Silence and Invisibility: Exploring Labour Strategies of Zimbabwean Farmworkers in Musina, South Africa

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Jinnah, Z. (2017). Silence and Invisibility: Exploring Labour Strategies of Zimbabwean Farmworkers in Musina, South Africa. South African Review of

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Silence and Invisibility: Exploring Labour Strategies of Zimbabwean Farmworkers in Musina, South Africa

Zaheera Jinnah December 2017

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Silence and Invisibility: Exploring Labour Strategies

of Zimbabwean Farmworkers in Musina, South

Africa

Zaheera Jinnah

To cite this article: Zaheera Jinnah (2017) Silence and Invisibility: Exploring Labour Strategies of Zimbabwean Farmworkers in Musina, South Africa, South African Review of Sociology, 48:3, 46-63, DOI: 10.1080/21528586.2017.1327822

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https://doi.org/10.1080/21528586.2017.1327822 ISSN 2072-1978 (Online), ISSN 2152-8586 (Print) © The Author(s) 2017 Published by Unisa Press and Informa UK Limited, (trading as Taylor & Francis Group) South African Review of Sociology

Volume 48 | Number 3 | 2017 | pp. 46–63

SILENCE AND INVISIBILITY: EXPLORING LABOUR

STRATEGIES OF ZIMBABWEAN FARMWORKERS

IN MUSINA, SOUTH AFRICA

Zaheera Jinnah

African Centre for Migration and Society University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa zaheera.jinnah@wits.ac.za

ABSTRACT

Commercial farms in South Africa have relied on cross-border migrant workers for decades. In this article the author explores how social relations on farms in Musina, Limpopo, South Africa, shape the employment conditions of Zimbabwean farmworkers. Drawing on empirical fieldwork with 134 workers, the author argues that within a context of unequal social power on farms and conditioned by a labour migration regime that has strong informal patterns, workers use silence and invisibility as tactics of self-preservation, and everyday survival. The author locates these actions within the political economy of Musina; and the strong desire amongst farmworkers to ensure access to livelihoods in the face of compounded precarity.

Keywords: migrant farmworkers; mobilisation; precarity; resistance; Musina; South Africa

INTRODUCTION

In this article, I explore the everyday forms of survival and resistance and labour strategies of Zimbabwean farmworkers in Musina, Limpopo, South Africa, and interrogate the social context in which these are created and maintained. I argue that the social and political structures on commercial farms shape an informal-formal system of governing labour and migration, and that silence and invisibility are strategies employed by migrant workers to ensure their economic survival. Based on original qualitative research conducted in 2011, including interviews with 134 farmworkers in Musina, the main findings of the study showed poor compliance with existing labour standards on

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numerous commercial farms, and little formal opportunity amongst workers to challenge these. Instead, the farmworkers’ actions are targeted at ensuring that their employment, regardless of how precarious and unequal it is, remains protected. This behaviour stems from the underlying need for work amongst this group and perceptions that collective action will result in the termination of employment. Most of the respondents have precarious or no legal status in the country and limited skills in a labour market that is marked by high unemployment levels. Drawing on the literature of mobilisation and Scott’s (2008) work on everyday resistance, I argue that the strategy amongst migrant farmworkers to remain silent and hidden is a form of survival and response.

A number of studies have highlighted the difficulties farmworkers and migrants face in accessing health care services, and in documenting violations of human rights on farms in Musina (Addison 2011; Bloch 2008; Human Rights Watch 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011; IOM 2009b; Lincoln and Maririke 2000; MSF 2009). These suggest the poor availability of resources in Musina; the increased mobility through and to this town; and the resultant challenges in policing and servicing the area. Other studies have highlighted the complexity of farms themselves, as spaces of contestation between farmers and workers that are rooted in historical racialised systems of inequality and oppression (Bolt 2012; 2013; Rutherford and Anderson 2007; B. Rutherford 2008; J. Rutherford 2008). It is within the scholarship of examining how rights and social relations on farms are constructed and intersect, and how migrants create modes of belonging within a context of exclusion and precarity (Chereni 2014), that this article is located. Drawing on the literature on mobilisation and resistance, I interrogate how farmworkers’ positions of legal and economic precarity, and the specificities of farms as private and unequal spaces, help to explain workers’ decisions of silence and invisibility as modes of self-preservation and everyday endurance.

The outline of the article is as follows: I begin with a discussion on the methodology of the study and then provide an overview of the literature and theory on farm work, and mobilisation. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical findings. Thereafter. I discuss how a compounded state of precarity amongst workers, and on farms, helps to explain the persistence of poor labour conditions. Finally, I discuss how silence and invisibility emerge as conscious acts of survival and response amongst migrant farmworkers.

METHODOLOGY

The article is primarily based on qualitative research conducted in Musina. This consisted of semi-structured interviews with 95 Zimbabwean farmworkers, and five naturalised South Africans who were born in Zimbabwe, at 12 farms around Musina; and five focus group interviews with 34 Zimbabwean farmworkers in total.

Key informant interviews with 19 representatives from civil society and government were also conducted. These consisted of interviews with local organisations and

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community leaders to facilitate initial access to the target populations, and to identify major obstacles in protecting farmworkers; structured telephonic and in-person interviews with 15 civil society organisations rendering services to farmworkers, or migrants, or both, based in Musina or other parts of Limpopo; interviews with representatives of four local government departments in Musina at district level in order to understand how they were working with farmworkers. These included:

• an inspector at the South African Police Service (SAPS); • an extension officer at the Department of Agriculture (DoA);

• a social worker at the Department of Social Development (DSD); and • a manager and a field officer at the Department of Justice (DoJ).

A series of informal discussions with a representative from the Department of Labour (DoL) in Musina and with nurses working at a hospital in Musina were also undertaken. Finally, I attended several local forums established by government departments, civil society organisations, and farmers in Musina on migrants’ rights during 2011 which provided insight into service delivery, and the political and social context of farms. This process included attendance at the:

• UN-NGO Stakeholders Forum, held at UNHCR weekly;

• Migrant’s Health Forum, held monthly at the Musina Municipality;

• Immigration Forum (for farmers, government departments and civil society organisations, held once in month at the Musina Municipality); and

• Steering Committee Meeting (for migrant unaccompanied minors) which is was held monthly at Save the Children.

Minutes of these meetings were used to understand the work that is being done by these actors in as far as the rights of farmworkers are concerned. There was no representation of farmworkers at any of these forums.

The current study specifically targeted Zimbabweans in order to examine the intersection of migration and labour in border-lying areas. The research project was introduced to farm owners at various stakeholder meetings in Musina organised by the Vhembe District Municipality. Farms were selected based on the farm owner’s willingness to provide access to the property. This bias in sampling is acknowledged and the study is therefore not representative of farms in Musina. Once access was secured, farmworkers were informed of the purpose of the research by farm managers and those willing to be interviewed were selected. At some farms, workers were willing to be interviewed in groups only, hence five focus group interviews with a total of 34 workers were conducted. Interviews were conducted until no significant new material emerged.

Given the sensitive nature of the study, the farmworkers were informed about the voluntary nature of participation; all information was coded to prevent the identification

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of individuals or farms; and access to legal and social resources for workers was facilitated where needed.

Interviews were held during work hours and in the evening on farms to accommodate the various work schedules and duties of the respondents. The respondents completed a questionnaire to capture basic information on working conditions and demographics. The data was entered into a spread sheet and analysed using the quantitative software STATA. In addition an open-ended, semi-structured interview process was followed during which the respondents were probed around three broad themes, namely: personal background including migration; working and living conditions; and strategies for redress including mobilisation and organisation. Interviews were conducted in Shona and Ndebele with the aid of a research assistant who undertook fieldwork and were later translated and transcribed. Thematic analysis was used to organise the qualitative data.

ENDURANCE, MOBILISATION AND EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS

Employment relations are central to how work is structured and labour conditions negotiated (Baron 1988; Burawoy 1983). These are defined as “relations which represent the dynamic social, economic, psychological, and political linkages between individual workers and their employers” (Kalleberg 2009, 12). Employment takes place in a context of personal and political relations, which shape how conditions of employment under labour law are performed, negotiated and resisted. These deeply individual and structural conditions of power are important contextual factors that help to understand workers’ responses to employment. In such a context, formal mobilising and organising can be seen as only one part of a resistance strategy (Jinnah and Holaday 2010).

Scott (2008) in his seminal work on the “weapons of the weak” draws attention to the everyday forms of resistance that workers engage in as acts of mobilisation and survival. He calls the “multiple acts of peasant insubordination and evasion” ways in which the “peasantry makes its political presence felt” (Scott 2008, xvi). This is a powerful argument as it shifts the attention of power away from formal employment relations and organising as the central tenets of resistance amongst workers. Instead, by drawing on the multiple and subtle strategies that workers employ, Scott repositions worker agency as central to mobilising. In the article, I argue that the decisions around staying silent and invisible are similar forms of instrumental action taken by workers to protect their livelihoods in the context of deeply unequal employment and social structures on farms. Staying invisible by not formally mobilising, and remaining quiet by not engaging, are not forms of passive acceptance; instead they are strategies of survival and can be seen as examples of instrumental action (Weber 1978).

The ways in which these strategies unfold can be further understood by considering the broader context of migrant farm work in South Africa, and of low skilled migration. Farms are spaces of informality where historical patterns of employment and social

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relations govern more strongly than labour or migration laws. Farm owners occupy powerful positions in Musina’s political and economic spaces. For instance, they are well represented in formal planning and policy committees in the Musina municipality and have good social relations with members of the SAPS and other state authority. Farms are recognised as important components of the local economy. Residents are reliant on farm owners for substantial employment and housing services, regardless of how poor they are (Bolt 2013). Using Weber’s (1978) social action theory, I explain how the deeply personal and informal relations on farms help to understand the actions taken by workers to maintain their survival.

Classical models of mobilisation assume a collective identity and common purpose (Davies 1969; Gusfield 1968; Lang and Lang 1961; Turner and Killian 1972) coupled with external factors such as the political climate, and the availability of resources to fund and sustain movements of change (Jenkins and Perrow 1977). Two triggers are identified in the literature for mobilisation to occur, namely: an internal “tipping point”, and external support from sympathetic funders, politicians and civil society (Jenkins 1985).

For farmworkers in Musina, the fragmentation of the working class, divided by individual desires to survive, pragmatic issues of access to farms, pervasive unequal social relations with employers, and the lack of an encompassing migrant policy and rights regime in South Africa collude to prevent any significant organised and formal mobilisation. Instead of overt action, or mass mobilisation, workers use covert and subtle tactics to survive and endure conditions. These include making their own work arrangements, such as leave periods or rest hours within a team; resisting direct orders from farm managers; delaying production times; and even in some cases sabotaging or stealing crops or machinery. Most of these are possible because the workers have no direct contact with the farm owner; instead, by working under a foreman, many are able to resist identification and evade reprimand or responsibility directly.

CONTEXT: MIGRANT FARM WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA

Through bilateral agreements with its neighbours, South Africa’s commercial agricultural sector has relied on cross-border migrants for decades, to fill its seasonal and permanent labour needs (Adepoju 2003; Bolt 2013; Mather 2000). In the post-1994 period, the commercial agricultural sector has been subject to significant pressure and change including the reduction of subsidies to farmers as part of market liberalisation measures, and land reform efforts. In addition, changes to South Africa’s migration and refugee laws, and political unrest and economic crises in Zimbabwe, have led to increased mobility to South Africa. Today, commercial farms in border-lying areas continue to rely on foreign labour especially during harvesting, and at the same time provide much needed work for newly arrived and low skilled migrants (Crush and Dodson 2007; Harris 2001). Available data from previous studies suggests that there

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are an estimated 200 commercial farms in northern Limpopo, of a total of 2 915 in the province (Limpopo Provincial Government 2010) and these employ between 15 000 and 20 000 Zimbabweans (IOM 2009a; Rutherford and Anderson 2007).

Currently, there is a mixture of informal and casual employment, and irregular migration practices alongside historically entrenched, formal systems of movement and work. Since the 2000s, many Zimbabweans have been drawn to the number of South African farms alongside and in close proximity to the border for temporary work (Bolt 2013; B. Rutherford 2008; 2009; 2011). As such there is a diverse group of foreign farmworkers in Musina, comprising of permanent workers, recurrent seasonal workers, and temporary workers. Although studies conducted elsewhere in South Africa attributed differences in conditions of work to the category of workers (e.g. Mather 2000), the current study found that migrants’ working conditions are generally poor regardless of the type of employment contract they hold (or do not).

MUSINA

The town of Musina and the surrounding farms fall within the Vhembe district which includes three other local municipalities, namely, Makhado, Thulamela and Mutale. The Musina local municipality has a particular geography, in that it has two international borders, Zimbabwe to the north, and Botswana to the north-west, and is in close proximity to a third with the Kruger National Park buffering Mozambique to the east.

Musina is in Limpopo, one of the nine provinces of South Africa, and one of the poorest provinces. It has a population of 5.2 million people, roughly a tenth of the country. It contributes about 6.8 per cent to the national economy primarily drawn on mining, which makes up 25 per cent of the economic structure of the province. Agriculture constitutes 3 per cent of the economy of the province and more than 60 per cent of the commercial land is privately owned (Limpopo Provincial Government 2010).

In 2011, the municipal area of Musina had a population of 68 359 people, a significant increase from the 39 310 population recorded in 2001 (Census 2011). By all accounts these official figures did not include the number of cross-border migrants living and working in Musina. Given that many Zimbabweans in the area are undocumented (Rutherford 2011), and that mobility in the area is high, the actual number of foreigners, including Zimbabweans in Musina, is unknown.

The social and political geography of Musina is an important factor in understanding employment relations between farmers and farmworkers for a number of reasons. Firstly, the majority of workers and their families live on the farms, which creates a unique employment relationship with uneven social relations, as workers are reliant on employers for access to basic services such as water, and housing. Moreover as the place of employment is a private property this limits possibilities for organising. Secondly, farm work is an important part of the economy in the area. Of the 20 042

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households in Musina, one third (6 944) are private farms (StatsSA 2011), and most of the employment for lower skilled workers is restricted to commercial agriculture (StatsSA 2011). Thirdly, Musina is relatively rural and most of the municipality has untarred roads. Aside from the national highway linking Pretoria to the Zimbabwean border, there are only two additional main tarred roads leading west and south-east from Musina. Most of the farms are accessible by secondary roads, which are often untarred and in poor condition. Farmers use private pickup trucks and vehicles to transport goods and workers to farms, and farmworkers often walk as public transport between farms and Musina is virtually non existent. Access onto farms for labour inspectorates or service providers and opportunities for farmworkers to access resources in towns where most services are located is therefore severely limited.

Like many small towns across South Africa, Musina has a small but authoritative elite, largely consisting of farm owners, who have important social relations with public institutions such as the SAPS and the courts (Bolt 2013). In an interview with an official at the Musina Legal Advice office, which deals with labour and legal disputes in the area, it emerged that the police would not investigate cases opened by farmworkers due to the influence of farmers.

Farm owners are influential and powerful players in local politics with at least four occupying council positions in 2011. About eight farmers who are responsible for employing about 7 500 workers have been living and working in the area for generations and maintain personal connections with each other, with the local police and other state bodies. In an interview with a state prosecutor, he affirmed that “justice for farmworkers depends on who one knows” stating that farmers have influence within the criminal justice system. This sentiment was shared in interviews with officials from the Departments of Labour and Social Development. For instance, workers complained that reports to the SAPS are “useless as they are in the pockets of the owners”.1_This is neither new nor unique to Musina. Indeed as Hall, Wisborg, Shirinda, and Zamchiya (2013, 3) note:

(farms are sites of) structural inequalities created through a long history of conquest, dispossession and uneven development. The South African countryside remains divided between the communal rural areas once set aside for the black majority and the private farm land owned mostly by white South Africans, largely the descendants of European settlers.

What this suggests is a narrowing of official structures within which farmworkers may exercise and claim their rights. Instead, these factors combine to create an “invisible” space for farmworkers, marked by a largely rural geography, land ownership patterns and historically entrenched social class differentials (Weber 1978) beyond the law. Whilst this holds for both disenfranchised local workers (see, e.g., Atkinson 2007; Davies 1990; London 2003; May 1998) and migrants, in the article I examine the politics and

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pragmatics of the intersection of farm work and migration in particular. The sections below discuss the outcomes and causes of this in more detail.

FINDINGS

The research findings revealed the prevailing conditions of precarity, including exploitative labour, atypical work structures and patterns (such as causalisation), and violations of human rights for migrants working on commercial farms in Musina. Work is structured as temporary and seasonal, wages are determined based on output rather than time, and costs of employment such as housing, services, and occupational compensation for injury on duty, are moved directly onto the worker. These factors suggest a broader move toward the casualisation of the workforce and increased precarity for a sector in which workers are already vulnerable (Barchiesi 2011; Kenny and Webster 1998).

Non-compliance with labour legislation

The employment conditions of almost all of the respondents fell short of the minimum requirements pertaining to wages, hours of work, rest and leave period, the provision of contracts, and occupational health and safety measures, as set out in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) (No. 95 of 1997) (DoL 1997).2

Of the 134 respondents, 89 (66%) stated they were employed without any written contract of work; and about half had been notified verbally of the basic terms and conditions of their employment. This usually consisted of the conditions pertaining to the number of hours of work, amount of wages, and tasks to be undertaken.

Wage levels are low with about three quarters of the 134 respondents earning below the legal minimum wage level. Farmworkers often work for 12 hours a day or more. Most mentioned that they did not receive any compensation for working overtime, or for working on public holidays and weekends, despite strict regulations to the contrary in the Sectoral Determination (11–14). As one respondent stated:

Even with the recent holiday, Easter holiday, but we were working and we know there is no payment for that. Here you work and there is no holiday, if you decide to go on holiday then (there is) no payment. (Interview, 7 May 2011)

Apart from hours and wages, the conditions of work also failed to meet regulatory standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993) (DoL 1993) and the BCEA (DoL 1997) stipulate that the employer is bound to provide necessary protective clothing, and to take measures to ensure that employees are protected from job related

2. The national legislation governing terms of employment are set out in the BCEA (No. 75 of 1997) and its amendment (No. 11 of 2002 of South Africa).

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risks. Some workers stated that they were coerced into paying for protective clothing, which makes many opt to not wear any. As one farmworker outlined:

As you can see, the shoes that I am wearing here have been bought by the employer but I was told to pay him because it is me who will be wearing them … I didn’t have an option but to pay for these shoes because it is important for the sake of my health, because I cannot spray chemicals without proper protective clothes. However, it is still a challenge to pay R250 for shoes considering my monthly earnings. (Interview, 16 May 2011)

A related concern amongst workers was injury sustained whilst on duty. The labour law in South Africa requires employers to be liable for expenses and compensation arsing from injury sustained on duty. However, many farmworkers stated that there is no compensation for them if they are injured at work:

A number of people, especially foreigners who are injured at work are not being compensated, (in the) past few months, another guy from Zimbabwe was injured at work and could not report for duty, the owner fired him. (Interview, 16 May 2011)

Of the 134 respondents 43 (32%) stated that their wages were prone to illegal deductions by the employer. Some farmworkers alleged that at certain farms the owner deducted a portion of each farmworker’s salary in the event that livestock was stolen or lost. Others stated that they did not have electricity at their lodgings on the farms, despite paying for it from their wages. In another instance, a number of farmworkers reported that a portion of their salaries was being deducted for water, electricity and housing costs even though they were not staying on the farm. As one respondent said:

I have been working for more than five years here and I do not stay here on the farm but I pay R85 for water and stepping on (the) soil and R25 for burial society but people when they die are not compensated. (Interview, 5 May 2011)

As most of the respondents did not receive payslips, they were unable to determine what their salary and deductions constituted. They were notified orally of deductions when receiving their weekly wages. The amount deducted varied from farm to farm and covered any number of items, including food, water, shelter, and electricity. At one farm, between R300 and R400 was being deducted monthly for electricity, food, utilities, housing and water, which was in excess of the amount determined by the SDA.3 If a worker earns the minimum wage of R1 316.69, the maximum deduction permitted would be R263.34. This did not appear to be the case amongst the majority of the study respondents.

The farmworkers reported that they were paid in terms of productivity rather than number of hours worked. At two of the, the workers reported that the farmer paid them

3. In terms of the BCEA, “a maximum of 20% of the worker’s salary can be deducted monthly from wages, provided that the food and housing provided is of an acceptable standard” (S8(1)a-e of Sectoral Determination 13 of the BCEA (No. 75 of 1997).

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R56 per task (e.g. planting a field), instead of a daily amount, thus regardless of how long a task takes, a person would be paid a fixed amount. In some cases, such tasks can take up to three days, further reducing the amount of money a person earns in a month. One respondent said:

When it is raining, some of us have been here for more than 15 years now and we are permanent workers but the owner does not recognize that, if it is raining, there is no money (for you that day) … (Interview, 5 May 2011).

At two of the farms, the workers stated that since 2008 they no longer received a fixed weekly wage, but instead were paid a proportionally lower daily wage and were told to return home when no farming took place. The owners at these farms confirmed that economic conditions had forced them to reduce the size of their permanent workforce and employ casual daily workers instead.

DISCUSSION: FARMWORKERS’ RESPONSES

Given the political economy of Musina, the social relations between workers and employers, and the poor working conditions faced by the respondents, in this section I draw on the narratives of farmworkers to tease out their responses. Using Scott’s (2008) theory of subtle resistance, I frame this discussion around the strategies of everyday survival and endurance that workers employ. Moreover, I argue that the personal and political nature of employment relations, in this case an underlying social and legal precarity of workers also shapes their perceptions of mobilisation and modes of response.

A number of response strategies can be traced from the farmworkers’ narratives. Many said that they would remain silent and continue working under the same conditions that they find unfair. Underlying this is the sense of vulnerability they face drawn from their own insecure legal status, their socio-economic class, and the farm as a space of informality and vulnerability where divisions and distrust amongst workers further weaken any opportunity for collective action.

Other farmworkers feared that any mobilisation for an improvement in living and working conditions would result in them losing their jobs, being evicted from the property or in the worst case, being detained by the SAPS and deported to Zimbabwe. The migrants’ fear is based on a number of factors that compound their precarity: being undocumented or holding documentation that is dependent on an employer (as is the case of farmworkers who have corporate permits), and again the lack of unity and collective action amongst workers on farms.

Silence and subtlety

The farmworkers were mindful that speaking out forcefully against working conditions would be detrimental to their livelihoods. As one stated:

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As you can see, today is the 9th_{of May, but I have not yet received (a) salary for last month,}

(April), how do I work or eat not even talking of support for my children back home? ... we only keep quiet because if you complain too much you can be told to leave … (Interview, 9 May 2011)

The sentiment expressed in the above statement was widely shared by the respondents in the study who felt that speaking out and taking action would be counter-productive to their livelihoods.

Rather, the farmworkers emphasised informal modes of survival and resistance. At one farm, where the respondents were paid a set weekly wage, the mentioned that they worked as slowly as they could to earn more money. At another farm, the workers pool a portion of their incomes together weekly to buy basic supplies such as groceries in bulk to save money.

To avoid detection by immigration authorities, the respondents mentioned that they would prefer working on farms that are in close proximity to the Zimbabwean border, even if wages were lower there, as they could then simply walk back and forth when needed without documentation. Others said that they obtained money from their employers to bribe officials to cross the border; as employers are dependent on them for labour, they often consent to this.

The farmworkers rely on social networks to identify employers who, as one respondent said, are “difficult” by this he meant those that withhold wages without reason, or dismiss workers without justification. If an employer is known to be unfair, workers will refuse to work for him. Social networks are also used to pressurise employers. For instance one worker who was dismissed said that he asked a relative’s employer (another farmer) to successfully intervene with his former employer in order for him to be reinstated to his position.

The farmworkers also use farm-based spaces and structures to voice their discontent. At one farm, the workers told us that if they have a problem with their conditions or the employer, they will stop working or even sabotage crops or equipment to voice their unhappiness. At another farm, many said that they would confront the foreman who was their line manager and “make his life hell” until he leaves.

The foreman plays an important role on the farm as intermediary and having a sympathetic foreman for workers is one of the strongest advantages they can have. At some farms, workers mentioned that they were able to remove a foreman who did not support workers or who colluded too closely with management by for instance reporting those who did not work or had stolen livestock, through witchcraft, or violence.

For others, onward mobility was an objective and strategy. The majority of the respondents did not envisage working on a farm beyond five years. Most imagined that they would return home or migrate to Johannesburg in search of better economic opportunities. For those who held permanent positions and had been working as farmworkers for five years or longer, there was a strong feeling that collective action

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would worsen conditions. Thus many stay on to save money that will facilitate migration to a city.

Documentation

How can we make claims if we don’t exist?(Interview with a group of farmworkers, 20 May 2011)

In 2011, there were limited legal routes for entry and work in the country for low-skilled regional workers. The Zimbabwean Dispensation Project (ZDP), a special regularisation for Zimbabweans in the country which included a moratorium on deportations which was in place for most of the study’s duration, had not improved opportunities for the respondents. Only a few farmworkers had applied for regularisation, and of these none had yet received any documentation. The ZDP was limited to those with Zimbabwean passports and those who had an offer of employment in writing, criteria that excluded many in the study (Thebe 2016). Consequently, many Zimbabweans used a variety of other ways to enter the country including the asylum route, a visitor visa which did not allow them to work, or irregularly by paying border officials at both the Zimbabwean and South African sides of the border; cutting a hole through the border fence and navigating the bush; or crossing the Limpopo River. As some farms lie adjacent to the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, many workers can simply walked back and forth between the two countries as needed.

Twenty-two of the workers were undocumented, and faced the risk of detention and deportation by the SAPS and immigration officials. For farmworkers though these challenges can be mitigated by living and working on a farm where they are physically protected from state authorities. In this sense, the farm provides a sense of protection for undocumented migrants, as they do not come into contact with immigration officials or police. Many respondents suggested that remaining on farms was a way to “stay safe” from deportation and arrest.

However, this “benefit” also comes with costs. One respondent from the Musina Legal Advice Office, a local non-profit organisation, stated that some farmers intentionally recruit undocumented migrants; do not pay them; and then call the police to have the workers arrested for failing to have documentation, at the end of the month. Several local activists who suggested that farmers are regarded as the local economic and political elite corroborated this. Many farmworkers stated that the farmers collude with immigration and police officials to detain and deport workers if complaints are made about working conditions or if there are any problems on the farms (such as theft or damage to property).

The sense of protection on farms from the police and the fear of being deported if complaints are made, make many workers remain invisible. From a social action theory perspective, this decision can be viewed in light of the risks associated with being visible, the expectation that mobilising or reporting exploitative conditions will result in a loss of livelihoods and a desire

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to remain working. A common theme amongst the respondents was the need to focus on their primary objective as migrant workers. Thus, many were unwilling to take the risk of jeopardising their livelihoods by asserting their labour rights forcefully.

The respondents’ precarious legal status constrains their perception and ability to seek legitimacy and make claims for rights. Asylum applicants were awaiting the finalisation of their refugee status, a process that is drawn out and lengthy. Although they have the right to work and remain in the country pending a decision on their status, many farmworkers who have applied for asylum feel that making any demands for rights would jeopardise their claims, as they would be seen as burdens to the state. Furthermore, many asylum applicants are already investing considerable time in renewing their applications that expire every two or three months and do not have the resources to make additional claims. Some of the respondents stated that they were being asked to pay R1 500 to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to renew their applications or risk being detained and deported.

Many of those who had documentation were working under a corporate permit scheme, which is a visa obtained by an employer to recruit foreign workers en masse. The farmers (illegally) hold the workers’ passports to prevent them from leaving the farm. This practice has two implications for migrant workers: (1) it restricts their movement outside the farm property; and (2) it affects how they perceive their own sense of legitimacy outside the farm. For as long as their legal status is tied to the farm, workers hold little desire or opportunity in staking claims outside this space. Rather, they frame claims and develop strategies within farms. If they encounter any social, medical or economic problems, they seek redress within the farm from their colleagues or the farmer. Many workers stated that they if they have problems, they would go to the foreman or someone on the farm for assistance. When asked in a focus group interview if they would seek services from the state or civil society, the dominant response was:

Here you cannot just report anything to the police because this is a private property, our foreman again cannot go against the Boss, they report what the Boss wants to hear, so if you have your own concerns, the best may be to keep them and just do the work that you came for … foremen are after favours from the Boss so if you need extra increments, do not think that they will tell the Boss, they will tell you to go and tell him alone … if the Department of Labour staff arrives here, we do not see them, you will only see the foremen talking to them and few others who are selected by the foremen, we do not have money to visit them in Musina so at the end of the day, we are left without an option but to keep quiet and stay like that. (FG interview, 21 May 2011)

Lack of unity

Unequal social relations on farms extended beyond the employer-employee to within the workforce as well. On some of the farms there was a great deal of mistrust and animosity amongst farmworkers, driven by a mixture of personal reasons, ethnic or linguistic differences, conflict between seasonal, permanent, and temporary staff and

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between older and younger workers. Women also expressed fear of men in terms of gender based and domestic violence. Many workers spoke openly about hatred toward co-workers, cases of food poisoning, allegations of witchcraft, assault, theft, and even murder amongst farmworkers. As one worker said:

It’s a matter of being careful when dealing with people here. (Interview, 11 May 2011)

The farmworkers are drawn into silos of self-preservation, a situation that is reinforced by the lack of structural and institutional attempts at mobilising and uniting workers (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011).

Employment relations amongst workers, managers and owners on the farms we visited were tense. Furthermore, the structure at the farm places workers under a foreman who many workers claim is easily bribed, a sentiment shared by an SAPS inspector. In the event of inspections, foremen coerce workers to make particular statements, or identify selected workers who officials can interview. In a group interview with farmworkers, many shared the following feeling:

Who is there to complain to? The foreman can be bribed to take sides, so what is the use of complaining? (Interview, 25 May 2011)

Thus, by not forming associations and not joining unions, workers are in fact taking a form of what Weber (1978) calls “instrumental action”, a form of purposeful behaviour as a response to the prevailing mistrust amongst workers. Their actions of remaining quiet and engaging in informal and subtle strategies of resistance and survival are a response to the actions of farmers who will take disciplinary action against them and a response to other workers who will marginalise or exclude them from farm based social networks. By drawing on various informal and subtle strategies, workers are able to preserve their livelihoods and to voice their dissent, albeit in quiet and often discreet ways.

CONCLUSION

Border-lying farms in northern Limpopo, South Africa, produce a particular set of socio-legal conditions between farmers and migrant workers that are positioned at the intersection of social relations and legal norms. This has resulted in a number of poor working conditions being documented amongst the study respondents. The workers respond to these in different and subtle ways that cut across and beyond formal mobilisation strategies and overt resistance activities. What is clear is that their underlying desire to survive economically as low-skilled, precarious regional migrants, is the primary driver of responses on farms.

Empirical fieldwork revealed that farms are spaces of extra legal authority which offer physical and economic protection to undocumented migrants but also serve as spaces of exploitation and repression. However, even though most workers are

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discontent with their working conditions, their tactics for mobilisation are nuanced and subtle. Foreign farmworkers adopt strategies of invisibility, silence and subterfuge to avoid harassment by authorities; to mitigate risks to their livelihoods; and to give voice to their experiences.

By these means the farmworkers are able to cope with exploitative conditions and to stake a political space for themselves under difficult social, legal and physical circumstances.

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INTERVIEWS

Key informants

1. Chief Prosecutor, Department of Justice, 15 May 2011.

2. Social worker, Department of Social Development, 22 April 2011. 3. Extension Officer, Department of Agriculture, 12 March 2011. 4. Inspector, South African Police Service, 10 March 2011. 5. Officer, Musina Municipality, 5 March 2011.

6. Officer, Musina Legal Advice Office, 12 and 14 March 2011.

Farmworkers

1. Individual farmworker, 5 May 2011. 2. Individual farmworker, 7 May 2011. 3. Individual farmworker, 9 May 2011. 4. Individual farmworker, 16 May 2011. 5. Focus group interview, 20 May 2011. 6. Focus group interview, 21 May 2011. 7. Focus group interview, 25 May 2011.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ZAHEERA JINNAH is a researcher at the African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She holds a PhD in anthropology and has conducted research on gender, migration, and work. She is currently the recipient of a Volkswagen Stiftung postdoctoral fellowship in the Humanities in Africa (2017– 2020), and part of an Investigator Award on Migration and Health in Southern Africa funded by the Wellcome Trust (2016–2018).