ENGO influence : on the policy cycle of national lifestock manure policies : exploratory comparative case study of the Netherlands and Denmark

(1)

ENGO Influence

On The Policy Cycle of National Livestock Manure Policies

Exploratory Comparative Case Study of the Netherlands and Denmark

Master Research Project: Transnational Sustainability Governance Demi van Rijswijk demishannon@live.nl Student Number: 10801057 Political Science: International Relations Master Thesis Supervisor/1st Reader: dhr. dr. P. Schleifer

Second Reader: Conny Roggeband 21 June 2018 Word Count: 21362

(2)

(3)

Abbreviations

APAE Action Plans for the Aquatic Environment

EEB European Environmental Bureau

ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organization

EU European Union

N Nitrogen

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

(5)

1. Introduction

Demand for livestock products, primarily driven by population growth, income growth, and urbanization, keeps on rising (Thornton 2010: 2864). Simultaneously, the influence of livestock on climate change and the environment is becoming increasingly dominant in the public debate. Industrial livestock production leads to various detrimental impacts, such as human health issues, environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity, and poor animal welfare (Compassion in World Farming 2017: 1). Especially livestock manure creates a wide-ranging number of adverse environmental externalities (Sarteel, Tostivint, Landowski, Basset, Muehmel, Lockwood & Grebot 2016: 36).

“Livestock manure is organic material consisting primarily of a more or less homogenous mix of feces and urine from livestock, including bedding material, and secondarily of other material that would be discarded as waste from a livestock production such as fodder residues, silage effluents, and process water. The most important sub-groups of livestock manure are slurry, deep litter, liquid manure, and solid manure.” (Foged 2012: 6)

Livestock manure can pollute the air, water, and soil among multiple dimensions (Lankoski & Ollikainen 2003: 51). Negative impacts on the environment encompass eutrophication, soil acidification, and global warming related to ammonia emissions, nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) (Hou, Velthof, Case, Oelofse, Grignani, Balsari & Trindade 2016: 1620).

In Europe, there are several countries with high livestock densities, which is closely associated with the extensive amounts of livestock manure (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Manure Production in ton per ha of agricultural

(6)

Figure 1 demonstrates that the Netherlands and Denmark are European countries with extensive amounts of livestock manure production. This is caused by the Netherlands and Denmark having the highest livestock densities in Europe, together with France (Sarteel et al. 2016: 37). The trend of growing livestock production paired with the negative environmental impacts caused by livestock manure is taking place in both the Netherlands and Denmark.

For instance, both the Netherlands and Denmark are regions with the highest emissions of ammonia (Sarteel et al. 2016: 133). Ammonia emissions negatively influence the environmental and public health as well as climate change. Further, both regions also know high nitrogen leaching and run-off (Sarteel et al. 2016: 134). Nitrogen water pollution negatively influences the aquatic biodiversity and human health. Nitrogen pollution also leads to eutrophication and acidification in both regions (Sarteel et al. 2016: 134). While this is only a small section of the environmental effects, it shows that both countries experience the negative effects caused by high livestock densities paired with high livestock manure production.

To minimize and mitigate the adverse effects of nutrient surpluses on the environment caused by extensive amounts of livestock manure, several European regulations regarding the use and handling of livestock manure have been implemented. These are the EU Nitrates Directive, aimed at reducing water pollution caused by agricultural sources, and the EU Water Framework Directive, aimed at preserving the aquatic ecosystems (Sarteel et al. 2016: 107). Both the Netherlands and Denmark have livestock manure-related laws and regulations aiming at implementing these EU Directives and balanced fertilization (Sarteel et al. 2016: 108).

However, while extensive policy and regulation measures regarding livestock manure have been put in place in the Netherlands and Denmark, stakeholder opinions regarding the factors influencing livestock manure treatment policies have received limited recognition (Hou et al. 2016: 1621). “Stakeholders from different sectors can have diverse opinions when it comes to the objectives of a policy measure as well as the relevant actions needed to achieve it” (Hou et al. 2016: 1621). Hou et al. (2016) look at the stakeholder perceptions of livestock manure treatment policies. However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were left out of this research.

The absence of NGOs is remarkable since NGOs are progressively participating in national and global environmental politics. While animal welfare NGOs have proven to be successful in implementing legislation regarding a wide range of issues, such as transport of livestock, feedlots, and animal welfare (Wilkins, Houseman, Allan, Appleby, Peeling & Stevenson 2005: 630), the influence of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) on the policy cycle of the livestock manure policies in Denmark and the Netherlands has not been researched.

(7)

1

1.1. Research Question

The following research question will be analyzed:

How is the policy cycle of livestock manure policies on the national level influenced by environmental non-governmental organizations in the Netherlands and Denmark?

The following sub-research questions will lead to answering the primary research question: • How can ENGOs influence national environmental policymaking?

• What are the livestock manure policies and regulations in the Netherlands and Denmark?

• What are the policy objectives of the different ENGOs for livestock manure?

• What explains the different policy objectives of the ENGOs in Denmark and the Netherlands?

• What explains the similar ENGO influence across Denmark and the Netherlands?

1.2. Social Relevance

Empirically this research question aims to contribute to a better understanding of the growing concern of ‘tackling climate change through livestock’ researched by the FAO (Gerber, Steinfeld, Henderson, Mottet, Opio, Dijkman & Tempio 2013). Since tackling climate change has become an extremely urgent issue, the focus should also be on the contribution of livestock (Gerber et al. 2013).

Primarily, the deposition of livestock manure on pastures together with the fertilization of feed crops generate significant amounts of nitrous oxide emissions, representing one-quarter of the sector’s overall emissions (Gerber et al. 2013: 17). Further, methane and nitrous oxide emissions from livestock manure storage and processing represent about 10 percent of the sector’s emissions (Gerber et al. 2013: 17). Livestock manure is thus an essential contributor to climate change.

Additionally, as discussed above shortly, livestock production can contribute to several other detrimental environmental impacts. Environmental impacts caused by intensified livestock production create excess nitrogen in the environment, soil degradation, overuse and pollution of water, biodiversity loss, and several negative human health impacts (Compassion in World Farming 2017).

There is an increasing acknowledgment that these negative impacts caused by intensified livestock production need to be internalized (Compassion in World Farming 2017: 11). The principal objective of internalizing these negative impacts is to achieve a better

(8)

alignment between an individual’s incentives and societal objectives. Measures to internalize negative impacts are for instance legislation, fiscal measures and policies (Compassion in World Farming 2017: 12). The research will focus on the measures (livestock manure policies and regulations) set to internalize the costs of livestock manure and further identify the influence of ENGOs on these measures.

1.3. Academic Relevance

The scientific literature has recognized the increased role of ENGOs in environmental politics and has identified several reasons. First, governments alone cannot address environmental problems, which are becoming increasingly complex. Different stakeholders should cooperate in solving the current environmental problems (Harangozó & Zilahy 2015: 18). Second, NGOs and pressure groups have taken up the role of balancing the power of multinational corporations (Harangozó & Zilahy 2015: 18).

The thesis is academically relevant because of the lack of research on the influence of ENGOs on national environmental policymaking, which is contradictory to the increasing role of ENGOs in environmental politics. Why is there a lack of research on the national level? National governments are less inclined to intensively cooperate with civil society organizations or give NGOs responsibilities when the government has the ability and capacity to rely on vertical supervision (Börzel & Risse 2010). Börzel and Risse (2010) argue that governments are not only interested in increasing their problem-solving capacity but also in maintaining their autonomy. This explains why the vast majority of the co-regulation with NGOs takes place at the international level where a government has fewer opportunities to achieve its goals through vertical supervision (Börzel & Risse 2010). This is why the current literature is more focused on the influence of ENGOs on the international level.

However, Hou et al. (2016) look at the stakeholder opinions regarding the factors influencing livestock manure treatment policies on the national level. Few studies (Gebrezgabher et al. 2015; Hoppe & Sanders 2014; Viaene et al. 2016) have been conducted to investigate stakeholder perceptions of factors influencing the adoption of livestock manure treatment policies on the national level (Hou et al. 2016: 1621). “Stakeholders from different sectors can have diverse opinions when it comes to the objectives of a policy measure as well as the relevant actions needed to achieve it” (Hou et al. 2016: 1621). However, while this study looks at the stakeholder perceptions, ENGOs were left out of this research. Since ENGOs are an active participator in environmental governance, there should also be a focus on the role and influence of these stakeholders when it comes to livestock manure policies. The literature review will reveal the gap where there lacks a focus on the influence of ENGOs on national environmental politics.

(9)

1.4. Main Argument

The approach of this research is inductive. This means that the research is first based on observations, to propose theories towards the end of the research process as a result of the observations (George & Bennett 2005: 7). So the aim of this research is not to test a theory, but exploring new phenomena. Since the research on the national influence of ENGOs on the national livestock manure policies is insufficient, this research will be based on an explorative case study analysis. This research will conduct the first initial research on the topic of ENGO influence on the national livestock manure policies in the Netherlands and Denmark. The objective of exploratory research is to gather preliminary information that will help to define the main problems (George & Bennett 2005: 21). The analysis is based on two explorations: first, the mapping of the different ENGOs active in the policy cycle of the livestock manure issue in the Netherlands and Denmark and the policy objectives of these organizations. Second, the exploration of the different ways ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark try to influence livestock manure politics.

The research will argue that ENGO influence in the Netherlands and Denmark seems to be quite similar. This might first be explained by the system in the Netherlands and Denmark being both open. An open society with democratic mechanisms leads to interaction and feedback among the government. This leads to the integration of actors into policymaking processes in both the Netherlands and Denmark. Second, some active ENGOs on the national level are international NGOs (Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth), thus having similar strategies implemented on the Dutch and Danish national level from above. Lastly, ENGOs active on the livestock manure issues are members of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB). EEB organizes working groups where ENGOs exchange information. This exchange of information might explain the similar ENGO influence since strategies can be taken over by other ENGOs. However, the policy objectives of the Danish and Dutch ENGOs differ. There is an emphasis on converting livestock manure into biogas in Denmark, while this biogas debate is still quite absent under Dutch ENGOs. Further, there is more cooperation with animal welfare NGOs and an emphasis on animal welfare in relation to livestock manure in the Netherlands.

1.5. Thesis Outline

First, the literature review will be discussed, focusing on ENGO influence on national environmental politics. The literature review will answer the sub-research question ‘how can ENGOs influence national environmental policymaking’? The theoretical framework will follow, discussing three essential concepts: ENGOs, NGO influence, and the policy cycle. This

(10)

will also include the measurement of NGO influence. Moreover, the methodology will be discussed, followed by the analysis. The first part of the analysis will discuss the cases separately. The chapters first focus on the livestock manure policies both on the European level and in Denmark and the Netherlands itself, followed by a discussion of the ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark. The vision for livestock manure and policy objectives of the ENGOs will be discussed, followed by analyzing how ENGOs try to influence the policy cycle of livestock manure policies on the national level. This part of the analysis will answer the sub-research questions ‘what are the livestock manure policies and regulations in the Netherlands and Denmark’ and ‘what are the policy objectives of the different ENGOs for livestock manure’? The second part of the analysis will compare the policy objectives of ENGOs and ENGO influence in the Netherlands and Denmark. This last part of the analysis will focus on the sub-research questions ‘what explains the different policy objectives of the ENGOs in Denmark and the Netherlands?’ and ‘what explains the similar NGO influence across Denmark and the Netherlands’?

(11)

2. Literature Review

The literature review will systematically review the existing literature on ENGO influence on national environmental politics. It will reveal the gap where, on the one hand, there is much literature written on international ENGOs and the influence on the international level of environmental politics, and on the other hand, civil society literature which focuses on national NGO influence but not on environmental issues. This reveals the gap in the literature. There lacks a focus on the influence of national ENGOs on national environmental politics.

2.1. Global NGO Influence: Environmental Politics

While ENGO influence on the international level has been researched extensively (Corell & Betsill 2001; Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu 2002; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Humhreys 2004), significantly less literature is written on the influence of ENGOs on national policymaking. As discussed in the introduction, Börzel and Risse (2010) argue that governments are not only interested in increasing their problem-solving capacity but also in maintaining their autonomy. This explains why the vast majority of the co-regulation with NGOs takes place at the international level where a government has fewer opportunities to achieve its goals through vertical supervision (Börzel & Risse 2010).

NGOs are becoming increasingly important at all levels: local, national, and global. However, much literature has been written about ENGOs on the global level when it comes to environmental politics and the influence of ENGOs. Based on the literature on the global level, some distinctions have been made for ENGOs. NGOs tend to be developed differently in different sectors. ENGOs are primarily membership organizations based in the North, which promote and lobby for environmental interests both internationally and nationally (Carr, Humphreys & Thomas 2013: 3).

ENGOs are no homogenous group. There is a distinction between the traditional activist groups and the more research-focused groups with the expertise to promote environmental goals. Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004: 56) examine the role of ENGOs on the global level and distinguish ENGOs in two groups: first, “the activist organizations that secure funding and legitimacy through offering membership and popular support” and second, “advisory organizations that secure funding and legitimacy through their ability to give policy recommendations and inform decision-makers” (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 56). Activist ENGOs are for example Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 56).

(12)

Further, Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004: 56) differentiate two central strategies based on the distinction between activist and advisory organizations. First, ENGOs can attempt an insider strategy, seeking to secure influence by working closely with the government by presenting expert advice and policy solutions related to the environment. These organizations also engage in producing knowledge and research-based reports. Second, ENGOs can attempt an outsider strategy, where the organization tries to comply with international environmental agreements by putting pressure on the government and other groups through campaigning, letters of protest, direct actions, rallying, and boycotts. The tactic is to influence public opinion to push governments to comply with international environmental commitments (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 57). It is often argued that especially in world politics ENGOs dominate the agenda setting, which means that ENGOs are primarily responsible for introducing environmental interests internationally (Carr et al. 2013: 2).

Among ENGOs, the insider and outsider dimension is likely to differ. Several ENGOs are pursuing a dual strategy. Especially the major ENGOs with substantial resources tend to have a dual strategy. The broad insider and outside categories can be broken down in terms of what groups the various types of ENGOs target: international negotiations and processes, national climate policy and ratification, industry’s climate policy and behavior, or public opinion (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 57).

The final point regarding the ENGOs power to influence environmental policy is the kind of resources that the various types of ENGOs have. There are several sources of influence ENGOs can rely on to convey information and to influence decision-makers: intellectual base, membership base, political base, or financial base. The distinction defines the opportunity set of ENGOs concerning exerting political influence. The resources are interchangeably linked to the type of chosen strategies and the arenas the organization targets (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 58). The assumption is that the higher score on resources, the higher the likelihood that ENGOs could influence environmental policies. However, resources do not always translate into political influence (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 58).

The ENGOs know a relatively high level of recognition for a variety of governance activities. The recognition may stem from the combination of broad power sources for ENGOs. Especially larger ENGOs have both financial strength, contact with decision-makers, and also established media strategies. This gives them both leverage and material powers (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Linnér 2016: 122). However, it is often argued that the financial strength of ENGOs is often not as structural as businesses. Businesses are expected to contribute financial resources to attack for instance climate change on a much bigger scale than ENGOs. One interpretation of the results is that influencing the agenda and decisions is less associated with endogenous recourses (ENGOs) than with structural power (businesses) that can be employed to affect change (Nasiritousi et al. 2017: 122).

(13)

After discussing the type of ENGOs, strategies, and the resources, ENGOs can take up five key potential roles in the realm of international environmental governance (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 13): information-based duties, inputs into policy development, operational functions, assessment and monitoring, and advocacy for environmental justice. The potential roles would also help to identify the goals of the different ENGOs and how the organizations attain political influence.

As discussed before, one type of ENGOs is advisory organizations. The main role of this organization is information-based duties. Policymakers often read opinion papers and other documents written by ENGOs, which can shed new lights on the options for change (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 13). Second, inputs in policy development present the ENGOs assuming a more active role in the process of agenda setting and policy development. ENGOs are instrumental in notifying the public, government, and international organizations on critical new issues (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 14).

Thirdly, the operational functions of ENGOs in the realm of environmental governance relate to the implementation phase and the provision of services. It is argued that ENGOs are particularly useful in an operational context since they can provide implementation tailored to specific conditions. For instance, the management of natural resources is often best handled by community-based organizations that have a stake in the local environment (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 16). Fourthly, performance assessment and monitoring of environmental conditions undertaken by ENGOs can hold decision-makers accountable for decisions in ways that the governmental system itself cannot accomplish (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 17). These four key potential roles are overlapping with the policy cycle, which will be discussed in the theoretical framework.

In conclusion, the first part of the literature review thus showed that considerable literature has been written on the type of ENGOs and how these organizations can exert political influence. However, this is all focused on the international and global level. The civil society literature on national NGOs will now be discussed further.

2.2. National NGO Influence: Civil Society Literature

As discussed above, the literature on environmental politics focuses mainly on the global level. However, in this research, the general influence of ENGOs on the national level will be discussed. Civil society literature focuses on national NGOs and how the national NGOs can exert influence. NGOs and government can have different interaction patterns. Horizontal relationships or also known as intra-level relationships (Relationship 1 in Figure 2) include the different relations at the national level between NGOs and the national government (Coston 1998). This study will focus on relationship 1.

(14)

Figure 2 Model of government-NGO relations (Bouget & Prouteau 2002: 33).

Internationalization broadens the possibilities for state-NGO interaction on the national level (Bouget & Prouteau 2002: 31). Both internationalization and downsizing of the nation-state have been an essential driver in institutional pluralism. This expands the political and policy space of civil society in the national spheres. A necessary aspect of government-NGO relations that concern policy dialogue on the national level is related to the trust issue: representativeness of NGOs. The extent to which NGOs depict ‘authentic electorates’ determines the legitimacy. This perception influences the willingness of the government to listen to NGOs (Bouget & Prouteau 2002: 32).

Different types and roles of NGOs have been identified, which determines the kind of influence on the national level. For instance, Elkington and Beloe (2010: 25-26) classified the different types of NGOs. NGOs can either disrupt the status quo through confrontation (‘shark’ NGOs), or NGOs can seek collaboration with businesses, government, and other stakeholders with the goal of changing the status quo (‘dolphin’ NGOs). This distinction can also be defined as activist NGOs (shark NGOs) or moderate NGOs (dolphin NGOs) (Buurma, Hoes, de Greef, & Beekman 2017: 163). These two kinds of NGOs can support each other in achieving changes (Buurma et al. 2017: 173).

The most common distinction between NGOs on the national level is that of operational and campaigning NGOs. The first one relates to small-scale change achieved directly through projects, while the latter means large-scale change promoted indirectly through influence on the political system (Campo, Hamada, Barbiroli, Sassen, Barbieri-Masini, Nchoji Nkwi, Sichone, & Momoh 2010: 37). Operational NGOs have to mobilize resources, in the form of donations, volunteer labor, or materials, to sustain their programs. Campaigning NGOs will carry out much

(15)

of the same functions. However, while fundraising is still necessary, it is needed on a much smaller scale (Campo et al. 2010: 38). The defining activities, implementing projects for operational NGOs or holding demonstrations for campaigning NGOs, differentiates them (Campo et al. 2010: 38). This means the different types of NGOs also try to influence the government differently.

Further, Yan, Lin, and Clarke (2018: 1) argue that while the academic literature has recognized that NGO involvement may lead to more proactive outcomes, there is still a limited understanding of NGO’s various roles in collaborative settings. They identify three roles of NGOs in partnerships: enabling roles, coordinating roles, and facilitating roles. Partnerships between NGOs and governments have emerged more and more. NGOs in this context usually act as assistance providers to inform information to achieve specific goals (Yan et al. 2018: 2). The NGOs take a consultative role to provide support and documentation. NGOs also disseminate information and expertise (Yan et al. 2018: 4). This can be seen as an enabling role. Additionally, NGOs have recognized the usefulness of expanding their partnerships with the private sector. This is seen as a strategic means to diversify their resource base as an organization and strengthen the partners’ scope to become ‘responsible’ citizens (Yan et al. 2018: 2). “NGOs used to lobby for corporate change through advocacy.” Nowadays, NGOs help other partners to develop environmental advancement (Yan et al. 2018: 3). This changed the lobby spheres since NGOs do not have to lobby directly against corporations.

Civil society literature thus focuses on national NGOs and how the national NGOs can exert influence. However, this literature is not focused on ENGOs or national environmental policymaking. This reveals the gap where, on the one hand, there is much literature written on international ENGOs and the influence on the international level of environmental politics, and on the other hand, civil society literature which focuses on national NGOs and their influence on the national level but not on environmental issues. This reveals the gap in the literature. There lacks a focus on the influence of national ENGOs on national environmental politics.

(16)

3. Theoretical Framework

In the theoretical framework, three concepts will be discussed. First, the term ENGO will be conceptualized. Second, the conceptualization and operationalization of NGO influence will be discussed, providing a framework for measuring NGO influence qualitatively. Lastly, the conceptualization of the policy cycle will be addressed and how this is linked to NGO influence.

3.1. Conceptualization Environmental Non-Governmental Organization

The first important concept is NGO. The term came into currency in 1945 because of the need for the United Nations to differentiate in its charter between participation rights for specialized intergovernmental agencies and international private organizations (Campo et al. 2010: 25). There is, however, no generally accepted definition of an NGO (Campo et al. 2010: 26). Some fundamental features are: independent from government control, not seeking to challenge governments as a political party, not for profit, and noncriminal. These features match the conditions for acknowledgement by the United Nations (Campo et al. 2010: 25).

NGOs are prominent actors in civil society. Society is composed of three sectors: government, the private sector, and civil society (Campo et al. 2010: 26). NGOs constitute the third sector. Civil society is the sphere of social life that is public but excludes the government. Civil society classifies persons, institutions, and organizations that have the goal of advancing a common purpose (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu 2002: 3).

“An NGO is defined as an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making money, or illegal activities” (Campo et al. 2010: 27).

Civil society is the broader concept to encompass all social activity (Campo et al. 2010: 26). NGOs do not belong to the public or the private sector. The aim is to serve a particular societal interest on a local or global level (Schwenger, Straub & Borzillo 2014: 11). ENGOs are NGOs in the field of environmentalism. ENGOs have the goal of advancing the environment, and the environment is their particular societal interest (Schwenger et al. 2014: 11).

NGOs are structured in a great variety of ways. The classic model relates to a membership organization, “coordinated in a geographically defined hierarchy.” The countrywide organizations are called national NGOs (Campo et al. 2010: 32). This relates to one of the ambiguities about the term NGO: whether it is referring to the local, provincial, national, regional, or global level (Campo et al. 2010: 32). However, the term NGO covers both national and international NGOs (Campo et al. 2010: 32).

(17)

3.2. Conceptualization and Operationalization of NGO Influence

While the above-discussed classification of NGOs in the literature review provided some insights into how NGOs try to influence national politics, it is further essential to conceptualize and operationalize NGO influence.

3.2.1. Conceptualization

Before operationalizing NGO influence, it is first essential to conceptualize. Influence is interchangeably linked to power in the International Relations literature. Defining influence and constructing its relationship with power has proven to be a demanding challenge. “While influence is a relationship between actors and emerges in the political process, power refers to capability – the aggregate of political resources available to an actor” (Betsill & Corell 2001: 73). Power can be transformed in influence, but it can also be not transformed to its full extent or at all. Oppositely, power is not essential for exerting influence (Betsill & Corell 2001: 73).

NGOs can exert influence by “using their specialized knowledge to modify the actions taken by state decision-makers by altering the conceptions of their interests” (Betsill & Corell 2001: 74). NGOs are assumed to function well in an open society, such as the Netherlands and Denmark. The structure of the Danish and Dutch system and the democratic mechanisms enable interactions and also feedback between NGOs and the government (Wietze & Bayramoglu Lise 2002: 14). Such a political system experiences high levels of flexibility and openness, which makes it feasible and practical to integrate actors into the agenda building and policymaking processes (Wietze & Bayramoglu Lise 2002: 14).

3.2.2. Operationalization

An operationalization of NGO influence is necessary since it is one of the central concepts in the research. Scholars often rely on three kinds of evidence of NGO influence: NGO activities (for example lobbying or submitting information to decision makers), access to negotiations (number of NGOs attending decision-making and the rules of participation), and lastly NGO resources (for example knowledge and financial resources) (Betsill & Corell 2001: 69).

While these three kinds of evidence show the engagement of NGOs in environmental negotiations, this does not show the subsequent effects (Betsill & Corell 2001: 69). NGO activity does not automatically convert into influence. So the focus should also turn to the effects of NGO participation and not only the participation itself. This can be identified as the actual goal attainment of the objectives of NGOs (Betsill & Corell 2001: 71). Goal attainment addresses both what knowledge and information were transmitted and whether negotiators

(18)

reacted by altering their behavior. NGOs goals can focus both on the outcome as well as the process of the negotiations (Betsill & Corell 2001: 75).

Betsill and Corell (2001: 65) theoretically developed an analytical framework for estimating NGO influence, as shown in Table 1.

2 Dimensions of NGO Influence

1) Intentional transmission of information 2) Behavior of other actors

NGO participation Activities:

What did NGOs do to transmit information to decision makers?

Access:

What opportunities did NGOs have to transmit information?

Resources:

What sources of leverage did NGOs use to transmit information?

Goal attainment Outcome:

Does the final agreement reflect NGO goals and principles?

Process:

Did negotiators discuss issues proposed by NGOs (or cease to discuss issues opposed by NGOs)?

Table 1 Two dimensions of NGO influence, adapted from Betsill and Corell (2001: 79).

NGO influence can be measured first by intentional transmission of information (NGO participation focused on activities, access, and resources) and second by the behavior of other actors (goal attainment focused both on the outcome and process) (Betsill and Corell 2001: 79).

The first measure of NGO influence (transmission of information) is distinguished by what the NGOs are doing (activities and resources) and the political opportunity structure (access). Political opportunities point out those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that social groups have to mobilize effectively. This is related to the relative openness of the political system, the stability of elite alignments, the presence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and the tendency for repression (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire & Prakash 2014: 718). It is not clear if enthusiasm for NGO participation is shared even across advanced industrial democracies. The resources, attention, and political space afforded to NGOs have political consequences as NGOs may create political uncertainty and upset the political status quo (Bloodgood et al. 2014: 717).

Bloodgood et al. (2014) investigated in advanced industrial democracies the incentives for the political order to support NGOs. The research focused on three factors: barriers to entry,

(19)

the ability to combine advocacy with service delivery, and the scope of economic activity. Both the Netherlands and Denmark score quite similar on the corporatism index, have corporatist macro-institutions, similar regulatory index, and a restrictive regulatory style (Bloodgood et al. 2014: 723). Any restrictions based on the political opportunity structure are thus to be expected similar in the Netherlands and Denmark.

The most direct indication of the second measure (behavior of other actors) of NGO influence is whether the final agreement reflects NGO goals. If NGOs influenced the negotiations, it is rational to expect coherence between ideas presented by the NGOs during negotiations and the ideas embedded in the final agreement. The agreement can contain specific text drafted by NGOs or reflect a general idea introduced by NGOs (Betsill and Corell 2001: 75).

There is, however, the problem of identifying NGO goals. Frequently, there is a gap between what NGOs publicly demand and what they privately want to achieve. Especially ENGOs are infamous for promoting severe positions as a strategy for pushing state decision-makers in different directions (Betsill and Corell 2001: 75). This makes it difficult to determine whether the NGO achieved the goals and identified the need to also look at the negotiation process (Betsill and Corell 2001: 75).

During the negotiation process, information provided by NGOs may affect the debates by placing components on the agenda or by imposing decision-makers to focus on particular issues in more depth. Another procedural indicator of NGO influence is if the delegates give sincere consideration to an NGO proposal, even if it is not included in the final agreement. NGOs can also be influential if evidence can be found suggesting that the NGO has shaped the jargon used by state decision-makers during the negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2001: 76). This framework provides a richer picture of NGO influence by looking both at the intentional transmission of information as well as its effects on other actors (Betsill and Corell 2001: 76).

Gulbrandsen & Andresen (2004: 59) add another measurement of influence, next to access to negotiations and goal attainment: ego and alter perceptions. This measures how NGOs judge their capacity to exercise influence but also how negotiators and other key actors judge those capacities from their side. The chance is that NGOs may overestimate their influence (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59). For instance, an interesting finding from Nasiritousi et al. (2016: 121) is that other parties perceive ENGOs as being weaker in proposing viable solutions and representing public opinion compared to how they view their self-image.

3.3. Conceptualization Policy Cycle

The third concept is the policy cycle (Figure 3). The policy cycle is a tool used to understand the different policy phases better. This can be linked to measuring NGO influence since it provides

(20)

a tool to identify in which policy phases the NGOs exert the most influence. As discussed in the literature review, NGOs can take up five key potential roles in the realm of environmental governance (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002: 13): information-based duties, inputs into policy development, operational functions, assessment and monitoring, and advocacy for environmental justice.

This seems to be overlapping with the policy cycle. Information-based duties and inputs into policy development can be overlapping with the agenda setting and policy formulation phase. Further, operational functions and assessment and monitoring are similar to the policy implementation and monitoring and evaluation phase. NGOs thus can influence different phases based on the role they take up in the realm of environmental governance. The policy cycle tool thus can be used to identify the different roles ENGOs can have on the level of national environmental governance as well as identify in which policy phase they are trying to be influential.

Since the 1950s, policy analysis has been tightly connected with the perspective that the policy process evolves through a sequence of phases (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 43). Lasswell first introduced the idea of modeling the policy process in terms of phases. Since then, different differentiations of (sub-) phases have been initiated. However, the distinction between agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation has become the typical approach to describe the chronology of the policy process (Figure 3) (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 43).

Figure 3 Policy cycle (James Anderson 2014).

The cyclical perspective emphasizes the feedback processes between outputs and inputs of policymaking (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 44). The tendency of policies to create unintended consequences became evident through this policy process approach. However, it is important to keep in mind that this is a simplified and ideal-type model of the policy process (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 44). Despite its limitations, the policy cycle is still an adequate system to organize

(21)

and systemize public policy and to identify the influence of NGOs on different phases (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 45). The different phases will be discussed separately.

3.3.1. Agenda Setting Phase

The first phase is agenda setting. Policymaking assumes the recognition of a policy problem. Problem recognition itself demands “that a social problem has been defined as such and that the necessity of state intervention has been indicated” (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 45). The recognized problem needs to be put on the agenda for serious consideration. The agenda is “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside the government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 45). The government agenda is differentiated from the media and overall public agenda. However, the means of problem recognition and issue selection for the government agenda is connected to the way a social problem is perceived and recognized on the public and media agenda (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 45).

Actors outside the government continually seek to influence and shape the agenda, as well as the actors within the government (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 46). The actual agenda setting is characterized by different patterns of actor composition and the role of the public. First, the outside-initiation pattern, where social actors force governments to place an issue on the systematic agenda by gaining public support. Second, policies can also be initiated without public input. This happens when actors outside the government have direct access to government agencies and are capable of putting issues on the agenda. The agriculture policy in some European countries is an example of this inside-initiation pattern of agenda setting (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 46). Lastly, the third type is consolidation whereby the state actors initiate an issue where public support is already high (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 47).

While earlier figures of agenda setting focused on the economic and social aspects as explanatory variables, the role of ideas expressed in the public has become more influential in shaping the perception of a particular problem (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 47). NGOs are often successful in influencing public opinion and also bringing problems to the public agenda (Casey 2004: 249).

3.3.2. Policy Formulation and Decision Making Phase

The second and third phases are policy formulation and decision-making. During this phase, expressed problems and proposals are transformed into government programs. Policy formulation and adoption encompasses the definition of objectives and the examination of different alternatives (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 48). These two phases are intertwined, and it is often hard to make a clear-cut separation between the policy formulation and decision making

(22)

phase. Formulating policies means continually interacting with social actors and forming stable relationships (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 49). Further, decision-making comprises not only information gathering and processing but also consists of conflict resolution between different actors and the government (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 49).

However, while the final decision on a specific policy remains in the realm of the decision-making institutions, the policy formulation phase is open for other actors. Often the processes in the preliminary phases of decision-making strongly influence the outcome and often shape the policy to a more significant extent than the final processes within the parliamentary arena (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 49). The particular system of actors within policy networks varies between different policy domains (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 50).

A crucial aspect of the policy formulation phase represents the role of policy advice. Scientific research is one of the diverse sources of information that is brought into the policymaking process (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 51). Experts play an increasingly visible role in representing knowledge within the public debate on political issues (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 51). However, while NGOs appear to be quite influential in the policy formulation phase, they are less influential in determining the form of public policies. NGOs try to influence the framing process of the policy, which creates a belief system. Moreover, NGOs are less successful in influencing specific actions (Casey 2004: 249).

3.3.3. Implementation and Evaluation Phase

However, a decision does not guarantee that the actions on the ground will strictly follow the aims and objectives of policymakers. The phase of execution and enforcement of policy is referred to as implementation (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 51). Policy implementation can be defined as “what happens between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of the government to do something or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 51). Implementation can be both top-down as well as bottom-up (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 53).

Further, the assumption with policymaking is that it contributes to problem solving or at least to a reduction of the problem. During the evaluation phase of the policy cycle, the intended outcomes of policies become the center of attention. However, also the unintended consequences of the policies play a role in this phase (Wegrich & Jann 2006: 53). Policy evaluation can lead to diverse patterns of policy learning. For instance, it can lead to different implications for feedback mechanisms or even a potential restart of the policy process.

NGOs generally seek to participate in the agenda setting phase and the later reformulation phases of the policy cycle. The implementation phases and the evaluation phase are thus the less interesting phases to investigate when it comes to NGO influence. NGO tend to

(23)

be more directed towards convincing actors to change the existing policies or focus on a policy area that is being ignored, rather than to focus on the phase of policy implementation (Casey 2004: 249).

This theoretical framework thus provided a conceptualization and operationalization of three essential concepts: ENGO, NGO influence, and the policy cycle. NGO influence can be measured by focusing on ‘intentional transmission of information’ and the ‘behavior of other actors.’ Further, the policy cycle is a tool used to understand the different policy phases better. This can be linked to measuring NGO influence since it provides a tool to identify in which policy phases the NGOs exert the most influence. These concepts will be used in the analysis. However, before discussing the case studies separately, followed by a comparison, the methodology will be discussed first.

(24)

4. Methodology

The methodology section will examine four different issues: the research design, case selection, data collection and analysis, and the limitations of the research.

4.1. Research Design

Starting with the research design, the method used will be a qualitative case study method. Specifically, a case study comparison will be made. Case studies offer a depth of information as it captures many variables to identify how certain circumstances come together (George & Bennett 2005: 7). As discussed in the introduction, the goal of the research is to do an explorative case study analysis since there has been no specific research done on the influence of ENGOs on the national livestock manure policies in the Netherlands and Denmark. However, a common criticism of case study designs is that it is not representative of a broader social setting and therefore cannot be used to make generalizations (George & Bennett 2005: 31), but since the influence of ENGOs on livestock manure policies has not been researched before, this should also not be the aim of this research. Nonetheless, a comparative case study is a bit more representative than just one case (George & Bennet 2005: 18).

The case study method is versatile when it comes to gathering information. The research is combining process tracing with interviews. Process tracing is a useful method to measure ENGO participation (since the objective of process tracing is to establish a clear chain of evidence by linking cause and effect (George & Bennett 2005: 6)), while interviews would be an excellent method to measure the actual goal attainment of the ENGO. These two dimensions of NGO influence are based on the analytical framework created by Corell and Betsill (2001).

4.2. Case Selection

The research will thus be based on a comparative case study. Both the Netherlands and Denmark are quite similar on specific variables. First, they are both regions within Europe with extremely high livestock manure production (Sarteel et al. 2016: 105). Second, they are both intensive livestock producers. Third, they both have extensive livestock manure policies and regulations put in place (Sarteel et al. 2016). The Netherlands and Denmark are thus quite similar on variables related to livestock production and livestock manure.

While this research initially would have been based on the method of difference and thus a controlled comparison, this did not work out. The initial argument was that the actual ENGO influence in the Netherlands and Denmark would be different. However, after gathering some initial data and doing interviews, this did not seem the case. The ENGO influence is quite

(25)

similar in both countries. Only the policy objectives of the ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark seem to differ. Based on these results, the research moved away from a controlled comparison based on the method of difference. The goal of this research is more inductive and thus based on an explorative case study analysis.

4.3. Data Collection and Analysis

An overview will be given of the different types of data that were collected and analyzed for the research. Interviews were done with ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark. So, the first type of data used is in-depth interviews. I carried out semi-structured interviews and got in contact with ENGOs via email to arrange the interviews. Since ENGOs are committed to advancing a common purpose, I expected this data to be accessible. The following ENGOs would have been interesting to interview: Milieudefensie, Natuur & Milieu, Greenpeace, Brabantse Milieufederatie, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening, Det Økologiske Råd, Vedvarende Energi, NOAH, and Greenpeace Nordic. I tried to get in contact with all the above-listed ENGOs. I also tried to get in contact with animal welfare NGOs in the Netherlands: Dierenbescherming and Wakker Dier.

The employees of ‘Milieudefensie’ were too busy to accommodate to all the interview requests. ‘Wakker Dier’ has only a few employees, and they do no interviews. I had contact with the ‘Dierenbescherming,’ but after sending a questionnaire, they contacted me that they could not answer the questions. ‘Danmarks Naturfredningsforening’ was open to doing an interview, but when I tried to make concrete plans, they did not respond anymore. The ENGO ‘Vedvarende Energi’ responded that the organization does not work much with livestock manure. The other ENGOs did not give any response: Brabantse Milieufederatie, Natuur & Miliefederatie Noord-Holland, NOAH, Greenpeace, and Greenpeace Nordic. Some interviews were, however, planned. I had an interview with the Dutch ENGO ‘Natuur & Milieu’ on April 17, 2018. Further, I had an interview with the Danish ENGO ‘Det Økologiske Råd’ on May 15, 2018. Preferably, I would have wanted to arrange more interviews with ENGOs, but the responses were limited. I tried to get in contact with several organizations via different employees, but still, I was not able to arrange any more interviews.

Also, interviews with other actors such as policymakers and other stakeholders would have been desirable, since NGOs alone may overemphasize their influence. As discussed in the theoretical framework, ego and alter perceptions measure how NGOs judge their capacity to exercise influence but also how negotiators and other key actors judge those capacities from their side. The chance is that NGOs may overestimate their influence. Crucial actors here would be lobbying farmer groups and policymakers. I tried to get in contact with different groups: LTO, Agrifirm, Groengas Nederland, RVO, Danish Agriculture, De Groene11 and Food

(26)

Council. These are prominent stakeholders when it comes to this issue and experience the developments set by the livestock manure policies and regulations. However, due to limited time and writing space and because of the lack of response of these organizations, I chose to focus entirely on ENGOs and not discuss the ego and alter perceptions of the lobbying farmer groups and policymakers. However, I did have one interview with an employee of a biogas foundation in the Netherlands called ‘Groen Gas Nederland’ on Juni 1, 2018.

Further, I also analyzed different documents. These were media articles, ENGO documents, and policy documents. I first started off by mapping the different ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark that are active on the livestock manure issue. This has been done by searching for letters about livestock manure send to the government by ENGOs. For discussing the policy objectives of these ENGOs on the livestock manure issue, I searched on the ENGO websites for ENGO documents and analyzed their policy objectives for livestock manure. In the Netherlands, the most important ENGOs have published articles focused on the policy objectives for livestock manure. However, for Danish ENGOs, it was much harder to find definite articles on the livestock manure issue, since most ENGOs are focused on renewable energy. I, therefore, used the website of the Danish ENGOs to find information. This led to the first mapping exercise.

The second mapping exercise focuses on the actual ENGO influence on the national livestock manure policies in the Netherlands and Denmark. Besides using interviews, different documents were analyzed. I started off by searching for ENGO documents on the ENGO websites. In the Netherlands, the ENGO ‘Natuur & Milieu’ published an article about the influence of ENGOs in the Netherlands on livestock manure politics. Based on discussed events in this article, media articles and policy documents were looked up that were related. However, I had to make the decision to focus only on the two biggest ENGOs active in the Netherlands to showcase ENGO influence. This was caused by the limited writing space. In Denmark, there was not an article published about the ENGO influence on livestock manure politics. So it was much harder to find information. However, first ENGO documents were looked up, followed by looking up media articles and policy documents. This was harder to find since my lack of fluency in the Danish language. Some Danish documents were also available in English, but not all. I tried to understand the Danish documents by translating them into English myself.

So within the research, there is a combining of process tracing with interviews. As discussed before, process tracing is an excellent method to measure ENGO participation (since the objective of process tracing is to establish a clear chain of evidence by linking cause and effect), while interviews are a sufficient method to measure the actual goal attainment of the ENGO.

(27)

4.4. Limitations of Research

The qualitative case study method can cause potential problems with data validity, reliability, and replicability. How will be dealt with this? Data validity refers to the credibility of the research. There are two aspects of validity: internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the correct measurement of concepts, and external validity refers to the generalization of the study. Internal validity applies in studies that seek to establish a causal relationship between two variables and refers to the degree of good interferences about this causal relationship have been made (George & Bennett 2005: 19).

Even though the main purpose of this study is inductive and thus not to establish a causal relationship between two variables, the study still explores the links between the ENGOs and their influence on the policy cycle of the livestock manure policies. Since influence is hard to measure and often relies on opinions which actors were influential, one problem with this study was to know if the ENGOs were the influential actors. However, the objective of this study was not to make causal links, but a firsthand exploration of ENGO influence. Further, using multiple approaches and integrating the information through a process of triangulation can enhance the internal data validity of the comparative case study (George & Bennett 2005: 19). Combining interviews with process tracing will lead to this triangulation. Since this exploratory study is not concerned with making causal statements, incorrect conclusions for causal relationships cannot be made.

The external validity of the case study will be limited. First, only two countries have been studied. These two countries are developed countries in Europe. So while the results can maybe conclude about the ‘larger group’ of ENGO influence in developed, Western countries, it is quite hard to generalize the conclusions to ENGO influence in less developed countries. Second, the obtained results via interviews represent an individual opinion of different actors. It was quite hard to know if this was indeed the opinion of the organization or the opinion of the individual representative during the interview. Trying to limit this discrepancy has been done through linking ENGO documents to the opinions given during the interview.

Further, reliability refers to the repeatability of findings. Data reliability becomes problematic when doing interviews since each interview is unique and does not lead to the same results. However, the more the interview structure decreases, so does the reliability. To increase the reliability, semi-structured interviews and not unstructured interviews have been done. Additionally, as discussed before, by linking ENGO documents to the interviews this has been tried to be limited. Replicability is thus problematic with interviews since it is not possible for others to have the same interview.

Lastly, an explicit reflection should be included on ethical issues raised by this research. By doing interviews, it was first important to ask people for consent to be researched. I transcribed all the interviews and sent them to the interviewees after, for them to look if I

(28)

understood everything correctly during the interview. Further, I made clear that the information given during the interview would only be used for this master thesis and that it will not be published. I also arranged with all the interviewees that I would send them my final thesis for them to see how I analyzed the information they provided. In addition, I made sure that I guaranteed the interviewees’ anonymity, by presenting them as the ‘representative’ of the organization. Before discussing the two case studies, the EU regulations and Directives regarding livestock manure will be discussed first.

(29)

5. Analysis Part I: The Netherlands

After discussing the methodology, the analysis will now be examined. The analysis will consist of three chapters: two case study chapters of the Netherlands and Denmark (analysis part I) and a comparison chapter (analysis part II). In the case study chapters the national policies, the mapping of the active ENGOs, and ENGO influence will be discussed. First starting with the Netherlands.

5.1. EU Regulations and Directives: Livestock Manure

Before focusing on the national differentiations between policies and ENGOs in the Netherlands and Denmark, it is first necessary to discuss the directives set on the European Level. These measures are influential both in the Netherlands and Denmark and form a regulatory basis for the national level. Further, within both countries, ENGOs try to influence national measures related to livestock manure set on the European level.

The main problems from intensive livestock agriculture arise from excess N and P originating from livestock manure. These excesses can lead to eutrophication of natural areas, acidification of soils and lakes, and contamination of groundwater (Oenema 2004: 196). Governmental measures and policies regulating livestock production and the use of livestock manure in the member states of the European Union started to develop during the second half of the 1980s (Oenema 2004: 196).

From the early 1990s onward, EU environmental policies and measures started to overrule national environmental policies. There are currently two types of environmental legislation on the EU level: regulations and directives. Regulations are binding and directly applicable in the member states. Directives are still binding, but the objectives can be achieved in different ways by the member states (Oenema 2004: 201). The use of livestock manure is affected by two categories of EU policies and measures: the Water Framework Directive and the Air Quality Directive.

The Water Framework Directive calls for all inland and coastal waters to reach sufficient ecological status. The Water Framework Directive embodies a large number of other directives. The most critical directive for agriculture is the Nitrates Directive. The primary objective of this directive is “to decrease water pollution caused or induced by nitrates from agricultural sources and prevent further such pollution” (Oenema 2004: 202). Nitrate-vulnerable zones have been established which indicates that groundwater and surface waters in these zones are affected by nitrate pollution from agriculture. The Netherlands and Denmark have allocated the whole national territory as nitrate-vulnerable zone (Oenema 2004: 202).

(30)

Further, within the Nitrates Directive, a national action program is required for each member state. The action program must contain necessary measures related to limits to the amounts of livestock manure applied to land, periods when the application of livestock manure is prohibited, and capacity of and facilities for the storage of livestock manure (Oenema 2004: 202). Member states are obliged to monitor, assess the impact, and report the results to the European Commission. The limit of N from livestock manure has been questioned. Some countries may derogate from the limit when justified on the basis of scientific data. Denmark and the Netherlands are countries that can derogate from this limit (Oenema 2004: 202).

Lastly, the EU Air Quality Directive sets limits for the emission of ammonia and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere. Mitigation measures within this directive relate to manure application, manure storage, and livestock housing. There are significant differences in policy construction and implementation of these EU directives. However, the Netherlands and Denmark both have systems that are heavily based on legislation (Jakobsson, Sommer, De Clercq, Bonazzi & Schröder 2002: 1). Denmark has had fewer problems though with the implementation of the EU Nitrates Directive than the Netherlands (Oenema 2004: 205). The different livestock manure policy measures and regulations of Denmark and the Netherlands will be discussed further, starting with the Netherlands.

5.2. Livestock Manure Policy in The Netherlands

In 1984, the first governmental policies and measures regulating livestock manure were created. There are three phases in the livestock manure policy in the Netherlands: 1) stop increasing animal production (1984-1990), 2) stepwise decrease of the livestock manure burden (1990-1998), and 3) move toward balanced inputs of N and P (1998-present). The last phase was implemented in response to the EU Nitrates Directive (Oenema 2004: 203). The current livestock manure policies and regulations in the Netherlands are extensive (Rijksoverheid voor Ondernemend Nederland 2017).

The Nitrates Directive is implemented in the Netherlands via the ‘Meststoffenwet’ (Fertilizers Act) (Velthof, Koeijer, Schröder, Timmerman, Hooijboer, Rozemeijer & Groenendijk 2017: 26). The Fertilizers Act regulates the fertilization of agricultural land. The act contains five systems. The ‘Application Standards’ and ‘Instructions for Use’ are the first two systems. The application standards apply to the quantities of livestock manure that a farmer may drive out of his farmland. The Dutch livestock manure policy has three different types of application standards: a usage standard for livestock manure (expressed in nitrogen), application standards for the total amount of nitrogen (for all fertilizers), and application standards for the total amount of phosphate (for all fertilizers) (Rijksoverheid voor Ondernemend Nederland 2017). The Instructions for Use consist of rules for the spreading and use of fertilizers. These