Striking morals, moral strikes : vigilantism, Islamic activism and dramatic pemuda 'fun' in Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam

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Striking Morals, Moral Strikes

Vigilantism, Islamic activism and dramatic pemuda 'fun' in Indonesia's

Front Pembela Islam

Supervisor: Dr. Laurens Bakker Second reader: Dr. Gerben Nooteboom

MSc Contemporary Asian Studies K.R. van Marissing

Student No: 10476369

Amsterdam 30 June 2015 Word count: 24.068

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When I started this master's program in 2012 I could not have fathomed that my bookish fascination with comprehending radicalism and violence would bring me to the turmoil of the slums of Jakarta. Though I had enrolled in the program precisely to broaden my horizon beyond these burdensome topics, I found myself inexorably drawn to them again when choosing the topic of my field research and thesis.

Finally coming face to face with violent acts and their perpetrators was challenging and confusing. It is the anthropologist's job to understand without judging and to engage without becoming involved. I'm afraid that I did not succeed at either. While I tried to remain objective towards my informants, it was hard to reconcile the kindness, enthusiasm and pride they showed me with the cruelty and occasional violence they directed at others. On the other hand, the imperative to remain neutral regardless of my own convictions also led to moments where I found myself nodding at their statements a little too vigorously or enjoying the thrill of going on patrol with a group of disciplined laskars.

My solution to this unsettling contradiction was to stick to the tired axiom that trying to understand is not the same as trying to excuse. Whether I succeeded in recapturing the necessary distance in writing this thesis is for others to judge.

Before I start, however, I would like to thank my wonderful fiancée, friends and family, my teachers my fellow students, and all the people in Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Pekanbaru, Medan and Makassar (and all the places in between) who took the time to help me. Not least among these is Yanti, without whom I would have never even entered the country. Above all, though, I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Laurens Bakker for his patience, his encouragements and his understanding.

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1. Introduction

Why do ordinary people join radical organizations and perform violent acts? With this thesis I attempt to provide an answer to this question in the specific case of the Front Pembela Islam, or Islamic Defenders Front. As its name suggests, this organization claims to defend Islam and the Muslim community in Indonesia. Both from 'ordinary' vice, or maksiat, that is a perceived threat to morality and Islamic values, but also from ideological or religious dangers. The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is best known for carrying out forceful or even violent 'moral strikes' against ‘immoral’ targets. These strikes are known in Indonesian as sweepings and razzias and their targets range from night clubs and shops selling alcohol to 'deviant' Islamic sects and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) activists. Many of FPI's methods are generally considered to be illegal, whereas its ideological and religious interpretations are seen as a radical minority view.

Hand in hand with this radical outlook and occasional violence, however, FPI also carries out altruistic activities. The organization provides disaster relief in case of flooding or fires, has undertaken guard duty at churches under terrorist threat, distributes food to the poor, organizes public religious celebrations and offers its members the opportunity of a tightly knit social experience.

This apparent contradiction begs the question of what exactly drives this organization and its members. The issue is made even more complex by the fact that FPI claims to undertake these, sometimes violent, activities on behalf of the community and in assistance of the Indonesian state authorities.

Not surprisingly, the FPI has been the subject of various academic publications and intense public debate in Indonesian society. However, there are three problems that exist in both polemics. First, they mostly deal with the leadership of the organization, its origins and its political maneuvering related to high-profile incidents. This results in a top-down analysis that overemphasizes the power relations of the organization with political, business and military elites and its supposed involvement in criminal activities. Second, the literature displays an almost total bias towards the FPI chapters in the Jakarta metropolitan area. Third, most of the scholarly writing and public debate has dealt with the negative aspects of the organization, rather than attempting to explain the more positive experiences that it offers members and the help and assistance that it provides to others.

I argue that these three problems result in an incomplete picture of the organization and that the understanding of the motivations of the ordinary members is underdeveloped. Even if all the rumors are true and FPI really is a tool for the military, a proxy for business elites, or a sophisticated

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religious criminal organization, it would seem that these aspects of the organization do not explain why FPI has grown into an enormous social movement. Most of these explanations do not make clear what it is about the organization that appeals to and motivates its ordinary members, or how these factors subsequently influence the organization's conduct and activities.

Nor can these explanations account for why FPI members frame their use of violence as a way of helping the state maintain public order, rather than undermining the state's authority. Though FPI has sometimes been described as a vigilante organization, this label has subsequently not been explored in depth. I argue that this is an oversight and that the model of vigilantism should be central to any explanation of the motivation and mobilization of the ordinary members of FPI.

1.1 Problem definition and thesis outline

The aim of this thesis is to complement and, where necessary, correct the existing top-down analyses of FPI by exploring the motivation and mobilization of the ordinary, rank-and-file FPI members. I should state explicitly that the political maneuvers of the organization's leadership are not my concern in this thesis. These have been covered by many other authors. Instead, by using a bottom-up approach I hope to gain a better understanding of what kind of people are attracted to the movement, how they frame their participation in it and what their day-to-day activities actually look like. I do so using the following research question:

What are the reasons for ordinary members of Front Pembela Islam to participate in the organization in general and its vigilante activities in particular?

The thesis is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 will provide a brief overview of FPI's history, organization and activities. In Chapter 3, I will attempt to create a theoretical framework of vigilantism and turn to social movement theory for explanations of how ordinary members of an organization are motivated and mobilized. Social movement theory provides two main categories of factors that drive collective social action: the first being material and socio-psychological interests or benefits; the second being ideological and in this case, religious ideas. Considering that it has received the most attention in the existing literature and public debate, I will try to answer the sub-question of what interests might be relevant as a motivating factor for FPI members in Chapter 4. I will argue, however, that these explanations are incorrect or at least insufficient. The second sub-question I will attempt to answer in Chapter 5 is therefore: what kind of ideas are driving the motivations and actions of FPI members? In both these Chapters, the neat fit of vigilantism as a

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model for explaining FPI's behavior will also become clear. The useful explanations that have been identified will then be further explored in Chapter 6, which will explore the final sub-question of how these ideas and interests are used in practice during the actual activities of FPI members. Finally, Chapter 7 will review the conclusions of this exercise and present an answer to the research question.

1.2 Methodology

To answer the research question, I have conducted almost three months of fieldwork in several cities in Indonesia, with most of my time spent in Jakarta and its metropolitan area. I have also spent shorter amounts of time in other locations, such as Jogjakarta, Pekanbaru, Medan, and Makassar, in order to avoid repeating the Jakarta-centric bias that is present in much of the existing literature. Wherever possible, I visited the same locations and people multiple times.

At each location, I conducted semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with FPI members and other relevant informants, such as victims of FPI 'moral strikes', researchers and academics, as well as members of other organizations that had dealings with FPI. These interviews took place both on appointment and in a more formal setting, as well as during FPI events or social gatherings. Given that these interviews form my most significant source of data, I had to be aware of certain risks about the responses of my informants, such as the “social desirability bias” that can occur when discussing sensitive or controversial topics. Another risk, particularly when it came to possibly criminal acts, was that informants would undertake “impression management” of themselves in their answers for “ego-defensive” reasons.1_{Particularly in Asian societies, there is the}

added risk of “courtesy bias”, where an inaccurate answer is provided in order to please a stranger.2

However, though some members, particularly young militia members in Jakarta, were reluctant, the vast majority were often very proud of the movement and happy to talk to me. FPI members were often surprisingly open about their thoughts and ideas, because they did not consider their acts to be criminal or something to be ashamed of. In particular, many of them complained that FPI is often misunderstood or misrepresented in the press, which supposedly only focuses on the negative aspects and activities of the organization. They therefore seemed to regard being interviewed by me as an opportunity to 'set the record straight' and give their version of events.

1

Robert J. Fisher, “Social Desirability Bias and the Validity of Indirect Questioning”, Journal of Consumer Research 20:2 (1993), p. 303-315, therein 303. I am indebted to my fellow student Pim Verweij for pointing out this and the next source.

2 _{Timothy P. Johnson and Fons J.R. van de Vijver, “Social Desirability in Cross-Cultural Research”, in: J. A. Harkness}

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To be clear, I do not dismiss the possibility that the negative and cynical interpretations of FPI are true and that things like extortion and political power brokerage happen. First, because it is impossible to prove a negative and second, because I accept that because of the limitations of my field work methods, I would have been unable to uncover such criminal or disingenuous activities. However, as I will argue later in this thesis, my impression is that whatever political or criminal wheeling and dealing happens higher up the hierarchy, this is for the most part invisible and not relevant to ordinary members. Central to this thesis is the idea that ideology and religion are not a mere excuse, but at the very heart of activities of FPI. My approach has therefore been to treat the comments and assertions as well as the denials of my informants as genuine, rather than cynical excuses for behavior they actually know to be wrong.

These interviews were supplemented by observations of events organized or frequented by FPI, as well as the behavior, appearance, and other visual markers of FPI members. I also looked at many accessories and publications produced by the organization and wherever possible, I participated in the activities of the organization, such as joining one of their weekly patrols.

For security reasons, I have not used the names and affiliations of those informants who were not FPI members, unless they explicitly indicated otherwise or were speaking on behalf of a certain organization. I should also point out at this stage that I do not wish to excuse the organization or its members for the violent and intolerant acts they sometimes carry out. During the field work undertaken for this thesis, I have spoken with many of the victims of FPI and I want to underline the fact that being on the receiving end of their intimidations and even physical attacks can be a dangerous and deeply traumatic experience.

My goal with this thesis, however, is merely to provide a better understanding of the experience of FPI membership and I have therefore tried to reserve moral judgment. I am afraid that this approach emphasizes the complexity of the motivations of FPI membership, rather than provide simple answers. I hope nonetheless that it can contribute to better understanding of FPI's striking morals as well as their 'moral strikes'.

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2. Overview of Front Pembela Islam

The Front Pembela Islam emerged during the 1998 Reformasi, supposedly with the backing of a number of high military officials. Its founder, Habib Rizieq, and many other high ranking figures of the organization are so-called habaib of Arab Hadhrami descent. The group was supposedly intended to become a counterweight to the protest movement or a support base for certain Islamist political parties or factions in the military and the police. However, it quickly developed as an independent street-level movement that targeted vice or maksiat in society and has supposedly been abandoned by many of its political patrons.3

The FPI founded a dedicated militia called the Laskar Pembela Islam, which quickly developed a reputation for incorporating either former or active preman, or criminal thugs, engaging in extortion and racketeering. As a result of these negative connotations, its rapid and uncontrollable growth and the government backlash after the 2002 Bali bombings, the organization was temporarily banned in 2002, but quickly reorganized and professionalized itself. Its membership grew from an estimated 100.000 in the years after its founding and to a currently claimed figure of 4 million registered members and an additional number of between 6-7 million sympathizers.4_The

organization has also grown nationwide, with at least 26 local chapters throughout the Indonesian archipelago.5

Whereas the organization initially targeted night clubs, cafe's, hotels and restaurants, and other such places of 'ordinary' maksiat in the neighborhoods of Jakarta, particularly during Ramadan, it started to expand its repertoire from 2005 onwards. It started to speak out against more abstract, ideologically and religiously 'deviant' targets, like a Lady Gaga concert, the Ahmadiyah sect, liberal Muslim organizations, and the publication of Playboy Magazine.6_{Although it is by now}

also active on the national political level, the local context appears to remain very important for

3 _{Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia’s Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003 (Chiang Mai:}

Silkworm Books, 2008), p. 51

4 _{The figure of 4 million registered members plus 6 million sympathizers comes from an interview with the mid-level}

secretary of central FPI headquarters responsible for the administration of the membership lists (RN25), 13 March 2013. The upper claim of 7 million comes from Chaider S. Bamualim, “Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and His Islamic Defenders Front”,

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31:2 (2011), p. 267-81, therein 211, but it is not

entirely clear if he means just members or also includes sympathizers in this figure. The initial figure of 100.000 members comes from Wilson, see below.

5 _{Ian Douglas Wilson, “Continuity and change: The changing contours of organized violence in post–New Order}

Indonesia”, Critical Asian Studies 38:2 (2006), pp. 265-97, therein 282-4 and Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?”, in: K. Kesavapany (ed.), Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 104-124, therein p. 114-5.

6 _{See for instance Helen Pausacker, “Playboy, the Islamic Defenders’ Front and the Law: Enforcing Islamic Norms in}

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determining specific target selection, with for instance FPI in Madura being concerned with a Shia community and FPI in Solo focused on supposed police abuse.7

Although there is supposedly a precise hierarchy of members and LPI 'units', in practice, membership is very informal and primarily dependent on members' presence at and participation in actual events. That is all it takes to be considered an FPI sympathizer, and although LPI membership involves more of a selection and training process, it is not much more structured.8

Activities in most FPI chapters are centered around a weekly Islamic lecture or pengajian, a collective prayer service, and a patrol through the city for the LPI. When specific instances of

maksiat have been identified, FPI claims to follow a strict procedure of reporting the problem to the

police and only as a last resort a sweeping may be organized to clear out the target.

In addition to this fixed schedule, special circumstances ranging from natural disasters to political incidents to special ideological or religious threats being identified may lead to the mobilization of large numbers of both FPI and LPI members for demonstrations and protests, humanitarian assistance and everything in between. It is no surprise then, that in 17 years, FPI has become a widely recognized organization and has occupied a highly controversial slot in Indonesian public life.

7 _{Interview with researchers at Wahid Institute (RN27M), 14 February 2013.}

8 _{Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos (eds.), The Faces of Islam ‘Defenders’: Religion Radicalism and its}

Implications on Assurance of Religious/Belief Freedom in Jabodetabek and West-Java (Jakarta: Setara Institute,

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3. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will discuss a number of concepts that are useful in explaining how FPI members are motivated and mobilized. I will start with a theoretical model of vigilantism, because I argue that this concept has been underused in our comprehension of the movement. The relationship between a vigilante organization and the state is particularly relevant in the case of FPI. However, while vigilantism can be seen as a motivating factor in its own right, as a model it can also easily incorporate other factors. After all, what drives people to join and participate in social movements, often at considerable costs, can seldom be reduced to a single factor. The final section of this chapter will therefore examine some useful concepts related to social movement theory accounts of Islamic activism.

3.1 Vigilantism Defined

Although most observers use the word ‘vigilante’ at one point to describe aspects of FPI activities, this is usually not central to their interpretations. In fact, they seem to use the term ‘vigilantism’ as a given, without defining exactly what they mean by it or using it systematically.9_{Usually, they}

appear to assume that a vigilante is someone who takes the law into his own hands to avenge a crime, or even just someone who is acting violently and without recourse for lawful procedure.

One of the main arguments of this thesis, however, is that the concept of vigilantism should take center stage in any explanation of FPI activism. Seeing FPI's actions through the lens of vigilantism puts the emphasis on its claim to be a necessary reaction to the perceived lack of appropriate government response to social and moral injustices committed against Muslims. Vigilantism as a model creates a focus on the relations between the organization and the state. Yet it does so from the perspective of the FPI itself, not from what it means for the viability of the Western-centric Weberian state model in Indonesia. At the same time, it still allows room for the incorporation of other possible motivating factors, such new forms of criminal premanisme as described by Wilson, if necessary.

First and foremost, vigilantism is often seen as a result of a lack of confidence in the ability of the formal justice system to adequately respond to crime and other social transgressions.10_To

illustrate this point, Ehud Sprinzak’s elaboration on the use of violence by vigilante movements is worth quoting in full, because it applies to the actions and ideas of FPI quite well:

9 _{For instance, see Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”, p. 104, Pausacker, “Playboy, the Islamic Defenders’}

Front and the Law”, p. 3 and Wilson, “Continuity and change”, p. 275.

10 _{R. Abrahams, “Vigilantism, State Jurisdiction and Community Morality: Control of Crime and ‘Undesirable’}

Behaviour when the State ‘Fails’”, in: I. Pardo (ed.), Morals of Legitimacy: Between Agency and System (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), p. 107-26.

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“A vigilante movement never sees itself in a state of principled conflict either with the government or with the prevailing concept of law. It is not revolutionary and does not try to bring down authority. Rather, what characterizes the vigilante state of mind is the profound conviction that the government or some of its agencies have failed to enforce their own order in an area under their jurisdiction. Backed by the fundamental norm of self-defense and speaking in the name of what they believe to be the valid law of the land, vigilantes, in effect, enforce the law and execute justice. 'Due process of the law' is the least of their concerns.”11

Subsequent discussion centers around the questions of whether or not vigilantism is necessarily illegal, whether or not vigilantes are always private citizens, whether or not they always use the (threat of) violence or if non-violent groups like neighborhood watches should also be included and whether vigilantism has to be a pre-meditated act or can also be spontaneous.12

Rosenbaum and Sederberg, who were among the first to systematically theorize the subject, see vigilantism as a transgression of the formal boundaries regulating the use of violence in an established socio-political order, but with the aim of protecting that order from subversion. They assume vigilantes depend on that socio-political order for ideological guidance and justification, rather than having an ideology of their own.13_{This definition is very broad, but their distinction}

between different types of vigilantism is useful. First, they distinguish “crime control vigilantism”, which is aimed at (alleged) perpetrators of legally defined crimes who have escaped official justice for various reasons. Targets of crime control vigilantism are usually individuals or small groups who are being attacked because of their specific illegal deeds. Second, “social control vigilantism” is aimed at supposed racial, religious, political, or economic threats to value systems in society. Social control vigilantism usually targets groups, rather than individuals, and the victims need not necessarily have committed a crime (yet) and are thus targeted for their inherent characteristics, not their deeds.14

Pedahzur and Perliger further argue that the targets of crime control vigilantism are usually “near or dear” to the vigilantes, while social control vigilantism is usually more impersonal, as it is targeted at symbolic representatives which the vigilantes have no personal connection with. As a result, action against crime is supposed to be a more spontaneous and direct response to an immediate provocation, while social control vigilantism is more organized, and therefore more

11 _{Ehud Sprinzak, “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground”,}

Journal of Strategic Studies 10:4 (1987), p. 194-216, therein 211 (note 9).

12 _{For an extensive discussion, see Eveline N. Haas, Public Support for Vigilantism (PhD thesis: University of Leiden,}

2010).

13 _{H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg, “Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence”, Comparative}

Politics 6:4 (1974), p. 541-570, therein 542 and 567. Rosenbaum and Sederberg established a third variant, namely

regime control vigilantism, which targets the state to effect a particular policy change.This appears to be more or less the same as terrorism or insurgency and is less interesting in a discussion of FPI.

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malignant.

A definition on vigilantism that fits better with FPI is provided by Les Johnston, who describes six features of vigilantism. First, vigilantism involves planning and premeditation by the vigilantes, rather than being a spontaneous reaction. Second, its participants must be private citizens who act voluntarily, not because of payment or official duty. Third, Johnston sees vigilantism as a form of autonomous citizenship, and therefore, as an example of a social movement. Fourth, vigilantism involves the use or threat of violence. Fifth, it is a response to actual, potential, or perceived transgressions of the institutionalized norms of an established order. Sixth, vigilantism sends a message to a wider audience than the immediate victim, both in order to provide reassurances to supporters and to deter transgressions of social norms by others.16

In this definition, vigilantes are not necessarily defending the status quo of the established order, but their own norms and values, which fits better with FPI. Johnston’s characteristics establish the possibility of vigilantism being used as part of a systematic political or religious campaign by a social movement. Johnston’s definition also does not assume that vigilantism is automatically an illegal activity. Most importantly, though, using vigilantism as a theoretical framework allows us to see FPI’s actions as the organization sees it itself: as a reaction to vices and heresies that threaten Islam in Indonesia, justified because law enforcement by the state is an ineffective “illusion”.17

3.2 Vigilantism and the State

Eveline Haas identifies a paradox: the state was created partly to stop vigilantism, but vigilantes are dependent on the existence of law in order to take it into their own hands.18_{Vigilantism and the}

imposition of state authority are therefore intimately tied to each other.

Vigilantism can perhaps be understood as a privatized form of the imposition of Giorgio Agamben’s “state of exception”. Originally, this term referred to the prerogative of the state to suspend, out of assumed necessity, the application of constitutional law in certain periods of time and/or with respect to certain individuals or groups. The essence of sovereignty in Agamben’s theory is therefore the ability to determine where and when a state can decide to ignore the law in the name of the law, which is de facto replaced by the capacity for “pure violence”. Agamben calls this the application of a pure “force-of-law”, where the law is crossed out and only state violence

15 _{Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Causes of Vigilante Political Violence: The Case of Jewish Settlers”, Civil}

Wars 6:3 (2003), p. 9-30, therein 13-14.

16 _{Les Johnston, “What is Vigilantism?”, British Journal of Criminology 36:2 (1996), p. 220- 236, therein 232.} 17 _{Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, p. 33.}

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stripped of its usual legitimacy remains.19_{Although Agamben is primarily concerned with (military)}

dictatorships and revolutionary governments, recent anthropological work has stretched the use of the “state of exception” to refer to the arbitrary refusal of legal protection to vulnerable groups in supposedly democratic states.20

Although it remains under-theorized, several authors have suggested a relation between vigilantism and the state of exception. For instance, Gilberto Rosas claims that the state of exception can be intensified by vigilantism, because the creation and diffusion of 'exceptions' allows vigilantes to more easily claim to be working on behalf of the state.21_{Arriving at the same}

conclusion from another direction is Loren Landau, who suggests that governments reinforce extra-legal systems for specific groups of citizens through the “passive acceptance of vigilantism”.22

Haley Duschinski argues that violence from part-time vigilantes that are put to work within an area that is under a state of exception by the security forces in Kashmir are a part of the “informalized repertoires of power, authority and sociability”.23_{She thereby draws attention to the fact that}

vigilante groups and the state are not necessarily completely separated, but that there is often a considerable overlap.

Finally, Laurens Bakker states that some Indonesian ormas who act as vigilantes appropriate the state of exception’s ‘force-of-law’, simply because such law making force is “recognized as legitimate or authoritative by a broader public.”24_{In this way, he extends the ability to impose the}

state of exception not just to the government, but to private groups as well. However, in Agamben’s definition of exceptionality, the ‘force-of-law’ only exists because of the constitutional law of the state, which in this case “applies by ceasing to apply”.25_{It is not, therefore, something that is}

available to private groups in and of themselves. It would be more accurate to argue that the choice of whether or not to impose the state of exception is forced upon the government by these private groups. After all, it remains the responsibility of the state to choose whether or not to accept the

19 _{Note that in the original text there is a cross superimposed over the word “law” in “force-of-law”. Because of}

technical limitations this has been replaced by double strikeout lines. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), p. 40.

20 _{See for instance Loren B. Landau, “Immigration and the State of Exception: Security and Sovereignty in East and}

Southern Africa”, Millenium: Journal of International Studies 34:2 (2006), p. 325-348, Barak Kalir, “Illegality Rules: Chinese Migrant Workers Caught Up in the Illegal but Licit Operations of Labour Migration Schemes”, in: Barak Kalir and Malini Sur (eds.), Transnational Flows and Permissive Polities: Ethnographies of Human Mobilies

in Asia (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), p. 27-54 and Reece Jones, “Agents of exception: border

security and the marginalization of Muslims in India”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27 (2009), p. 879-97.

21 _{Gilberto Rosas, “The Thickening Borderlands: Diffused Exceptionality and ‘Immigrant’ Social Struggles during the}

‘War on Terror’, Cultural Dynamics 18:3 (2006), p. 335-349, therein 342 and 344.

22 _{Landau, “Immigration and the State of Exception”, p. 338.}

23 _{Haley Duschinski, “Reproducing Regimes of Impunity: Fake encounters and the informalization of everyday}

violence in Kashmir Valley”, Cultural Studies 24:1 (2010), p. 110-32, therein 112.

24 _{Laurens Bakker, “Illegality for the general good? Vigilantism and social responsibility in contemporary Indonesia”,}

Critique of Anthropology 35:1 (2014), p. 78-93, therein p. 84.

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creation of a state of exception by correcting or not correcting the ormas’ vigilante actions. Only then can the ’force-of-law’ be devolved from the state to an ormas.

3.3 Social Movement Theory and Islamic Activism

Vigilantism might provide a valuable model for explaining the actions of FPI as a whole, but the question remains how movements can create and sustain linkages with potential recruits. How exactly are members of FPI mobilized for activism as vigilantes? To answer this question, it is necessary to turn to social movement theory.

Within the body of literature on social movements, relatively little attention has been devoted to specifically Islamic activism. This situation was partially amended by a groundbreaking volume edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz in 2004, who defined the subject simply as “the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes.”26_{However, a definition by Asef Bayat is}

somewhat more useful here, because it fits better with the vigilante activities of FPI. According to Bayat, activism consists of: “extra-ordinary, extra-usual practices which aim, collectively or individually, institutionally or informally, to cause social change.”27_{Both authors note that Islamic}

activism itself is not sui generis. The ideational components and inspiration of Islamic activists may be different from the world views of other contentious ideologies, but the mechanisms, dynamics, processes, and organization are similar across different types of movements. While both are applying theories developed about social movements in the West to Islamic activism in the Middle East, there is no reason to think that the theories are not valid for Islamist groups in Indonesia as well.

The literature on mobilization for activism in social movements has traditionally known two main schools of thought on what motivates people to join and participate. The first interests theory breaks down into a sociopsychological model and a rational actor model. Early sociology considered social movements to be “mechanisms for alleviating [socio]psychological discomfort derived from structural strains” such as the discontent resulting from modernization, industrialization, and economic crises. Such discontent can be political, economic, or cultural and its accumulation supposedly makes organized mobilization highly likely.28_{This was later critiqued}

26 _{Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction”, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory}

Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 1-33, therein p. 2-3.

27 _{Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory”, Third World Quarterly 26:6 (2005), p. 891-908, therein 894.}

While both Wiktorowicz and Bayat are applying theories developed about social movements in the West to Islamic activism in the Middle East, there is no reason to think that the theories are not valid for Islamist groups in Indonesia as well.

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by adherents of rational choice theory, who see participation in social movements not simply as an outlet for the pressures of deprivation, but as a logical choice because social movements offer material and immaterial benefits. By structuring mechanisms of resource mobilization, social movements become capable of sustained organized contention and collective action. This mobilization can occur both formally through bureaucratized organizations and informally through social networks.29_{Both these approaches assume that individuals join a social movement primarily}

because they get something out of it. Participation serves a need or fulfills an interest, because in return, social movements provide psychological, material, or emotional incentives and rewards.

On the other hand, the second theory, revolving around ideas, contends that individuals are frequently motivated by deeply held commitments that are a part of identity. As Laraña et al. state about these ideational motivations:

“They are associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated social group; with the members’ image of themselves; and with new, socially constructed attributions about the meaning of everyday life.”30

While the role of religion as an idea has been somewhat neglected in recent social movement literature, Rinaldo argues that it can be a “crucial source of collective action” in its own right.31

Social movements can use these ideas by appealing to a perceived moral duty or obligation in order to mobilize collective action, irrespective of the incentives available to participants. They can achieve this through the use of frames, which represent “interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools” which both social movements and individuals make use of to understand and process the events and impressions of social life.32_{Snow et al. argue that the degree}

to which the framing efforts of a social movement resonate and align with the individual frames of potential constituents is critical to reaching its objectives. However temporary and vulnerable this alignment, it is argued to be just as crucial as the successful leveraging of physical resources.33

Yet framing efforts must not be conceived of as simply manipulating the message in order to draw in the most supporters. In fact, it is a reciprocal process. It is important to underline that the theory of ideas, unlike interests, emphasizes that people can undertake certain actions out of their own convictions rather than because of a response to structural pressures or in order to

29 _{Ibid, p. 9-10.}

30 _{Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds.), New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity}

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), p. 7.

31 _{Rachel Rinaldo, “The Islamic revival and women's political subjectivity in Indonesia”, Women's Studies}

International Forum 33 (2010), p. 422–431, therein 423.

32 _{Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, p. 15.}

33 _{David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,}

Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review 51:4 (1986), p. 464-481, therein 477-8.

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mechanically fulfill certain desires.

A practical way out of the debate over the importance of interests versus ideas in the motivation for participation in social movements is offered by Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. She contends that both interests and ideas are essential for explaining why people become involved in, sometimes personally risky, Islamic activism. However, the relative importance of each of these factors is not constant, but can increase and decrease over time. Someone can be drawn into a movement because of the tangible or psychological benefits ranging from increased access to goods and services to better marriage opportunities and from feelings of belonging and solidarity to peer pressure and social conformity. Yet she argues that the degree to which participants integrate into the movement and become radicalized by it depends on how much the framing efforts of the organization resonate with participants’ own pre-existing convictions. In this case, it was the framing of activism as a religious duty revolving around fulfilling a moral “obligation” for the cause of religious transformation that proved very successful.34_{However, a reverse development is}

also possible, whereby participants are motivated to become active because of a perceived alignment of frames and ideas, but that tangible and psychological incentives grow in importance over time to ensure that a participant remains in the movement.

This variance is not surprising, because Bayat reminds us that social movements are usually “internally fluid, fragmented and differentiated” when it comes to the characteristics of their members. Multiple types of motivations can exist not just within the same participants at the same time, but also within the organization as a whole, while also varying with time. Therefore, unity of action and commonality of are often achieved not just by a real understanding of shared interests of members of a social movement, but also by imagined solidarity.35_{With respect to FPI, this allows}

for the possibility that normal members do not actually perceive a gap between the organization’s professed goals and the supposedly selfish actions of its leaders. As long as the frame alignment between organization and participant is strong enough, internal divisions need not be a problem.

Dramatic pemuda 'fun'

Like many organizations and social movements, it can be assumed that FPI provides a sense of social belonging and identity to its members. More unique to the organization, however, is the opportunity for excitement and the perpetration of legitimized violence that it offers. To develop this point further, Oskar Verkaaik offers a useful framework in his description of a religious

34 _{Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Interests, Ideas, and Islamic Outreach in Egypt”, in: Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic}

Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 231-49, therein

231-2.

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nationalist group in Pakistan, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), which has fomented large-scale ethnic-religious violence. For instance, he highlights the importance of sacrifice of funds and effort for the movement’s project, which gives participants a sense of ownership of an egalitarian community. A true sacrifice requires passion, which is considered to be an “expression of the spiritual power to fight opponents who are physically or socially stronger and defeat them against all odds.”36_{More than the experience of sacrifice and passion, however, Verkaaik places the}

attraction of participation largely in the opportunities provided for what he calls “competitive fun”. This includes such experiences as spectacle, provocation, vandalism, and transgression, as carried out by young male peer groups. These masculine subcultures engage in “dangerous play” related to internal competitions for status and power. Such play includes “arson, looting, and the public humiliation of their victims” but is otherwise relatively limited in its cruelty. Yet, even though 'fun' is more important than a desire for a coherent ideology during these activities, Verkaaik still considers participation as a whole a “deadly serious business” in which identity and conviction remain important motivators.37

Turning to Indonesia, similar behavior as that displayed in Muhajir 'fun' is associated with the “masculine, militant and violent pemuda figure” which nowadays often refers to the poor urban underclasses. Yet Doree Lee has shown how the wild urban pemuda also became an important stereotype for university students during the anti-Suharto protests. In this way, students could shed themselves of the powerless feminine connotations of their previous campus activism and establish a connection with the rakyat, the people, they were claiming to represent.38_{Such behavior does not}

just draw in the lower classes, but has also become more acceptable for the middle classes and students, as long as it is on behalf of the community.

Several of the above-mentioned types of motivation come together in a concept described by Noorhaidi Hassan in his characterization of young Muslims who went to fight a military jihad, or struggle, in the Moluccas in the immediate post-Suharto period. While he initially explains their activism as a classic response to the structural pressures of modernization and economic grievance, he needs something more to determine why exactly they turned to active, violent resistance:

“Their acts can be conceptualized as drama, a sort of performative practice of youths to demonstrate, in the face of powerful opponents, a hitherto marginalized power and to challenge the hegemonic global order.”39 36 _{Oskar Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan (Princeton: Princeton University}

Press, 2004), p. 51-52

37 _{Ibid., p. 4-5 and 185-6.}

38 _{Doreen Lee, “Styling the Revolution: Masculinities, Youth and Street Politics in Jakarta, Indonesia”, Journal of}

Urban History 37 (2011), p. 933-51, therein 943-44.

39 _{Noorhaidi Hassan, “The Drama of Jihad: the Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia”, in: Asef Bayat and Linda}

Herrera (eds.), Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 49-62, therein 51.

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The value of Hassans concepts of drama is that he presents the jihadists not as passively reacting to sooth their grievances, but as actively attempting to claim dignity by negotiating different identities. These mechanisms can also be fruitfully transferred to the discussion of FPI motivations, because they highlight that much of the value of participation in the movement lies not in the background of structural causes or the expected benefits, but in the value of the 'dramatic act' itself that is performed by the stereotype of the pemuada and offers opportunities for 'fun'. We might thus combine these three concepts into the notion of ‘dramatic pemuda ‘fun’’.

Social Movement Theory, Vigilantism and the State

Finally, vigilantism itself offers one of the most important ideas for FPI members, because it is a cathartic response to perceived state failure. According to Tripp, Bies and Aquino, people who perceive an act of unfairness can take matters into their own hands against those they judge are responsible for that act for two reasons: either because of individual negative personal traits or more generally, because normal people are pushed into extreme reactions by provocations by others. These authors recognize that victims feel a genuine “need for justice following an injustice-laden offense.”40

Building on this, in Bayat’s definition of activism it already became clear that much activism is focused on trying to accomplish social change. It comes as no surprise that much of this effort is directed against the state. Islamic activism in Indonesia is no exception. In her study of expressions of piety of female Muslim activists in Indonesia, Rinaldo emphasizes that through their involvement in Islamic organizations, these pious women engage directly with the parts of the state in an attempt to change its “social norms and practices.”41_{It is argued here that the activism of vigilantes can be}

seen in the same way. Their action always contains an indirect message to the state that it is failing to take social or religious transgressions seriously. The connection between vigilantism and the state that was already apparent in the privatized imposition of the “state of exception” is thus echoed in relevant social movement theory.

Conclusion

To summarize, vigilantism can be understood as pre-meditated and voluntary violence against

40 _{Thomas M. Tripp, Robert J. Bies and Karl Aquino, “A Vigilante Model of Justice: Revenge, Reconciliation,}

Forgiveness, and Avoidance”, Social Justice Research 20(1) (2007), p. 9-30, therein 11-12. Although they write on vigilante action in the workplace, their model is presumed applicable to other situations.

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transgressions of criminal, social, or religious norms, with the aim of complementing an inadequate response from the state authorities against those perceived transgressions. The message of vigilantes is therefore aimed at the state as much as against their victims, and is intended to force the authorities to choose whether or not to implement a state of exception upon the vigilante's victims.

Vigilante groups are also a social movement and to understand what actually draws people into such activist groups, social movement theory provides a fruitful approach. Both interests or

ideas can serve as the prime motivation for participants and the balance between depends on the

specific characteristics of a group and can change over time. Moreover, this balance also depends on the degree to which frame alignment successfully leads to 'imagined solidarities' that holds a movement together.

Specific factors that might be relevant for FPI are the concept of 'dramatic pemuda 'fun'' and the cathartic experience of vigilantism as a message to the authorities. The first can be categorized as an idea because it is clearly predicated on the notion of individual agency and forms part of identity. The second is perhaps more an interest because it serves the desire for justice and redemption. However, successfully moving people to participate in vigilante activities depends on the particular frames that are chosen and here ideas such as a strong devotion to Islamic values might be equally, if not more relevant. This hypothesis will now be tested in the following chapters.

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4. Interests as Motivating and Mobilizating Factors

within Front Pembela Islam

The majority of both academic writers and public opponents of FPI, including the organization's victims place the emphasis on what I identified as interests in the last chapter. They generally see the motivation of the ordinary rank-and-file members as a combination of being manipulated by a cynical power-hungry leadership and the opportunities that FPI membership offers to relieve their socio-psychological grievances and fulfill their material needs. A particular variant of this assertion is that FPI members, especially the laskars of LPI, are active or reformed criminals who have found a new excuse for their rackets or are simply following their violent nature. In this chapter I will examine these stereotypes more closely and argue that they are often not correct or incomplete. One compelling argument is that membership provides a sense of identity, social belonging and opportunity for 'dramatic pemuda 'fun''. This is, however, in itself an insufficient explanation of why members specifically choose FPI.

4.1 Material and Socio-psychological interests for FPI Membership?

In the academic literature, various different combinations of incentives and motivations have been suggested. Many commentators were simplistic about the FPI motivations, taking a cynical approach and focusing on material rewards. Granted, these works are more concerned with the history, leadership and ideology of the movement and are therefore not very elaborate on the issue of the motivation of the FPI rank-and-file. Yet, as this thesis is intended to complement, update and correct this existing literature, it is worthwhile to provide a short overview.

For example, in 2002 Barry Desker characterized the group as consisting mainly of “Jakarta-based youths” and perhaps even being “little more than a protection racket”.42 _{According to Martin}

van Bruinessen in 2002, FPI was: “more like a mob for hire than a genuine Islamic movement” and seemed to serve mostly as political leverage tool for the Hadhrami elite.43_{Also in 2002, Robert} 42

Barry Desker, Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11 [Working Paper No. 33] (Singapore: Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 9.

43 _{Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research}

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Heffner acknowledged that the movement contains some Islamist idealists, but saw the rank-and-file mostly as “unemployed urban youth” attracted by the tough image of the group and motivated primarily by the promise of employment and payment.44_{In 2011, Chaider Bamualim described the}

LPI militia as consisting of “former preman, unemployed, homeless youth and otherwise disadvantaged people”, and interestingly also suggested that they were attracted to the “ritual and spiritual activities” that FPI offers.45

In an elaborate study, the pro-religious tolerance Setara Institute investigated several radical Islamic organizations in the greater Jakarta area. It mainly sees the socioeconomic frustration and grievances resulting from “modernization and urban development” as motivating factors in the recruitment process for these groups.46_{Within the movement, the Setara Institute distinguishes}

between four different groups, each with different motivations. The first two, the small groups of religious leaders and “intellectual” administrators are not my main concern here. However, the institute’s description of the third group of “lascar” [sic] of the LPI militia as originating from “low social class with low education background” is relevant. So is its description of the fourth group of ordinary members who are the “low class society such as small entrepreneur, low class employee” and driven by their slavish devotion to the religious authority of the habaib.47_{Jajang Jahroni}

suggests a similar division, also focusing on the supposed lack of education as a reason they are drawn into the movement, although he recognizes that not all of FPI's membership consists “entirely of uneducated or poor Muslims”.48

This emphasis on structural pressures and grievances such as supposed unemployment, disadvantaged youths, poverty, low social class and lack of social status is echoed by many of the public opponents and victims of FPI that I spoke with.49_{One person even went so far as to call the}

clashes between FPI and supposedly more well-to-do victims as “almost like a class struggle.”50

Another academic describe it as follows:

“These people don’t have a job or money. That’s why they join. The government should recognize them.

Ormas give them jobs, uniforms, dignity. Its rational for people who feel marginalized to join that kind of

organization.”51

44 _{Robert W. Heffner, Islam in Indonesia’s Political Future [Project Asia study] (Alexandria: Center for Strategic}

Studies, 2002), p. 15-16.

45 _{Bamualim, “Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, p. 211.} 46 _{Hasani and Naipospos (eds.), The Faces of Islam ‘Defenders’, p. 175-6.}

47 _{Ibid, p. 136-7.}

48 _{Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, p. 55.}

49 _{For instance, during interview with academic from Universitas Atma Jaya (RN20), 6 February 2013 and interview}

with Marlon, Chinese business student (RN37), 27 February 2013.

50 _{Interview with activist from Kontras (RN19), 5 February 2013.}

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The academics and others that I cite, clearly explain the motivations of the FPI rank-and-file predominantly by looking to material and socio-psychological interests: socially disadvantaged people, who supposedly make up the majority of FPI followers, are thought to rationally seek to improve their chances and social status through membership.

Social background of FPI members

However, I doubt this explanation because the results of my field work indicate that the social background of ordinary FPI members is much more varied and perhaps even a lot better on average than is often suggested. For instance, my impression is that the age distribution in FPI is much more balanced than has been suggested above. Across the range of activities and events organized by FPI that I observed, the attendants were a mix of all ages.52_{Furthermore, I have not}

met a single FPI member who was unemployed (or not a student). Examples ranged widely from lower class jobs like carpenters, gardeners, tailors, fishers, factory workers and chauffeurs, but also middle to higher class jobs like civil servants, university and school teachers, engineers, construction managers, retired engineers, shop owners and entrepreneurs. Not one of these professions or classes dominated.

The same goes for members’ educational background. The common assertion that ordinary FPI members often lack a proper education was vigorously denied by all the members with whom I discussed this. Many of them claimed to have at least a Sarjana 1 level degree, which is equivalent to a bachelor's. A former leader in FPI Makassar even claimed that at least 50% of the members there had at least an S2 level degree.53_{Most of the younger members I spoke with indicated they}

were enrolled in some kind of higher or professional education program. Members would also enthusiastically point to the fact that FPI even included some who held even higher degrees: “There are all types of people in FPI concerning education level: SMA, SMIC, teacher, doctor, master.”54

To be fair, I cannot be sure if all of those I talked to were employed full time, what sort of standard of living they were able to enjoy from their jobs, or what the quality of their education was. On one occasion, for instance, a lack of education and knowledge was cited to me as a reason why a group of LPI members wouldn't talk to me: “They are afraid that what they say will be interpreted in the wrong way. They are afraid of creating fitnah within FPI by uttering wrong

52 _{Though its representativeness can be doubted, this is also borne out by my overview of informants in the appendix.} 53 _{Interview with Habib Muchsin, senior member of FPI Makassar (RN61), 18 March 2013.}

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statements.”55

However, my point is that these comments do seem to suggest that the social background of ordinary FPI members is much more diverse than previously outlined. This is borne out by a survey that is, ironically, used by Fealy to emphasize the “lower-middle to poorer classes” background of many members. He mentions that apparently 35% of members of radical groups were suffering from unemployment or other socio-economic difficulties.56_{However, focusing on deprivation in this}

way means losing sight of the major 65% majority who are apparently employed and reasonably secure in socio-economic terms. It might therefore very well be that, just as in many terrorist organizations, there is actually no direct relationship between poverty, lack of education and opportunity as a root cause for involvement in radical groups. In fact, terrorists are more likely to come from middle or even upper class families and are likely to have received at least some education.57_{The idea here is that the poor are too busy sustaining themselves to become very}

involved in activism, but that the more well-to-do have the opportunity to become “self-appointed representatives” of their cause, in the name of the masses.

In any case, regardless of the actual situation, what is relevant is that FPI members and sympathizers, rather than acknowledging a greater degree of poverty or disadvantage in FPI, often emphasized that FPI members are “ordinary” and do not differ significantly from the rest of the Indonesian population.58_{Perhaps significant, this was most noticeable in Makassar and especially}

Pekanbaru, where the secretary general of FPI proudly remarked that: “It is a mix of all sorts of people. Rich, poor, ordinary. Everything.”59 _{This is important because if this is the reputation of FPI,}

then that means there is no particular reason to join FPI if one is looking for social advancement, employment or compensating for low social status or lack of education. In fact, this last statement from Pekanbaru indicates that one of the positive aspects of FPI membership is considered to be the social diversity of the organization and its transcendence of social boundaries.

4.2 Crossing Ethnic Boundaries

Another example of the experience of membership as one that transcends normal social boundaries,

55 _{Interview with FPI members at “maulid nabi Muhammad” celebration (RN35M), 22 February 2013.} 56 _{Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”, p. 110.}

57 _{Jitka Malečková, “Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality?”, in: Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism:}

Myths, reality and ways forward (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 33-43, therein 40-41.

58 _{Interview with Habib Muchsin, senior member of FPI Makassar (RN61), 18 March 2013, interview with Professor}

Zapul, Universitas Islam Riau (RN43), 29 February 2013, interview with rank-and-file FPI members at FPI headquarters, Makassar (RN66M), 20 March 2013 and interview with group of academics from Universitas Islam Riau (RN41), 29 February 2013.

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is its ethnic inclusiveness. Several FPI members described this to me as a positive ideological aspect of the organization.

To be sure, I have heard members make derogatory jokes about certain ethnicities, for instance that Betawi people and particularly members of Forum Betawi Rempug are not too bright.60_{Also, FPI membership certainly does not mean relinquishing one's ethnic identity. For}

instance, in Bekasi, Jakarta, I spoke with someone who consciously and proudly identified himself as Betawi, but was also anxious to become a member of the local FPI chapter that was going to be founded.61_{Another striking example of transcending ethnic boundaries is formed by Anton Medan,}

a Chinese former preman and Muslim convert who now runs his own “Chinese-style mosque” and supports FPI.62

Not only does the Muslim identity appear to be perfectly compatible with the ethnic identity of fellow members, or even taking precedence over it, but the ethnic inclusiveness of FPI is obviously a source of pride to many members. Listing the various different ethnicities present in the local chapter is a particular way of showing this. A former FPI leader in Makassar proudly assured me that: “They [the members] are from all ethnicities. From Bugis, Makassarese, Torajans, Mandar, Arab, Javan.”63_{Similarly, Pak Supriyadi, an LPI member in central Jakarta told me that: “In the}

hearts of members, there is sincerity, charitableness and wanting to do good. Within FPI there are bonds of friendship between all ethnicities, Jawa, Melayu, Batak, Betawi, Chinese, Dayak as well.”64_{In this example, the presence in FPI of ethnically Chinese converts was particularly}

important for my contact, who went on to emphasize that: “There is a universal tribe for all Indonesians, which comprises all ethnicities, nationalities and tribes. In here, there is no difference between rich and poor, between Melayu and Chinese. It’s normal.”65_{At this occasion, members}

even went so far as to locate a recent Chinese convert to Islam to proudly 'display' him to me as evidence of the inclusiveness of FPI.

For members, this emphasis on transcending ethnicity as a boundary might serve to underline the centrality of Islamic considerations as a motivation for FPI's program. The last quote by Pak Supriyadi also shows that, despite its resistance to the national ideology of Pancasila and its sense of connection to the global Islamic ummah, FPI operates in a distinctly national mental framework. Ethnic identity and division are an acknowledged presence in that framework, but one

60 _{Interview with Pak Sugito, FPI lawyer (RN76), January 2013.}

61 _{Interview with Betawi man, aspiring FPI member (RN30), 15 February 2013.}

62 _{Wai-weng Hew, “Expressing Chineseness, marketing Islam: the hybrid performance of Chinese Muslim preachers”,}

in: Siew-Min Sai and Chang-Yau Hoon (eds.), Chinese Indonesians Reassessed: History, Religion and Belonging (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 178-199, therein 190-192.

63 _{Interview with Habib Muchsin, senior member of FPI Makassar (RN61), 18 March 2013.} 64 _{Interview with Pak Supriyadi, LPI member Jakarta (RN38), 27 February 2013.}

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that is consciously overcome, thus proving that Islam is the answer to Indonesia's woes.

Tensions with the Chinese community have risen again lately because of FPI's resistance to the appointment of a Chinese Christian as governor of Jakarta. Yet this does not necessarily contradict the message that Islam and the bonds of FPI membership are so strong that they can even overcome the deep ethnic divisions between Chinese and other Indonesians.

4.3 Power Brokerage and Political Influence in FPI?

The assertion that FPI is involved in conspiracies, criminal activities and political power brokerage, or even that it has been created directly as a result of such activities, is so common that it is impossible to ignore. As I point out elsewhere, the position and genealogy of FPI within the wider framework of radical Islamism and the rise of violent non-state actors in Indonesia is the primary concern of most academic publications that are concerned with the organization. These usually acknowledge this supposedly political or criminal side of FPI. Even Jahroni allows for the possibility of cynical manipulation by the “senior comrades” or “dominated by the habaib factions” for political or financial purposes.66

In the public perception of FPI by many Indonesians critical of the organization, these matters also take center stage. The notion that FPI is being controlled by an “invisible hand” or is engaged in extortion, debt collection, business security, has established an “FPI kingdom” around its Petamburan headquarters or is using LPI as a tool for political bargaining is quite widespread.67

The accusation is that in a hypocritical way: “Many leaders use FPI as tool for advancement, influence and position.”68

There is no doubt that FPI has established itself as an important power broker that is willing and able to use its position for both 'the greater good' and its own benefit. Yet a problem with these assertions is that they are often not more than rumors that show considerable variation. I have heard references of “conspiracies” and “connections” between FPI and various factions of the Indonesian military, political parties, business elites and Indonesia's multiple police forces. Though they are impossible to disprove, we simply do not know how much truth there is to them. Indeed, Jahroni points to the superficial nature of those types of relations when he remarks that:

66 _{Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, p. 55-6.}

67 _{For instance, it came up during my interview with researcher from the Setara Institute (RN33), 18 February 2013,}

interview with Nuri, academic with Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia (RN16), 1 February 2013, interview with academic from Universitas Atma Jaya (RN20), 6 February 2013 and interview with activist from Kontras (RN19), 5 February 2013.

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many of its political patrons have abandoned it, the FPI still remains active in numerous places.”69

My primary concern in this thesis, however, is the motivation of the ordinary FPI members, not the relations between its leadership and other elites. There are several reasons to argue that most rank-and-file are unaware, or at least unconcerned with such possible power brokering by FPI's leaders.

The first is that the vast majority of FPI-related events and activities are concerned with religious services or lectures or are 'moral strikes' related to countering 'ordinary' maksiat or street-crime, sometimes controlled by other gangs. The number of activities which could perhaps be directed because of political or financial reasons is most likely relatively low and forms only a small component of the total repertoire.

Second, most of the assertions on this topic are based on research done in Jakarta. Even if political maneuvers and 'morality racketeering' happen there, this does not necessarily mean that they are also common in the many FPI chapters in other locations.

Third, as Laurens Bakker has pointed out, ormas engaged in power brokerage are not operating in a vacuum and have to take the support from their members and the rest of society into consideration. They therefore have an incentive to display 'good behavior' in the eyes of their followers.70_{Accusations of criminality or political games by opponents and outsiders can be}

deflected, but we can assume that the leadership, if it is really involved in such matters, has reasons to keep this hidden from the rank-and-file membership.

Therefore, even if members would be aware of the cynical reasons behind these particular activities, these activities and events would not necessarily be representative of the overall experience of membership. In fact, this is sometimes also acknowledged by some opponents, who, albeit with a negative spin, talk about “brainwashing” of the lower ranks by supplying “false information”.71

4.4 Premanisme and Criminal Rents as Motivations for FPI Members?

A particular form of the accusation of criminal activity by FPI that merits further discussion is the idea that FPI consists for a large part of former or active preman, thugs, who have found in Islam a new legitimation for their extortion activities.

69 _{Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, p. 51.} 70 _{Bakker, “Illegality for the general good?”, p. 84.}

71 _{Interview with Marlon, Chinese business student (RN37), 27 February 2013, but in an interview Nuri, academic}

Striking morals, moral strikes : vigilantism, Islamic activism and dramatic pemuda 'fun' in Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam