Good fences make good
neighbours?
The European Union’s external governance and
migration management in Ceuta and Melilla
GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN CEUTA AND MELILLA
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author: Alexine van Olst
Main Supervisor: prof. dr. L. A. Bialasiewicz Second Supervisor: dr. M. E. Spiering
Table of contents
Introduction………p. 4 Chapter one: Theoretical Framework
Introduction……….p. 7
EU external governance in 'wider Europe' ………..p. 7
Modes of governance………p. 8
The limits of external governance………p. 10
Implementing EU external migration policy………...p. 11
The role of communication links in implementing EU external migration policy………p. 11
Migration management………p. 15
Conclusion……….p. 19
Chapter two: EU - Morocco Relations
Introduction………...p. 20
The French and Spanish Protectorates 1912-1956………..p. 20
Relations between the EU and Morocco after 1956……….p. 29
Chapter three: EU Migration policy
Introduction………..p. 38
The European Commission……….p.38
The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament……….p. 39
The European External Action Service………p. 39
Frontex………p. 40
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility……….p. 40
The Hague Programme ………..p. 44
The Stockholm Programme………p. 45
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees……….p. 46
Morocco's migration policy………p. 52
Chapter four: Border management in practice: Ceuta & Melilla
Introduction………...p. 54
From EU- accession to ‘Schengenland’………..………..……….p. 55
Fencing Europe: Fortress or Maze?...p. 59
From Country of Origin to Transit Country and Destination Country?...p. 62 Conclusion………p. 65 Bibliography……….p. 68
Introduction
The histories of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea are strongly connected.
From the understandings that European society is based on the ancient Greek society1, which had
its roots both on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to the heritage of Al-Andalus in Spain, the connections between the both sides of the sea are visible in many places.23
Since the borders of the European Union (EU) have spread to the edges of the continent and even beyond, the relationship between North-African countries and the EU have become of increasing significance for both.
This thesis focuses on the influence of external governance and migration management
discourses on the EU’s approach to migration policies. In order to research this, the two Spanish enclaves that make up the EU’s only border on the African continent, the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, will be discussed. The thesis investigates what impacts the changing EU discourses have had on both the EU’s migration policies and Morocco’s migration policies.
For both the EU and the MENA-region, the cooperation within the region, through frameworks such as the Barcelona Process or its successor the Union for the Mediterranean, matters. As the High Representative Catherine Ashton stated on Europe Day in 2012: ‘’Europe has always been outward looking and open. We have consistently influenced the way the world thinks – about trade, the environment, climate change, the death penalty, the International Criminal Court, and many other important issues. I am convinced that Europe must remain actively engaged around the world. And equally that our international work can help to underpin our economic
recovery.’’4
More recently, the High Representative has said that ‘’[...] engagement with our neighbours is an absolute priority for the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy allows us to respond to the challenges our partners face while safeguarding the EU’s interests. It aims to prevent and resolve
1See for example the myth of Europa and the Bull that refers to these historical ties in the work of M. Wintle: ‘Europa and the bull, Europe and European Studies: visual images as historical source material.’, Amsterdam: VossiuspersUvA, 2004.
2J. Goody: ‘Islam in Europe’, Cambridge [etc.] : Polity, cop. 2004.
3 For a work that challenges this Greek origin understanding, see for example: M. Bernal: ‘Black Athena: the Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization’, New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1987.
4 C. Ashton: ‘Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Europe Day’. 09.05.2014. Retrieved from the Council for the European Union’s website:
conflicts and it provides incentives for our neighbours to move towards political and economic reforms.’’5
Concluding from these statements can be said that the EU aims both for helping its partners on different subjects through the partnerships, but will also always look at the benefits the
partnerships can offer to the EU itself. From the Mediterranean partner's point of view, the main benefits come in in the form of the financial and economic aid, which are also the most
successful parts of the partnership. This is also expressed by the Secretary-General of the Union or the Mediterranean, who stated that ‘’in order to stimulate growth and employment, the Secretariat focuses on developing initiatives and concrete projects in favor of SMEs and job creation, as a response to the current socio economic context in the Mediterranean region and the needs expressed by the Southern countries.’’6
Especially when it comes to sensitive topics, such as irregular migration, the routes from North Africa into Europe are very often used.7 The need for cooperation in the region on this matter is
therefore also crucial.
The key theories and discourses on external governance and migration management will be discussed in the conceptual framework of this thesis. This conceptual framework can be found in the first chapter of this thesis. It elaborates on the existing theories in the field and discusses their influence on the discourse the EU follows in policies related to external governance and
migration management. The work by Sandra Lavanex, Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel Wunderlich will form the central argument in this chapter as related to the EU’s external governance. For the existing theories and discourses on migration management, the work of scholars such as Sarah Kalm and William Walters will be predominantly adopted.
The second chapter will focus on the relations between the EU and Morocco. First, the historical ties between especially Spain and France and Morocco will be discussed. The period 1912-1956, when Morocco had the status of ‘Protectorate’ in both French and Spanish governmental
structures will be a central focus point of this chapter, for it has formed the basis for the relations
5 C. Ashton: ‘Presentation of the ENP’s annual package’, Brussels, 27.03.2014. Retrieved from the ENPI-info centre’s website: http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=36666&id_type=1&lang_id=450. Last visited 19.06.2014.
6 Union for the Mediteranean: ‘Speech by MrFathallahSijilmassi, UfM Secretary-General at the 9th UfM Ministerial on Industrial Cooperation’, Brussels, 19.03.2014. Retrieved from the Union for the Mediterranean’s website: http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Speech-Secretary-General-Sijilmassi.pdf. Last visited: 19.06.2014.
7International Organisation for Migration’s website: https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/africa-and-the-middle-east/middle-east-and-north-africa.html. Last visited: 19.06.2014.
between the countries today. Second, the current relations, in the form of the Barcelona Process and its successor the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will be discussed.
The third chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the actors involved in the decision making process regarding the EU’s migration policy. The chapter starts out by explaining the roles of the EU institutions and agencies in the process. Next, the role of two of the main NGOs involved in shaping the migration policy, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), will be discussed.
This chapter is meant to give an insight to how the discourses and theories from the first chapter, find their way in the EU’s policy making on external governance and migration management and how the policies have developed through the years.
The fourth chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the practices of the implemented policies
discussed in the third chapter. Therefore, this chapter looks at the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, to provide a case study on the border management in practice and the consequences the EU’s external governance and migration management has on Moroccan migration policy and the country’s situation as a country of origin, a transit country and more recent even a destination country for migrants.
Introduction The concept of external governance is important in the understanding of the functioning of migration policies of the European Union (EU). It is a concept that has been widely discussed and interpreted by scholars of both International Relations (IR) and European Union studies. The European Commission (EC) stated in 2003 a very ambitious and long-term objective with the expression of the wish to expand the EU’s free movement of labour and people to its southern and eastern ‘ring of friends’.8 With the creation of this objective, the
importance of theoretical frameworks that could be used by scholars to study external governance theories within the EU framework, grew. Leading scholars in the field are for example Sandra Lavanex, Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel Wunderlich. After an overview of some of the key theories of external governance, the term migration management will be closer explored and the implications that it can have on the implementation of the EU's external migration policy will be discussed. Migration management is a relatively new term used within the external governance literature. It is studied as a form of external governance and offers a different approach towards the study of the EU's involvement in implementing their policies in the neighbourhood.
EU external governance in 'wider Europe' Sandra Lavanex describes the concept of external governance as ‘the extension of internal rules and policies beyond formal membership’9. Formal membership is for most states engaged by the
European Union’s (EU) external governance not an option because they do not meet the criteria to become an EU Member State.10 According to Lavanex and Schimmelfennig, external
governance is ‘’both an attempt at conceptualizing important aspects of the EU’s international role and a step towards analyzing forms of integration into the European system of rules that remain below the threshold of membership.’’11 External governance thus occurs when ‘parts of
the EU’s acquiscommunautaire are extended to Non-Member States’12. It creates for the EU an
8 Commission of the European Communities : Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament. Wider Europe – neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbours, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels, 11.03.2003.
9 S. Lavanex: 'EU external governance in 'wider Europe' in: Journal of European Public Policy, 2004, Vol.11(4). 10 Copenhagen criteria, formulated by the European Council of Ministers on 21-22 June 1993. Retrieved from the European Union’s website: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-93-3_en.htm?locale=en. Last visited 04.02.2014.
11 S. Lavanex, F. Schimmelfennig: ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics’ in: Journal of European Public Policy, 16:6, p. 791.
opportunity to implement policies outside their jurisdiction and gives the EU a chance to act as a normative power in their spheres of influence, in this case the European Neighbourhood Area. This involvement of the EU shows by the commitment by the EU for providing a space of 'strengthened prosperity, stability and security of Europe's neighbourhood in order to avoid any dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its direct neighbours'.13 The instruments used to
achieve this objective are described in the literature on the EU as a normative power as the 'norms and values of the EU'.14 The norms and values mostly linked to the EU, also by the EU
itself 15, are 'the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy,
equality and the rule of law.'16 For further debate on the EU as a normative power, please see the
works suggested in the footnotes. The reasons for the Non-Member States (NMS) to agree on implementing policy which they are not legally obliged to implement, is that it puts them in a positive light with the EU and that creates an opportunity to further negotiate successfully on topics they would like to address in the partnership with the EU.
Modes of governance In their article, Lavanex and Schimmelfennig identify three basic modes of external governance. These modes are: (1) hierarchy governance, (2) network governance and (3) market
governance.17 The first form of this model is, as the name suggests, based on a relation of
domination and subordination between MS and NMS. This form of governance is bound to a strict set of rules and regulations, which leaves little room for negotiation between the partners or adjusting the rules to specific and ad hoc situations. Within the framework of the EU, this mode of governance is often linked to the 'Community Method'.18 The second form of governance in
this model is based on a level of equality between the partners, at least on an institutional level. In order to reach implementation of certain policies in this form of governance, mutual
agreement is necessary. Therefore, this form of governance is far more open to negotiations from
13 The European Commission's website:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/index_en.htm. Last visited 18.03.2014. 14Described as such in the works by I. Manners (2002), M. Pace (2007), R. Youngs (2009) and many others. 15Preambule of the Treaty of the European Union, 30.03.2010. Retrieved from the Eur-lexwebiste: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF. Last visited 18.03.2014. 16 Idem.
17S. Lavanex, F. Schimmelfennig: ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics’ in: Journal of European Public Policy, 16:6, p. 796.
both partners and can be seen as more flexible. It also gives space to stakeholder engagement practices, such as the influence of civil society and NGOs that can function as 'experts' in the specific policy areas, in the case of migration policy that would be for example the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This form of governance has won terrain within the EU as a challenger of the traditional 'Community Method'.19 The third mode of governance in this model is focused on
sectorial partnerships between the EU and the NMS. This creates an opportunity to work together with a NMS in sectors that can be beneficial for both parties, but do not need the institutional frameworks required for the level of partnership that is described by the previous two modes of governance. This third mode of governance can be seen as a framework in which both MS and NMS can choose sectors to focus on where cooperation would be beneficial for both, and at the same time leave the sectors where cooperation is less beneficial, out. Besides these modes of governance, this framework suggested by Lavanex and Schimmelfennig also explains how to measure the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance.20 This
effectiveness is explained by assessing the effectiveness of each of the three modes of
governance following specific theories, existing in IR and European Studies. The hypotheses that become clear from this assessment of effectiveness can be used to measure the effectiveness of the external governance policies of the EU. Every theory focuses on different aspects and criteria in order to judge the effectiveness; therefore it is hard to give only one conclusion about the effectiveness. What does stand out from Lavanex and Schimmelfennig's conceptual framework is that the EU’s external governance works most effectively on their closest neighbours, since they have already previously committed to adoption of parts of the acquiscommunautaire.21 Also,
there are few ‘set rules’ for the form of external governance. As Lavanex and Schimmelfennig argue, external governance mostly follows sector-specific rules and traditions.22 The goal of
external governance can therefore be described not so much as the spread and implementation of the exact contents of the EU’s acquiscommunautaire, but more the extension of the EU’s norms and values, such as the rule of law, the protection of human rights and democratic promotion, as is stated in the Treaties of the EU.23
19 Ibid, 798. 20Ibid, p. 800. 21Ibid,p. 807. 22 Idem.
http://eur-The limits of external governance Wunderlich’s article ‘The limits of external governance: implementing EU external migration policy’ focuses specifically on the ways of implementing EU migration policy through external governance. It explains what competing factors are of importance while implementing migration policies through external governance. These factors are divided in (1) EU institutional factors, (2) domestic factors in the Non-Member States (NMS) and (3) ‘power-based’ explanations of interdependence and the influence of external ‘governance providers’ on selection, adoption and application in NMS.24 The author of this article is rather critical towards the prevalent theories
that have been conducted in the field of EU external governance. He argues that it ‘’has three shortcomings regarding implementation that make adjustments necessary: it implies
dichotomous EU-NMS relations; overemphasizes structural elements and mixes different levels of analysis.’’25Wunderlich argues that the prevalent research on implementation of external
migration policy is viewed from a Eurocentric view. He argues that most theories focus on the possibility of either the adaptation of EU rules or the violation of it, 26 which indicates that there
is some sort of obligation for NMS to act in a way that the EU wants, which is not the case when looking from a different perspective rather than the Eurocentric one. The perspective Wunderlich proposes to use when studying EU external migration policy, is an organizational perspective. This organizational approach suggests that there are environmental factors that influence the effectiveness of the implementation of EU external governance in NMS. These environmental factors are (1) the policy ‘problem’ that is at the center of the policy intervention; (2) the macro-economic context; and (3) the immediate organizational context with which the implementing organization interacting.27 The inclusion of not only the governmental factors such as
implementation traditions and policy diffusion, but also the environmental factors playing in the NMS, makes Wunderlich’s approach broad enough to assess the effectiveness of EU external migration policy in different contexts. The influence of environmental actors on the
implementation of the EU's external migration governance will be further analysed below, using the case study by the same author on EU-Moroccan cooperation with EU's external migration
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF. Last visited: 06.02.2014. 24 D. Wunderlich: Limits of external governance: implementing EU external migration policy’ in: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.19:9, 2012, p. 1416.
25Idem. 26Idem. 27 Ibid, p. 1418.
policy.
Implementing EU external migration policy As various authors in the field have argued, the direct influence that the EU can have on the implementation of policies outside the Accession and Member States, is limited.28Therefore, the
influence that other organizations can have, is larger in NMS than in Accession and Member States. The specific actors in question, are stakeholders in the policy area involved. For external migration policy, large stakeholders are for example the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The 'modes of governance' used by the EU to implement external migration policy in the NMS, is also very important for the effectiveness of the policy.29 In order to assess the influence of
non-governmental actors, the role of communication links, domestic political structures and network governance will be discussed in the next section.
The role of communication links in implementing EU external migration policyThe importance of communication links in implementing EU external policies of all different areas, comes from the fact that EU institutions and policy makers have to rely on the cooperation of actors in the NMS to implement the EU policy correctly. The necessary cooperation with the NMS implies that the NMS is the one who actually has to implement the policy, but have no legal obligation to do so. The EU has no legal authority in the NMS on implementing its rules, it can only link not implementing the policy with negative side-effects in the partnership with the NMS in other areas, such as financial aid. Because of this lack of administrative authority, the implementers have to: (1) make sense of the policy object; (2) identify capable cooperation partners; and (3) achieve enough mutual understanding to follow through with joint projects.30
As becomes clear from the short list of necessities that the EU and the NMS partners have to meet, communication plays a major role in it. Without proper communication between the EU and the NMS, coordination of the project and ultimately the correct implementation of the policy will become next to impossible. Since implementing EU external migration policy in NMS becomes such a dynamic process because of the involvement of previously mentioned
28 D. Wunderlich: ‘Europeanization through the Grapevine: Communication Gaps and the Role of International Organizations in Implementing Networks of EU External Migration Policy’ in: Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34:5, 2012, p. 486.
29 Idem. 30 Ibid, 489.
organizations such as the UNHCR and the IOM, top-down hierarchical implementation
structures, like the structures common within implementing EU policy in EU Member States, are likely to fail. In contrast, bottom-up approaches leave more room for interpretation and
adaptation and are therefore more suitable for the dynamic situations in which the external policies are implemented. The bottom-up approach that is suggested by many authors in the field, is the cooperation with local NGO's and Civil Society.31 These actors are familiar with the
specific region, know the policy 'problems' that have existed before and are more likely to achieve the objectives through their individual project than top-down implementation of policy that is not specific to individual programs, could. This creates an opportunity for experimenting with new forms of governance that might be very useful for the implementation of external policy, for example network governance. Another point that has been made throughout the discourse on the EU’s external governance policy, especially when it comes to migration policy, is that the EU’s external governance touches upon a sensitive point of sovereignty of the NMS. The sensitiveness of these issues lies in the fact that migration policies touch upon the territorial integrity of a state. It can influence it borders and the way in which a state wishes to execute border controls. Giving competences to another actor than the state's own institutions to intervene with the control of the borders, is a very sensitive topic within both EU discourses and discourses on EU-NMS relations. The question remains how much of the EU’s intended policies are actually implemented in the NMS and in what form? Are the NMS more likely to adapt the policies or are they implemented straight in the NMS’s system, in a manner familiar to the MS where the acquiscommunautaire is directly implemented? The way and degree of implementation of the policy depends according to Wunderlich of three factors: (1) relations between MS and NMS; (2) intra-EU coordination problems and (3) the effect of organizational environments in the NMS on implementation of EU external migration policy.32 In his case study on Morocco, Wunderlich shows that these factors
play important roles in the implementation of the EU's external migration policy in a NMS such as Morocco. The first factor, the relation between MS and NMS, is in the case of Morocco easiest exemplified by looking closer at the relation between Spain and Morocco. Wunderlich's case study shows that both the cooperation between a specific MS and a NMS can influence
31 Idem.
32D. Wunderlich: ‘Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco’ in: Mediterranean Politics, 15:2, 2010, p. 252.
policy decisions in the EU. Individual MS can influence these policy decisions because of their personal interest in the policy at stake and the experiences it has with the needs and opportunities of the specific case. This makes sure that their voice is heard by the EU migration policy makers, since they can function as the 'expert' on the topic for being closely involved in the topic. In the case study, discussed by Wunderlich, Spain uses its influence to push through initiatives that have been on the Spanish agenda, which are reflected in the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) of 1999.33 This HLWG and its content was not fully discussed
with Morocco, and the Moroccans therefore reacted by saying they had no interest in becoming the 'Gendarme of Europe'.34 This example shows the influence of a single MS, as discussed
above, but also the crucial role for the NMS to be able to stop the process by refusing to agree when the NMS finds that it has not been properly informed about the agreement. This supports the argument in Wunderlich's framework that the cooperation between the MS and the NMS is of crucial importance, because it can influence the type of action the EU wants to undertake in the NMS. There have been several tensed moments in the relationship between Spain and Morocco in the past decade. Examples of this are the dispute the two countries have had over the
Leila/Perejil islet in 2002, where the Moroccan police blocked the islet to monitor the irregular migration in the region35 and the problems in the cooperation between both states when a group
of irregular migrants tried to climb the fences surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Morocco in a series of incidents in 2004 and 2005, where several migrants died in their attempts to enter the EU. After these incidents, Spain decided unilaterally to enhance border surveillance,36 showing that a decreasing partnership between a particular, strongly
involved MS and a NMS, can influence the type of migration management the EU is willing to execute. Before the incidents happened, the EU policy makers were willing to negotiate with the NMS on their wishes for the partnership, in the case of Morocco, a stronger focus on socio-economic developments over the focus on securitisation. The influence that a negative relationship between a single MS and a NMS can have on the policy-making process, can be
33Council of the European Union: 'Action Plan for Morocco', 11426/99, 1999.
34D. Wunderlich: ‘Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco’ in: Mediterranean Politics, 15:2, 2010, p. 262.
35G. Tremlett: 'Moroccans seize Parsley Island and leave a bitter taste in Spanish mouths'. in: The Guardian, 13.07.2002. Retrieved from the website of The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/13/spain.gilestremlett. Last visited 28.02.2014.
36D. Wunderlich: ‘Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco’ in: Mediterranean Politics, 15:2, 2010, p. 262.
shown from the increased security measures on the fences of the Spanish enclaves after the incidents with the migrants in 2004, 2005 and the recent incidents of 2014.37 These measures
have not been able to stop migrants from trying to enter Europe in an illegal way through the enclaves, as new incidents in recent years have shown.38
The second factor that influences the implementation of the EU's external migration policy in the NMS is intra-EU coordination problems. The difficulties with the EU's external migration policy lay in the past with the several different Directorate-Generals (DGs) that were involved in the policy making for migration. The DGs involved were DG Freedom, Security and Justice (JLS), DG Development and DG External Relations (RELEX).39 Since all these different DGs function
in a different way to obtain their DG-specific goals, the creation of a coherent external migration policy turned out to be difficult. In order to address these coordination problems, the EU created the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the 3rd of July 2010, by a Council decision.40
This agency serves as the diplomatic corps of the EU and is therefore now the central body for the EU's external actions, led by the High Representative, who is also the Vice-President of the Commission. (HR/VP) and the president of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).41 Bringing the
external policies of the EU together in the same body is intended to overcome the internal organizational problems that the EU encountered before. Nevertheless, creating a new body that deals with the EU's external competences is likely to compete with MS sovereignty and their reluctance over the years to transfer competences in this field to an EU-level. The third factor that influences the implementation of the EU's external migration policy is the effect of organizational environments in the NMS on implementation of EU external migration policy. A key issue for the EU in implementing external policies, whether it is on migration or any other topic, is the influence contextual factors have on the process. In the case of migration
37G. Tremlett: Spain heightens fence at African enclave' in: The Guardian, 22.09.2005. Retrieved from the website of The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/22/spain.gilestremlett. Last visited 28.02.2014. 38Le Monde: ' Espagne: Plus de 200 migrants entrent à Melilla depuis le Maroc' in: Le Monde, 28.02,2014. Retrieved from the website of Le Monde : http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/02/28/espagne-plus-de-200-migrants-entrent-a-melilla-depuis-le-maroc_4375347_3214.html. Last visited: 01.03.2014.
39D. Wunderlich: ‘Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco’ in: Mediterranean Politics, 15:2, 2010, p. 252.
40European Council of Ministers Decision: 'Establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service', 03.08.2010. Retrieved from the European External Action Service's website:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf. Last visited 01.03.2014. 41Idem.
policy, the environmental factors that play the most important roles are the governmental institutions in the NMS that are involved in implementing the policy and NGO's related to migration issues, such as the UNHCR and IOM. According to Barrett and Fudge,
implementation in NMS should be seen as a 'non-political process following a hierarchical implementation chain that translates EU policy into actions and processes in the NMS'.42 This
also implicates, again, that the relations between the MS and NMS have to be positive in order to make sure that the policy is implemented (a) in the right way and (b) within the timeframe set out for it. Tensions between the MS and NMS can create implementation problems for the policy. In the case of Morocco, the largest contextual factor in implementing the EU's external migration policy is Morocco's King and his Interior Ministry. Since most of the political power in Morocco lies with the King43, the Interior Ministry receives his direct orders in implementing policy. This
Ministry has proved over the years to be exercising its power through 'administrative authority, clientelism and nepotism'.44 These domestic political structures of Morocco show again that the
relation between the MS and the NMS is the most important factor in implementing the EU's external migration policy, since the implementation of this policy in Morocco depends more strongly on the willingness of the domestic political power holders, than of NGO's, as can also be indicated by the troublesome relations Morocco has had with organizations such as the UNHCR, which will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, that focuses on the EU's migration policy in Morocco.
Migration managementNow that some of the key actors and their roles in the process of implementation of external governance in the EU-Morocco relationships have been highlighted, an overview of the relatively new concept of 'migration management' will be provided.
'Migration management' refers to all practices used to implement the policy and to execute the actions necessary for achieving the goals set out by the policy. Yet as some scholars have argued, by referring to all these processes as 'migration management', there is a de-politicalization of the concept taking place.45 In my view, this shift of naming the concept creates a discourse around
42S. Barrett & C. Fudge: 'Examining the policy-reaction relationship' in: S. Barrett & C. Fudge (eds) Policy and Action. Essays on the implementation of Public Policy. London and New York: 1981.
43 T. CofmanWittes& M. McFaul: 'Morocco's election: The limits of limited reform' in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, 2008, pp. 19-33.
44 P. Vermeren: 'Histoire du Marocdepuisl'indépendence.' La Découverte: Paris, 2006, p. 80.
45 G. Martin & A. Pécoud (eds): 'The politics of international migration management', Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstroke, 2010, p. 11.
migration that removes the discourse from a humanitarian and social issue, towards a
technocratic and abstract problem. On the other hand, this shift creates a possibility to approach the problems that are associated with migration, such as the control of irregular migration and the distribution of migrants over the MS, in a more detached way. The use of the concept of
'migration management' in the study of the EU's external governance could lead to new insights on the possible solutions for the problems in the policy field of (irregular) migration, what could lead to new insights on the possible solutions for the problems in this policy area. A risk that is also mentioned by Martin and Pécoud, is that this managerial approach could lead to the justification of harsh measures.46
Sara Kalm links migration management to Foucault's work on the relationship between power, knowledge and governing. She argues that the exercise of power and knowledge in migration politics is easily recognizable: ' the militarization of borders, the forcible deportation of irregular migrants or the enclosure of asylum seekers in camps are telling examples'.47 The approach of
migration as a 'manageable topic', transforms it into a 'political rationality', 'which is marked by relative international coherence, yet is affected by other more general complexes of power and knowledge.48 She also argues that neoliberalism has created an opportunity for migration
management to ' emerge and become, within their limits, rational.'49 She continues this argument
by stating that 'migration is an integral part of globalisation'50, and globalisation is linked to
neoliberalism, especially in the economic spheres. Her final argument leads to the win-win-win situation suggested by many migration policies: migration as a potential positive phenomenon. She states that ‘’the movement of migrants is now thought of as positive for them, the state of origin and host states’’.51 The first 'win', the win for the migrants, has been recognized for a long
time, it is the chance of a better life for the migrant. The second 'win' is for the country of origin, for whom ‘’the labour migration relieves labour market pressures while generating remittances, transfers of skills, knowledge, FDI and other positive feedback effects’’52, the third and final
46Ibid, p. 12. 47 Ibid, p. 26. 48 ibid, p. 40. 49 Ibid, p. 29. 50 Ibid, p, 33. 51 Ibid, p. 34.
52 UNFPA : 'Meeting the challenges of migration: Progress since the ICPD', 2004. Retrieved from the UNFPA's website: http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2004/migration_icpd.pdf. Last visited: 01.03.2014.
'win' in this argument is the win of the host country, for whom (labour) migration ‘’rejuvenates the workforce and expands the human capital resource base, thus enhancing productivity and prosperity’’.53 In my view, this 'win-win-win' argument is only partially valid for specific groups
of labour migrants, who are able to think in an entrepreneurial fashion and are given the opportunity by the host country to achieve these sorts of goals. I do not believe that it is a realistic argument for migration management in a broader sense, because a large part of the migrants will not fit the ideal type of migrant necessary to fit this profile. To continue exploring the strategies and reasons behind migration management, I will now focus on the work of William Walters, who focuses on the approach of irregular immigration in the EU. He argues that the EU's 'combat' against irregular immigration in the EU is in fact 'state-making in a new form'.54
To substantiate his argument, Walters starts with a discussion of the use of the term 'illegal immigration'. He argues that the EU continues to use this term, while organizations such as IOM, have already switched to the term 'irregular migration'.55 This argument, even though it is only
based on terminology, shows in his analysis that the EU is more focused on the legal
qualifications behind migration, than focusing on 'managing migrants' who enter the EU. He continues his argument by stating that a large group of people who are portrayed as 'illegal immigrants' do not enter the EU in an illegal fashion; they become illegal after their visa expire or other similar situations occur.56 Finally, he states that the EU is often seen as a re-active actor
in 'illegal immigration' issues, rather than an active actor.57 This creates a setting where the EU is
presented as a passive bystander whose territory has been crossed by the 'illegal immigrants', often from chaotic, corrupted 'failed states' and 'crisis areas'.58 This passive image of the EU,
bypasses the measures that the EU itself initiates in order to keep 'illegal immigrants' outside of the EU-territory. It creates a strongly one-sided picture of the story, since it does not take in consideration the regulations and action plans the EU implements. Nevertheless it is part of a narrative often portrayed in the media and using this argument in this fashion, is a geopolitical
53Idem.
54 G. Martin & A. Pécoud (eds): 'The politics of international migration management' Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstroke, 2010, p. 70.
55 ibid, p. 82. 56 Ibid, 84. 57 Ibid, p. 89. 58 Idem.
strategy on the part of the media.59 Concluding his argument, Walters states that the migration
policy of the EU should be seen as evolving around borders rather than around migration
control.60 He shows that the line between illegal and legal is a very thin one and that it is strongly
linked to the political visions of the EU and how it sees itself and its role in the global order. From the definition of the concept of migration management and the issues raised above, the EU's motives for using external migration policy seem to be driven mostly by a need for securitisation of the EU's borders. However, this is not the complete argument. As Boswell argues, the relations between the EU and the southern Mediterranean states have two main facets. ‘’The migration control measures aim at curtailing illegal migration and controlling legal migration, whereas preventive measures aim to address the 'root causes' of migration by
improving livelihood in the countries of origin.’’61Wunderlich goes even as far as referring to the
incompleteness of this argument as the 'security bias' in the EU's relations with southern Mediterranean states.62
Prevalent theses on the security-driven external migration policy of the EU are the 'securitisation' thesis and the venue-shopping thesis.63 The first explains the security bias of the EU through
constructivist ideas of the social construction of a problem such as migration, which does not necessarily have to be a real security issue, but is constructed as such.64
The latter explains the security bias by focusing on the actions executed to implement and enforce the policy and the type of technologies that are being used to increase its influence.65
Both theses limit their argument to the results of the implemented policy, rather than looking beyond the implementation itself and analyze the process that precedes it. Only if those
processes are also analyzed, one can see the true and complex ways the policy has to go through before it is implemented in a NMS. As Wunderlich also argues, implementation of EU external migration policy depends strongly on the means and willingness of the NMS to implement the
59 Idem. 60 Ibid, p.90.
61C. Boswell: ' The 'external dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum policy' in: International Affairs, 79(3), 2003, pp. 619-620.
62 D. Wunderlich: 'Implementing EU external migration policy: Security-driven by default?' in: Comparative European Politics, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 407.
63 Ibid, p. 408.
64 J. Huysmans: 'Security! What do you mean? From concept to think signifier' in: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4 (2), 1998, p. 231.
65 D. Wunderlich: 'Implementing EU external migration policy: Security-driven by default?' in; Comparative European Politics, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 409.
policy. Most of the problems with implementing the external policy in the NMS have to do with the little interest NMS have to prevent migration to the EU and the fact that the NSM are legally not obliged to implement the policy, in contrast to MS and Accession States.66 The security bias
also underestimates the EU's involvement in preventive measures and initiatives. An example of these preventive measures is the 'Global Approach to Migration (GAM)'67, initiated by Spain, but
adopted as a project for the EU as a whole. A more extensive explanation of the GAM will be provided in chapter three of this thesis.
ConclusionTheorizing external governance leads to several conclusions about its approaches, its success and the factors that can influence the process of implementing the EU's external
migration policy in NMS. As is indicated by several of the above discussed works, the EU uses a different approach to implementing EU external policies, compared to domestic policies. The main reasons for the differences in approach has to do with the lack of administrative influence the EU has in NMS, the willingness of the NMS to implement policies which they are not legally bound to implement and the relationship between individual EU member states and the NMS. The importance of the relationship between Spain and Morocco, and the consequences this relationship has had on the implementation and execution of the EU's external migration policy is elaborated in this chapter and can be seen as an example that shows the importance of this issue in external governance. The success of implementing the external migration policy in NMS is measured by the effectiveness of the policy. As Lavanex and Schimmelfennig show in their article, the effectiveness of the EU's external migration policy is strongest in NMS that are relatively close to the EU, since they are the most likely to have already implemented parts of the EU's acquiscommunautaire, which makes it easier for the EU and the NSM to implement more EU policies. The factors that are most influential on the implementation process of the EU's external migration policy, are often non-EU actors. There are several reasons for their high influence on the implementation process. As Wunderlich shows in his work, the influence of NGOs, such as the UNHCR and IOM, are of great importance because of their expertise on the subject. Since the EU has to rely on NMS actors to implement their policy in the NSM,
governmental actors such as the Interior Ministry in Morocco also hold important influence in the implementation process. Because of the many actors that are involved in the process of
66 Idem. 67 Ibid, p,410.
implementing EU external migration policy, the mode of governance that is most suited for understanding the implementation of EU external migration policy in my view, is the theoretical framework of network governance.
Chapter two: EU - Morocco Relations
Introduction Divided only by the Mediterranean Sea, the history of Europe and North Africa have always been intertwined. In this section the relations between these two worlds will be discussed. In particular the relations between Spain and France with Morocco will be central to the argument in this section. For the relation between these three countries, I will start from the Treaty between France and Spain regarding Morocco of 1912.68 This is not the starting point of the relations
between the three states, but it marks the start of a period where Morocco was divided in a colonial structure of a 'protectorate' between two of Europe's largest empirical states. The
consequences of this protectorate era in the region, is still visible in the approach that the current EU has on the region, and is therefore important to understand when studying the relations in the region today.
The French and Spanish Protectorates 1912-1956In 1912, Spain and France signed an
agreement that divided the Kingdom of Morocco in separate spheres of influence of respectively Spain and France. In this treaty, the territorial frontiers of both zones of influence were
determined and all governmental arrangements were made. The structure was that of a so called 'protectorate'. The borders of the Spanish protectorate were situated in the northern part of Morocco. It stretched from the city of Tetouan in northwest Morocco until the city of Nador in
68 Treaty of Fez, signed in Fez on 27.11.1912. in: The American Journal of International Law, vol.7, no.2, Apr. 1913.
the northeast. Besides this protectorate in the north of Morocco, Spain also colonized the so called 'Spanish Sahara', which is nowadays known as the 'Western Sahara'.69 The Spanish
occupied this part of Africa already before their agreement with France upon the separate zones of influence in Morocco. The period of the 'Spanish Sahara' took place from 1884 until 197570, as
Spain got control over the area due to the negotiations of the conference of Berlin in 1884.71 The
cities of Ceuta and Melilla were not part of the Spanish protectorate, since both of these cities were already considered part of Spanish territory, since they were conquered centuries earlier. Ceuta was conquered by Portugal in the 1415, during the Battle of Ceuta.72 The importance of
the city comes mostly from its strategic position across the Strait of Gibraltar. Ceuta remained in Portuguese hands until 1580, when the Spanish king Felipe II became king of the entire Iberian Peninsula. The city has been part of the Spanish kingdom ever since, although this is often contested by Morocco since its independence of 1956.73 The other Spanish city in Morocco,
Melilla, has a similar history as Ceuta does, although it has not been in Portuguese hands before becoming a Spanish enclave.
Map of the Spanish protectorate of Morocco, 1912-1956.74
69 B. Janos: 'Western Sahara'.Pécs: Publikon Publishers, 2009. 70 Ibid.
71'Berlin West Africa Conference', retrieved from the Encyclopaedia Britannica's website:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/62214/Berlin-West-Africa-Conference. Last visited 03.04.2014. 72M. Newitt: 'A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668', Roudledge: London, 2005, pp. 20-21. 73 M. Willis: 'Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from independence
to the Arab Spring', Hurst & Company, London: 2012.
74 Image retrieved from: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Morocco-spanish-protectorate-1955-a.svg. Last visited 03.04.2014.
The French protectorate covered a larger part of the territories that are now part of the Kingdom of Morocco. It consisted of all remaining territory between the Spanish protectorate in the northern part of the country until the 'Spanish Sahara' in the south.
The system of the 'protectorates' left room for the Sultan of Morocco to formally be recognized to be the sole sovereign power in the state, despite the diplomatic, economic and governmental influence that the both European powers had. As can be imagined, the rule of France and Spain over an in essence independent state like Morocco, was not without any problems.
One of the most well-known uprisings against the protectorate system in Morocco was the Rif War, fought from 1920 until 1926.75 After the Treaty of Versailles, the Sultan of Morocco agreed
on keeping the status quo in his country, meaning to stay as a protectorate of both France and Spain, for he wanted his country to be accepted in the League of Nations and recognized the dependence his country had on foreign powers.76 The Spanish protectorate in the north of
Morocco, also covered the territories that the Rif people considered to be their own. The uprisings did not start from the beginning of the establishment of the Franco-Spanish
protectorate, since the European powers started out as rather distant powers that were not too invasive and strict on implementing their own rules on the Moroccan people. Nevertheless, in 1919 the Spanish troops started 'to advance towards the edge of the Rif mountains, which make up the backbone of their former zone, and an anti-Spanish group emerged in the largest of the Riff tribes, the BanuWaryaghal.'77 The Riff people were able to defeat the Spanish troops in the
battle of Anual in 1921.78 This defeat of the Spanish troops led to an organized anti-Spanish
organization of the Rif tribes. Despite the fact that the Spanish were able to take back the territories they had lost to the Rif tribes within a short amount of time, the Rif war that had started with this battle, continued to affect the rule of both France and Spain in the region. It has led to a forced retreat all the way to the east of the protectorate, towards the Melilla area. The war came as far as threatening to attack the capital of Morocco, the city of Fez, but the Rif alliance was unable to take the city. This event led to the alliance between French and Spanish troops. The extreme winter in 1925 made it impossible to continue the fights. After a failed peace
75P. La Porte: 'Rien à ajouter: The League of Nations and the Rif War (1920-1926)' in: European History Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 66, 2011.
76Idem.
77C. Pennell: Ideology and practical politics: A case study of the Rif War in Morocco, 1921-1926.’, in: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 20.
treaty in the spring of 1926, the war ended at the end of May 1926.79 After the Rif War, the
French decided to move the court of Morocco away from Fez to Rabat, in case these uprisings would happen again. Rabat has been the capital of the country ever since.80
After the Rif War, nationalism became a new topic within Moroccan politics. Starting out as a variety of different parties and organizations with different opinions and visions, a group organized themselves as the Comitéd'ActionMarocaine (CAM).81 These types of organizations
called for changes in the protectorate system, which they considered to be unfair and unequal. This has been labeled as a form of nationalism by many scholars in the field. Adrian Lawrence, however, argues that the rise of the CAM and later on the Istiqlal party, are a reaction to oppose to colonial rule rather than a nationalist movement.82 She argues that the call for reforms in the
Moroccan protectorate in the 1930s and 1940s was not directly linked to the 'foreignness' of the Franco-Spanish rule, but rather the authoritarian style the French and the Spanish ruled the Moroccans with.83 Therefore, nationalism is not the right term for the call for reforms, since it is
not based on the fact that the French and the Spanish rulers were French and Spanish, but the problem lies in the approach they had, notwithstanding their nationality. ''Nationalist
mobilisation in favour of independence thus focused on challenging the foreign nature of
imperial rule, rather than specific injustices of colonial policy. Nationalists sought to capture the state, while reformists sought to democratise it.''84
The CAM created a 'Plan of Reforms' in 1934. As Lawrence also stated, this plan did not include plans of separation or independence; it was focused on creating more equality for all Moroccan citizens, meaning no more privileges for the French inhabitants.85 The protectorate government
did not agree on the terms and reforms in the Plan. It was viewed to be an attempt for separatism. After explaining the goals and ideals of the Plan more extensively, the French administrators said to have to have more time to discuss the matter.86
79 Ibid, pp. 21-23.
80P. La Porte: 'Rien à ajouter: The League of Nations and the Rif War (1920-1926)' in: European History Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 66, 2011.
81 A. Lawrence: 'Rethinking Moroccan Nationalism, 1930-1944' in: The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.17, No.3, 2012. 82 Ibid, p. 476. 83 Idem. 84Idem. 85 Ibid, p. 477. 86Idem.
After a change of government in France in 1936, many Moroccans believed that the reforms they hoped for, would come. The main reason to believe so, was that the new government installed in Paris, was the Front Populaire87, a left-wing party that had always opposed to the way in which
the previous French government treated the French territories in North Africa. Unfortunately for CAM and its supporters, these changes never came.88 The problems for France to implement the
Plan, had not so much to do with its content, but more with the legitimacy of CAM as a representative for all the people of Morocco. Since it was not an official, political party, it was not recognized by the French government as a legitimate actor. Besides this argument, the French Foreign Affairs Minister of the time, Vienot, had another reason for objecting to the legitimacy of CAM, as he wrote as a response to the decline of the Plan: ‘No political group, whether in Morocco or France, can pretend to act for the Nation as a whole.’89
Early in 1937, the French Foreign Affairs Minister had a change of heart, for he told the Residence General Noguès that ‘’Morocco must be governed for the Moroccans [...] Native policy presently is more important – much more – than all the rest.’’90 This change of heart did
not happen out of the blue. After the decline by the French government to implement the Plan, a meeting organized by CAM in November, turned violently. Several CAM-leaders were
arrested.91 The change of heart resulted only in the release of the leaders that were arrested in the
events of November 1936, some minor policy changes but not the far-reaching reforms the Plan called for.
The logical response of the CAM to the reaction of the French government to label CAM as illegitimate for not being an official political party, was to transform CAM into one, named the National Action Party. This reaction encountered a lot of repression from the French government and as a consequence, CAM was outlawed in March of 1937.92 CAM continued its existence as
an underground movement, renamed 'The National Party for the Realization of the Plan of Reforms (al-Hizb al-Watani li tahiq al-Matalib).93 The party grew to be very influential, and by
87 Idem.
88 For a discussion on the reform politics of France in the colonies, from the French perspective, see the work of Cohen (1972) and Thomas (2005).
89W.Hoisington: 'The Casablanca connection: French colonial policy, 1936–1943.' Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984, p. 43.
90Ibid, p. 56.
91A. Lawrence: 'Rethinking Moroccan Nationalism, 1930-1944' in: The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.17, No.3, 2012, p. 478.
92 Idem. 93 Idem.
the end of 1937, most of its leaders, for example Allal al-Fasi and AchmedMekouar, were arrested.94 The movement came to an end with all leaders either arrested or in exile. The policy
of repression rather than reform seemed to have worked. After the uprisings in the mid-1930s described above, the French government could continue to govern Morocco without any real threats to its authority, due to the loyalty they received from the Moroccan authorities. This continued even until after the fall of France in 1940.95
According to French administrators, Moroccans stayed loyal to the French government until a year before the allied invasion. 96 Even though calls for independence and reform towards the
end and after the Second World War became louder and louder, no course towards independence had been set out until the next decade. Many scholars in the field argue that the call for reforms by elitist groups within a colonized area, are the first step towards separatism.97 In a different
article, Moore creates a framework by which elites overthrow colonial power. He describes three modes of action: 'activists seek equality, activists engage in traditional anti-colonialism, and finally modern nationalism, when they ‘’achieve full consciousness of their mission’’.98 By many
scholars in the field, these three modes, especially the call for reform, have been linked to nationalism. But as Lawrence also argues in her article, a call for reform is more likely to be linked to an aversion against the structures and regulations implemented by the colonizing power, rather than to the 'foreignness' of the power. However, many of the Moroccan leaders describe in their memoirs that they called for reforms rather than independence, since they realized that calling for independence was an even more unreachable goal than the call for reforms.99 Lawrence doubts this argument, since in hindsight, one could say they strived for
independence, while this might not be true. Another reason that made Lawrence study a different approach on the focus on nationalism during the Franco-Spanish protectorate is that the Plan of Reforms initiated by CAM, went much further than just independence. It called for specific changes in government, towards a democratic and equal Morocco.100 This leads to an objective
94Ibid, p. 479. 95 Ibid, p.478.
96Bulletin de RenseignementsPolitiques, Novembre 1942, SHAT 1414.
97 C. Moore: 'The national party: a tentative model.' in: Public policy, Vol.10, 1960, pp. 239–267. 98C. Moore: 'Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia'. 1st ed. New York: Little Brown & Company, 1970, p. 36.
99 A. Lawrence: 'Rethinking Moroccan Nationalism, 1930-1944' in: The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.17, No.3, 2012, p. 480.
that goes beyond sole independence of France and Spain alone. The French administration also referred to the members of CAM as 'nationalists' seeking 'independence' and having 'separatist aspirations'.101 Since both the quotes of the French administration and the ones from the memoirs
of the former CAM leaders are possibly not true, Lawrence argues that it makes it difficult to trust these sources as the basis of the argument in favor for the nationalism-argument indicated in this section.
In 1956, Morocco gained independence from both France and Spain. The ways to independence from both France and Spain have been strongly influenced by each other. Therefore, the years leading up to the independence of Morocco will be discussed combined in this chapter. The relations between Spain and Morocco in the 1950s consisted for a large part out of a lack of policy. The Spanish leader in that era, General Franco, had no formal policies regarding
Morocco.102 General Franco expressed only set objectives for the protectorate in Morocco. His
rule over the Moroccan territories is said to be caught in a well-known quote by the General: ‘’to use a firm hand [or an iron hand] in a velvet glove.’’103 In the 1950s and under Franco's rule in
general, the animosity between France and Spain reached a very high level. One of Franco's goals was to show the world, especially the United States and the United Nations, that Spain was the most important power in the Mediterranean, as opposed to France, who was usually
considered to be the main ally in the region.104
Since Spain gained its international support mostly from the Arab countries (Arab League) and several Latin-American states, it felt the need to show an interest in the calls for reform and independence in the Moroccan territories.105 This was in strong contrast to the repressive policy
France handed, as is been discussed above. In 1953, the French repression politics escalated and caused the French government to replace the Sultan Mohammed V with a ruler that was more likely to follow French orders, this was Mohammed V's uncle Mohammed Bin Arafa.106 Spain
101Ibid, p. 482.
102 M. Elkin: 'Franco’s last stand: an analysis of Spanish foreign policy regarding Moroccan independence in 1956', in: International Journal of Iberian Studies, Vol. 17, no.2, 2004, p. 67.
103Archivo de la FundaciónNacional Francisco Franco, Madrid. Official Spanish documents and Franco’s personal notes, 1948–56, 14.3.52: 268/22654 Letter from Franco to GarcíaValiño. As cited in: M. Elkin: 'Franco’s last stand: an analysis of Spanish foreign policy regarding Moroccan independence in 1956', in: International Journal of Iberian Studies, Vol. 17, no.2, 2004, p. 68.
104 M. Elkin: 'Franco’s last stand: an analysis of Spanish foreign policy regarding Moroccan independence in 1956', in: International Journal of Iberian Studies, Vol. 17, no.2, 2004, p. 68.
105 Idem. 106 Ibid, p. 69.
refused to recognize the leadership of this French-imposed leader, therefore reinforcing its anti-French strategy. The main reason for Spain to do so was the fear of losing the protectorate in Northern Morocco. What has been argued by scholars in this field as Franco's flaw in this pro-Moroccan stand, is that he did not oversee the consequences when French Morocco would break free from French rule. It would implicate that the situation for the Spanish protectorate would also soon become unbearable and would lead to the abolition of the Spanish protectorate as well.107 France granted independence to Morocco in March of 1956. In contrast to other
decolonization operations, the way to independence in Morocco passed by relatively easy. It is considered by scholars in the field, for example R. Ikeda and others, to be the midway between the wars of independence that precedent Moroccan independence and the peaceful negotiations that followed after the Moroccan case.108 From the 1950s onwards, the Istiqlal party, supported
by the Sultan, called stronger for independent Morocco. The French saw these events and reacted again by repression, forcing the Sultan to condemn the Istiqlal party in 1951.109 The Istiqlal
party, together with other groups, reacted by starting a riot in Casablanca to attract international attention to the Moroccan situation.110 The unrest pressured France to take reformative measures,
with one of them being the forced replacement of the Sultan by his uncle in 1953, as discussed above. The French government counted on the implementation of the planned reforms now that the reluctant Sultan had been replaced by a more French-minded leader. This was a misjudgment from the French government, for the people of Morocco did not support the new leader in any way and were therefore unwilling to form to the new reforms.111 The French authorities realized
that the reforms that they had in mind were only possible when taking in consideration three fundamental principles: ‘’First, it was impossible to obtain nationalist co-operation under Arafa’s reign since he was a puppet of el-Glaoui, who was the Pasha of Marrakech and a supporter of French rule in his country. Second, after Arafa’s departure, the restoration of Mohammed V or his sons was out of the question, because of el-Glaoui’s opposition. Third, there was no single dominant political group with whom to collaborate but three main streams in Moroccan opinion: the traditionalists, the moderate nationalists and the radical nationalists.’’112 By the end of 1955,
107 Idem.
108 R. Ikeda: 'The Paradox of Independence: The maintenance of influence and the French decision to transfer power in Morocco.' in:The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2007, Vol.35, No. 4, pp.569-592. 109 Ibid, p. 573.
110 Idem. 111 Idem. 112 Idem.
the French were starting to run out of time to decide what to do with the Moroccan question. On the one hand, because of the upcoming second anniversary of the exile of the Sultan, an issue that still infuriated many Moroccan citizens. On the other hand due to the upcoming UN meeting in which the Moroccan question would most certainly be discussed, with a possible negative outcome for France.113
The French government decided on letting the Sultan Mohammed V return to Morocco, under terms of conditions discussed at an open Franco-Moroccan meeting in Aix-les-Baines on the 22th of August.114 The approved meeting's conclusions were:
‘’1. retraite du sultan Ben Arafa; 2. constitution d’un Conseil du Trône;
3. formation d’un gouvernementrépresentatif chargé de négocier avec la France’’115
After this meeting, the French protectorate turned into a situation where, under French
supervision, reforms towards a more independent Morocco were set into place. The final step in the process came, when even the Sultan's strongest adversary, the Pasha of Marrakech, supported the plans for an independent Morocco. 116 With this last hurdle out of the way, the Istiqlal party
asked for the termination of the protectorate status of Morocco on the 27th of October 1956, just two days after the turn in favour for the Sultan by the Pasha of Marrakech.117 The French
government agreed with the request of the Istiqlal party and Morocco's independence was signed on the 6th of November 1956.118
The negotiations with Spain happened separately and were signed in the same year, for the Spanish government realized that it was impossible to continue the protectorate, without a strong French protectorate in the rest of the state, and to assure support for Spain with its Arab allies.119
In 1957, Sultan Mohammed V replaced his title of 'Sultan' with 'King'.120
Despite the termination of both protectorates in Morocco, some territories are still part of Spain and are therefore seen by Morocco as 'occupied territories'. The territories that create a dispute
113 Ibid, p. 577. 114 Idem.
115L’AnnéePolitique, 1955, p. 263.
116 R. Ikeda: 'The Paradox of Independence: The maintenance of influence and the French decision to transfer power in Morocco.' in:The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.35, No. 4, 2007, p.580. 117 Idem.
118Idem.
119 M. Elkin: 'Franco’s last stand: an analysis of Spanish foreign policy regarding Moroccan independence in 1956', in: International Journal of IberianStudies, Vol. 17, no.2, 2004.
between Morocco and Spain are the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, Alborán Island, Perejil island and some other small islands on the coast of Morocco.121 The argument on the Spanish side to
hold on to these territories after the protectorate of Morocco ended, is that these territories belonged to the Spanish kingdom long before the period of the protectorate in Morocco had started. Morocco considers these territories an integral part of Morocco, still to be decolonized.122
Map of Spanish territories in Morocco after 1956.123
Relations between the EU and Morocco after 1956
The relations between the EU and Morocco have been close since its independence in 1956. In 1960 already, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed a commercial agreement with Morocco.124
The difficulties in the relationship between Morocco and the European continent returned when Spain accessed the EU in 1986. Since Ceuta and Melilla were registered as integral parts of the
121 X. Ferrer Gallardo: 'The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of geopolitical, functional and symbolic rebordering.' in: Political Geography, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008, pp. 303-304.
122 Ibid, p. 305.
123Map of Spanish territories in Morocco. Retrieved from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_del_sur_de_Espa%C3%B1a_neutral.png. Last visited: 08.04.2014. 124European Union's website: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1960-1969/1960/index_nl.htm. Last visited: 08.04.2014.
