MASTER THESIS
‘
Cosmopolitan Hospitality and Fortress Europe’
A Frame Analysis of the
Political Speeches of David Cameron, Angela Merkel and Mark Rutte regarding the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal
Student: Roosmarijn Groen
Studentnumber: 10373543
Department: Political Science, International Relations Supervisor: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon
Second reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris
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Table of contents
1. Introduction p. 3
2. Contextualizing the EU-Turkey refugee deal p. 5
2.1 Turkey-EU p. 5
2.2 Refugee crisis p. 6
2.3 The deal and its aftermath p. 7
3. Literature Review p. 10
3.1 The contemporary cosmopolitan thought and EU’s
normative power p. 11
3.2 The fort p. 14
3.3 The ambivalence of humanitarianism p. 16
Humanitarianism
The ‘humanitarian way’ as a shield Homo Sacer: Inclusion/exclusion
4. Methodology p. 22
4.1 Frame analysis and CDA p. 22
4.2 Operationalization p. 24
4.3 Positioning the sample p. 25
5. Analysis p. 27
5.1 EU’s protective ethos and (dis)unity p. 27
5.2 The humanitarian language regarding the prevention of crimes p. 32 and casualties
5.3 Inclusion/exclusion p. 38
6. Conclusion p. 45
7. Bibliography p. 48
8. Appendix p. 55
8.1 Translations Merkel and Rutte p. 55
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1
Introduction
The European Union (hereinafter: EU) signed the so-called ‘refugee deal’ with Turkey the 8th of March, 2016. A year after the EU-Turkey refugee deal was signed; the Médecins Sans Frontières (hereinafter: MSF) released a report on the impact of the deal on the lives of the refugees trying to reach the EU, exposing the consequences and significances of this widely discussed international agreement (MSF 2017). The MSF report draws a picture of a harsh reality of abuse, imprisonment and logistic shortcomings at the external borders of the EU. Moreover, MSF stresses how their reports stands in high contrast with the legitimization of the deal by EU policymakers: “Politicians have also highlighted a ‘substantial fall in the loss of life’. However, as these about the deal’s alleged success fail to address what happens to those people who continue to have reason to flee for their lives” (idem: 7). MSF argues that the EU-Turkey refugee deal has increased people’s vulnerability, both mentally and
physically, calling the policy regulation worrying, in relation to the ‘disastrous consequences for people’s health’ (idem: 17).
The disputed EU-Turkey refugee deal was supposed to reduce tension in the Schengen Zone, since the ascending number of asylum-seekers was deteriorating the EU’s internal relations. The pressure on the EU’s external borders was increasing as a result of this
ascending number of refugees, overpowered EU countries such as Italy and Greece that were the first countries where refugees arrive into EU territory due to their geographical locations. At the same time, the attitude of other EU countries towards the arrival of refugees was getting more hostile. Besides the fear of corroding the social-economic domestic system of EU member states, the arrival of refugees was feared amongst the European society due to a growing anxiety towards the unknown that was triggered amongst the European societies, as a result of the terror attacks in Paris (Radu 2016: 22-23). Concomitantly, different scholars have demonstrated how the representation of the refugees as threat, in relation to the fearful Other (Gale 2004; Harrison 2016; Papastergiadis 2006), has contributed to EU ‘fortressing’ its territory. This problem construction is built upon fear, as a result of growing anxieties in the aftermath of 9/11 (Papastergiadis 2006: 429). Consequently, the Othering lens has been used to construct ‘the refugee’ as threatening burden to the host countries (Olsen et al. 2015: 59). However, this increased hostility within the migration debate in combination with the growing pressure on the EU’s external borders, is not detectible in the political speeches of EU leaders. There is a dominant humanitarian discourse within the public debate, regarding gatekeeping and the coming of asylum-seekers to Europe.
4 This current study addresses the occurring shift from the refugee as a threat towards a more humanitarian approach, while the objective of the EU remains the same: gatekeeping the external borders of the EU. Herewith, the refugee is positioned as a victim, instead of a threat. In the political speeches of EU member states’ representatives, statements concerning EU’s humanitarian intentions and the willingness to help prevail, while their policies suggest other priorities regarding migration. Therefore, the research question of this current study will be: To what extent has the Turkey deal been legitimised through a humanitarian discourse, focusing on the ambiguous tensions between EU’s normative power and the notion of Fortress Europe?
Since this thesis explores the public discourse of cosmopolitanism and the harsh reality of a Fortress Europe regarding the EU-Turkey refugee in relation to humanitarianism, the study contributes to the academic debate on humanitarianism and its possible ambiguities in relation to the position of refugees. This discursive discrepancy between ‘cosmopolitan openness’ and ‘fortressing closeness’ is going to be proved with the help of a frame analysis on the use of the humanitarian language in the political speeches on the EU-Turkey refugee deal. This study looks at the legitimization of the EU-Turkey refugee deal and approaches the current situation in the EU regarding refugees as a ‘crisis’. The term reflects the growing number of displaced persons, forced to reside overpopulated and inadequate refugee camps and the fatal accidents on the Mediterranean. The uprising far-right populism in European member states as a recent political phenomenon is viewed as a unfortunate symptoms, according to Amnesty International, MSF (2017; 2017) and Collett (2017). The crisis will be specifically referred to as a refugee crisis, rather than a migrant crisis. In the past, different organizations have spoken of a migrant crisis (BBC 2016; Reuters 2015). However, as the majority of the asylum-seekers are fleeing armed conflict from for example Syria,
Afghanistan or Iraq (BBC 2016), the majority of them are officially defined and protected under international law as refugees (UNHCRa 2016). Therefore, the asylum-seekers of this current migration crisis will be addressed as refugees.
The following sections provides a detailed overview of the diplomatic relation between the EU and Turkey, the refugee crisis and the disputed refugee deal itself. The literature review discusses the position of the EU as on the one hand a political actor with an acknowledged normative power influenced by the cosmopolitan thought, while on the other hand political interferences such as the refugee deal are strengthening the image of Fortress Europe. Therefore, the literature review conceptualizes first the contemporary cosmopolitan thought in relation to EU’s normative power, followed by a description of the notion of
5 Fortress Europe. The concept of humanitarianism is deepened in order to demonstrate the ambivalence character of the humanitarian apparatus with regard to its relationship with politics. Agamben’s reading on homo sacer is used in order to shine light upon a possible comparison between the by Agamben introduced ‘sacred men’ and the refugee, emphasising the inclusion/exclusion opposition. Agamben explains the problematic position of the refugee as the homo sacer within the humanitarian apparatus. This is why Agamben’s school of thought is position within the section on humanitarianism of the literature review. The methodology chapter legitimizes the choice of the frame analysis as a methodological tool as well as the CDA and the sample itself. A frame analysis is used to analyse the political speeches of Merkel, Cameron and Rutte as the representatives of the Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as three European member states that were in the position to elaborate on creation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal. At last, the findings outlined in the analysis will come together in the final conclusion of this thesis.
2
Contextualizing the EU-Turkey refugee deal
2.1 Turkey-EU
Turkey’s prospective membership has been of significant influence on the bilateral relation between Turkey and the EU (Paçacı Elitok & Straubhaar 2012: 259; Rumelili 2008: 97-98). This process has been going on for years, starting when Turkey attempted its application to the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community, in 1987 (European
Commission 2016a). While Turkey had already been declared eligible to join the EU in 1997, the official membership negotiations did not start until 2005 (ibid.).
The negotiations between the EU and Turkey have not yet led to membership and have even been described as a political deadlock (Ugur 2010: 968). However, the diplomatic
relations between the EU and Turkey are not completely alienated. Turkey, for example, has been a long-time member of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe. Yet, the diplomatic relationship between the EU and Turkey faced recently
difficulties as a result of the critical reviewof the referendum in Turkey by the EU. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has organised a constitutional referendum on the 16th of April in 2017. Since the intention behind the referendum was to establish more presidential power, the EU openly rejected the cause of the referendum that was able to
6 weaken the parliamentary system in Turkey. Overall, Erdogan’s wish to campaign abroad, in combination with the reaction of several EU member states, including the Netherlands and Germany by refusing Turkish politicians to rally abroad, made that the diplomatic relation between the EU and Turkey took a nosedive (Candar 2017). The Turkish president called both Germany and the Netherlands “Nazi remnants and fascists” while the EU
representative’s claim that Turkey is slipping back into dictatorship (ibid.).
The diplomatic relation between the EU and Turkey has been fragile, since the absence of Turkish EU membership has been an overarching hindrance (Kosebalaban 2002: 130). Meanwhile, the ratio has been a slippery slope after the recent diplomatic clash in relation to the constitutional referendum in Turkey. The EU-Turkey refugee deal seems to be a product of negotiations that happened before the latest disharmonies (ibid.). However, several sources have expressed their concerns with regard to the implementation and even continuation of the existence of the deal, due to incidents and threats with regard to the commitment of the United Kingdom towards the disputed deal (BBC 2017; Tamkin 2017).
2.2 Refugee crisis
Europe’s bilateral relations with its neighbouring countries such as Turkey are diplomatically essential, and often tested during times of crises, such as this current refugee crisis. Looking at the global wars and unrest, poverty and crises, the amount of asylum-seekers should not have come as a surprise. This refugee crisis did not appear out of the blue (Christodoulou et al. 2016: 322; Colett 2017: 150; Radu 2016: 22). On-going conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and continuing economic problems in the Balkan have resulted in a rising number of asylum seekers (Radu 2016: 22). Due to a ruling lack of solidarity and unity within the EU, several member states their initial response to the wave of arriving refugees was even to close the borders. Consequently, it took the EU an exceptional amount of time to establish any kind of grip on the ‘mass movement’ (ibid.). Hungary for example responded by building a razor-wire barrier in order to stem the flow of migrants, and Austria built a four kilometres fence at its border with Slovenia. As a result of this incoherent response of EU member states, it became clear that the EU did not have a working unified migration policy that could manage the recent refugees movement (Bal 2016: 16-17).
The most current statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (hereinafter: UNHCR) show 16.121.427 refugees around the globe in 2015. By refugees, the UNHCR includes:
7 Individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation (UNHCR Statistics)
The high number of desperate refugees resulted in distress amongst different European countries. As Nina Perkowski pointed out, over the last ten years Italy has been annually declaring a state of emergency inside its national borders, due to the coming of refugees (2012). As a result, temporary remedies became the point of focus within the management of the situation, instead of focusing on long-term solutions (ibid.). Furthermore, Italy is not the only country that proclaimed the state of emergency. In the beginning of March 2016, the government of Greece declared a state of emergency, describing the situation as a ‘huge humanitarian crisis’ (Al Jazeera 2016). Just in the Idomeni camp alone, at the Greek border with Macedonia, were 13.000-14.000 people trapped, while another 6.000 – 7.000 refugee were housed in the region of the Idomeni border crossing (ibid.). In addition, Hungary declared a state of emergency on the 9th of March 2016 (NBC 2016), announcing that troops would be deployed in order to close the border.
2.3 The deal and its aftermath
The earlier mentioned distress within the domestic sphere of EU member states was not solely proliferating in EU member states, that where receiving refugees, as Brussels was stressing the importance of collective action with regard to the refugee crisis. Existing instruments and policies were not able to manage this refugee crisis (Rozakou 2012). Consequently, the EU was devoted to find alternatives. One alternative option is concluding international
agreements, called European Union Readmission Agreements (hereinafter: EURAs). These EURAs between the EU and non-EU countries are in existence to “[…] facilitate the return of people residing irregularly in a country to their country of origin or to a country of transit” (European Parliament 2015). Overall, these agreements are established in negotiations that focus upon the broader context, with regard to mutual interests. Most often, VISA facilitation is one of the incentives the EU is able to offer (ibid.).
8 Due to Turkey’s demographic location, immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa have used Turkey as a transit country for years (Paçacı Elitok & Straubhaar 2012: 259). However, as a result of the on-going unrest in these regions, the group of asylum-seekers increased. Besides the Balkan route through Turkey, many desperate asylum-asylum-seekers have chosen the dangerous and often deadly route overseas. Turkey sheltered a high number of refugees, hosting 2.8 million asylum-seekers at the mid-2016 (UNHCRb 2017).
Overviewing the disputed refugee deal between the EU and Turkey, a few headlines need to be mentioned in order to comprehend the capacity of the deal. Since the official document of the deal is not directly accessible, this overview will be based upon the EU-Turkey statement in press release, EU ‘factsheets' and communication report of the European Commission. The European Commission is referring to the merits of the deal as ‘bold moves’ that were necessary to end the migration crisis in Europe. They have distinguished several action points that elaborate further on the cooperation between the EU and Turkey in tackling the crisis. First of all, all new irregular ‘migrants’ crossing from Turkey to Greece will be sent back to Turkish territory (European Commission 2016: 2). Secondly, a 1:1 resettlement scheme will be implemented with regard to the asylum-seekers crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands. For each readmitted refugee by Turkey, the EU will welcome a Syrian refugee from Turkey (European Commission 2016: 5; European Council 2016). More specifically, the EU’s member states should honour the earlier commitment of 18.000 resettlements (European Council 2016). The press release by the EU states: “Any further need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons” (European Council 2016). Meanwhile, the European Commission reaffirms within the communication towards the European Parliament, European Council and the Council the temporary character of this second principle (European Commission 2016: 9).
In return of the first two action points that are in the advantage of the EU, Turkey could benefit from the implementation of visa liberalisation in order to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the end of June 2016 (idem: 6). In light of the still unsuccessful membership negotiations, this action point could be seen as an important incentive for Turkey to participate with the EU for this refugee deal. The fourth action plan suggests speeding up the disbursement of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (idem: 7). In addition, the EU allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility. Until the end of 2018, the EU will mobilise an additional 3 billion euro (European Council 2016). The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey is an initiative of the European Commission, in order “to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated
9 manner” (European Commission 2016b). Overall, the EU Facility for Refugees mostly
manages and supervises the capital that the EU and its member states have contributed. In addition, the EU and Turkey agreed upon upgrading customs Unions and to re-energise Turkey’s accession process. Currently, the European Commission stated that the Facility of Refugees as of June 2017 has been contracted 48 project worth 1.6 billion euros. The final action point highlights the importance of future cooperation between the EU and Turkey to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria (ibid.).
As many NGOs have published reports on the refugee crisis in relation to the refugee deal, this study will grasp on the current situation at the external borders of the EU anno 2017, by the usage of two detailed reports by Amnesty International and MSF.
Amnesty is already referring to the deal as the ‘blue print for despair’ in the title of their report. Amnesty International, globally known as a committed NGO campaigning “for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all”, positions the deals as punishment without crime, positioning the refugee as a victim of population management at the EU borders, besides a victim of conflict in their home country (2017: 8). Many lives have been put at risk within the last couple of years as a result of the absence of alternative safe and legal routes to the EU. While the political unrest and conflicts are at the crux of the uprising flow of
refugees, it is this absence of safe alternatives as described by Amnesty International, which causes hundreds of casualties. At the same time, Amnesty stresses that it is in the EU its power to undertake action in order to resolve this absence. In short, the critical standpoint of Amnesty International regarding the EU-Turkey deal:
Asylum-seekers should not be sent back to a country that is, currently at least, unable to guarantee access to an adequate protection status and adequate living conditions. The EU can legitimately seek to assist Turkey to meet these conditions, but it is callous in the extreme, and a straightforward violation of international law, to construct an entire migration policy around the pretence that this is currently the case (Amnesty International 2017: 6)
The MSF also published a contemporary report, reflecting on the year after the 18th of March. At the heart of the report lies the unfortunate disagreement with founding chairman of the European Stability Institute, Gerald Knaus, who MSF identifies as the architect of the EU-Turkey deal (MSF 2017). As Knaus states that the deal between the EU and EU-Turkey could
10 protect the EU’s external borders whilst “combining compassion and empathy with control and security concerns” (ESI 2017), the MSF firmly disagrees with this statement. This disagreement is built upon several observations made by the MSF.
Foremost, the MSF notes that the absence of safe and legal routes, in combination with people desperately seeking for alternatives and the lack of protection and assistance leads to a highly increased risk of death for the refugees (2017: 7). The MSF quotes victims of abuse at the external borders of the EU (idem: 9). Closing of the Balkan route, people are being physically harmed at the Turkish border, getting kicked, beaten and attacked by guards and their dogs (ibid.). Moreover, the MSF takes a critical stand against the conditions in the refugee camps on the Greek Islands; they consider the conditions to be dangerous. Refugees are supposed to register and wait at so-called hotspots until it has been decided on their further transfer (idem: 10). In principle, the decision means whether the refugee is going to be relocated to Turkey or whether the refugee is eligible for asylum in Greece. However, these hotspots are accommodating double their capacity, hence lacking basic services such as heating and hot water (idem: 11). The containment policy of the EU is portrayed to be ‘deadly’ in the MSF report, supported with facts and numbers regarding a strong increase of mental health problems (idem: 13). The MSF noticed a severe arrival of people with
psychoses, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depressions (idem: 15).
3
Literature review
The following section is going to outline the concepts of cosmopolitanism, humanitarianism and Agamben’s homo sacer, in order to understand the ambiguous tension between the contemporary cosmopolitan ideology and the reality of a Fortress Europe. The discussion takes place in the public debate in the EU about the EU-Turkey refugee deal.
This chapter will unfold as follows. First, the contemporary cosmopolitan thought will be outlined, built upon Kantian hospitality and Habermas’ postnationalism and obligatory solidarity. Moreover, this first section of the literature review elaborates on the academic debate regarding EU’s normative power in relation to the contemporary cosmopolitan thought. Secondly, the notion of Fortress Europe is viewed upon, with regard to the logic of state territoriality. In light of the earlier discussed proclaimed normative power of the EU, its protective ethos, the notion of Fortress Europe will be discussed, stressing the conflict between the two paradigms. Furthermore, this study wants to address the use of a
11 humanitarian discourse with regard to the legitimization of the EU-Turkey refugee deal. Therefore, the humanitarian apparatus needs to be conceptualised within the third section of this literature review, in order to understand the merits and logic behind this discourse. The tension between EU’s normative power and the notion of Fortress Europe appears within humanitarianism, in relation to inclusion and exclusion. In light of this opposition of inclusive and exclusive, Agamben’s thoughts on the concept of homo sacer are going to be discussed, in order to distinguish the compatibility between the position of the homo sacer within the inclusive exclusion and the refugees.
3.1 The contemporary cosmopolitan thought and EU’s normative power
Before outlining EU’s protective ethos towards the marginalised such as refugee within the political world stage`, this literature review elaborates on the contemporary cosmopolitan thought within the EU. This exploration of the cosmopolitan thought will be used to establish an understanding of EU’s normative power.
Cosmopolitanism entails the vision of all human beings, belonging to the same global community linked with the universalism of modern western thought (Delanty 2006: 26). The term cosmopolitan derives from the Greek words ‘cosmos’ (world) and ‘polis’ (city),
reproducing the notion of the ‘citizen of the universe’ (Cheah 2006: 487). The main tradition in modern cosmopolitan thought is rooted in the age of Enlightenment, descends from Immanuel Kant, who “sought to extend republican political philosophy into a wider and essentially legal framework beyond the relatively limited modern republic” (Delanty 2006: 26). Kant proposed the cosmopolitan order in world governance, including both an
international legal authority and the universal civil society, to construct a peaceful
understanding and cooperation between the individual modern republics (Fine & Boon 2007: 5). Consequently, Kant addressed the ability of humanity to unite within peaceful mutual relations regulated by public laws. This notion of ‘communal possession of the world’ would disperse amongst the world society, bringing the human race closer and closer to a
cosmopolitan constitution (Nussbaum 1997: 13).
At the heart of Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism lies mutual hospitality (Baker 2010; Fine & Boon 2007; Kattago 2017; Nussbaum 1997). The Kantian hospitality is being
described both as ‘the right to associate’ and the negative right not to be treated as an enemy when he or she arrives in the land of ‘others’ (Kattago 2017: 48). Essentially, a guest should be treated as a guest once his or her presence does not harm the host, and when the guest understands the temporal character of the stay. Hence, the Kantian hospitality within the
12 contemporary cosmopolitan thought is built upon the idea that the residence of the guest is never permanent. Moreover, this hospitality should be granted as a cosmopolitan right, rather than an act of charity (ibid.). Ultimately, the Kantian cosmopolitan right of hospitality is in a way limited to the right of visitation since the visitor “may indeed be turned away if doing so will not cause his death” (Baker 2010: 88).
One of the main problems within Kant’s search for perpetual peace, accomplished by the implementation of the cosmopolitan order, lies within the requirement of the nation-state to give up parts of its sovereignty: Just as the people within the territory of a nation-state abandon their lawless condition and enter into a social contract to end internal strife, so should nation-states willingly limit their freedom and submit to a legal authority beyond themselves (Fine & Boon 2007: 5). In relation to this problem, Jürgen Habermas describes the obstinacy of political power to self-assertion as the ‘realist thorn’ in the applicability of the politics of human rights (1999: 267). The everyday challenges, crises and the proliferation of supranational institutions require a certain level of international cooperation (ibid.). The historical constellation, in which the democratic process in each nation state was the ruling institutional form, shifted to a postnational constellation (Habermas 2001: 60-61). This postnationalism entails the de-nationalization or ‘self-dismantling’ of the neoliberal nation-states in the process of globalization: “[…] finding the appropriate forms of the democratic process to take beyond the nation-state” (ibid.).
This transformation of constellations that consists out of a new world society, a cosmopolitan community of states, impacted the consciousness of the citizens as well (idem: 55). The world society could be held accountable for all ‘citizens of the universe’, challenging this civil society and transformed political sphere to foster the obligatory cosmopolitan
solidarity. Overall, human rights have established a dominant position within the construct of cosmopolitanism in the 20th century (Cheah 2006: 490; Fine & Boon 2007: 6). Hospitality, the recognition of humanity and the acceptance of Otherness are all situated at the crux of this new kind of humanism (Fine & Boon 2007: 6). Concepts such as Kant’s perpetual peace, human rights and global governance took the overhand within the cosmopolitan narrative after the Second World War in Europe (idem: 7). Cosmopolitanism could therefore be seen as a political agenda for the EU, which means certain holistic ideals and beliefs could infiltrate policies and cosmopolitanism should not be considered solely a theoretical approach that highlights the existence of a ‘world society’. In addition to the cosmopolitan political agenda as described earlier, EU’s normative power and protective ethos could be considered to be related to the contemporary cosmopolitan thought.
13 Within this current study, the political speech of Merkel, Rutte and Cameron is
analysed in relation to their commitment to each other as member states of the supranational EU, as well as to the international community, as a result of the de-nationalization or ‘self-dismantling’ that characterizes the postnational constellation (Habermas 1999: 60-61). This commitment of supranationalism between the EU member states lies within shared values and solidarity on which the EU has been founded on (Bulley 2017: 53). These shared values are embedded in Europe’s protective ethos, which determines EU’s international reputation amongst the world. EU’s protective ethos consists out of the urge of the EU to fulfil the role of the helping hand where assistance is needed, reflecting the cosmopolitan obligatory solidarity as described by Habermas (2001: 55). As such, the EU became a self-proclaimed progressive voice on the political world stage by asserting to be founded on liberal values (Bulley 2017: 53.). These were the principles that Angela Merkel referred to in the beginning of 2015, when she expressed her willingness to unite with fellow European member states: “If Europe fails in this refugee crisis, it betrays its founding principles” (Deutsche Welle 2015). The normative power of EU and its solidarity thus moves beyond state-centricity (Bulley 2017: 56; Kattago 2017: 37). A great part of EU’s protective ethos, as described by Bulley, is based on Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (European Union 2007).
Besides the merits of the Treaty of Lisbon the EU’s shared identity has been documented within the Copenhagen Declaration in 1973, positioning principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights at the heart of the identity (Manners 2002: 241). By defining its identity, the EU constructs itself by its relation to oneself and the ‘others’ (Bulley 2017: 53-54; Manners 2002: 241). EU’s normative power is described as the ‘power over opinion’ and the ‘ideological power’ through an understanding of the EU’s international identity (Manners 2002: 239). Manners described EU’s normative power as the active
position, power, of the EU to project its values across its external borders: “[…] the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it –
14 that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system” (Manners 2002: 252).
This normative power carries out a certain cosmopolitan solidarity that goes beyond its external borders, as the tolerance of the EU member states does not end at the EU borders. The EU members respect the moral, political, and legal responsibilities of the institution towards the cosmopolitan idea of a ‘global society’ (Bulley 2017: 54). However, EU’s normative power is not undisputed, as other scholars paint a less optimistic picture, arguing that the EU’s inconsistency with regard to actively upholding its normative power has undermined their credibility, as the European Commission for example supported secrecy in World Trade Organization proceedings (Nicolaïdis & Howse 2002: 787). In addition, the analysis of this thesis will elaborate further on the critique on EU’s normative power as reaction on empirical findings.
In summary, the contemporary cosmopolitan thought is understood within this study in relation to Habermas’ postnationalism and Kant’s perceptual peace, the last from the 18th century, the former still alive. According to Habermas, the contemporary philosopher, the world society could be held accountable for the wellbeing of the humanity in its totality, since the world is moving towards a globalized international community (Habermas 2001: 55). Moreover, the Kantian hospitality can also be considered as part of this expansion of
international human rights and norms, as the hospitality should be granted as right, according to Kant. However, while refugees should be welcomed and assisted after the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR 1951), their stay should not considered to be permanent (Baker 2010: 88; Kattago 2017: 48). With regard to the EU, the contemporary cosmopolitan thought is recognisable within EU’s normative power. EU has portrayed itself as a responsible political actor on a global scale, conceptualized by a form of cosmopolitan solidarity through a sharing of responsibility (Bulley 2017; Manners 2002; Kattago 2017).
3.2 The fort
As a consequence of EU’s ‘value based foundation’ and its role in promoting principles for democracy and social justice the EU as a political entity could be hold responsible for their moral actions. However, the reality of closing borders for refugees calls this moral and political foundation of the EU into question (Kattago 2017: 36). While the earlier described notion of cosmopolitan solidarity (Habermas 2001: 55) is visible in many critiques that the EU has expressed in earlier days towards non-EU members in its role of promoter of its values (Manners 2002: 236), the EU-Turkey refugee deal can be seen as a hitch in Europe’s protective ethos as described earlier in relation to EU’s normative power. The EU has not hide
15 the limitations to their cosmopolitan solidarity, locking at the EU strict VISA policies. But, the consequences of the refugee deal has put the content of the Treaty of Lisbon or the Copenhagen Declaration heavily into question, amongst the international society of state and non-state actors (Harrison 2016; Migration Policy Institute 2016). As part of the international society the MSF involved within daily management of the refugee crisis at EU’s external borders and turned against the EU after the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU became reality. In December 2016 MSF went public to reject all EU funding as reaction on the EU-Turkey refugee deal. MSF argues that their decision is “In opposition to their damaging deterrence policies and continued attempts to push people and their suffering away from European shores” (MSF 2016). There are some aspects within the agreement that are in line with the role of the EU as a progressive institution, such as the close cooperation between the EU and Turkey in improving the socio-economic conditions of refugees in Turkey (Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016: 59). However, refusing those refugees as a result of the EU-Turkey refugee deal is felt by organisations like the MSF as in conflict with the founding principles of the EU.
Consequently, as a result of the EU disowning their own core principles, the EU is viewed as a gated community (Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007). The EU is described as ‘Fortress Europe’ zooming in on the role of fear within the process of becoming this
hermetically sealed metaphor: “In understanding the historical and political foundations of the current protective immigration policies we need to reflect further on a fear that runs through the member states; namely the fear of losing the comfort zone, which entails the fear of losing economic welfare, public security as well as social identity” (ibid.). Strict border controls, increased punitive sanctions, deportations, tighter visa requirements and asylum criteria all contribute to the fortress (Avci & McDonald 2000: 192). The concept of ‘state territoriality’ lies at the heart of the metaphor of the EU as a fort. State territoriality can be seen as one of the fundamental principles that define the current dominant international system
(Vigneswaran 2013: 1). Darshan Vigneswaran describes how in current debates concerning migration: “[…] we have almost always conceptualized migration as a ‘problem’ and state territoriality as its ‘response’” (2013: 11). While the focus lies upon fixing or preventing this migration problem, it is often ignored how institutions such as the EU in other times have fostered the movement of people across borders. With regard to Fortress Europe and this current study on the EU-Turkey refugee deal, the territorial exclusion of refugees as a result of states ‘protecting’ their unitary jurisdictions by fortressing policies (idem: 2) could demonstrate the effectiveness of the fort its gates as a gated community.
16 The image of Fortress Europe should on the other hand not be generalised onto EU’s identity in totality (Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007: 302), since not all of the EU’s policies reflect this notion of a gated and closed community; the regulations on the flow of capital and goods across international borders are less restricted (Briskman & Cemlyn 2005: 715).
However, in relation to the refugees Brussels’s government policy is stern, in order to protect the Schengen Territory (Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007: 294).
3.3 The ambivalence of humanitarianism
Until now this literature review has demonstrated two different readings on the role and position of the EU regarding its internal value-system and external relations. On the one hand, the EU has been positioned as a supranational actor in the possession of a value based
foundation and active role as promoter of those values. EU’s normative power has been described as the representation of ideational impact of the EU’s role and identity in relation to others (Manners 2002: 238). As a consequence, the contemporary cosmopolitan thought coexists within EU’s protective ethos. On the other hand, the notion of Fortress Europe has showed how the EU could be seen as a gated community in which principles of state territoriality is dominant. Consequently, there is a tension between EU’s cosmopolitan foundation of universal principles and fortressing political behaviour such as the EU-Turkey refugee deal.
This tension can be described as ambiguous tension between two opposing paradigms becomes visible while analysing the disputed deal in relation to the relation between politics and the humanitarian apparatus. The following section will therefore first conceptualize humanitarianism, after which the concept of inclusion and exclusion of society will be identified by the usage of Agamben’s homo sacer. Lastly, this literature review will zoom in on how the ‘humanitarian reason’ has become a mobilizing feature within the frame of a EU’s normative power and the notion of Fortress Europe.
Humanitarianism
Reflecting on the earlier described contrasting readings on the role of the EU as a political transnational actor with regard to the refugee crisis, the following paragraph will
conceptualize humanitarianism by the usage of diverse literature on the position of the humanitarian apparatus with regard to politics.
According to Polly Pallister-Wilkens (2015: 58) there are two trends that can be identified within the field of humanitarianism. The first trend is the understanding of a
17 growing willingness to those in need, as standing up for the weak has become a popular endeavour. Second, due to the technological advancement and growth, the capacity of the humanitarian sector has expanded recognisably (ibid.). Besides these two trends, Pallister-Wilkens adds a third in which she describes how the raison d'être of the humanitarian
intervention gets undermined, ignored and transformed in order to condone the governance of ‘problematic peoples’ such as refugees (idem: 59). In light of the central argument of this current study, this third trend described by Pallister-Wilkins could be recognised within the legitimization of the EU-Turkey refugee deal, in relation to the tension between EU as a fort and its protective ethos. It is this point of critique on the problematic relation of an interests based approach with regard to the humanitarian intervention that is going to be discussed and analysed within this thesis.
At the centre of this third trend lies an overarching compromise between the
humanitarian sector and politics. Michael Barnett states that humanitarianism had gone global after the Second World War as a result of the many non-governmental organisations who focused on Europe in the aftermath of World War II, discovered the rest of the world:
‘Waiting to be helped’ (2011: 2). The ‘humanitarian community’ provided life-saving relief to those in need, while at the same time acting in neutrality, as being apolitical was one of the keys to their success (ibid.). Humanitarians were therefore considered to be political ‘outsiders’, meaning that the executives of humanitarian organisations left politics to the states. However, Barnett proposes that after 1990 this non-politic approach changed. The world was challenged by new wars, in which the opponents within the conflicts were not solely the states (ibid.). Barnett argues that this increasing complexity has weakened the position of the humanitarians, since the states began to bulk the humanitarian sector in order to advance their own political interests and foreign relations. The interference by states went beyond the donation of funds. Besides financial support, the states for example began creating their own humanitarian units within their foreign and defence ministries (idem: 4). Barnett highlights the relation between the surge of humanitarian intervention and the interest of the states to intervene as a donor (ibid.). Consequently, the humanitarian organizations saw themselves catapulted into a difficult position. On the one hand the funds would increase their potential contribution to humanity. On the other hand, core principles that define
humanitarianism, such as impartiality, neutrality and humanity, create a ‘humanitarian space’ according to Barnett, and disowning one of these principles would politicize the cause
18 Nonetheless, while Barnett describes how the purpose of humanitarianism got
proliferated and politicised, his reading on the history of humanitarianism raises the question if humanitarian intervention was ever free of political influence. Didier Fassin describes humanitarianism as a ‘politics of life’, in which he argues that a humanitarian intervention has always been a political action on itself (Fassin 2007: 501). According to Fassin, it is
inevitable to choose sides, as ‘making a selection’ it inescapable within a humanitarian
intervention. At the action of saving individuals lurks the risk of harming others (ibid.). In this process, the choices define the power of control, whereas political agenda’s influence those choices by different relations and/or agreements.
Barnett and Fassin both address the ambivalent relationship between politics and humanitarianism and are therefore considered to be viable for the analyses of this study to understand the current humanitarian role of the EU while analysing the political speech of Merkel, Cameron and Rutte. Moreover, the following section will further address this issue on the influence of politics within the humanitarian apparatus.
The ‘humanitarian way’ as a shield
As mentioned before, the third trend within contemporary humanitarianism addresses the interplay between the humanitarian intervention, political actors and its interests (Pallister-Wilkins 2015: 59). The relation between the humanitarian apparatus and politics remain an on-going debate, in which possible political self-interest underlying humanitarian assistance stands in conflict with the principles of the ‘humanitarian space’ (Barnett 2005: 724). Humanitarianism became a strategy, framing the narrative on humanitarian intervention grounds in order to strategically counter criticism (Pallister-Wilkins 2015: 67). The ‘humanitarian reason’ has become a mobilizing feature in European politics, in order to legitimize measures in the contemporary political life (Fassin 2011: 2). Didier Fassin compares the humanitarian language as “A smoke screen that plays on sentiment in order to impose the law of the market and the brutality of realpolitik” (ibid.). For this research, the comparison between the humanitarian language and a smoke screen as given by Fassin allows us to understand the possible power of the humanitarian discourse within the political speech. Consequently, the following section will elaborate on the mobilizing power of the
humanitarian language in relation to the position of the refugee.
In addition, Michel Agier describes how the field of humanitarianism is caught in a web of ‘secret solidarity’ (Agier 2010: 30). This web is based upon the unchallenged rule of world police to rescue victims, overshadowing political influence. Agier states: “[...]
19 humanitarianism overlaps with and contributes to the end of politics, instantiated by the unchallenged rule of world police and the rescue of ‘victims’. Yet, as any other form of policing, it is ‘political’ to the extent that it embodies a desire to control” (ibid.). Similarly, Agamben addresses the issue of the secret solidarity of the humanitarian apparatus in relation to “the very powers they are ought to fight” (1998: 133). The humanitarian organizations are in ‘perfect symmetry’ with the states, as they both position the ‘victim’ as bare life (ibid.). The following section of the literature review on the concept of homo sacer will explain the notion of bare life and its relation to the humanitarian apparatus more carefully.
Concomitantly, the exclusion of humanitarianism from politics could be seen as naïve, since according to Agier “we must reconsider this not because, or not only because, in the end, ‘everything is political,’ or because the humanitarian apparatus fulfills certain political functions and not only moral ones” (2010: 42). The controversial character of the
humanitarian language with regard to the web of secret solidarity is stressed within Agier’s metaphor of the two hands that strike and heal. The humanitarian intervention, described as the ‘left hand of the empire’ copes with damage the right hands leaves behind (idem: 29-30). While the right hand of police and military strikes and takes what it wants, the left hand is there to deal with the consequences. In alignment with this argument it is essential to emphasize the importance of the responsibility and involvement of sovereign EU member states, when expressing concerns about international agreements such as the EU-Turkey refugee deal.
Homo Sacer: inclusion/exclusion
Reflecting on the tension between inclusiveness and exclusiveness, caused by the conflicted perspectives of Fortress Europe and EU’s protective ethos, a line could is drawn between this friction and Giorgo Agamben work on the position of the homo sacer. Agambens’ homo sacer is based upon ancient Greek distinction between ‘bare life’ and the ‘political life’. First this section will clarify the position of the homo sacer as described by Agamben, after which the connection is made with the position of the refugee and the opposition between inclusion and exclusion.
Agamben elaborates on this notion of biopolitics, perceived as the management of population by state power (Agamben 1998: 3). According to Agamben, the biopower should be understood as the fundamental technology behind sovereignty rather than a historical specific technology of power (Rozakou 2012: 564). Agamben argues that modern politics is more than “The fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and
20 calculations of State power” (1998: 9). Agamben starts by referring to an ancient Greek dichotomy: ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’. Bios refers to the proper way of living, as an individual or group: political life, while zoe expresses bare life as the simple common life lived by men, animals and even gods (Agamben 1998: 1). The latter is grounded in the exclusion of the rule of law by its sovereign, by which the ‘state of exception’ is constructed. The differences between zoe and bios embodies the historical philosophical foundation of the concept of homo sacer, the possibility of expelling someone’s bios and the construction of the state of exception, in which the tension between inclusion and exclusion could be recognized.
The state of exception as described by Agamben is not just bare life, zoe, but it is forced upon the people by the state/polis. Their bios is taken away, leaving ‘sacred men’ that are devoid of value (idem: 83). This sacred position is what Agamben refers to as ‘homo sacer’. The intervention of actively rejecting the bios by its sovereign creates a position in which a human being may be killed, but not sacrificed (idem: 8). The individual was being expelled from the society, and therefore from the political world and homo sacer becomes homo sacred. The bios in ancient Greece have been removed by force as a form of
punishment for their citizens. By the usage of ‘sacred’, Agamben does not mean that the bare life is protected on the grounds that it is holy or religious. Sacred means that it is outside of the society of bios, instead of being precious due to spiritual value. On the other hand, it is not permitted to celebrate a sacrifice in the killing of homo sacer. Hence, the life of someone is permissible to be killed inside of the sovereign sphere (idem: 83).
Elaborating on the position of the sacred men whose bios gets rejected Agamben addresses the problematic relation between inclusion and exclusion in relation to
contemporary humanitarianism. According to Agamben, the humanitarian apparatus can only understand the human life as bare life as a result of the separation of the rights of man and the rights of a citizen. Consequently, the separation of humanitarianism and politics is causing an isolation of the sacred life, creating exclusion. With regard to the position of refugees,
Agamben states that we must accept the term ‘refugees’ for what it is: “nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state, from the birth-nation to the man-citizen link, and that thereby makes it possible to clear the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the service of a politics in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in the figure of human rights” idem: 134). According to Agamben, the position of the refugee within the world society corresponds with that of the homo sacer, making the refugee camps an example of the earlier described state of exception “as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar
21 as it is founded solely on the state of exception)” (idem: 122). Within this “hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity” (idem: 123), the refugees are those whose bios get
rejected: the sacred life. However, when describing the refugee as homo sacer, this would not mean that the refugee is placed ‘outside’ of the society. According to Agamben, this situation cannot be simplified into a binary opposition between inside and outside. A space of loss is necessary to keep the system open. The state of exception is necessary in order for the society to exist. Therefore, Agamben describes the position of the homo sacer as ‘inclusive exclusion’ (idem: 21), as “Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion” (Agamben 1998: 11). The exclusion is necessary within the inclusive society, in order for the system to exist and be productive; hence the exclusion is inclusive (ibid.).
According to Agamben, the situation and position of the refugee is compatible with the concept of homo sacer, being inclusive excluded, caused by the rejection of the refugees’ bios. He claims that the world leaders justify the ‘inclusive exclusion’ by the invention of the crisis (Agamben 1998: 77; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins 2016: 3), meaning that the state of emergency sovereign states find themselves in justifies it. The narrative of an emergency opens the way towards ‘exceptional measures’ (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins 2016: 3). Therefore, crisis labeling could work misleading, as more exceptional responses are considered to be appropriate (ibid.).
Moreover, concerning human rights, Agamben argues that the so-called sacred an inalienable rights are only protected as long as the can be conceived as rights of the citizens of a state (2008: 92). Consequently, Agamben questions the principle of the sovereign nation state as the status quo: “Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus
perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable” (idem: 95). Agamben’s critique on human rights is founded upon the conviction that these fundamental and universal rights are unable to bridge gap between the position of the refugee and that of the citizen. How can it be approved that a refugee as a human being has far fewer rights than a nation-state citizen? In that sense, the conception of human rights is based upon the idea that each individual is possession of citizenship (Agamben 1998: 126; Arendt 1973: 293). Hence, these agreements on humanity, between all human beings as the international community as a whole, should not be taken for granted (Rieff 2002: 8). The international community as a world society can recommend and condemn in all its glory (idem: 32).
22 In light of Agamben’s description of the homo sacer, the concept of homo sacer has its equivalences within the position of the refugees at EU’s external borders. More specifically with regard to the disputed refugee deal between Turkey and the EU, the refugees are placed after their arrival inside the state of exception of the refugee camps, while outside of society of the EU. The eventual consequences of the fortressing refugee deal, as described by
Amnesty International and MSF, are therefore compatible with the position of homo sacer, as individuals deprived by their bios, as outlaws within the law, in times of crisis. On the
contrary, the comparison between the concept of homo sacer and the refugee lies in sharp contrast with the earlier described contemporary cosmopolitan thought. Therefore, the
upcoming analysis will address the concept of homo sacer focusing on the ambiguous tension between this inclusion and exclusion opposition.
4
Methodology
This current study has focused on how the EU-Turkey refugee deals have been legitimized through a humanitarian public discourse, focusing on the ambiguous relation between the EU as a gated community and EU’s protective ethos. The humanitarian discourse of the EU is visible in the identification of frames as a result of an analysis of the public statements and speeches of three representatives of European member states at the time: Angela Merkel, Mark Rutte and David Cameron, by the use of a frame analysis, as this method can unravel the ambiguous tension between EU’s cosmopolitan normative power and the notion of Fortress Europe. The public statements of Merkel, Rutte and Cameron in political speeches and official press conferences have been analyzed in the time period of three months, and were gathered via the official British, German and Dutch governmental websites. The analysis has been focusing on the discursive formation within the public political speech, before and after the agreement got signed on the 18th of March 2016. The frame analysis concentrated on a time period from the first of February till the end of April 2016.
4.1 Frame analysis and CDA
Frame analysis as a method is situated within the theory and method of critical discourse analysis (hereinafter: CDA). According to Fairclough public discourses can be seen as diverse representations of social life in a way of designating particular ways of representing particular aspects of social life (1995: 456). Fairclough stresses the potential impact of a discourse on
23 society when a certain discourse becomes the mainstream discourse: “A particular social structuring of semiotic difference may become hegemonic, become part of the legitimizing common sense which sustains relations of domination, though hegemony is always open to contestation to a greater or lesser extent” (ibid.). As a politician, a country’s representative at the negotiation table and leader, all three of the selected European leaders have been part of the discursive formation process. Their choices of words and storylines have, in part, constructed and reflected the position of the three EU member states that have closely invested in the creation of this controversial refugee deal. Concomitantly, this study demonstrates the construction and application of a legitimatizing humanitarian discourse within the political speech act of the three politicians mentioned earlier.
In relation to CDA Michel Foucault philosophy was groundbreaking, since his vision about discourses as a mechanism is considered to be the epistemological foundation of the CDA (Weiss & Wodak 2007: 6). Foucault studied the relation between power and knowledge production by zooming in on the continuities and discontinuities between different 'epistemes’ (Campbell 2013: 234). Foucault does not reflect on power as a purely repressive instrument, since power establishes limitations by which the social life derived part of its meaning. This productive power is what Foucault refers to as ‘disciplinary power’. For example, in the political order of discourse, the disciplinary power constructs the political subject by
limitations such as inside/outside and self/other (ibid.). Foucault examined the way issues in social life are systematically conceived and constructed, focusing on the social knowledge that underpins the thoughts of human beings. The power of discourse does not simply lie in identifying objects around us: “We must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them” (Foucault 1971: 22).
Within this process of ‘meaning-making’, Foucault focuses on the historical and political implications of text; hence his understanding of ‘discourse’ emphasizes the relationship of the text to power in all its forces (Bacchi 2000: 51). The power of the
discursive frames lies in the ability to order reality in a way as “they allow for certain ways of thinking about reality while excluding others” (Cheek 2004: 1142). Therefore, the dominant storylines, metaphors and other linguistic vehicles in public utterances, with specific regards to the refugee deal, will be taken into account in relation to identified frames which originate from the literature review. Before operationalizing these discursive frames, it is essential to establish a clear definition of a frame in the tradition of the CDA. According to Erving Goffman, frames are mental orientations that orchestrate the processes of perception and interpretation (1974: 21). The world gets framed, as social frames involve social construction
24 of social phenomenon’s, enabling people to make sense of the world around them. Within this logic of frames as the ‘schemata of interpretation’ (ibid.), Gitlin elaborates on Goffman’s reading on the frame as a mechanism, linking the concept of frame directly to the production of a discourse (1980: 7). Therefore, the following section will operationalize the distinguished frames in relation to the earlier described literature.
4.2 Operationalization
The frame analysis will be attentive to both the confirming and opposing statements of the three representatives towards the humanitarian discourse. There is a solemnly linguistic focus since the analysis is carried out on the direct documentation of the politician’s original
political speeches. The literature review of this interpretive qualitative study is functioning as the theoretical lens during the analysis of the sample, in order to distinguish a clear selection of linguistic outings. Eventually, three themes are selected as a result of the interaction between theoretical lens regarding the ambiguous tension between the contemporary cosmopolitan thought and the notion of Fortress Europe and the political speech on the EU-Turkey refugee deal. After identifying the three main frames, the findings and the theory were brought together, on which this study has been able to draw its conclusions.
More specifically, the first frame will be built upon EU’s earlier described protective ethos, in combination with the EU’s desire to form a coherent unit. Central within this frame stands EU’s willingness to reach out to others with a helping hand. EU’s normative power, based upon the contemporary cosmopolitan thought as described in the literature review; the willingness to help as a unified transnational actor with regard to EU’s protective ethos. In relation to this first frame, the second frame is built upon the usage of the humanitarian language. The humanitarian intentions behind the EU-Turkey refugee deal will be discussed, in combination with that information which in excluded from the public speeches. Lastly, the opposition of inclusion/exclusion will act as the third frame. This third frame will consists out of the positioning of the refugee by the politicians. The concept of homo sacer as described by Agamben, will be compared with the position of the refugee. This last frame is going to outline how the political speech of Cameron, Merkel and Rutte reveal the opposition between exclusion and inclusion in relation to the position of the refugee at EU’s external border as the outlaw within the law, the sacred men.
Furthermore, it is also essential to stress the limitations of the chosen methods of CDA. Foremost, this qualitative study on the discursive formation within political speech is subjective, and therefore sensitive to influences of the subjective leanings of the researcher
25 (Bryman 2012: 392-393). While it is rather problematic to aim for pure value-free and
objective qualitative research (Smith 2004: 498), the quotes of Merkel, Rutte and Cameron have been incorporated in the analysis chapter in order to establish a transparent overview of the procedure of interpretation. While the actual analysis have been carried out on the quotes in the original language of English, German and Dutch, the quotations of Merkel and Rutte have therefore been carefully translated to assure the readability of the thesis, assembling an understandable English overview of the process. Moreover, both the translations and all of the speeches have been adjusted in the appendix. By doing so, I hope to offer enough insight in this research, while being aware of the subjective position of the researcher within this interpretative qualitative study.
Lastly, operationalizing the process of legitimation in public discourse, Van Leeuwen and Wodak describe the authorization legitimation (1999: 104). This kind of process of legitimation is in reference to authority, as an overarching order. This authority does not automatically have to be an individual political leader, but could be generated by a moral or legal order. Within the logic of this kind of legitimation, something is considered to be legitimate simply because it is ‘said to be so’ (ibid.). In addition, a specific form of authorization legitimation is the conformity legitimation, in which the normality lexis is considered to be a powerful tool (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 105). The power of the majority is protected on the basis of what is considered to be ‘normal’, safeguarding the absolute values. This kind of legitimation is less common according to Van Leeuwen and Wodak (ibid.). However, in its relation to the power of absolute values in order to establish legitimacy within a society, this process of legitimation is found to be helpful in this current study.
4.3 Positioning the sample
Before carrying out the actual analysis, it is essential to elaborate on the choice of the three EU politicians that have been chosen as a sample, in order to generate understanding of the context and their specific position in it. The sample of this current study is based upon the role EU’s member states’ representatives had in the process towards the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey. While the EU leaders of the member states do not possess the full discursive agency, due to the growing complexity on the globalized and institutionalized stage of world politics that provides many other forms of political participation and sources of legitimacy, they are at any rate partially responsible for justifying the top-down policies imposed from Brussels in their home countries. Consequently, the statements of the three representatives of
26 the EU member states should not automatically be generalized on the whole union “since there are often many stakeholders involved, policy discourses are characterized by multiple storylines communicating competing truths” (ibid.). Rather than the single version of the ‘ultimate truth’ (Smith 2004: 511), this analysis shows one of the dominant readings by three EU leaders towards the EU-Turkey refugee deal.
Locating the three chosen politicians, David Cameron as the prime minister of the United Kingdom could be considered as a controversial choice, in light of the UK’s absence in the ratification of the Schengen agreement in combination with the latest Brexit. However, Theresa May stated in her speech after the informal European Council in Malta this February:
They warmly welcomed our ambition to build a new partnership between Britain and the European Union that is in the interests of both sides. They also welcomed the recognition that we in Britain want to see a strong and successful European Union, because that is in our interests and the interests of the whole world (06-02-2017, May)
Moreover, May has announced that more funds will be available to collectively tackle the refugee crisis, pledging 30 million of new aid for “the most vulnerable refugees” in for example Greece and the Balkans (ibid.). And even though it is inescapable to argue that the diplomatic and political relations between the UK and its former EU member states have fundamentally changed over the last year as a result of the EU referendum, there has not been a change within the implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal due to the British
abandonment of the EU. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the diplomatic changes of the past year.
At last, it is worthy to mention that despite attempts to gain access to the official refugee deal, the EU has unfortunately not given permission to analyse the official document. Whether this is an example of bad luck, what seems unlikely due to several attempts on my behalf, or a judgement call in order to restore the status quo, it seems unfortunate that this current study is now compelled to be partly based upon secondary material such as press releases and communication reports.
27
5
Analysis
The following chapter is devoted to examining the public statements, speeches and press conferences of three democratically chosen representatives of EU member states, in the time period of February till April 2016. The findings of the frame analysis are organised in three main frames that are built upon the earlier outlined literature review. The first frame consists of references to EU’s protective ethos and (dis)unity. Within the second frame, the
humanitarian language on preventing crime and casualties is discussed, followed by the third frame that consists of the opposition of inclusion/exclusion. At the end of the thesis, all three discursive frames will come together at the conclusion.
5.1 EU’s protective ethos and (dis) unity
This following section is going to deconstruct the usage of the temporary cosmopolitan thought in relation to EU’s normative power within the public political speech of Rutte, Merkel and Cameron.
In public speeches, both Merkel and Rutte are referring to the international norms within the EU:
We have expressed our expectations and we expect, that the democratically
development will be continued, that the rights will be respected and the fundamental freedoms like the freedom of press are assured. For sure we will continue the
dialogues about these topics. (Merkel 2016a)
You all know the principle, which we emanate from, that says that migrants, which arrive on the Islands in Greece, will be sent back to Turkey. It has been important in the negotiations, that this will happen with all the international standards and therefore it will be necessary to stick with principles. Every single person will be registered and every application for asylum will be individually edited. This is recorded in the EU-Turkey agreement being in accordance with the EU procedures directive in
cooperation with the UNHCR (Merkel 2016a).
Then everyone can see that that of course, is not a situation that we can regard as acceptable with each other (Rutte 2016a)
28 The importance of fundamental freedoms and the process of democratisation are dominating in these public statements of Rutte and Merkel. According to Merkel, it could be expected of the EU to respect the fundamental freedoms, as it is important: ‘to stick with principles’ (Merkel 2016a). In correspondence to Merkel’s trust in the EU to deal with the crisis at EU’s external borders while respecting the fundamental principles of EU’s own foundation, Rutte is referring to the severe situation in the refugee camps as something Europe cannot collectively acknowledge as acceptable circumstances. These quotes demonstrate how the political speech of the European leaders prevail at times the tendency of sketching a picture of a social
responsible and righteous Europe. The EU leaders directly and indirectly refer to the
fundamental rights, such as the second article of the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union 2007). This dominant image of the EU is referred to in these statements as something that could be taken for granted, just because it can be expected of the EU to care about the marginalised. However, with regard to EU’s normative power in relation to itself and the world society, there has been critique on the international representation of the EU as normative power as described by Manners (2002: 252). Different scholars reaffirm the gap between EU’s rhetoric and reality, as a result of for example EU’s lacking efforts to address or sanction human rights violations by Israel (Bouris 2011: 100; Pace 2007: 1056-1058). More specifically, with regard to the refugee crisis at EU’s external borders, Bulley argues that the politics of protection underlying the EU’s migration and asylum policy is primarily focused on the EU member states rather than protecting the refugees (2017: 52). Since the normative power of the EU is not undisputed, treating it as self-evident could be found presumptuous.
In addition, emphasis is placed on the willingness of Europe to help. Not surprisingly, all three politicians do not openly show any doubts regarding EU’s affability as a result of their values and commitments to each other and ‘the rest’. The EU ‘must’ therefore help those who are suffering, and is undoubtedly going to:
The Netherlands is willing to help. Europe is willing to help, many other countries. And importantly thereby is of course also the humanitarian aid that must be granted on this moment, because at the Western Balkans there are things happening that of course do not currently fit into a European framework, that we really must see to achieve next week, that will also have big humanitarian consequences on what we have seen so far, the scenes we have seen last Wednesday at that border. And that are, once again, no scenes we want in Europe (Rutte 2016a)
