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~ Legitimacy ~

To be or not to be…..

A Study of Case Histories of Children’s Edutainment Centres

University of Groningen

Faculty of Management and Organization

MSc in Business Administration

Strategy and Innovation

Date:

20-04-2006

Author:

Ellen Rijntjes

Student number:

1229702

1

st

Supervisor:

Dr. G. Gemser

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Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction... 6

Chapter 2 Theoretical Background...10

2.1 Children’s edutainment centre; an innovation?... 10

2.2 Stakeholder Approach... 11

2.3.1 Which stakeholders?... 12

2.3.2 Relationship with stakeholder... 13

2.3.3 Stakeholder management... 13

2.4 Legitimacy... 14

2.4.1 Legitimacy disciplines... 14

2.4.2 Cognitive legitimacy ... 14

2.4.3 Sociopolitical legitimacy ... 15

2.4.4 Legitimacy and support ... 15

2.5 Role models ... 16

2.6 Relationships with (critical) stakeholders... 16

2.7 Contents ... 17

2.8 Third Parties ... 18

2.9 Conceptual Model... 19

Chapter 3 Methodology...21

3.1 Introduction... 21

3.2 Sample ... 21

3.2.1 Limitations... 22

3.2.1.1 KIT junior in Amsterdam... 23

3.2.1.2 Villa Zebra in Rotterdam... 23

3.2.1.3 Reispaleis in Rotterdam ... 23

3.3 Sampling technique... 24

3.4 Interview techniques ... 24

3.5 Table of interviewees ... 25

3.6 Data analysis ... 26

Chapter 4 Case study...27

4.1 Case study NEMO... 27

4.1.1 Description ... 27

4.1.2 Case analysis... 31

Graphic 1 Flowchart of support of NEMO... 32

4.2 Case study Children’s Museum Zoom in Vienna... 33

4.2.1 Description ... 33

4.2.2 Case Analysis ... 36

Graphic 2 Flowchart of support of Zoom ... 37

4.3 Case study of Musée d’enfant in Brussels... 38

4.3.1 Description ... 38

4.3.2 Case analysis... 40

Graphic 3 Flowchart of support of Musée d’enfant ... 40

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4.4.1 Description ... 41

4.4.2 Case analysis... 43

Graphic 4 Flowchart of support Machmit! Children’s Museum ... 44

4.5 Case study of Brooklyn Children’s Museum in New York... 45

4.5.1 Description ... 45

4.5.2 American Association of Museums (AAM) ... 46

4.5.3 Association of Children’s Museums ... 46

4.5.4 Legitimacy then... 46

4.5.5 Legitimacy now ... 47

4.5.6 Case Analysis ... 48

Graphic 5 Flowchart of support for Brooklyn Children’s Museum in New York... 49

Chapter 5 Conclusion and recommendations...50

5.1 Recommendations ... 55

5.2 Recommendations for further research ... 55

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Summary

This study examines how founding entrepreneurs manage to obtain legitimacy and (financial) support of (critical) stakeholders in the context of launching a non-technical innovation, namely a Children’s

Edutainment Centre with a “hands-on” approach. In order to set up a CEdC with a “hands-on” approach, the concept needs to be legitimized. When (critical) stakeholders fail to recognize and acknowledge the new venture, they are unable to give (financial) support to launch the new venture. Moreover, (critical) stakeholders need to attribute value to the new venture too. Legitimacy is the recognition of a new venture as well known that it is taken for granted and perceived as appropriate and right given the existing norms and values.

(Financial) support and legitimacy are intertwined. As soon as (critical) stakeholders are willing to contribute their (financial) value, the initiative is legitimized. Furthermore, once the initiative has been legitimized, (critical) stakeholders are sooner willing to give (financial) support. The critical stakeholders are all those who provide critical resources necessary to setting up the children’s edutainment centre. The critical stakeholders must be convinced of the new concept; to design a new facility (CEdC) with a “hands-on” approach.

I conducted a case study of non-technical innovations, namely Children’s Edutainment Centres (CEdC). The focus was upon the founding entrepreneurs at the time they set up the CEdC. The research was based on a benchmark study. I conducted my research on five CEdCs in Europe and the United States. These share the name of Children’s Museums. They have the same edutainment focus as a CEdC. These Children’s Museums are called NEMO in Amsterdam, Zoom in Vienna, Musée d’enfant in Brussels, MachMit! Museum in Berlin and Brooklyn Children’s Museum in Brooklyn, New York, United States. All five museums have the same “hands-on” approach.

In the discussion of the theory on legitimacy and (critical) stakeholders I will elaborate more upon the theory of role models, the communication of the contents of the new venture and third parties by linking them to legitimacy. I conclude each theoretical part with a proposition which I tested in my case studies. These propositions are intended to provide an answer to the subordinate questions which will finally leads to the answer to my main research question.

With my findings I make recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs for an initiative to set up a children’s edutainment centre in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Coming up with a new idea is easy. But putting it into effect is more difficult, especially when it concerns an innovation. Whenever a new idea is unfamiliar to the stakeholders, the entrepreneur has to be careful in managing those who provide the critical resources to make the idea a reality. To launch an innovation, the entrepreneur with the idea needs support to bring the project to fruition. This support can take various forms. Stakeholders may inject money into the project so that it can be launched. Legal affairs can play a role either in supporting the process towards launching an innovation or even thwarting it. Therefore, those stakeholders who have significant influence need to be identified. To begin with, the innovation needs to be legitimized by the critical stakeholders for failing this the critical stakeholders will not know to what or whom they are giving their support. As soon as the innovation is acknowledged by the critical stakeholders, they can give their (financial) support in order to launch the innovation. Once the founding entrepreneur has obtained (financial) support from the critical stakeholders, the innovation can be realised. There is a paradox here however. Once an innovation has been acknowledged, it will be easier for the (critical) stakeholders to determine to what or whom they are giving their (financial) support. Once the innovation has received (financial) support, it will seem worthwhile for other (critical) stakeholders to support the innovation. For instance if the founding entrepreneur has the financial support of a reputable bank, such as ABNAMRO, other supporters will be more easily convinced of the value of the innovation. In short, on the one hand a founding entrepreneur needs to legitimize the innovation in order to receive (financial) support from critical stakeholders, but on the other hand support from critical stakeholders can legitimize the innovation. As the two go hand in hand, it is hypothesized that founding entrepreneurs get easier (financial) support when the legitimacy of an innovation is managed carefully.

In this paper I will do a benchmark study of Children’s Edutainment Centres in Europe and the United States. I will examine how founding entrepreneurs at the time obtained legitimacy and (financial) support from critical stakeholders. With my findings I make recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs of an initiative to set up a children’s edutainment centre in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. My goal in this paper is:

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My main research question is:

Which (critical) stakeholders are to be taken into account when setting up a Children’s Edutainment Centre and how does a founding entrepreneur obtain legitimacy and (financial) support from (critical) stakeholders?

In order to give answer to the main research question, several subordinate questions have to be answered; - Who are the critical stakeholders with regard to setting up a CEdC?

- What is the impact of a role model within the industry with regard to legitimacy? - What is the impact of relationships among critical stakeholders with regard to legitimacy? - What is the impact of communicating clearly the contents with regard to legitimacy? - What is the impact of third parties with regard to legitimacy?

In order to answer the research question, a case study of non-technical innovation will be done. Children’s Edutainment Centres are the non-technical innovations which will be studied. The focus is upon the founding entrepreneurs when they set up the CEdC. This will be done by conducting a benchmark study. I will test my propositions against the case studies. With my findings I make recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs of an initiative to set up a children’s edutainment centre in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

The Children’s Edutainment Centers are centers where children learn through play. In this paper a Children’s Edutainment Centre is defined as a shared public space where the “hands-on” approach makes part of interactive learning through playing as a family experience.

This is a concept which has been given the name edutainment1. This involves a broad variety of facilities

where education and entertainment are combined. The Children’s Edutainment Centre (CEdC) is a concept which involves a “hands-on” approach. It offers children and families a place where they can discover, play, watch, feel and listen. Elements such as art, literature and different cultures will be the dominating elements to enable children to develop a passion for learning.2

In order to set up the CEdC, the concept needs to be recognised and acknowledged as something new which has value. The concept involves designing a new facility specifically for edutainment with a

1The word edutainment comes from the computer industry. It was first thought up several years ago to describe

CD-ROM programs, mainly for children, which were designed for education or teaching and that had an

entertainment component to increase their appeal. The term was adopted by the family entertainment industry about a year ago. The term "industry" didn't really apply to the family entertainment centre (FEC) until about 1990. The growing FEC industry now encompasses many new and different categories of centers in both outdoor and indoor configurations, including children's entertainment centers (CECs), children's edutainment centers (CEdCs), FECs, adult entertainment centers (AECs), and urban-based location-based entertainment (LBEs) centers.

(www.whitehutchinson.com)

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on” approach. This concept needs to be legitimized for the critical stakeholders. The critical stakeholders who are of relevance for realising the CedC can be determined by making use of a framework. In this research critical stakeholders are defined as those who have a certain amount of power to provide the critical resources that are necessary to set up the children’s edutainment centre. They provide the critical resources to make the realisation possible. They are the ones who must be convinced of the worth of the new concept and are willing to contribute value to it, in terms of (financial) support.

Before a new CEdC in Amsterdam can be launched successfully, the founding entrepreneurs need to obtain (financial) support from critical stakeholders. As edutainment is a relatively new concept, this first needs to be acknowledged by the critical stakeholders. The task of the founding entrepreneur is to legitimize the concept, so that critical stakeholders can give their (financial) support. In this study legitimacy will be defined as the recognition of a new venture as well known that it is taken for granted and perceived as appropriate and right given the existing norms and values.

Moreover, the new venture is also new for the founding entrepreneur. He or she has no conventional rules or guidelines to follow with regard to setting up a new CEdC because he or she has (probably) never done it before. “Among the many problems facing innovating entrepreneurs, their relative lack of legitimacy is especially critical, as both entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders may not fully understand the nature of the new ventures, and their conformity to established institutional rules may be in question.” 3

In the first chapter I will discuss the theory about stakeholders and legitimacy dealing with the stakeholders, the relationship with stakeholders and stakeholder management. This will shed some more light on the critical stakeholders who the entrepreneur will have to take into account when he or she seeks (financial) support, for they will provide the critical resources to make the realisation possible. The variety of stakeholders can be broad, but it is not relevant to include them all in the process towards setting up a new CEdC. In this study I will focus on the critical stakeholders who are all those who provide critical resources necessary to setting up the children’s edutainment centre. The critical stakeholders must be convinced of the new concept; to design a new facility (CEdC) with a “hands-on” approach. This initiative needs to be legitimized. Once it is acknowledged, the critical stakeholders can attribute their (financial) value in terms of support. Moreover, once critical stakeholders attribute their value, the initiative is legitimized. Therefore support and legitimacy act upon each other. As soon as critical stakeholders are willing to contribute their (financial) value, the initiative is legitimized. Furthermore, once the initiative has been legitimized, critical stakeholders are sooner willing to give (financial) support.

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Model 1: Increase the legitimizing process

The legitimacy of the children’s edutainment centre can take two forms, that of cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy refers to the recognition of a CEdC with a “hands-on” approach as known. Socio-political legitimacy implies that different (critical) stakeholders not only recognize the new venture, they also give their approval to it. This will be elaborated more in the second chapter.

In the third chapter I will discuss the methodology used in my research. This is a benchmark research. I conducted my research on five CEdCs in Europe and the United States. These share the name of Children’s Museums. They have the same edutainment focus as a CEdC. These Children’s Museums are called NEMO in Amsterdam, Zoom in Vienna, Musée d’enfant in Brussels and MachMit! Museum in Berlin. I also decided to include the Brooklyn Children’s Museum in Brooklyn, New York, United States. All five museums have the same “hands-on” approach.

In the final chapter I will conclude and give recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs of the CEdC in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

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Chapter 2 Theoretical Background

In this chapter, the main theoretical concepts of the stakeholder approach are discussed. The focus is upon the variety of stakeholders, the relationship with stakeholders and the founding entrepreneur and stakeholder management. Subsequently the theory on legitimacy will be set out. This includes a discussion of legitimacy. This discussion will be extended by including the theory on role models, the communication of the contents of the new venture and third parties by linking them to legitimacy. Each theoretical part will be concluded with a proposition. In conclusion a conceptual model will illustrate my expectations. 2.1 Children’s edutainment centre; an innovation?

An innovation is something new which is presented in such a way that the value will be determined by the selectors (Wijnberg, 2004). The question that arises is what constitutes ‘something new’ in this definition of innovation. Schumpeter (1934) defines innovation as ‘new combinations’ which entails products, services, processes of combinations of these. Postma (1992) stated that an innovation means bringing something into new use and that an invention is bringing something new into being. The invention is moreover having an idea. An innovation is characterised by bringing the idea to the market.

The idea is to set up a new CEdC in Amsterdam where children and families are offered a service. This service involves a “hands-on” approach which stands for learning through play. This research is a benchmark study of CEdCs handling of this “hands-on” approach. These CEdCs are innovations which have already been brought to the market. By testing my findings on these innovations, I will make recommendations for the founding entrepreneur of the initiative to set up a CEdC in Amsterdam.

Although the “hands-on” approach may seem new, the concept of edutainment is not. Families visit places such as zoos, aquariums, botanical gardens and tourist attractions in Amsterdam. These are mainly entertainment facilities. They have long used the educational aspects as the draw, while adding entertainment or amusement. What is actually new is the idea of designing facilities specifically for edutainment.4

Within a CEdC, the child is the customer and the “hands-on” approach is the service. Den Hertog (2000) states that service innovations are rarely limited to a change in the characteristics of the service product itself. Innovation often coincides with new patterns of product distribution, client interaction, quality control and assurance, etc. This implies that there is a big difference between introducing a new product compared to a new service. Given the high degree of co-design and co-production of service products, it may be difficult to locate the innovation within service supplier or client.

When referring to Wijnberg (2004), he states that an incremental innovation implies an innovation of the smallest importance. The selectors have to reconsider the relative value of the service satisfying the same

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set of preferences. A radical innovation however changes the preferences of the selectors and ultimately the selection system dominating the industry. This implies that attention should be paid to the characteristics of the evaluators and that the importance of an innovation cannot be determined without specifying to whom and in whose eyes.

The evaluators are the children, parents, caregivers and schools. The new CEdC will indeed generate a reconsidering of the value of the “hand-on approach”. However the relative value attached to this, will not change their preferences into new preferences. The bottom line of the concept is learning through play, which is not entirely new to them. Furthermore, as the family entertainment facilities (zoos, aquariums, botanical gardens, science and children's museums, and tourist attractions) are a well-known feature in the eyes of the evaluators, the CEdC will be an incremental innovation.

Den Hertog (2000) says that judgements can vary according to whether and when it is new to the providing firm, new to the client, to the regional, national or global market and whether it involves new logic or scientific knowledge. The ‘hands-on” approach is a service innovation in terms of its new logic in CEdCs. The new logic relates to that although the “hands-on” service concept may already be familiar in other markets, the key thing is that it is novel in its application within the edutainment industry. Therefore, the children, parents, caregivers and schools have to reconsider the relative value of the “hands-on” approach satisfying the same set of preferences which refers to an incremental innovation. 2.2 Stakeholder Approach

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2.3.1 Which stakeholders?

Donaldson et al (1995) wrote that stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. Their interests in the corporation identify stakeholders, whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them.

According to De Leeuw (2000) stakeholders are those who have an interest in the performance of an organization. Freeman (1984) described stakeholders as all those who can influence the objectives of the firm, or are being influenced by the firm in attaining their own objectives. Goodpastor (1991) has observed that this definition implies two types of stakeholders--strategic and moral. According to Freeman (1984) with regard to the strategic stakeholder (the one who can affect a firm), there is a managing of interests; these stakeholders and their interests must be "dealt with" so that the firm may still achieve its interests. With the moral stakeholder (the one who is affected by the firm), stakeholder theorists seek some balancing of interests … how stakeholders manage a firm to enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of the firm's (Frooman 1999).

The set of stakeholders described above could be extensive in terms of these criteria. It may include consumers and suppliers, employees, shareholders, trade unions, environmental groups, local communities and governmental bodies. A distinction can be made between the internal and the external stakeholders. Freeman (1984) describes internal stakeholders as groups and individuals that affect a particular manager, even though these groups and individuals are internal members of the corporation. He states that internal stakeholders are often the (voluntary) employees, the management and the shareholders. Internal stakeholders must be seen as the conduits through which managers can reach other external stakeholders. Such internal stakeholders become the channel through which the manager reaches out to the external stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997). The external stakeholders however are those who are situated in the external environment and have a stake in the firm. They are any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives.

First of all there has to be a selection of the stakeholders that really matter; the critical stakeholders. Mitchell, Agle and Wood(1997), argue that there are three criteria that should be used for this selection process. At first the power needs to be assessed that a stakeholder has over the firm. This relates to the state of dependency of the firm towards the possession of a certain resource. These can be tangible (materials) or intangible (knowledge) of a stakeholder. The second variable is legitimacy. This is about the legitimate claims a stakeholder has over a firm. An example is that the government has legitimacy to develop rules for the firm. (Not to be confused with the legitimacy of the CEdC later on in the thesis). The third variable is urgency. The claims of stakeholders can differ with respect to the urgency of a response of the firm. An example is that if the media become aware of an incident, the related stakes need to be dealt with sooner than the stakes that has not yet caught the attention of the public.

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basis. Power in terms of dependency on resources, power in terms of legitimate claims and power in terms of urgency of a response. In this study, critical stakeholders will be defined as all those who have a certain amount of power to provide critical resources necessary to set up the children’s edutainment centre. 2.3.2 Relationship with stakeholder

Freeman (1984) described stakeholders as all those who can influence the objectives of the firm, or are being influenced by the firm in attaining their own objectives. Rowley (1997) has drawn attention to the fact that stakeholders may have other connections, and that the firm operates in a network of stakeholders. He states that a stakeholder may not be critical given the variables of legitimacy, power and urgency, but the stakeholder should still be selected because he or she influences other stakeholders who are important to the firm. For that reason, an ordinary stakeholder can become an indirect critical stakeholder. An example could be the local community that influences a supplier. Therefore I will put the word ‘critical’ in brackets when using the term stakeholders in case there is a possibility of such a relationship.

2.3.3 Stakeholder management

The management of stakeholders is an internal process of the firm. Stakeholder management is about the interaction with representatives of the organization. These representatives can be seen as the stakeholders. Stakeholder approaches deal with the way in which these interactions are coordinated internally. Freeman (1984) wrote about strategic management, saying that the stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals who can affect the organization, and that it is about managerial behavior taken in response to those groups and individuals. The focus here is more upon the management and the strategic decisions they make. I would like to narrow the definition by making use of the definition made by De Leeuw (2000), he states that the task of the management has to be focused on the fact that for every stakeholder (of which shareholders) a surplus arises in that they want to support or have at least a minimal tolerance in the organization.

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This brings me to the theory of legitimacy, which will be discussed in the next chapter. At first I will give a definition that will be suitable for this thesis. A series of propositions summarizes my discussion of the founding entrepreneur and the way legitimacy is gained

2.4 Legitimacy

This section will be discussing legitimacy in its various forms and the accompanying essentials by making use of the article of Aldrich and Fiol (1994). They state that innovating entrepreneurs may have difficulties with respect to the legitimacy of their innovation. Both the entrepreneur and the (critical) stakeholder may not fully comprehend the contents of the new venture. Without knowledge and understanding of their activity, entrepreneurs may have trouble obtaining the (financial) support of (critical) stakeholders.

2.4.1 Legitimacy disciplines

Legitimacy can be interpreted in several ways. At first I will make a distinction between the different disciplines of which legitimacy is comprised. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) describe legitimacy as the extent to which people perceive that it adheres to accepted principles, rules, norms, standards, and way of doing things. They describe it is a social judgment that is ultimately accorded the organization by its constituents. Perrow (1970) confirms this argument by saying that legitimacy is conferred upon or attributed to the organization by its constituents – like beauty; it resides in the eye of the beholder. It is a belief among constituents that the organization’s activities and ends are congruent with the expectations, values, and norms of constituents (Ashfort and Gibbs 1990). These descriptions of legitimacy have the subjectivity of the constituents as their central basis. This implies that the assessment of legitimacy finds place in a social context, where actors meet each other. When dealing with social (inter)actions, legitimacy will be determined by actors. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) assume that the founding entrepreneur needs to build trust, reliability and reputation. Trust however embraces a longer time span and is more personal then reputation.

Much has already been written about existing organizations that try to maintain their legitimacy. This study however focuses on the legitimacy that needs to be obtained by founding entrepreneurs of new products, services and concepts. Here, legitimacy is the recognition and the acknowledgment of an innovation by (critical) stakeholders in that they will attribute value to it in terms of (financial) support. I will define the term legitimacy by using two related senses according to Aldrich and Fiol (1994); how taken for granted a new form is and the extent to which a new form conforms to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards. In other words the term legitimacy is about recognition and approval. The first form of legitimacy is labeled cognitive and the second socio-political.

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Cognitive legitimacy refers to the knowledge of a new idea or concept in that it can be recognized. Hannan and Freeman (1986) noted that when an activity becomes so familiar and well known that it is taken for granted, time and other organizing resources are conserved, attempts at creating copies of legitimated forms are common, and the success rate of such attempts is high. In other words, cognitive legitimacy refers to the recognition of a product, process or concept as known. It is measurable by the level of public acceptance of the new product, process or concept. An example is the use and manufacturing of personal computers. Because of the widespread use of personal computer at schools and at home, the product and its usage are taken for granted. People are familiar with it.

2.4.3 Sociopolitical legitimacy

When the new product, process or concept is known and acknowledged among the public, more value can be attributed to the venture by agreeing on it. This implies that different (critical) stakeholders not only recognize the new venture, they also give their approval to it. This refers to sociopolitical legitimacy. It is the moment when key stakeholders; the general public, key opinion leaders, or governmental officials accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). This happens for example when governments award subsidies. Whenever a (critical) stakeholder acknowledges the invention, its sociopolitical legitimacy increases. This may have the consequence of enhancing the ability of other (critical) stakeholders to acknowledge the venture. This implies that (critical) stakeholders and sociopolitical legitimacy are intertwined.

2.4.4 Legitimacy and support

After having discussed various forms of legitimacy, I will define legitimacy in terms of its relevance for this research. Cognitive legitimacy is about the knowledge critical stakeholders possess about the new venture. This knowledge is characterized by the extent of which the new venture is “taken for granted”. Socio-political legitimacy refers to the considerable acceptance of the new venture by critical stakeholders. As soon as the new venture is well-known and taken for granted, it will find (financial) support more easily from critical stakeholders. As a result, the new venture is accepted and approved by critical stakeholders given the existing norms and laws. Moreover, critical stakeholders can also support the new venture intentionally (financially). This acceptance by critical stakeholders will engender familiarity and awareness of the new venture. Consequently, the new venture will be well-known and will be more likely to obtain (financial) support from other critical stakeholders.

This implies that the two legitimacy principles, with respect to support, are interrelated.

Model 2. Interrelatedness of cognitive- and socio-political legitimacy

Cognitive Legitimacy

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Because of this interrelatedness, it is difficult to articulate which discipline has more impact on the (financial) support of critical stakeholders for launching a new venture. Therefore, I would like to cover this grey area by giving a definition appropriate for this research. In this paper legitimacy will be defined as the recognition of a new venture as well known that it is taken for granted and perceived as appropriate and right given the existing norms and values.

2.5 Role models

Aldrich and Fiol (1994) argue that producers experience the cognitive acceptance of a product, process or concept too. This will often lead to imitation as the role model functions as a standard. New entrants to an industry are likely to copy an existing organizational form, rather than experiment with a new one. The imitation of such an existing organizational form confirms the existence of the product, process or concept. It is accepted cognitively. Teece (1987) has provided a treatment of the technological evolution of an industry which appears to parallel Kuhnian notions of scientific evolution. Kuhnian notions imply two stages in the evolutionary development of a given branch of science: ‘the pre-paradigmatic stage when there is no single generally accepted conceptual treatment of the phenomenon in a field of study, and the paradigmatic stage which begins when a body of theory appears to have passed the canons of scientific acceptability.’ In an industry setting in the pre-paradigmatic phase, no design paradigm is yet dominant and rivalry is focused on trying to identify the design which will be dominant. Therefore, legitimacy of the venture is low in this phase as the dominant design is not yet apparent. In the paradigmatic stage, as the leading design or design begins to be revealed by the market, competition takes place within this dominant design. An example is the mobile phones industry. Early in the life cycle of the mobile phone, competition was upon the dominant design. No one knew which design was going to be successful as nobody was familiar with it. This dominant design can lead as a role model in the industry. As Delacroix and Rao (1993) pointed out, organizations founded later in an industry’s life cycle benefit vicariously, learning from early successful foundings. When a founding entrepreneur can easily imitate the role model of an earlier product, process or concept that has proven itself, thereby its existence has an advantage of increased legitimacy. This implies that a role model can increase a standardized perception of the product, process or concept.

Proposition 1: The presence of a role model within an industry will increase the legitimacy of the new venture.

2.6 Relationships with (critical) stakeholders

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stakeholders could influence other stakeholders that are important to the firm too. A stakeholder may not seem critical to the firm at first, but as he or she may have relations with other critical stakeholders, he or she may seem more critical than judged before. This can have positive effects, whenever (critical) stakeholders act in favor of the founding entrepreneur. The acknowledgement of one (critical) stakeholder can be a sign of reliability and can induce other (critical) stakeholders to follow. This diffusion process will increase the legitimacy as they reinforce each other’s positive opinion on the venture5.

Proposition 2: (Financial) support from one critical stakeholder facilitates obtaining the (financial) support of the other critical stakeholders.

2.7 Contents

The focus in this research is upon the (critical) stakeholders and their perception of new venture. For that reason, it is the new venture that needs to be communicated towards (critical) stakeholders. This new venture holds a certain contents that need to be communicated clearly. As described earlier, founding entrepreneurs need (financial) support from (critical) stakeholders in order to launch the new venture. The founding entrepreneurs need to communicate a certain contents of the new venture towards the (critical) stakeholders. These (critical) stakeholders need to perceive the new venture as having potential for success.

But how do founding entrepreneurs deal with the communication of the contents of a new venture? As I already said at the beginning, new ventures have not yet been introduced onto the market. Hence it is impossible to communicate clear contents, let alone a visual one, as there is nothing on the market yet. The public and (critical) stakeholders do not know what to expect or perhaps they do not even know that they are expecting something in the first place. If the founding entrepreneur wants to approach these, he or she needs to communicate certain content that represents the new venture. It should be the task of the founding entrepreneur to do so, even though the new venture is not yet on the market. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) state that founding entrepreneurs must build a knowledge base which outsiders will accept as valid. The contents and the story that the founding entrepreneur wants to tell needs to be consistent. If the information on the new venture is vague and not well understood, the public and the stakeholders may perceive the new venture differently to the way initially intended by the founding entrepreneur. Fischer (1985) confirms this by stating that the validity of a story relies not on a set of external criteria, but on how well the story coheres and is free from contradictions. He adds up by stating that good story telling is useful to obtaining legitimacy because stories are evaluated on their internal coherence rather than on external validation. As Aldrich (1999) explains, ‘‘given the lack of externally validated arguments, founders

5 This is not relevant whenever an agreement is made in restraint of trade between critical stakeholders and/or

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must draw on alternative forms of communication, such as narratives, to make a case that their ventures are compatible with more widely established sets of activities.’’ Therefore, founders ‘‘frame issues in ways that increase their credibility with others [and] use stories and other means of symbolic communication to assure others that the new venture is on the right track and actually has a future.’’

Thus, the new venture needs to be well communicated by the founding entrepreneur towards the (critical) stakeholders. By doing so, the founding entrepreneur needs to clearly communicate the meaning of the new venture. If the communication of the founding entrepreneur about the contents is clear-cut and consistent in the sense that it cannot be misunderstood by the (critical) stakeholders, the legitimacy of the new venture will be enhanced.

Proposition 3: Founding entrepreneurs who clearly communicate the contents of the new venture will gain more legitimacy than others.

2.8 Third Parties

According to Aldrich and Fiol (1994) a problem that may arise is that newcomers are not taken seriously in its industry. This is often the effect of insufficient legitimacy which renders the newcomer vulnerable and thereby jeopardises its acceptance.

Inter firm linkages such as trade associations may play a critical role in helping entrepreneurs promote an industry’s legitimacy (Aldrich & Staber, 1988). They may help the founding entrepreneur by acknowledging the industry’s existence. These inter firm links can be referred to as third parties. In this paper third parties refer to those parties who can practise a certain amount of influence necessary to erect a children’s edutainment centre. Not to confuse with (critical) stakeholders who are all those who have a certain amount of power to provide critical resources necessary to set up the children’s edutainment centre. The difference between third parties and (critical) stakeholders is that third parties do not necessarily have a stake in the firm with regard to their objectives. (Critical) stakeholders on the other hand have an interest in the performance of the firm.

Aldrich and Fiol (1994) say that third parties help firms to formulate product/process standards through trade committees, trade journals, marketing campaigns (to enhance the industry’s standing), and trade fairs (where customers and suppliers can gain a sense of the industry’s stability).

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third parties there are representing the industry, the more they help to acknowledge the industry. Whenever founding entrepreneurs are being supported by a broad range of third parties, the new venture will obtain legitimacy more easily. Hence third parties give the founding entrepreneur a voice to communicate the contents of the new venture. Third parties can serve as a promoter to reduce the doubts and scepticism of (critical) stakeholders and thereby increases acceptance.

Proposition 4: Founding entrepreneurs who promote their new venture by third party actors will increase their legitimacy.

2.9 Conceptual Model

I would like to summarize by means of conceptual framework which can be found in the below. Cognitive and socio-political legitimacy are interrelated with regard to support. In order to obtain (financial) support from (critical) stakeholders, the new venture needs to be legitimized. Legitimacy is defined as the

recognition of a new venture as well known that it is taken for granted and perceived as appropriate and right given the existing norms and values. The presence of a role model, (financial) support of (critical) stakeholders, communication of the contents of the new venture and the (financial) support by third parties is assumed to have impact on legitimacy of the new venture.

A role model within the industry will simplify the identification process of the (critical) stakeholders of what the new venture is about. Secondly, the acknowledgement of the new venture by one (critical) stakeholder can be a signal of reliance and can induce other (critical) stakeholders to follow. By clearly communicating the contents of the new venture, (critical) stakeholders have a feeling or impression of what they can expect of the new venture. If the value is visible to them, it acknowledges the legitimacy of the new venture. Finally, the model shows that the quality and number of third-party support will promote the communication of the contents of a new venture and thereby legitimize it. The more quality third parties attribute to the industry and the more third parties there are who promote an industry, the greater the approval that can be attained for the new venture.

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= a positive relation Presence of a role model

Support (critical) stakeholder Communicating contents of new venture

Quality and number of third parties

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Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The management and design of my research will be described in this chapter. The design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to the study’s initial research question and ultimately to its conclusions (Yin 1989).

I will do a benchmark research among five CEdCs. I will examine the legitimacy the CEdCs obtained at the time they were set up. This will be done by looking at the interests (or lack of these) and the motives of the critical stakeholders for giving (financial) support to the founding entrepreneur when setting up a CEdC.

3.2 Sample

I have visited four CEdCs in Europe. These CEdCs all share the name of children’s museums. The word museum however is not used in its first sense meaning exhibits of collections on cultural heritage. All CEdCs use the same “hands-on” approach. The CEdCs I have visited are Musée d’enfant in Brussels, MachMit! Museum in Berlin, Zoom in Vienna and NEMO in Amsterdam. I also decided to include the Brooklyn Children’s Museum in New York, United States.

I decided to visit these children’s museums in capitals where they were the first ones to open their doors. The founding entrepreneurs had to obtain legitimacy at the time for setting up these children’s museums. In the first place this implies more effort was required from the founding entrepreneurs who were the first in the industry. New organizations are always vulnerable to the liabilities of newness, but such pressures are especially severe when an industry is in its formative years (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). These were the Brooklyn Children’s Museum (New York) in the US, which was also the first children’s museum in the world and Musée d’enfants in Brussels for Europe. The European and American children’s museum industry are characterised by two covering associations; Hands On! Europe and the American Children’s Association. These are associations that represent and advocate CEdCs. They provide information about developments in the industry and strive to be an effective voice for children’s edutainment centres throughout the world.6

My attendance at a conference in Vienna of Hands On! Europe made me go to Zoom. The City Council of Vienna supported the conference and therefore I hoped to find out more on the legitimacy of Zoom. Another capital in Europe which was the first to open a children’s museum in its country was The

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Machmit! Museum in Berlin. These founding entrepreneurs also dealt with legitimacy issues with regard to the liability of newness in Germany.

Finally I also wanted to analyze the set up of a CEdC in Amsterdam. This was because my research is aimed at giving recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs for the new initiative in Amsterdam. The only museum that was especially founded for children was NEMO. This CEdC however has more a scientific and technical focus and is less concerned with the arts. However, it is of interest to examine the fundraising and subsidies from the Amsterdam City Council and the Dutch Government as it was a project costing 80 million guilders7. Thus it was a project that has set an example for facilities that are

specifically designed for edutainment.

All children’s museums in my sample are members of Hands On! Europe or the American Children’s Museum Association. The five sampled children’s museums use the “hands on” approach.

By means of the case studies, I will try to find out how decisions (or a set of decisions) of the management were taken, why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result (Yin 1989). The emphasis will be on legitimacy issues. With the available information, I will highlight how the founding entrepreneur obtained and maintained legitimacy. This analysis will include among other things an enumeration of the critical stakeholders.

This however was rather difficult for the Brooklyn Children’s Museum (BCM). It was launched in 1899 and the founding entrepreneur had already passed away. However, much has been written and documented about the BCM, because it was “the world’s first museum for kids.”8

3.2.1 Limitations

Other CEdCs have been already set up in other cities in the Netherlands. According to Marijke Boele, such initiatives started around 1990 and were driven by the infotainment trend.9 Most CEdCs have grown

out of existing museums which wanted to include children exhibitions Fred Warthna, for instance, says that he developed the Reispaleis because he was fed up with the opportunistic programming of museums with respect to children.10

Amsterdam already has cultural initiatives for children which have the same focus, but they have come into existence out of established museums for adults with special children’s departments (permanent or temporary), centres with only a scientific basis (NEMO) or special cultural children’s establishments (KIT junior).

To demonstrate how CEdCs in the Netherlands have been set up, I will briefly highlight in the below two Dutch CEdCs that came into existence out of established museums for adults, namely KIT junior in

7 Interview Joost Douma (80 million guilders is now approximately 35 million euros) 8 Brooklyn Children’s Museum fact sheet November 2005

9 Interview Marijke Boele, Director of Reispaleis (part of the World Museum in Rotterdam)

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Amsterdam and the Reispaleis in Rotterdam. I also included a CEdC in Rotterdam which was set up exclusively for children with and handled the “hands-on” approach, named Villa Zebra.

My research however is solely aimed at a new initiative in Amsterdam and at making recommendations to the founding entrepreneurs. Therefore I will not include CEdCs in my case studies which are situated in other cities in the Netherlands.

3.2.1.1 KIT junior in Amsterdam

KIT junior was set up in 1975 and is part of the Dutch Royal Tropical Institute (KIT). KIT is characterised by the fact that it is a museum but with a material collection as well as an immaterial collection such as expressive activities like story telling, dance and music. KIT junior started as an initiative which has developed throughout the years into an autonomous children’s museum.

KIT junior finances its activities through its own income, through proceeds from projects, through subsidies, and through production agreements with the Dutch Government (output-financing).11

3.2.1.2 Villa Zebra in Rotterdam

This CEdC was set up in 2001, because the founding entrepreneurs were convinced that there were no activities for children with regard to art and culture. It was a private initiative. The board of directors obtained financial support from their own private network. The greater part was financed by the business community. The former building of Villa Zebra was privately owned. When the City Council of Rotterdam made a contribution of 100,000 guilders, Villa Zebra could finally be set up. When the board got into financial trouble after one and a half years, they sold the building. In 2003 it reopened and Fred Warthna became director. Now they rent a building next to the Maas.

3.2.1.3 Reispaleis in Rotterdam

The Reispaleis is part of the World Museum in Rotterdam. The current concept involves a hotel in which every room tells the story of a different nationality. The backgrounds of the cultures are shown or told with the help of image or sound fragments.

The realisation was supported by the World Museum since there were no activities on offer for children at the time. They received structural subsidies from the City Council of Rotterdam. Now they have become a foundation, so they have become independent of the World Museum and the City Council. In order to survive, they have had to become more commercial. According to Marijke Boele commerce is not a dirty word, “idealism is beautiful but you have to be practical too”.12

11Annual report Dutch Royal Tropical Institute

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3.3 Sampling technique

It was impossible to examine all the children’s museums in Europe and the US. There are more then 400 children’s museums active in the world.13 In my research I only focus on CEdCs that have children at

their main interest. The target group for children can vary from 0-14 years old. Parents, teachers and caregivers are also included in the target group.

I will not include entertainment facilities or (adult) museums that have either permanent or temporary children’s exhibitions in my research. Nor are existing museums which later included children’s exhibitions in the museum included in my research. They had gained their legitimacy already by means of the adult exhibitions. Therefore I will not include KIT junior in Amsterdam, the Reispaleis and Villa Zebra in Rotterdam as discussed in the above.

3.4 Interview techniques

To establish the construct validity and reliability of the case study, I collected multiple sources as far as possible. This generated a development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation (Yin 1989).

I made use of primary and secondary information. Primary information was collected from interviews. In every children’s museum I spoke with a minimum of two persons of the management. I expected that the respondents would not be entirely objective, since they were often the founding entrepreneurs of the children’s museum. Empirically evaluating the effect of founders’ actions on the survival of new ventures has been problematic because reliable evidence has been difficult to gather (Katz and Gartner 1988) I have made use of open unstructured interviews. Because every children’s museum was set up in a different way and had a different story, I needed to have flexibility in asking my questions. My research is mainly based on the strategic choices and decisions taken towards obtaining legitimacy.

The conference of Hands On! Europe in November 2005 in Vienna provided me with more primary and secondary data on children’s museums in Europe. The theme was “how to serve different audiences”. The focus was upon children’s museums throughout Europe. I collected secondary data from the speakers who shed light on this issue in their lectures. Documentation was handed out that which I could use as secondary data. Other secondary data I collected on my visits to the children’s museum were; annual reports and other press releases. Internet provided me with (secondary) information too.

A table of interviewees is presented below. In this table I also included two interviewees of the Reispaleis and Villa Zebra both in Rotterdam. As mentioned earlier, my research only focussed on the setting up of a

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new CEdC in Amsterdam. Therefore I will not include the museums of Rotterdam in my case study. It was however interesting to have other respondents shedding light on the setting up of a CEdC in the Netherlands. I did not make use of the interview questions as discussed above.

3.5 Table of interviewees

Museum Name Date Function Reason to interview

Musée

d’enfant. Kathleen Lippens October 2005 President She was the founding entrepreneur of the children’s museum and thereby the first one in Europe

Musée

d’enfant. Michele Clette October 2005 Vice-President She takes care of the creative content of the children’s museum

Zoom

Vienna Claudia Haas November 2005 Former President She was the founding entrepreneur of Zoom Zoom

Vienna Karin Schrammel November 2005 Press Marketingand She takes care of the public relations of Zoom and the Museum quarter Brooklyn

Children’s Museum

Carol Enseki November 2005 President She gives leadership to the

entire children’s museum Brooklyn

Children’s Museum

Beth Alberty November 2005 Director of

collections She manages the storage and conservation of the

objects. She also

participates in exhibit development teams.

Machmit Museum Berlin

Marie Lorbeer December 2005 Director She set up the museum

with partner who left after realisation.

Machmit Museum Berlin

Karen Hoffmann December 2005 Director She takes care of the

fund-raising and the subsidiaries. NEMO

Amsterdam Peter Rijntjes January 2006 Director Marketing and

Events

He managed New

Metropolis when it was in financial trouble. He changed the name into NEMO, the exhibitions and the marketing

NEMO

Amsterdam Joost Douma January 2006 Founding Entrepreneur He is the founding entrepreneur of New Metropolis (NEMO), after which he left.

Reispaleis

Rotterdam Marijke Boele February 2006 Coordinator She coordinates the Reispaleismanages and Villa Zebra

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3.6 Data analysis

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Chapter 4 Case study

This chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of the findings of my research. At first I will discuss the setting up of the children’s museum by the founding entrepreneurs. I will mainly focus on the critical stakeholders and their motives for either supporting or rejecting support of the children’s museum. Subsequently I will highlight the way the founding entrepreneurs dealt with legitimizing the children’s museum towards critical stakeholders. Each case will be concluded with an enumeration of the critical stakeholders by discussing the power they had in providing the critical resources necessary to set up the children edutainment centre at the time.

4.1 Case study NEMO

After a struggle of ten years to set up NEMO, the children’s science centre was finally established in 1997 in Amsterdam by the “founding fathers”14 Douma and Willemse. This museum had to have a scientific

focus. “We do not want to be the translators of science for children, we want to start a debate so that we do not offer them answers instead we offer them questions.”15

The first foundations for a science centre were manifest in 1923 when the Museum of Labour in

Amsterdam was set up, called Heyenbrock. This museum became NINT.16 At the time, Douma was part

of the board of directors of NINT. The other “founding father”, Willemse, worked at the Van Gogh Museum– and the University Museum of Amsterdam.

The children’s science centre was at first called New Metropolis. After a financial setback, the name was changed into NEMO. I refer to it as NEMO.

4.1.1 Description

In 1986 there was a national debate for setting up in a science centre in the Netherlands. A commission of ‘wise men’ was appointed by the Dutch Government.17 This commission was to be involved in the project

of setting up a science centre in the Netherlands. At the time, there were seven applications for setting up a science centre in the Netherlands. The “wise men” were to investigate which project had most potential for being a successful science centre. Of these seven projects, only one winner was to be selected. The “wise men” would grant two million guilders for the project. One of these projects was NEMO in Amsterdam. After the investigation by the commission two million guilders was earmarked for a project in

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Rotterdam. Despite the fact that the initiators of NEMO were disappointed they continued to realize their project. They started to do research into opportunities and chances by conducting a feasibility study for the NEMO project. According to the founding entrepreneur of NEMO, they decided to have this done by the reputable science centre of Ontario in the United States.18

One of the two initiators of NEMO wrote the business plan. He was a history graduate as well as an urban structural engineer. He had great writing capabilities and had insight into the architectural aspects of NEMO in the context of the urban view of Amsterdam. He had written a visionary theoretical basic text on NEMO and transformed it into a business plan. He concentrated on the perceptions of the stakeholders. “Stakeholders must have the feeling that when they step on board, everybody else will do so too.” 19 He had learnt from his management years in NINT which stakeholders to approach. “We

presented our plan by showing the project as a concrete realization of a range of relevant political policy intentions.”20 He combined his vision, missions and goals so that they represented those of the critical

stakeholders. He wrote the business plan from the point of view of the critical stakeholders. So the critical stakeholders saw value in the intent of setting up a science centre in Amsterdam. He wanted to convince the critical stakeholders of the relevance of setting up a new science centre. These critical stakeholders would not know what to support if the distinctiveness of the new science centre was not clear. According to Rijntjes, Douma had the right communication competences to do this. With the writing capabilities and the insight described above, he was able to communicate the contents of what the science centre would be like. In this way the critical stakeholders had a better visualization of the project.21

The NINT was the predecessor to what the founding entrepreneur had in mind. Douma had worked many years at the NINT. However, this institute according to him was still too much in the entertainment sphere. “I wanted to get rid of the Disney-sauce-topping.”22 He became a member of ECSITE which is a

European Network of Science Centres and Museums. There he came into contact with a variety of science centres in Europe. Douma affirms that role models for him were the Experimentarium in Copenhagen, Denmark; Heureka in Helsinki, Finland; Spectrum in Berlin, Germany and La Cité de Science de la Villette in Paris, France. The existence of ECSITE increased the acknowledgement and importance of the science centres. Traditionally ECSITE provides information services and networking tools such as a newsletter, a website, an annual conference, and specific seminars for directors and staff training. Moreover the network has tried to increase the professional capacity of the whole field by taking up different challenges and projects.23 ECSITE has helped to connect people in these fields and, through this,

increased the professional capacity of the whole science centre sector.

18 Additional information from Joost Douma (founding entrepreneur NEMO) via email contact 19 Interview Peter Rijntjes (managed NEMO during financial setback)

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Despite the efforts of the founding entrepreneurs to set up NEMO, they could not count on the support or cooperation of the Dutch Government or the City Council of Amsterdam. However, both the Dutch Government as the City Council can be decisive in realizing the project as they provide the critical resources in terms of (legitimate) power and money. According to Douma the Dutch Government however was not inclined to support NEMO because such as initiative already existed, namely NINT. The founding entrepreneur did receive some subsidies for the renovation of NINT. After the renovation, the number of visitors increased. Douma invested the profit made into more efforts for realizing NEMO. At the same time, the other five initiatives collapsed as they got into internal fights. This was advantageous for the founding entrepreneurs of NEMO as “there was only one pond in which we could fish”.24 Of all

the big projects, there is often only one that could be realized.

The setting up of the science centre took shape bit by bit. The initiators became founding entrepreneurs. The science centre took on serious proportions from the moment that Douma created a website for the IMPULS Science & Technology Centre. This was the initial name for NEMO. At that time IMPULS attracted a lot of attention in the Dutch press. Despite the high quality – low profile communication strategy, the project had a great deal of publicity.25 Even before the founding entrepreneurs received the

green light for realising IMPULS Science & Technology Center the press came out against the initiative eleven times but 43 times in favour of the realisation of the science centre.

Douma wrote an article for debate on the website of IMPULS in which he put forward his idea for a science centre and discussed the roots of Amsterdam and the importance of science. He launched a discussion of the major trends and issues for the next decades and presented a portrait of six outstanding individuals, their ideas and the institutions they created. Douma thought that forthcoming trends in the developments in European and American scientific and technological culture and thoughts can be enhanced with the characteristics of Science Centres/Museums. In September 1994, he wrote "to develop a vision to guide our development. For we truly believe that we cannot simply build a new Science Centre without having reflected as thoroughly as possible on what role this new centre should and could play in our present and future society".26

The founding entrepreneurs gradually found their first support. The Public Information Service for Science and Technique was founded by the Minister of Education, Culture and Science. This service was set up in order to make a contribution to the running costs of independent organisations with little financial capacity, which had public information services about science and technology as their main activity.27 The founding entrepreneurs received five million guilders from the Public Information Service

for Science and Technique to start realising the science centre. The costs of the project however were

24 Interview Joost Douma (founding entrepreneur NEMO)

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calculated at approximately 80 million guilders. But with the five million guilders, the founding entrepreneurs could cover their first starting costs.

Increasingly, more money came available. The founding entrepreneurs received a declaration of intent from the City Council of Amsterdam for setting up a science centre. The City Council was willing to finance the project, given that the founding entrepreneurs would lobby the business community for additional money. This was however delicate as firms were hesitant to provide sponsoring because the founding entrepreneurs had not yet received unconditional support from either the City Council or the Dutch Government. It took two years before the Dutch Government agreed on the project. “The Government is a ponderous bureaucratic system. It is a continuous process; they do not have a memory, no conscience and no moral.”28 Because of the changing constellations of the parties in power, ongoing

internal reconsiderations have to be dealt with. The policies of the Dutch Government renew themselves after every selection.

The Dutch Government promised the founding entrepreneurs 40 million guilders provided that money would be raised by the City Council of Amsterdam too. Rijntjes affirms that the Minister of Education, Culture and Science29 and the Minister of Economic Affairs30 put the most effort into realising the science

centre. “You need to convince big names with a good reputation and a broad network.”31 The founding

entrepreneurs thought the Minister of Economic Affairs was a visionary as regards the knowledge

economy. As soon as he was on board, the rest followed, such as the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research32 and a well-known real estate agent in the

Netherlands33. “When you have a winning team like this at your side, credibility is guaranteed. Whoever is

first becomes the face of the project. This is a certain level to with the rest will click on to.”34 This means

that (critical) stakeholders are likely to follow a critical stakeholder with a good reputation. After intensive lobbying a declaration of intent of 20 million guilders was offered by the business community, provided that the Dutch Government would support the project too.

As soon as the founding entrepreneurs had the Dutch Government on their side, the City Council of Amsterdam gave support too. They received 12 million guilders to start with. Together with the 20 million guilders from the business community, the architect (Renzo Piano) could get started.

The science centre was realised in 1997 and was named New Metropolis. The second founding entrepreneur Willemse became adjunct director. Shortly after the realisation of New Metropolis it encountered financial setbacks. Again the Minister of Economic Affairs put efforts into the retention of

28 Interview Joost Douma (founding entrepreneur of NEMO) 29 Dr.ir. JMM Ritzen

30Mr. FHJJ Andriessen

31 Interview Peter Rijntjes (managed NEMO whence in financial setback) 32 Peter Nijkamp

33 Cor van Zadelhoff

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New Metropolis. Rijntjes was assigned to manage the reorganisation. He changed the content of the science centre, the name (into NEMO), the marketing and an internal modification regarding the exhibitions. According to Rijntjes, Willemse cannot be held accountable for the fact that NEMO almost went bankrupt. “The mistake was the idea of a duo in which Douma would set up NEMO and Willemse would run it. Willemse is not a runner. Building a house is not the same as living in it.”35

4.1.2 Case analysis

The founding entrepreneurs included the common mission, visions and goals of both themselves and the critical stakeholders in the business plan. The critical stakeholders, therefore, saw value in the intent of setting up a science centre. With the business plan, the critical stakeholders were informed about what a science centre involved. Because of the study background of Douma, he had writing capabilities and insight with respect to the urban development of Amsterdam. These qualities made a contribution in the business plan and helped critical stakeholders in recognising the project as appropriate and right. By communicating clear the content of what the science centre is about and what it contributes to the Dutch society, the business plan legitimized NEMO. This was reinforced by third parties such as ECSITE and the website of IMPULS.

The activities and the very existence of ECSITE seemed to have increased the acknowledgment of a science centre as being valuable to society. The European network of ECSITE enables the founding entrepreneur to come into contact with other science centres. Douma confirmed that these science centres served as role models for him. Not so much in terms of imitating the science centres as a whole. It was rather the concept of European countries each having their own science centres. These science centres emphasised what the Netherlands lacked. The concept of setting one up in the Netherlands was thus legitimized.

The texts written by Douma on the IMPULS website contributed to the relevance of a science centre in the Netherlands. He could explain and articulate in the articles what the science centre is about and what it contributes to society. The spread of knowledge on the IMPULS website promoted the concept of setting up a science centre. As a result press articles were published, which generated publicity for the initiative. The ECSITE network and the IMPULS website served as third parties which contributed to legitimizing NEMO. Consequently, the project attracted the press which acted as a third party too. Positive publicity was achieved, which legitimized the initiative even more.

The most critical stakeholders for setting up the science centre were the Dutch Government, the City Council of Amsterdam and the business community. According to Rijntjes it was important that the founding entrepreneurs assembled the right people at their side and that the founding entrepreneurs brought about a good cooperation between the government, funds and the business community.

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