurements are published on the Record for a time span of 5 years (in most cases) as well as on the website of the respective organization. Usually, the platform is being managed by independent staffing agencies (Nayer, 2015).

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This sub-section will elaborate on the notion of successful implementation. It begins by presenting the four dominant theoretical approaches as to what constitutes a successful/unsuccessful policy. The first two approaches are supported by top-down theorists while the last two by bottom-uppers. My theoretical framework ends with a brief presentation of the different models describing the process of policy implementation. I chose to define successful implementation as the application of a legal statute in real life, hence the strong statute approach is important for my thesis.

3.5.a. Strong Statute Approach

From this perspective, policy implementation is a process that should be handled exclusively by elected officials. Bureaucrats and interest groups have an advisory role and their actions should not intervene with the prescribed policy measures (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975). More specifically, for Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) policies are deemed successful when legal statutes are being implemented by word in real life. For the proponents of the strong statute approach, governments are responsible for formulating statutes prior to exhaustive research with responsibility against the common interest, impartiality and professionalism. These statutes, should guarantee an equal allocation of public goods without neglecting the less privileged social groups (Katzmann, 1989). The first reason why bureaucrats have such a limited role in this approach is initially because they do not have the competence to intervene in the formation of policies as they are not elected. Secondly, the strong statute proponents are aware that implementers are often politicized, therefore by having discretion in shaping policies would promote personal interests instead of public good values.

Nevertheless, this approach comes with a major disadvantage which has to do with the deliberate statutory inconsistency and vagueness, in order for politicians to prevent public disapproval against policies. Consequently, bureaucrats have very little knowledge and guidance as to what the policy should look like leading to an interpretative implementation which might produce different outcomes than those envisioned by policy makers (McGregor, 1993).

3.5.b. The Wilsonian Perspective

The Wilsonians retain the same top-down approach regarding the supremacy of the legal statute in determining successful implementation. However, what changes is the extent of bureaucratic discretion to implement the law as they see fit (Lowi, 1979). More specifically, the statute still

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needs to be implemented by word in order for a policy to be considered successful, only this time, implementers are in charge of the implementation process. This implies that the statute provides all the necessary resources, means and tools to implementers, but the actual operationalization of the means is a responsibility of the bureaucrats (Ingram and Schneider, 1990). An important concept for the Wilsonian perspective is the notion of accountability. Statutory clarity can prevent the pursuit of particularistic interests, and where misconduct emerges, bureaucrats are subject to negative sanctions. Hence, the Wilsonian perspective implies a de-politicized civil service acting professionally and impartially in implementing well-structured legal statutes as prescribed by their superiors. Bureaucrats are on control of the means to implement policies but at the same time they are held accountable if policies drift off their original wording (Matland, 1995). In sum, the Wilsonian perspective sees policy success as a two dimensional process where bureaucrats are in control over the means and resources necessary to implement the statutory objectives.

The biggest disadvantage of the Wilsonian perspective is that it adopts a passive role for the government in driving societal change (Gormley, 1987). For the Wilsonians if governments are unable to come up with explicitly stated policy measures as well as concrete, achievable and quantifiable policy goals, then it is best if the government does not intervene. For many societal problems the solutions are not always available to policy makers, therefore policy making is to a large extent experimental. Hence, from this perspective complex societal problems could forever remain unsolved due to the lack of concrete solutions (Sabatier, 1983).

3.5.c Grass Roots Approach

This school of thought prefers to explain policy implementation as a process evolving at the lower levels between bureaucrats and social actors. For them, politicians are less legitimate than bureaucrats to implement public policy, as civil servants’ ties with the citizens are stronger than politicians’ (Hjern and Hull, 1982). Policy success should be determined by popular perception against policy measures and the extent of positive effects to the society rather than the exact application of policy statutes as top-downers suggest. It is the implementation environment that shapes policy outcomes. For Palumbo, Maynard-Moody and Wright, 1984) if bureaucrats do not enjoy the freedom to adapt the law to the needs of social actors, policies will most likely fail. The role of the legal statute is to allocate citizens and implementers the capacities to co-produce policy outcomes that meet their needs (Salamon, 1980).

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Problems arising from the grass roots approach have to do with legitimacy and technical expertise. First of all, as Ingram and Schneider (1990) point out, many citizens are less enthusiastic about policies formulated at the lower level. Therefore, it is likely that these policies will not be considered legitimate. Secondly, the grass roots approach assumes that all local areas have the same access to resources to conduct the necessary research for policy formulation while this is not the case. Even in many Western countries there are large resource disparities between different areas and the adoption of this perspective could lead some areas to develop rapidly while others would lag behind (Salomon, 1980).

3.5.d Support Building Approach

The support building approach adopts a top-down idea of successful implementation. In contrast to the grass roots approach, it focuses on the participation side of the implementation, seeing success as a process in which all social actors have equal access to the implementation process (Stone, 1988). It is a deliberative model of policy success, emphasizing in cooperation between interest groups, exchange of ideas and learning politics by doing. Even if the deliberation fails to produce feasible policy measures, it is successful if it manages to engage all interest groups in a discussion where everyone would have the chance to raise their voice. Unfortunately, in modern societies, citizens rarely have the time and space to discuss politics. Furthermore, not everyone has the skills to coordinate with others in order to reach a decision, therefore this approach is criticized as far from realistic (Ingram and Schneider, 1990).

4. Data and methods

4.1 Methodology

In this section I will be outlining the methods and data used to address my research question. In order to perform an in-depth deductive study of the reform’s success or failure I chose a case study design of two cases, being the ministries of administrative reform and finance, which will allow me to observe in detail the effect of the reform on senior level bureaucratic politicization. My research ambition is to find out whether the new legal framework has resulted in de-politicization in the field of HRM. My research question implies a thorough investigation of the reform’s compatibility with theories of depoliticization as well as an analysis of the implementation phase