Unequal participation and the threat to democratic legitimacy: a possible solution in the principle of equal subjection

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Unequal participation and the threat to democratic legitimacy

A possible solution in the principle of Equal Subjection

Name: Maxim Burlini

Student Number: 12766062

Supervisor: Dr. A. Afsahi

Second Reader: Dr. G.R. Arlen

Date: 25-6-2020

Master Thesis Political Science

Specialization: Political Theory

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Abstract

Unequal participation poses a threat to the legitimacy of democratic states. In this thesis, I argue that legitimacy requires democratic states to provide citizens with the opportunity to participate in an equal manner and take measures against circumstances that prevent citizens from participating. Economic inequality prevents poorer citizens from participating. I identify two specific areas in which this happens. The first area is elections, where a dependency on financial resources prevents poorer citizens from successfully running for office. The second area is the media, where public opinion can be manipulated through captured media. By adapting the principle of Equal Subjection I propose three solutions to these problems: a system of public funding, a system of public media and a reserved timeslot on public and private media for political candidates. These solutions will limit the degree to which economic inequality decreases political participation.

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Introduction

Political participation is crucial for representative democracies. Without it, democracy is devoid of legitimacy and its guiding force (Dalton, 2008). Unfortunately, political participation rates within liberal democracies are decreasing. Furthermore, the existing participation in these democracies is distributed unequally; participation is progressively becoming concentrated among wealthier citizens (Bartels, 2016; Gilens, 2014; Solt, 2008). This is problematic as a democracy cannot be deemed legitimate if only a minority of eligible voters is represented (Engelen, 2007). Much scholarly attention has already been given to the problem of low rates of political participation within liberal democracies (Hay, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Schlozman, Brady & Verba, 2013; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999; Stoker, 2017; Whiteley, 2012) and different solutions have been proposed to deal with these lowered rates of political participation. Solutions range from moving away from a system of widespread participation and instead focussing more on representation (Parvin, 2018), to implementing a system of compulsory voting (Engelen, 2007).

In this thesis, I argue that using López-Guerra’s principle of Equal Subjection (2017) and applying it to legitimacy allows for solutions to be formed that can limit the negative effects that economic inequality has on participation. This should increase political participation. When we apply the principle of Equal Subjection to legitimacy, it states that economic resources may not be converted into political power. Based on this principle I propose the following solutions: a) a system of public funding, which makes public funds the exclusive source of all political expenditures and prohibits the use of private funds; b) a system of public media which

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5 implements the four points by Benson, Powers and Neff (2017)1 to reduce chances of media capture; and c) a reserved timeslot on public and private media, in which political candidates are allocated time to voice their positions.

This thesis is structured in the following way. In the first chapter, political participation is defined as participation in elections, either as a candidate or as a voter. Furthermore, Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democracy is explained and applied. I argue that democratic states derive their legitimacy from equal participation, while unequal participation threatens the legitimacy of democracy. I further argue that the existence of negative rights is insufficient to create equal participation, Instead democracy requires the existence of positive rights that enable citizens to participate in an equal manner. Therefore, democratic states need to provide citizens with the opportunity to participate and act against circumstances that prevent groups from participating, if they are to be legitimate.

In the second chapter, multiple theories concerning the effect of economic inequality on political participation are covered, before concluding that the relative power theory is most supported in academic literature. I show how economic inequality negatively affects political participation, as rich citizens can use their wealth to capture elections and the media. Ultimately, two problems are identified that democratic states must act against to remain legitimate. First, the dependency on large financial resources to successfully run for office, which prevents citizens, who lack these resources, to do so. Second, the manipulation of public opinion through captured media.

In the third chapter, López-Guerra’s principle of Equal Subjection (2017) is adapted and applied to legitimacy. Based on this principle I propose a system of public funding, a system of

1_{These points include funding through licencing fees; charters that mandate non-interference from government}

and the provision of quality programming for diverse audiences; independent oversight agencies and the creation of audience councils and surveys to strengthen links to diverse publics.

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6 public media and a reserved timeslot on public and private media for political candidates. I conclude that these solutions are not sufficient in solving the negative effects that economic inequality has on political participation, but that they will limit the degree to which economic inequality decreases political participation.

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Chapter 1 Participation

This chapter focusses on participation and its importance for democracy. I start by defining political participation and democracy, after which I show that, even in the most narrow conception of democracy, participation is necessary for the legitimation of democracy. I then show how negative rights, that result in formal participation, are not sufficient to provide legitimacy and that democratic states need to realize substantive participation if they are to be legitimate.

Defining political participation

Before we discuss political participation it is necessary to clarify how political participation is defined in this thesis. Political participation is quite a broad term and there is discussion on what it precisely entails. Generally, political participation denotes citizens’ voluntary activities that commonly relate to government, politics, or the state. These activities can in general terms be aimed at altering systematic patterns of social behaviour, attempts at creating social changes or altering the collective life of the polity. Even more broadly, participation can be referred to as a term for citizen power. These definitions of political participation create a whole list of activities that can arguably be seen as political participation. Though there is some contention as to what should and shouldn’t count as political participation, four points are generally seen as unproblematic. First, political participation should be seen as an activity. Second, it is done by people in their role as a citizen. Third, it should be voluntary and not coerced. The fourth point is that political participation is concerned with the political system or the policy process, and is unrestricted to specific phases or specific levels (van Deth, 2014). With these four points, the possible list of activities that can be seen as political participation has shrunk, but a clear categorization is still missing. Following van Deth’s thorough conceptualisation of political participation, we can categorize different acts of political participation into four operational concepts of political participation:

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 The minimalist deﬁnition of political participation-I

 The targeted deﬁnitions of political participation-II and –III

 The motivational deﬁnition of political participation-IV

Political participation-I is also described as conventional political participation, institutional political participation, elite-directed action and formal participation. It focuses on acts such as voting, budget forums, party membership and contacting politicians.

Political Participation-II includes participation that targets the government, the state, or politics in itself. It is also described as unconventional political participation, non-institutional political participation, protest, political action, contentious politics, elite-challenging action and everyday activism. Signing a petition, demonstrating, blocking streets, painting slogans and flash mobs are all activities that are typically associated with this concept of political participation.

Political Participation-III revolves around participation that is aimed at solving collective or community problems. It is also labelled as civic engagement, social participation, or community participation, and examples of associated activities are volunteering and reclaim-the-street-parties.

The last concept of political participation, political participation-IV covers all voluntary activities by citizens that are non-political but are used to express their political goals and intentions. Other names for this kind of political participation are expressive political participation, individualized collective action and personalized politics. The most commonly associated activities with this kind of political participation are political consumerism, buycotts, boycotts and public suicides (p.361).

The operational concept of political participation that is used for this thesis is the minimalist definition of political participation-I, which mostly focusses on voting, budget forums, party membership and contacting politicians. I recognize that other forms of political

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9 participation, such as demonstrations, boycotts and petitions are important and deserving of scholarly attention. Furthermore, the conceptions of political participation- II, III and IV have their merit and should not be overlooked when writing about political participation. However, the central focus of this thesis is about the unequal participation in elections, the capturing of media by elites and the effects of financial resources in politics. These phenomena are in essence all features of political participation-I. Thus, although other forms of political participation are indeed important, given the context of this thesis, featuring them would be redundant.

Defining democracy

Having defined political participation, the next step is to define democracy. There are different conceptions of democracy ranging from representative democracy, direct democracy and deliberative democracy (Smith, 2017). Representative democracy and direct democracy are in direct opposition with each other. Deliberative democracy and its methods, however, can be employed by decision makers in both systems of representative and direct democracy (Elster, 1998). For this thesis, I focus on a system of representative democracy. The reason is that this thesis specifically focusses on participation in elections, and representative democracy is a system in which general and regular elections are used by citizens to hold representatives accountable (Näsström, 2006). A system of direct democracy focusses on opportunities for direct participation through new areas that lay outside the traditional representative system (Teorell, 2006). This means that under a system of direct democracy voting in elections would be of less importance than under a system of representative democracy, which makes direct democracy unsuitable. Deliberative democracy is also unsuitable because less importance is placed on elections.

In sum, I acknowledge that there are other forms of democracy other than representative democracy, but since the focus of this thesis is specifically aimed at participation in elections,

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10 I define democracy in this thesis as a representative democracy. I further limit political participation to solely the participation in elections, either as a candidate or as a voter, since this is the primary way for citizens to make their views known within a representative democracy. This holds especially true within narrow conceptions of democracy that do not allow for any other political participation other than electoral participation such as Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy.

Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy and legitimacy

With political participation defined as the minimalist definition of political participation-I and the system of democracy defined as representative democracy, I show the function that political participation has within a representative democracy, namely the providence of legitimacy through periodical elections. I make use of Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy. In this doctrine, democracy essentially boils down to “ free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter, 2013 p.271). The reason for using such a narrow conception of democracy is to show that, even within the barest conception of democracy, political participation is required to provide legitimacy to the democratic system.

Schumpeter defined democracy in the following way:

Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political- legislative and administrative-decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions. (Schumpeter, 2013 p.242)

Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy centres around the idea of competition between leaders for votes. Democracy is merely an institutional arrangement to put certain individuals in charge based on the result of them having successfully pursued the people’s vote. Democratic life is nothing more than rival political leaders who are assembled in parties struggling against each other for the mandate to rule. Citizens merely choose and authorize their government to act on

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11 their behalf. In Schumpeter’s system, the voter accepts or refuses one leader over another. This is done through elections, whereby the competitive struggle for votes decides the leader. This leader then provides the order and ability to manage the complexity of politics. The electorate’s vote serves as a means to provide legitimacy for the political actions persuaded by the leader (Held, 2006). Citizens should not participate in any other way than electing a politician.

The voters outside of parliament must respect the division of labor between themselves and the politicians they elect. They must not withdraw confidence too easily between elections and they must understand that, once they have elected an individual, political action is his business and not theirs. (Schumpeter, 2013 p.295).

Citizens shouldn’t instruct their representatives, nor try to influence their judgement. Democracy is most effective when leaders make public policy without being subjected to back-seat driving (Schumpeter, 2013).

In Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy, the only form of political participation open to citizens is the periodical vote in elections. This conception of political participation is even more restrictive than the operational definition of political participation-I, which also focusses on contacting politicians besides voting in elections. This doctrine of democracy is very elite driven, as it is predicated on keeping political participation at a minimum. Schumpeter’s democracy entails “a state in which everyone is, in principle, free to compete for political leadership. The conditions of such participation are freedom of discussion and speech” (Held, 2006 p.156).

For this thesis, I make use of Schumpeter’s conception of democracy. Schumpeter’s doctrine has been criticized by multiple scholars (O'Toole, 1977; Gerry, 2009) for a variety of reasons which go beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important to take away from Schumpeter’s doctrine of democracy his notion of democracy as a procedural method and elections serving as a means to legitimize democracy. In other words, the only thing that

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12 political participation is good for in Schumpeter’s view is providing legitimacy to the democratic system. Similarly, Glasius (2018) states that the core concept of democracy is the accountability of rulers to the demos. This translates to the existence of election by which citizens can hold incumbent rulers accountable by voting them out of office. Elections within representative democracy fulfil the function of holding rulers accountable to the demos, or as Schmitter and Karl (1991) state: “modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable in the public realm, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991 p.76). Elections and the act of electing leaders provide legitimacy to democracy precisely because they serve as an instrument to hold rulers accountable.

Participation and effective participation

In Schumpeter’s view of democracy, everyone is free to compete for political leadership, at least in principle. The conditions that Schumpeter places are the existence of freedom of discussion and speech (Schumpeter, 2013). The keyword here is in principle. Regardless of the situation in reality, what matters is that a state provides freedom of discussion and speech for it to be considered democratic. This is seen as inadequate by Held (2006) who states that a lack of freedom of discussion and speech is not what limits people to stand for political office. Rather, it is a lack of necessary resources such as time, skill and capital. Many groups do not have the means to compete against those who control most of the economic resources. Freedom of discussion and speech, though necessary, are not sufficient for ensuring equal participation. Held notes this by writing the following:

Schumpeter did not examine the vicious circles of non-participation, although even he acknowledged that without scope for political initiative people are likely to become apathetic even in the face of all the information needed for active involvement. Effective participation

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13 depends both upon political will and upon having the actual capacity (the resources, skills and knowledge) to pursue different courses of action. (Held, 2006 p.156)

Here we see that there is contention between merely having the right to participate and actually having the opportunity to participate, which Held and Dahl call effective participation.

For Dahl, the existence of free and fair elections is not enough. He lists five criteria that need to be met to be considered fully democratic. These criteria are: “1. Effective participation 2. Equality in voting 3. Gaining enlightened understanding 4. Exercising final control over the agenda 5. Inclusion of adults” (Dahl, 1998 p.38). Effective participation means that all citizens must be able to make their views known as to what the policy should be. Equality in voting entails that every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote. Furthermore, all votes need to count as equal. Gaining enlightened understanding consists of equal and effective opportunities to learn about alternative policies and their possible consequences. Exercising final control over the agenda ensures that citizens ultimately decide which matters are placed on the agenda. Inclusion holds the following: “the citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons subject to the laws of that state except transients and person proved to be incapable of caring for them” (Dahl, 1998 p.78). Note how Dahl specifies that citizens must have an equal and effective opportunity, meaning that the negative right to be able to vote itself is not adequate. Dahl elaborates on this point in the following way:

In order for citizens to exercise their right to vote effectively, democratic political systems must impose duties on officials and on all other citizens to respect and enforce the right to an equal vote, and to ensure that all citizens have an adequate opportunity to vote.

(Dahl, 2006 p.51-52)

In short, democratic states should ensure that citizens not only have the right to vote but that they are, to an equal degree, able to cast their votes. This would mean that democratic states should actively enable citizens to vote and take measures against phenomena that obstruct

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14 citizens from voting or create unequal participation in elections between groups. If many citizens abstain from participation, the less representative the electoral results become. This creates an unequal influence which violates the value of political equality. A democracy cannot be deemed legitimate if only a minority of eligible voters is represented (Engelen 2007).

Dangers to legitimacy

From the previous section, it becomes clear that political participation is required within democracies since they provide legitimacy. Within a representative democracy, elections serve as a way to choose rulers and to hold them accountable. This provides legitimacy. A minimalist conception of democracy, such as Schumpeter’s, requires only that there are free and fair elections, in which everyone has a right to participate (Schumpeter, 2013). Rights such as freedom of speech and association, and the right to vote can be considered negative rights, as the state is prohibited to interfere with them (Fried, 1978). Held (2006) and Dahl (1998; 2006) argue that the existence of these rights is not enough since some groups are not able to use these rights. Instead, they argue for effective participation, meaning that citizens should not only have these rights but must also be able to use them. This can be seen as a call for positive rights, as a positive right is a claim to something (Fried, 1978). The clash between participation and effective participation can thus be seen as a clash between negative rights and positive rights, or a clash between formal participation and substantive participation.

While I take a minimalist definition of participation, I am far from suggesting that simple right or access to voting is sufficient to ensure that this minimalist definition is upheld. The existence of negative rights is not sufficient to create equal participation and democratic states have a responsibility to actively enable its citizens to participate, lest they lose their legitimacy. This means that democratic states should also deal with any circumstances than actively obstruct or prevent certain groups from participating. Negative rights are insufficient in themselves for they merely provide the possibility to participate. It is necessary to have the

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15 possibility to participate, however, as Held pointed out, this does not provide the opportunity to participate. Participation requires certain resources such as time, skill and capital, which are unequally distributed (Dahl, 1998). Certain groups that have these resources can thus participate more easily than other groups who do not have the resources to participate. This is problematic since democracy derives its legitimacy from participation. Democratic states lose their legitimacy if large groups are unable to use their negative right to participate, while only a minority can use this right. If a democratic state is to retain its legitimacy it has to a) go beyond the negative right that provides citizens with the possibility to participate and ensure that citizens have equal opportunity to participate and b) take measures against circumstances that prevent citizens from participating.

Schematically my argument is as follows:

1. Democratic states derive their legitimacy from equal participation 2. Democracy allows for participation through negative rights

3. Negative rights are insufficient since participation also requires certain resources which are distributed unequally

4. As a result, certain groups are unable to participate while other groups are 5. Unequal participation threatens the legitimacy of democracy

6. Democratic states are illegitimate unless they a) provide citizens with the opportunity to participate in an equal manner and b) take measures against circumstances that prevent citizens from participating

In short, democracy requires the existence of positive rights that enable citizens to participate in an equal manner, if it is to be legitimate. Democratic states need to provide citizens with the opportunity to participate and act against circumstances that prevent groups from participating. The next chapter concerns itself with the relationship between economic inequality and unequal

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16 participation, and how economic inequality can lead to the capturing of elections and the media by wealthy elites.

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Chapter 2 Economic Inequality

This chapter focusses on why economic inequality matters for political participation. I start by analysing the three main theories on economic inequality and its effect on political participation. Then, I look at how economic inequality affects elections and election campaigns, and how it lowers political participation. Finally, I show how economic inequality makes the media more susceptible to capture and how this also negatively affects political participation.

Inequality and participation

There are multiple theories as to what the effects of economic inequality are on political participation. The three main theories are the relative power theory, the conflict theory and the resource theory. (Solt, 2008; Cicatiello, Ercolano, & Gaeta, 2015).

According to the relative power theory (Goodin & Dryzek, 1980), economic inequalities create an unequal concentration of political power. This is because money is a political resource, it can be used to influence others. Therefore, if wealth is more concentrated, meaning that there are more economic inequalities, then power will also be more concentrated. This means that rich individuals will have relatively more power than poor individuals. The political landscape will be shaped by this power imbalance between the rich and poor through three factors. First, the larger power advantage of richer individuals, that results from higher levels of economic inequality, will make them more likely to win political struggles.2 Second, through the use of money, rich citizens can amplify their position on some issues. This drowns out the voices of poorer citizens preventing certain issues to be raised and discussed. And third, by consistently losing political contests and being prevented from having their positions heard poorer citizens are convinced that there is no point in participating in the political process (Solt, 2008). The

2_{Since money is considered a political resource those who have more money possess more political power. An}

example of winning a political struggle through power imbalances created by economic inequalities is ensuring favourable legislation is passed through the use of lobbying. For more information on the rich and their ability to win political struggles, see Rueschemeyer (2004).

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18 declined participation of poor citizens will also make rich citizens participate less since they no longer have to defend their interest from poorer citizens. However, to some extent, their conflict with each other will continue to motivate rich citizens to participate (Schattschneider, 1960). Accordingly, economic inequality should decrease the political participation of rich and poor citizens alike, though the impact on the participation of poor citizens is much bigger (Solt, 2008).

In contrast, the conflict theory (Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Brady, 2004) sees economic inequality as positive for participation. Higher levels of economic inequality would create a divide in political preferences, which results in debates on what policy should be followed. This would increase political participation. For the poor, high levels of economic inequality would make redistributive policies more appealing, prompting them to participate. Meanwhile, high levels of economic inequality would make rich citizens more opposed to redistribution policies and more in favour of policies that reduce redistribution. Higher levels of inequality should thus incentivise both rich and poor citizens to participate in the political process, increasing political participation in general. In reverse, low levels of economic inequality would create fewer incentives for both groups to participate.

The resource theory (Brady, Verba, & Lehman Schlozman, 1995) maintains that resources such as time, skill and money are powerful predictors of political participation. Citizens must invest in these resources to participate. Individuals are expected to make decisions to participate in the same manner that they make decisions to consume other goods. Individuals will thus only participate if they are willing to pay the costs that participation entails. Since money is an important predictor of political participation, economic inequality should yield unequal participation. As Solt describes:

According to the resource theory, then, inequality should affect political engagement because for any given average income, higher levels of inequality mean fewer resources with

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19 which to pay the costs of engagement for a country’s poorer citizens and more such resources for its richer citizens. (Solt, 2008 p,50)

Contrarily to the previous two theories, the resource theory only focusses on the effects of economic inequality for citizens as individuals. It does not look at the societal impact that economic inequality has on the shaping of politics (Solt, 2008).

Of the three theories on political participation, both the relative power theory and resource theory assert that economic inequality decreases political participation. The relative power theory claims that the unequal wealth creates an unequal concentration of political power, which manifests itself in all three dimensions of power of Lukes (2005). By prevailing in open conflict, preventing certain issues to be raised and convincing the poorer citizens that there is no point in participating in the political process (Solt, 2008). For the resource theory economic inequality limits the amount of resources that are available for poorer citizens, meaning that political participation is more costly for them, which decreases the likelihood of them participating (Brady et al., 2005). Only the conflict theory sees economic inequality as positive for political participation. High levels of economic inequality would make redistributive policies more appealing for poorer citizens, prompting them to participate. Meanwhile, high levels of economic inequality would make rich citizens more opposed to redistribution policies and more in favour of policies that reduce redistribution. Higher levels of inequality thereby incentivise both rich and poor citizens to participate in the political process, increasing political participation (Meltzer et al., 2004).

Within the literature, there is ample evidence that economic inequality decreases political participation. Cicatiello et al. (2015) found that economic inequality reinforces the positive effect that income has on conventional political participation. Accordingly, wealthy citizens are more likely to vote than relatively poor citizens. From a multilevel analysis, Solt (2008) discovered that economic inequality strongly lowers interest in politics, discussion of

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20 politics and participation in elections among all but the wealthiest citizens. These results are supportive of the relative power theory. Anderson and Beramendi (2008) note that economic inequality reduces electoral participation and that economic inequality also affects participation overall. “Economic inequality at the lower end reduces participation among low-income individuals because it deprives them of resources, higher inequalities at the upper end reduce participation by creating disincentives for very rich people to get involved” (Anderson & Beramendi, 2008 p. 303). These findings also seem consistent with the relative power theory. Filetti (2016) concludes that economic inequality always lowers political participation and that it typically widens the participatory gap between the rich and poor. Additionally, The findings of Solt and Anderson and Beramendi are confirmed by Persson (2010), who also states that inequality decreases participation. In short, economic inequality is shown to limit political participation, especially for relatively poorer citizens. This causes a discrepancy between the participation rates of richer and poorer citizens.

Unequal participation becomes a threat to the legitimacy of democracy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, having the legal right to political participation is not sufficient. Democratic states should go beyond providing formal participation and realize substantive participation. This means that democratic states should take measures against circumstances that prevent citizens from participating if they are to remain legitimate. The relative power theory states that losing political contests and being prevented from having their positions heard convince poorer citizens that there is no point in participating in the political process. Participation is thus lowered due to the ability that rich citizens have to convert economic resources into political power. Briefly put, economic inequality lowers political participation and democratic states need to take measures against it if they are to remain legitimate.

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Inequality and elections

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in a representative democracy, citizen’s primary mode of participation is through voting in elections or through running as a candidate within elections. The problem with unequal participation in terms of voting is already highlighted, but economic inequality also obstructs poorer citizens in successfully running for office. This is because poorer citizens do not have the financial resources to run an election campaign, which is necessary for candidates to successfully run for office and get elected (Jacobson, 1978; Bartels, Heclo & Hero, 2005).

Election campaigns serve two functions. First, they allow citizens to successfully run for office. However, economic inequalities prevent poorer citizens from successfully running for office, as they lack sufficient resources to fund their campaign.

Candidates who decide to run for office and partake in elections require enormous amounts of funds for their electoral campaign. Travel expenses, hiring of staff, conducting polls and buying advertisements are examples of the high costs of election campaigns. Candidates who run for office either finance themselves, which only a minority of wealthy citizens have the resources for and an even smaller minority is willing to use their resources, or are financed by others (Fiss, 1997). For potential candidates, money is an obstacle that one needs to overcome to contend for office (Hiebert, 1998). The large amount of funds that are needed for an electoral campaign creates inequalities between those who can finance themselves and those who need contributors, since “a candidate is likely to adopt policies that are especially responsive to the desires and interests of the persons who are spending the money or who are in a position to spend the money to further the candidacy” (Fiss, 1997 p.2478). This holds also true if the candidate has no explicit or implicit quid pro quo relationship with its contributor. As a result, candidates are generally less responsive to relatively poorer citizens as they “ cannot help them purchase the advertising and other media access that are essential to winning the

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22 election” (Fiss, 1997 p.2478).

An example from the U.S. shows that big financial resources are necessary, but not sufficient, for getting elected to the House of Representatives. This is even more so the case for challengers (Jacobson, 1978; Bartels et al., 2005). It is furthermore reasonable to expect that senatorial and presidential candidates are even more dependent on financial resources, as these election campaigns are even more expensive (Winters & Page, 2009). Hence, the candidates from which citizens can vote for in elections are already more likely to pursue the interests of the wealthy because the wealthy, through their resources, can fund the expensive election campaign which is necessary for candidates to get elected. Candidates who finance themselves are not dependent on wealthy contributors, yet are wealthy themselves and as such can be expected to have similar interests.

The second function of election campaigns is “ to inform voters about the choices before them and to mobilize citizen participation” (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell & Semetko, 1999 p.20). In other words, election campaigns allow citizens to become more informed, which should make them more likely to participate through voting.3

However, economic inequality makes it easier for some to become mobilized from election campaigns, which increases unequal participation. This can be illustrated with the following thought experiment: imagine two persons, one is a single mother working two jobs just to make ends meet. The other person is a married man, who is the heir to a multi-billion enterprise and is financially independent. Both have the opportunity to become informed from election campaigns, which will make it more likely for either one to go and vote. However, it is reasonable to assume that the single mother who is struggling to survive, will not be able to watch debates, attend rallies and read up on the policy plans of various candidates. Working

3_{Unfortunately, a detailed discussion on why informed citizens are more likely to vote and the potential use of}

heuristics to make citizens more informed is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a more detailed discussion, I refer the reader to the following authors: Bernhard & Freeder (2020), Dancey & Sheagley (2013), Fiske & Taylor (2008), Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder & Rich (2000) and Lau & Redlawsk (2001).

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23 two jobs, raising a child and living paycheck to paycheck, she simply does not have the time, energy, or other resources to engage with election campaigns. In contrast, the financially independent man would have the time, energy and other resources to engage with the election campaign. He may also have children to raise but does not need to work two jobs or even work at all to sustain himself. Furthermore, he has the resources to hire a nanny and a cleaner if need be, which will give him the necessary free time to engage with election campaigns. Thus, the financially independent man can watch debates, attend rallies and read up on policy plans, whereas the single mother, due to her financial circumstances, is unlikely to. From this thought experiment, it becomes clear poorer citizens, compared to richer citizens, are less likely to become mobilized from elections campaigns, which reduces the overall political participation.

There are also democratic states that publicly fund candidates and their campaigns to some degree. This would mitigate the effects described above, yet only to the extent that private financing of campaigns is allowed. If there are no limits imposed on the amount of private financing that candidates are allowed to receive while receiving public funds, then economic inequality would still affect election campaigns in the same way. This is also the case if only the candidates who receive public funds are forbidden to receive additional private financing. The candidate who has relatively more access to wealth would still be in a better position to win, as he can spend more money on advertising and other media access, which is essential to winning elections. Candidates in democratic states that partly publicly fund campaigns would thus be just as likely to be responsive to the desires and interests of wealthy contributors as in states without publicly funded campaigns. If a system of publicly funded campaigns is to be effective, it must be the exclusive source of all political expenditures and should be mandatory for all candidates (Fiss, 1997).

In sum, election campaigns are necessary to successfully run for office. These campaigns require a lot of resources. Economic inequality makes it so that a small wealthy

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24 minority has the required resources, while others are dependent on contributors. Candidates are more responsive to the desires of their wealthy contributors and less to the desires of poorer citizens, who do not have the resources to fund their campaigns. Furthermore, election campaigns mobilize richer citizens more than poorer citizens, as richer citizens are more able to engage in election campaigns, which make them more informed and more likely to vote. As a result of economic inequality, poorer citizens are obstructed from participating in elections, both as voters and as candidates. Due to the dependency on wealth, both for being able to successfully run for office and for being able to become mobilized by election campaigns, the rich can capture elections. This is something democratic states have to take measures against.

Inequality and media

Another effect of economic inequality is the so-called capturing of the media, whereby rich individuals exert influence over media outlets, resulting in biased news coverage. Objective coverage is vital for democracy because messages that are communicated by mass media have a huge impact on collective decision-making. The media allows voters to become more informed, thereby increasing the voter’s ability to make an intelligent choice. This is endangered by special interest groups such as wealthy citizens that use the media to manipulate public opinion (Corneo, 2006; Petrova, 2008).

The media has a big role in shaping people’s opinions. Zaller (1992) writes how mass opinion is largely shaped by exposure to elite discourses through the media. Citizens construct opinions following elite discourses. Voters themselves have little control over what information is available to them and how it is presented to them. This is determined by the media through these elite discourses.4 The important role that media have in shaping people’s preferences makes it appealing, for those who have the resources, to use the media to promote their preferences. According to Prat (2018) “owners may manipulate news for their own goals” (Prat,

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25 2018 p.1750).5

Indeed, the previous section already showed how rich citizens can dictate their preferred issues on the political agenda and prevent certain issues to be raised and discussed (Solt, 2008; Cicatiello et al., 2015). It also showed how media access and advertising are essential to winning elections (Fiss, 1997). Higher levels of economic inequality make the capturing of media more likely as “it provides the media with a patron who has much to benefit from manipulating the electorate and is willing to pay much for this” (Corneo, 2006 p.48). Furthermore, Media outlets are less profitable than they once were. This increases the likelihood that rich individuals who own media outlets own them for their political agenda, rather than for economic motives (Nielsen, 2017).

The capturing of the media through economic inequality is problematic as it allows a small group to shape public opinion. Through the use of this third face of power, which is the shaping of people their understanding of the world, politics, and their place in them (Lukes, 2005), poorer citizens will participate less as they will have internalized that their situation is natural and that there is consequently little point in participating (Solt, 2008; Cicatiello et al., 2015).

In short, mass opinion is largely shaped by exposure to elite discourses through the media. Economic inequality increases the likelihood that the media is captured. Privately owned media outlets can be expected to pursue the interest of their wealthy owners or at least not go against the interest of their owner, especially since reduced profitability makes it more likely that the owner owns the media outlet for political motives rather than economic motives. The manipulation of public opinion, through captured media, will make poorer citizens believe that

5_{See also Baron (2006), Besley & Prat (2006), Duggan & Martinelli (2011), Anderson & McLaren (2012), and}

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26 their situation is natural. As a result, their participation will drop, since they no longer see any point in it.

Towards Equal Subjection

Economic inequality threatens the legitimacy of democracy as it actively prevents poorer citizens from participating. According to the relative power theory, losing political contests and being prevented from having their positions heard, convince poorer citizens that there is no point in participating in the political process. Participation is thus lowered due to the ability that rich citizens have to convert economic resources into political power. In other words, economic inequality negatively affects political participation because rich citizens can use their wealth to capture elections and the media. As argued in the previous chapter, democratic states need to go beyond formal participation and ensure substantive participation. This means that democratic states need to act against circumstances that actively prevent participation if they are to be legitimate. In this case, democratic states should take measures against the lowered participation that is caused by economic inequality, if they are to remain legitimate.

In more detail, this means that measures have to be taken against two specific phenomena. First, measures need to be taken against the dependency on large financial resources to successfully run for office, which prevents citizens who lack these resources to successfully run for office. Second, measures should be taken against the manipulation of public opinion through captured media. This also relates to the role that media have within election campaigns.

The next chapter examines the principle of Equal Subjection by López-Guerra to assess if an application of it is sufficient in providing the required measures.

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Chapter 3 Equal Subjection

In this chapter, I propose solutions to the negative effect that economic inequality has on political participation. I start by adapting the principle of Equal Subjection to apply to legitimacy. This adaptation states thateconomic resources may not be converted into political power. Using this principle, I offer multiple solutions to limit the conversion of economic resources into political power. To combat the dependency on financial resources in elections, which prevent poorer citizens from running, I propose a system of public funding which makes public funds the exclusive source of all political expenditures and prohibits the use of private funds. To decrease the likelihood of media capture and subsequent manipulation of public opinion I propose a system of public media which implements the four points of Benson et al. (2017), along with a reserved timeslot in which political candidates are allocated time to voice their positions.

Principles of Equal Subjection

López-Guerra (2017) notes that “public ofﬁcials have a duty of justice to act for the greatest beneﬁt of the governed—to maximally serve their interests—in all matters that concern their position as subjects” (López-Guerra, 2017 p.331). This is described as a first-order duty. In addition, public officials have a second-order duty, which requires them to demonstrate, as much as possible, that their exercise of power has been proper. According to López-Guerra, the optimal fulfilment of this second-order duty necessitates Equal Subjection. Therefore, Equal Subjection is pro tanto required by justice.

Equal Subjection is defined by López-Guerra in the following way:

Former and incumbent rulers may not obtain private, public, or foreign substitutes for the basic goods that justice requires the state to provide—those who have exercised political power, in other words, ought to become full and equal members of the public as users or

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28 consumers of the goods that constitute the state’s raison d’être. (López-Guerra, 2017 p.323-324)

In other words, Equal Subjection forces high public officials to use the basic goods that the state provides, rather than acquiring these goods from the market. As a result, high public officials are not only providers of these basic goods, but also passive recipients. An example of Equal Subjection is requiring high public officials to attend public hospitals when sick, instead of going to private clinics, assuming that the state in this example has the obligation to provide healthcare to its citizens.

Equal Subjection does not mean that politicians have to make use of public services if there is no need for them. They are not required to receive some random treatment from a public hospital if they do not need this treatment. Furthermore, “the obligation to be a full and equal member of the public is not an obligation to be equally affected” (López-Guerra, 2017 p.326).

Equal subjection can be realized in multiple ways. López-Guerra argues for an institutionalization through a scheme of Piloting Responsibility. This scheme entails that:

As a condition for the occupancy of high public ofﬁce, public ofﬁcials and their dependents, for the duration of their term and some time after, will be required to reside within the polity, and if they seek out a basic service, they would be randomly appointed to a public provider. (López-Guerra, 2017 p.327)

The implementation of this scheme would not violate any rights that the politician has, for it is similar to other measures that are already imposed on politicians to prevent potential conflicts of interests.6 Furthermore, the politician is not forced to be a politician. If he decides that the requirements for the occupancy of public ofﬁce are not to his liking, then he can just seek another occupation.

6_{These measures include laws that forbid politicians to work in certain occupations, for a certain amount of}

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29 Under Equal Subjection, high public officials would effectively be in the same boat as regular citizens since both would be dependent on the basic goods that the state provides and both would be affected if these goods were insufficient. As a result, high public officials can provide citizens with good, nonsubstitutable (albeit inconclusive) evidence that their exercise of power has been proper, precisely because these public officials throw their lot in with regular citizens. This means that they would suffer the same ills that their improper exercise of power would cause.

In short, public ofﬁcials have a first-order duty of justice to act for the beneﬁt of the governed. Furthermore, they have a second-order duty, which requires them to demonstrate, as much as possible, that their exercise of power has been proper. the principle of Equal Subjection demands that those who exercise political power at the highest level, become users of the basic goods that the state is required to provide. By becoming equal subjects, high public officials are prohibited from acquiring these goods elsewhere. As a result, they share in the suffering of any mismanaging of the providence of these basic goods and this gives citizens good, nonsubstitutable (albeit inconclusive) evidence that their exercise of power has been proper.

Operationalization of Equal Subjection

The principle of Equal Subjection, as created by López-Guerra, concerns itself with justice. This thesis concerns itself with legitimacy, rather than justice. Consequently, to apply the principle of Equal Subjection to legitimacy, it first needs to be operationalized.

The essence of Equal Subjection is the limitation that is put on former and incumbent rulers to not obtain substitutes for the basic goods that justice demands the state to provide. Being forced to use the same basic goods that they are required to provide turns them into full and equal members of the public. By becoming full and equal members of the public, high public officials can provide good, nonsubstitutable (albeit inconclusive) evidence that their exercise of power has been proper, which is vital in fulfilling their second-order duty of justice.

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30 Legitimacy, as framed in this thesis, is achieved by democratic states through participation. Legitimacy demands that democratic states provide its citizens with equal opportunity to participate. As mentioned in the first chapter, this formal right is not enough, since participation also requires certain resources which are distributed unequally throughout society. Democratic states lose their legitimacy if large groups are unable to use the negative right to participate while only a minority is can use this right. Consequently, legitimacy demands that democratic states provide its citizens with the substantive right to participate and act against circumstances that prevent groups from participating.

Equal Subjection aids in fulfilling the second-order duty of justice, which is the justification that power has been exercised properly. When applied to legitimacy, Equal Subjection should aid in ensuring that certain groups are not prevented from participating. As noted in the previous chapter, economic inequalities prevent poorer citizens from participating. Therefore, Equal Subjection should prevent economic resources to matter in politics. In other words, Equal Subjection should keep money out of politics. When applied to legitimacy, the principle of Equal Subjection becomes the following: economic resources may not be converted into political power.

In the next section, I apply this operationalization of the principle of Equal Subjection and see how this principle allows for solutions for the two problems that are identified in the previous chapter. These problems are the dependency on large financial resources that prevent poorer citizens from successfully running for office and the manipulation of public opinion through captured media.

Elections

The previous chapter highlights a problematic feature of elections, that allow economic inequality to affect political participation. This is the dependency on large financial resources to successfully run for office and which prevent citizens who lack these resources to

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31 successfully run for office.

If we apply the modified principle of Equal Subjection, that economic resources may not be converted into political power, then some solutions can be thought of that fulfil this principle and prevent economic inequality to affect political participation. One solution that I propose is a system of public funding for electoral candidates. This system would make public funds the exclusive source of all political expenditures and prohibits the use of private funds. Under this system, all candidates will receive a certain amount of funds to cover their election campaigns. Candidates are free to use their funding in whatever manner they deem most appropriate but are forbidden to supplement it with additional private funding. Concretely, this means that rich citizens are no longer able to use their wealth to fund themselves or fund candidates. The equal funds that candidates will receive under this system mean that access to large financial resources would no longer be a requirement for candidates to successfully run for office.

This system would prevent economic resources to be converted into political power. It would also succeed in preventing economic inequality to limit the participation of poorer citizens as candidates since they would no longer need to overcome the obstacle of money to successfully contend for office. While election campaigns would still be necessary to successfully run for office, this system of public funding would ensure that all potential candidates have the required financial resources.

This system of public funding does have some kinks that need to be ironed out. First, the mandatory public funding of candidates could prove to be a big strain on the budget of the state. Though it is likely that, under this system of public funding, the total amount of money spent in elections would decrease. This is because it would no longer be possible for a candidate, to spend a large amount of financial resources to increase his chances of winning. However, it is still very much possible that this system of public funding will be a big strain on the budget

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32 of the state. Unfortunately, this is unavoidable and should be seen as a price that has to be paid by democratic states to ensure that no one is prevented from successfully running for office.

Another problem is that “the legislature must establish criteria for allocating the funds, determining which candidates are qualified to receive funds and how much each should receive” (Fiss, 1997 p.2474). As a result, bigger candidates might receive more funds than smaller candidates, which can lock in a status-quo. Candidates are furthermore dependent on criteria set by the state that will decide if they can run. Though this proposed solution sketches the contours of this system of public funding, the legislature must work out the finer details such as the criteria for candidates and the amounts of funds that they will receive. As a result, citizens might still be prevented from running under this system of public funding. However, citizens would not be prevented from running due to a lack of financial resources. Instead, citizens would be prevented based on criteria that were established by democratically elected officials and which can be amended by democratically elected officials.

Last, even though poorer citizens would no longer be prevented from running as a candidate, this system of public funding does not change the fact that the existing economic inequality obstructs poorer citizens to become mobilized from election campaigns, making poorer citizens less likely to participate as voters. According to the relative power theory, poorer citizens stop participating due to consistently losing political contests and being prevented from having their positions heard (Solt, 2008). However, under a system of public funding, poorer citizens can have their positions heard, since the system of public funding allows poorer citizens to successfully run for office and have an election campaign that is centred on the positions of poorer citizens. This increase the participation of poorer citizens. It does not change the fact that, consistent with the relative power theory, poorer citizens have relatively fewer resources and thus less political power. What does change is the degree to which rich citizens can prevent certain issues to be discussed, limiting the degree to which poorer citizens are made to believe

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33 that their situation is natural. In short, even though this system of public funding does not solve the problem of poorer citizens being obstructed from becoming mobilized by election campaigns, it is possible that being able to have their positions heard, prompts them to vote and thereby increasing political participation among poorer citizens.

In conclusion, using the principle of Equal Subjection, I propose a system of public funding which makes public funds the exclusive source of all political expenditures and prohibits the use of private funds. This system would eliminate the problem that currently plagues elections, namely the dependency on financial resources to successfully run for office. Under this system of public funding, poorer citizens would no longer be prevented from running for office. It is true that this system could be a bigger strain on the budget of the state. The state would also have to establish criteria to determine who is eligible for funds. Citizens could thus still be prevented from participating. However, citizens would not be prevented from running due to a lack of financial resources. Instead, citizens would be prevented based on criteria that were established by democratically elected officials and which can be amended by democratically elected officials. Finally, though this system of public funding would prevent economic inequality to obstruct poorer citizens to participate as a candidate, it would not change the fact that poorer citizens, due to economic inequality, are less likely to become informed and mobilized by elections campaigns. As such, it would not solve the problem that economic inequality has on the participation of poorer citizens as voters.

Media

The previous chapter noted how mass opinion is largely shaped by exposure to elite discourses through the media and that economic inequality increases the likelihood of media being captured. The ensuing manipulation of public opinion, through captured media, will make poorer citizens believe that their situation is natural and lower their participation.

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34 The solution that is proposed to captured media is only intended to solve the negative effects that captured media have on political participation. Building on the solution of public funding, I propose a system of public media. This is in itself not a novel idea, as most democracies already have public media. Yet, as noted by Benson et al. (2017) public media vary in their autonomy:

Public media systems that are highly regulated but in clearly stated, nonpartisan terms (as in Germany, the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom) tend to achieve greater autonomy and accountability than public media systems that are loosely regulated and exposed to greater pressures from the market, philanthropy, and political parties.

(Benson et al., 2017 p.15)

Thus, I propose a system of public media wherein the likelihood of capture is decreased. According to Benson et al. (2017), this is aided by the implementation of four points. These are: 1) funding through licencing fees rather than general tax revenues, which lessens the ability of governments to directly interfere with programming; 2) legal and administrate charters that mandate non-interference from government and the provision of quality programming for diverse audiences; 3) independent oversight agencies that function as a buffer from political pressures and which have a dispersal of authority to make appointments; 4) audience councils and surveys which serve to strengthen links to diverse publics.

In addition to these four points, I propose this system of public media to have a reserved timeslot in which political candidates are allocated time to voice their positions. The implementation would be something similar to the zendtijd voor politieke partijen [airtime for political parties] that exists in the Netherlands (Commissariaat voor de Media, n.d.). Through a lottery, all elected politicians are grouped into a time-table and during an election year, airtime is extended to all potential candidates. Candidates are then free to spread their message in whatever manner they seem fit. The responsible agency that is tasked with airing these

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35 messages is forbidden to influence them in any way.

Until now I have only proposed solutions that concern the public media. I am fully aware of the major role that privatized media have on public opinion. Furthermore, privatized media seem more susceptible to capture, as decreased profitability makes it more likely that media outlets are owned for a political agenda, rather than economic motives (Nielsen, 2017). Abolishing private media would not be feasible within current liberal democracies, as the protection of private property is one of its tenets (Beetham, 1992). Instead, I propose to implement the same reserved timeslots for candidates on private media. This is entirely possible within current liberal democracies, as the airwaves that private media use to broadcast are part of public infrastructure. Democratic states can make the implementation of these reserved timeslots a condition for private media to make use of this public infrastructure. In fact, in the U.S. the 1934 Communications Act already determined that the Federal Communications Commission could only grant or renew licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum if the public interest, convenience, and necessity are served (Hundt, 1996). This requirement still exists to this day (Federal Communications Commission, n.d.). The implementation of reserved timeslots for candidates on private media can be seen as a public service and can thus be implemented in current liberal democracies. Although this implementation would not be sufficient to prevent economic resources to be converted into political power, it would at least ensure that a plurality of positions is heard on privatized media. Accordingly, this makes the manipulation of public opinion by these private media outlets harder to accomplish.

In short, a system of public media that is structured along the four points of Benson et al. (2017) should prove resilient against capture. The implementation of a reserved timeslot, in which all political candidates can spread their message, would further make manipulation of public opinion harder to realize. Keeping in mind the relative power theory, ensuring that all candidates can equally make their position heard could convince poorer citizens that there is a

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36 point in participating since they are no longer prevented from having their position heard. The implementation of these solutions could then increase political participation.

The usefulness of Equal Subjection

In this chapter, I tried to mitigate the effects that economic inequality has on political participation. By using the principle of Equal Subjection and adapting it to apply to legitimacy I attempted to limit the conversion of economic resources into political power. To achieve this I offered multiple solutions. To combat the dependency on financial resources in elections, which prevent poorer citizens from running, I proposed a system of public funding which makes public funds the exclusive source of all political expenditures and prohibits the use of private funds. To decrease the likelihood of media capture and subsequent manipulation of public opinion, I proposed a system of public media, which implements the four points by Benson et al. (2017), along with a reserved timeslot in which political candidates are allocated time to voice their positions. These solutions should limit the ability to convert economic resources into political power and remove some financial barriers to participation, increasing political participation.

It should be noted that solutions that I proposed in this chapter are by no means the limits of what Equal Subjection is capable of. Equal Subjection goes beyond the few solutions that I offered in this thesis. Other principles may lead to the same solutions that I proposed in this thesis, but what sets the principle of Equal Subjection apart is that it requires us to think differently about the way we think about politics. Equal Subjection sees the relationship between economic resources and political power as inherently problematic and seeks to prevent one being converted into the other. The solutions that I proposed in this chapter all fit within the principle of Equal Subjection because they all try to limit the conversion of economic resources into political power as much as possible. The system of public funding would make the use of private money in election campaigns forbidden, preventing economic resources to

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37 increase the chance for candidates to win elections and opening up elections to candidates who do not possess economic resources. Meanwhile, the proposed four points by Benson et al. (2017) and the reserved timeslot for candidates try to prevent the capturing of media and try to mitigate the effects of captured media by rich citizens. In other words, these solutions try to prevent and limit the effects that economic resources have on impacting public opinion. The solutions I proposed in this thesis all fit within Equal Subjection, yet the principle of Equal Subjection is more than just the aforementioned solutions and it allows for more radical solutions to be proposed.

Rather than limiting the effects that economic inequality has on participation, one can argue that it is more effective to just solve economic inequality by the appropriation and redistribution of wealth. This can be achieved through measures such as an extreme wealth tax or the outright abolishment of private property. I agree that this would be a more effective method. However, I also believe that such measures to eliminate economic inequality are highly unlikely to be achieved in current liberal democracies. This means that solutions with regards to economic inequality and participation should take into account that the existence of economic inequality itself will most likely remain a fact of life within current liberal democracies. Instead, I tried to find solutions to the negative effects that economic inequality has on participation and that can be implemented in conditions of economic inequality. In other words, I accept the current economic reality as fixed and try to find solutions that work within this economic reality. As a result, the solutions that I proposed are compatible with our current liberal democracy and economic reality.

In conclusion, the solutions that I proposed in this chapter are a system of public funding, a system of public media based on the four points by Benson et al. (2017), and a reserved timeslot for candidates on public and private media. This should limit the degree to which economic resources can be converted into political power. This should increase political

Unequal participation and the threat to democratic legitimacy: a possible solution in the principle of equal subjection